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84th Congress, 2nd Session..... House Document No. 477, Vol. XV

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957

Volume XV

Arab-Israeli Dispute January 1– July 26, 1956

Editor in Chief John P. Glennon

Editor Carl N. Raether

United States Government Printing Office
Washington
1989

H920-9

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 9689

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

Preface

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.

b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.

c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.

d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.

e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government.

The Center, in coordination with geographic bureaus of the Department of State, conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

Carl N. Raether of the Office of the Historian compiled this volume under the supervision of John P. Glennon. Paul Claussen provided planning and direction and Nina J. Noring conducted the initial editorial review. Edward C. Keefer assisted in final preparation for publication. Lynn Chase and Bret D. Bellamy prepared the lists of sources, names, and abbreviations.

Rita M. Baker performed the technical editing. The Twin Oaks Indexing Collective prepared the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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Department of State

1. *Indexed Central Files.* Papers in the indexed central files of the Department for the years 1955–1957 are indicated by a decimal file number in the first footnote. The following are among the most useful of these files for the preparation of this volume: 120.1580, 396.1–GE, 474.008, 601.0084A, 611.61, 611.74, 611.80, 611.84A, 645W.74322, 674.84A, 684A.85322, 684A.86, 774.00, 774.5–MSP, 774.56, 780.5, 784A.5274, 786.00, and 874.2614

2. *Lot Files.* Documents from the central files have been supplemented by lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the lot files used in or consulted for this volume follows:

Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95

Collection of documentation on official visits by ranking foreign officials and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1949–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627

Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1953–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1955-1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

INR–NIE Files

Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

IO Files: Lot 71 D 440

Master files of classified records and correspondence of United States delegations to sessions of the U.N. General Assembly for the years 1945–1965, as maintained by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518

Top Secret records pertaining to the Near East, and in particular to Project Alpha and the Anderson Mission, for the years 1954–1957, as maintained by the Office

of Near Eastern Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA Files: Lot 58 D 722

Files maintained by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs for the years 1954–1956, relating to the Middle East Watch.

NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 246

Documentation on the Jordan Valley Mission for 1955, as maintained by the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254

Files for 1954–1955 pertaining to the Eric Johnston Mission and for 1945–1963 concerning the Jordan Valley Waters (Yarmuk) Project, as maintained by the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA/IAI Files: Lot 72 D 438

Miscellaneous Top Secret records concerning the Middle East for the years 1955–1964, as maintained by the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments for the years 1953–1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75

Chronological collections of the minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Meetings during the years 1952–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417

See State–JCS Meetings.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat for the years 1947–1963.

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

Top Secret records of meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State for the years 1951–1959 and selected problem

files on the Middle East for the years 1954–1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

UNP Files: Lot 58 D 224

Miscellaneous country and subject files relating to political issues before the United Nations for the years 1943–1956, including the Collective Measures Committees, Palestine, and Suez, as retired by the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

UNP Files: Lot 59 D 237

Subject files of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs for the years 1946–1957.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Dulles Papers

Records of John Foster Dulles, 1952–1959, including General Memoranda of Conversation, Meetings with the President, General Telephone Conversations, and White House Telephone Conversations.

President's Daily Appointments Record

Records of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, Daily Appointments, 1953–1961.

White House Office Files

Several White House office collections, including files of the Office of the Staff Secretary, and Project "Clean Up."

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, maintained by his personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: the Name Series, the Dulles–Herter Series, Eisenhower (DDE) Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, the Administration Series, and the International File.

Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey

Dulles Papers, Dulles Daily Appointment Book

Daily log of the meetings and appointments of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for the years 1953–1959.

List of Abbreviations

Editor's Note: This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

A, airgram
AA, Anti-Aircraft
Achdut Haavoda, Israeli Socialist Labor Party
ACSP, Arab Collective Security Pact
AFSC, American Friends Service Committee
AKA, Attack Cargo Vessel
AL, Arab League or Arab Legion (Transjordan)
ALCSP, Arab League Collective Security Pact
ALO, series indicator for military telegrams
AmEmb, American Embassy
AMS, Agricultural Marketing Services, Department of Agriculture
AP, Associated Press; Atlantic Pact
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARAMCO, Arabian-American Oil Company
ARMATT, Army Attaché
ASRP, Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party (Syrian)
B/D, barrels of petroleum per day
BG, David Ben Gurion
BIS, Bank of International Settlements
BJSM, British Joint Services Mission or British Joint Staff Mission
BMEO, British Middle East Office
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
BSFMC, Bilateral San Francisco Memorandum of Conversation
CA, circular airgram
CARE, Cooperative for American Remittances to Everywhere
CASU, Cooperative Association of Suez Canal Users
CCS, Combined Chiefs of Staff
CE, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army; Central Europe; Council of Europe; Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State
CF, Conference File
CHMAAG, Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIA/LC, Central Intelligence Agency, Legislative Counsel
CINCAL, Commander in Chief, Alaska
CINCARIB, Commander in Chief, Caribbean
CINCFE, Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, Atlantic
CINCNELM, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCONAD, Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCSAC, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

CINCUSAFE, Commander in Chief, United States Air Force, Europe
CINCUSAREUR, Commander in Chief, United States Army in Europe
circ, circular telegram
cirtel, circular telegram
com, communications
comite, committee
CONAD, Continental Air Defense Command
CONADR, Continental Air Defense Command Regulation
ConGen, Consulate General
Contel, Consulate telegram
CRO, Commonwealth Relations Office
CS, Chief of Staff
CSA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
CSAFM, Chief of Staff, Air Force Memorandum
CSS, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture
CVA, Attack Aircraft Carrier
CVS, Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft Carrier
CX, Army telegram designator
CZ, Canal Zone
DA, Development Assistance
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DD, Destroyer
DEFREPARMA, Defense Representative Army Attaché
Del, Delegation
Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly; also used to refer to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
Dento, series indicator for telegrams sent from the Denver White House
Depcirgram, Department of State circular airgram
Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram
Deptel, Department of State telegram
desp, despatch
DEW, Distant Early Warning
DIB, Defense Intelligence Briefing
DirGen, Director General
DL, Demarcation Line
DRN, Division of Research for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Department of State
DRS, Division of Research for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Department of State
DRW, Division of Research for Western Europe, Department of State
Dulte, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
DZ, Demilitarized Zone
E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
EARIS, Egyptian-American Rural Improvement Service
ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration
E–I, Egyptian-Israeli
EIMAC, Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission
E.J., Eric Johnston
Embdesp, Embassy despatch
Embtel, Embassy telegram
ES, Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly
ES–I, First Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly
ESS, Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Pact
ETW, Eden Talks, Washington
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EURATOM, European Atomic Energy Community
EXIM Bank, Export-Import Bank
FAF, French Air Force
FAO, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FAS, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FinAtt, Financial Attaché
FLO, Foreign Liaison Office
FN, Division of Financial Affairs, Department of State
F.O., Foreign Office
FOA, Foreign Operations Administration
FonMin, Foreign Minister; Foreign Ministry
FonOff, Foreign Office

FPSC, Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee
FRC, Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate
FSD, Division of Fuels, Department of State
FTC, Federal Trade Commission
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State
G–2, Army (or Marine) general staff section dealing with intelligence at the divisional level or higher
GA, United Nations General Assembly
GAA, General Armistice Agreement
Gadel, series indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
GHQ, General Headquarters
GMT, Greenwich mean time
GOE, Government of Egypt
GOI, Government of Israel; Government of India
GOL, Government of Lebanon
GOS, Government of Syria
GSA, General Services Administration
H, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Department of State
Herut (Tenuat Haherut), Israeli political party
HICOM, High Commission(er)
Histradut, General Federation of Jewish Labor in Israel
HJK, Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom
HJK–IMAC, Jordanian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission
HKJ, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
HM, His/Her Majesty
HMG, His/Her Majesty's Government
HQ, Headquarters
IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IC, Division of International Conferences, Department of State
ICA, International Cooperation Administration
ICA/W, International Cooperation Administration, Washington
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization
ICJ, International Court of Justice
IDAB, International Development Advisory Board
IDF, Israeli Defense Forces
IDF–FLO, Israel Defense Forces–Foreign Liaison Office
I–E, Israeli-Egyptian
IEG, Imperial Ethiopian Government
IFC, International Finance Corporation
IG, Israeli Government
IIS, Israeli Intelligence Service
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INS, International News Service
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/OES, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
IO/OIA, Office of International Administration, Department of State
IPC, Iraq Petroleum Company
IRD, International Resources Division, Department of State
ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs or the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; also Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
ISMAC, Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Jlem, Jerusalem
JSPC, Joint Strategic Plans Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSSC, Joint Strategic Survey Committee
Jugs, Yugoslavs
JVP, Jordan Valley Plan; Jordan Valley Proposal
K, kilometer
kw, kilowatt
L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/E, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State
L/NEA, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
LE, Egyptian pounds
Leb, Lebanon

Lon, London
MA, Military Attaché
MAAC, Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC, Mixed Armistice Commission
MAG, Military Advisory Group
Mapai, Israeli Labor Party
Mapam, Israeli United Workers' Party
MATS, Military Air Transport Service
MC, Memorandum of Conversation; Office of Munitions Control, Department of State
MCM, Milliard Cubic Meters
MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance
MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
ME, Middle East
MEEC, Middle East Emergency Committee
MEPPG, Middle East Policy Planning Group
MinDef, Minister or Ministry of Defense
MinFonAff, Minister or Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MP, Member of Parliament (United Kingdom)
MSA, Mutual Security Agency/Act/Assistance
MSP, Mutual Security Program
MSTS, Military Sea Transport Service
mytel, my telegram
NAC, North Atlantic Council; National Advisory Council
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NE, Near East; Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
NEA, Near East and Africa; Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
NEACC, Near East Arms Coordinating Committee
NH, Note to Holders
Niact, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NIC, National Indications Center
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
Noforn, not releasable to foreign nationals
NSC, National Security Council
NUP, National Unionist Party of Sudan
NZ, New Zealand
O, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
OCB, Operations Coordinating Board
ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization
OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OFD, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State
ONE, Office of National Estimates, Department of State
ORM, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Department of State
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSP, Offshore Procurement
PAO, Public Affairs Officer
PCC, Palestine Conciliation Commission
PIO, Public Information Officer
PL, Public Law
PLG, Paris Liaison Group
PM, Prime Minister
PMCG (NY), preparations for the Meeting of the Chiefs of Government (New York)
POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants
Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the Office of the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council to the Department of State
POM (NY) MC, preparations for the October Meetings (of the Foreign Ministers) (New York) Memorandum of Conversation
PPS, Parti Populaire Syrien, Syrian National Party
PriMin, Prime Minister
PTS, proposed talks with the Soviets
R, Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State
R&D, Research and Development
RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State
RAF, Royal Air Force
RCC, Revolutionary Command Council of Egypt
RCT, Regimental Combat Team
reftel, reference telegram
Res, Resolution
RGT, Army Regimental Combat Team
RLG, Rome Liaison Group
RMA, Reimbursable Military Assistance

RO, Reports and Operations Staff of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S, Office of the Secretary of State
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
S/PV, Security Council/Procès-Verbal
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S–RO, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SA, Saudi Arabia
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SAG, Saudi Arabian Government
SC, United Nations Security Council
SCUA, Suez Canal Users Association
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEATO, South East Asia Treaty Organization
Sec, Secretary
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences
Secy, Secretary
SFIO, Société Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (French Society of International Socialists)
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOCONY, Standard Oil Company of New York
SOSUS, Sound Surveillance Underwater System
SPC, Special Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly
SPD, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party)
SS, submarine
SY, Division of Security, Department of State
SYG, Secretary-General
T/O & E, Table of Organization and Equipment
TAPLINE, Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company
TC, Truce Commission (in Palestine); United Nations Trusteeship Council
Tedul, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
Toden, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Denver White House
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences
TS, Top Secret
TSO, Truce Supervisory Organization (United Nations)
TVA, Tennessee Valley Authority
TWA, Trans World Airlines
U, Office of the Under Secretary of State
U/MSA, Office of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State
U/PR, Office of the Chief of Protocol, Department of State
UJA, United Jewish Appeal
UK, United Kingdom
UKG, United Kingdom Government
Umma, Umma (Independence) Party of Sudan
UN, United Nations
UNA, Office of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
UNEF, United Nations Emergency Force
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNMIS, United Nations Mission
UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State
UNRRA, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine and the Near East
UNSC, United Nations Security Council
UNSCOP, U.N. Special Committee on Palestine
UNSYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations
UNTS, United Nations Truce Supervisor; United Nations Treaty Series
UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization
UP, United Press
urtel, your telegram
USA, United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USAREUR, United States Army, Europe
USARMA, United States Army Attaché

USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe
USDel, United States delegation
USG, United States Government
USGADel, United States Delegation at the United Nations
USIA, United States Infomation Agency
USIS, United States Information Service
USLO, United States Liaison Officer
USMC, United States Marine Corps
USNMR, United States National Military Representatiave to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
USOM, United States Operations Mission
USRO, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations
Wafd, Egypt's principal political party
WE, Western Europe; Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
WFTU (WFTCU), World Federation of Trade Unions
WH, White House
ZI, Zone of Interior

List of Persons

Editor's Note: The identification of persons in this list is limited to circumstances and positions under reference in this volume. Historical personages alluded to in the volume and certain minor officials are not identified in this list. All titles and positions are American unless there is an indication to the contrary.

In this and in other editorial material throughout the volume (document headings, footnotes, and editorial notes), every effort has been made to provide recognizable and consistent transliterations of names of individuals from countries using non-Roman alphabets. The transliterations adopted for proper names were those commonly used by the Department of State at the time, or in documents or official publications of the countries concerned. (In the case of Arabic names, differences arise in the transliteration of vowels. The editors have generally rendered the definite article as al- rather than el-, and have omitted diacritical marks.)

Abramov (Abramav), Aleksandr N., Soviet Ambassador to Israel

Aldrich, Winthrop W., Ambassador to the United Kingdom until February 1, 1957

Allen, George V., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, January 24, 1955–July 26, 1956; Ambassador to Greece, October 12, 1956–November 13, 1957; Director, United States Information Agency, from November 15, 1957

Alphand, Hervé, Permanent Representative of France at the United Nations until August 24, 1956; Ambassador to the United States from September 10, 1956

Amer, Gen. Abdel Hakim, Egyptian Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; Minister of War and Marine; Chief Commander of the Egyptian-Syrian Joint Command from October 23, 1956

Anderson, Dillon, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, April 2, 1955–September 1, 1956; White House Consultant from June 29, 1957

Anderson, Robert B., Deputy Secretary of Defense until August 4, 1955; Special Emissary for the President to the Middle East, January–March 1956, and again in August 1956; Secretary of the Treasury from July 29, 1957

Armstrong, William P., Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, until June 16, 1957

Asbjornson, Mildred, Secretary to Secretary of State Dulles

Bailey, Ronald W., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States until October 25, 1957

Barbour, Walworth, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until November 20, 1955; Deputy Chief of Mission in the United Kingdom, November 20, 1955–February 23, 1956; thereafter Minister-Counselor of the Embassy

Barnes, Robert G., Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, June 12–August 1, 1955; Director, August 1, 1955–March 11, 1956; thereafter Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs

Ben Gurion, David, Israeli Minister of Defense from February 17, 1955; also Prime Minister from November 3, 1955

Bergus, Donald C., Officer in Charge of Israel-Jordan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State

Bernau, Phyllis D., Personal Assistant to Secretary of State Dulles

Black, Eugene R., President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

Blackiston, Slator C., Jr., Vice Consul at Jerusalem until February 9, 1956; Consul, February 9–April 8, 1956; Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, April 8, 1956–March 10, 1957; thereafter Attaché of the Embassy in Lebanon

Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to the Soviet Union until April 18, 1957; Ambassador to the Philippines from June 4, 1957

Bowie, Robert R., Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until October 18, 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, August 10, 1955–October 18, 1957; Department of State member of the National Security Council Planning Board, August 28, 1955–October 18, 1957

Brosio, Manlio, Italian Ambassador to the United States from February 3, 1955

Bulganin, Nikolai A., Soviet Minister of Defense until February 1955; Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Presidium Member of the Soviet Communist Party, and Head of Government

Burdett, William C., Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until October 9, 1955; Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, October 9, 1955–October 7, 1956; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, October 7, 1956–August 11, 1957; Acting Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, August 11–November 3, 1957; thereafter First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Burke, Adm. Arleigh A., USN, Chief of Naval Operations from August 1955

Burns, Maj. Gen. E.L.M., Canadian Army Officer; Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization until November 1956; Commander, United Nations Emergency Force, from November 1956

Byroade, Henry A., Ambassador to Egypt, March 10, 1955–September 10, 1956; Ambassador to the Union of South Africa from October 9, 1956

Caccia, Sir Harold, Deputy Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office until November 1956; Ambassador to the United States from November 9, 1956

Chamoun, Camille, President of Lebanon

Comay, Michael S., Israeli Ambassador to Canada until April 1957

Corbett, Jack C., Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State

Coulson, Sir John E., Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, until October 1955; Minister of the British Embassy in the United States from October 27, 1955

Crosthwaite, Ponsonby Moore, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations Security Council; Alternate Representative at

the General Assembly; Alternate Representative on the Disarmament Commission

Daridan, Jean Henri, Assistant Director General of Political Affairs, French Foreign Ministry, until February 1956; Assistant Director of the Cabinet of the Minister, February–July 1956; Director General of Political and Economic Affairs from July 5, 1956

Dickson, Air Marshal Sir William, Marshal of the Royal Air Force and Chairman of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee from October 25, 1955

Dillon, C. Douglas, Ambassador to France until January 28, 1957; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from March 15, 1957

Dixon, Sir Pierson John, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations

Dodds-Parker, Arthur D., British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations until December 1955; Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Relations, December 1955–January 1957

Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence

Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State

Eban, Abba, Israeli Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative at the United Nations

Eden, Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister until April 6, 1955; Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, April 6, 1955–January 10, 1957

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States

Elbrick, C. Burke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until February 14, 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Faisal, ibn al-Aziz, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister

Faisal II, King of Iraq

Fawzi, Mahmoud, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs; Chairman of the Egyptian Delegation at the United Nations and Representative at the General Assembly

Finn, Richard B., Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs after February 26, 1956

FitzGerald, Dennis A., Deputy Director for Operations, International Cooperation Administration

FitzGerald, Desmond, Central Intelligence Agency

Foster, Andrew B., Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Gay, Merrill C., Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until March 11, 1956; thereafter Special Assistant, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs

George, Walter F., Democratic Senator from Georgia until January 3, 1957; Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee until January 3, 1957; Special Ambassador to NATO, January 3–August 4, 1957; died August 4, 1957

Geren, Paul F., Counselor of the Embassy in Jordan until November 14, 1955; Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, November 15, 1955–summer 1956

Gleason, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

Glubb, Lt. Gen. Sir John Bagot, British Chief of the General Staff of the Arab Legion in Jordan until March 2, 1956

Goodpaster, Brig. Gen. Andrew J., USA, Staff Secretary and Defense Liaison Officer to the President; became Brigadier General on January 1, 1957

Graves, Sir Hubert Ashton, Minister of the British Embassy in the United States, October 5, 1955–July 2, 1956; thereafter British Foreign Office

Gray, Gordon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, July 14, 1955–February 27, 1957; Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, from March 14, 1957

Green, Theodore F., Democratic Senator from Rhode Island; Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from January 3, 1957

Gruenther, Gen. Alfred M., USA, Supreme Allied Commander, NATO, until November 1956

Hagerty, James C., Press Secretary to the President

Hammarskjöld, Dag, Secretary-General of the United Nations

Hanes, John W., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until April 1957; Staff Member, Secretary of State's Public Commission on Personnel, until 1956; Special Assistant to the U.S. Representative on the Suez Canal Conference at London (August 16–23, 1956); Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from April 8, 1957

Hare, Raymond A., Ambassador to Egypt from September 25, 1956

Harkavy, Yehoshafat, Chief of the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence Branch

Hart, Parker T., Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until June 30, 1955; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Egypt

Hayter, Sir William Goodenough, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union until January 1957; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office

Heath, Donald R., Ambassador to Lebanon from March 9, 1955

Hedding, Adm. Truman, USN, Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until August 14, 1957

Henderson, Loy W., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration from January 26, 1955

Herter, Christian A., Consultant to the Secretary of State, January 14–February 21, 1957; thereafter Under Secretary of State

Herzog, Col. Chaim, former Israeli Military, Naval, and Air Attaché of the Embassy in the United States; Commanding Officer of the Jerusalem District

Hoover, Herbert, Jr., Under Secretary of State until February 21, 1957

Howe, Fisher, Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, until March 12, 1956; thereafter Director of the Executive Secretariat

Humphrey, George M., Secretary of the Treasury

Hussein, Ahmad, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States

Hussein ibn Talal, King of Jordan

Jebb, Sir Hubert Miles Gladwyn, British Ambassador to France

Johnson, Lyndon B., Democratic Senator from Texas; Senate Majority Leader from January 3, 1955

Johnston, Eric, Chairman of the International Development Advisory Board, Foreign Operations Administration (after 1956, International Cooperation Administration)

Jones, John Wesley, Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until February 14, 1957; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Kennedy, Donald D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, from November 12, 1957

Khrushchev, Nikita S., First Secretary of the Central Commitee of the Soviet Communist Party

Kirk, Roger, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until May 5, 1957; Second Secretary of the Embassy in Italy from June 16, 1957

Kirkpatrick, Ivone A., British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Knowland, William F., Republican Senator from California; Senate Minority Leader and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Laboulaye, François de, Second Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States

Lathram, L. Wade, Politico-Economic Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, July 31, 1955–October 6, 1957; thereafter Director, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian and Regional Affairs

Lawson, Edward B., Ambassador to Israel

Lister, Ernest A., Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, July 25, 1955–May 6, 1956; Deputy Director, May 6, 1956–August 25, 1957

Lloyd, John Selwyn, British Minister of Supply until April 1955; Minister of Defense, April–December 1955; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from December 12, 1955

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., Permanent Representative at the United Nations

Lucet, Charles E., Minister-Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States from June 1955

Ludlow, James M., Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, until November 4, 1956; thereafter Acting United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs

MacArthur, Douglas II, Counselor of the Department of State until November 24, 1956; Ambassador to Japan from February 25, 1957

McCardle, Carl W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until March 1, 1957

McCormack, John W., Democratic Congressman from Massachusetts; House Majority Leader

McGuire, E. Perkins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1956–1957; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics from 1957

Macmillan, Harold M., British Minister of Defense until April 6, 1955; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, April 6–December 20, 1955; Chancellor of the Exchequer, December 20, 1955–January 10, 1957; thereafter Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury

Macomber, William B., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, January 10–November 16, 1955; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, November 16, 1955–August 15, 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations

Makins, Sir Roger M., British Ambassador to the United States until November 15, 1956

Mansfield, Mike, Democratic Senator from Montana; member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Senate Majority Whip from January 3, 1957

Martin, Joseph W., Jr., Republican Congressman from Massachusetts; House Minority Leader

Mathews, Elbert G., Member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, March 13, 1955–November 13, 1957; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning

Meir, Golda, see Myerson

Merchant, Livingston T., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until May 7, 1956; Ambassador to Canada from May 23, 1956

Mollet, Guy, Prime Minister of France, January 31, 1956–June 11, 1957

Molotov, Vyacheslav M., Soviet Foreign Minister until June 1, 1956; Chairman of the Soviet Delegation at the United Nations and Representative at the General Assembly, 1955; First Vice Chairman, Council of Ministers, until July 5, 1957; Minister of State Control, November 21, 1956–July 4, 1957; Ambassador to Mongolia from August 1957

Monckton of Brenchley, 1st Viscount (Walter Turner Monckton), British Minister of Labor and National Service until December 1955; Minister of Defense, December 1955–October 1956; Paymaster General, October 1956–January 1957

Moose, James S., Jr., Ambassador to Syria until June 30, 1957

Morris, Willie, First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States from August 1, 1955

Mosadeq, Mohammad, former Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Iran

Murphy, Robert D., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Myerson, Goldie (Meir, Golda), Israeli Minister of Labor until June 1956; Foreign Minister from June 18, 1956

Nasser (Nasr, Nassir), Col. Gamal Abdul, Egyptian Prime Minister; also President from June 24, 1956

Nehru, Jawaharlal, Indian Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs; Head of the Department of Atomic Energy

Nixon, Richard M., Vice President of the United States

Persons, Maj. Gen. Wilton B. (Jerry), USA, Deputy Assistant to the President

Phleger, Herman, Legal Adviser of the Department of State until April 1, 1957

Pineau, Christian, French Foreign Minister from February 1, 1956; President of the French Delegations at the United Nations, 1956 and 1957

Prochnow, Herbert V., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, November 7, 1955–November 11, 1956

al-Quwatli (Quwaitli, Quwatly, Kuwatly), Shukri, President of Syria from August 18, 1955

Radford, Adm. Arthur W., USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until August 14, 1957

Rayburn, Sam, Democratic Congressman from Texas; Speaker of the House of Representatives

Riad, Gen. Mahmoud, Egyptian Army; Egyptian Ambassador to Syria

Richards, James P., Democratic Congressman from South Carolina until January 3, 1957; Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee, until January 3, 1957; Special Envoy of the President to the Middle East, March–May 1957

Robertson, Reuben B., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, August 5, 1955–April 25, 1957

Rose, Michael, Head of the Levant Department, British Foreign Office, from January 17, 1955

Rountree, William M., Counselor of the Embassy in Iran with personal rank of Minister until October 9, 1955; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, October 9, 1955–July 26, 1956; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs

Rowan, Sir (Thomas) Leslie, British Second Secretary of the Treasury; Alternate Governor, Board of Governors, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Finance Corporation

Russell, Francis H., Counselor of the Embassy in Israel until May 17, 1955; Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, May 17–September 25, 1955; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, September 25, 1955–October 7, 1956

Samuel, Ian (Adrian Christopher Ian), British Foreign Office; Head of the Security Department from July 30, 1956

Saud, ibn Abd al-Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia

Sharett, Moshe, Prime Minister of Israel until November 2, 1955; also Foreign Minister until June 16, 1956

Shaw, John F., Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, July 3, 1955–September 23, 1956; thereafter Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs

Shepilov, Dimitri T., Soviet Foreign Minister, June 1, 1956–February 15, 1957; Chairman of the Soviet Delegation at the United Nations, 1956

Shiloah, Reuven, Minister of the Israeli Embassy in the United States

Shuckburgh, Charles Arthur Evelyn, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, until June 25, 1956

Smith, H. Alexander, Republican Senator from New Jersey; member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Stassen, Harold E., Special Assistant to the President from March 22, 1955; Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission from August 2, 1955; Director of the Foreign Operations Administration and Chairman of the Foreign Operations Council, Foreign Operations Administration, until June 30, 1955; also member of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, 1955

Stevenson, Adlai, Democratic Candidate for President, 1952 and 1956

Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., USA, Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Far East, and the 8th U.S. Army, Far East Command, until March 1955; Commander in Chief, Far East Command, April–June 1955; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, from June 30, 1955

Templer, Sir Gerald, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff

Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador to Austria until July 9, 1957; Ambassador to the Soviet Union from July 16, 1957

Trevelyan, Sir Humphrey, British Ambassador to Egypt from August 1955

Tunner, Gen. William H., USAF, Commander in Chief of the United States Air Forces, Europe

Twining, Gen. Nathan F., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force until June 30, 1957; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from August 15, 1957

Wadsworth, George E., Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

Walmsley, Arnold R., British Consul at Jerusalem until April 27, 1956

Weeks, Sinclair, Secretary of Commerce

White, Gen. Thomas D., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force until June 1957; Chief of Staff from July 1, 1957

Whitman, Ann, Secretary to the President

Wilcox, Francis O., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs after September 6, 1955

Wilson, Charles E., Secretary of Defense until October 8, 1957

Wilson, Evan M., First Secretary and Consul General of the Embassy in the United Kingdom until September 1957; Adviser to the U.S. Delgation to the Suez Canal Conference at London (August 16–23, 1956), and the Suez Canal Conference at London (September 19–21, 1956)

Arab-Israeli Dispute

Continued U.S. Consideration of Funding the Aswan High Dam and the Anderson Mission, January 1–March 12, 1956

1. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, January 1, 1956—7 p.m.

1236. For Hoover. Had long talk with Nasser today as to general aspects our relations. This ranged over many matters in Middle East as whole, including Arab-Israeli situation. While I found talk in general encouraging, in view early departure will report here only item of immediate interest which has do with High Dam.

Department may find Nasser's remarks on High Dam discouraging but consider this not totally the case. Everything Nasser said pointed up his determination make some type arrangements through Western Powers. As to specifics, Nasser made following important points:

1. Could not agree that principle of international bidding must be maintained as far as Egyptian funds concerned. Based his objection on political grounds as well as conviction that doing bulk of job through consortium (to which American addition welcome) was most expeditious and practical way of proceeding. Matter could be worked out so that all our funds, and probably great deal in addition, would actually be used under competitive bidding arrangements.

2. Conditions of World Bank, particularly those embodied in b and c of letter of intent were such that he could not accept them. [2] It

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/1–156. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:37 p.m., January 2. Repeated to London.

[2] Black handed Kaissouni the IBRD's draft letter of intent on December 17. In paragraphs b and c of the letter, the IBRD specifically asked the Egyptian Government to pledge that:

"(b) the Government's own contribution to the project will be provided in such a way as to avoid inflation and impairment of Egypt's creditworthiness. To this end, the

(Continued)

did not matter so much to him that Western oriented or trained businessmen might see these as logical, or that even he might be convinced of their reasonableness. Documents would become published and they would simply say on their face to public opinion here that Egypt had surrendered its sovereignty and independence in economic and financial fields to World Bank. He talked at length as to why Egyptians are unusually sensitive, in view their history, to matters involving large foreign debt. Foreign debts handled in past during lifetime present population to foreign domination. He pointed to huge debt contracted by Ismail and foreign control which resulted therefrom.[3] This control extended deep into Egypt's sovereignty even including matters such as customs control.

However, Nasser said he quite realized bank must have safeguards upon its investment. He thought perhaps wording could be found which would protect bank's interests without giving it veto power over practically all phases Egyptian economy. If this could not be done he faced with great dilemma as he felt himself in very bad position to either reject or accept present letter of intent. If he accepted letter as it stood he might gain $200 million but he greatly feared reaction would be such that in long run he would lose far more. He talked in this connection of his own parliament soon to be established and of situation where press was already endeavoring find out what conditions West has attached. (In this connection John Hightower story today will be most unhelpful.)[4] He also mentioned Communist literature beginning to appear saying Western conditions are such Egypt will be completely dominated by West if bank's conditions are accepted. On other hand he greatly feared complete misunderstanding with West if he rejected bank proposal. He had been particularly upset (this has been confirmed other sources) by hearing indirectly word attributable to Embassy that in such case there would be those in West who would conclude that GOE effort obtain assistance from West was only sham and for purpose of clarifying record. He did not feel he could afford such complete distortion of position of Egypt which had worked patiently with

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(Continued)
Government and the Bank will reach an understanding on, and will periodically review, an investment program which will recognize the priority of the High Dam project and the need for adjusting total public expenditures to the financial resources which can be mobilized;

"(c) the Government will not incur obligations in respect of foreign debt, including suppliers' credits, in excess of amounts mutually agreed by Egypt and the Bank from time to time to be prudent in the light of Egypt's circumstances, and will consult with the Bank before undertaking any such obligations". (*Ibid.*, 874.2614/12–1655)

[3] Reference is to Ismail, who became the Ottoman Empire's governor of Egypt in 1863.

[4] For text, see *The Washington Evening Star*, January 2, 1956, p. 1.

IBRD and Western consortium over long period in anticipation that job would be done by West.

Nasser said he could see only two ways out. One was change in bank letter of intent which would make it politically acceptable in Egypt. This was by far his preferred course as he would like see program for entire project worked out prior to proceeding. He feared however this might prove impossible in short run. If this case he concluded due his fear Western misunderstanding that it would be better to leave World Bank out of project initially with its eventual participation to be worked out as soon as possible and perhaps under better conditions all around. This would mean that Egypt, with such assistance as US and UK and perhaps consortium itself could provide, would undertake first phase of work. This he thought not too illogical as completion of first stage would in itself bring benefits to Egypt in form of some increase in irrigation. He realized however that at present time assistance of US, UK and bank were all interwoven. Could they be separated with hope that World Bank could enter picture in second phase? If conditions were such that bank participation could not be worked out, he would then most probably conclude that second phase should nevertheless be undertaken by Egypt with time limit for completion perhaps doubled or even tripled. This certainly not in interests of Egypt, yet he felt it probably preferable course to attempting accept World Bank conditions as they now stand.

Told Nasser I could give him no assurance whatsoever this plan might be acceptable in Washington. Stated it had been as much a part of our thinking as his that entire project should be mapped out prior to initiation. Our preference for assistance was loan from IBRD to be supplemented as feasible by government funds. I feared Washington might feel we were becoming indirectly committed to entire project with no real assurance that bank loan might eventually be made possible. He countered by saying that after all bank had planned to enter first stage in supervisory capacity only and without any responsibility for loans during that period. What was difference between his approach and that which would have been case if some months ago he had simply asked that we divert our economic assistance to High Dam, which Egyptians would initiate under Western contract?

Told him I also thought would be asked question in Washington [5] as to whether under this method of procedure we might be

[5] The Department informed Byroade on December 27 that the Alpha project was undergoing intensive reexamination and instructed him "to come to Washington on consultation arriving here January 3 or 4." (Telegram 1345 to Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/12–2755) Byroade returned to Cairo on February 11. (Telegram 1836 to Cairo, February 8; *ibid.*, 123–Byroade, Henry A.)

contributing to project in which portion of work and materials would be allocated to Eastern bloc. He replied that he would give us categoric assurance on this point if we could agree to separation of project into phases and principle of negotiated contract with consortium arrangement. In this manner he could assure us that all work and materials would be allotted to West. He called Helmy on the phone in my presence and got confirmation that this would be plan. I asked what would happen if Soviet bloc were to offer transmission cable, pumping stations, etc., at much below Western prices. He replied that he certain we could be adequately assured on this point and that all this could be arranged through consortium. Stated his plan more foolproof than ours in this regard. Under the concept of international competition he already had a problem as one of the Eastern countries was trying to compete on preliminary contract now under consideration for roads and housing. If matter could be done through consortium he would have answer to this question. If it a question of international competition how was he to handle this sort of thing?

While I held out no hope to Nasser of such major shift in arrangements believe on first analysis Nasser's suggestion holds certain advantages as well as disadvantages. Hope Department will give this every consideration in order assure ourselves we have made best effort possible meet local conditions. Will withhold further comment until arrival.

For London Embassy: Trevelyan asked if you could show copy this message to him as he has shown me his of talk with Nasser same subject.

Byroade

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2. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, January 2, 1956—7 p.m.

667. When the Foreign Minister asked me to see him Friday, December 30, he dwelt at length and with some emphasis on the serious position in which Israel finds itself with regard to its

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/1–256. Secret. Received at 7:33 a.m., January 3. Repeated to Paris and London.

inability to in any way meet the strong air superiority of Egypt. It seemed obvious to me that not only Sharett but the GOI are finding this insoluble problem a highly disturbing factor in the determination of Israel's foreign policy. From other sources we have heard that this problem has created an attitude approaching panic in some quarters and that Ben Gurion is getting extremely nervous and upset over it.

Although Sharett led up to the subject casually it undoubtedly was the principal theme of his discussion with me. He underscored the tremendous disadvantage which Israel was facing and the almost complete lack of defensive facilities to meet Egyptian jet air threats with wide-open bombing of Israel cities by Egypt a distinct possibility. Considering the immediate situation and a possibility of meeting it partially, both from a factual and psychological viewpoint, he introduced the subject of the twelve Mystere IV planes on order with the French and delivery of which had been temporarily delayed. He spent considerable time emphasizing the importance of receiving even this small number of planes and the gist of his comment is as follows:

Israel had negotiated with the French and actually had a contract with them for purchase of Mystere IVs. Sharett understood that these were to come from an off-shore procurement production total and unless the US could authorize their delivery by the French the earliest date Israel could expect to receive them would be July 1956. The French authorities had implied that the decision for delivery rested entirely with US Government, and the French were prepared to make delivery without delay. Sharett referred to the fact that two months had passed since the first shipment of 15 MIGs had arrived in Egypt and he was not sure how many more had been delivered, but the Egyptians were now in a position to have trained their pilots in their use. Meanwhile, Israel could not consider training their pilots on a comparable plane until July if the present hold up on the French contract continued. Sharett had explained to me that Israel could not hope to match Egypt quantitatively in planes—that if Egypt received 100 MIGs it was not Israel's expectation to receive necessarily 100 planes of equivalent value. But, Israel must have units of the same quality, making up for quantitative disparity to some extent by greater courage and technical ability of the Israeli pilots. Sharett was very hopeful something might be done to expedite delivery these planes, and he made point Israel had never used planes of any kind in any act of retaliation.

The following day Sharett sent Herzog to the residence to reemphasize the over-all importance of this problem and to urge most favorable consideration by US Government of indicating to French Government its willingness to have such planes released. Herzog said

it was impossible to overestimate the psychological benefit of even the knowledge that the United States was willing in the near future to express its agreement in this matter. Even confidential advance knowledge to Sharett that we were thinking favorably along this line would be extremely helpful and would have a beneficial effect on the present discouraged government seeking means of meeting in part at least this critical and desperate danger to the country's very life.

Herzog informed me that even if the twelve Mysteres were delivered that in actual practice only about eight of them would be available for military use at any one time thus further reducing the extent to which Israel could meet the Egyptian threat. He said the French manufacturer was prepared to increase its production to the point where it could deliver these twelve planes and yet meet its original delivery scheduled by the first of June. The GOI believes that the French have applied to the United States for release of these planes to Israel and awaits US Government reply.

I believe that Sharett appreciates that no positive action of this kind can be taken until after the Security Council resolution on the Kinneret raid of December 11 has been debated.[2] And he knows that the related subject of US policy with regard to Israel's arms request also must be considered. However, I feel that he believes that the GOI has made a sober reappraisal of the Kinneret raid, that it is unlikely similar Israeli action would be taken under similar conditions in the future, and in the future broader political sources will be consulted as well as the usual military sources. Although Sharett did not condemn his government for the Kinneret action it seemed obvious to me that he regarded it as a severe blunder and one which has brought about among Israeli leaders some serious second thoughts which should be effective in producing a much more cautious policy.

Lawson

[2] See the editorial note, vol. XIV, p. 854.

3. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Robert Anderson, Washington, January 3, 1956, 4:32 p.m. [1]

TELEPHONE CALL TO ROBERT ANDERSON

Anderson said he talked to all but one partner. He thinks he is reasonably clear. Sec. said there are one or two things we would like to do here, and guess is we can start to move ahead. Hoover is with him and we should think about letting the British know [2] in a general way we are planning some action here. We may start to break it gently to them now. The Sec. asked when A. would really be able to plunge into it. A. will talk to the third partner, and will come down tomorrow afternoon and spend a couple of days; go back to New York, and in a couple of days be ready. Sec. said between us and the President we will deal with the third partner if there is any trouble.

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Bernau.

[2] Dulles informed Makins of Anderson's impending mission on January 5. See Document 5.

4. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, January 4, 1956—9 p.m.

675. General Burns called on me yesterday afternoon at his request following luncheon given by Canadian Ambassador [2] which we both attended. Burns said he desired to bring me up to date regarding his appraisal of recent developments in area.

Relative to Nitzana situation he felt a stalemate had been reached with neither party willing give unconditional agreement to three point program. He intended therefore to recommend to UN Secretary General this approach be abandoned and efforts be redirected at obtaining compliance by both parties with provisions of armistice agreement.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/1–456. Confidential. Received at 10:43 p.m., January 7. Repeated to Jerusalem, Cairo, London, and Damascus.

[2] T.W.L. MacDermot.

Regarding Gaza situation he intended renew his efforts obtain cooperation of Israel Government in keeping their patrols 500 meters behind armistice line and expressed opinion if he could accomplish this the Egyptians would agree to eliminate any military positions which they had within similar distance from line.

General Burns said he had concluded things were moving toward general hostilities between Israel and Egypt. He believed Nasser was too smart to launch war against Israel until he was prepared which Burns thought would take two or three years but did not appear as certain the officers under Nasser would exercise same restraint. He referred to common belief GOI estimates June as point when Egypt will be prepared to utilize new arms. He thought there was good chance the Israelis would precipitate matters in coming months. In view of foregoing Burns was interested in ascertaining what consideration had been given by UK and US to employment of sanctions against Israel and whether any measures were contemplated to warn Israel of measures tripartite powers would adopt in case of hostilities. . . .

General Burns also made reference to Banat Yaacov question, saying, "I am not so sure I share General Bennike's[3] view the question of military advantage was involved in this issue".

In the course of this conversation we made the following comments to General Burns:

1. Believed Israelis at the moment were principally preoccupied with Egypt's impending preponderance air power and effect it would have on Israel's defensibility. Did not believe any decision for preventive action had been taken but it was probable if air problem not solved in near future pressures in Israel would reach point where government would find it necessary consider possibility preventive action. In any event there were several issues between Egypt and Israel with explosive possibilities which could easily develop into large scale hostilities without premeditation. Embassy agreed Banat Yaacov was one of these issues. Israelis believed they had done their full part along peaceful lines in this regard; that issue was unresolved because of political factors and GOI was publicly committed to recommence work this spring. In view public temper it was unlikely GOI could avoid discharging its obligation. Furthermore Mapam Party which within Cabinet was moderate force on most Arab issues was strongly in favor of Banat Yaacov project.

2. Embassy had no information regarding contemplated sanctions but pointed out likelihood in event hostilities developed it

[3] Major General Vagn Bennike, Burns' predecessor as Chief of Staff, U.N. Truce Supervision Organization.

would be under circumstances making it very difficult to place responsibility.

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Lawson

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5. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 5, 1956 [1]

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Sir Roger Makins
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Merchant

During the course of a call on another subject this morning, Sir Roger told the Secretary that he would be interested in the information that Mr. Russell had given a member of his staff that the US was considering the use of an intermediary in the Arab-Israeli matter. [2] The Secretary said that this was true and that such consideration was based on a hint which had come indirectly to us that the use of a covert intermediary might advance our purposes in Alpha. He went on to say that one or two men were under consideration for the assignment but that no one had yet been selected. He hoped to be able to inform Sir Roger of our choice in the near future. He added that the operation of course would be in the framework of our agreed Alpha policy.

Sir Roger seemed entirely satisfied, particularly in light of the information that it was intended that any such operation would be covert.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 16. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Merchant.

[2] See vol. XIV, footnote 3, p. 888.

The Secretary then inquired what the British were doing in Jordan. Sir Roger replied that he thought they were holding off. The King was steady and anxious to produce a spell of quiet. [3] . . .

. . . . . .

[3] On December 6, General Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, accompanied by Michael Rose of the British Foreign Office, arrived in Amman for discussions with King Hussein and Jordanian officials. The visit, which lasted until December 14, was motivated primarily by British desire to facilitate Jordan's early adherence to the Baghdad Pact. On December 14, Prime Minister Said al-Mufti and four members of his cabinet resigned in protest over the British proposals. On December 14, Hussein asked Haza al-Majali, a proponent of the Baghdad Pact, to form a new government. Demonstrations against the new government and the Baghdad Pact broke out on December 18 in Amman, Jericho, and Hebron and forced al-Majali to resign on December 19. Hussein, in turn, issued a decree dissolving Parliament and calling for a general election within 4 months. The King also asked Ibrahim Hashim, President of the Senate, to form a caretaker government to rule until the new elections. On December 20, Hashim announced formation of a new cabinet, and the riots ceased.

6. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State [1]

Paris, January 5, 1956—4 p.m.

3073. French Ministry Defense officials have approached Embassy on several occasions, independently of Foreign Office (Embtel 2929 [2]), urging prompt reply to French request for United States concurrence to sale of Mysteres to Israel. They state there is a contractual commitment to deliver such planes. While this confirms Sharett statement reference contract (Tel Aviv telegram 667 to Department [3]) it is not clear whether contract with firm or government.

Embassy has informed Defense officials that since French request made at political level any reply transmitted to Embassy will be delivered to Foreign Office. In view last sentence Deptel 2389 [4] question of Ambassadorial committee not mentioned to Defense.

Maillard of Foreign Office had following explanation reference Defense Ministry's approach to Embassy:

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/1–556. Secret. Received at 3:59 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, and Rome.

[2] See vol. XIV, footnote 2, p. 884.

[3] Document 2.

[4] Vol. XIV, p. 884.

Foreign Office had asked French Defense Ministry to ascertain from the Embassy if it was technically possible to transfer 12 MDAP/OSP Mysteres IVA for delivery to Israel. If Embassy agreed this was possible from purely technical standpoint, Foreign Office, before reaching any final decision, would submit its recommendation to Ambassadorial committee for consideration. Foreign Office fully aware Foreign Ministers decision later confirmed by Ambassadorial committee that no planes or other equipment should be delivered Israel prior Security Council consideration of Lake Tiberias incident but wants only to clear ground in event Ambassadorial committee approves plane deliveries to Israel after Security Council deliberations.

Maillard emphasized that Defense Ministry's current request reference possibility transferring MDAP planes to Israel should not be interpreted as commitment United States or French Government to deliver planes to Israel. At same time if Embassy found such transfer technically impossible, French would then be relieved of political decision reference final delivery.

Maillard regretted that Sharett has apparently placed onus for delay in delivering French Mysteres on US Government (Tel Aviv telegram 667) but explained Israel must know Mysteres were to come from MDAP source and that production priorities therefore controlled by United States.

Joyce

7. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State [1]

Paris, January 5, 1956—4 p.m.

3074. Reference Embtel 3073 [2] (repeated other posts). Counselor Israeli Embassy Bendor called today to ask status French Ministry Defense request to Embassy re technical feasibility rerouting 12 MDAP/OSP Mysteres IV–A to Israel.

Bendor stated Quai d'Orsay had agreed to delivery 12 MDAP Mysteres to Israel provided US Embassy concurred such operation

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/1–556. Secret. Received at 3:53 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, and Rome.

[2] *Supra.*

was technically feasible. Quai d'Orsay reportedly told Israeli Embassy that economic section Ministry Defense had approached OSP personnel our Embassy with problem and were still awaiting reply. Though Bendor realized he would not intervene officially in matter involving US and France, Israel nevertheless hoped US could reach favorable decision soonest. Bendor added that, if delivery planes judged technically feasible by US, Quai d'Orsay had promised immediate delivery without reference to "committee of 3, 4 or 5 members Washington who consult on arms deliveries to NE".

We informed Bendor that Embassy could not differentiate between technical and political aspects involved in rerouting 12 MDAP planes and matter had been referred to Department. If Israelis wished to intervene, such intervention would be more appropriate in Washington.

He did not make reference to US decision to suspend all arms shipments to Israel pending Security Council deliberation on Lake Tiberias incident.

Joyce

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8. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, January 5, 1956—1 p.m.

676. In conversation yesterday with Embassy Counselor [2] Raphael Foreign Ministry adviser on Arab affairs said there rumors Washington would send out someone soon to shuttle back and forth between Cairo and Jerusalem in "Jacksonian operation" [3] designed to settle matters between two countries.

Raphael said in his judgment such an approach would prove abortive. Israel Government convinced Nasser not serious but merely playing for time while impressing United States with his reasonableness. There is no incentive for Nasser to make settlement at this time because he believes a few months hence his position would be stronger than today. GOI had received corroboration of this analysis in form of report of Pearson's (Canadian Minister for External

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/1–556. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 6:57 a.m., January 6. Repeated to Cairo and London.

[2] Ivan B. White.

[3] Reference is to Elmore Jackson of the American Friends Service Committee.

Affairs) conversation with Nasser in which latter advocated settlement based on Bernadotte proposals which would have given entire Negev to Arabs and repatriation by Israel of all Arab refugees. These proposals so ridiculous they revealed complete lack of sincerity on Nasser's part.

In view of foregoing Israel Government "was not prepared to disclose its hand to any third party". Negotiations with Egypt would prove possible only when Egypt had taken some dramatic step to change among Israelis prevailing view of Nasser's intentions. Atmosphere here could be entirely changed if Nasser and Ben-Gurion were to sit down together. Furthermore such personal meeting between two leaders was requisite to progress because only in this manner could their mutual distrust be dispelled.

Lawson

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9. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, January 6, 1956—7:27 p.m.

465. Israel Ambassador called Dept his request Jan. 5. [2] Stated IG and people had reached following conclusions:

1) There was no question of Israel initiating war in NE; 2) despite this, country must think in terms of national emergency and must plan for it in view of USSR and UK arms deliveries to Egypt. When Israelis projected growing arms imbalance it appeared almost inevitable that there would be an Arab attack on Israel early summer 1956 or shortly thereafter. Israel would be almost defenseless from air attack and would "lie at mercy Nasser's statesmanship." Israel thought only thing to remove shadow was attempt reduce disparity by obtaining limited quantities of good arms from US. This fact stood in absolute center Israel thinking.

Israel's appeal for arms from US made on two bases: 1) friendship—Secretary's statement to Sharett in Paris [3] that US for-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 680.84A/1–655. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Allen, who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Cairo, London, and Paris. Repeated by pouch to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda.

[2] According to Bergus' memorandum of January 5 of this conversation, telegram 465 constituted the record of this conversation. (*Ibid.*, 784A.5–MSP/1–556)

[3] See Secto 38, vol. XIV, p. 657.

eign policy predicated on continued existence Israel had been reassuring. Sale of US arms to Israel would be indication of US determination implement such policy. 2) US national interest in NE peace—Eban said that NE peace and US sale arms to Israel were "practically synonyms". It might sound drastic, Eban continued, but conversely not selling arms to Israel and inviting NE war were the same. Allen interposed this was indeed drastic and implied GOI attitude which should not be pursued. Eban replied this was a judgment of consequences not of intention. Continuing disparity would mean growing Israel nervousness re survival and concomitantly increasing lack desire by Egypt make peace and increasing temptation solve Palestine problem by force.

Allen said there was something that could happen for Israel which would be much better than arms deliveries. That would be peace settlement with Arabs. Some American Zionists had said to Allen that USG trying keep Israel weak so as to soften her for settlement. Allen did not dispute their right hold such views. He could understand how it would come as shock to ordinary Israeli to realize Israel's future as small nation in NE must depend on goodwill great powers and at whim great powers' decisions. On other hand perhaps these were facts of life. Eban replied many small countries rely on friendship great powers but there was no contractual relationship between Israel and US. Even if Israel had treaty with US or "all great powers in world" necessary for Israel have sufficient military strength hold back Arab attack until help arrived from outside.

In conclusion Eban asked where Israel arms request "rested diplomatically". Allen replied he would report conversation to Secretary but that situation was same now as expressed in Secretary's letter to Sharett of Dec. 23.[4] Eban inquired re other reasons mentioned in Secretary's letter besides Syrian incident. Allen replied one of such reasons was matter of types and models Western arms in NE. US had been in consultation with other governments on this subject before Israel's request; these consultations continued. Eban stated he would seek to reopen this matter with Secretary after conclusion SC action on Syrian incident.

Dulles

[4] See telegram 445, vol. XIV, p. 889.

10. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, January 6, 1956—8:14 p.m.

466. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. I wish to give you this advance information that recent discussions that have taken place through covert channels with both Israel and Egyptian Government representatives give us substantial hopes that it may be possible at an early date for some person who will be designated by the President and myself to meet secretly with Ben Gurion and with Nasser and commence an exchange of views between the two governments with a view to a settlement of the principle issues between the two countries. It is not clear at this time to what extent it may be wise and possible for our representative to be in touch with our embassies in Tel Aviv and Cairo. I will in any event let you know from time to time how the matter is developing. You should not however until further notice indicate to anyone connected with the Israel Government nor to any other member of the Embassy the fact that you have been informed that the talks may be taking place.

Dulles

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/1–656. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Russell and approved and signed by Dulles.

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11. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, January 7, 1956—5 p.m.

687. Eyes only for the Secretary. Re Department's telegram 466. [2] It appears evident from Embassy's telegram 676 [3] that knowledge of the proposed operation is known to the Israeli Government from a top-level down to that of Raphael, advisor on Arab affairs, Foreign Office.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/1–756. Top Secret; Alpha. Received at 8:57 a.m., January 8.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Document 8.

Therefore, in my judgment, this operation as well as subsequent details developed during the discussions will not be as closely held within the GOI as within the USG.

In view of the initiative taken by Raphael in introducing this subject, his closeness to Sharett and past experiences of the Embassy, we should not overlook the possibility that Raphael may have been transmitting Sharett's initial views on the efficacy of the proposed operation.

Lawson

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12. Editorial Note

On January 9, President Eisenhower signed letters introducing former Deputy Secretary of Defense and personal friend, Robert B. Anderson, to Egyptian Prime Minister Nasser and to Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion and informing them that he had asked Anderson to review and to discuss with them the serious problems confronting Egypt, Israel, and the Middle East in general. The President indicated to Ben Gurion and Nasser that "Anderson fully understands my personal concern and hopes in this area, which I am sure you and he will want to explore completely." President Eisenhower also expressed his hope to both of them that they would be able to work effectively with Anderson "to render . . . valuable assistance in working toward settlement of these problems." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)

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13. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, January 10, 1956—2 p.m.

693. At Prime Minister's request I met with him and Foreign Minister yesterday for an hour. Difficult to assess reason for this

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/1–1056. Secret. Received at 9:36 a.m., January 11. Repeated to London, Paris, and Cairo.

high-level meeting but believe it primarily to make strong and impassioned plea for US favorable and quick action on arms request and Mystere order (Embtel 667) [2] as soon as Security Council debate concluded. Significant elements of Ben-Gurion's comment and approach to subject as follows: he obviously deeply concerned over Israel's indefensible position especially against Egypt's jet air power. He spoke with fire and emotion and with obvious effort to impress with his seriousness and alarm. Said Egypt has presently tremendous air advantage with MIGs and jet bombers which could destroy Israel's cities, settlements and waterworks without which Israel ruined. He spent some time on performance features of Egyptian jets and said they could drop their loads and return to Egypt before Israel could spread alarm. Israel needed something to fight with not same quantity but same quality. Even if Israel received Mysteres and F–86's now it would be at serious disadvantage in pilot training.

I scouted idea Nasser would [not?] start air attack without being prepared for large-scale balanced military operation unless he felt forced into such action before prepared. But Ben-Gurion thought Nasser would strike at any time using foreign pilots if necessary.

He described at some length his feeling about Nasser's intention. Visitors from Egypt had told him Nasser spoke of wanting peace but did not act in that spirit; Nasser's technique danger to world peace; at Ben-Gurion's request General Burns endeavored but unable to obtain Nasser's agreement to abide by GAA or at least order cease-fire; Egypt's action against Israel stepped up over past two or three years with 192 of total of 259 Israeli casualties in 1955 being charged to Egypt whereas only 26 of 160 recorded 1953; Nasser ambitious become great leader of Arab States and African Continent therefore thinks it better for his objective if he defeats Israel; desires link across Negev with Jordan as part of leadership drive; Nasser back of trouble in Jordan and is subversively active in Iraq all to disadvantage of West.

He said Nasser had two possibilities: either attack Israel or build up military potential to give him strength to dictate; Israel would never accept dictation from Nasser; there can only be peace between equals; some people think Eden's speech encourages Nasser to believe he can dictate from strength of arms. Nasser knows Israel will not attack him as it did not do so or even consider possibilities when he was weak, having his troubles with British and with other Arab States. But now with Nasser receiving arms and Israel confronted with arms embargo and even France not meeting its contract "Israel in mortal danger." He feels keenly what he called "sanctions" in form of arms embargo while Egypt receives arms from both Soviets and UK.

[2] Document 2.

He then said "if balance of arms is not restored (in terms of quality of arms not quantity) then we in desperate danger. Can citizens of this little country not live in peace and security? I ask you in all frankness what would be reaction of governments of US and UK and France to danger and to attacks on their frontier people? All we want to do is bring in our people, develop land and live". United Nations has proven helpless with Security Council resolutions ignored in particular Suez resolution unenforced, Red Sea blockade in defiance of international law. "If we don't get quality arms in time it may be too late—there may be an explosion consequences of which cannot be foreseen".

I then asked Ben-Gurion if he did not share our conviction that answer to problem of war or no war lay in starting peace negotiations—starting them before deadline is reached or before serious trouble started. He agreed enthusiastically saying that what he favored all along and said so publicly many times but Nasser will not agree to do so. He said he would reply favorably to such proposal if called to do so "in middle of the night". He repeated much of what he said to Streibert (Embtel 614 [3]) when I asked if that meant he would agree to discussions without any preconditions and not necessarily require face to face talks with Nasser.

I expressed some doubt Nasser would attack although superior in arms and asked Ben Gurion "if arms imbalance were to continue if in his opinion war inevitable." He replied "not necessarily inevitable but very probable." He then added ambiguously I thought, "you cannot expect even people of small country to commit suicide."

I then asked "how strong is your evidence Nasser will strike when he prepared to use his few arms?" He said it clearly logical Nasser would do so in view of his known techniques and intentions as already described—he not spending all that money for nothing—Cairo Radio has said Egypt will attack and defeat Israel and so has Syria. In reply to my question as to when Nasser would be ready to strike Ben Gurion said within 6–8 months.

I replied it seemed to me illogical for Nasser to attack Israel at early date as time working his favor, he needed more time to acquire facility of use of his arms, his position in military potential outstripping Israel [garble] and great monument of Nasser's life—Aswan Dam—would be threatened and would require all Egypt's resources. These seemed to me to be effective deterrents. He made no comment.

In effort to gain some impression as to whether there had been some fairly firm GOI thinking as to future action at Bnat Yaacov I pointed out Israeli work at that point could start military action by Egypt before 6–8 months. I wondered what would happen if it

[3] Vol. XIV, p. 871.

became evident Nasser unwilling or unable to bring about Arab States acceptance of Eric Johnston's Jordan River Plan—was it likely following sequence of events would occur in spring i.e., Israel would start digging, Syria would start shooting and Egypt would come to support of Syria when fighting started. Neither Ben Gurion nor Sharett would give any reply probably not wishing to be on record suggesting such possibility and later being charged with being aggressors. They made no comment despite fact GOI pretty well committed to start digging in circumstances.

Ben Gurion apparently realizes seriousness of error with regard Tiberias raid and unfavorable effect on US Government attitude toward GOI arms request. I felt he desired to create feeling of reassurance he will not resort to such ill-considered and untimely acts in future. Although he made no reference to event he took opportunity on at least three occasions to underscore necessity for Israel to take into consideration "wider political factors" of Arab-Israel problem and "Israel must not be indifferent to wider interests of humanity and must not consider her relations with her neighbors only but broader interests of humanity. He then remarked "we may have made mistakes but we are all human" and asked when wider political factors considered that elements of Israel's position be taken into account. He said Israel cast her lot with democracies as she is democracy. "Speaking frankly" he said, "we have no better friends than US and I ask that US understand our position."

Comment: I did not at any time gain impression Ben Gurion threatening action by Israel in event she received no arms and noted how carefully he avoided linking Israeli action with failure to receive arms. I felt he making dramatic plea for understanding in a way regretting his hasty ill-timed Tiberias raid action and implying in future he would be more cautious and regardful of effect on US policy both global and area-wise. I believe it significant of his reaction to strong and widespread criticism heaped on him since raid and his indefensible action in placing Sharett in his unfavorable position by raid that he had Sharett present when he discussed these important matters with me. However Ben Gurion most careful to keep control of conversation and Sharett had little opportunity to comment except to discuss Security Council resolution (Embtel 691 [4]).

Lawson

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[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/1–956)

14. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 11, 1956, 2:30 p.m. [1]

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Robert B. Anderson
Secretary Dulles

Mr. Anderson told the President he expected to leave on his mission on Sunday. [2] We then discussed the various elements of the situation which might give the United States negotiating power.

I said that oftentimes matters which were insoluble in isolation became soluble in a larger context. Here there was a larger context, namely, the future leadership of the Arab world. Egypt was ambitious to hold this position, which it felt was now challenged by Iraq, with the backing of the UK and Turkey. Iraq was now a key state in the Baghdad Pact of Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the UK, and the UK was exerting influence to bring Jordan first and then perhaps Syria and Lebanon into the Baghdad Pact. Egypt, with backing from Saudi Arabia and the present Syrian Government, was opposing this movement. The United States had maintained a position of flexibility. It had not joined the Baghdad Pact nor had it exerted any influence in favor of enlarging the Baghdad Pact through the adhesion of other Arab countries.

I believe that Nasser would be willing to pay a considerable price to get the support of the United States in limiting the Baghdad Pact to its present Arab membership with concentration upon the peril from the North, with Egypt maintaining its hegemony of the Arab countries.

Our policy in this respect might have to be firmed up when Eden arrives and it would be important to know Nasser's view before then, if possible.

The second bargaining position we had was in relation to cotton, where we could either destroy or help Egypt's market.

The third point was the Aswan Dam.

These latter two points could probably not be openly negotiated, but could be delicately suggested. In the case of the Aswan Dam, Nasser was very nervous lest we attempt to use aid to control his political policies.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. According to an attached handwritten note from Macomber to Hanes, the Secretary wished to have this memorandum shown to Hoover, Allen, and Russell.

[2] January 15.

A fourth position which might be hinted at was that if good relations continued and developed between the Arab States and the West, this would undoubtedly call for paralleling the Suez Canal with another canal which could be financed by the oil companies and which could increase Egypt's revenues.

I pointed out that Egypt would not make a settlement with Israel unless it could carry along in that settlement the other bordering Arab countries, namely, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Here the possibilities of the Johnston plan for water diversion were considerable and beneficial to these states. Failure to reach an agreement would undoubtedly mean that Israel would itself divert all the water for its own purposes, which it could easily do because of the geographical configuration.

There was also the problem of indemnifying and resettling the refugees. This would take large sums of money, to which the United States would contribute and would bring large sums into the area. We talked about various locations for possible resettlement, including perhaps 50,000 in Israel. Mr. Anderson raised the possibility of using the Sinai Peninsula as an area for resettlement. We also discussed the possibilities in Iraq and Iran. The President raised the question as to whether the Arab countries would be tempted to look to Israel as a manufacturer. I said I doubted that this was an inducement at the present, because the Arabs would still want to maintain some economic restrictions against Israel.

Turning to the Israeli side of the picture, I said I felt that the Israelis should realize that their position had been completely altered by the entry of the Soviets into the picture. Up until now, Israel had been strong and somewhat arrogant, relying upon the fact that the Western powers were the only purveyors of arms to the area and that this fact, coupled with their natural sense of discipline and organization, enabled them to maintain a military superiority over their Arab neighbors. But with the Soviet surplus arms available to the Arabs they, with their population of about 40,000,000, had an absorbent capacity which could not possibly be matched by the 1,500,000 Israelis. Furthermore, the political interests of Britain and France were altered by the possibility of loss of the oil from the Arab countries. That would be a crippling blow to their economy and to the NATO forces, and they would not be willing to pay this price merely to back Israel against the Arabs here in the United States. There was also a growing realization that backing Israel might be very costly to vital United States national interests.

Israel from now on would have to play the part of a good neighbor to the Arabs and not seek to maintain itself by its own force and foreign backing. Unless the Israelis realized this, they were doomed. The present was their best time to negotiate a settlement

because they still had a military equality and would not be negotiating from weakness. Also, the full significance of the changed situation was not yet fully reflected in changed political attitudes.

I said that so far as the immediate issue between Israel and the Arab States was concerned, I felt that money could deal basically with the problem of the refugees. The most difficult problem was the Negev and the question of Israel's access to the Gulf of Aqaba and Egypt's access to Jordan and Arabia. At this point we got out a map and studied it. It was pointed out that the Egyptians could block the channel between the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea and that the Israeli port of Elath was never really dependable. I pointed out our suggestion about the converging triangles across the Negev. The President threw out the suggestion of a causeway across the Gulf of Aqaba which would connect the Sinai Peninsula with Saudi Arabia.

We discussed somewhat the question of the cost to the United States. We agreed that the question of money within reason would not be an obstacle because a settlement would be so valuable to the United States and would attract such large political support that Congress would almost assuredly vote the necessary funds which, although considerable in the aggregate, could not usefully be spent very rapidly.

The President expressed to Mr. Anderson his great personal confidence in him and the great importance which he attached to his mission.

Mr. Anderson said he would like to be able to quote some of the President's views to Colonel Nasser as those of one military man to another. The President said he could do so and I suggested, and the President agreed, that Anderson should feel that he had a free hand in attributing to the President the views with reference to the matters we had discussed. It was understood, however, that no firm commitments should be made except ad referendum, and that the matter of our relationship to the Baghdad Pact was particularly delicate in view of our relations with the UK.

JFD

15. Diary Entry by the President [1]

Washington, January 11, 1956.

[Here follow President Eisenhower's views on the need to maintain the United States strategic raw materials stockpile.]

This afternoon the Secretary of State and the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Anderson, came to see me. Our discussion centered around the forthcoming visit of Bob to the Mid East, where we hope he can make some progress in bringing about a rapprochement between Israel and Egypt. He is one of the most capable men I know. My confidence in him is such that at the moment I feel that nothing could give me greater satisfaction than to believe that next January 20th, I could turn over this office to his hands. His capacity is unlimited and his dedication to this country is complete.

Because of this feeling of confidence, the Secretary of State and I have requested him to have the frankest kind of talks with both Nasser in Egypt and Ben Gurion in Israel. We feel certain that if a practicable peace treaty could be arranged between these two nations, that our people and our Congress would authorize almost any kind of material aid for the two of them that they could effectively use. But we are convinced that the interests of this country will not be served by attempting to arm one against the other, and we would regard it as tragic if the USSR began to arm one while we undertook to defend the other with weapons and financial support. Consequently, we are ready to do anything within reason to bring them closer together and to start between them the cooperative process, particularly in economic matters.

Bob is starting for the Mid East next Sunday. [2]

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries.
[2] January 15.

16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, January 11, 1956—8:03 p.m.

481. Eyes only for Ambassador. Re Embtel 687. [2] Both Sharett and Eban had previously indicated to me Israel's lack of confidence in Nasser and the desire of IG to postpone negotiations for settlement. We have however within past two days been given firm assurance of Ben Gurion's willingness to talk with intermediary. We are under no illusions concerning difficulty of inducing IG to commence process of arriving at compromises essential for a settlement but believe we should take fullest advantage of willingness of leaders of both governments to talk with intermediary. Raphael has in past made exaggerated statements of IG position.

Dulles

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/1–1156. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Russell, cleared with Hoover, and approved and signed by Dulles.
[2] Document 11.

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17. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, January 12, 1956—4 p.m.

705. In conversation yesterday Embassy counselor asked Sapir, Minister of Commerce and Industry whether provision being made for Jordan diversion plan in budget fiscal year beginning April 1. Sapir replied provision would be made and while no exact figure yet decided it would be magnitude 3 to 5 million Israel pounds. White then inquired why in view of fact this sum so negligible relative to total cost irrigation scheme and fact that with Israel's financial burden immigration and defense no real prospect completing project without American aid GOI felt it necessary to proceed with work at Bnat Yaacov this spring.

Sapir said answer simple. In autumn 1953 at time original Bnat Yaacov controversy Lavon and other members of government argued

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/1–1256. Confidential. Received at 1:38 p.m., January 13. Repeated to London, Paris, Cairo, and Damascus.

strongly Israel should continue digging in DZ because Jordan water essential to Israel's development; Western powers would not go beyond Security Council condemnation and Arab States not strong enough to intervene militarily. Moderate school of thought prevailed at time and Israel had entered into Johnston negotiations as alternative means solving its water problem. With long delay and if there is failure obtain Arab agreement moderates no longer have case and Lavon and others will be in position to argue convincingly no further delay possible because Israel position must be consolidated through completing canal in DZ even though complete execution project may require many years. Otherwise in few more months Arabs will be militarily strong enough to prevent work and Israel will be deprived forever its vital water supply. At close of conversation Sapir who is a moderate and one of Israel negotiators with Johnston group indicated he likewise saw no alternative to resumption of work at Bnat Yaacov.

Thus it seems to Embassy that date it becomes clear to GOI that "Johnston plan is dead" and decision to go ahead with Bnat Yaacov is likely to be most important "day of decision" in Israel foreign policy.

Lawson

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18. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, January 13, 1956—6 p.m.

710. Thoroughly agree (Deptel 481 [2]) we should take fullest advantage intermediary technique and in view deteriorating situation areawise no time should be lost. I had not thought (Embtel 687 [3]) discouragement in either use of talks or their ultimate effectiveness. In fact my attitude just contrary and I have let no opportunity pass to encourage Ben-Gurion not insist on face-to-face talks with Nasser but adopt wide open enthusiasm for getting settlement talks started direct or through intermediary and without any pre-talk conditions. This he apparently agreed to do in conversation with Streibert

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/1–1356. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:36 a.m., January 14.

[2] Document 16.

[3] Document 11.

(Embtel 614 [4]) and now direct with you. Now we seem to be in position to test sincerity both leaders and fix clearly burden of irresponsibility.

Purpose Embtels 676 [5] and 687 was to supply useful important factual intelligence as to how widely this highly sensitive information held here. It gave as well views of Rafael on efficacy of proposed operation—not unwillingness Sharett to agree to talks with intermediary despite his "foot-dragging" attitude while in Washington on general effort to negotiate settlement. That developed I believe from natural desire to negotiate from greater strength which he hoped would come from receipt of arms.

Lawson

[4] Vol. XIV, p. 871.
[5] Document 8.

19. Letter From the Foreign Minister Sharett to Secretary of State Dulles [1]

Jerusalem, January 16, 1956.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I felt grateful for your letter of 23 December 1955 [2] and appreciated your having written immediately after your return from Paris. My answer has been delayed by the knowledge that, crucial as was the loss of the intervening weeks, further progress on the issue of arms was blocked by the discussions of the Security Council.

With this chapter now drawing to its close, I must renew, with all the earnestness at my command, the urgent plea I repeatedly put forward to you in our conversations in Paris, Geneva and Washington for the supply of arms to Israel. The delivery of Soviet armaments to Egypt is, according to all reports, proceeding apace and the Egyptians are training in the use of the new weapons, of which they already possess substantial quantities. Unless something drastic is done without delay to offset this menacing Egyptian superiority, a position wi'l very soon be created in which Colonel Nasser will be undisputed master of the situation, free to attack whenever he

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/1–1656.
[2] See telegram 445, vol. XIV, p. 889.

chooses. Our information does indeed point to his intention to launch an offensive with the object of annihilating the State of Israel as soon as he considers himself ready. His knowledge that Israel does not dispose of weapons equivalent in effectiveness to those which he has secured appears to play a decisive part in his military thinking. We cannot conceive that the United States Government should contemplate with equanimity the development of so ominous a crisis, with all its incalculable consequences.

In this situation, to suggest to us that arms alone will not solve the problem is tantamount to telling a starving person that man does not live by bread alone. We are eager as ever to explore any possibility of a settlement, but we cannot pin all hopes on that extremely problematical chance whilst resigning ourselves to an imminent and mortal danger. Arms of the same quality as Egypt is now getting is our only anchor of safety—the only effective deterrent to Egyptian aggression.

I am authorized by my Government to state that, if given adequate arms, they will be used only for defensive purposes and that the avoidance of war and of any further deterioration in the stability of the area will be a primary consideration in our policy and action.

I earnestly trust that a sober appraisal of the peril confronting us will enable you to reach the conclusion that Israel's defensive position must and can be materially strengthened without further loss of time. That time is of the essence is something of a commonplace, but I can think of few circumstances in which it applies with greater force and validity than those in which we find ourselves today. [3]

With warmest personal regards,

Very sincerely yours,

M. Sharett

[3] The Department requested the Embassy in Tel Aviv on February 1 "on behalf Secretary formally acknowledge receipt Foreign Minister's letter to him of January 16." The Embassy also received instructions to remind Sharett of the US position concerning arms, as previously expressed to Eban by Assistant Secretary Allen and Secretary Dulles. (Telegram 531 to Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/2–156) The Embassy informed the Department of State on February 6 that Sharett had been told of the Secretary's "appreciation of the letter which has been read with interest." (Despatch 487 from Tel Aviv; *ibid.*, 784A.56/2–656)

20. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, January 16, 1956—4 p.m.

714. Herzog, Chief American Division Foreign Ministry, called on Embassy Counselor yesterday evening. Herzog indicated primary purpose his call was to reassure Embassy that in spite of Rafael's comments (Embtel 676 [2]) Ben Gurion's position regarding negotiations with Egypt remained unchanged from that which he had set forth to Streibert and White (Embtel 614 [3]), namely, that he was prepared to conduct earlier stages of any negotiations through an intermediary, but believed that before much progress could be made, direct talks would be necessary. Herzog added that Rafael's comments did reflect GOI disappointment growing out of many failures in the past to make progress with Nasser through third parties and that Rafael was personally quite bitter at the failure of Jackson's efforts immediately prior to the Khan Yunis incident August last.

Lawson

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/1–1656. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Received at 7:21 a.m., January 17. Repeated to Cairo and London.

[2] Document 8.

[3] Vol. XIV, p. 871.

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21. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State [1]

No. 2 *Cairo, January 19, 1956.*

1. Our first meeting with PriMin Nasr was arranged at the home of Colonel Zacharia Tuesday evening [2] at 8 PM. Present at the

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG and Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret. No documentation has been found in Department of State files or at the Eisenhower Library to indicate that either the President or the Secretary of State had given Anderson a formal title. According to documentation in Department of State files, Anderson and others associated with his mission transmitted 134 specially numbered messages to Washington. Outgoing messages from Washington to Anderson and to associates were transmitted unnumbered, until February 27. Thereafter, there were 13 specially numbered outgoing messages. All messages dealing with substantive matters, which were declassified for publication, have been included.

[2] January 17.

dinner were the PriMin, Zacharia, . . . myself [and others]. The dinner was a pleasant social affair. General economic conditions and the desirability for the improvement of standards of living in Egypt and elsewhere were the subjects of discussion.

2. Prior to going in to dinner the PriMin expressed his concern about the terms of the letter had [*he?*] had received from the World Bank with reference to the Aswan Dam.[3] When it was suggested that the matter might finally be resolved by his meeting directly with Eugene Black, the PriMin was hesitant and said "it appears from the terms of the letter that Mr. Black wants to replace me in this country". I gave him repeated assurances that Mr. Black was concerned only with making sound financial arrangements and in no way wanted to infringe on his prerogatives or interfere with the Egyptian power of decision. I emphasized that Mr. Black under his responsibility to investors in the World Bank approached the problem from the view point of a financier who had definite responsibilities to his own investors. The PriMin then stated that he too felt that the matter had been approached purely from a financial point of view and that he had informed his Minister of Finance that he would have to take the problem over and solve it personally as the issue of terms connected with the loan were essentially political.

3. We then told the PriMin that Amb Byroade and other members of the Dept were discussing the matter of the loan with the World Bank and that we felt confident that terms of reference could be included in another letter which the Prime Minister would find acceptable. This concluded the discussion with reference to the Dam but numerous other references during our dinner and subsequent conversation emphasize the great importance which the Prime Minister attaches to the project and to the development of terms of financial arrangements which are politically acceptable.

4. After dinner the Prime Minister indicated that he was now ready to discuss the business at hand. At this point I stated to him that one of the primary interests of the President stemmed from a great belief in the advantages of world peace in order to afford the fullest opportunities for all countries and all peoples to better their standard of living and to increase their capabilities of productivity and of the utilization of the world goods. I added that he recognized in the Prime Minister one who had shared in military experiences and who therefore appreciated the destructiveness of war and the tremendous problems encountered by nations in preparation for war. We also had an appreciation for his national aspirations and his sincere desire to engage in a productive program of public works and to better the way of life for his people. I pointed out to him that we

[3] See footnote 2, Document 1.

fully recognized that he had certain problems both in his own country and with neighboring countries which were peculiar to his part of the world because of the history, culture and background of the Arab people. We realized that these problems would have to be dealt with in a manner that was consistent with their traditions and with his own national problems and aspirations.

5. I pointed out to him that I did not come as one who had all of the answers to any problems nor as a final adjudicator of what might be wrong or right on differing points of views, but rather to explore the problems of his country as he saw them and to be a patient and careful listener to his own explanation of the problems which confronted him and of their possible solutions. My hope was to determine the elements of negotiability between the differing viewpoints and to reconcile if possible the gaps between them. Because I proposed to visit Israel as well as Egypt I might raise certain problems and propose solutions from time to time for discussion but that I hoped he would understand that raising such problems or solutions did not necessarily indicate an advocacy of the solution but was rather a means for exploring it.

6. At this point I told the Prime Minister that I would be very pleased if he would indicate to me his own thinking about the problems of his country because I was anxious to understand them completely. The Prime Minister stated that while he did not wish to unnecessarily review historical background, he felt that he should to some extent indicate some historical occurrences which currentiy influenced the situation with which he was confronted.

7. The Prime Minister opened his conversation by saying that the Israeli problem was a combination of issues. The first part of the issue was that of existing tensions between Israel and Egypt. These tensions involved the basic questions of territory and refugees. He stated however that the much larger and more important problem was the divisions of thought in the Arab world and the necessity for some kind of unity that was inspired from within the Arab world. The Prime Minister stated that the solutions of both problems were interrelated and could not be solved independently.

8. At this point the Prime Minister said he wanted to make quite clear that the problem was much more difficult today than it was a year ago. He went back historically to the beginning of 54 at which time he stated that the Egyptians as a people were relatively little concerned about Israel. However, the occurrences during 55 had now brought about a condition in which the people of Egypt were all deeply and emotionally concerned about Israel and felt a very strong resentment and anger which had not heretofore existed. This made his task a much more difficult one.

9. Continuing his historical review the Prime Minister pointed out that in 1954 a debate was going on between the leaders of the various Arab states as to whether or not it was possible to enter into cooperative arrangements with the Western powers. By the end of 54 the Arab leaders had decided that cooperative arrangements could be made with the Western powers and that preferably they would be undertaken through a loose autonomous confederation of cooperation rather than entering into a formal pact between the great powers and respective Arab countries. He indicated that the only country which felt that cooperation would be difficult was Syria who did not want to submit the "cooperative thesis" directly to its legislative body but proposed to agree to cooperative measures on an oral and informal basis. The Prime Minister stated that at the time of decision in the Arab countries they were concerned with two things: one was Arab unity and the other was the development of sufficient strength to give them a sense of security. This Arab decision, the Prime Minister indicated, reached a final conclusion at a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Dec 54.[4]

10. In Jan of 55 the Baghdad Pact was announced which the Prime Minister pointed out came as a severe disillusioning surprise. He made repeated references to the fact that the Baghdad Pact not only proposed to establish defense arrangements, but included in its terms an invitation to all other Arab Nations to join in the Pact and thereby establish a political philosophy whereby the Arab nations who should subsequently adhere to the pact would be entering into a political as well as a defense arrangement with powers outside of Arab world. He stated emphatically that the Baghdad Pact was viewed by him and his Government as a political ideology designed to isolate Egypt. That, one by one, nations in the Arab world would be brought into the Baghdad Pact until finally Egypt would be left alone to confront the Israelis. He said that he would say quite frankly under these circumstances his country was forced to take counteraction.

11. This counteraction expressed itself primarily in terms of a propaganda campaign against Turkey (as the principal seeker for additional members) but included as well propaganda efforts against Great Britain, the United States, and colonialism. The Prime Minister pointed out, therefore, that some of the strong feeling which existed today in the Arab countries and particularly in Egypt against the Western powers and which would now make more difficult a settlement with Israel, resulted directly from their propaganda efforts which they felt were essential to their own security at a time when

[4] The conference of Arab League Foreign Ministers at Cairo concluded on December 16, 1954.

the Baghdad Pact threatened to isolate them from the rest of the world. The Prime Minister said that during this period with a great deal of reluctance they had "burned several of their bridges behind them".

12. He then went back to the question of securing Arab unity and said that there were four major considerations which had to be taken into account in the solution of this problem. First, and most important, was the resolution of differences of opinion between the Arab States and the establishment of an informal security arrangement which would be inspired from within rather than from without the Arab States. Second, he was concerned with the influence and the expenditures of money by the Saudi Arabs. Third, he was concerned with the expenditure of money and the influence of the U.S., as for example the influence of the U.S. exerted in behalf of such things as the Baghdad Pact which he regards as counter to the Arab nationalist interest. Fourth, he was concerned with the resolution of the debate within the Arab countries as to whether or not at this time cooperative arrangements could be entered into between the Arab States and the Western powers.

13. The Prime Minister then pointed out that under present circumstances as outlined by him, any announcement of a settlement between Egypt and Israel would produce a very unpopular reaction both within Egypt and the other Arab countries. He stated that he liked to take a calculated look at the risk he was running and had determined that upon making an announcement of a settlement he would lose at least 60 percent of the support of his own people and a like percentage of the support of people in the other Arab countries. This, incidentally, is the same percentage of loss of support which Nasr calculated he would and did lose as a result of the dismissal of General Naguib [5] and this is the rate of recovery of support which he believes he experienced following that incident. He felt that he would recover the support of the people within Egypt through a program of public works and demonstrating an interest in the establishment of better standards of living and that within a period of 30 to 60 days he would recover 30 percent of the support he had lost and within six months he would recover all except 10 percent of the support he had lost. He stated that while he felt that he could also recover the support of people in other Arab States it would be more difficult, take longer period of time, and that in this instance he would have to be helped by the Western powers rather than to have his progress impeded.

14. At this point he stated with some bitterness that even when he thought he was taking actions which would be approved by the

[5] Naguib was dismissed on November 14, 1954.

West, he was frequently attacked both by the British and the American press, and even more importantly was attacked by sections of the Lebanese press which he pointed out he believes are substantially controlled by the USIA. (As an example, Nasr stated that when he supported Eden's Guildhall speech he was severely criticized in the Lebanese press. This, he believes, resulted from efforts by a Western power to discredit him with other Arab countries. This is the sort of thing which he believes we could, through our influence, prevent reoccurring).

15. While he appears to be concerned with what is said in the world press his very obvious direct interest is what is said in the press in this part of the world which he believes to a large extent is influenced by Britain or the U.S. He stated during one point of his conversation that he was sure that certain very influential elements of the press in certain of the Arab States were either financed by the British or by the USIA.

16. At several points during his discussion I asked the Prime Minister if he would repeat his points because I was anxious to understand clearly his point of view and on one or two occasions I asked him if I might express in my own terms my understanding of what he was saying to me in order that he would be sure that I understood his point of view. By this means we believe that he feels that his point of view was made quite clear.

17. At one point in his conversation he said quite significantly that he and his govt felt that powers with whom they were friendly should exchange views and ideas prior to taking action even though all of the views and ideas were not universally accepted by their respective govts and that "my govt does not like to be confronted with surprises such as the Baghdad Pact which require counter surprises".

18. The Prime Minister expressed himself very forcibly against what he considers the aggressive actions of Great Britain further to implement the Baghdad Pact and pointed out that he had said to the British Ambassador that only trouble could result from General Templer's visit to Jordan. He then reviewed the reaction of the Jordanian people against Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact and said that he felt the same reaction would take place in most of the Arab States.

19. We consider significant the emphasis which the Prime Minister continued to place on the Baghdad Pact. He regards it as the beginning point of serious deterioration of relationships between Egypt and Western powers. He feels that it came to him as an unwarranted surprise. He is convinced that it has political implications adverse to national Egyptian interest. I pointed out to him that we had regarded the pact solely as a defense arrangement and never

as a political ideology directed against Egyptian interests. I pointed out to him also that despite urgings we had not at this time adhered to the pact. The Prime Minister seemed to appreciate these expressions. Neither of us mentioned at the meeting the fact that we would soon have conversations with the British but it was obviously in his mind.

20. At the conclusion of the PriMin's talk I asked him if I might sum up for my own benefit the points which I understood him to have made and that I proceeded to do. The PriMin acknowledged he thought I had an understanding on the points of view he expressed. I pointed out to him that he had very significantly raised the larger aspect of the problem of leadership in the Arab world and I felt we could very usefully explore any ideas which he might have in this regard. He stated that while he would like to have positive help in this area it must be help which his people would understand and that neither he nor ME should take such actions as would indicate that he had "sold out to the Western powers". I reassured him that what we were seeking to do was to explore kinds of things which might be helpful to him in a spirit that would contribute to the objectives of a peaceful settlement of current tensions and of maintaining a peaceful world. The PriMin thought that this could be usefully discussed.

21. My personal reaction to our first meeting was that the PriMin was pleased by the idea of a representative of President coming to discuss his problem with him, that he was much more concerned with the question of Arab leadership than with the immediate problem of tensions between Egypt and Israel, that he did not at our first meeting want to enter into detailed discussions involving territories or refugees but rather wanted to feel out our own position with reference to his leadership in the Arab world. I have the impression that he is confident of his own position in Egypt and relatively confident of his ability to dispose of a settlement between Egypt and Israel and still maintain a strong position in the Arab world if he is positively and in the right way [supported?] by the Western powers and their allies and if he is not impeded either by adverse propaganda or by aggressive arrangements which he considers political as well as defensive. He specifically referred from time to time not only to our own conduct of affairs but the influence which we would have with other Western powers in supporting his efforts at settling the tensions between Israel and Egypt.

22. While our meeting was very friendly and our discussion quite frank, I think it should be emphasized that the Prime Minister spoke time and again about the fact that the problem was a difficult one and involved many factors. No doubt one of our most difficult

problems will be that of timing. The Prime Minister raises the question that our objective must be accomplished by stages as he expressed . . . in December.[6] He now seems to be preoccupied with stage 2—that is the support or acquiescence of other Arab States. We believe that a large part of our discussions during the next few days will be concerned with working out the kinds of support the U.S. can give toward reaching the objectives of this phase. I think that we should be conservative in our hopes for an early resolution of this problem.

23. Our meeting ended at approximately midnight. . . . My next meeting with the Prime Minister is scheduled for Thursday.[7] He requested Wednesday for his own thinking. Any suggestions, comments or advice will be appreciated.

24. . . . At this stage the PriMin reemphasized certain points which he regards as major. He specifically said that he felt confident of being able to sell a "reasonable" settlement with Israel to the Arab world providing that he could be absolutely sure that he would not have the United States, Britain, Turkey or Iraq working against him. He expressed himself as willing to accept the Presidential emissary's assurance that the United States would not engage in such activity and would use its influence to persuade other states to refrain also. However he is deeply suspicious that, no matter what assurances might be given by the U.S., certain elements in the British Govt (specifically British intelligence) as well as Turkey and Iraq might be unable to restrain themselves from taking advantage of every vulnerable moment to attempt to destroy Egypt's prestige and position in Arab world by presenting Egypt as traitor to Arab national cause. The PriMin said he was not sure how satisfactory assurances on this score could be worked out but he would give the matter serious and detailed thought and would hope to have more specific suggestions for his next talk with the Presidential emissary.

25. The second point on which the PriMin dwelt at considerable length related to the timing of a possible settlement. He argued that whereas a year ago feeling in Egypt and the Arab world generally was comparatively quiescent as far as Israel was concerned the Gaza raid and subsequent Israeli aggressions have inflamed feeling in Egypt and particularly in Syria which would make announcement of any settlement absolutely not feasible in the immediate future. In further discussion of this point he agreed that it might be possible to conclude a settlement quickly if the announcement of it could be deferred until he has had time to prepare the proper psychological moment. Among other things it will be necessary to relax the

[6] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
[7] January 19.

currently vigorous and virulent anti Israeli propaganda in the Arab press and radio. He would not estimate how much time this would require but made no objection to the suggestion that six months without further border incidents or provocation would probably be sufficient.

26. His final point referred back to what he said earlier but was expressed more specifically. He does feel that the development of a regional economic aid program channeled under Egyptian leadership through the Arab League would be one of the most helpful things that the U.S. could do.

27. In discussing the Israeli position both the PriMin and Colonel Zacharia professed surprise at our supposition that the question of the Negev would be the most difficult one for the Israelis to compromise upon.

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22. Message From the Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Cairo [1]

Washington, January 19, 1956.

Have read with intense interest your message No. 2. [2] Believe you have made good start.

It is matter of concern that Nasser should believe it would be as long as 6 months before he could take any public action in connection with settlement but that statement may be counterbalanced by his subsequent statement that it might be possible to conclude settlement quickly if announcement could be deferred.

As you know, we believe it is imperative for us to know soon whether or not settlement can probably be concluded. We would have great difficulty in getting Israel to sit by waiting for 6 months while Egypt absorbs arms. Israelis always contended this would be Egypt's tactic. Furthermore by summer political competition will be at level which would gravely militate against our then taking effective part in settlement. Senator George indicated he would seek to maintain bipartisanship for time being, but also he indicated that

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/1–1956. Secret.

[2] *Supra*. Immediately upon receipt of Anderson's message, Russell, on January 19, forwarded a copy of it under cover of a memorandum to Dulles and Hoover. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Jan '56—memos, etc.)

mounting pressures would limit period of bipartisanship.[3] In sum it is difficult to see how conditions in which settlement would be possible could be maintained for several months, although details and announcements could be deferred once there were sufficient agreement on basic essentials.

John Foster Dulles[4]

[3] Senator George and Secretary Dulles discussed the Arab-Israeli situation and the problem of keeping it out of domestic politics during a luncheon conversation on January 13. (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Sen. Walter George)

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

23. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State[1]

No. 3

Cairo, January 20, 1956.

1. We are awaiting information as to the precise meeting time with PriMin today.[2] In view of his pre-occupation with the question of Arab unity and Arab security during our first meeting we anticipate he may either make suggestions or ask the extent to which we are prepared to go to in taking . . . actions which would indicate our support of some form of Arab State security arrangements which would envision Egyptian leadership. We anticipated that such a proposal probably would not contemplate formal arrangements between the Arab States but any action on our part would rather give evidence of our support which would be construed by Nasr and other Arab leaders as Western recognition of Arab unity and security. In the context of what we believe is a primary concern of the PriMin we realize the problem of the future balance of power between the collective Arab States and Israel and that our continuing policy must be one which will aid in maintaining the peace. Nasr seems to be worried about a policy that equates Israel with all the Arab States combined. Nasr's philosophy appears to be that after settlement Israel must be content to live as one state among several sovereign states and be content with Western guaran-

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.

[2] Presumably Anderson is referring to his meeting scheduled for Thursday, January 19.

tee of her borders. We therefore would like your guidance on a policy that seems to contemplate steering the narrow course of purely legitimate defensive abilities by boundaries and still lends credence to the thesis of Arab security.

2. For thought purposes, it is suggested that such proposals (some of which have already been discussed with you) might include:

A. A declaration by the Government of the United States that the Baghdad Pact is not incompatible with arrangements for Arab unity and security.

B. Appropriate assurances that there would be no further efforts to expand membership in the Baghdad Pact which would be limited to defensive arrangement vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and pointing out that Iraqi membership occurred by reason of its close proximity to the Soviet Union.

C. In connection with B we could of course indicate in the event of settlement our willingness to abstain from adherence to the Baghdad Pact but probably will be asked for assurances that we will lend our full support in influencing Britain and other members of the Baghdad Pact not to enlarge membership and if possible to withdraw or minimize its standing invitation to other Arab States for membership which would help to eliminate from the Pact the political implication which Nasr now ascribes to it.

D. Some statement indicating our willingness to consider economic assistance when asked for to various Arab States within a framework consistent with unified Arab planning.

E. As indicative of our willingness to work within the framework of unified Arab planning could we consider providing an economic survey by reputable U.S. management concerns on a regional basis?

F. Assurances of our willingness to consider legitimate defensive support to various Arab States if requested accompanied by a declaration that our support was not incompatible with Arab collective security and at the same time the Baghdad Pact.

G. Assurances that we would through appropriate channels indicate to other Arab leaders our support of Nasr's efforts toward Arab unity and security.

H. Providing for the channeling at least to appearances of refugee compensation and rehabilitation either through the Arab League or a commission giving a predominant place to the Arab League. In this connection we realize the undesirability of entrusting the financial aspects of compensation and resettlement to Arab League leadership but are concerned essentially with appearances for purposes of prestige.

. . . . . .

3. Your early advice and counsel will be appreciated. The extent to which we go in assurances concerning these matters may have very significant results both as to issue of settlement and particularly

as to the issue of timing. This advice you realize of course is sought purely from the viewpoint of problems as we contemplate they are being viewed through Arab eyes and has not yet taken into account considerations which we may have or which may be proposed by the other side.

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24. Message From the Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Cairo [1]

Washington, January 20, 1956.

You may, at your discretion, take the position indicated below with reference to the points raised in your message No. 3.[2] If feasible, however, you should put them forward as personal views ad referendum in order to retain for use some flexibility and avoid confronting Eden when he arrives with commitments by us in relation to matters of deep interest to the UK.

1. We would be prepared, in context of settlement, to give our support in various ways to Arab unity and to Egyptian leadership in achieving it (your para 1, with respect extent to which we are prepared to go in taking . . . actions which would indicate our support of some form of Arab state security arrangements which would envision Egyptian leadership). It is not clear from your phrase "Arab state security arrangements" what danger the security arrangements would be designed to deal with, or size of military build-up contemplated. If security need referred to is against possible aggression from North, we would, of course, give support. If Israel-Arab settlement is achieved, and U.S. security guarantees given per August 26 statement[3] with resulting decrease in Israel armed strength, it should be presumed that Arabs would not feel need maintain large and expensive armed forces against danger of Israel expansion. We would readily recognize that, following Israel-Arab settlement, six Arab states with much larger population and area should not be expected to have their defense arrangements related to Israel armed strength. On other hand, we could not support "Arab state security arrangements" of unlimited proportions

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Secret. Drafted by Russell; cleared with Hoover, Allen, and Byroade; and approved by the Secretary.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] See telegram 139, vol. XIV, p. 385.

which would have no visible purpose other than possible "third round" which some Arab leaders might personally harbor even following a settlement. Having made this distinction clear, we would be prepared to give evidence of our "support of Arab unity and security".

2. With respect to "Nasser's philosophy that after settlement Israel must be content to live as one state among several sovereign states" (your para 1), we are in agreement. With respect to "Israel being content with Western guarantee of her borders", we contemplate that Israel's primary reliance for her security would be upon such guarantees; that she would not seek maintain armed position equivalent to that of six Arab states; and that she would expect to base her position not on defiance but on good neighbor policy. This would presuppose, however, that Arab states would not engage in military policies of a nature that would cause Israel and those countries which had guaranteed Israel's security to have justified fears about purpose to which Arab arms would be devoted.

3. We would be prepared to make a declaration that in our view the Baghdad Pact is not incompatible with arrangements for Arab unity and security (your para 2A).

4. Given an Israel-Arab settlement and given adequate assurances that the organization embodying Arab unity would be devoted to maintaining the countries that were members of it as truly free and independent nations, resisting efforts by outside powers at subversion and domination (your para 2B), we would expect no further efforts to induce other countries in the area to adhere to the Baghdad Pact. Baghdad Pact came into existence as an effort by its members to resist any possible efforts by Soviet Bloc to apply to Middle East forceful expansion of kind it had engaged in in other areas. If it became apparent that Soviet Union was actively contemplating such expansion in the area or if any organization of Arab states should appear to be lending itself to Soviet objective of area domination, we would, of course, hope and urge that all individual states desiring to maintain their freedom and independence would cooperate in all measures toward that end including Baghdad Pact.

5. We cannot, of course, speak for U.K. but Shuckburgh, in discussions here this past week,[4] has stated that U.K. desires to give

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[4] Between January 13 and 19, British officials, led by Evelyn Shuckburgh, had met in Washington with representatives of the Department of State to discuss U.S.–U.K. interests and objectives in the Middle East and to help prepare the ground for the impending talks between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden.

Extensive documentation on the Shuckburgh talks is in Department of State, Central Files 033.4111, 611.41, and 780.00; *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha Memos, etc. during Eden Talks. Dec. 11 to Feb. 15, 1956, Eden Talks, Washington, Jan. 28–Feb. 1, 1956 (Background Papers), and Alpha—Middle East Defense and Soviet Objectives in ME; and *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 647.

assurances to Nasser that would relieve his apprehensions (your para 2C).

6. We would greatly welcome unified Arab planning for economic progress in the area (your para 2D). It is doubtful that the U.S. could grant economic assistance to an Arab multi-nation organization but we would take into full account sound plans developed by such an organization in making grants to individual nations.

7. We would consider most sympathetically a request by an organization of Arab states to provide an economic survey to serve as basis of Arab regional planning (your para 2E).

8. It is difficult for us to give advance assurances with respect to military aid but future requests for such aid from Arab states would presumably be governed by points made in para one and three above.

9. Given Arab-Israel settlement, we would give our support to efforts by Nasser to achieve an Arab unity devoted to economic progress and legitimate security measures, and would be willing to make such support known in appropriate ways (your para 2G).

10. We believe it would be desirable to have it appear that Arab refugee compensation and rehabilitation measures were being implemented in cooperation with Arab countries (your para 2H). As you point out, it would probably not be practicable to have the program actually administered by an inter-Arab organization. We shall, however, need fullest cooperation of Arab countries in dealing with Arab refugee problem and would wish to work most closely with them. It is not clear from Nasser's statements whether "Arab League" is the formal instrument he envisages for accomplishing his objective of Arab unity. Terms of charter would appear to make it a possible instrument although ways would have to be found for removing impression existing up to present time that its principal preoccupation is destruction of Israel.

11. We would, of course, give whatever assistance we could to obtaining support among Arab leaders for a settlement. . . .

25. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, January 20, 1956—noon.

266. Lucas, American political adviser with UNTSO, has given me following details recent developments.

When Burns received letter from Eytan of January 4 (Tel Aviv's telegram 715 to Department [2]) "confirming" acceptance UNSYG proposals for El Auja D/Z, he inquired as to status Foreign Ministry communiqué dated December 27 [3] which indicated Israel's acceptance UNSYG's proposals conditional on Egypt's agreeing "to ensure an effective cease-fire and to honor fully all provisions GAA".

Replying Burns' inquiry Foreign Ministry informed him that Israel's acceptance as set forth in Eytan's letter of January 4 is "complete and self-explanatory." Reply continued with statement to effect that Israel now awaits similar acceptance from Egypt, pending which Foreign Ministry saw no point in implementing UNSYG proposals nor in entering into any discussions about them.

Burns saw Gohar on January 10. Gohar said Egypt interprets so-called unconditional acceptance by Israel as meaning that Israel will (1) maintain the kibbutz in El Auja D/Z (2) allow marking of western boundary only and (3) maintain 30 "police" in the D/Z. Upshot would be that Israel would come out of discussions El Auja with acquiescence her "right" to maintain "police" there which she did not have before and for which there is no basis. Burns took position that the three points just mentioned should be the subject of separate negotiations and not confused with acceptance of UNSYG proposals for El Auja.

Gohar indicated Egypt willing discuss above matter further when UNSYG visits Cairo. [4] Burns proceeding Cairo with UNSYG January 21. [5]

Regarding Israel's continuing accounts Egyptian-instigated border incidents, Lucas said it is only in rare instances that Israel

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/1–2056. Confidential. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, and London. Received at 9:26 a.m., January 21.

[2] Dated January 14, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/1–1656) The Israeli Foreign Office did not provide the Embassy in Tel Aviv with a copy of Eytan's letter to Burns until January 16.

[3] See telegram 473, vol. XIV, p. 893.

[4] U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld left New York on January 15 for talks in the Middle East with Arab and Israeli leaders.

[5] Hammarskjöld was in Egypt January 21–23. On January 24, he announced in Jerusalem that Egypt had accepted his proposals for a reduction of tension in the Al Auja demilitarized zone. Documentation is in Department of State, Central File 674.84A.

submits verbal complaints promptly and requests investigation. Most alleged incidents are subject of written complaints lodged some time after the event and not requesting UNTSO action.

Cole

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26. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State [1]

No. 13

Cairo, January 21, 1956.

We met this evening [2] at seven o'clock with PriMin Nasr and Colonel Zacharia at the latter's apartment. . . .

1. I opened the discussion by suggesting we explore the possibilities of settling those issues which created tension in order that we might get on with profitable discussions involving the realization of Egypt's national aspirations and the establishment of some unity among Arab States.

2. Nasr said that before beginning any discussions he thought he should in all honesty point out the problem of settlement involved all of the Arab States and not just Egypt. That in view of the universal Arab interest a "quick settlement" was just impossible. He felt an atmosphere of Arab acceptance had to be created. I then asked him if we could try to establish a series of formulae in principle, leaving the details to be settled in the atmosphere which he referred to as "Arab acceptance". He thought this could be done.

3. Nasr stated it was necessary first to clarify the issues with reference to the refugees. On this point he stated emphatically that no one could speak for the refugees and that decisions had to be made by them. He felt that no solution regardless of the amount of compensation would be acceptable either to the refugees or to the Arab States except one involving an expression of Israeli willingness to repatriate all of the refugees. We pointed out this program would involve such a large population increase in Israel that it would likely be impossible for Israel to accept. Nasr stated he believed that only a small percentage of refugees would want to return to Israel but that

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.

[2] Presumably Anderson is describing his meeting with Nasser scheduled for Thursday, January 19.

the principle of the right of choice as to whether to return or take compensation should be preserved.

4. It was then suggested that for purposes of exploration we might inquire as to his feeling about a program offering repatriation to the refugees on a basis not to exceed 20 percent per year for a five year period with the right of any of the refugees at any time to elect to take compensation in lieu of repatriation. Nasr believed this formula would be acceptable and would serve the purpose of her lowering the percentage of those electing repatriation although preserving the right of election which he thought was essential. We made clear this solution might not be acceptable to Israel and was exploratory.

5. Nasr said that he thought a solution of the boundaries must go hand in hand with a solution of refugee problem. At this point he reverted to the U.N. resolutions stating that the partition resolution of 47 and the U.N. resolution of 49 had been accepted by the Arab States prior to the Bandung Conference of 55 and had been refused by Israel.

6. Nasr then expressed himself as believing that the proposed partition as provided by the U.N. resolution of 47 was impractical and would be the source of future trouble. He reiterated his comment that a land link to sovereign Arab territory was essential to a lasting settlement and referred to the historical connection between the Arabs of Africa and Asia for 2,000 years. I asked him at this point if he were not primarily concerned with the psychological existence of a land link between the Arabs of Afri[illegible]nd Asia rather than with the amount or value and area of te[illegible]ory involved. He replied that this was so but that he was still concerned with the size of the sovereign Arab area providing the land link.

7. After considerable discussion in principle we procured maps and suggested he delineate the amount of territory which he felt was essential to a settlement, whereupon Nasr said that he believed the line should run from Dhahiriya about 10 miles south-west of Hebron to Gaza.

8. After this pronouncement there was a moment of complete silence, following which I expressed the view to the PriMin that any such proposal would likely create an impossible situation for the Israelis and that no Israeli Govt could likely survive such a division. This point of view was strongly supported . . . , each pointing out that the proposal would be completely unacceptable to the Israelis and would doubtlessly produce a stalemate to any efforts of settlement. Both Nasr and Zacharia appeared visibly shaken by the emphatic points of view which we expressed and Nasr hastened to explain that this was a proposal which he had made some 11 months

ago to Ambassador Byroade[3] and was now restating the same proposal to us. He stated that under his proposal the Israelis would have more total territory than they would have had under the United Nations partition of 1947 and that in any event the land which he was asking for was arid and of little value.

9. We restated a firm belief that any such proposals would be unacceptable to the Israelis and hoped that he would reconsider his demands. He then indicated a willingness to restudy his demands and stated that "while the Israeli problem was constantly on his mind he had not thought too much recently about solutions". We then went in to dinner which was a pleasant affair during which time discussion of business was suspended.

10. Following dinner I restated to the PriMin that I felt that he should realize the serious importance which we attached to the effort at hand. We regarded this effort as one which amounted to a great hour of decision for Egypt and would have considerable influence on the achievement of her national objectives. I reiterated that the U.S. had thus far maintained a position of flexibility in the Near East and that we were faced with some important decisions to be made at an early date. I hoped that I might be able to report to our Government a sufficient amount of flexibility in the Egyptian position that would give real hopes of achieving a settlement which would allow our respective nations to plan logically and clearly a future course of action, both for Egypt as a nation and for the Arab States collectively. I pointed out that while I had not yet visited Israel, I felt that any such proposals along the line of the territorial division proposed by Nasr would further increase Israeli suspicions and very possibly could lead Israel to believe that settlement was not feasible and therefore raised the possibility of their taking precipitate action which regardless of any ultimate outcome could be exceedingly damaging to Egypt and could set back her plans for national development. I stated that even if Israel were not moved to drastic action, the best that Nasr could hope for would be large expenditures for military purposes over a number of years which would in itself severely limit their ability to achieve economic growth and development such as the PriMin had outlined as being a part of his plan for Egypt's development. I emphasized that in the absence of a settlement the Western powers and particularly the U.S. would force some major decision of policy in the Middle East which might have to be made without the collaboration of Egypt. We hoped for a solution of tensions that would allow us to plan with Egypt on both a national and a regional basis and outlined some ideas which we

[3] Presumably Nasser is referring to his conversation with Byroade on April 5, 1955. See vol. XIV, p. 141.

have discussed at the inception of my trip as a basis for such cooperative planning in an atmosphere of peace.

11. We further pointed out that Nasr must surely realize as well as anyone the heavy drain which his military machine would place on his country. That it was a waste of his national assets at the very time when increased population and increased opportunity for Egypt created both necessity and hope for their further advancement. . . .

12. Nasr then reiterated for the second time that while the Israeli problem had been constantly on his mind he had not recently thought much about solutions. He was now prepared to do so.

13. It was then suggested he determine whether there were other problems which could be settled in principle leaving only proposed thinking with reference to the refugees and the problem of the Negev to be dealt with.

14. Nasr then pointed out that the only other territorial change of importance with which he was concerned was the Samakh Triangle at the southeast corner of Lake Tiberias. This area, Nasr said, was not essentially of concern to him but he thought was essentially in Syrian thinking and stated that the area comprised the high ground around Lake Tiberias and gave the country holding it a decided military advantage.

15. He then stated there would be some minor problems in aligning Arab communities and farms. He regarded them of not very great importance.

16. We asked him specifically about the elimination of the blockade and the secondary boycott and the Israeli use of the Suez Canal. Nasr replied that in the absence of a state of belligerency there would be no problem involved. He stated that so far as direct trading between Israel and Egypt was concerned each nation would have to be left free to determine its own practices.

17. We also asked the PriMin about his feeling concerning Jerusalem and the Holy Places. He answered quickly saying that both he and the Jordanians preferred a division of Jerusalem and the Holy Places substantially along existing lines.

18. It was then agreed that . . . [the others] and Zacharia would meet Saturday morning [4] at 1030 at Zacharia's house for the purpose of exploring and determining alternative solutions of the Negev [5]

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[4] January 21.

[5] According to Message 14, January 22, Colonel Muhieddin stated "emphatically that there no chance Nasr settle for less than whole Negev up to Dhahiriya Gaza line and that Egypt would not negotiate on this point." It was pointed out that this would put Anderson in an impossible situation because the Israelis would also insist on the entire Negev. Alternate plans for a territorial settlement in the Negev were then presented. One proposal was to divide the Negev in half; the other was to provide Israel with a corridor to Elath. Colonel Muhieddin indicated his willingness to

(Continued)

territorial question and timing and that all of us would resume our discussions with the PriMin at 830 Saturday evening. [6]

19. I then pointed out to the PriMin that while we did not wish to rush him, I hoped to go to Israel on Sunday. [7] That to further delay going would merely create suspicion and I felt it was necessary to go with enough assurances on his part that there was flexibility in his thinking so as not to be required to take a pessimistic point of view with Israel. To this Nasr replied that he understood the problem and would give it intense thought. One additional piece of info which I believe you shave [*should*] have is that . . . [it was] mentioned to Nasr at . . . meeting with the PriMin prior to my arrival, the hope that a meeting might take place between Nasr and Ben Gurion in the immediate future. Nasr's immediate reaction was that such a meeting was impossible. . . . it was possible that Ben Gurion would not be willing to make as many concessions to an intermediary as he might be willing to make directly. Nasr agreed to think over this suggestion and left it open as a possibility. Up to this time I had thought it best not to raise a question of a meeting myself until there was some clearer definition of his willingness to negotiate on points of difference.

(Continued)
consider, "if only academically", the proposition. The meeting produced no other results, leading to the conclusion that "Nasr is convinced he cannot sell settlement to his people or to other Arab states unless Arabs get bulk of Negev territory", and that if his territorial requirements were met, Nasser would agree to all other points needed to conclude a settlement. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I)

[6] See *infra*.

[7] January 22.

27. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State [1]

No. 16 *Cairo, January 22, 1956.*

1. The same group on our side met with Nasr and Zacharia tonight [2] for four hours. Following dinner I reopened the conversa-

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks with w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret. According to Dulles' message, *infra*, this message was dated January 22.

[2] January 21.

tion with a reiteration of the importance which we attached, and hoped Nasr attached, to the operation at hand and reviewed alternative policy decisions that would face Egypt, Israel, and the Western powers dependent upon obtaining or not obtaining a settlement. A most important concern was what I might say to the Israelis tomorrow. I expressed the hope that I would be able to indicate flexibility in his position concerning the issues so as to be optimistic about achieving a final settlement solution. We discussed the alternative positions which would confront Egypt and Israel dependent upon obtaining the settlement and pointed out that each country would have to decide what a settlement was worth and what they would be willing to concede as a price for obtaining it. I indicated that we anticipated the Israelis would be looking forward to direct negotiation at some point and probably would make more concessions by direct negotiations than through an emissary.

2. While there were extended conversations and discussions Nasr then made following points:

A. He could not presume to speak for the entire Arab States but would have to establish an atmosphere in which they were willing to accept settlement.

B. Any Arab who proposed settlement at this time would be regarded as a traitor and would face loss of power or the threat of assassination.

C. Nasr in reviewing the possibility of his country facing drastic action by Israel or the continued necessity of heavy military expenditures took an attitude of complete resignation saying "even though we consider a public works program of irrigation, schools, hospitals, and such things highly essential we have done without them for 1000 years and can continue to do without them for ten years more if necessity requires it in order to preserve the independence of our action." His attitude indicated a fatalistic approach to what his country might have to face but a very active concern with what he might have to face in terms of his own political future.

D. Should it become known that any Arab leader has opened direct negotiations with Israel such leader would have committed political suicide or worse. He therefore insisted that direct negotiations in the near future was an impossibility and said that he felt it must be left completely out of the agenda of our talks. We inquired if this attitude would prevail even if Ben Gurion should come to Egypt and he replied that the locale would make no difference.

E. Nasr stated that while there were several issues the only real problem in achieving settlement was that of boundaries. I asked him at this point if he could not agree to a more flexible position than that which he took yesterday.[3] He indicated that some flexibility was possible but insisted that the territorial link between the Arab countries had to reflect not only lines of communication but (A) the establishment of substantial sovereign Arab territory in the Negev

[3] See *supra*.

and (B) give the impression to the Arabs that they had recovered a substantial part of the territory which they feel was unjustly taken from them.

3. I then asked Nasr if in view of his refusal of direct negotiations at this time it would be possible to agree upon the principles of settlement through an exchange of documents to be signed by both countries comparable to the "Heads of Agreement" arrangement used in the settlement of the Suez dispute. Nasr doubted that this were possible and stated that he was willing to make commitments and pledges to me as an Emissary on a Top Secret basis but could not exchange any form of agreement directly with Israel and could not allow any of his pledges to be made public. He stated emphatically that if news of the operation at hand should leak he would immediately deny having had any such conversation.

4. I then asked if he thought it would be practicable for Egypt to direct a letter or document on a unilateral basis as a voluntary act without reference to our talks to the President setting forth assurances that Egypt would not engage in further hostilities and setting forth in broad principles the solutions which they believe possible of boundaries and the refugee problems. A similar letter might then be sought on a voluntary basis from Israel. Nasr thought this might be possible and agreed to meet . . . tomorrow night to try to draft such a letter.[4] We also suggested that he include in his letter allowing Israel the use of the Suez in the absence of a continued state of war, the lifting of the secondary boycott and the elimination of the blockade of Aqaba. While Nasr indicated agreement to include the latter three items in the letter we are not clear upon exactly what terms and whether these items would be conditioned upon the cessation of immediate hostilities or a longer term settlement agreement. I repeatedly pointed out to Nasr that oral pledges in the best of faith remaining Top Secret would allow a continuation of political pressures such as those associated with supplying arms to Israel in the light of the Egyptian-Czech arms trade. He said that he understood this point of view but wants to be in a position of not openly initiating settlement agreements with Israel at this time which he considers politically disastrous in Egypt and the other Arab States.

5. I now plan to depart Cairo Sunday[5] afternoon and arrive in Israel at approximately 5 p.m. I would appreciate your comments concerning our most recent conversations sent direct to me at Israel with copy to Cairo.[6] We will transmit to you tomorrow the draft text of my proposed letter which Nasr might agree to. I am particu-

[4] See Document 30.
[5] January 22.
[6] *Infra.*

larly interested in your evaluation of the effectiveness and worth of this arrangement in the light of Nasr's complete conviction that he cannot enter into direct negotiation in the near future.

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28. Message From the Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Jerusalem [1]

Washington, January 23, 1956.

REF

Paragraph 5 of your message, Sunday, January 22

1. You have handled discussions with Nasser with greatest skill. I believe you have advanced to him the basic points of our position and I fully support all of your statements. I will wire to you, after reports of your discussions with Ben Gurion, any further ideas I may have for your second round with Nasser.

2. It is obvious that we face great difficulties in bringing Nasser to positions that will make possible a settlement which the Israelis could accept or which we could urge upon them. With respect to Palestinian refugees, Nasser's position may not be as far from those developed in Alpha studies as may appear on surface. Question would hinge on number which would wish to return to Israel, bearing in mind that it would, of course, continue to be a Jewish state and bearing in mind that refugees' previous homes have for most part been destroyed or taken over by present inhabitants of Israel and that great majority of returning refugees would have to make new settlements. If, in fact, not more than 75,000 to 100,000 or less, when faced with actual choice between repatriation or resettlement in Arab communities elsewhere, would wish to return, possibility of arrangements which we could support is not too remote.

3. Nasser's condition of cession of Negev south of Dhariya–Gaza line is, of course, out of question. Presumably it is his starting point for bargaining but even as such it is disappointing. It remains to be developed in your subsequent discussions with him whether he can be brought to more reasonable position.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Secret. Drafted by Russell and approved by Hoover and Dulles.

4. Your suggestion of letters from Nasser and Ben Gurion is an excellent one and we should concentrate upon it. Israelis will undoubtedly make strong play for early direct meeting but as long as possibility remains of obtaining a letter from Nasser that in any way holds out real possibility of a settlement, you should tell Israelis that we believe refusal on their part proceed on this basis would put responsibility for breakdown of negotiations on them.

5. In reporting to Israelis on results of your talks with Nasser, I believe you should take general position that while his position was not encouraging, it was not completely discouraging; that in your opinion it still remains to be ascertained whether that position was for bargaining purposes and to what extent he is prepared to compromise with Israel position.

6. The Israelis will, of course, be suspicious and apprehensive over any suggestion that it may take several months to prepare the ground for the announcement of a settlement, fearing that it is a device to keep them from using their present military superiority while Egypt absorbs its new arms. One means of allaying this fear might be for both Egypt and Israel to give a firm undertaking not to resort to the use of armed force. This undertaking might be given either in the letters which you have suggested or in separate letters. As assurance that these undertakings would be carried out, you could refer to the U.S., as well as the U.K. and French, commitments under the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950, with particular emphasis on action within the U.N. which would be calculated to commit or expose Soviet Union. [2]

[2] According to a typewritten notation on the source text, Dulles added the text following "1950".

29. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State [1]

No. 19 *Jerusalem, January 23, 1956.*

Arrived Israel 5:00 p.m., Sunday. [2] Proceeded to Jerusalem by car

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Top Secret.

[2] January 22.

and dined with Mr. and Mrs. Teddy Kollek, and Mr. Shalit. No business was discussed.

1. We met this morning [3] for two and half hours with Prime Minister Ben Gurion, Mr. Sharett, Kollek and Mr. Herzog of the Foreign Office, the latter to keep notes. [4] . . . I opened the conversation by telling the Prime Minister of the great desire of President Eisenhower to secure a lasting peace in this area in order that the standards of living and national ambitions of Israel and her neighbors could be accomplished and expressed our concern over recent developments in the Middle East. It was suggested that I wanted above all else to fully understand the problems on both sides and therefore suggested that Ben Gurion begin our discussions by outlining the problems as he saw them.

2. Ben Gurion then related the historical and spiritual ambitions of his countrymen to re-establish the traditional home of the Jews, and recited the hardships which his countrymen had had over centuries, both during times of war, and as a result of discriminations in various nations in times of peace. He emphasized his belief in the ultimate superiority of spiritual values over material values.

3. Relating to the current tensions, he pointed out that war began on the day Israel was declared a state and continued until the Armistice was signed. He said Israel had at all times adhered strictly to the Armistice and still would abide by its terms. This he said Nasser had been unwilling to do. He expressed appreciation for the operation at hand and hoped that it could be productive but expressed grave reservations, particularly with reference to the sincerity of Nasser's desire to achieve a settlement.

4. Ben Gurion emphasized his own great desire for peace but stated that it must be within the framework of their national aspirations, that their territory was exceedingly small and that peace which involved a loss of territory would be suicide rather than settlement. He then stated that if Nasr were sincere and wanted peace in order to better the standards of living for his people there was hope. However, if Nasr believed that both the East and West were competing for his support and was influenced essentially by political aspirations with this competition to his advantage there was little hope. He stated that so long as there was one percent hope of settlement his country would enter the negotiations with sincerity.

5. He then indicated a desire to be informed as to the result of my visit with Nasr. I explained that my conversations had been limited to Nasr and Zacharia. That the problem of security was

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[3] January 23.

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Meetings with Israeli Officials. January 1956–March 1956)

uppermost in the Egyptian mind. That Nasr separated the problems into those involving the current tensions, and the larger question of his ability to sell the idea of settlement both to his own people and the other Arab countries. That Nasr insisted he wanted settlement but that it had to come after an atmosphere of acceptance was established in both Egypt and other Arab countries. That Nasr had been very concerned with the political aspects of the Baghdad Pact which he felt was directed from outside the Arab countries toward diminishing Egyptian influence. That he had frankly thought it necessary to counter the political consequences of Baghdad by propaganda campaigns directed against Turkey and the Western Powers which now had a substantial influence upon his ability to lead an Israeli settlement. I stated that our own evaluation of the political difficulties facing Nasr, both inside Egypt and among other Arab States, lent support to the belief that his problem was a difficult one.

6. I outlined the immediate problems of concern to Nasr relating to existing tensions, saying that he felt the refugee problem must be settled and that it should include a choice of repatriation or compensation on some acceptable terms. That he had insisted upon substantial sovereign Arab territory, linking the Arabs of Africa and Asia. That I had urged him to maintain a flexible position in this regard. That there were other boundary problems involving the linkage of villages and farms which would have to be settled but were of secondary importance. That problems of the secondary boycott, the blockade and the use of the Suez could be resolved in the absence of hostilities. That throughout my conversations I had urged an attitude of negotiability, but uppermost in Nasr's mind were questions of his own limitations in leading Egypt and Arab nations to accept a settlement and the establishment of the atmosphere in which this could be done. That certainly this atmosphere would require a cessation of hostilities and border incidents with an agreement on both sides to this effect to punish those who violated orders.

7. I pointed out that with the Egyptians now securing arms from Russia and Satellites, a new element of danger confronted Israel which must be faced realistically. That Israel could not hope to compete on a long term basis in view of the wide differences between their populations. That the sheer weight of numbers could eventually determine the balance of strength and influence their survival.

8. I then asked Ben Gurion if he thought the atmosphere within which settlement could be accomplished might be helped by a unilateral declaration of assurances by Israel to the President—that there would be a cease fire with a similar assurance from Egypt. He replied that it would provided there were discussions that could take

place between representatives of both sides on neutral territory at a lower level. I stated I had asked Nasr to explore this possibility. It was made clear that in conversations with Nasr we had not sought specific yes or no answers to questions of unilateral declarations, talks by representatives on neutral grounds and similar questions but had rather asked him to explore these possibilities which he was willing to do. Ben Gurion stated he was agreeable now to:

A. Assurances of cease fire.
B. Punishment of any on his side who violated cease fire.
C. The designation of a representative to discuss the broader issues in secrecy on neutral ground. That if results were not obtained, the secrecy would be maintained.

9. Ben Gurion repeatedly said he did not like to doubt Nasr's assurances of sincerity but did view his intentions skeptically stating "The facts were incompatible with a desire for peace" and then recited that he had asked General Burns to secure from Nasr a cease fire and an agreement to abide by the terms of the armistice. Burns had been unable to see Nasr and secure this agreement. That Israel had accepted the Hammarskjold proposals by [*but*] Egypt had not.

10. Ben Gurion said he appreciated the political difficulty of Nasr entering into direct negotiations at this time and believed it was more difficult for a dictator to make terms of settlement than for the leader of a democracy. However if there was the least desire for peace a cease fire and an agreement to carry on secret talks between representatives of the two countries should be possible.

11. Ben Gurion several times insisted that a final peace would only be achieved through agreement by heads of state but any advancement towards this end would require some exchange between representatives of the two governments at lower levels. He would prefer his representative would be Sharett.

12. Ben Gurion elaborated on his belief that Soviets were making a calculated bid for Central Asia and Africa in their support of the Czech arms deal and stated "Nasr probably believes that he is using the Russians but in fact he is their instrument". Ben Gurion stated that Russia now has one half of Europe and one half of Asia and with the Middle East and Africa in turmoil they would have gone a long way toward their goal of world domination.

13. At this point I again inquired of Ben Gurion if he believed sincerely that a declaration from both sides establishing a cease fire and some secret negotiation between the representatives of their countries would be a really constructive advancement towards settlement. Sharett intervened by saying it would be the "First serious step" toward achieving peaceful settlement.

14. Sharett stated that he understood Nasr's problem of establishing settlement because of the technique of the Arab States had been to inflame the people by propaganda in order to achieve cohesion of their people. In expanding on this theme Sharett stated the Arabs in attacking Zionism "Painted it blacker than the devil and utilized mass hysteria to focus the attention and hatred of the people against Zionism. In turn the leaders themselves became slaves to their own tactics and are unable to shift their ground since they cannot break the vicious circle".

15. Ben Gurion then asked "Is it your conclusion that the only thing you will be able to do now is (A) possibly obtain a cease fire, and (B) possibly arrange for discussions between representatives of both governments on a secret basis." I replied that I would like to put his inquiry conversely. That I did not think at this moment it was possible to evaluate all that could be accomplished. I doubted that a direct meeting of heads of state was feasible at this moment. That much could be accomplished through development of negotiable thinking, that a belief could be established that peace was achievable, that the final price for peace on both sides would ultimately have to be resolved by those responsible, that we might incorporate a definition of the principles upon which a solution could be achieved even though their principles at first might be different. We could, nevertheless, spell out the wideness of the gap, and explore the ways necessary to close the gap by flexibility on both sides. I stated that it was my belief that the most serious of all problems was that of boundaries and territory.

16. Ben Gurion then stated that he must face realities, that he was willing now to agree to a cease fire and for representatives to discuss problems, that he feared this would create an illusion in the U.S. with those who really mattered, naming President and the Secretary of State; that the Egyptians were receiving arms from Soviets and England; that they were being trained by Russian and Polish officers; that Egyptians were in Russia learning to use arms; that soon bombers could reach Israel from Egypt in 10 minutes and make 10 trips per day carrying 6000 lb bombs; that they could thus destroy Israel cities, population and industry, that Nasr would be sorely tempted to use this power; that he might come to believe peace was unnecessary because he could destroy Israel. This could come in a few months. He was forced to think about the security of his people. This security required arms which would match Soviet bombers and fighter planes. A decision concerning such offensive armaments had to be made by the U.S. He was trying to think as Nasr would think and this led him to doubt Nasr's real desire for peace because Nasr might conclude that Israel could be destroyed.

He stated this was Israel's last stand and wanted U.S. to appreciate the depth and sincerity of his worry.

17. Ben Gurion stated he could not finally depend on Nasr's assurances to me. They were not public, he would not reaffirm the armistice. He might simply continue talks. If U.S. maintains its present attitude of embargo of arms to Israel and failed to provide for Israel's safety, we would be "Guilty of the greatest crime in our history." During whole of this speech containing other arguments, he was most impassioned.

18. The meeting ended at this time because of other official commitments by Sharett and Ben Gurion. Talks will continue this afternoon. [5] Please give me your comments and counsel. [6]

[5] See Document 33.
[6] See Document 34.

30. Message to Washington [1]

No. 20 *Cairo, January 24, 1956.*

1. Following is text of proposed message from Nasr to President Eisenhower prepared . . . evening Jan 22. Nasr acknowledges that message represents his views and authorizes us to state to President. However he says he cannot even consider signing until satisfied that Israelis will sign a letter embodying substantially the same points, particularly with regard to territorial adjustments and refugees.

"My Dear President:

Knowing and sharing the world wide anxiety for the preservation of peace, I wish to address myself to you, whose many declarations on behalf of peace and justice are well known to my countrymen. The people of Egypt have no desire other than to grow in the peaceful fruition of our national inheritance. Having so recently acquired the pure—that is to say sovereign—possession of our lands, it could not now be our wish to desert their enjoyment for the purpose of military conquest or adventure. This means that Egypt harbors no hostile intentions toward any other state and will never be party to an aggressive war. More particularly, it means that Egypt will continue to make every reasonable effort to insure that

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret. Also sent to Anderson in Jerusalem. According to the Government of Egypt, the message transmitted in Message 20 was never issued by Nasser.

hostile incidents along the armistice line between Egypt and Israel do not become the occasion of war, and I assure you that on Egypt's part, every effort will be made to prevent the incidents themselves. Any person under Egyptian jurisdiction found responsible for improper conduct in this respect will, moreover, be suitably punished. The establishment of Israel in Palestine has been beyond a doubt the gravest imaginable challenge to the peaceful preoccupation of the Arab people. Notwithstanding the sense of injustice which will linger among generations of us, Egypt, however has indicated her acceptance of the U.N. resolutions concerning the disposition of Palestine and of the two million Arab refugees displaced by Israel. In doing so Egypt has recognized the ultimate desirability of any understanding between the Arab States and Israel which will bring a permanent peace to the area and which will respect the fundamental rights and aspirations of the Arab people.

It may now be time to clarify further the principles upon which, in my view, such a permanent peace might be achieved. The basic issue is that of territorial adjustment, and I am confident that justice demands that Israel concede such territory as she now occupies as will permit the Arabs of Asia and Africa to be joined together by a continuous and substantial land area under Arab sovereignty and peopled by Arabs. Other rectifications which may be desirable to convert the present demarkation lines into permanent borders can be made, I am sure, on a mutual basis.

Only [*Once*] a just and reasonable solution of the territorial problem has been reached, I am convinced that agreement on the resettlement or repatriation of the Arab refugees can follow readily. I regard it as essential, however, that the refugees be given their freedom to choose repatriation or compensation for the loss of their former homes and property in Palestine. It would seem to me to be wise to grant all refugees the opportunity of electing to receive compensation immediately if they so choose; but as for those electing repatriation, account must be taken of Israel's absorptive capacity, and actual repatriation would have to be phased over an appropriate number of years. Meanwhile, suitable resettlement undertakings could be got underway.

With respect to the primary status of Jerusalem, it is my feeling that the Kingdom of Jordan should have the right of decision, and I would not object if the Kingdom of Jordan elected to retain the present division of Jerusalem. It goes without saying that the exercise of belligerent rights, such as blockade and secondary boycott, would cease upon the effective date of any settlement envisioned above; and in the event that suitable guarantees of a forthcoming settlement were presented, it would appear quite possible that the exercise of these rights could be terminated in advance of an actual announcement of the settlement. As for the matter of future trade relations between the Arab States and Israel I regard this as within the competence of each of the sovereign Arab States to decide in accordance with its own desires and interests. I do not profess to know whether Israel could ever come to a recognition of the propriety of the above suggestions nor indeed at this moment do I have a conviction that Israel desires to seek peaceful solutions. In writing to you Mr. President I have wished to inform you of the possibilities for peaceful settlement which I and my government can

foresee and which we would earnestly entertain and support with regard to the other Arab States."

2. Comment and fuller report of conversation will follow. [2]

[2] Document 32.

31. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State [1]

No. 21 *Jerusalem, January 24, 1956.*

1. On Monday 23 January I lunched alone with Sharett. He made several inquiries concerning Nasser and Zacharia. He asked if they appeared to be frank. If I thought they were really concerned in a program of economic development for their country. If they used the language well. If they appeared to have an attitude of seriousness on the importance of our undertaking. I stated that both spoke good English. That occasionally there was some need for explaining particular words or phrases. That I had asked them to repeat their observations in case of doubt. That I believed they were seriously concerned with their economic and development program. He asked what this program included. I replied that it included projects of irrigation, community centers, schools, water surveys and similar efforts.

2. Sharett asked whether I had directly ascertained from Nasser if he would agree to representatives below the level of heads of state meeting secretly on neutral territory to discuss the issues. I replied that I had not put the question directly to Nasser, asking for a yes or no answer, but had asked him to explore the idea which he had agreed to do. I then stated that since Nasser had limited conversations on his side, the choice of such a representative might be difficult. Sharett agreed it would be much more difficult for Nasser than for Israel.

3. Sharett said he wanted to make two very pointed statements. He then stated that he thought I had correctly assessed the primary issue dividing the two countries as being one of territories and boundaries. He reminded me that the Prime Minister had stated that Israel could not consider any relinquishment of territory as a price

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Top Secret.

for peace. He understood Nasser's insistence on a territorial link between the Arab States but felt that this might be a cover for Nasser's real intentions of cutting off the State of Israel from the Port of Elath and their access to the Red Sea. He felt that a "belt of territory" connecting the Arab States and separating Israel from the Red Sea would be untenable even though a corridor to Elath should be provided. He said that Elath represented to them a great national hope and was necessary to the fulfillment of their ambitions. He wanted me to understand the necessity of Israel maintaining her territory and her connection to the Red Sea through the Gulf of Aqaba under all circumstances.

4. His second point related to refugees. He said in this area he saw a ray of hope. That it was unthinkable for Israel to be asked to provide settlement for "new Arab families". That currently Israel had an Arab community of about 180,000. That recently they had authorized members of the family who had been separated from those now located in Israel to return to Israel. That this policy might be enlarged so as to include additional relatives and thereby allow Egypt to take the position that they had secured from Israel the repatriation of a percentage of the refugees. That this enlargement would be limited to increases in existing families but that once repatriated they would have freedom of action. Sharett said that historically the Arab States had not been connected and it might be to the Western advantage if the Arabs of Africa and Asia were not united. That the existence of Israel between them might be a blessing.

5. I replied saying that unquestionably the territorial problem was the greatest barrier to a settlement. That if both sides approached the problem with absolute inflexibility, discussions at any level would be of little profit. That I had insisted on Nasser maintaining position of flexibility and I hoped that Israel would maintain an attitude of flexibility despite any feelings which they might now have about the problem.

6. On the question of refugees, I stated that I too saw hope. That I did not believe Nasser was deeply concerned with the actual numbers repatriated but essentially with setting up device which would preserve principle of some freedom of choice between repatriation and compensation. Sharett said he appreciated this point of view but that acceptance of the "principle of the freedom of choice was a dangerous one". He thought that there was room to explore various devices by which the refugee problem could be solved.

7. As I was preparing to leave, Sharett said he wanted to emphasize again that the most important problem at the moment was our decision concerning additional arms for Israel.

8. Our conversation ended at this point. Will appreciate any comments or suggestions. [2]

[2] See Document 34.

32. Message to Washington [1]

No. 22 *Cairo, January 24, 1956.*

1. . . . During discussion Nasr reactions to Anderson's proposals of the evening before [2] emerged as follows:

A. . . . in December, he made most tremendous and difficult decision of any Arab leader this generation; that is he resolved make peace with Israel. This is firm decision.

B. As Nasr understood the agreement . . . that he agreed procedure comprised three phases: First, a period during which a negotiator had discussions with both sides in order to narrow the differences and join the issues; Second, a phase wherein Nasr would get the Arab leaders in line and ensure that they would follow along with whatever agreement is worked out with Ben Gurion; finally, actual negotiations with Ben Gurion. Since December, Nasr has been feeling out his own supporters and other Arab leaders as well. He had always thought that the second phase would take "Many months" and he now thinks that it may take still longer and cannot be accomplished at all unless preceded by a "Tension reducing period".

C. Though Nasr has been most impressed by Anderson's sincerity and obvious stature, he is "Nervous" because Anderson seems to be introducing a new time element into the understanding. "This problem is seven years old and many people have tried to solve it. Mr. Anderson seems to think that only three days after his arrival he can get us to agree and arrange an immediate meeting with Ben Gurion".

D. Nasr does not understand why Anderson was so upset about position he took with regard to Negev. "Does not Mr. Anderson understand that this is the position I am taking at beginning of negotiations?" Nasr then indicated that he would "Probably" be willing to settle for "Beersheba South". After I needled him he finally hinted this was still an asking price. (I do feel any further retreat he makes will simply be minor alterations of proposed line.)

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.-March 1956. Part I. Secret. Also sent to Anderson in Jerusalem.

[2] See Document 27.

2. . . . pointed out that during their December talks Nasr seemed to envision faster progress through phase one and two than he apparently now expects. Nasr admitted this and gave as reason that his attempts since December to feel out views of various Arab leaders had evoked overwhelming insistence that no peace with Israel at any time or under any circumstances is possible. (That very afternoon in fact he had gotten this line from Nazim Qudsi, Akram Hourani and Leb FonMin [3]) "In spite of our determination", he said, "This will be a long and difficult task and if we are to succeed we must go into it with full realization that this is the case".

3. Nasr then reminded us that what he had promised . . . was that he would go as far in compromising with Israel as was possible and at same time maintain a position he could sell other Arab leaders. Our intelligence on public opinion throughout the Arab World could not be so adequate as to lead us to believe that he has any chance whatever of getting away with accepting a "Heads of Agreement" settlement just now. He is convinced, as he feels we must be convinced if we have any appreciation of the present mood of the Arab people, that he could not possibly admit publicly his intention to recognize Israel until the present tensions are eased. The two factors causing these tensions are the refugees and the absence of a land link between African and Asiatic Arabs.

4. Nasr reminded us that over a year ago he had suggested . . . that a "Secret Committee" of Egyptians and Americans be set up with the task of ironing out all problems between us which stood in the way of American-Egyptian cooperation in the area. [4] He said that he now needs some individual to work with him on just such a basis, and that when he talked . . . in December he had this sort of arrangement in mind rather than one involving working with a Presidential representative for a "few days". He is ready to launch upon a full scale program, one objective of which will be peace with Israel. He added that his approach to the problem would succeed, whereas our approach (i.e. that of having an immediate announcement of his intentions to recognize Israel) would certainly fail and that if we wish to work with him at solving the problem on this basis he suggests he is prepared to set about doing his part immediately.

5. I pointed out we were in no position to dispute his views on the situation in the Arab World and his capabilities for dealing with it. On the other hand he is in no position to argue with us on the question of our position and the many factors affecting it. What we have to do is to arrive at a solution of the problem which takes into

[3] Salim Lahoud.

[4] No record of such a suggestion has been found in Department of State files.

consideration both his capabilities and ours. The plan he suggests totally ignores our problems. More specifically it does not recognize the dilemma we will all be in should Israel launch a preventive war. To this Nasr replied that in taking into consideration his own capabilities, he could think of no way of proceeding other than what he had already proposed. (See Para 1B above) He would be most interested however in seeing a proposal from us which takes into consideration our capabilities and at the same time our views of his capabilities. It is difficult for Nasr to believe that the proposal Anderson made was in any way based on an understanding of his present capabilities. The only result would be to give Nuri Said a weapon with which to destroy him.

6. Nasr then said he had told . . . in December that he was willing to discuss settlement of the Israel problem as part of the area wide problems and that he could take a constructive attitude only so long as the discussions were on this basis. "Once the threat of Israel is raised", he said, "I have no choice but reply that I will face this threat with all my energies and to give you my conviction that we will defeat the Israeli if they launch an attack upon us."

7. We then took up the question of the letter. After considerable quibbling over some of the passages we finally agreed upon the text forwarded in Message No. 20. [5] He said that even this however must be in the form of a message sent via our channels to the President (rather than a signed official letter) and that it must be regarded as Top Secret. He would not be able to consider putting this letter in the form of an official document until given the assurances as indicated in Message No. 20. He pointedly reminded us of the fact that several times in the past we had given sensitive info to American Embassy and that it has subsequently leaked to his and often our extreme disadvantage.

8. When I pointed out that he was now agreeing to something less than what we had understood the evening before, he replied that he had later been disturbed at the possibility that he may not really have understood Anderson's proposal nor had we understood his reply to it. We then discussed briefly the problem of understanding one another and he remarked that there were very few foreigners that he could talk to with any confidence that they were understanding him and he was understanding them. He said that he used Fawzi as a device for delay. Since Fawzi is powerless to make decisions having him conduct negotiations assures Nasr of an opportunity to study carefully any propositions that are put to him and to make sure he comprehends them. It is evident that he regrets the absence of such a device in dealing with Anderson, for . . . this

[5] Document 30.

does not give him time for study and consequently he cannot be sure of avoiding giving a wrong or easily misunderstood answer to propositions put to him, e.g. Anderson's "Heads of Agreements" Proposal.

9. There are still numerous loose ends arising from our conversations which we will eventually get around to reporting separately. I believe however that in this discussion with Nasr we have gotten more nearly to the heart of the problem than we have up to now. My own view . . . is that the problem before us is that we have a chance of solving the Palestine problem provided we are able to give Nasr the capability of doing so. I also feel that if we are not able to work on this basis we must plan for the future on the assumption that the Palestine problem will not be solved for many years to come. I feel we have made many points with Nasr (certainly we made a major point when we got him to agree to work actively toward making peace with Israel) but he has also successfully made one point with us. That it is useless to get an agreement from him which he has no chance of selling to other Arab leaders and that he has no chance of selling to other Arab leaders any agreement except after going through the phases he envisions.

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33. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State [1]

No. 26 *Jerusalem, January 24, 1956.*

1. I met with Ben-Gurion and Teddy Kollek at 5 p.m. [2] We remained alone for two and half hours. Our early discussions concerned agricultural developments in Israel and various problems of agriculture in the U.S. and elsewhere. Ben-Gurion then asked if I minded "talking shop". I told him I was delighted since this was my purpose in being here. He stated that during my earlier conversations I had referred to both Egypt and Israel maintaining a position of "flexibility" in order that a solution of their problems might be arrived at. He wanted to make clear that in his mind this term meant different things when applied to the opposite sides. In the case of Egypt flexibility meant that they should not be too demand-

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.-March 1956. Part I. Top Secret.

[2] January 23.

ing in asking concessions of Israel territory; while in the case of Israel flexibility meant that they must be willing to give up territory without receiving territory in exchange. He wanted to emphasize that he was not asking for any part of Egyptian territory although they had great areas, particularly in the Sinai Peninsula, of which they were making little use and which would be to his great advantage. He was only asking that he keep the territory which he now occupied. He thought, therefore, that there was a danger in arriving at solutions through formulas since they did have different meanings as in this case. He elaborated that true flexibility would mean each side keeping its own territory as now occupied and sharing lines of communication, cultural exchanges, educational opportunities and like areas of mutual helpfulness. That in this respect he was entirely flexible and wanted to be a good neighbor and in fact a partner in improving the lot of people in this part of the world. He then stated that he would like to discuss the question of freedom of choice on the part of the refugees between repatriation and compensation. That freedom of choice in his judgment was unthinkable. That if he gave his word it would mean in his mind an ultimate responsibility for the repatriation of large numbers of refugees. He wanted me to know that after the defeat of the Arabs in the Gaza area, Israel had offered the refugees the right to remain in the country if they would lay down their arms. They sought advice from Arab leaders who told them to get out of the country because their lands would be retaken by conquest. He said that a similar occurrence was applicable to the refugees in the area of Tiberias. He wanted me to understand that Israel had taken refugees from all parts of the world and had provided homes, lands and employment for them without asking anything in return. He believed that the refugees were not [?] entitled to compensation but that any "freedom of choice" was not possible as a matter of principle or practice for Israel.

2. Ben-Gurion stated that he appreciated the great concern of the President in trying to achieve peace in this area. He too wanted peace but felt that realism required almost a miracle to achieve it. He stated "you have undertaken the most difficult task of modern times but the most noble one." He felt we should never say that "peace was impossible" but that we should look at it realistically and when so examined it presented almost insuperable barriers.

3. While he was not endeavoring to advise the U.S. in the determination of its own policy, he thought we should realize two dangers which confronted us. The first of these dangers was that the Russian penetration of Africa had already begun. Their arms trade with Egypt was a part of a well-conceived plan for penetration which would continue. He pointed out that we had taken action in

Iran just in time to prevent the penetration of that country but that in Egypt he fears that we were "too late." He stated that he now fears that we were in a position of being "lured" to Egypt in the hope that we would make commitments to their advantage after the penetration had already progressed to the point that it could not be halted.

4. He expressed the fear that the philosophy was growing that "Israel should be sacrificed in order to achieve Arab alliances with the Western powers." He thought this was a great mistake. He felt that the course of wisdom required the continued strengthening of the free countries in the Middle East and those who supported democratic forms of government. He was quite sure in his own mind that the Arab States would make their decisions on alliances quite independent of any action which we might take in support of Egypt.

5. The second danger which he wanted to point out to us was that resulting from an increase in the strength of Egypt as compared to the strength of Israel. Under these circumstances he feared the temptation to use its power would be too great for Nasser to resist. That we might be promoting the feeling on Nasser's part that a "settlement was unnecessary." That Nasser as a soldier had once been defeated in battle with Israel and would therefore be moved to take revenge if he secured equality or superiority in arms.

6. He then asked if I had the impression "not from what has been told you by either side but from your understanding of the issues involved" if I felt there was any real hope of achieving settlement. I replied that I thought it essential that we keep the hopes for peaceful settlement alive. That war could only do damage to both sides. That the very best men in both countries might be lost regardless of the outcome. That in any event the damage would set back the countries for a long time to come. That I felt we must regard the decisions which would be made now "as fateful choices" having great implications for the survival and progress of the countries involved. That we approached this difficult problem fully realizing the severity of the issues but were concerned with each country surviving, making progress for its people, and achieving an important place in the community of nations. That war could only promote turmoil and confusion in this area of the world and offered the best hope of the Soviets extending their sphere of influence. That our country faced very important decisions in connection with these issues. That I realized the necessity for facing the problems realistically and that the price which might have to be paid for peace could be exceedingly severe but that it should always be measured against the consequences of war or the long-term implication of a flow of arms to the Arab countries with its population advantage over Israel. That on a long-term basis this could only place Israel in

an untenable position. He stated that these problems were very much on his mind and he was continuing to give the most serious thought to them.

7. As I was preparing to leave, Ben-Gurion said he wanted to make two statements. The first was that he thought every effort should be made to secure peace. That whether or not peace was secured could not be entirely decided through any efforts by our country alone. The second statement was that our country could, through its own decisions, "be responsible for the prevention of war."

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34. Message From the Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Jerusalem [1]

Washington, January 24, 1956.

Following are my thoughts in connection your messages of January 23 and 24 and . . . of January 24: [2]

1. Problem as it appears from your talks to date divides into: (a) ascertaining extent of agreement between two countries and extent of divergence on questions where there is not agreement; and, (b) maintaining atmosphere in which negotiations can continue for minimum period necessary to work out terms of settlement and area acceptance. Suggest you take position with both Ben Gurion and Nasser that your first round of discussions has been for purpose of hearing their general views and statement of principles on which they approach problem; that, as you anticipated when you came to area, problem of working out a settlement will prove to be an extremely difficult one requiring, quite possibly, numerous interchanges; that you would like in second round of conversations to discuss in more detail what appear to you to be the eight or ten items on which agreement will be essential so that you and they may ascertain exact extent of agreement and differences.

2. For purpose of check-list, of ascertaining extent of agreement and disagreement, and possible direction toward which thinking of both sides might be directed where there is a divergence, you may

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.-March 1956. Secret. Approved by Byroade, Hoover, and Dulles.

[2] Documents 29, 31, and 32, respectively.

find useful Alpha materials sent to you at Cairo [3] and on which Burdett, who is arriving Cairo today, conversant.

3. In discussions with Israelis concerning Negev, suggest you take position that we believe some concession toward principle of land contact between Egypt and rest of Arab world is necessary if Nasser's cooperation on settlement is to be obtained and that position by IG of no alterations in Negev boundaries would, in our opinion, foreclose possibility of a settlement. We hope they will give most serious thought to possible alternative arrangements which would make possible establishment of principle of Arab land contact with minimum lessening of Israel's vital interests in area, assuming an overall settlement and consequent security treaty by U.S. and possibly other powers.

4. It is, of course, indispensable that both sides refrain from any armed action during period necessary for working out a settlement. I am inclined to believe, however, that a specific agreement to a cease-fire through you as channel would raise complicating issues which might derail your main effort and which, even if achieved, could prove illusory since relaxed border may always be at mercy of acts by unidentified individuals. Would recommend, therefore, that you confine your efforts along this line to emphasizing need for continued relaxed situation, leaving problem of specific agreements on this question to Burns and Hammerskjold.

5. With respect to point (b) in paragraph 1 above, believe you should take position, especially with Nasser, that it will probably be impossible to delay agreement in principle upon terms of settlement for more than next month or possibly two or three at very most, but also, and this point should be stressed especially with Ben Gurion, Nasser will be faced with very real problem of making sure of Arab acceptance of any settlement which may well take some time. If agreement in principle is reached soon, the problem of assuring Israel's security during period required for announcing and implementing agreement should not prove insuperable.

6. Nasser's agreement to send communication of general nature indicated by . . . message January 24 is step forward. Obviously drafting of it should await determination of extent to which you ascertain agreement is possible and should incorporate all points of agreement or progress toward some compromise position.

7. Nasser's agreement to reduce propaganda against Israel also encouraging. [4] With respect point 6 in . . . message January 24, it

[3] Not further identified.

[4] According to Message 23 of January 24 from Cairo to Anderson in Jerusalem, Nasser had agreed to order a reduction of Egyptian propaganda against Israel. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Jan. '56—memos, etc.)

should be stressed with Nasser that points you may make with him pursuant my message to you of January 20 [5] are in broadest sense a discussion of "area-wide problems" and constitute effort to "iron out problems between us which stood in the way of American-Egyptian cooperation in the area" referred to in paragraph 4 same message.

[5] Document 24.

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35. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State [1]

No. 29 *Jerusalem, January 25, 1956.*

1. We were advised Monday evening that our next meeting with Ben-Gurion would be desirable at 11 o'clock Tuesday [2] in order to give Ben-Gurion, Sharett and their associates an opportunity to talk privately. . . . I met with Ben-Gurion, Sharett, Kollek and Herzog for more than an hour. [3]

2. Ben-Gurion inquired if I still had hopes for peace. I replied that I thought the continuation of hope and optimism was necessary. That all of us owed primary oblig make supreme effort achieve peace. That I thought we must not be unduly discouraged by opening positions if both sides maintained a willingness to try to reach rapprochement. That I was not an expert in psychology, especially Oriental, and that we must not overlook the psychological factors of bargaining which could motivate each side in taking a position. Ben-Gurion indicated that he agreed that every effort must be made to reach settlement.

3. I then asked Ben-Gurion if after our talks of yesterday, he felt we are nearer to peace. Ben-Gurion started to reply but Sharett interrupted and replied instead.

4. Sharett made following points: He stated that as the result of the talks of yesterday and my coming to Israel, the IG now feels most determined to attempt to arrive at an understanding. In order that there can be an effort to deter the situation rolling into "an

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Top Secret.

[2] January 24.

[3] Memorandum of conversation by Anderson, not printed. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Meetings with Israeli Officials. January 1956–March 1956)

abyss" he stated that they attached the most decisive importance to direct meeting at the highest possible level since this would constitute an earnest or token of good will by Nasser. Otherwise, he stated, the IG would be suspicious that Nasser will be misleading the President and the Israelis and enemies into sense of false assurance. This he said, would result in blunting our senses of apprehension and in time we lose while they gain. He explained that the meeting was not merely symbol but that it would clarify and feel out the future courses and possibilities for peace. For example, on the territorial question he stated "Let Nasser explain to us what his real interest is in Arab land continuity. Let us develop our view why it is not necessary." He observed that even if meeting failed there would be some progress since certain difficulties would be better understood and at least communications will have been established. Sharett emphasized that they attached primary significance to the meeting itself rather than the issues discussed or solutions accomplished, elaborated that progress would be made if their discussions only revolved around secondary issues leading up to primary issues which could be discussed later in a better climate of understanding.

5. I then inquired if Sharett had learned anything of value from his conversation with Hammarskjold.[4] He replied that he was seeing Hammarskjold at 4:00 o'clock with Ben-Gurion and would report to me tonight.[5] Sharett stated he inferred that Hammarskjold felt Nasser had made a commitment to him accepting Hammarskjold's proposals. However, he could not be sure until he talked to Hammarskjold directly.

6. I then asked if he felt that really worthwhile progress had been achieved if we secured unilateral declarations resulting in a cease fire, followed by secret conversations at the highest obtainable level. They thought so. I suggested that such a course should be coinciden; with discernible evidences which would ease tensions such as refraining from inflammatory statements, refraining from retaliation, confiding in an emissary and working toward an atmosphere of understanding. They agreed.

7. Ben-Gurion then stated that there were only two problems. The first was peace; the second was prevention of war. All of us wanted [peace?]. Israel was determined to try. He tried to appreciate Nasser's position and understood that Nasser faced political difficulties in making peace. Ben-Gurion's primary concern, however, was

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[4] Hammarskjöld was in Israel January 23–25.

[5] According to the memorandum of his conversation on the evening of January 24 with Ben Gurion, Sharett, Kollek, and Herzog, Anderson was informed by Sharett "that Hammarskjold had not obtained a cease-fire from Nasr, . . . but rather an explanation of why Nasr could not issue one." (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Meetings with Israeli Officials. January 1956–March 1956)

with preventing war. This could only be accomplished by creating a situation in which war would not occur. They now faced the realization that Egypt was acquiring arms. These arms could only have one purpose. It was necessary for Israel to be placed in situation where they did not fear this flow of arms to Egypt. The situation which will prevent war, he said "your govt. can accomplish alone. This is message which I want you to take home to your govt."

8. Ben-Gurion continued his discussions saying "there is no inherent conflict between us and Egypt" if we can sit down together, we can work out our problems. Meanwhile war must be prevented.

9. I then asked Ben-Gurion if I understood correctly that he was concerned both with the facts of strength on the respective sides and assurances by the respective sides that their strength would not be used. This he said was the substance of his concern but currently the situation of relative strength was the most important element. Neither side could be content with assurance alone, either from the opposite side or from outside powers.

10. Reverting to possibility of conversations, I pointed out if secret conversations become possible they might not include same official reps on respective sides because of differences govt. organization. They replied protocol was not important, only that the Egyptian rep have Nasser's confidence. I further suggested if secret high level conversations were not possible at this moment they should participate in secret conversations at any level obtainable, looking to an improvement in the level. This they agreed to. I then reverted to possibility of unilateral statements by each side in order to focus attention to the effort of settlement. This they agreed was desirable and significant. However, they emphasized that it must not be regarded as an act of "absolution" by Nasser. Other discernible efforts must be coincidental.

11. While agreeing to secret conversations at any level, they continually emphasized the importance of high level, and expressed willingness to hold such conversations in Egypt in order to lessen the problem for Nasser.

12. Their preoccupation with arms issue is always apparent. Their overwhelming desire for some direct communication is uppermost in their minds.

13. The tone of our conversations seem to have swung from an initial reaction of disappointment by Israel to one of real determination to make the most of what they call this "decisive effort."

36. Message From the Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Jerusalem [1]

Washington, January 25, 1956.

Following comments and suggestions based on your message of January 24 to Secretary, [2] your message January 25 [3] . . . , and first section your message January 25 to Secretary [4] (last section delayed in receipt):

1. I believe it is important that you take position both with Ben Gurion and Nasser that, while you have desired and benefited from exposition of their concerns and views on broadest basis, your specific task is to ascertain specifically what agreement exists or could likely be achieved on the eight or ten principal issues between two sides. Problems of cease-fire and arms shipments are, of course, important but they are so involved with UN and Tripartite policies and procedures that it is not feasible to attempt to deal with them through your discussions. Suggest, therefore, you take position that you will report fully in your telegrams and after your return all statements they make to you in respect those matters but that they are not the subject of your mission, which is to make direct contribution to helping parties work out terms of settlement. Upon our appraisal of that much else will depend.

2. The Israel Government, as anticipated, is laying heavy stress on early direct meeting. In view of Nasser's position on this, I doubt whether much hope can be placed on direct talks as means of achieving settlement at this time. Therefore, believe we should assure IB [*IG*] that we will continue to work toward direct meeting but inform them we believe that as practical matter if settlement is to be achieved at this time a considerable amount of ground work will have to be done in lining up the issues, ascertaining extent of agreement and areas and nature of disagreement in preparation for direct meetings which could then deal with specific matters.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Russell, cleared with Rountree and Byroade, and approved by Dulles.

[2] Presumably a reference to Document 31.

[3] According to Message 28, January 25, the Israelis emphasized to Anderson that they understood the need to ease tensions. Anderson stated that they were "preoccupied" with a direct, secret, high-level meeting with the Egyptians which would deal with both important and secondary problems. Anderson considered the Israelis to be determined to make the most of such a meeting with Egypt and asked that the U.S. officials in Egypt try to sell Nasser on the idea. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 5189, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956, Part I)

[4] *Supra*.

37. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, January 25, 1956—11 a.m.

743. For the Secretary. Sharett called me to Jerusalem last night to inform me of Eban's appointment with you [2] and, as he put it, to use my "good offices" to send few personal words in addition to those you will hear from Eban this afternoon.

He showed me copy his January 16 letter, [3] endorsed its contents, then spoke full hour on following lines:

(1) He reviewed development Israel's request to United States for arms and how [garble] which he had led himself to hope would be favorable "at least to modest extent" had been frustrated or delayed by Kinneret, leisurely Security Council deliberations, and seasonal holidays.

(2) Meanwhile Egypt's strength grew apace both in equipment and skill of its personnel in use of new weapons.

(3) Time for decision had arrived for United States and Israel. To trust Nasser's humanitarianism or statesmanship to refrain from attacking is to "tax quite unduly Israel's capacity for wishful thinking", to trust outside guarantees would be irresponsible. In first place there is none; if they existed they could not avail against swift blitz attack which could destroy Tel Aviv and Haifa in matter of hours. Therefore Israel must know where she is going. United States must decide in manner consistent with its traditional sense of fair play and its responsibilities to those nations, large and small, which have chosen to cast lot with west.

(4) He then broached his main point. If it were present disposition of United States to decide to supply Israel with arms but if in existing circumstances we were inhibited from announcing it, he would personally guarantee complete secrecy of any such decision made known to GOI until it was mutually agreed to disclose it.

Sooner or later, decision would have to be known; first, because such decisions eventually are known; and second for whatever deterrent effect it would have on aggressive intent of "other side". Public knowledge can be indefinitely delayed but it is most important for government "or possibly only leading members of government to know". I asked him what sort of communication he required. He replied that most informal word from me to him or

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/1–2556. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:48 a.m.

[2] See *infra*.

[3] Document 19.

from you to Eban to effect that decision in principle had been taken plus assurances of early discussion of types, quantities and deliveries, would be eminently satisfactory.

Discussion could be on basis of Israel list but there were many possibilities for flexible adjustment. US might choose to eliminate whole categories, reduce others. It might choose to encourage existing negotiations with France (presumably for Mystere IV's).

But Israel must have assurances as basis for formulation of policy. "It must know", he repeated "where it is going".

(5) Sharett said they had one report British line of argument in Eisenhower–Eden talks would be that present critical circumstances Middle East require short-cut to peaceful settlement between Israel and Egypt, essential element of which would be "far-reaching concessions" by Israel. This thesis has it that Israel is so desperately pressed she can be persuaded to make such concessions if permitted to survive. Hence she must understand she can obtain no arms until she agrees.

"Those who so believe are due for sharp disappointment. We will not make concessions which threaten our survival. We shall resist".

He developed extensively theme of British self-delusion as to their infallibility in Middle East despite record of failure after failure year after year. He cited Jordan where he said British had "position" which they had shaken to foundations by failure to foretell consequences of attempting to obtain Jordanian adherence to Baghdad Pact. "Now status quo ante is very best they can hope for".

(6) He challenged theory attributed by press to Byroade that "if United States gives or sells arms to Israel it will push Arabs, particularly Egypt, closer to Soviets and only result in Soviets supplying even greater quantities of arms to Arab States (Embtel 722[4]). We are told that Israel must jeopardize her own security to avoid Egyptian appeal to Soviets for couple score more MIGs to add to 200 she has already received or has been promised.

If Egyptians demanded additional arms of Soviets as result of United States decision to supply arms to Israel, it would be clearly established that Nasser's intent was annihilation of Israel. "He already has advantage that we cannot hope or do not want to overtake quantitatively. Why should he want to increase it if his intent is not offensive? We cannot entertain such counsel. Time is running against us. Other side has very considerable start but within limits we can still overtake them, not quantitatively, which we are not interested in, but qualitatively".

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[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/1–1856)

(7) I asked about public pressures, Sharett replying that opinion had not yet crystallized because public could still hope in absence of United States rejection. "If public ever despairs of favorable United States reply they will be in difficult mood."

Comment: Sharett spoke with all exterior manifestations of his usual urbanity, but he was more serious than I have seen him in months. I believe he was speaking on line previously agreed by top leadership, including Ben Gurion. He is sincerely incredulous that we can entertain other than his evaluation of substance items 3, 5, and 6 above. He believes Israel has suffered consequences of its Kinneret action and having been censured for this transgression, chapter should be closed.

Meanwhile, public is being conditioned to regard United States arms decision as key to their security. If disappointed, reaction will be unpredictable but I am confident it won't be one of docile resignation to whatever fate holds.

Lawson

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38. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 25, 1956, 10:40 a.m. [1]

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
The Secretary
NEA—George V. Allen

Ambassador Eban repeated the urgent Israeli request to buy arms in the United States, stressing that four months had passed since the Egyptian-Czech deal, during which time Israel had not been able to obtain one single item of equipment relevant to the Egypt arms increment. As regards the possibility of a peace settlement with the Arabs, he said Ambassador Byroade had confirmed to him that a considerable slice of the Negev would have to be surrendered to obtain peace. This was added reason to think that peace was unlikely. He said his Government could understand that the United States might not wish to make a public announcement of

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/1–2556. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles and Allen. The time of the conversation is from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

the sale of arms to Israel at this moment due to the reaction in the Arab World, but he earnestly hoped that some assurance could be given in confidence to Ben Gurion and Sharett that arms would be available before long. Reports of large numbers of Soviet technicians in Egypt indicated that Nasser was hastening his preparations, to be ready by summer.

The Secretary said relations between Israel and the United States were close enough to enable him to discuss the situation with full friendliness and frankness. Even if agreement could not be reached, there should be understanding of our respective points of view due to our common objectives. He stated that the preservation of Israel "in all its essentials" was basic to United States policy, and that this policy was bipartisan.

The Secretary then pointed out that a reappraisal of the means for achieving common objectives in the Middle East had been made necessary by Soviet activities in the area. Almost unlimited Soviet arms were available to Egypt. Perhaps these arms were not of the most modern type but they were formidable. Israel might obtain enough arms to improve its security position for a few months but the end result might well be that a year from now Israel might be less secure than it is today.

The new situation in the Near East opens up new dangers and calls for a reappraisal of the situation and how the United States shall achieve its objectives in that area. The State of Israel is presumably also reappraising the situation and it has concluded that its preservation requires more arms in order to deter possible attack from Egypt and other unfriendly countries.

This is a natural conclusion for Israel to come to because it has no other deterrents at its command.

However, the United States has other deterrents. Egypt wants to develop its economy. Egypt wants markets for its cotton. Egypt wants leadership among the Arab states and is jealous of the potential position of Iraq as a member of the Baghdad Pact. Egypt is involved on the Saudi Arabian side of the territorial dispute with the British.

All such factors need to be weighed.

The United States is not today in a position to conclude that its policy with respect to Israel will be best advanced by putting primary reliance upon the capacity of Israel to defend itself by force of arms. We do not exclude the possibility of coming to that conclusion nor do we exclude the possibility of combining the deterrent of increased Israel military power with some of the other deterrents which may be available. We are not now, however, in a position to say that we go along with the thesis that the best

protection of Israel is for the United States now to allow it to purchase arms on a large scale.

These considerations might have caused the US to defer action on the Israeli arms request even if the recent attack on Syria had not occurred. The British Prime Minister would arrive in Washington in a few days. In view of all these factors, which could not yet be fully appraised, he was not in a position today to give a positive answer to the Israeli request.

Mr. Eban said this would be a "heavy blow" to his Government. The Secretary said he did not believe the Israeli Government was justified in regarding his reply in this light, and that if it did, perhaps he had been mistaken in speaking so fully and frankly regarding the U.S. position.

Mr. Eban said he welcomed the Secretary's frankness but repeated that the news would be a heavy blow. He added that his Government would have to try to scrape together whatever arms it could from *anywhere*, and that he used the word "anywhere" advisedly.

The Secretary emphasized that what Israel wanted and needed was to feel certain that it would not be attacked by overwhelming forces. The Israelis believed that arms in their own hands were the best deterrents. He could understand this attitude, which was by no means unique. However, like situations in many parts of the world, arms were by no means the only deterrent and were often not even the most effective deterrent. He stressed that he would not do anything at this juncture to upset the present hope for an Arab-Israeli settlement.

Mr. Eban asked the Secretary's estimate of the time it would take to judge Nasser's intentions. The Secretary said he supposed some indication should be forthcoming within a couple of weeks or so. [2]

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[2] Later that day, Dulles transmitted a message to Anderson in which he summarized the contents of this conversation. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956)

The Department also transmitted a summary of the conversation to Tel Aviv in telegram 525, January 28, repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, and Paris. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 784A.56/1–2856)

39. Message From the Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Cairo [1]

Washington, January 26, 1956.

1. In view of points made in . . . message to you January 26, [2] I believe that at this stage we should not press Nasser for early direct meetings but should concentrate on discussions with both sides to ascertain areas of agreement and extent of differences, which Nasser has assented to as reported paragraph B . . . message Washington January 24. [3] After that stage has been completed, we could determine whether we wish to press for direct meeting or find some other means of arriving at final settlement.

2. As means of reconciling IG's urgent desire to ascertain as soon as possible whether settlement can be achieved, and Nasser's feeling that no public announcement possible earlier than six months, we might take position that every effort be made to ascertain now through these secret negotiations whether settlement possible with understanding that no public announcement for period thereafter necessary to prepare Arab public opinion.

3. You should point out to Nasser I will probably be able to take position with Israel Government that I did in my meeting with Eban yesterday, [4] which has been reported to you, [5] only so long as I feel confident that Israel will not be attacked by Arab states who are rapidly increasing their armaments. Also, our withholding of arms to Israel increases our moral responsibility to Israel. The situation needs to be clarified if possible by acts demonstrating real purpose to effect peaceful settlement or other firm evidences that Israel not facing Arab aggression.

4. In order make most of this next period of discussions, I suggest as a check-list of topics on which rather full and detailed

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Top Secret. Drafted by Russell; cleared with Allen, Rountree, and Byroade; and approved by Dulles.

[2] Message 30 from Cairo to Anderson in Jerusalem, January 26, stated the belief that Nasser's position, as outlined in Document 32, was final, but added that the question of secret meetings would be taken up again, "but we have no arguments which will make sense to the Egyptians as to why they are essential. The holding of secret meetings at this time would seem to be irrelevant to overcoming what Nasr sees as most serious obstacle ultimate solution this problem, i.e., bringing other Arab States into line behind Nasr position." The message also noted that "Mere fact that Israelis attaching so much importance to these meetings causing gravest suspicions on part of Nasr." (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I)

[3] Document 32.

[4] See *supra*.

[5] See footnote 2, *supra*.

explanation would be useful following main elements on which it will ultimately be essential to obtain agreement:

a. *Refugees*: What is number that should realistically be expected to be repatriated, by whatever formula of determination? Assuming for purpose of discussion that not more than 100,000 should, or would wish to, return to Israel, what plans should be made for resettlement of others? Would Nasser agree that, besides Jordan Valley Plan and Sinai project, best opportunities lie in Syria and Iraq? Would he use influence with Syria to agree to staged resettlement there, especially if Western powers assisted in projects for creating new arable land? What figure does he believe would constitute reasonable compensation or what means does he suggest for arriving at figure? What suggestions does he have for assuming that amounts paid for compensation will help to provide new satisfactory life for refugees and not be wasted?

b. *Jerusalem*: If, as Nasser has suggested, Israel's and Jordan's claims to sovereignty of portions of Jerusalem are to be recognized, will he use influence to obtain agreement of other Arab states and what suggestions does he have for supervision of Holy Places?

c. *Boycott*: What formulation does Nasser suggest with respect cessation of secondary boycott and restrictions on shipping, including those on vessels transiting Suez Canal or Gulf of Aqaba, and with respect position of Arab states on trade between Arab states and Israel?

d. *Termination of State of Belligerency*: What formula does Nasser suggest to effect termination of state of belligerency: amendment of armistice agreements, U.N. resolution, or what?

e. *Communications arrangements*: Does Nasser believe that Jordan would be interested in free port facilities at Haifa and free access to port? Would Egypt be interested in right to use roads through Israel to other Arab states? Question of overflight rights, telecommunications, etc.

f. *Unified Development Jordan Valley*: As concrete measure toward creating Arab attitudes that will make possible Arab public acceptance of overall settlement within period suggested by Nasser, will it not be possible for him to take steps now, in accordance his conversations with Ambassador Johnston, to secure agreement of other Arab states on early commencement Jordan Valley Plan?

g. *Territorial*: Besides problem of Negev, what other boundary questions does Nasser see and what solution or method of arriving at solution does he recommend?

h. *Territorial guarantees*: What are Nasser's views with respect to the territorial guarantees suggested by Secretary in August 26 speech?

5. It is most important that we have explicit statements by Nasser of his best position on these and not permit him merely take general position they will present no difficulty if Negev question settled.

6. What are Nasser's reactions to points made in my message to you January 20? [6]

7. It would seem to me that process of ascertaining best possible position of Nasser and Ben Gurion on above points may require more than one more round as indicated your message January 25. [7] Would appreciate your views on this.

[6] Document 24.
[7] Document 35.

40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France [1]

Washington, January 26, 1956—7:36 p.m.

2714. Reurtel 3253. [2] Department consulted Jan 24 with British, Italian, French Ambassadors concerning Israeli request arms including 12 Mystere IV's from France. [3] French were informed that if they wished to interrupt offshore production in France for length of time necessary to secure 12 planes, U.S. would have no objection. However, decision on Israel request of France was one for France. Initiative must be theirs and planes must be manufactured, processed and shipped by France.

It was also noted that Hammerskjold in area trying to get agreement of parties reduce tension and his efforts should not be prejudiced; Security Council had recently condemned Israel in strong resolution [4] and grant of arms immediately after might involve difficult public relations problem. All representatives agreed Israeli requests should continue in suspense for another week or two. After

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/1–1856. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins and Geren and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London, Rome, and Tel Aviv.

[2] The Embassy in Paris reported in telegram 3253, January 18, that, according to Henri Roux, Director of Afrique-Levant Affairs at the French Foreign Ministry, "political tensions within Israel daily becoming more critical as Ben-Gurion, pushing for early attack on Egypt, becomes more difficult to restrain by Sharett, who urges restraint. Ben-Gurion appears to French to have increasing support within Israel." Roux also stated that the Israelis were pressing all levels of the French Government for the early delivery of the 12 OSP Mysteres, and Roux "reiterated that if US Government approved feasibility delivering OSP Mysteres, project would then be submitted to Ambassadorial Committee for consideration." (*Ibid.*)

[3] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, 784A.56/1–2456)

[4] See the editorial note, vol. XIV, p. 854.

that time question would again be considered in light of developments.

Dulles

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41. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State [1]

No. 32 *Cairo, January 27, 1956.*

1. Our last conversations abroad [2] did not contribute substantially new material to further our objectives, but were a continuation of discussions relating to items previously reported. They did express the feeling that Hammarsjkold visits were of little consequence and outlined their own historical positions particularly with reference to the Gaza incident.

2. An analysis of the respective positions seem to be about as follows:

Egypt:

A. There is a desire for a settlement.

B. The essential preoccupation of Nasr relates to his own political position and realization of national aspirations in Egypt and the Arab States where he is concerned with his capabilities.

C. Nasr envisions a considerable time involved in what he refers in . . . conversations as the "Second Phase".

D. As to differences between Egypt and Israel, he is concerned first with the Negev, some with some freedom of choice between repatriation and compensation by refugees and finally with minor boundary differences.

E. Problems of the secondary boycott and use of the Suez will work themselves out in the event of the end of hostilities.

F. He is essentially concerned with security and wishes to avoid placing himself either in the position of settlement discussions being known between Nasr and an emissary and even more importantly between Nasr and his opposition.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.

[2] Anderson met with Ben Gurion, Sharett, Kollek, and Herzog at 8:30 p.m. on January 24 and again at 9:30 a.m. on January 25 with Sharett, Kollek, and Herzog. Neither memorandum of conversation is printed. (*Ibid.*, Meetings with Israeli Officials. January 1956–March 1956)

Israel:

A. There is a desire for peaceful settlement.

B. They regard the results of this operation as particularly "Decisive". . . . Jerusalem seems to believe they will await the outcome of this op and then make some "Reappraisal" of their position.

C. They are appreciative to some extent of Nasr's political problems but are not content to envision a long time schedule for establishing the atmosphere Nasr seeks.

D. They are completely preoccupied with the establishment of some kind of direct communication between the two sides. They continuously reiterate that this is essential to their belief in Nasr's sincerity of purpose. They would like high level communication channels but would accept any level and almost any terms hoping for improvement.

E. They obviously are concerned with time running against them and therefore place great urgency on tangible steps for war [*forward?*].

F. They continuously emphasize their need of the Negev and deplore our references to maintaining "Flexibility" which they regard as requiring them to surrender a portion of their territory.

G. They bring into each conversation the necessity for arms to offset those received by Egypt and insist that this is a decision which the United States must make alone.

3. From their respective positions it appears we might at this time hope for the following:

A. The establishment on both sides of genuine intentions to achieve discernible evidences contributory to easing tensions to be followed by discernible actions themselves.

B. Unilateral statements of a general nature setting out their sincerity of purpose in working for a settlement and the elimination of border incidents and other activities which would disturb the atmosphere in which settlement might be achievable.

C. Abstaining from statements and criticisms of respective sides which would increase the possibility of emotional reactions.

D. Willingness to continue talks with emissary so long as secrecy is maintained.

E. A sincere effort to avoid incidents with the possibility of refraining from retaliation in the event of an incident if each side will openly punish its own offenders.

F. The possibility of some level of communication between the sides perhaps engineered by controlled sources.

4. FYI, although the term "Cease Fire" had been used conversationally and in cables, we have not discussed formal cease fire with either side but only in the context of avoiding border incidents and of refraining from retaliation in the event of an unauthorized incident.

5. With reference to suggestions in your cables, I find little or no disposition on either side to catalogue items which they will

discuss. The complete preoccupation on both sides is with the issues above. We will continue to raise other items for their discussion but with little hope of diverting their attention from those listed.

6. With reference to your suggestions that the Israelis be told that we believe some concession toward the principle of land contact between Arabs is necessary, I suggest that in view of the fact they already have this impression of our feeling from Ben Gurion's reference to the term flexibility meaning that Israel would be asked to give up territory, we [3] continue to emphasize this point by continuation of this line in order to avoid the Israelis taking a position that we have already determined upon a course of "Enforced Settlement" and thereby incur the possibility of their beginning a reappraisal of their position prematurely.

7. Will appreciate your comments and suggestions earliest. [4]

[3] At this point in the source text, an unidentified individual inserted "not?".
[4] *Infra.*

42. Message From the Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Cairo [1]

Washington, January 27, 1956.

1. I accept at face value Nasser's assurances to you as summarized para 2 your message January 27. [2] I fully appreciate his need to assure secrecy during period in which he would prepare Arab public opinion and understand his taking position that if secret agreement became public before then he would have to disavow it. It is my very strong belief, however, that unless some substantial and concrete advance toward a settlement can be worked out consistently with foregoing conditions, either during or as an immediate consequence of your trip, the situation will rapidly deteriorate and require emergency measures to maintain peace.

2. It is difficult to see how Nasser could expect to be in stronger position than at present to engage in negotiations with IG. His arms strength is increasing rapidly. West is temporarily denying arms to Israel. He has Aswan Dam within his grasp. He has possibility of

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Flles: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Russell, cleared in substance with Rountree and Byroade, and approved by Dulles.
[2] *Supra.*

acquiring our support for Arab unity and Egyptian leadership in it. Israel has just been censured by Security Council for its policy of retaliatory raids.

3. It is doubtful that present situation in area can be maintained for as long as six months unless there are definite prospects of a settlement on agreed terms. Mere understanding that both sides would commence negotiations on specific terms of settlement at end of six months would in all probability not suffice. Possibility has to be faced that Israel would in meantime force some issue that would provoke Arabs in such way as to take blame away from itself, such as commencement of construction at Jisr Banat Ya'quob or sending ship through Gulf of Aqaba. It is difficult to see how anyone, including Arab states, could benefit from hostilities that might result and in any event possibility of settlement in near future would be lost.

4. I therefore attach greatest importance to "willingness of both sides to continue talks with emissary so long as secrecy is maintained" (your para 3D).

5. While preoccupation on part of both sides with one or two issues is understandable, it seems to me to be particularly desirable to work out with Nasser in specific terms Egypt's position on issues listed my tel January 26 [3] and not let him take position of refusing to go beyond mere statement that those questions would "work themselves out in event of end of hostilities" (your para 2E). As you will have seen from summary my talk with Eban January 25, [4] we are prepared to take strong position with Israel in order to maintain atmosphere conducive to settlement and to induce her to adopt reasonable position on major issues. If we can have Nasser's agreement in specific terms on issues listed my tel January 26, we can take position with IG that reasonable settlement is within reach and urge it make reasonable concessions. We cannot, however, do this on mere basis of Nasser's statement that in event settlement is reached in six months on one or two issues, the others "would work themselves out".

6. For above reasons, I hope that it will be possible for us to secure Nasser's agreement to continue with discussions on concrete and specific aspects of all issues.

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[3] Document 39.
[4] See footnote 2, Document 38.

43. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State [1]

Paris, January 27, 1956—6 p.m.

3373. Reference: Department telegram 2714. [2] Counselor Israeli Embassy Bendor told Embassy officer last night State Department assured Ambassador Eban U.S. Government would permit French Government to make available 12 MDAP Mysteres IV–A planes for delivery Israel. He added that French Government told him U.S. permission to release planes would come to Foreign Office through this Embassy to whom French Government originally addressed its request.

Bendor is pressing us for information on status Department's alleged action in authorizing French to release MDAP Mysteres to Israel.

We propose to reply to Bendor if and when he approaches us again that this Embassy has no further role in this matter and that he should deal with Quai d'Orsay. Embassy also intends to advise Foreign Office of our position vis-à-vis Bendor.

From foregoing Department will observe that on both French and Israeli sides there is disposition to cast US in role of "granting permission" for making these planes available to Israel, position which may subsequently be exploited at US expense. [3]

Dillon

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/1–2756. Secret. Received at 5:38 p.m. Repeated to Rome, Tel Aviv, and London.

[2] Document 40.

[3] Referring to this telegram on January 30, Ambassador Lawson suggested that he "make clear to GOI that decision of Mysteres rests solely with French Government." (Telegram 759 from Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/1–2756)

44. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, January 28, 1956—3 p.m.

701. Pass Army. During my call on him January 28 Prime Minister-Foreign Minister Ghazzi said that if I had not asked to see him he would have called me in. He referred to a radio broadcast yesterday reporting that Israel Ambassador to US had stated Israel would request about March 1 project to dry up Lake Huleh. Ghazzi went on that under terms of armistice agreement nothing was to be done by either side which would give one side an advantage, pending permanent agreement on frontiers. [2] Israel, he declared, was endeavoring to carry out Huleh project for own advantage and benefit. If Israelis do carry out work he said, it will be beginning of hostilities (ouverture de la guerre) and asked that I inform Department. He volunteered to send me a note. I replied that I would report matter to Department promptly but would like note nevertheless. [3]

Observing that I had no information this subject but had heard Israelis considering resumption work early spring on diversion canal at Jisr Banat Yacub, and would not necessarily alter conditions re Huleh, I asked Ghazzi whether he was sure Israeli Ambassador had referred to Lake Huleh or to Jisr Banat Yacub canal. Ghazzi insisted that broadcast concerned Lake Huleh. I remarked that Israel had been forced earlier by General Bennike's decision to stop work in DZ at Jisr Banat Yacub and asked if Ghazzi knew attitude of General Burns.

Ghazzi replied that he did not, and he showed no interest in Burns' attitude. His statement about "beginning of hostilities" was made twice in conversation concerning Lake Huleh.

Comment: Despite Ghazzi's insistence Embassy inclined believe he is confused between project to drain Huleh, which is not in DZ, and project to divert Jordan at Jisr Banat Yacub, which is partly in DZ. Note, when received may clarify.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/1–2856. Confidential; Priority. Received at 11:59 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Rome, and Tehran.

[2] Reference is to the General Armistice Agreement that Israel and Syria signed on July 20, 1949. (U.N. doc. S/1353/Add. 1 and 2 and Corr. 1) Ghazzi was presumably referring to Article 2 (1).

[3] See Document 57.

Syrian military leaders have repeatedly predicted further hostilities if Israelis resume work at Jisr Banat Yacub.

Moose

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45. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State [1]

No. 33

Cairo, January 28, 1956.

1. Thursday night [2] . . . and I met with PriMin from 10 P.M. until 1 A.M. They were anxious to hear a report of my visit abroad.

2. I gave a brief reportorial account of my visit to Israel, dwelling on those aspects which served to humanize the Israelis with whom I talked and to point up their sincere desire to arrive at peaceful settlement. The report reflected that the territorial and boundary question was uppermost, with each side taking a firm position for reasons known to you. The question of refugees presented difficulties but there were indications of willingness to consider compromise on both sides. I told Nasr the importance which the Israelis attached to direct negotiations and that I had informed the Israelis that a meeting of heads of Govt was not possible at this time. The Israelis had accepted this situation. They had, however, urged the establishment of some channel of direct communication. I had stated that this was a point which Nasr had been asked to consider. I reported an attitude on both sides which reflected willingness to negotiate on the secondary problems concerning minor border adjustments, division of Jerusalem, etc which seemed to present no difficulties that could not be solved by compromise.

3. Nasr indicated appreciation of my report and my associates feel that he thought my references in Israel to his position did justice to his thinking and that I had been able to explain his difficulties both in Egypt and in the other Arab States in establishing the atmosphere needed for a peaceful settlement.

4. At the conclusion of my report, Nasr said he had two questions of utmost importance:

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.

[2] January 26.

a. Israel had previously made statements saying they wanted peace. How is the situation now different?

b. Why should we believe that the Israelis are sincere at this time when he believes they were not sincere previously?

5. We answered that there were new elements as follows:

a. A greater interest on the part of the U.S. under the leadership of the President to achieve acceptable solution which would result in peace.

b. A feeling on the part of Israel that new elements make their position less secure and peaceful solution more desirable.

c. A realization by the Israelis that they now faced "crucial" decisions in order to achieve settlement.

d. The fact that both countries were now facing up to the realities of the major points of conflict with determination on both sides to avoid war.

e. A realization by both countries that if they were to achieve their national and area ambitions and aspirations, there must be avoidance of the burdens, risks and damages of war.

6. I pointed out that this first round of conversations had identified and explored the areas of difficulty between the two countries. I expressed my belief that both countries appreciated the severity of the decisions and actions required of them but appeared willing to face up to them. I also indicated that future negotiations and conversations appeared essential and that during this time it was necessary to maintain both a spirit of willingness and a determination to achieve settlement if possible.

7. We pointed out that we believed settlement could be achieved along the lines of phased program suggested by Nasr. We emphasized the urgency of time and the necessity for keeping at the task. We explained that the element of time, being important, should take into consideration time elements concerning the Egyptian position, the Israeli position and the necessity for making important decisions in the U.S.

8. We emphasized that the important thing was to take some first steps in order that we begin moving toward the objective of settlement. These first steps would include among other things the avoidance of border incidents, the abstaining from inflammatory remarks, a gradual change in radio and newspaper statements so as to develop tolerance and understanding. That no exact timetable should be established, but we should work toward our objective, gaining momentum as we made progress.

9. Nasr said he was willing to pursue this program.

10. Nasr raised no objection to considering the reopening of direct commo channels along lines previously arranged . . . .

11. A final meeting is arranged for 5 P.M. Friday. [3]

12. I plan to depart Egypt Saturday and arrive Israel Sunday night via Athens.

13. Will appreciate any comments.

[3] January 27.

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46. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State [1]

No. 34 *Cairo, January 28, 1956.*

1. . . . and I met with Nasr and Zacharia from 5 PM to 7:30. [2] . . .

2. I told Nasr that I would like to summarize the various discussions which we had had to be sure that I had correctly interpreted his opinions and conclusions and the actions he has agreed to undertake in order to secure peaceful settlement. I then proceeded to outline in some detail a summary of our various conversations which Nasr said he thought fairly represented his views and the various proposals, principles and possible solutions which we had considered. In more specific detail we developed and discussed the following points:

a. We pointed out that there were suspicions on both sides and it was important that Nasr make known again his real desires and intentions. He stated emphatically that his own desire was for the attainment of a settlement and intended to work toward that end.

b. Pursuant to this objective we asked if he would issue instructions to avoid all border incidents. He stated that he would issue such instructions and appropriately punish those who violated his instructions although open court trials of offenders at this time would probably increase rather than decrease internal tensions. He also pointed out that incidents could take place as a result of transient refugees over whom he could establish little control. He would do his best.

c. He would continue to consider the reopening of direct secret channels of communication. However he feels he was deceitfully misled when such channels existed in 1954. He also feels that such a direct channel might be used against him with other Arab leaders.

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.

[2] January 27.

He authorized saying to the Israeli he would continue to consider the possibility and meanwhile Israeli views could be presented to him through [other] . . . channels.

d. He will take positive action designed to lessen inflammatory statements in press radio speeches and other media.

e. We arranged . . . to maintain continuous contact with Zacharia and Ali Sabri to discuss technical problems and to evaluate the progress that has been made and to be made in bringing the Egyptian population and other Arab areas into an acceptance of an Israeli settlement. They will also explore such problems as what can be done now about the refugees etc. This we thought would be a useful device to keep attention centered on the problem, keep up momentum and work toward an area of solution of secondary problems.

f. It was also agreed that at regular intervals Nasr would confer directly . . . concerning progress made and to be made in the staff work outlined in e above.

3. At this point I told Nasr that I would like to review in some more detail various problems and proposals in the interest of clarity and to that end would like to re ask him certain questions applying for the most part to things we had discussed previously. While our discussions were quite detailed we developed the following:

a. He was asked to review his position with reference to his concept of Arab security arrangements. He regards Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact as his principal problem. He said that he envisions unified Arab military planning within the framework of an ALCSP Pact which he regards as now defunct. This arrangement would deal with strategic planning, unified commands, force levels and similar military plans. He did not envision including unified budgetary planning. We pointed out that it was important to us whether the arrangement would be orientated toward defense from aggression from the north or for other purposes. He said it will "be used only for legitimate self defense", as he had previously expressed in a letter of 10 Dec 52 to President Truman.[3]

b. Responding to a question of what we could do about the problem of refugees now he suggested that Col. Zacharia would prepare and send to us a full report of the thinking of his experts on the refugee problem. Nasr said pointedly that he was not personally familiar with the technical thinking of his experts in this and like matters.

c. He thought that regional economic surveys and plans should be considered but had no definite ideas and thought this was another kind of question . . . .

d. When asked if he had any thoughts as to where refugees could be most desirably resettled, he again referred to the fact that

[3] Not found in Department of State files. Prime Minister Mohammed Naguib and Ambassador Jefferson Caffery had exchanged formal notes on December 9 and 10, 1952, in order to bring into force a Mutual Defense Assistance Understanding under Section 408 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (64 Stat. 373) and the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 373). See TIAS No. 3565; 7 UST 844.

he "thought" his experts looked with favor upon the "Blandford" Plan which had proposed resettlement in the Sinai Area.[4] He would include more elaborate thoughts in the report to be prepared by Col. Zacharia. (In an earlier conversation he had stated that he thought some refugees could be settled in Syria.)

e. He has not given any thought to such problems as what is reasonable compensation and how the refugees would be most benefited. He will include any current thinking in Zacharia's report and continue his thinking in staff work . . . .

f. Such problems as overflights, telecommunications, he has not thought about personally. This will also be the subject of staff work . . . .

g. Nasr looks upon the territorial guarantee suggested by the Secretary as "A good thing" but he must depend upon his own capabilities to assure his boundaries. His people would not be content to depend upon assurances by any foreign power.

h. Nasr believes that Syria presents the only real Arab stumbling block to the Jordan Valley Project. He stated that "All the other Arab States had agreed". When questioned closely he stated that Jordan "Would not oppose the plan". We indicated that perhaps Jordan still constituted a problem and he agreed. He will continue to discuss the approval of the Jordan Valley Plan with other Arab leaders but is pessimistic about Svria agreeing at this time.

i. . . . raised the question of Israel beginning work on Banat Yacov Project in the near future if the Jordan Valley Project was not approved. Nasr stated his Govt had considered this possibility and believed that Syria would take military action against Israel if the project was begun. He stated that his Govt had taken the military and political decision to support Syria in that event.

j. Nasr will look forward to a continuation of conversations when we believe it desirable to resume discussions like those now being conducted.

k. Nasr continues to work on draft of proposed letter to the President giving assurances of his efforts to avoid hostilities and work toward peaceful settlement.[5] He will continue working on draft . . . tomorrow.

l. At the conclusion of our talks I asked Nasr if he thought that progress had been made. He studied for some moments and he replied that he thought he could only answer my question honestly after lapse of two or three weeks during which he could observe the Israeli attitude and actions taken indicating their sincerity and desire for settlement.

m. I pointed out the importance of his own actions in orienting his Govt and military planning toward the West in legitimate self defense since we would be assuming greater moral responsibility in making our own decisions such as a decision with reference to arms

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[4] John B. Blandford, Jr., Director of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), July 4, 1951–March 7, 1953, helped conclude a broad program agreement between UNRWA and the Government of Egypt on June 30, 1953, which sought to encourage practical development projects in the Sinai Peninsula and in the Gaza Strip that would enable Palestinian refugees to become economically self-supporting.

[5] See Documents 30 and 32.

to Israel. He said that he understood our problems and that his intentions were not aggressive and his arms were intended only for his self defense.

n. We reemphasized the urgency of time and the necessity for continuing actions toward peaceful settlement as important in decisions facing all the countries involved.

4. We have continuously probed to ascertain Nasr's views with reference to the various items suggested in yours of January 20 and 27.[6] During the course of our discussions these items have constantly reoccurred. For the most part both Nasr and Zacharia are unprepared to discuss them and frequently state that they have not given thought to possible solution in these areas. I believe however that the positions stated above represent the best summary of their views on the various items obtainable during these conversations.

5. Plan to depart Cairo noon Saturday[7] arrive Israel 6:30 Sunday. Currently plan to arrive U.S. on Thursday[8] with Gen Gruenther.

[6] Documents 24 and 42.
[7] January 28.
[8] February 2.

47. Message From the Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Athens[1]

Washington, January 28, 1956.

1. For reasons I have mentioned in previous telegrams, I believe we are unlikely to have a better time than the present for working out the terms of a settlement. Many Israeli leaders believe that Israel's security is imperiled; that as soon as the Arab states have assimilated the Soviet arms they will strike; and that, given no new factor in the situation, Israel's interests may best be served by dealing a crippling blow to the Arabs before they have gained military superiority. Eban states some of them realize such a move would be an act of suicidal desperation but says it would be a compulsion of Israeli character. To some extent such statements are made for purpose of inducing U.S. to assist Israel in maintaining

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Russell and approved by Hoover after discussion with the Secretary.

military superiority (a policy which we are convinced would only drive the Arabs further into the Soviet camp) but there can be no doubt that IDF is strongly urging such a policy upon the Israel Government and, if there is no continuing solid prospect of a settlement, the Israel cabinet might well give its approval.

2. If Nasser is sincere in his statements to you expressing his desire for a settlement, I see no reason why he could not cooperate in maintaining the momentum of the present discussions along the lines of my two previous tels to you.[2] In any event, I believe we must do everything possible to that end. Admittedly, the Egyptians will need to give the details of the various problems careful study but they have already said that most of them would present no difficulties. There would appear to be no reason why decisions on them could not be made as easily at this time as at the end of six months, with the understanding there would be no publicity. The knowledge that these discussions were going on expeditiously at a high level would enable us to place the most effective possible deterrents upon the Israelis.

3. More specifically, it seems quite possible that Israel will resume work at Banat Ya'acov around March 1 unless there is realistic progress toward a settlement. Paras 3 h and i your message number 34 January 28[3] are particularly disquieting in this connection. Discussions of the kind mentioned in my two previous telegrams would, I believe, constitute sufficient progress to serve as a deterrent. I fear that arrangements of the kind mentioned in your telegrams of January 28 would not.[4]

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[2] Documents 39 and 42.
[3] *Supra.*
[4] *Supra* and Document 45.

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48. Message From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles)[1]

Washington, January 29, 1956.

1. I have been following the traffic between Mr. Anderson and the Department and have been in constant contact with State

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Secret. Repeated to Jerusalem and Cairo.

Department chiefs who are personally and hourly following the situation. This message contains my own intelligence conclusions but I have shown it to Mr. Hoover.

2. It is quite unrealistic to believe that this situation can be maintained in status quo for a period of months either three or six. Before then Israel will either have moved to destroy Nasr or pressures for resumption of arms shipments to Israel will have become so impelling as to be irresistible. Not only American opinion but the general feeling of fair play will make it impossible to sit by and see a vast military build up of Egypt by USSR take place and our arms embargo of Israel remain. Furthermore British will not stand still long in getting into this act and in other area operations.

3. While it is probable that aggressive action by Israel in the long run would result in the destruction of Israel and they realize this, it will almost certainly also end in the destruction of Nasr and in grave jeopardy to, if not the loss of, Western oil interests and military bases in the Middle East.

4. Thinking as I do I have welcomed the Department's messages of 28 January 1956 [2] and [3], urging a decisive effort with Nasr so that he will give a tangible token that he is making a start on a course of action which may prevent the disasters I fear are impending. Action along lines of Mr. Anderson's Message No. 44 [4] would help if something tangible added.

5. The Department and we believe our best chance of obtaining early agreement which would give Nasr in some degree land contact between Egypt and rest of Arab world lies in his authorizing Anderson to state to Ben Gurion what Egypt would be prepared to agree to on eight or ten principal issues, mentioned in previous traffic between Anderson and the Department so that we can exert appropriate available pressures on Israel to make reasonable concessions on Negev and on repatriation issue. Unless Anderson has such

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[2] Message dated 28 January 1956 beginning "1. The Secretary and I feel it vital for you etc." [Footnote in the source text. The message informed Anderson that "The Secretary and I feel it vital for you to carry present conversations forward for next week to ten days." *Ibid.*]

[3] Message dated 28 January 1956 beginning "1. For reasons I have mentioned in previous telegrams etc." [Footnote in the source text. The message is printed *supra.*]

[4] In Message 44, January 29, from Anderson at Athens to Cairo, Anderson asked for a report on the feasibility of suggesting to "Nasser that we believe it in his interest we resolve his positions on all secondary questions in order to make up package that could be implemented at psychological time . . . . This would avoid any embarrassment on his part if the right moment should arise and he be unprepared on these issues . . . . To accomplish this end we would advise him I have decided to return either now or in two or three days to participate in final staff work already arranged and for secure Nasser's approval of their conclusions on these questions." (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I)

authorization from Nasser to Ben Gurion he has no basis for taking position with Ben Gurion that settlement depends on Israel making such concessions.

6. Events in the entire Middle East and North African area have possibly been moving faster since you left than either you or Nasr realize. The influx of bloc missions, experts, and their pressures are having cumulative effect on both our friends and the neutrals in the area. It is absolutely imperative that some change in this trend come promptly. The prospect of later resumption of Anderson operation with maintenance of present excellent security is dim.

7. Ref your Message No. 43 [5] I have the fullest realization of the obstacles but fear that what you feel is slight delay might in fact prove to be long enough to set in motion a chain of events which will impair prospect of resumption.

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[5] Message 43 of January 29 from Cairo to Athens, informed Anderson: "Appreciate sense urgency but from this end cannot see how slight delay involved would be damaging. So far as Nasr concerned, some delay would in fact be psychologically desirable." (*Ibid.*)

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49. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Secretary of State [1]

No. 45 *Athens, January 29, 1956.*

1. I have been giving much thought your message of 28 January 1956. [2] You are doubtlessly already advised of suggestions in my message to Cairo [3] after receiving yours. Certainly working out the terms of settlement seems timely now both from circumstances and necessity. I am most concerned with the degree of time and how to best use our efforts over next three weeks.

2. I am of course agreeable to continuing discussions of kinds mentioned in your previous telegrams. One major difficulty in so doing lies in the fact that Nasser is operating without a staff. Only Zacharia was originally cut in on this operation. Lately Aly Sabry has been told. Zacharia is not informed on the subjects and can only secure info from others. Aly Sabry I am told, fairly knowledgeable.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Top Secret.

[2] A footnote in the source text refers to Document 47.

[3] See footnote 4, *supra.*

3. A second difficulty is that Nasser insists he, Zacharia and Aly Sabry must carry on their regular duties to preserve security. Hence our meetings are at night when the principals come unprepared.

4. I realize that the problems in your telegrams of 27 January 1956 [4] and 26 January 1956 [5] could be profitably discussed and must be resolved in settlement. While Nasser has said these are secondary problems and present no real difficulty the details must be spelled out. This I have repeatedly tried with Nasser making either a general statement or saying he is not familiar with details.

5. My concern is whether more progress can be made by returning now to insist on discussing them or returning in 2 to 3 weeks to do so. I have some fear that Nasser might regard the former course as pressure and the effort be counter productive. If we follow the latter course we must certainly keep pressure on the staff work proposed in my message, so Nasser will on my return be able to take a detailed position. Also under existing arrangements progress toward Egyptian positions would be very slow since Egyptians involved are sent with difficulty due to their security arrangements.

6. I realize the acute situation in Israel and that Israel might conclude its best interest is served to act before Egypt secures important additional military strength. I doubt that high level discussions of the kind mentioned in your telegrams if explained to Israel would deter action within themselves. Israel I believe fears most (A) Not securing arms and (B) An enforced peace that would deprive her of a substantial portion of the Negev.

7. If Israel concludes she will get no arms or that she faces enforced settlement through loss of a substantial part of the Negev she may reappraise her situation by deciding whether to take drastic action or some act of provocation such as resuming work at Banat Yacov or (which will be most difficult) accepting the decisions.

8. Again I am inclined to think they will be as much deterred by my telling them I will resume conversation in 2 to 3 weeks as telling them I continue now our discussions aimed at anything other than the two areas of their main concern. They are obsessed with the idea of a direct meeting and unless they believe discussions by others offer prospect of settlement of their major problems they will be little comforted.

9. I am awaiting reply to my message to Cairo [6] . . . . What I have said does not necessarily represent a final point of view but is my current thinking.

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[4] A footnote in the source text refers to Document 42.
[5] A footnote in the source text refers to Document 39.
[6] See footnote 4, *supra*.

10. Very likely, unless some other message or circumstance alters my thinking I will proceed to Israel tomorrow [7] and then decide whether to return to Cairo now or later. In that event will assure IG that high level discussions will continue on one basis or the other.

11. Your continued counsel will be appreciated.

[7] January 30.

50. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, January 29, 1956—8 p.m.

1424. Met last evening at British Embassy with Black and Trevelyan. [2] Black gave following report:

(1) Reviewed briefly his one hour morning conference with Nasser which he described as very pleasant. Had sought meeting alone with Nasser but Kaissouni and Ibrahim (Minister National Production) also present. No discussion controversial points. Black explained purposes, organization, and operation of Bank, and emphasized Bank's willingness even eagerness assist on high dam. Cited loan practices with other countries including India. Nasser responded Nehru had told him India's experience with bank had been very satisfactory but Nasser in examining India's agreements with bank had not found therein such conditions as contained in Black's draft letter of intent re Egypt. [3] Black replied situations not comparable. Bank's loans to India covered a number of projects, not single project such as high dam, magnitude of which relative to Egypt's total financial resources, called for special care required to assure such resources used to best advantage. Black also emphasized to Nasser bank and GOE "in exactly same boat" in requiring all possible assurance of continued future USG support since it could not afford have its label on an unfinished project. However bank satisfied USG had gone as far as it could and in fact considered

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/1–2956. Secret; Priority. Received at 11:11 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

[2] On January 24, Nasser had invited Black to Cairo for further discussions concerning the financing of the Aswan High Dam project. Black accepted Nasser's invitation and arrived in Egypt on January 27.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 1.

US–UK offer most generous. Nasser arranged for Black to continue discussions, on specific points, with Kaissouni and Ibrahim indicating, however, be available to Black any time. Black understood to have met Kaissouni today.

(2) During stop-over in London, Black visited by French officials who made rush trip from Paris to indicate their Governments desired help bank on high dam and prepared to guarantee to GOE twelve year supplier's credit up to $60 million without need French Cabinet approval. Black states he replied that in his personal views such an offer would upset his mission. Bank prepared to lend up to what it regards as limit Egypt's borrowing capacity and French loan would merely mean smaller IBRD loan. Furthermore, French loan terms not such as bank considered proper. Also informed French that while he could speak only for IBRD he believed French loan might prove embarrassing to US and UK who were offering grant aid. If France desired be helpful, it too might offer grant aid. French representatives replied such offer would require parliamentary action and not possible in present circumstances. One of these representatives, formerly commercial counselor Cairo (Herrenschmidt) is coming to Cairo presumably to discuss proposal with GOE. In this connection Black mentioned also report (Department's 1661, January 27 [4]) that German credit for high dam involved in new trade agreement now under negotiation between West Germany and Egypt. Black is disturbed by these developments, feeling they may divert GOE attention from realities of situation.

(3) Stated if GOE insists on long-term commitment from IBRD re high dam financing, he would have to insist in return on conditions contained in his draft letter of intent and GOE would have to be made to realize this. Phraseology could be changed but not substance. If he should return to his Board and ask them to yield on these conditions, bank's relations with member countries would become seriously complicated. It would be charged that bank was yielding because of Soviet aid offer to Egypt and other member countries would expect concessions from bank. Such charges would adversely affect market for IBRD bonds, which is source of funds for its development loans. Black prepared, on basis meeting with his Board just prior departure, to propose if necessary following alternative to GOE: Unilateral separate declarations of intent by GOE and by bank. On basis recent remark by Kaissouni, British Ambassador questioned whether GOE would favor this alternative.

(4) Regarding GOE objection to condition that all expenditures on high dam, including those involving Egyptian funds, must be on basis competitive bidding, Black pointed out this condition insisted

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 462A.7441/1–2756)

upon by USG not bank, although expenditure bank funds must in any case be subject to competitive bidding.

(5) In conversation with Black prior conference with Nasser Kaissouni urged IBRD loan be made in lump sum rather than in series of partial amounts. Black replied he prepared to discuss this later but pointed out it would involve unnecessary cost, since ¾ of one percent interest would have to be paid on committed funds during period of some years before they could be used and he could demonstrate it would make no financial sense to GOE.

Trevelyan and I meeting with Black and staff again tonight. We expect to hold these evening meetings with him regularly during his visit.

Hart

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51. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, January 30, 1956—2 p.m.

1432. Reference Embtel 1424 January 28. [2] Met again last evening with Black and Trevelyan, Black having had in interim two meetings with Kaissouni and Ibrahim, second of which included also Helmy. More important matters covered were as follows:

At first meeting, Kaissouni urged Bank negotiate now regular loan agreement for entire project. Black replied Bank could not do so until after Nile waters settlement. Kaissouni pointed out such agreement could provide that there would be no disbursement loan funds until after settlement. Black rejected this proviso. Kaissouni then urged that when loan agreement made, it be for lump sum rather than series of partial amounts. Black observed this would cost GOE from $4.5 million to $6 million in commitment fees, but did not reject proposition. Kaissouni apparently not much concerned about additional cost. Black explained alternative (described reftel) to Bank letter of intent (i.e. unilateral declarations of intentions) and left with Kaissouni for study new draft document (memo of understand-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/1–3056. Secret; Priority. Received at 3:24 p.m. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and priority to London.

[2] *Supra.*

ing)[3] incorporating such declarations. Kaissouni raised objections which are to be discussed at next meeting.[4]

At second meeting, Helmy reported engineering changes in design High Dam now under consideration, involving relocation inlets to diversion tunnels. Since change in plans entails delay in letting contract for Dam, he proposed that GOE High Dam authority itself (presumably headed by Helmy) assume responsibility for management and coordination of construction which could then be departmentalized and started on schedule. This approach, in which there would be no place for a consortium, would involve the letting of numerous contracts by the authority. Many could be first on competitive basis, but some might have to be negotiated, "in order to save time or money" or because of unique nature of work involved. Helmy asked if this approach would meet Bank's condition regarding competitive bidding if negotiated contracts involved only Egyptian funds. Black doubted it would meet condition competitive bidding as now set forth in United States and UK aide-mémoires[5] and said it might therefore entail reconsideration of whole IBRD–US–UK offer.

In his report to us Black expressed irritation over fact that since his arrival Cairo Kaissouni has raised anew (possibly, for Ibrahim's benefit) many questions which were thoroughly discussed in Washington and regarding which he thought understanding had been reached. He does not know whether or not Helmy's new approach is serious proposal but suspects Helmy would like to delay matters in order to reinforce his position that only British-German-French consortium able to start Dam on schedule. Black feels it is already about time for him to see Nasser again since he believes no progress can be made until basic issues resolved. If results of further talk with Nasser inconclusive or if GOE not yet ready with final plans for Dam, he would favor returning to Washington, indicating to Nasser Bank's continuing interest and availability at any time if and when GOE desires resume discussions.

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[3] On January 11, Black had prepared, in response to Nasser's objections to the IBRD letter of intent of December 17, a possible alternative in the form of a draft Memorandum of Understanding. On January 19, officials of the IBRD, after consulting with U.S. and British representatives, approved a revised draft Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Egypt and the IBRD to govern the financing of the Aswan High Dam. This memorandum set forth the intentions of both parties respecting the project, expressed the willingness of the IBRD to disburse U.S. and British funds, and described the general arrangements for floating the specific loans. (Memorandum from Corbett to Hoover, January 19, with attached revised draft Memorandum of Understanding; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/1–1956)

[4] See *infra*.

[5] For text of the U.S. aide-mémoire, see telegram 1282, vol. XIV, p. 868. No copy of the British aide-mémoire has been found in Department of State files.

Black has privately asked me to let word leak to "right people" that talks not going well as he feels this may help sweep away underbrush and strengthen his bargaining position. Have complied.

Hart

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52. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, January 30, 1956—8 p.m.

1439. For Assistant Secretary Allen, NEA. Black conversations encountered heavy going today as yesterday primarily due GOE'S repeated insistence need for signed loan agreement covering entire project. This Black refused time and again although he offered exchange of unilateral declarations of intentions. Meeting terminated with Black making clear useless continue conversations on subject overall loan agreement. Kaissouni indicated whole matter might have to be referred to Cabinet and Black might be asked to see Nasser. Black told me afterwards he felt sure now GOE did not want to see him break off these talks and go home. Of interest was fact Helmy did not participate today's session.

Underlying problem here seems clearly to be political and while I cannot at this point sort out all cross currents behind Egypt's attitude, we all agree one ingredient is Egypt's fear Bank likely to back out later if conditions brought Egypt into arms race with resultant heavy pledging of Egyptian resources to unproductive uses. I therefore think it would be of great help if I could pass word to Nasser that Secretary has in effect turned down sine die Israel's arms request. I need not go into details Deptel 1674 [2] and can state case in any words you elect. Result in my opinion would be to relax Egyptians somewhat and permit them to look at Bank's conditions with more balanced viewpoint. Urgent reply requested. [3]

Hart

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/1–3056. Secret; Niact. Received at 4:56 p.m.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 38.

[3] Allen responded negatively to Hart's suggestion to pass information to Nasser, on the grounds that "Israeli request may be reconsidered at any time, depending in part on outcome various conversations now going on in Cairo." (Telegram 1720 to Cairo, January 31; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/1–3056)

53. Editorial Note

Secretary Dulles informed Anderson on January 30 that "Recent developments have given greatest urgency to maintaining unbroken momentum in your discussions. We must, I believe, make all out effort to obtain largest measure of agreement at this time in specific and concrete terms on eight or ten principal issues with understanding, of course, that agreement would be kept secret as long as necessary to enable Nasser develop favorable Arab opinion."

To make certain that Anderson had access to the most recent thinking in Washington, Dulles told him he was sending Russell to Athens for consultation. Russell would arrive at 8 p.m., January 31. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956)

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54. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1956, 2:15–4 p.m.[1]

ETW MC–1

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	*UK*
The Secretary	Prime Minister Eden
Under Secretary Hoover	Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Ambassador Aldrich	Ambassador Makins
Mr. Merchant	Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. MacArthur	Sir Leslie Rowan
Mr. Bowie	Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. Allen	Mr. Ian Samuel
Mr. Rountree	Mr. Willie Morris
Mr. Hagerty	
Mr. Cottman	

[Here follow a list of subjects discussed and discussion of unrelated matters.]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7. No other drafting information is given on the source text. A note on the source text reads: "The attached memorandum of conversation, cleared at the Assistant Secretary of State level only, is now being given restricted circulation to appropriate officials of the U.S. Government *on a need to know basis.*"

Prime Minister Eden visited Washington January 30–February 3.

Middle East—Arab-Israel Conflict

Turning to the Middle East, the Secretary said there were two elements of the problem which should be discussed: First, the Arab-Israeli conflict which might flare up at any moment and which posed grave difficulties for us, and second, broader aspects relating to Saudi Arabia, the Baghdad Pact, etc. These elements were so intertwined, however, it would not be possible wholly to segregate them. Luncheon conversations with the British Delegation [2] had indicated a willingness on both sides to find a way to convince the Arabs and Israeli alike that there would be no profit in resorting to war and, if either side should bring about hostilities, it would suffer penalties which we might inflict. The basis for action in the event of hostilities might be the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, and the United States and British officials should, perhaps, bring the French into discussions of ways of implementing that Declaration.

The Secretary, continuing, said he had pointed out during the luncheon discussion some of the problems which the United States had in the matter of acting pursuant to the Tripartite Declaration. It would be difficult for the President to implement any commitment involving the use of armed forces without some form of Congressional resolution (such as the Formosa resolution) [3] or pursuant to a treaty. He said that steps which might be taken in the event of hostilities should be studied now, as should the problem of establishing a sound moral and legal basis for any action we subsequently might agree to take. Israel and many supporters of that country in the United States would like for the United States to enter into a treaty which would protect Israel against an attack. In making this suggestion, the Israeli and their supporters undoubtedly had in mind that the existence of such a treaty would put Israel in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the Arabs. The Secretary questioned, however, whether any such commitment would be ratified by the Senate, and said that indications in talks with Congressional leaders here raised considerable doubt on this score, although he felt that we probably could get support for "putting teeth" into the 1950 Declaration. In the latter connection, the Secretary commented upon the danger that this action might cause the Arabs to fear that we were preparing to protect Israel alone.

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[2] According to the Chronology of the Eden Talks, President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Eden, Secretary Dulles, and Foreign Secretary Lloyd discussed Arab-Israeli issues at a luncheon hosted by the President at the White House, beginning at 1 p.m. on January 30. Neither the President nor Dulles prepared a record of the discussion. (*Ibid.*)

[3] Reference is to House Joint Resolution 159 (84th Cong., 1st sess.), January 29, 1955. For text, see 69 Stat. 7.

Mr. Eden agreed generally with the Secretary's observations and commented that no one in the Middle East now thought the United States and Great Britain were prepared to do anything should hostilities in fact break out. There was a strong feeling we had done nothing beyond making a declaration and if this opinion continued to be held it might lead to trouble. For example, Israel might resort to a preventive war. He commented that Nasser would not in his opinion, "be keen to be attacked by Israel at this time." Both sides stood to lose by early hostilities. It would be extremely helpful if we could give consideration as to how to put teeth into the Declaration.

Mr. Lloyd emphasized we should give effect to the idea that some military action on the part of the Tripartite Powers would be involved in case of an attack by either the Arabs or the Israeli. Some people estimated Israeli forces could be in Cairo within a matter of a few days, and the Egyptians might fear we would drag out action in the Security Council until they were faced with a fait accompli. If we should fail to move quickly in case of aggression, our stock would be gone forever in the Arab world. We must, therefore, give the impression we were prepared to undertake extremely quick action or our statement of intention to act in case of hostilities would be no substantial deterrent.

The Secretary said he had asked American officials dealing with the United Nations to look into the question of what might be done through that organization to prevent aggression. He asked Mr. Allen to outline possible things which might be done.

Mr. Allen outlined a number of possibilities including the assignment of observers with, perhaps, civilians included, and reactivation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission,[4] which consisted of the United States, United Kingdom, France and Turkey and which had been in abeyance for some time.

The Secretary commented that if we should go forward with well selected steps in the United Nations, and combine this with talks with Congressional leaders designed to attain adequate flexibility for the United States Government to move quickly in a crisis, this might convince everyone we meant business. Doing less than that might leave doubt we were determined to act forcibly in case of aggression. Even if the Soviets should veto any United Nations resolution which might be sought, the effect of general Free World support for this measure would demonstrate the seriousness of the matter and would provide a good moral basis for subsequent action. The Secretary then commented that Mr. Hoover had met with

[4] On December 11, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted, at its 186th plenary meeting, General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), which established the Palestine Conciliation Commission. For text, see U.N. doc. A/810.

officials of the Defense Department[5] and asked him to talk about the military aspects of the situation.

Mr. Hoover reported he had talked with the military about a possible show of force if it should be decided that this should be done. Among the possibilities were (1) sending the Sixth Fleet on maneuvers in the Eastern Mediterranean; (2) moving the present minesweeper assigned to the Persian Gulf to Massawa, Eritrea, and reinforcing it with a flotilla of destroyers to be dispatched to the Red Sea; (3) redeploying two marine brigades to the area; and (4) other steps such as deploying small aircraft from carriers.

Mr. Eden said he did not visualize that it would be necessary for either side to say publicly precisely what it would do in case of hostilities, although we should tell each other. It was more important to show the public we were taking certain steps in concert which would make it possible for us to act if need be.

Mr. Lloyd inquired whether the Secretary thought a public statement should be made to the effect that we were prepared to take military action.

The Secretary replied that we should not put out what might appear to be a bluff, and unless we had some Constitutional foundation for military action, such as a treaty, a United Nations call for the employment of military force, a Congressional resolution, or at least preparatory talks with Congressional leaders to assure their support for such action, a public statement would have little effect beyond perhaps an initial period of a few days. He doubted, therefore, that a public statement would suffice as a deterrent unless accompanied by some of the measures he had mentioned. One problem was that if trouble started it might take years to ascertain who was at fault. We must make it clear that it made no difference who started it, we would move in to stop hostilities.

Mr. Lloyd stated a Congressional resolution in advance seemed to him to be a good idea but asked whether the Secretary thought it would be passed. He observed that the resolution should be drafted in such a way as to make sure it would not be objectionable to either side. He referred to the Uniting for Peace resolution[6] as a good example.

The Secretary said the Uniting for Peace resolution called on members to hold certain contingents available if they were required by action of the Security Council or the General Assembly. However, he thought we should not get the General Assembly into the present issue for several reasons, including the fact that there were a

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[5] No record of such a meeting has been found in Department of State files.

[6] Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), adopted at the 302d plenary meeting on November 3, 1950. For text, see U.N. doc. A/1775.

number of new United Nations members which might complicate matters.

Mr. Eden summarized British comments upon this subject by saying the suggestions thus far made involved a firm statement of intention, some action in the United Nations, and respective United States and United Kingdom governmental authority to act in an emergency. He thought the combination of these three approaches might be a very good thing.

The Secretary inquired of Mr. Eden whether British military authorities had thought through what might be done.

Mr. Eden said that thus far their consideration of military possibilities had been largely related to the problem of looking after British subjects in the area. They were now undertaking a study of military possibilities deriving from British Forces in Libya, Jordan, and Cyprus. Regarding the latter, there were some 15,000 troops present, all of whom were not needed for the maintenance of security on Cyprus itself. These forces included a brigade of paratroopers, which would be highly effective. The Navy was also considering the possibility of providing more marines in the Eastern Mediterranean. Air Force potentialities were primarily in the equipment which they now had in Jordan and Iraq. Between the Americans and British, a great deal could be done. The important thing was that the people in the area should think we would do something.

The Secretary agreed and stated we must arrive at something along the lines which had been discussed. On the American side we would think through the legal basis and be sure we would know what we would be getting into before making a definite decision on a line of action.

Mr. Hoover observed that if it should be decided a show of military force would be desirable, that should be related to something demonstrating the force would, if needed, be used; otherwise the gesture would be taken as a bluff. Our best estimate was that economic sanctions alone would not be an effective deterrent to hostilities and large-scale fighting could be undertaken by either side long before any pinch would be felt from the imposition of such sanctions.

Mr. Eden said he thought we should follow up with studies of what might be done on the military side and also examine more carefully possible courses of United Nations action.

Mr. Lloyd proposed to ask some of the British experts in United Nations affairs to come down to Washington from New York to

meet with American experts, perhaps at 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, January 31, to begin work on this aspect of the problem. [7]

To this the Secretary agreed, and raised the question of bringing the French into the matter.

Mr. Lloyd suggested this be discussed with the French Ambassador [8] when the latter meets with Secretary Dulles and the Foreign Secretary on Wednesday, February 1. [9]

The Secretary suggested the matter of military discussions be taken up with the President when he later joined the meeting. [10] He observed we had a difficult public relations problem regarding possible military action since the American people were not accustomed to looking upon the Middle East as a vital area. The United Kingdom had always played an important part in that area and security matters were usually identified as a British responsibility. There might be some suspicion that any military plans developed might be related to Zionists' efforts to involve the United States in fighting to support Israel, and there was substantial opposition to the U.S. being drawn into such an affair. Also, we had always played down American oil interests, and it would certainly not be popular if the impression should be given that we were risking military action to protect investments of American oil companies. Unless, therefore, military preparations were represented in their proper light—of reacting to a Soviet threat—it would not be easy to obtain support for the prospect of sending United States troops to the area.

Mr. Eden observed that our purpose really was to prevent a war.

The Secretary suggested we proceed as indicated and try to come up with concrete ideas within the next twenty-four hours as to the best way to proceed.

The Secretary stated that current efforts to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute itself had not as yet produced any real hopes for an early settlement. It appeared that the Egyptians were dragging their feet. They claimed it would take six months to pave the way for acceptance by the other Arab states of any agreed plan. We might soon know whether the Egyptians were employing dilatory tactics. Mr. Eugene Black, President of the World Bank, was now in Egypt to discuss the High Aswan Dam project [11] and the Egyptian decision regarding that project might be indicative of the Egypt attitude generally.

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[7] No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.
[8] Maurice Couve de Murville.
[9] See Document 65.
[10] See *infra*.
[11] See Documents 50–52.

Mr. Eden commented upon the difficulties which existed between Nuri Said of Iraq and Nasser.

Mr. Allen, at the Secretary's request, summarized a statement made by Nasser on January 29 on the question of the Baghdad Pact and the recent arrest of an Egyptian messenger attached to the Egyptian Embassy in Baghdad who had been charged with activities detrimental to Iraq. Nasser had said the Baghdad Pact was a new form of imperialism, in which Nuri Said was involved, designed to imprison all of the Arab people, but that the prison was bare except for the Egyptian messenger; that the messenger would willingly serve his time in contented knowledge of the great sacrifice which he was making on behalf of his Arab brothers.

Mr. Eden observed this was another example of the difficulties being created by Nasser and said he did not know how long we could go along with Nasser.

The Secretary repeated we might soon know whether our whole attitude toward Nasser would have to be changed.

Mr. Eden said if Egypt should succeed in undermining the Baghdad Pact the Western Powers would be in terrific trouble in the Middle East, and the Egyptians seemed to be doing all they could to accomplish this.

Mr. Allen observed Nuri Said had been in and out as Prime Minister of Iraq so many times that it might be possible he would again leave the Premiership for a period. If his successor as Prime Minister should favor the Baghdad Pact the change might in fact be a good thing since Nasser had attributed to Nuri personally the responsibility for Iraqi adherence to the treaty. The change would, in these circumstances show that other Iraqi leaders favored the Pact concept.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

55. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1956, 4 p.m.[1]

ETW MC–2

PARTICIPANTS

US	*UK*
President Eisenhower	Prime Minister Eden
Secretary Dulles	Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Under Secretary Hoover	Ambassador Makins
Ambassador Aldrich	Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. Merchant	Sir Leslie Rowan
Mr. Allen	Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. MacArthur	Mr. Ian Samuel
Mr. Bowie	Mr. Willie Morris
Mr. Hagerty	
Mr. Rountree	
Mr. Cottman	

Arab-Israel Dispute

The Secretary informed the President that in the preceding discussions of the Arab-Israeli situation,[2] the elements of the problem had been reviewed and it had been agreed in principle we should make clearly evident our resolution to react to an outbreak of hostilities in order to forestall such an outbreak. It was thought we should consider a possible UN resolution and other steps in the UN to establish a basis for action if it should be required. It also had been decided to request the President to instruct U.S. military authorities, in consultation with the British, to see what could be done in the way of utilizing military forces in the area. There had been a preliminary exploration of various suggestions in this regard, but the possibilities should be studied with great care.

The President instructed an Assistant to telephone Admiral Radford and ask that military representatives get in touch with General Whiteley (Chairman, British Joint Services Mission) to arrange an early meeting. He said he should know what he could do without further Congressional authority, such as moving the Sixth Fleet accompanied by an amphibious expedition, etc.[3]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7. No other drafting information is given on the source text. There is a note on the source text identical to the one on ETW MC–1, *supra*; see footnote 1 thereto.

[2] See *supra*.

[3] In response to these instructions, Admiral Radford on January 31 transmitted a memorandum to the President in which he informed Eisenhower that he and (Continued)

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

(Continued)
Lieutenant General Whiteley had "conferred and concluded that we would prepare separate memoranda in connection with a joint U.S.–U.K. show of force in critical Middle East areas." (JCS Records, CJCS 091 Palestine (31 Jan 56)) The signed original of Whiteley's memorandum detailing British forces in the area, dated January 31, is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.

56. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 31, 1956, 2:40 p.m.[1]

ETW MC–5

PARTICIPANTS

US
President Eisenhower
(where indicated)
Secretary Dulles
Under Secretary Hoover
Ambassador Aldrich
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Procknow
Governor Stassen
Mr. Reuben Robertson
Admiral Radford
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Wilcox
Mr. Allen
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Hagerty (in part)
Mr. Goodkind
Mr. Timmons
Mr. Lister
Mr. Cottman

UK
Prime Minister Eden
Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Ambassador Makins
Sir Harold Caccia
Sir Leslie Rowan
Sir Hubert Graves
Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
Mr. Ian Samuel

[Here follow a list of subjects discussed and discussion of unrelated matters.]

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7. No other drafting information is given on the source text. According to an account by Goodpaster, the conversation took place in the Cabinet Room. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries) There is a note on the source text identical to the one on Document 54; see footnote 1 thereto.

Arab-Israeli Dispute

The Secretary said that our military people had been asked to review the possibility of military action in the area in order to prevent or control possible hostilities. He asked Admiral Radford to comment on this point.

Admiral Radford said that he and General Whiteley had studied this question and had concluded that both countries have naval forces in the area which could be moved if necessary to the Eastern Mediterranean.[2] We have plenty of resources, particularly naval, to permit us to make a show of force. It might be difficult, however, to obtain wide public awareness of any action since it is widely known that we have considerable naval strength in the Mediterranean. Our naval forces alone could establish an effective maritime blockade of Israel, and with a few reinforcements in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, we could blockade Egypt also.

The President inquired whether it would be possible to arrange for naval visits to number of ports in the area. Admiral Radford confirmed that this could be done.

The Prime Minister suggested that, if we say anything about these discussions, we should reaffirm our 1950 Tripartite Declaration and state that we have had further talks in Washington concerning this problem.

Mr. Lloyd suggested that we add the information that military dispositions could be made, that we give the appearance of concentrating on the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, perhaps by moving aircraft carriers and other naval vessels.

The President turned to the Secretary and said that this raised serious questions of policy which should be discussed with Congressional leaders. He said that perhaps the Secretary, alone or with him, should do this, pointing out that it is imperative that we take all possible steps to keep the peace in this area. The President noted, however, that Congressional leaders would probably ask why we did not operate through the United Nations.

The Secretary commented that such a move would probably give the Soviets a chance to move into the picture.

The President said that we should probably send naval vessels into the Eastern Mediterranean in such a way that it looked as though they were on special missions such as mapping. Make it appear, he suggested, that they are on secret business and not just out to make a show of force.

The Secretary noted that this might be effective if the moves were coupled with these discussions in Washington.

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[2] See footnote 3, *supra*.

The Prime Minister stated that the Arabs and Israelis know that we have the necessary means at our disposal. What we must do, he said, is make them realize we are prepared to make some use of our capabilities.

The President reiterated that before saying or doing very much, it would be necessary for us to consult Congressional leaders.

The Secretary noted that the latter would certainly raise a number of questions. If our bluff does not work, he said, we must be prepared to say what we would do next.

The President commented that if we work through the United Nations on this problem, the Soviets would no doubt be happy to jump in and send some of their own ships into the area.

The Secretary inquired as to how quickly a naval blockade would be effective.

Admiral Radford replied that its effect would be immediate and quite complete on Israel and effective but less immediate on Egypt.

The Secretary then referred to UN Resolution 378 [3] and said that this might be helpful in determining who is the guilty party in any particular situation.

Mr. Lloyd suggested that we could say that we adhere to the 1950 Tripartite Declaration and would take action both inside and outside the United Nations. This might be very effective when coupled with a show of force.

The President stated that to say we have discussed the various possibilities, including a show of force, would be about as far as we can go. He reminded the British representatives that only Congress could take action which would involve the United States in war.

The Secretary referred again to the 1950 Tripartite Declaration and said that the developments feared at that time were even more likely today. He indicated that the US and UK should discuss what steps might be taken, including a show of force, and repeated that this would have to be discussed with Congressional leaders. We should tell them of our problems and ask for their ideas, he added.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that the possible moves just discussed would be better than providing more arms for Israel. He asked whether it was not likely that the Israelis would agree with this analysis.

The Secretary replied that they would probably not favor such a course if they want a preventive war.

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[3] Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 378 (V), entitled "Duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities". The General Assembly adopted this measure at its 308th plenary meeting on November 17, 1950. For text, see U.N. doc. A/1775.

Admiral Radford said that Egyptian military capabilities are not very impressive at the present time but will probably increase considerably following delivery of jet aircraft, tanks and other equipment from the Soviet bloc. He said that the Israelis hold a preponderance of strength in the Gaza area.

The President asked if there was agreement that one or two naval vessels might be sent into the Eastern Mediterranean.

Admiral Radford stated that this could be done in such a way that the action would receive public notice. He suggested we might also consider sending naval vessels into the Red Sea.

The Under Secretary agreed that this would be a good idea.

The President said that the main thing is for us to show clearly that we are giving urgent study to the dangerous situation existing in the area and are considering steps which might be open to us.

The Prime Minister agreed and said that we should consider the words to be used in describing our position and that the question of action to be taken should be discussed with General Whiteley. [4]

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

[4] See Document 70.

57. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, January 31, 1956—5 p.m.

710. Embtel 701. [2] Prime Minister Ghazzi handed me January 31 aide-mémoire of which following is summary.

Syrian Foreign Office informed that Israeli Embassy Washington told Department Israel determined resume work for diversion Jordan River end of February. GOS continues hold following position stated in its complaint to SC of October 16, 1953:

(1) Diversion of Jordan removes natural barrier, which leads to military gain and thus conflicts with paragraph 1, Article 2, of GAA;

(2) Diversion constitutes exercise of sovereignty on DZ, which conflicts with characteristic of area and in addition involves political gain contradicting paragraph 1, Article 2 of GAA;

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/1–3156. Confidential; Niact. Received at 3:14 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Rome, Tehran, Jidda, and Karachi.

[2] Document 44.

(3) Diversion deprives owners of Arab land irrigated by river of natural acquired right.

In addition, last paragraph of General Bennike's decision of September 23, 1953, asked Israel to instruct authority which began to work in DZ on September 2, 1953, to stop work in area. Subsequently, on October 27, 1953, SC took unanimous decision supporting Bennike's decision and providing that work in DZ should stop until issuance of final SC decision on basis of Syrian complaint. GOS therefore considers resumption work for diversion Jordan waters as new breach of GAA, violation of SC decision and provocation threatening peace and security in area. Ministry requests Embassy of US to inform its government of position of GOS re this question in order that, in interest of peace and security, it may take necessary steps to prevent Israeli authorities from resuming their illegal attempts.

End summary.

Texts follow by despatch. [3]

Copy aide-mémoire was also given British Ambassador [4] January 30. Evening January 31 French Ambassador [5] had not yet been approached. In reply to question, Ghazzi informed me Syrian position had been established following consultation with Syrian military and with Egyptians.

Press January 31 reports a GOS memo being presented to all members of SC.

Moose

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[3] The Embassy in Damascus transmitted the text of the Syrian aide-mémoire to the Department in despatch 245, January 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/1–3156)

[4] Sir John Gardner.

[5] Achille Marie Clarac.

58. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, January 31, 1956—7:26 p.m.

1729. US–UK and IBRD have agreed on changes in Aide-Mémoire December 16, 1956 [*1955*] [2] necessitated by new Memorandum of Understanding [3] which Black has brought to Cairo.

Thought here is Aide-Mémoire December 16 be withdrawn and new Aide-Mémoire (Aide-Mémoire December 16 as amended) be substituted therefor, such new Aide-Mémoire to be handed Egypt at time Memorandum of Understanding is signed by Bank and Egypt. It should be noted that any changes in Memorandum of Understanding made as result discussions between Black and Egypt may require consequential changes in Aide-Mémoire.

Following are changes necessitated Aide-Mémoire December 16:

1. On Page 1 figure "45,890,000 million cubic feet" should be changed to read "4,589,000 million cubic feet".

2. On Page 2 third paragraph should read "The Bank, the United States Government, and the United Kingdom Government have conferred with the Government of Egypt regarding the manner in which each may assist in financing the Project. The United Kingdom Government has submitted a proposal to the Government of Egypt, and the Bank and the Government of Egypt have signed a Memorandum of Understanding of _____, 1956, copies of which have been delivered to the United States Government, regarding the participation of the United Kingdom Government and the Bank respectively."

3. On Page 2 last two lines numbered paragraph 1 should read: "the proposal of the United Kingdom Government is accepted, and on the conditions hereafter set forth".

4. On Page 4 paragraph c) should read: "The Bank intends to participate in the financing of external foreign exchange requirements of the Project in an amount equivalent to $200 million, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding of _____, 1956 between the Government of Egypt and the Bank."

5. On Page 4 paragraph d) second sentence should read: "In this connection, the United States Government relies upon the assurances of the Government of Egypt, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding of _____ 1956 between it and the Bank, regarding the maintenance of a sound and stable economy and the avoidance of inflation."

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/1–3156. Confidential. Drafted by Jack C. Corbett and Stanley D. Metzger; cleared with Hoover, Phleger, Rountree, Byroade, and Walter A. Radius; and approved by Phleger who signed for Dulles.

[2] See telegram 1282, vol. XIV, p. 868.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 51.

Show this message to Black.

Dulles

59. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, January 31, 1956—9 p.m.

1450. No discussions today between Black and GOE. Black's staff called on me this morning. After some discussion, and at their request (prompted by Black) I had private talk with Kaissuny in which I made clear my belief Black sincere in stating he saw no purpose in continuing discussions regarding preparation at this time on even draft basis of a loan agreement. This subject had been thoroughly gone over between Kaissuny and Black in Washington and Black had not expected nor intended proceed Egypt to discuss this point. Informed Kaissuny Black's interest in project as high as ever but unless GOE dropped insistence on this topic Black had made it known to me he planned to leave Saturday [2] and had reservations. Black's offer of exchange unilateral declarations of intention still stood. [3]

There followed lengthy conversation during which Kaissuny repeatedly urged me to press upon Black need for patience and his belief that matters could be worked out with time. Casting about for a formula Kaissuny proposed: (1) a letter by GOE to Black covering all basic conditions required by Bank including necessity Sudan waters agreement. This would be a unilateral statement of undertakings by GOE.

(2) Bank's reply would take note of undertakings in GOE's letter and would be voted by Bank's board before despatch to GOE. Kaissuny emphasized vote by Bank board important as Black himself had stated such procedure would make Bank's undertaking more formal and binding. (GOE considered Black's latest proposal of exchange of letters of intent without vote by Bank board as not constituting firm commitment by Bank.) He suggested that Black volunteer at next meeting with GOE (without of course naming

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/1–3156. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:23 p.m. Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] February 4.

[3] See Document 50.

Kaissuny as originator of idea) that if and when such exchange of letters consummated Black would be willing to start drafting a letter of agreement which would necessarily take considerable time and could in any case not be signed until GOE's undertakings complete.

Conveyed Kaissuny's suggestion to Black and staff who seemed interested but obviously wished discuss it among themselves. Black's personal reaction appeared somewhat more negative than positive but he did not close door.

During my conversation with Kaissuny in lobby Semiramis, Black stepped up and made inquiry regarding forthcoming [meeting?] in view his desire visit Suez Canal and his reservations for departure Saturday. Kaissuny asked whether he could not stay longer and Black replied "That depends upon tomorrow's meeting". (Scheduled for 11:00 a.m.).

Kaissuny made very clear to me he personally working hard for success present negotiations and having rough time with some his colleagues. His own repetition of questions to Black regarding possibility loan agreement had sole purpose of permitting new ears to receive Black's expected replies.

Would summarize situation as follows: Black and staff obviously interested concluding agreement with GOE and openminded on phraseology any exchange of letters with Egypt provided basic conditions met. Kaissuny understands Bank's position thoroughly and sympathizes but so far unable carry his government with him due suspicions regarding Bank's unwillingness spell out new provisions loan agreement so that GOE would know where it stands. Deadlock just about at hand and probably can only be broken by Nasser. Early meeting Black with Nasser likely, results of which can by no means be forecast.

Hart

60. Message From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to Cairo [1]

Washington, January 31, 1956.

REFERENCE

State cable 1432 Jan 30, 2 PM [2]
Message No. 56 [3]
Message No. 55 [4]

1. We appreciate gravity of situation described above refs and its impact upon Bob's mission. Accordingly if Bob is not available Cairo to handle this matter himself you are authorized to give Eugene Black following message from Hoover and to give him such background info of Bob's mission as in your opinion is necessary to reinforce urgency of this message.

"For Eugene Black from Hoover. . . . Secretary and I are most anxious that at this particular juncture Nasser should not be faced with a take it or leave it proposition if this can in any way be avoided. As you will realize . . . , vitally important considerations of highest interest to entire Western world all involved. While we do not wish in any way to bring pressure to bear on you on the business side of your important negotiations we felt you should know the background which bears upon the question of maintenance of peace in the area. This is of course essential to the realization of the great project on which you are negotiating. Bob if he is able to visit Cairo shortly will give you further details."

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.-March 1956. Secret. Repeated to Jerusalem and Athens for Anderson.

[2] Document 51.

[3] This message from Cairo, January 31, reported that the High Dam negotiations were "on the verge of collapse." The message noted that Black was considering issuing a "take it or leave it" ultimatum and then leaving for the United States. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.-March 1956. Part I)

[4] This message from Cairo, January 31, noted that the Anderson Mission would certainly fail if Black's talks failed. It was feared that an ultimatum from Black, which Nasser would reject, might drive Nasser to accept the Russian offer of aid. In addition, one of Anderson's strong bargaining points, the promise of U.S. assistance on the High Dam, would be "gravely weakened." (*Ibid.*)

61. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, February 1, 1956—10 a.m.

712. Pass Army. Embtel 710. [2] In conversation with Army Attaché [3] January 31 re situation Syro-Israeli frontier C/S Shuqayr made following points:

(1) Latest Security Council resolution called on Syria and Israel to take no action which might provoke incidents on DZ; [4]

(2) Diversion canal at Jisr Banat Yacoub is within DZ;

(3) Israelis are ready for war, believe they can win a war and are seeking pretext to start a war;

(4) From Israeli point of view, diversion project would be economically profitable; result in Syria, however, would be that large territory would become desert and at least 5 communities would have to be abandoned;

(5) As of January 31, no Israeli construction equipment had been moved into region but Ben-Gurion has again declared he intends start project;

(6) Four Israeli brigades and additional units now in position opposite Syrian frontier;

(7) In November, Israel bought in Italy US M–7 self-propelled artillery (quantity unspecified) and has recently bought other arms in Italy as well;

(8) He expects Egyptians' reply to request for anti-aircraft equipment (Embtel 688, January 31 or February 1 [*January 24*]). [5] If reply negative, he will immediately authorize purchase from Czechs since it is imperative equipment be in Syria by March 1;

(9) If Israelis start diversion project, Syria can wait "a few hours" for UN or tripartite action;

(10) Lacking such action Syria will "interdict" the area (presumably by artillery or mortar fire);

(11) Syria does not want war, but if Israelis want war it will begin at Jisr Bakat Yacoub.

Comment: Shuqayr's statements confirm Embassy impression that Syrians

(a) Base their opposition to resumption of work on diversion project on UN decisions and recommendations

(b) Believe Israelis intend resume work although Israelis are aware that outbreak of hostilities is likely result, and

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–155. Confidential; Priority. Received at 8:21 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Rome, Tehran, Jidda, and Karachi.

[2] Document 57.

[3] Colonel Robert W. Molloy.

[4] See the editorial note, vol. XIV, p. 854.

[5] Vol. XIII, p. 531.

(c) Contemplate no aggressive action themselves but, relying on Egyptian help, are determined, regardless of consequences, to resist completion of diversion project.

Moose

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62. Message to Robert B. Anderson, at Athens [1]

No. 60 *Cairo, February 1, 1956.*

1. . . . This message will cover the essential points and details will follow subsequently. [2]

2. I explained deep sense of urgency President feels regarding making some progress toward settlement. I had returned for purpose of urging PriMin to speed up work . . . Ali Sabri [is] doing . . . so that Anderson could take back to Washington with him paper, read and approved by PriMin, setting forth his position on the various problems of settlement, apart from the Negev. I showed PriMin possible draft of such paper on which he made little comment beyond objecting to statement that Egypt would remove all restrictions from vessels entering the Gulf of Acaba with comment that there would be no reason for them to be entering that Gulf. He agreed that . . . Ali Sabri could work upon an agreed draft which could be brought to him where he will be resting (he is leaving Cairo for four days rest tomorrow morning).

3. PriMin went on to say that he did not wish in any way mislead us and he hoped that we understood what he had told us many many times, namely that agreement on these minor issues was of no consequence without agreement on two major issues, the Negev and the timing of announcement of settlement.

4. PriMin then said he had grave sensitive matter to raise. For last five days dispatches have been received by Egyptian newspapers from New York or Washington reporting that Egypt and U.S. were working to reach an agreed position on settlement with Israel. PriMin can censor such dispatches in his own country but feels that some will appear elsewhere in the Arab World and will oblige him to deny the story. The Arab leaders might take advantage of this

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret. The source text bears a notation that Dulles saw the message on February 1.

[2] See Document 67.

occasion to request assurances of a sort which he would prefer not to be obliged to give and which would make settlement even more difficult. He asked that I transmit to Washington his extreme concern over this danger to the success of all of our negotiations.

5. At Gene Black's request I also discussed with PriMin current negotiations over IBRD loan. This discussion will be fully reported to Black. Briefly the PriMin's position is that if he is to commit the tremendous amount of Egyptian financial resources involved in the first five years of work he must be absolutely certain that at the end of that time money to continue that project will be available. No letter of intent can really give him this assurance, for he insists upon regarding the Bank as having political character since the Board of Directors is made up of representatives of different nations who must vote as their Govts instruct them to. He agreed to talk to Black further probably Thursday [3] but it is clear that he still has his mind set upon loan agreement.

6. Several times in course of discussion PriMin reiterated that he had no intention of aggressive action. As a final gesture, he made this most important suggestion: Within two months, he would be able to make military move which should conclusively demonstrate this fact. At that time he should be strong enough militarily so that his forces could defend Egypt proper without the necessity of fighting delayed campaign in the Sinai Peninsula. Once that position is reached he would be willing to withdraw almost all his regular forces from Sinai Peninsula.

7. Drafted 2030Z Jan 31.

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[3] February 2.

63. Message From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell), at Athens [1]

Washington, February 1, 1956.

1. Re your message No. 64, February 1, [2] talks with British have thus far had little direct relationship Anderson's mission, although utmost importance of outcome mission emphasized. Various elements problem of finding solution Arab-Israel dispute discussed, but no new considerations have emerged. Most significant feature has been substantial doubt held by British as to Nasser's reliability. It generally felt that his attitudes re Anderson mission and Black mission might be strongly indicative whether West can, in fact, hope to work with him.

2. Both sides equally concerned possibility outbreak hostilities and, in accordance decisions taken, joint studies now underway to consider what might be done to put teeth into Tripartite Declaration. Items under consideration include (a) advisability establishing through UN moral or legal basis for subsequent action if required; (b) desirability seeking now respective US-UK legislative authority or endorsement for such steps as may be required to bring about cessation hostilities; and, (c) military potentialities of both sides to act in emergency. We also considering movement Sixth Fleet to Eastern Mediterranean, dispatch smaller ships to Middle East Naval Command in Red Sea area and other measures which would without fanfare demonstrate availability of force. Essential objective would be to make it clear that we would move to stop hostilities regardless of who was at fault. Believed this would be most effective deterrent.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518; Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Rountree and cleared in draft by Byroade, Hoover, and Dulles. Regarding Russell's presence at Athens, see Document 53.

[2] Russell at Athens had asked Hoover to send "summary those sections Eden talks which bear on this [Anderson] mission." (*Ibid.*, Jan. '56—memos, etc.)

64. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State [1]

No. 66 *Jerusalem, February 1, 1956.*

1. Returned to Israel night of January 30. Was fearful that further delay would increase Israel doubts concerning mission.

2. . . . I met with Ben-Gurion, Sharett, Kollek and Herzog for 4 hours afternoon of January 31. [2] They were exceedingly anxious to hear the results of my second conversations with Nasser. [3] I reported:

a. Nasser reaffirmed absence of hostile intent;
b. the resolution to avoid border incidents;
c. a willingness to still consider some form direct negotiations but that he felt former channel had resulted in his being misled and was concerned with the Abdullah incident.
d. I went over check list of items which had been discussed with Nasser, pointing out that these represented substantially areas of agreement either in detail or principle.
e. that Nasser had indicated privately and to me that he was optimistic concerning possible results of this operation.
f. Sharett asked if progress had been made on the real problems of refugees and boundaries. I reviewed statements on both sides re refugees and said both sides had evidenced flexibility and expressed hope; that we had discussed possible areas of resettlement of refugees in Arab States after determination of number to be repatriated by some formula. On the boundary question I said I could only reiterate that both sides must remain flexible although I understood clearly that to Ben-Gurion the application of the term meant giving up of territory.

3. Ben-Gurion then made the following points: This mission offers great hope and great danger. The hope lies in its succeeding. Ben-Gurion tries earnestly to believe Nasser is sincere but even with this belief fears Nasser may face pressures from his army and other Arab leaders which will result in his resorting to war in view of the flow of armaments to Egypt. Ben-Gurion insists that shooting on the border must cease if he is really to believe in Nasser's sincerity. Says shooting has occurred each day since I came but by miracle no one killed. Ben-Gurion states his great objectives are:

a. Security of his people;
b. the establishment and continuation of Israel;
c. the making of an Arab-Jewish alliance.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518; Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Top Secret. The source text bears a notation that Dulles saw this message.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, Meetings with Israeli Officials. January 1956–March 1956)

[3] See Documents 45 and 46.

Because of the great hope which this mission holds for the achievement of these objectives, he is willing to be patient, understands the necessity of Nasser securing acceptability by his people and other Arab leaders, and states that he is willing to negotiate or be patient for months or years if it is possible for him to remain patient. He points out that he is misleading his colleagues by not informing them of this mission thereby increasing the responsibility of those who know. That there are limits beyond which he cannot go, and if his colleagues cease to believe in Israel's security, it may not be possible for him to be as patient or take the time necessary to achieve a settlement. He asserts that we urge him to be reasonable but he can be reasonable only if the anxiety of war is removed. He understands the problem Nasser faces of not immediately reopening channel of communication. He wants me to give reassurance to Nasser that security will be maintained and that misunderstanding will be avoided. He feels that direct communication is a necessary step to what he regards as finally indispensable and that is meeting with Nasser. He stated that he was willing to concede "things that Nasser never dreamed of" but only if he could discuss matters with him personally. In reply to my question, he stated that he would never spell out the price he was willing to pay for peace to any third person. He said, "If only we could meet, I know there would be peace in ten days." He stated that he wanted me to clearly understand that if the anxiety of war continued, it might at some point become impossible for him to continue to be patient and seek peace and that this anxiety had to be measured in weeks or at best a month or two.

4. I replied that I understood the weight of his responsibilities and wanted him to know our country was concerned with the long-term best interest of Israel as a state surrounded as it is by Arab States, and he must surely realize that this was more desirable than any short-term point of view. That a precipitous course of action might allay anxieties temporarily but could only lead to greater long-term dangers of survival. He said this was so but there were limits to his holding this line.

5. It seems evident that Ben-Gurion regards this operation as a great personal undertaking. He feels himself on the horns of a dilemma. He says, "Every child in Israel is my child. I am responsible to them and history. I want so earnestly to believe in Nasser's sincerity, but I look in vain for signs. If only the shooting at the border would cease, I could then believe."

6. Sharett asked if I had heard the broadcast from Syria stating that if work was resumed on the Banat Yacov Dam that Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt would resort to force. I told him I had not heard the broadcast, but I hoped Israel would not find it necessary to do

anything which could be regarded as justification for use of force during the period of our effort. Ben-Gurion said he would make no commitment about what his intentions were regarding Banat Yacov but again stated, "You are asking me to be reasonable and I can only be reasonable if my people feel secure. If they do not feel secure, then unreasonable things become the reasonable."

7. Ben-Gurion inquired as to whether Nasser had discussed the Jordan Valley Plan. I replied as reported in my previous telegram to you.[4] Ben-Gurion seemed pleased at Nasser's attitude and stated that he realized the difficulty was enhanced by the instability of the Syrian Government.

8. During general conversations which followed, the following points of view were put forth:

a. Israel will accept any form of supervision of the Holy Places suggested by Jordan.

b. They subscribe to the principle of border adjustments linking villages to farms and making other minor corrections.

c. They envision free trade without duty between adjacent Arab countries and want to work towards its development although they realize that prejudices now exist.

d. They look forward to unrestricted transit of planes, trains and other forms of communication across Israel and between Arab States.

e. They regard with favor the Secretary's statement of the guarantee of boundaries in August, but want to make clear that their people would not accept the guarantee of any power exclusively and they would always require sufficient weapons for what they regard as legitimate self-defense. They emphasize that theirs is a civilization of "in-gathering" and that the principal ingredient is the morale of their people.

9. They maintain hope for the success of this operation if we keep it moving. I explained that I might now return either to Cairo or U.S., and was remaining flexible which they accepted as proper.

10. Sharett was deeply concerned that the British Ambassador to Cairo held a two and one-half hour conference with Nasser subsequent to my departure. He fears the influence of Britain and the doctrine of the Guildhall speech.[5]

11. Was prevented returning to Athens late last night due to inclement weather. Now plan to return and meet Russell late tonight.

12. Have been very worried about effect of reported Black conversations . . . . Am pleased to receive Hoover's message to Black.[6] Will discuss matter with Black if opportunity arises.

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[4] Document 46.

[5] Reference is to Prime Minister Eden's speech of November 9, 1955.

[6] See Document 60.

65. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, February 1, 1956, 4 p.m. [1]

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
The British Ambassador
The French Ambassador
Minister Lucet, French Embassy
Mr. Shuckburgh
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Allen

SUBJECT

Tripartite Declaration

The Secretary handed to the French Ambassador the portion of the joint Declaration relating to the Middle East which will be issued by the President and Prime Minister Eden at 5:00 p.m. today. [2] After reading it, Ambassador de Murville referred to the statements that arrangements "have been made for joint discussions as to the nature of the action which should be taken" in the event contingencies arise which were envisaged by the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, and that the French Government was being invited to participate in these discussions. He asked whether the Secretary of State had any ideas regarding the substance of these discussions.

Mr. Dulles replied that it had been agreed merely that the Three Powers should meet to consider the question. [3] He pointed out that it was very difficult to envisage the exact situation which would have to be met and what specific action would be needed and appropriate. Mr. Dulles asked for comments by the British Ambassador, who concurred in the view Mr. Dulles had expressed.

The French Ambassador asked whether the talks by the Three Governments would be held prior to referring any situation to the

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WA/2–156. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. Assistant Secretary Allen on January 26 had recommended that Secretary Dulles invite the British and the French to participate in tripartite discussions on the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950. The Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs concluded it was essential for the three powers to concentrate their efforts over the next 2 or 3 months to press the parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute to work toward a settlement, to refrain from making any significant arms shipments to the area, and to consider economic and financial sanctions, as well as measures to be taken in the United Nations, to be applied against an aggressor in the Palestine conflict. (Memorandum from Allen to Dulles, January 26; *ibid.*, 684A.86/1–2656)

[2] For text of the Anglo-American declaration issued at Washington on February 1, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 13, 1956, p. 231.

[3] See Document 87.

Security Council. The Secretary said he was not certain what situations should be brought to the Security Council, chiefly because of Soviet Russia's membership. Count de Murville suggested that the question whether any given situation should go to the Security Council would be one of the matters for discussion. He asked whether these discussions would concern both substance and procedure. Mr. Dulles said they would.

Referring then to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, Mr. Dulles said that question of its reaffirmation had arisen during the discussions between the President and the Prime Minister but that it had been considered preferable to avoid a positive reaffirmation in their communiqué, first because the French were not present during the discussions, and second, because certain sections of the Tripartite Declaration had become outmoded and perhaps rendered invalid by the entry of the Soviet Union into the armaments picture in the Middle East.

The French Ambassador expressed appreciation for the invitation and said he would convey it promptly to his Government.

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66. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State [1]

Paris, February 1, 1956—8 p.m.

3432. Department telegram 2714. [2] Counselor Israeli Embassy Bendor today requested information on status 12 Mystere IV–A's requested by France for availability for Israel. Bendor reported that Director Afrique-Levant Roux at Quai d'Orsay informed Israeli Ambassador here that French Ministry Defense having received oral approval through French Ambassador Washington, via Quai d'Orsay, had requested specific authorization from Embassy's MDAP officer to make 12 planes available from OSP contracts. Bendor asked Embassy officer whether Roux's information is correct. If so, he wanted to know Embassy's plans for complying with Ministry Defense's request for specific authorization.

From first paragraph reference telegram Embassy assumes that Defense is prepared to accept any extension of completion date on Mysteres contract caused by delivery of Mysteres to Israel. We plan

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/2–156. Secret. Repeat to London, Rome, and Tel Aviv. Received at 8:43 p.m.

[2] Document 40.

to so advise French and Israeli Embassies later this week if Department has no objection. (See also Embassy telegram 2714. [3])

If French Government is deliberately dragging its feet because of considerations contained paragraph 2 reference telegram, responsibility for this delay has now been placed on this Embassy. We feel since original request was instigated by French Government, any delay for political reasons should be French responsibility.

Since French Government has kept Israeli Ambassador Paris fully informed on French-United States negotiations on release of 12 planes, we fear leak to press is distinct possibility. It would then be most unfortunate for United States, in interest maintaining neutrality toward Near East area, and we foresee possible recriminations with both United States and France being accused by Arabs for shipping Mysteres to Israel and by Israelis for holding up shipments.

Would appreciate instructions. [4]

Dillon

[3] Reference is presumably to telegram 3373, Document 43. Telegram 2714 from Paris deals with an unrelated matter.

[4] See Document 74.

67. Message to Washington [1]

No. 67 *Cairo, February 2, 1956.*

1. Add following to Message No. 60. [2] Much of meeting was actually devoted to Nasr's reflections on Egypt's economic future and he gave strong impression he has taken over role of chief planner in this field. He indicated that he is now in what will be prolonged period of reconsidering government's economic activities and that he had already been obliged perform major surgery on social services budgets, halving future expenditures for such things as hospitals, village centers, etc. In this connection he expressed great perturbation with regard to future development aid from the United States. He said that the announced intentions of U.S. to divert economic aid to direct support of high dam had left Egypt with a

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Secret. Repeated to Athens. The source text bears a notation that Dulles saw the message.

[2] Document 62.

number of projects undertaken on basis last year's development aid program and which now must be completed with Egyptian funds. He said some of these might not have been approved had he known that Egypt would have to complete them from her own resources.

2. Nasr appeared to feel he may have to wait a while before starting the high dam project. He specifically said he realized that an agreement with the Sudan was an absolute precondition. He was likewise adamant that firm outside commitments with regard to financing of this project were also a precondition to the undertaking. As mentioned in Message No. 60 Nasr wants to negotiate a loan agreement with IBRD and says that any letter of intention or commitment which leaves a future negotiating problem before the financing actually becomes available will not provide him with the necessary assurances to justify the huge expenditure of Egyptian pounds required to bring the project along during the next five years. Nasr had a copy of the agreement between India and IBRD covering the Demodar project on his desk and professed not to understand why the high dam could not be covered now by a similar agreement.

3. Nasr's attitude was reported fully . . . to Eugene Black the following morning.[3] While recognizing that this represents—at least for the time being—rather decisive parting of the ways between IBRD and Egypt Black indicated that he was prepared to regard the matter publicly as a still open issue.

4. As mentioned in Message No. 60 Nasr appeared decidedly relaxed about the military aspects of a major Israeli attack. He seemed quite positive that his force in the Sinai was capable of conducting a delaying action for two months after which time his striking force now forming in the rear would be available for General Amer to "play with." He reiterated that his real concern was with the question of U.S. and other arms assistance to Israel which would oblige him to build a still larger military establishment. This would have to be done with Soviet assistance since "it is obviously the U.S. Government's policy not to provide arms to Egypt."

5. Drafted 1200Z 1 February.

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[3] February 1.

68. Message to Athens [1]

No. 70 *Cairo, February 2, 1956.*

Since . . . meetings with Black and Nasr, [2] high dam talks have taken turn for better with both sides giving ground. Have now agreed exchange letters of commitment and Egyptians agree accept IBRD terms with "appropriate" competitive bidding. Understanding include delay commencement major work until Nile waters agreement. Both sides now optimistic. Black expects remain until about 8 February.

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Jan.'56—memos, etc. Secret. Repeated to Washington.

[2] See Document 62 and *supra*.

69. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, February 2, 1956—4 p.m.

1471. Reference Embtel 1450.[2] Black's meetings with GOE officials yesterday took hopeful turn which is believed due largely to conviction of Hassan Ibrahim and others close to Nasser that Black count [*can?*] not be persuaded undertake loan agreement now. (Kaissouni admitted to Black he had hammered away for loan agreement in order to convince others, mainly Hassan Ibrahim, Black's position firm. Elaborate stenographic notes taken and probably reviewed by Nasser. Black's irritation at these meetings genuine as he was not privy to Kaissouni's strategy and resultant sharp discussions apparently convinced Ibrahim and through him Nasser.) At meeting last evening, Kaissouni and colleagues told Black that GOE would postpone starting main project until after Nile waters settlement; would require, in accordance with principles Bank, appropriate competition in awarding contracts, and desired Bank commitment (approved by board) in form exchange letters. [3] GOE letter to Bank to cover,

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/2–256. Secret; Priority. Received at 1:33 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, and Khartoum.

[2] Document 59.

[3] The Egyptian draft texts of the proposed letters which Prime Minister Nasser and Eugene Black were to exchange were given to Black and transmitted to the (Continued)

unilaterally, substance conditions now contained draft letter intent presented Kaissouni in Washington [4] and to request working out loan agreement after Nile waters settlement. Bank's reply, probably brief, would concur. GOE promise to produce draft its letter for discussion Friday. [5]

Kaissouni has told Trevelyan in private conversation GOE letter would state intention conduct financial policy, in particular extent external credits, in such way as not affect its capacity to repay loan, but GOE could not agree to anything specifically giving Bank right veto GOE decisions in this field. Bank's position could be safeguarded by making signature loan contract conditional on GOE carrying out its intention. Loan contract itself could provide for stopping loan disbursements if Bank not satisfied GOE continuing to carry out its intentions.

Trevelyan raised with Kaissouni question Soviet-Bloc competition. Latter replied this not yet fully discussed with Nasser and his colleagues, and could probably not be made a specific point in exchange of letters, but thought letting of one contract to Western consortium for whole project might provide solution. Later, Black told Trevelyan Bank's practice is to limit construction to firms belonging to member countries or to countries from which Bank borrowed money. Black has received request from Sudan Government, delivered by Sudanese Chargé here, to come Khartoum to discuss Sudan projects. Black has replied could not do so for two reasons: (1) not enough time and (2) Sudan not member of Bank and therefore he could not discuss even projects, not to mention loans (nevertheless, invitation repeated, and Black again declined). [6] Black mission feels this also hopeful development. If Sudanese counting on Bank for assistance for Roseires Dam, they may be prepared take reasonable position regarding Nile waters settlement.

Hart

(Continued)
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and to the Department of State on February 4. (Telegram 1494 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/2–456)

[4] See footnote 2, Document 1.

[5] February 3.

[6] Further information regarding the Sudan's invitation and Black's refusal is in telegram 1523 from Cairo, February 7; Department of State, Central Files, 398.14/2–756 and in despatch 845 from Cairo, February 8; *ibid.*, 398.14/2–856.

70. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Special Assistant (Hedding) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) [1]

Washington, February 2, 1956.

SUBJECT

Naval Demonstration in the Eastern Mediterranean

1. As directed by the President, and in order to evidence discreet interest in the areas adjacent to Egypt and Israel, the Sixth Fleet has been ordered to conduct certain operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. These operations are to be coordinated with similar operations by U.K. naval forces, however, these two forces are not to operate as combined forces.

2. The following operations have been ordered:

a. Establish a patrol of two destroyers off the coast of Israel. These destroyers would remain in international waters well outside territorial waters and make their presence known by occasionally exchanging calls with passing ships.

b. Establish a similar patrol off the coast of Egypt and in the Red Sea.

c. Seek to obtain clearances for patrolling ships to visit ports in these patrol areas. Even though clearances might not be obtained, the object of disclosing presence in the area would be achieved.

d. Conduct fleet exercises as practicable in the Eastern Mediterranean area.

3. It is therefore requested that you inform our embassies in the area of the above operations in order to alert them as to the operations and to the requests for clearances for visits. As the President has requested that he be kept informed of the results of these operations, it is desired that the embassies be requested to report any reaction or information resulting from these operations.

T.J. Hedding
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5411/2–256. Top Secret.

71. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, February 2, 1956—5 p.m.

772. General Burns met earlier this week with Embassy Counselor and Service Attachés [2] in pursuance of subject Embtel 675 [3] and Deptel 499. [4] Consulate General Jerusalem also present. Burns said he desired to set forth his appraisal Egyptian-Israel situation and to raise several questions for Department consideration. He had informally discussed same questions in part with Hammerskjold during latter's recent visit but did not feel he could set forth matter to UN Secretariat because of danger leaks from that body.

Burns said that in his judgment there was enough danger of war in the area to require immediate decisions by tripartite powers regarding preventive measures or means of intervention if the former failed. As Burns saw situation hostilities could originate from either land invasion or air attack. If the former most probable that initiative would come from Israel; if the latter, from Egypt. As a preventive measure against land action he was thinking of proposing a buffer in the form of United Nations forces to be established in the demilitarized zone and in the Rafah–Khan Yunis area. In view of fact invading forces would have to overrun UN Forces, this would counter any possibility of developing a minor incident on the demarcation line into major hostilities or a staged "casus belli".

Re possible air attack by Egypt, Burns recognized that Egyptian possession Jet bombers was Israel's telling argument for being given more arms. He doubted whether Egypt would initiate air action unless she could resist an Israeli counterblow on the ground. He was not certain as to when this point would be reached, it depending on the length of time necessary for Egypt obtain and become efficient with new Czech weapons. Burns said he was unclear as to the form of tripartite intervention against air attack. He raised the question of another radar warning system and possible counterattack on air bases.

Burns concluded by saying that he was aware of his responsibility in the current situation as head of UNTSO but badly needed guidance. He said he would be most grateful any comments the Department could give him discreetly regarding the foregoing, as

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–256. Top Secret. Received at 9:06 a.m., February 3. Repeated on February 10 to London as telegram 4501. (*Ibid.*)

[2] Colonel Leo J. Query, USA; Colonel William B.M. Chase, USA; and Colonel David A. Peterson, USAF.

[3] Document 4.

[4] Not printed.

well as any information regarding such subjects as staff talks or other preparations to prevent wars; and whether prior action of the Security Council would be needed. He inquired about the location of U.S. and UK forces in the Middle East which might be in a position to intervene. Burns said he recognized that there were many political difficulties in trying to set up preventive forces through Security Council action now.

Embassy representatives informed Burns foregoing would be transmitted to Department and that Embassy appraisal situation remained unchanged from that set forth January 3 (Embtel 675). Burns left the impression that he would be greatly relieved if he learned that the problems he mentioned were being actively worked on by the tripartite powers. [5]

Lawson

[5] The Department responded on February 7 that "By now Burns will have seen Eden–Eisenhower communiqué which indicates US–UK–France will be consulting on measures to be taken against aggressor. Basic philosophy remains that in event NE aggression three powers will make every effort act through appropriate UN organs." (Telegram 547 to Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–256)

72. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State [1]

No. 72 *Athens, February 3, 1956.*

Russell . . . and I have today reviewed the progress of this operation with a view to determining our best recommendation for proceeding from this point.

1. On the Israeli side, BG has stated flatly that he will not spell out the price which Israel will be willing to pay for settlement in the absence of a meeting with Nasr. This meeting he is willing to approach through the establishment of direct contact at a lower level, working up to a meeting of heads of Government. He has discussed in principle the checklist items not in terms of commitments but in terms of their resolution within the context of a settlement to be achieved when the heads of Government meet.

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw this message.

2. On the Egyptian side, Nasr has stated that it is impossible for him to consider a meeting from the standpoint of his own security, the position of his government, and the attitude of the other Arab States. Such a meeting might become possible when the Arabs are more willing to accept the idea of settlement with Israel. We likely cannot afford this delay. At this time he is considering but has not agreed to low level direct contact. He is influenced considerably by the Abdullah incident.[2] He, too has discussed the checklist items, but again not on the basis of commitment, but within the context of a settlement of the territorial and refugee questions which he could announce as an Egyptian victory and which he believes he might make palatable to Egypt and the other Arab States.

3. This vicious circle suggests questions and courses of action of which the following are examples:

A. What chance do we have of persuading Nasr to agree on a meeting in the near future in order that BG will spell out his price for settlement and feel that, as the Head of State, he has had a personal opportunity to participate in decisions that ultimately affect his country's future? It is our view that such a meeting in the near future is most unlikely.

B. Should the United States now arrive at some decision with reference to the position it will take on the division of the Negev, which decision would be communicated to Nasr conditioned upon his acceptance of a reasonable decision and a reasonable point of view on all other items involved in settlement.

C. One course of action might then be that I would return to Nasr and endeavor to secure from him a reasonable position on the division of the Negev together with other problems. At this point I could tell Nasr that I would determine from our Government whether or not we could support the position he would take. If we decide that we could support his position we would then endeavor to sell the package settlement to BG. This course of action depends in part upon our evaluation of Nasr's reliability, together with his reasonableness giving us a fair chance of our selling the package to the IG. It would also involve the decision which our Government would make to deal with the situation in the event that BG did not buy the package and decided to initiate forceful action. At this point we would cease intermediation in its true sense and adopt a policy of putting forth the terms of a settlement, concurred in by Nasr, which we would try to sell to BG.

D. Another possible course of action might be spelling out what we consider to be the most equitable terms of settlement as between parties who cannot agree and putting appropriate pressures on both sides to accept such a settlement or face the alternatives which we would outline to them. It seems clear that through mere intermediation the parties are not going to agree on terms of settlement.

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[2] On July 20, 1951, King Abudullah of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was assassinated by a Palestinian Arab on the steps of the El Aksa Mosque in the Temple compound of Jerusalem as he was departing after Friday prayers.

E. Whichever course we might pursue, there is the risk that BG will feel compelled to take the terms of proposed settlement to his cabinet. At that time a crisis decision would be made by the IG. The IG will likely regard the context of the mission as changed. We will be regarded as no longer seeking to reconcile belligerents but will have staked our hopes for settlement on convincing the IG to accept a package settlement. BG will likely feel he has been deprived of a right of sovereignty in not personally participating in discussions establishing the terms of settlement. In this context consideration should be given to the cable to the Director of January 29, Para 14 (Message No. 53).[3]

F. Another possibility resulting from BG's refusal could be making public this effort. Even if this is done without attribution, Nasr would immediately disclaim the effort and the possibility of continued secret negotiations would be very slim.

4. The kinds of decisions which are involved in the next phase in trying to achieve a settlement within a few weeks requires, in our judgment, discussions at the highest level and preparation for the courses of actions which might confront us under the various alternatives.

5. I am advising both sides that I am returning to Washington but will be returning to this area in a week or so to resume discussions. I now plan to arrive in New York Sunday morning[4] and Washington Monday night. . . . Russell is going to Cairo today in order to assure that discussions which our people are carrying on with Ali Sabry are as productive as possible. He will leave Cairo for Dusseldorf Monday to accompany Hoover back to Washington per Hoover's schedule.[5]

6. Athens 3 February 1630 local hours.

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[3] Not printed.

[4] February 5.

[5] Hoover left Düsseldorf at 8:15 p.m., Monday, February 6, for New York, and arrived in New York at 7:15 a.m., February 7.

73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria [1]

Washington, February 3, 1956—6:15 p.m.

575. Syrian Aide-Mémoire on Banat Yaqub diversion project; Embtels 710 [2] and 712. [3] You may reply to GOS along following lines:

1. SC has held that Chief of Staff of TSO has general supervisory authority over DZ. US fully supports this position. Decision therefore as to whether or not Israel may recommence project in DZ is his. Whatever that decision we will support it.

2. Re arguments put forward by GOS we are confident General Burns would give them most serious consideration whenever he might be required to make decision. So far as US is concerned unless General Burns decides to contrary General Bennike's decision of September 23, 1953 still stands as basis for Israel not proceeding with water diversion project. As for SC resolution of October 27, 1953, decision as to its binding effect is up to SC.

3. US has repeatedly advised Israel not to attempt recommencement of diversion project in absence of overall understanding, involving Chief of Staff's consent, as to division and use of waters of Jordan River system.

4. US would take serious view of any action by Israel or Syria which might provoke hostilities.

Jerusalem inform General Burns. [4]

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–156. Confidential. Drafted by Ludlow, cleared with Bergus and Boardman, and approved by Bond who signed for Dulles. Repeated to USUN, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, and Paris; pouched to Cairo, Beirut, Amman, Baghdad, and Jidda.

[2] Document 57.

[3] Document 61.

[4] In telegram 338 from Jerusalem, February 6, Consul General Cole notified the Department of State that he had informed General Burns of the position that Ambassador Moose was to take with the Government of Syria. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–656)

74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France [1]

Washington, February 3, 1956—7:48 p.m.

2819. Paris Tels 3402, [2] 3432. [3] Israeli request for twelve Mysteres involves two important considerations: (1) French production now committed to French Air Force under OSP contract; (2) Four members of Ambassadorial Committee including French have agreed suspend action on all Israeli requests for arms for time being. [4]

Re (1), U.S. has informed French Ambassador if France decides to supply Israel with twelve Mysteres it would have no objection if OSP contract were interrupted. Technical details regarding interruption OSP contract will not be telegraphed until French decision ship Mysteres is made. French have not yet decided supply Mysteres.

Re (2), French agreement on suspension of action on Israeli request applies to Mysteres. Ambassadorial Committee plans consider all Israeli requests in week or two.

In light this situation Bendor should be informed decision re Mysteres is entirely in hands of French Gov't and that Embassy understands French Foreign Ministry plans inform U.S. officials in Washington and Paris when French Gov't has arrived at decision. Foreign Ministry should be informed of Bendor's approach and Embassy's reply. [5]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/2–156. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Tel Aviv, and pouched to London and Rome.

[2] The Embassy in Paris reported in telegram 3402, January 31, that an official of the French Ministry of Defense had called at the Embassy on January 27 to state that it was his understanding that the proposed sale of Mysteres to Israel had received favorable consideration in Washington. Embassy officials had replied that this official should "consult [French] FonOff which would undoubtedly be informed." (*Ibid.*, 784A.56/1–3156)

[3] Document 66.

[4] See Document 40.

[5] See Document 79.

Re Tel Aviv's 759[6] Embassy may wish inform Israeli officials decision re Mysteres rests with French and U.S. understands French have not yet decided.[7]

Dulles

[6] See footnote 3, Document 43.

[7] The Embassy in Tel Aviv on February 8, responded to the Department's instructions as follows:

"Substance last paragraph Department's 540 to Tel Aviv communicated informally to Foreign Ministry and to office of Prime Minister. GOI had already been approached by French Embassy and informed that US Government had no objection to delivery of Mysteres. GOI officials gave Embassy impression they confident that affirmative French action in this matter would not be long delayed which in line with Sharett's comment to me. French however have given GOI injunction strict secrecy re Mystere deliveries." (Telegram 784 from Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/2–856)

75. Message to Robert B. Anderson, at Washington[1]

No. 74 *Cairo, February 4, 1956.*

1. Ali Sabri agreed . . . this morning on the text of a secret letter to the President which Nasr will sign[2] and present to us for forwarding Monday morning.[3] Meanwhile Ali Sabri has authorized us to wire text which follows: "My dear Mr. President: Thank you for the letter presented to me by your personal representative and the expressions of personal regard contained therein.[4] May I reciprocate your kindness. Knowing and sharing the worldwide anxiety for the preservation of peace, I wish to address myself to you, whose many declarations on behalf of peace and justice are well known to my countrymen. Egypt has always declared and has sought every occasion to prove her desire for peace and her determination to develop her resources for the welfare of the Egyptian people. This means that Egypt harbors no hostile intentions toward any other state and will never be party to an aggressive war. Egypt is a part of the Middle East area; concerned with the stability of the area. Any

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret. The source text bears a notation that Dulles saw the message.

[2] A photocopy of the signed original of Nasser's letter of February 6 is *ibid.*, Jan. '56—memos, etc.

[3] February 6.

[4] See Document 12.

disturbance in the Middle East necessarily has profound effects on Egyptian ability to pursue a policy of peaceful development. The establishment of Israel in Palestine was the gravest imaginable challenge to the peaceful preoccupation of the Egyptian and Arab people. But, despite the sense of injustice evoked by this development, in the interest of peace Egypt recognizes the desirability of seeking to eliminate the tensions between the Arab states and Israel. At the same time Egypt must affirm its continuing desire to see the fundamental rights and aspirations of the Arab people respected and can foresee possibilities in this respect which we would earnestly entertain and support."

2. Ali Sabri said that Nasr preferred not to send the statement of principles for a settlement as an attachment to his letter to the President. He would however authorize us to send the statement to Mr. Anderson and tell him that it had been read by Nasr and that Nasr authorizes Mr. Anderson to treat it as representing Nasr's views on the points discussed. Text follows:

"Statement of general principles which would provide a satisfactory basis for the resolution of the several points at issue between the Arab states and Israel.

I. Territorial.

A. The establishment of Arab sovereignty over a satisfactorily substantial territory connecting Egypt and Jordan and forming a part of one or the other of those two states.

B. The establishment of permanent boundaries by means of alterations of the Armistice Demarcation Lines for such purposes as:

1. Restoring to Arab border villages adjoining farmlands and groves formerly tilled by the inhabitants of those villages,
2. Improvement of communications,
3. Improvement of access to water supplies, and
4. The general rationalization of boundaries.

II. Refugees.

A. Arab refugees from Palestine to be provided a choice between repatriation and compensation for loss of real property.

B. Phasing of the return to assume all rights and obligations of Israeli citizens.

C. Refugees granted repatriation to assume all rights and obligations of Israeli citizens.

D. Refugees electing resettlement and compensation to be moved from the refugee camps and resettled as rapidly as possible.

E. Assistance to be provided by the International Community, probably under U.N. auspices, for the reestablishment of all refugees.

III. Jerusalem. Formulation of solutions of the problems of territorial division and supervision of the Holy Places which are acceptable to the world community.

IV. State of belligerency and economic restrictions deriving therefrom.

A. The parties to recognize formally the termination of the state of belligerency.

B. Following the termination of this state of belligerency:

1. Lifting of the secondary boycott—that is, discontinuance of all measures taken by the Arab states to prevent trade with Israel by non Arab countries and non Arab firms, and

2. Removal of all restrictions on shipping, other than normal maritime regulations.

V. Unified development of the Jordan Valley. The states affected to agree to the proposals for the unified development of the Jordan Valley developed in discussions with Ambassador Eric Johnston."

3. Nasr asked that Mr. Anderson be told that he did not regard the question of development of Jordan Valley waters as an integral part of a settlement, but that he was willing to reaffirm his approval and support of the Johnston plan.

4. On advice of Burdette and Troxel [5] an attempt was made to change statement on Jerusalem so as to indicate approval of present territorial division. Ali Sabri stated, however, that Egypt would not support Jordan on this question against world opinion and that Nasr preferred the statement to remain unchanged.

5. Cairo 1030Z Feb 4.

[5] The Department of State on January 22 had cabled an offer to make Burdett and Troxel available to Anderson to provide expert advice on the various boundary and refugee problems. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Jan. '56—memos, etc.) Anderson immediately accepted the Department's offer of their services. (Message 15 from Anderson at Cairo, January 22; *ibid.*)

76. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan [1]

Washington, February 4, 1956—4:13 p.m.

390. Arab Ambassadors here are pressing to ascertain what actions US, UK and France would take under Tripartite Declaration if Israel cuts Canal at Banat Yacub and Syria fires on workmen, precipitating general hostilities. Department has pointed out that

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/2–456. Secret. Drafted and approved by Allen who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, and Baghdad.

impossible to say in advance what precise action would be taken or even what type would be needed and appropriate in hypothetical case.

During discussions with Eden, Secretary referred to UN Resolution No. 378 V of November 17, 1950, which provides that in case of aggression States involved shall, not later than 24 hours after outbreak of hostilities, make public statement proclaiming readiness, provided States with which it is in conflict will do same, to discontinue all military operations and withdraw all military forces to its own territory. Side refusing to comply would doubtless be considered aggressor. Presumably if both sides fail to comply, both could be considered at fault and blockade or other measures could be invoked against both.

In discussion with Jordanian Ambassador yesterday, Department made strong plea for prompt acceptance of Jordan Valley Plan by GOJ.[2] He was reminded that engineers on both sides had agreed on technical aspects of plan, that Israeli Government had accepted it officially, that Nasser had agreed four months ago to try to obtain Arab acceptance "during next two months", that Jordan would gain most from plan and that Lebanese, who had least interests in water aspects, were opposing it for selfish reasons at expense of fellow Arab States. If GOJ could make some public statement of acceptance, hedged with whatever reservations GOJ might deem necessary, for political reasons, retaining its position on or right of repatriation of refugees and re acceptance by other Arab States, US would have better basis for urging Israel to defer unilateral action pending further efforts to obtain general agreement. He was also reminded that Tripartite Declaration did not require action by us unless one side attempted to change boundaries by force and that cutting of canal by unarmed workmen might not be construed as such attempt. This did not mean we would condone unilateral action by either side to divert waters which had traditionally served Jordan Valley. We would, in fact, do what we could to prevent Israeli action. However, Israel might well declare that canal at Banat Yacub was called for by Jordan Plan, that Israel could not wait indefinitely for Arab agreement, and that Israel intended to take only that portion of water which Arab engineers had agreed was Israel's share. If Syrians started shooting, SC might decide, on same principle as Tiberias Resolution, that while Israeli initiative was improper, Syrian retaliation was out of proportion to offense or that Syria should seek other remedy than resort to force.

Moreover, all Arab Ambassadors here have been reminded that during four months since announcement of large Egyptian arms deal,

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[2] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

US has not permitted Israel to acquire single rifle bullet in US. This restraint by US, in face of heavy Israeli pressure, should be fully appreciated by Arabs even if source of Egyptian arms were disregarded since Tripartite Declaration refers to arms balance and introduction of fast jets into Middle East seriously affected that balance. When fact that arms and technicians reaching Arabs are of Commie origin is also taken into account, US restraint during four months has been truly remarkable. Arabs cannot expect US to continue much longer to show this restraint unless they give us something to work with.

It was suggested to Jordanian Ambassador that he should not reveal full details of this conversation to his Arab colleagues since 1) they would exaggerate reports and imply that US would be complacent if Israel dug canal and 2) extremist like Zeineddine[3] would promptly try to prevent any helpful action by GOJ.

Jordanian Ambassador appeared impressed by considerations mentioned and said he would report to his Government promptly. He is disturbed by possible demonstrations by refugees and by uncertainty whether Nasser would support his Government's action.

Shuckburgh has been informed of foregoing and has agreed to authorize Ambassador Duke to consort with Mallory in effort achieve positive action by Jordan. It is recognized that in view of recent experience, pressure by UK might be counterproductive at this moment but Eden has agreed that all appropriate efforts be made to put across Jordan plan. Best way to prevent action by Israel will be to show progress in negotiations.

Addressees authorized use foregoing as appropriate but principal effort can be made by Mallory and subsequently Lawson. Syrians and Lebanese should probably not be roused at this stage.

Dulles

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[3] Dr. Farid Zeineddine, Syrian Ambassador to the United States.

77. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, February 4, 1956—5 p.m.

1496. Re Embtel 1424 Jan 29. [2] Black has had separate talks with German and French Ambassadors Cairo re High Dam. Both interested in forms of their respective coparticipation, would be for 12-year term and tied to French suppliers. Black explained to them that (for reasons indicated reftel) credits extended by their countries to Egypt would merely reduce size Bank's loan to Egypt. German Ambassador appeared to take understanding attitude toward problem, but not French Ambassador who said his job was to look after French interests. However, according Black's info, French representative Herrenschmidt (see reftel) not coming to Cairo.

Hart

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/2–456. Confidential. Received at 8:06 p.m. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Paris.

[2] Document 50.

78. Message From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State [1]

No. 76 *Cairo, February 5, 1956.*

1. I have discussed with . . . State representatives working with Anderson in Cairo [2] implications and questions involved in paras 3 C and D of Anderson's Feb 3 telegram. [3]

2. Consensus is that procedure under 3 D is preferable to that under 3 C; that is, it would be better for Anderson to come out on his next round with set of U.S. suggestions for resolution of various issues and attempt to secure Nasr's assent or comments on them rather than to come without a plan and attempt to obtain his cooperation in working one out. It is also consensus that, leaving aside acceptability to Nasr of details of those proposals, Nasr would

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegram—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.

[2] Presumably Burdett and Troxel.

[3] Document 72.

not take any exception to fact we had given study to problems and were making specific suggestions.

3. If it is decided that Anderson on next round should bring a plan with him, following represents belief here as to what is likely to be absolute minimum Nasr could be induced to accept on territorial question and proposals that might be acceptable to him on other issues:

A. The critical and most difficult question, of course, is Negev. The only proposition Nasr made in recent conversations with Anderson was that the Negev South of the Dhahiriya–Gaza line be ceded to Egypt. It is believed, however, that the circumstances of this discussion were such as to lead him to propose what was in effect an asking price. . . . representatives here believe that at this point Nasr is still thinking in terms of general principles of settlement he would accept. This is substantial and militarily defensible territory under Arab sovereignty. . . . best guess is that with all inducements offered by U.S. Nasr would translate these principles into cession to Egypt of El Azja demilitarized zone and the Negev South of line from southern tip of zone to Ein HPSB (also recvd HKSB) (HOTSEVA) (170.5–020.3). As matter of tactics Anderson's first proposal should be less than above. Nasr as part of settlement along foregoing lines might be willing to cede Gaza strip to Israel. It is doubtful that Nasr could be brought to agree to Elath as part of Israel but there would be no harm in attempting sell him on that with suggestion that present main roads running through Israel from Cairo to Amman and Damascus would be open for use by Arabs and road running from Beersheba to Elath similarly open to Israel traffic.

B. Other territorial provisions might be: (1) Division of other "demilitarized zones" and "no mans lands" created by armistice agreements. (2) Restoration to Arab border villages of a portion of the adjoining farm lands and groves which are now cut off by the armistice demarcation lines. (3) Other alterations of the armistice demarcation lines for such purposes as improvement of communications, access to water supplies, establishment of more rational boundaries, etc.

C. Refugees: Arab refugees to be offered choice between repatriation on the one hand and resettlement and compensation on the other, with not more than 15,000 refugees to be repatriated per year for five years and 5,000 per year thereafter. Compensation and resettlement to be financed and administered (with assistance from international communities) in such a way as to maximize the appeal of this alternative as compared with that of repatriation. Election of one or the other of the two alternatives to be made within a period of two years after conclusion of a settlement. (This formulation is suggested as a means of meeting both the Israel insistence that the number to be repatriated shall be limited to specific figure and Nasr's insistence that theoretically at least all refugees should have the right of election.) The refugees repatriated to assume all rights and obligations of Israel citizenship. Israel to renounce the claims which it had advanced against the Arab States for war damages and abandoned Jewish property. No compensation to be claimed on behalf of the Arab refugees for war damages and such items as

movable personal property and lost income. Compensation payments to be made to the individual refugees through a quasi-judicial process in a manner to encourage investment in the area and prevention.

D. Jerusalem: . . . Creation of international organization responsible for supervision of Holy places and access to them. (3) Passage by U.N. of appropriate resolution recognizing these arrangements.

E. Termination of state of belligerency: (1) Formal recognition by Arab States and Israel of termination of state of belligerency. (2) Following the termination of the state of belligerency, discontinuance of all measures designed to prevent trade with Israel by non-Arab countries and non-Arab firms and removal of restrictions, other than normal maritime regulations, from all shipping.

F. Communications arrangements: (1) Israel to accord Jordan free post facilities at Haifa and free access to port. (2) Mutual overflight rights to be granted innocent civil aircraft. (3) Israel to permit restoration or construction across its territory of telecommunications facilities between Arab States.

G. Unified development of Jordan valley: States affected to agree to proposals for unified development of Jordan valley developed in discussions with Ambassador Johnson.

H. Guarantee of security. U.S., U.K. and perhaps other nations to offer to enter into formal treaty engagements with Arab States and Israel to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force definitive boundaries established between Arab States and Israel.

4. . . . believe that Nasr will want period of six months to prepare Arab public opinion for settlement (probably at least until July 1 in view of the presidential plebiscite on 23 July) there is bare possibility that if settlement could be agreed upon in next two or three weeks, Nasr might agree to announcement before March 15 on theory that he could recoup loss of popularity resulting from announcement before plebiscite date. This is admittedly slight chance but believe we should make greatest effort realize it.

5. Cairo 1130 Feb 5.

79. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State [1]

Paris, February 6, 1956—7 p.m.

3509. Re Deptel 2819. [2] Have discussed contents reference telegram with Maillard (Foreign Office).

Maillard stated today Foreign Office has already taken firm decision to deliver 12 Mysteres to Israel and is now awaiting US Government's authorization to interrupt MDAP contract.

In view Deptel 2714, [3] we informed Maillard that US concurrence in Washington was merely to principle of interruption of Mystere MDAP contract but French Ambassador had not informed Department that French had made firm decision. Review of our dossier reveals that Embassy has been informed by Margerie in written aide-mémoire (Embtel 2867 [4]), by Roux (Embtel 3253 [5]) and by Maillard himself (Embtel 3073 [6]) that Foreign Office wanted only US agreement in principle to interruption of MDAP contract, and that before reaching any final decision, matter would be referred to Ambassadorial Committee.

Maillard said that, as there had been misunderstanding in past, he would now inform Embassy officially of definite French decision to interrupt MDAP contract since US agreement to principle had already been obtained. Maillard, speaking for Foreign Office, further asked that State Department now take necessary action immediately to interrupt contract thus making possible for French to supply 12 Mysteres to Israel. Embassy official reminded Maillard that channel was Washington and appropriate approach would be through French Ambassador. Maillard said Foreign Office would give French Ambassador appropriate instructions but he requested Embassy also forward official Foreign Office request.

When asked if current decision Foreign Office to by-pass Ambassadorial Committee was deliberate, Maillard said contract for 12 Mysteres was signed December after Pinay-Sharett talks [7] and before Ambassadorial Committee had been established. Any future contracts to ship Mysteres would, of course, be raised with Committee. When asked if delivery planes had been discussed in NEACC,

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/2–656. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:41 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, and Rome.

[2] Document 74.

[3] Document 40.

[4] See vol. XIV, footnote 2, p. 884.

[5] See footnote 2, Document 40.

[6] Document 6.

[7] Sharett's conversation with Pinay occurred at Geneva on October 27, 1955.

Maillard said no approach had been made to NEACC but he admitted he was embarrassed and at a loss to explain this oversight.

Despite previous assurances from Margerie, Roux and Maillard that Mysteres shipment to Israel would be submitted to Ambassadorial Committee (see above), Maillard said original decision of Foreign Office had been reversed. Foreign Office was now committed to delivery this shipment 12 Mysteres and would proceed to fulfill contract with Israel as soon as Department gave appropriate technical instructions re interruption of MDAP contract.

Of possible interest is approach made to MDAP Embassy official on December 16 by French Minister Defense officials who stated contractual arrangements for delivering 12 Mysteres to Israel was two years standing. Original contract called for Mark II Mysteres which are now obsolete and Foreign Office therefore wished to substitute Mark IV–As.

Bendor approached Embassy today and we informed him along lines Deptel 2819, referring him to Maillard.

In view recent intimations from Bendor that planes ready to take off on receipt US final authorization, Embassy requests that any instructions re contract amendment be explicit as to point of contract interruption (i.e., at what stage of production are planes to be designated non MDAP). FYI: Air procurement official feels that any planes not accepted by his service would be considered non MDAP. Planes already on field would obviously have already been accepted by US.

Dillon

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80. Message to Washington [1]

No. 78 *Cairo, February 7, 1956.*

1. Nasr's letter to President [2] given . . . by Ali Sabri today, [3] is being pouched.

2. Sabri repeated warning that Nasr would be forced deny discussions if there any indication serious leak. Said there had been

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret. The source text bears a notation that Dulles saw the message.

[2] See Document 75.

[3] February 6.

however no further press statements which worried PriMin about possibility of leak.

3. . . . handed Sabri paper setting forth items for discussion and continuing review in support Anderson mission.[4] Plans made for joint effort:

A. Estimate Nasr's capabilities with regard settlement
B. Work out time table
C. Prepare plan for preparation of Arab public opinion for final announcement, and
D. Formulate agreed Egypt/U.S. statement of area objectives.

Sabri unusually interested and cooperative this discussion.

4. Practical measures to carry out what Nasr has called essential first stage then discussed, namely general easing of tensions. Sabri's suggestions as follows:

A. Return general situation to state Feb 55.
B. Stop public statements by Israel to effect that area tensions due Arab warlike intentions.
C. Withdrawal troops by both sides a set distance behind armistice line.

5. In general discussion Sabri made much of fact that general psych situation now would make announcement of settlement difficult or impossible. He made point that capability Egypt control refugees and nomads on Israeli border direct result general psych situation.

6. . . . made effort explain there no point talking about easing tensions unless each side took positive steps give assurance to other side of its intentions and desire for easing tensions. Sabri accepted fact Egypt as well as Israel would have to do something about this.

7. Meeting planned for 8 Feb at which specific plans for easing tensions and timetable whole operation will be discussed.[5]

8. 1130Z 6 Feb.

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[4] No copy of this document has been found in Department of State files.
[5] See Document 85.

81. Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, February 7, 1956—4 p.m.

1525. ReEmbtel 1480. [2] In response our inquiry British Embassy official expressed following views regarding possible consequences resumption work at Banat Yaqub:

1. Syrians would probably open fire on workers.
2. Israelis would seek interdict fire.
3. Egyptians would certainly respond to appeal for help from Syria as would Iraq.
4. Doubtful Jordan could stay out.

Regarding point four HMG carefully studying situation view treaty obligation. [3] No decision yet made but thinking tending towards view that British should support Jordan whether attacker or attacked. Alternative might be disappearance such British influence as still remains especially if Israelis occupied West Bank.

Regarding point one some thought being given by HMG to economic off set which they would hope might persuade Syrians and Jordanians not respond militarily to resumption work. Yarmuk works might encourage Jordan in acquiescence but not clear to British what could be offered Syria which chief danger point. If HMG thinking crystalizes British Embassy assumes Department will be informed in course current Washington talks. British Embassy officials here personally dubious economic aid offer would be efficacious since problem essentially political involving national prestige and "honor".

Meantime . . . reliable report that Nasser has addressed letter to Syrians advising in strongest terms that in event work at Banat Yaqub is resumed Syrians should exhaust all available peaceful measures through UNTSO and UN itself before under taking military action. GOE would give fullest support to Syria in such course.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/2–756. Secret. Received at 7:59 p.m. Repeated to Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Ankara, Tehran, Jerusalem, and USUN.

[2] The Embassy in Cairo, in telegram 1480, February 3, informed the Department that Nasser was convinced that Syria would initiate military action against Israel if the latter resumed work at Banat Yaqub "and GOE has decided support Syria militarily although GOE would initially insist Syrians give UN and US chance persuade Israel not to do so. Nasser believes Israeli tactic is to provoke preventive war by inviting Syrian and Egyptian military response to resumption project and estimates March 1 as critical date." The Embassy concurred in this assessment. (*Ibid.*, 683.84A/2–356)

[3] Reference is to the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of Alliance, signed at Amman on March 15, 1948, by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Transjordan. (77 UNTS 77)

Nasser reiterated to informant however that he was pessimistic as to Syrians capabilities of restraint. Although he did not wish be "trapped" into war with Israel over Banat Yaqub he would have no alternative to extending full military support to Syria if latter so required.

Hart

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82. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, February 8, 1956—noon.

735. Substance Deptel 575 [2] given to Prime Minister Ghazzi orally morning February 7. He was unusually attentive but showed no reaction. When he requested aide-mémoire for use in subsequent conversation with General Burns, I commented that my experience with one of his predecessors made me cautious in supplying aide-mémoires. Ghazzi assured me contents US Government reply would be treated confidentially in this case, and aide-mémoire delivered to him later same morning. [3]

Moose

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–856. Confidential. Received at 8 a.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, and Jidda. Passed to USUN at 11:30 a.m.

[2] Document 73.

[3] Moose, in telegram 741, February 9, informed the Department that Ghazzi apparently raised the Banat Yacub question during a conversation he had on February 7 with General Burns. According to the telegram Ghazzi claimed that:

"(1) Israeli resumption work in DZ would lead to trouble;

"(2) GOS had received US Government reply to its memorandum this question; and

"(3) Problem appeared in effect rested solely on Burns shoulders. Burns replied that, if Israelis resumed work, he would order them to stop and would request SC action." (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–956)

83. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State [1]

Amman, February 8, 1956—7 p.m.

414. Discussed with Ambassador Duke approach HKJ outlined Department's 390. [2] He has received no instructions. In view Prime Minister's [3] February 10 trip Cairo and Riyadh, considered desirable see him prior thereto. Requested predeparture appointment which given noon today.

In course discussion reviewed broad JVP problem. He had not received report HKJ Ambassador's discussions Department February 3 and asked for fill-in. He showed understanding and said he was aware of Syrian preoccupation Banat Yacoub statements re possible hostilities.

I asked him if HKJ might not undertake effort obtain acceptance JVP. He replied that as new government in office only one month he foresaw no possibilities. [4] I asked if it might not be possible make some declaration that matter continues under study. He replied in direct and plain language that Israelis apparently wished force agreement for their own purposes or to use Banat Yacoub as means of instituting hostilities. As between these two alternatives and if the US could not restrain Israelis he had no hesitation in saying it would have to be the second. I asked whether hostilities between Syria, Israel and Egypt would call for Jordanian participation. He replied that involvement of either Syria, Egypt or both would involve Jordan. Even if the government wished to stay out it would not be able to withstand public opinion.

I reviewed again the final negotiations in Cairo and the apparent good will of Nasser in support JVP, suggesting he might wish discuss with Nasser on Friday. [5] Suggested moreover that meeting of Arab Chiefs of State which he is promoting would be excellent place obtain Arab acceptance. He said (without much conviction) might be possible to arrange include discussion plan on agenda. However, meeting would not take decisions but would lay down policies for executive to follow. He said that given approbation of Nasser and Saudi Chiefs State meeting could be arranged for mid-March.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–856. Secret. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv. Received at 3:45 p.m.

[2] Document 76.

[3] Samir Rifai.

[4] Samir Rifai's government assumed power on January 9, 1956.

[5] February 10.

Comment: Samir Rifai is often verbose and can avoid commitment by flood of rhetoric which I somewhat expected this morning. I was surprised at brevity and directness his replies and statements. Have informed Duke.

Mallory

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84. Memorandum to Washington [1]

Cairo, February 8, 1956.

SUBJECT

The Problem of Tension Between the Arab States and Israel: Obstacle to Settlement

1. *Atmosphere of Tension*. The atmosphere of tension and mutual suspicion which has prevailed between Egypt and Israel since the Gaza raid of February 1955 and prevailed with varying intensity elsewhere along the armistice lines since the end of the Palestine War must be recognized as a primary obstacle to the settlement of the differences between the Arab States and Israel. Furthermore, it is an obstacle both to private and public discussion in consideration of a settlement. The elimination of this atmosphere is unquestionably the first step to be accomplished if a settlement of differences and the establishment of peace is to be achieved in the area.

2. *Effect of Situation on Capabilities of Governments*. The prevailing atmosphere of tension seriously limits the freedom of action of the governments of the area.

a. The Israeli Government is reliably reported to be influenced in its policy and propaganda by the fact that much of the Israeli population is frightened of infiltrators from across the armistice lines. The policy of retaliatory raids, aside from the moral questions involved, is apparently influenced by the political considerations and the fear of the Israeli Government that it would lose popular support if it did not give some indication of its willingness to use force in defense of the Israeli people. It is also reliably reported that the course of world events in recent months has appeared to be unfavorable to Israel. Many Israelis have feared that the increase of Arab strength and the threat of Soviet-communist penetration of the area

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II. Secret. The original text was handed to Ali Sabri on February 8. (Message 101, March 2; *ibid.*)

would lead the West to force the Israeli Government to make compromises, particularly territorial compromises. In order to counteract the political losses which these widespread fears have threatened, the Israeli Government, it is reported, has felt it necessary to carry on propaganda which insists on the Government's unwillingness to yield on any point.

b. The Arab Governments, since the end of the Palestine War, have been faced with the problem of satisfying the intense desire of many Arabs for revenge. Any attempt on the part of Arab leaders to modify bitterness toward Israel has tended to weaken their political position. The exercise of restraint on the part of Arab leaders has frequently been in the past cause for attacks upon them by their political opponents. The prevailing atmosphere of tension is largely responsible for limitations of this sort upon Arab leaders.

3. *Factors Responsible for the Prevailing Atmosphere of Tension*. The atmosphere which prevails along the Arab-Israeli armistice lines is not the product of isolated events or public statements, but is compounded of thousands of interacting events against the background of the Palestine War. Certain factors, however, can be pointed out as being particularly responsible for the present atmosphere.

a. *Military Raids*. The execution of organized military operations across the armistice lines and bringing about the death of both civilian and military personnel is, unquestionably, one of the major causes of the present atmosphere. Such raids terrorize the population along the border, stamp the government responsible for them as aggressive and warlike in its intentions and methods, and raise questions both as to its long range objectives and as to its relationship with its public. The action of the United Nations in repeatedly condemning the Israeli Government for military raids across the armistice lines, without regard for their retaliatory character, is clear evidence of world opinion. The cessation of military raids is an essential requisite of an atmosphere in which a peaceful settlement can be carried out.

b. *Infiltration*. The illegal crossing of the armistice lines by small groups or individuals for whatever purpose adds to the atmosphere of tension and suspicion, particularly when such infiltration is for the purpose of theft or harassment and when it leads to clashes, often resulting in the death of innocent persons. It must be recognized that most infiltrators in the past have been refugees, often innocently seeking a brief look at their former homes. However, many of them have engaged in theft and have been prepared to use force in order to extricate themselves from difficulties. Others, of course, are nomads over whom no government has effective authority or control. Nevertheless, the seriousness of this practice as a factor in the prevailing atmosphere cannot be discounted.

c. *Public Policy*. Statements and public policy, or statements which appear to be public policy, made by the leaders of the Arab States or of Israel and which involve threats to the other side contribute to a general state of tension. The statements by Israeli leaders favoring expansion of Israeli borders or threatening Arab States with further

military retaliation and statements by Arab leaders referring to a future time in which the Arabs will be able to destroy Israel all contribute to the state of tension. Propaganda which arouses suspicion and hatred of the other side also contributes another obstacle to any effort to solve the overall problem.

4. *The Problem of Change.* The problem which confronts all people on both sides of the armistice lines who are interested in bringing an end to the fruitless conflicts of the present situation and creating a situation in which peaceful progress and growth are possible is one of breaking out of the vicious circle of hostile actions and the hatred that comes in response and finding some formula for change. It appears almost certain that no formula for change can ever come as a result of resolving the problem of guilt and responsibility for the past. The strands of justice and injustice are so inextricably intertwined that there is probably now no solution on grounds of justice. The alternative is a solution on grounds of self interest and convenience.

5. *Establishment of Mutual Confidence.* Both sides recognize that before a formula for an agreed settlement can be devised or even discussed in face to face negotiation, it will be necessary to take the first step of lessening tensions. This will require the establishment of mutual confidence; mutual confidence, however, can come only as a result of positive acts and the withholding of actions which have in the past contributed to the vicious circle of aggression and hatred.

6. *Specific Measures for the Establishment of Mutual Confidence.*

a. *Border Control.*

(1) *Cessation of Military Raids.* Total cessation of military raids across the armistice lines must be regarded as a requisite to the easing of tensions.

(2) *Measures to Reduce and Control Infiltration.* A gradual and increasing stiffening of orders to border military and police forces for the control of infiltration is probably a necessity. Some carefully devised explanations for this step must be devised. Punishment of infiltrators, admittedly extremely difficult under present circumstances, probably should be organized. It would probably help for the Arab States to see that a report on the whole problem of control of infiltration and on measures being taken to control it be passed to the Israeli side.

(3) *Measures to Reduce Contact Between Troops.* Further efforts should be made to devise plans for the mutual withdrawal of troops a fixed distance behind armistice lines. Any other methods for reducing troop contact along the armistice lines should be discussed and, if possible, forwarded to the other side through some intermediary.

b. *Propaganda.*

(1) *Suspicion [Suspension] of Propaganda Statements and Techniques Which Contribute to the State of Tension.* An obvious requisite of an improved atmosphere is the suspicion [*suspension*] of propaganda statements attacking the government or people on the other side of the armistice lines, impugning their motives or accusing them of immoral or unjust plans and aspirations. It is not to be expected that all unfriendly statements against the other side could be quickly eliminated from propaganda from either side, but a progressive program for the elimination of statements which serve only to stir up the public against the other side must immediately be instituted if tensions are to be discussed.

(2) *Positive Propaganda Measures.* After steps have been taken to eliminate or reduce propaganda aimed solely at creating an antagonism, a program of positive propaganda aimed at producing an atmosphere favorable to the acceptance of a settlement must be instituted. Such a propaganda program must be made the subject of careful study, which must begin immediately.

(3) *Public Policy Statements.* A change in the tenor of the public policy statements should be carried out as rapidly as possible in order to prepare the way for an eventual announcement of a settlement. At the beginning it will, of course, not be possible for any public official to make any direct recommendation of a settlement or a statement indicating support, in general, of the idea of the settlement, but public policy statements can from the beginning show approval for the objectives of a settlement, that is, peace, the end of fear, the opportunity to devote the maximum amount of public resources to internal development, etc. In time, public policy statements can be made on the various measures for the achievement of those objectives. It must be acknowledged that statements similar to those described above have been made in the past. However, what must be sought now is a progressive program, so devised and so adhered to that the statement favoring peace and the devotion of resources to economic development today is not cancelled out by a statement looking forward to successful war tomorrow.

TIMETABLE

Step 1: 1st Anderson Mission.

To obtain statement of intent from both parties and assurances of interest in a settlement necessary for U.S. President to take further measures.

Step 2: 2nd Anderson Mission.

To report to both sides on discussions with the U.S. President, to bring a statement of plans and intentions from the U.S. President and, if a settlement appears possible, to obtain agreement on Step 3.

Step 3: Inauguration of systematic program using the United Nations as a vehicle for the reduction of tensions between Arab States and Israel.

The United Nations would not be informed in any way of the existence of secret preparations for a settlement, but would be "used" by the United States in concert with Nasser for the purposes below.

A. To Gain Time

1. To enable us to work out the details of the final settlement.
2. To enable both sides to prepare public opinion for the eventual announcement of the settlement.

B. To provide a changed international atmosphere with regard to the Arab-Israel problem.

1. To which the Arab States could respond favorably, and
2. Which Israel could not ignore without a decisive loss of outside support.

Step 4: Complete Staff Work on the Actual Terms of Settlement.

Israel and Egypt, acting independently, will begin this immediately upon the inauguration of Step 3 and will push ahead with it as rapidly as circumstances permit.

Step 5: Egyptian Prime Minister will initiate program to bring other Arab leaders into line for purpose of working out Arab terms and arriving at eventual settlement.

This step will begin whenever the effects of Step 3 make it feasible.

Step 6: Meetings of Authorized Representatives of the Chiefs of State.

This step to begin when staff work has been completed. The purpose of meetings will be to finalize the arrangements for the settlement.

Step 7: Meetings of the Chiefs of State.

To complete negotiations and come to agreement.

Step 8: Announcement of the Agreement and of Steps to be Taken to Implement the Agreement.

85. Message to Washington [1]

No. 79

Cairo, February 8, 1956.

1. . . . representatives presented Ali Sabri this morning (8 February) long memo on problem of reducing tensions between Arab States and Israel and discussed a timetable of eight steps to completion of settlement. [2]

2. Memo on easing tensions prepared and presented because of constant emphasis by Nasr and Ali Sabri on solution this problem as essential step in direction of settlement. We pointed out that agreement by two sides on necessity easing tensions and even agreement on measures necessary to achieve this end probably would not be successful in practice without some kind of machinery. Sabri agreed to analysis of situation presented in memo and to proposition that machinery required.

3. We then presented timetable in which Anderson's first visit was first step and second step was Anderson's second visit, which we said we thought would produce statement from U.S. President on what he willing to do. We then suggested for Sabri's consideration a third step consisting of systematic program under United Nations for reduction of tensions. We pointed out this could provide machinery needed by both sides, enable both sides to change propaganda line so as to favor eventual announcement settlement and provide cover for secret negotiations, which would not be revealed in any way to the United Nations.

4. Sabri accepted idea of step three in principle and asked time to study whole timetable in preparation for discussion on Saturday. [3] He made point that step two had to produce assurance of serious intent from both sides and definite indications that settlement possible. Step three, he emphasized, can begin only after completion step two. Sabri said he would try provide detailed suggestions on step three and said he could think many things that could be done as part of this program. For example: Withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Sinai Area and Israeli troops from Beersheba.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw this message. Information on the source text indicates the message was sent from Cairo on February 8, but the copy furnished to the Department of State was dated February 9.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] February 11. No record of such a discussion has been found in Department of State files. According to the records of the Department of State, the representatives did not meet again with Ali Sabri until February 15. See Document 96.

5. Steps four to eight in timetable, project staff work on terms settlement, Nasr bringing in other Arab States, meeting of reps of Chief of State, meeting of Chiefs of State and final announcement.

6. At close of discussion Sabri pointed out there considerable concern in Egyptian Government and he said throughout Arab area over Tripartite discussions Wash. Said discussion of use of force by Tripartite Powers particularly unfortunate following U.N. SecGen's visit. [4] Said U.N. only proper instrument intervention in event hostilities.

[4] See footnotes 4 and 5, Document 25.

86. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, February 9, 1956.

SUBJECT

Luncheon with Ambassador Eban and Reuven Shiloah, February 9, 1956

I had lunch with Ambassador Eban and Reuven Shiloah, at their request, this noon. In response to their inquiry as to how we felt the first rounds of the Anderson mission had gone, I told them that my impression was:

1. Discussions revealed desire on both sides to move towards settlement;

2. While our concept of Anderson's mission had been that it would have dual purpose of (a) delineating the issues and clarifying preliminary positions of both sides, and (b) arranging for direct meetings at which final issues could be resolved, Anderson had found readiness of Nasser to discuss points under (a) but difficulty in getting his agreement to (b); and had encountered difficulties in Israel in connection with (a) and almost complete preoccupation with (b);

3. To a gratifying extent the ground work had been laid for a further round of talks which we thought might take place in very short time.

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Jan. '56—memos, etc. Top Secret. A chit attached to the source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw this memorandum.

Eban made it clear he will take position with you tomorrow [2] that there is no immediate prospect of concluding settlement even if talks should continue and that Israel therefore should receive the arms she has requested from U.S. I said that this was a matter on which I was not in a position to speak.

[2] See Document 90.

87. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions [1]

Washington, February 9, 1956—7:56 p.m.

540. Statement by President and British Prime Minister February 1 [2] referred to provisions 1950 Tripartite Declaration and increasing danger of possible hostilities in Near East. Reference was also made to joint discussions in which French were invited to participate as to nature of action which should be taken in event of possible hostilities. [3] Representatives of US, UK, France met in Washington February 8 for organizational and exploratory discussions. [4] These discussions included various contingencies which might arise in NE such as 1) diversion of Jordan River at Banat Ya'qub 2) renewed hostilities in Al Auja DZ and 3) possible hostilities in Gulf of Aqaba. Discussion also included measures which might be taken individually or jointly both within and without UN to meet various contingencies. It was agreed Banat Ya'qub was presently most important and most critical point of conflict between Israel and Arab States.

Representatives of US, UK and France agreed report discussions to respective capitals including 1) question of Tripartite démarche in Israeli and Arab Capitals re support for Johnston Plan as means avoiding possible violence at Banat Ya'qub and 2) question of measures each might be prepared to take within or without UN to forestall development of hostilities at Banat Ya'qub. They agreed

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/2–956. Secret. Sent to Ankara, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Karachi, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv. Drafted by Wilkins and approved by Allen who signed for Dulles.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 65.

[3] See Document 65.

[4] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/2–856)

prepare short papers incorporating views of each covering possible contingencies and possible measures.[5]

Representatives of US, UK and France agreed on necessity for press release for purpose emphasizing continued Tripartite reliance on UN procedures in meeting threats to international peace and security.[6] Early press reports from NE had indicated Tripartite discussions were being interpreted as imperialistic action. It was therefore believed reference to UN would be timely. Press release also indicated current discussions were preliminary exchange of views under Tripartite Declaration and that further consultations would take place (probably in week's time).[7]

Dulles

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[5] The U.S. paper, February 14, entitled "Tripartite Courses of Action in Case of Threat or Outbreak of Israel-Arab Hostilities", which dealt with the three contingencies that might arise in the Near East—the diversion of the Jordan River at Banat Ya'qub, the renewal of hostilities in the Al Auja Demilitarized Zone, and the possibility of hostilities in the Gulf of Aqaba—is *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc. during Eden talks. Dec. 11 to Feb. 15, 1956.

[6] For text of this press release, February 8, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 20, 1956, p. 286.

[7] Representatives of the three governments met again at the Department of State on February 15. They discussed the latest developments with respect to the Banat Ya'qub situation and agreed that the three powers would make separate but coordinated approaches to the Egyptian Government urging Egypt to call a meeting of the Arab states to accept the Johnston proposals. No arrangements were made to conduct another of these tripartite meetings. (Memorandum of conversation by Geren, February 15; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WA/2–1556)

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88. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

Washington, February 9, 1956—7:56 p.m.

541. Since UK is already committed by treaty to defend Jordan and Egypt if attacked, UK effort has naturally been to obtain as firm commitment from US as possible to use force if necessary in event of Arab-Israeli hostilities. While US is no less anxious than UK to prevent hostilities and thwart aggression, we pointed out to UK that our formal commitment is in executive declaration and constitutional

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–956. Secret. Sent to London, Amman, Paris, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, and Baghdad. Drafted by Allen and approved and signed by Dulles.

procedures re use of armed force must be followed. Possibility of Congressional resolution authorizing President in advance to use force in ME, somewhat similar to resolution on Formosa, has been considered, but this approach presents difficulties. Our opponent in Formosa issue was clearly understood but we are endeavoring maintain good relations with both sides in Arab-Israeli dispute and definition of aggressor will inevitably be difficult.

During talks with Eden, it became apparent that UK was somewhat more inclined towards strong reaffirmation of Tripartite Declaration than we were. Our position was partly due to our belief that Declaration has become somewhat outmoded since at time of issuance, US, UK and France could largely control shipments of arms to area. This is no longer true since USSR has entered arms picture. Additional reason for different US and UK approach results from our respective constitutional procedures on use of armed forces.

Addressees should bear foregoing in mind when discussing Tripartite Declaration. Impression should not be given that we no longer adhere to it. It was cited in joint declaration at end of Eisenhower–Eden talks. [2] Moreover, UK–US expect start talks with French this week on implementation. [3] Purpose this telegram merely to suggest some caution in discussions by US representatives abroad because US does not have same treaty relationship and corresponding formal commitments as do British.

Dulles

[2] See footnote 2, Document 65.
[3] See footnote 7, *supra*.

89. Memorandum of a Conversation With the President, White House, Washington, February 10, 1956 [1]

OTHERS PRESENT

Mr. Eric Johnston
Colonel Goodpaster

The President asked whether it is correct in Mr. Johnston's view to say with regard to the Jordan River plan that the technical

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Drafted by Goodpaster.

features have been agreed on, and that it is now held up for political reasons. Mr. Johnston said that this summary is correct. In October the Arabs agreed to the technical features, but did not want to put the plan into effect, or announce agreement. In one country the officials said they were all likely to be assassinated if they made such an announcement. Israel also agreed on the technical features. Sharrett and Ben-Gurion withdrew one strongly held objection which they had previously held. They too blocked its adoption for political reasons.

Mr. Johnston said that Colonel Nasser had asked for a "few months" to settle the differences. On being pressed, Nasser had indicated that three or four months from last November should meet his needs. In the meantime, however, the Israeli raid on Syria in December had inflamed Arab opinion. The situation is accordingly made more difficult. He added that he is not pressing in the matter at the moment, inasmuch as a special American emissary is working for a more general settlement in the area. He felt, however, that economic and technical projects of this kind are likely to prove the more fruitful, and thought that if the U.S. put on the pressure in the next few months it might well be possible to get agreement. Mr. Johnston then told the President about the trip he is making to the Far East—in which he will visit Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and India. He said he would like to give personal greetings from the President to the top people he sees there. The President said he might mention that he had seen the President just before he left and that the President had asked him to convey his warm greetings.

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90. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 10, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

The Problem of Israel's Security

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
NE—Fraser Wilkins

The Secretary said that he had always felt that he was on close working terms with the representatives of Israel and wished to continue to work together with them. He realized that the present period was considered by Israel as critical and he also believed that the basic purpose was to work for the future of Israel, which was now imperiled as it never had been before. The Secretary realized that the Israel representatives did not agree that Israel's request for arms should be held up. The case was not, in the Secretary's opinion, quite so clear cut. There were steps which the U.S. might take other than to supply Israel with arms. In considering this matter it was necessary for the U.S. to balance the gain against the loss for the action in question. In saying this, the Secretary did not wish to exclude the supplying of arms to Israel by the U.S. He did not wish to agree to the request if it would leave Israel weaker or if it would increase the risk of war in the Near East. The Israel representatives have their own judgment regarding the situation, the U.S. had its own judgment. Meanwhile we were trying to work in harmony with Israel for the ends which we had in common.

Ambassador Eban said that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel and other Israel officials were extremely anxious regarding the present situation. They had read the Secretary's letter of February 6 to a number of Congressmen with interest. [2] They attached full weight to the Secretary's remarks regarding the preservation of Israel. They believed, however, that the present situation was tragic and poignant. There was a growing disparity in the armed strength of Israel and Egypt. Egypt was becoming clearly superior in the air. Egypt might, in the near future, be unable to resist the impulse to create havoc in Israel by air attack. According to a Feb. 1st issue of an Egyptian paper which contained official RCC views,

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5/2–1056. Confidential. Drafted by Wilkins.

[2] For text of Secretary Dulles' letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 20, 1956, p. 285.

Egyptian arms were now being concentrated on Egypt's frontier with Israel. Egypt was clearly benefiting from the military aid supplied by the Soviet Union. According to the press, Egypt was also receiving economic and financial aid from the U.S. for the High Aswan Dam. Mr. Eban realized it was a matter of judgment whether it had been wise to offer economic and financial aid to Egypt without recompense. It might have been hoped, however, that Egypt might have been persuaded to agree to non-belligerency or to give up the present economic blockade by the Arab states. It seemed to him the error made at the time of the Suez Agreement between the U.K. and Egypt had now been repeated. Meanwhile, Israel's efforts to strengthen itself through the purchase of arms from the U.S. continued in the state of paralysis. He had noted the Secretary's reference in his letter of Feb. 6 to the belief that the security of states in the Near East could not rest upon arms alone and that the possession of equal or superior arms was not the only deterrent to aggression. In this respect he wished to say that Israel did not believe that the U.S., U.K. and France, the Tripartite Powers under their Declaration of May 25, 1950, could offer any type of security guarantee which would represent a satisfactory alternative to the receipt of armament itself. Even if we had an iron-clad security guarantee, Israel would still need the forty-eight F–86 aircraft which had been requested. Israel would need defensive arms in order to bear the first brunt of Arab attack. Mr. Eban noted that other countries, even with security guarantees, had arms and he cited the NATO countries and the sad state of Poland which had had glittering security guarantees but no arms in 1939. Israel was a narrow country in which all targets were but twelve minutes away from Arab airfields. Israel's Arab neighbors were well aware of these facts and realized that external intervention would be too late. Israel was naked and exposed. In addition, Ambassador Eban continued, the issue of conscience arose. He did not believe the U.S. would now want Israel's hands held behind its back. The U.S. would not wish the shadows of war over Israel's peaceful homes.

In conclusion, he wished to refer to the effect of further delay in Israel's application for arms. The question of defense was now, to an increasing extent, preoccupying every level of the Israel Government to the exclusion of other important matters. The Arabs, he believed, were astonished and shocked that the U.S. delayed for five months. From this delay they drew unhealthy conclusions. Other countries, such as France and Canada, were beginning to ask "what is the U.S. doing? if it does not supply arms why should we do it alone?" The French, for example, would be reluctant to step out in front by supplying arms to Israel because of French relations with Algeria.

Ambassador Eban added that, from the Israel point of view, there were no prospects of settlement between Israel and the Arab states at this time. They believed that Egypt was delaying its response, that we were merely at the beginning of a long process of negotiations. The present imbalance between Israel and Egypt, which was growing, clearly vitiated the prospect of settlement. The Israel attitude regarding current moves between the Tripartite Powers under the Declaration of 1950 had been positive. The Arab attitude, on the other hand, had been negative. The Arabs now preferred the present situation because they had a one-way street in the UN since they could count on Russian support there. Israel had the right under Article 51,[3] Ambassador Eban continued, to defend itself. There was no reason why the U.S. could not help. The contractual principle was important. However, Israel did not believe such security arrangements should take the place of arms. Arms were the only real assurance.

Ambassador Eban said that the U.S. had the right to form its own judgment and make its own decision. It also had a duty to let Israel know where the U.S. stood. Israel wished to know whether the U.S. was merely delaying or planned to reject its arms request and to inquire regarding the prospects.

The Secretary said that he did not feel entirely discouraged by the present talks which had taken place in Israel and in Egypt although a quick solution might not be in sight. He added that he planned to spend the better part of the day tomorrow studying the present situation. He was glad to have had this talk before the study commenced. He realized that the Israelis had a sense of frustration because of the delays. However, from our own point of view, we had to be guided by events as we see them and as they were developing from day to day. The Secretary believed we had substantially decreased the risk of attack. An up-turn had taken place a few months ago. A very different course might have developed. We continued to work for an outcome which would be peaceful and preserve Israel in all its essentials. He believed that we had been able to progress because we had not thus far supplied Israel with arms. He was profoundly convinced that Israel had no future if it continued indefinitely as an embattled state surrounded by hostile forces. Israel had no future without a settlement with its neighbors. He strongly believed that Israel should not jeopardize present prospects for a momentary respite which arms might give. He thought that perhaps intermediate steps might be found to strengthen Israel militarily without causing an Arab reaction which would bar development of friendly relations. It would be a close judgment which

[3] Reference is to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. For text, see 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.

would not lightly be reached. The Secretary said he would weigh the judgment carefully.

The Secretary said he wished to discuss an extraneous matter. He did not know what political pressures were now being brought to bear within the U.S. He wished to observe, however, that they would be counter-productive if they took place. Developments might reach a crisis stage within the next eleven months. The Secretary believed the situation might better be handled to the advantage of all if it was not involved in American politics.

Ambassador Eban responded that he could not comment on the Secretary's remarks as they were not within his jurisdiction. He wished to observe that there existed a universal feeling about Israel over which Israel officials could not have complete control.

Ambassador Eban also wished to comment that the Secretary had said "the preservation of Israel" in his letter of Feb. 6, whereas today he had said "the preservation of Israel in all its essentials." He hoped it was the former. He also noted that the Secretary had referred to intermediate steps which might be found to strengthen Israel militarily. Ambassador Eban believed the prospects for peace would not be jeopardized by the supplying of radar. He hoped that he could have a further discussion with the Secretary next week [4] and if one item could be shipped it would be helpful. He mentioned the possibility of French shipment of twelve Mysteres. The Secretary said he would put all these suggestions into the hopper and think them over. [5]

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[4] Dulles did not meet again with Eban until March 2. See Document 151.

[5] On February 14, the Department transmitted, in circular telegram 550, a summary of this conversation to Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Paris, and Rome. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–1456)

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91. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, February 10, 1956—7 p.m.

1553. Meeting with Nasser which apparently Kaissuny had intended to be a mere formality after all basic decisions made took

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/2–1056. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Received at 4:45 a.m., February 11. Repeated to London.

different turn after Black brought up disputed point [2] and asked what could be said to press since no agreement reached. Nasser finally produced aides-mémoire [3] from among papers on his desk and good-naturedly stated "Mister Black, there many things in the aides-mémoire we do not like. We have no intention of accepting them as they are. We merely wanted to get our conversation with you out of the way first. This our schedule. Believe me, after you the two governments should be easy!" Black's point prevailed that no communiqué possible indicating full agreement and at his own suggestion Nasser reluctantly agreed to use "substantial agreement" in communiqué prominently featured today's Cairo press. Black made clear he would not submit draft letters to Bank's board until full understanding regarding aides-mémoire had been reached.

Black stated US and UK "next in line" and must expect strong Egyptian effort to tighten assurances given in aides-mémoire as well as modify much of texts. One of attempted changes will probably be last sentence. Black in response my question suggested substitution for "extraordinary circumstances" some such phrase as he used in last sentence paragraph four draft Prime Minister's letter (Embtel 1548 February 10). [4] Black also believes GOE will seek DA for FY 1956 supplementary to subsequent grant aid for High Dam. Embassy has received no approaches yet.

Comment: Black handled these negotiations very skillfully and appears have appraised GOE intentions and temper accurately. His own high interest in project never permitted him to weaken under GOE pressures and his own bluntness and apparent willingness to break off talks or conclude meetings without full agreement was successful test of GOE's deep interest in dealing with Bank.

Yesterday evening Fawzi told me GOE would be good neighbor of Sudan "and would generously compensate" for resettlement inhabitants Wadi Halfa area. He appeared very optimistic re possibility waters settlement with Sudan, although with what justification I do not know.

By yesterday noon Bank team reached own terms proposed letter from Prime Minister to IBRD except for paragraph three wherein Kaissuny desired change words "Government of Egypt" to read "Minister of Finance" and would not concur in insertion of reference to aides-mémoire desired by US and UK. Kaissuny had requested team to ascertain whether Embassies of US and UK authorized drop such insertion. Both Embassies immediately in-

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[2] Reference is presumably to differences over the text of Nasser's proposed letter to the IBRD that are discussed in this telegram.

[3] For the original text of the aides-mémoire and for the recommended textual changes, see telegram 1282, vol. XIV, p. 868, and Document 58 herein.

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/2–1056)

formed Bank team they not empowered drop this insertion. This relayed to Kaissuny from my office by Clark [5] who endeavored elicit from Kaissuny Egyptian reasons for demanding such omission. Kaissuny evasive although in response pressing inquiry stated he fully recognized complete inter-dependence of aides-mémoire with exchange of letters and that without aides-mémoire there could be no deal with Bank. Our tentative conclusion at this point was that GOE desired avoid mention aides-mémoire in exchange of letters (which would eventually be published) in order not be forced subsequently give publicity to texts of aides-mémoire.

Later in afternoon Trevelyan called urgent meeting with Black to express UK concern GOE unwillingness make desired insertion. As IBRD had no further elucidation on possible reason why GOE desired avoid all reference to aides-mémoire it was agreed among us Trevelyan would sound out Kaissuny informally and prior to scheduled 7 pm meeting between Black and Nasser. Trevelyan later reported Kaissuny indicated GOE dissatisfied with aides-mémoire and would seek revision from US and UK after agreement on exchange of letters with Bank. On learning of this, Black while proceeding to Nasser meeting with Kaissuny informed latter he imagined reasons for GOE reluctance refer to aides-mémoire must be due to (1) desire for more money than aides-mémoire proposed and/or (2) tighter assurances continued aid from governments. While not responding to former point, Kaissuny confirmed latter. Black then emphatically stated he felt GOE wasting its time to seek more concrete assurances from US Government which had gone as far as it possibly could. Emphasized fact aides-mémoire and exchange of letters were all part of one package and that there could be no deal with Bank unless fully understood aides-mémoire were accepted in some form. Reference to them in draft letter was one such form. GOE might find itself in box after having publicized an agreement with Bank and then be unable move US or UK. Kaissuny expressed concern over possibility that if Egypt agreed now to aides-mémoire, might fail benefit by subsequent long-term US aid legislation. Black said he could not speak for US Government but imagined this problem could be handled. Meanwhile Egypt might find everything stalled to her embarrassment. Kaissuny responded "in such event I guess we would accept the aides-mémoire". (This remark was made in great confidence and should not be quoted.)

Hart

[5] E. R. Clark, attorney for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

92. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, February 11, 1956—3 p.m.

1559. Reference Embassy telegram 1554. [2] British Embassy reports Ambassador Trevelyan asked Fawzi February 7 whether Egypt could exert its influence to persuade Arab States accept Johnston Plan. Fawzi replied:

(1) Present time most unpropitious;
(2) If Ambassador Johnston were to come to Cairo and fail obtain Arab concurrence situation would be even worse than now;
(3) Egypt intended, however, sound out chances for Arab adoption plan in forthcoming conversations with Jordanians.

British Embassy very dubious chances Arab acceptance Johnston Plan. Their views based on:

(a) Jordanian Foreign Minister's conversation with Ambassador Duke which although less "bellicose" than that with Rifai reported Amman's 414 [3] was apparently equally categoric,
(b) Internal conditions in Syria,
(c) Inability Egypt no matter how much it might wish avoid hostilities effectively persuade Jordan and Syrian Governments that their acceptance plan would obtain popular support in those countries.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/2–1156. Secret. Received at 2:01 a.m., February 12. Repeated to Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Ankara, Tehran, Jerusalem, and USUN.

[2] Hart had reported in telegram 1554 from Cairo, February 10, that the previous evening Fawzi expressed "his concern over crisis which would result if Israel recommenced work in D.Z. at Banat Yacub. Asking that he not be quoted he stated in substance: 'it is not that we are afraid but there is no use in having a fight if we can avoid it. We are therefore undertaking conversations with each Arab State to urge that further consideration be given to "Johnston plan".' " (*Ibid.*, 120.1580/2–1056)

[3] Document 83.

93. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, February 14, 1956—9:47 a.m.

568. Re urtel 793. [2] An independent U.S. representative has held discussions with top officials of Israel and Egyptian Governments during past three weeks and after consultations here will be returning to area for further meetings in ten days or so. Pending concrete results from meetings and at request of both governments, information about them is being confined to fewest possible number of persons. Scope of talks is limited to possibility of settlement and we will of course inform Embassies as soon as there are any developments that would affect our policy in area.

Hoover

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–956. Top Secret; Alpha—Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell, approved by Hoover, and signed for Hoover by Barnes.

[2] Telegram 793, February 9, requested a report on the progress of the Special Representative's mission. (*Ibid.*)

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94. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Counselor of the British Embassy (Bailey) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree), Department of State, Washington, February 14, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

High Aswan Dam and Aid to Iran

Mr. Bailey reported that his Government has asked whether the Embassy has been able to find out how Nasser plans to get the two Governments together on an acceptable aide-mémoire [2] and whether the money which the U.S. and UK have submitted to financing of the High Dam will be made available before an agreement is reached with the Government of Sudan on the Nile Waters. Mr. Bailey

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/2–1456. Confidential. Drafted by Shaw on February 16.

[2] See Document 91.

thought that since Nasser now says he will not start on the project until an agreement has been reached with the Sudan on the Nile Waters, a new element has been injected into the understanding; also he was of the opinion that as part of reaching an agreement on the Nile Waters, Egypt will have to reach a satisfactory understanding with the Government of Sudan on the establishment of a Sudanese currency. At the present time Egyptian currency is circulating in the Sudan; the Government of Egypt must agree with Sudan on the redemption of this currency.

Mr. Rountree stated that he had not before thought there was any direct relationship between the establishment of a Sudanese currency and the High Dam. He recognized, however, that in Sudanese thinking this might be an element in the negotiations; that Sudan was desirous of establishing its own currency; and in obtaining a membership in the IMF and in the IBRD. He thought that this might provide part of the quid pro quo in Egypt's negotiations with the Sudan and might facilitate an understanding on the Nile Waters.

Mr. Bailey mentioned in passing that a question was expected in the House of Lords tomorrow on the possibility of flooding of Sudanese territory and whether an understanding existed between the Government of Sudan and the Government of Egypt on indemnification for damages resulting from this flooding. Mr. Bailey read the proposed reply and there was a brief discussion thereof. [3]

With reference to a reported French offer to assist on the High Dam, [4] Mr. Bailey stated that his Government thought it would be useful to keep the French current on developments with respect to this project and that we should perhaps not only talk with the French but also with the Germans. Mr. Rountree concurred in this move but thought that now would probably not be the time to undertake such talks. He recounted an interview Mr. Black reported between himself and Nasser just prior to the issuance of the press release on their recent talks. [5] Nasser had stated that he could not accept the proposal that reference be made in his letter to the two aide-mémoires since they were not acceptable to him. He stated that he planned to take up these aide-mémoires with the U.S. and British Governments as soon as the conversations with Mr. Black had been completed. Mr. Black pointed out that, of course, the Bank's propos-

[3] Morris of the British Embassy had informed Wilkins that Lord Vansittart, a former Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, was planning to ask the question, and that the British Government planned to reply that "it understood 1) the Sudan required Egyptian-Sudanese agreement regarding division of the Nile; 2) use by each of its waters as it wished, and 3) responsibility for the livelihood of homeless Sudanese by Egypt." (Memorandum of conversation by Wilkins, February 14; Department of State, Central Files, 645W.74322/2–1455)

[4] See Documents 50 and 77.

[5] See Document 91.

al was contingent upon Egypt's acceptance of these aide-mémoires and that he felt that the Governments had gone about as far as they could be expected to go in providing assurance to the Egyptian Government of their support. Mr. Black pointed out that in the absence of the acceptability of the aide-mémoires, he could not agree to report to the press that agreement had been reached. However, he could justify stating that substantial agreement had been reached. After brief explanation as to what Mr. Black meant by substantial, Nasser stated that this would not be acceptable to him. Subsequently, however, as Mr. Black rose to leave, he asked Nasser what he should tell newsmen who were waiting outside. At this point Nasser is reported to have stated that he would take "substantial".

Mr. Rountree stated that in talking with Ambassador Hussein last evening,[6] the subject of the aide-mémoire came up and at that time he told the Ambassador that if Nasser had in mind a change in wording of the aide-mémoire, possibly we would be able to accommodate him. However, if he was seeking a substantive change as to our contribution during the second phase of construction, this could not be accommodated. The aide-mémoire represents the best and ultimate offer of the U.S. Ambassador Hussein was reported to have urged that the question be kept open stating that some middle ground could be found to reconcile differences between the two Governments.

Mr. Rountree said that we expect the question of these aide-mémoires to be raised shortly with the U.S. and British Ambassadors in Cairo. While the acceptability of these instruments is in question, conversations should not be held with the Germans and the French. However, when agreement is reached, it might be appropriate to provide them with a progress report on the negotiations.

[Here follows discussion of the Buraimi dispute and United States economic aid to Iran.]

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[6] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France [1]

Washington, February 15, 1956—7:24 p.m.

2965. French Ambassador informed February 13 [2] U.S. has no objection interrupt OSP contract for production Mysteres, but made clear France must take initiative and responsibility for any transaction with Israel. French Ambassador replied he more interested in general problem arms deliveries to Israel than in specific case Mysteres. He hoped Ambassadorial Committee would soon reach understanding on pooling and timing of deliveries to Israel. We indicated U.S. does not rule out delivery American arms to Israel in future, but for present our efforts reduce tension by other means have priority. Israeli officer in France mistaken in charge U.S. obstructing French arms delivery to Israel. [3]

Department understands French political decision re delivery of Mysteres not yet made, and presumably this decision would only follow consultation in Ambassadorial Committee. Existence that Committee and consultation procedures are of course known only to participants.

Hoover

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/2–1556. Secret. Drafted by Geren and approved by Allen who signed for Hoover. Also sent to London and Tel Aviv.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, 751.5622/2–1356)

[3] See Documents 43 and 66.

96. Message to Washington [1]

No. 81

Cairo, February 16, 1956.

1. Ali Sabri opened conversation . . . yesterday with usual gloomy note before settling down to discussion details of agreement. Sabri asked when Anderson returning. Said it important he come quickly as possible because present situation in area as whole most

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 51 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.

unfavorable and required modification before progress towards settlement possible.

2. When asked explain his reference bad area situation Sabri said this due two principal factors:

A. Constant emphasis by Western officials and press on emergency situation, danger war in Near East and talk of use of force in area by Western Powers. He cited press treatment of Eden–Eisenhower conversations, Eden's public statements since conference and Tripartite conversations.

B. Continuation British efforts push other Arab States into Baghdad Pact. When asked for evidence this Sabri said that both he and Nasr convinced that visit of Jordan P.M. Rifai to Arab States in effort get meeting revive Arab League Security Pact with Iraq in Pact and also in Bagh Pact was "British-inspired" effort employ other means expand Baghdad Pact. Said he and P.M. convinced Rifai would have done this only under British pressure.

3. . . . took hour to go over all the old arguments and explain again impossibility actually changing policy until there further agreement on ends and means. Suggested that Step 3 of timetable (Message No. 79)[2] should include program for modification area activity of all parties concerned in reaching settlement as well as plan under U.N. auspices for easing tensions along armistice lines.

4. Sabri accepted suggestion and agreed cooperate in working out detailed plan Step 3 with above mentioned two elements. At this meeting Sabri reported he had studied our proposal for U.N. administered program on borders and come to conclusion it was only means solving this problem. However, at this meeting he preoccupied with what he called area tensions to extent he willing say problem relaxation of Arab-Israeli tensions easy of solution.

5. . . . feels Egyptians are continuing attribute very great importance to Anderson mission. Their natural tendency, however is to devote majority their thought on subject to problems and dangers involved rather than positive forward steps. He believes detailed plan Step 3 can soon be worked out with Sabri, which he hopes will provide practical means going beyond present stage of indecision and hesitation. This step of course dependent upon outcome Anderson second visit.

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[2] Document 85.

97. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) and the Israeli Ambassador (Eban), Department of State, Washington, February 16, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Israel's FY '56 Economic Aid Program

The Ambassador stated that he had come in primarily to discuss the economic aid program for fiscal 1956. He observed that the Israeli Government rightly or wrongly had expected a larger contribution than the $20 million recently announced for Israel [2] and that the smallness of the amount and the sharp reduction from the $40 million program of last year had created much disappointment. In view of the smaller authorization for the region as a whole, they had anticipated some reduction, but not one so drastic. Ministries concerned with the planning and implementation of Israel's economic development had based their plans on the assumption of a larger figure.

In addition, the Ambassador mentioned other factors which were aggravating the present economic situation in Israel:

(1) Increased expenditures for defense purposes, for example, the installation of air-raid shelters which the public is demanding would cost about 100 million pounds;

(2) Increased effectiveness of the Arab boycott on Israeli earnings. He referred to the recent withdrawal from Israel, as a result of Arab pressures, of the American Express Company and Socony Vacuum [3] and to growing efforts of the Arabs to increase the effectiveness of the boycott in Western European countries. He mentioned also a report that American shipping companies have been warned against carrying P.L. 480 wheat to Egypt after passage through Israeli territorial waters;

(3) Failure of any financial assistance to materialize this year as a result of support for the Jordan Valley Project. (Ambassador Johnston had mentioned $40 million on several occasions.)

Ambassador Eban observed that these foregoing aggravations, particularly the increased cost for military expenditures, have reversed the previous trend toward improvement in the Israeli balance of payments situation.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5–MSP/2–1656. Confidential. Drafted on February 20 by Gay.

[2] The Department authorized the Embassy in Tel Aviv on February 1 to inform the Israeli Government that the level of U.S. development assistance for Fiscal Year 1956 had been set at $20 million. (Telegram 532 to Tel Aviv; *ibid.*, 784A.5–MSP/2–156)

[3] Documentation regarding the Socony Vacuum Oil Company's decision to terminate its operations in Israel is *ibid.*, 884A.2553.

The Ambassador urged the U.S. Government to reconsider the fiscal 1956 program, specifically by increasing its size by $10 million. If it were absolutely impossible to provide $10 million for general development uses, he suggested the addition of $10 million worth of surplus agricultural commodities under Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act;[4] he understood ICA is hard pressed to meet its total legal requirements under Section 402 and wondered if this device for increasing aid to Israel might not have some appeal. The Ambassador further observed that if an increase in total size of the program is impossible for fiscal 1956, he hoped the U.S. Government would at least undertake to change the composition of the $20 million program by reducing the Section 402 commodity component to $10 million, thereby adding $5 million for other types of procurement. He also hoped the reduction in the fiscal 1956 aid level would be offset by a larger contribution to Israel during fiscal 1957.

[4] Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act of 1955 (69 Stat. 283) earmarked a minimum of $300 million for fiscal year 1956 to finance the exportation and sale for foreign currencies of surplus agricultural commodities or products produced in the United States.

98. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State[1]

Tel Aviv, February 16, 1956—3 p.m.

817. When seeing Sharett today on other matters I queried him re *New York Times* interview with Ben Gurion (Deptel 571).[2] Sharett said there no question authenticity Ben Gurion's statement re demilitarized zone but it did not represent any shift of policy. Foreign Minister recalled his conversation October last with Johnston[3] in which latter had reported Nasser's request for two or three months

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–1656. Confidential. Received at 4:30 a.m., February 17. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, and Damascus on February 17. (*Ibid.*)

[2] In telegram 571 to Tel Aviv, October 15, the Department informed the Embassy that the *New York Times* on February 15 had printed an article based on an interview that Homer Bigart had conducted with Ben Gurion, during which Ben Gurion disclosed that Israel had postponed its plans to begin work within the Demilitarized Zone. In view of Ben Gurion's remarks, the Department asked the Embassy to comment on the significance of Ben Gurion's statement and to inform the Department if it represented a shift in Israeli policy. (*Ibid.*, 684A.85322/2–1556)

[3] See telegram 356, vol. XIV, p. 589.

to bring Arabs into line on a water agreement. Sharett had then told Johnston he would do even better; that he would give him four and one-half months or until end of February. He had not stated at any time that Israel would begin digging on March 1. Question after end of February would become one of weather. Israel did not intend to waste another season. Foreign Minister added "we will not act precipitously in next few weeks if there are prospects of an early agreement." "We are now in state of expectancy as to whether we will hear from Minister Johnston or State Department that there is real chance of an early settlement. If not we shall probably proceed."

In reply to my question as to why Israel regarded it necessary to resume work in demilitarized zone when water would not actually be needed for two years or more, Sharett said demilitarized zone link missing, investment which government has made and is making in other segments of Jordan diversion plan would be jeopardized. He concluded Israel Government must be "assured of physical certainty of diversion."

Comment: Embassy believes Ben Gurion's comments predicated on press reports indicating that Johnston actively working on settlement matters and he would be returning to area for this purpose. Sharett's statement he has never said Israel would begin work on March 1 but rather that Israel would consider itself free to do so is correct. Past experience has indicated that use of machinery in DZ becomes feasible only when rainy season ends in upper Galilee towards latter part of April. It believed GOI's principal concern is to assure itself of right to use water, preferably by negotiation or failing that by actual completion of canal during coming work season. For this reason U.S. Government appears to have period of some weeks for diplomatic negotiations and that this period might be extended somewhat if such negotiations appear to hold hope of successful conclusion.

Lawson

99. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, February 16, 1956—7 p.m.

819. Reference: Embtels 817, [2] 818. [3] Foreign Minister reports that Ben Gurion is astonished with and nonplussed about press reaction here and abroad to his *New York Times* interview. Prime Minister reportedly had drawn conclusion either from Johnston's press interview following his talk with President [4] (USIS Radio File 29) or from representative conversations with him by members Israel Embassy Washington, that Johnston's return to area to resume negotiations was imminent. This being the case Ben Gurion saw no harm in indicating there would be short delay resumption work Bnat Yaacov with active discussions water settlement underway.

In Embassy's judgment ultimate result this interview will depend on whether there is a real chance for settlement in near future. If active and hopeful negotiations underway, interview will have done no harm and might prove beneficial. If on other hand, there no progress to point to, public and Knesset discussion here may rapidly build up pressure early resumption work Bnat Yaacov. It would be most helpful to this Embassy for guidance purposes if it could obtain from the Department an appraisal of prospects for progress with Arab States and of any specific plans for Johnston's return to area.

Lawson

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–1656. Confidential. Received at 2:59 p.m., February 17.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] The Embassy reported in telegram 818, February 16, that Ben Gurion's announcement that Israel would defer work at Banat Yaacov pending the outcome of additional negotiations with Johnston had surprised Israelis and had caused many in Israel to assume that Ben Gurion's statement represented a new departure in Israeli policy. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–1656)

[4] See Document 89.

100. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Third Secretary of the British Embassy (Parsons) and the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Burdett), Department of State, Washington, February 18, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Tripartite Representations re the Johnston Plan

Mr. Parsons stated that in accordance with the agreement reached at the tripartite meeting of February 15 [2] the Foreign Office sent instructions to the British Ambassador at Cairo on February 17 to concert with his U.S. and French colleagues in an approach to the Egyptian Government urging Egypt to call a meeting of the Arab states to accept the Johnston Plan. He assumed that the U.S. had already sent similar instructions. The British Ambassador in Cairo was requested to advise Amman, Beirut, and Damascus of the action taken so that the British Embassies could inform the other interested Arab governments. The Foreign Office suggested the British Ambassador might point out to Egypt that acceptance of the Johnston Plan would involve no greater recognition of Israel than proceeding with the Yarmuk scheme. Approval from General Burns would be required to proceed with the Yarmuk development and such approval could not be expected without simultaneous approval by General Burns of the Banat Ya'qub project.

The Foreign Office instructed the British Ambassador at Tel Aviv [3] to ascertain whether the press reports of Ben Gurion's statement re Banat Ya'qub accurately reflected Israel policy. If so, the Ambassador was to state that HMG welcomed the statement as wise and statesman-like. After consulting his U.S. and French colleagues, [4] the Ambassador was instructed to inform the Israel Government that the three powers intended to exert all their influence to secure acceptance of the Johnston Plan and were suggesting that Egypt call a meeting of the Arab states for this purpose. The Foreign Office requested the Department to send similar instructions to Tel Aviv.

The Foreign Office also had asked the British Ambassador at Ankara [5] to inform the Turkish Government in general terms of the results of the tripartite meeting after consulting the U.S. and French Embassies.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–1856. Secret. Drafted by Burdett.

[2] See footnote 8, Document 87.

[3] Sir John Walter Nicholls.

[4] Pierre-Eugene Gilbert.

[5] Sir Reginald James Bowker.

Mr. Parsons referred to a telegram from the Foreign Office, left by Mr. Morris with Mr. Wilkins on February 17,[6] suggesting that the three powers make clear publicly that they would use force in the event of aggression only in response to UN action or at the request of the victim of aggression. He stated that the UK Delegation to the UN thought the statement might be too restrictive, and, consequently, the Foreign Office might wish to reconsider its suggestion.

I agreed to inform the British whether we had sent instructions to Cairo regarding a tripartite démarche. With respect to Ben Gurion's statement, I said that our Ambassador in Tel Aviv learned from a talk with Sharett that there had been in fact no change in the basic Israel position.[7] Israel reserved the right to start work any time after March 1 but made clear it had not taken a decision to do so and would be unlikely to resume work if negotiations were in progress or there were prospects of an agreement on the Johnston Plan. I suggested that it might be advisable to delay informing the Israel Government of the proposed approach to Egypt until after the three Ambassadors in Cairo had acted, and said I would inform the British Embassy of any instructions we sent to Tel Aviv along the lines of the British suggestion.

After consulting Mr. Wilkins, I subsequently telephoned Mr. Parsons that Mr. Allen had discussed Arab acceptance of the Johnston Plan on February 17 with Ambassador Hussein when he called on another matter.[8] In view of the Ambassador's negative reaction, we thought it would be advisable to consider the question of a démarche in Cairo further with the British and French before sending instructions to Cairo. Mr. Parsons said he would inform the Foreign Office.[9]

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[6] No copy of this telegram has been found in Department of State files.

[7] See Document 98.

[8] The memorandum of conversation is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 811.2321/2–1756)

[9] Later that same day, the Embassy in Cairo, in telegram 1949, was informed of the substance of this conversation. (*Ibid.*, 684A.85322/2–1856)

101. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State [1]

Paris, February 18, 1956—1 p.m.

3739. Re Deptel 2965. [2] We informed Foreign Office today contents reference telegram and verified that Embtel 3509 [3] clearly reflected Foreign Office views re desire that MDAP contract be extended immediately so 12 Mysteres could be made available to French for delivery Israel.

Foreign Office read to Embassy officer its telegram February 7 containing instructions to French Ambassador Washington to inform Department that political decision to deliver Mysteres to Israel had been taken and to request Department to issue instructions technical level to make plans available soon as possible. . . .

. . . . . .

Foreign Office, though realizing delivery Mysteres could probably not be kept from press, asked Department continue handle matter discreetly despite appearance of article in *Combat* for February 11–12, which reads in part: "Also, authorized American spokesmen refused to comment Thursday on certain information appearing in the press according to which United States reportedly gave its agreement to delivery by French to Israel of dozen Mystere fighters envisaged by long-standing contract. This is decision, it was observed in competent circles, in which France is sole judge."

Dillon

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/2–1856. Secret. Received at 1:27 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv and London.

[2] Document 95.

[3] Document 79.

102. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between Eric Johnston and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen), Washington, February 20, 1956 [1]

Eric Johnston telephoned today, an hour before taking off for the Far East, to say that he had seen Ambassador Eban Saturday [2] and had obtained Eban's assurances that he, Eban, would do everything he could to persuade his Government not to take any action in diverting the Jordan River prior to Ambassador Johnston's return to Washington around April 1.

Ambassador Johnston expressed his confidence to Eban that between now and April 1, the US Government would continue its strong efforts to bring about an agreement on the Jordan River development. [3]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 980.7301/2–2056. Drafted by Allen.

[2] February 18.

[3] Wilkins, in the course of a discussion on February 20, raised the question of the proposed tripartite approach regarding Banat Yacov with Bailey of the British Embassy. According to his memorandum of conversation, Wilkins informed Bailey "that Ambassador Johnston was returning from the Far East about April 1. Ambassador Johnston had had a conversation with Ambassador Eban who had thought no digging would commence provided there were some possibility of Arab agreement at a later date. Meanwhile, the United States and others would press the Arabs and Israelis toward agreement. Ambassador Johnston planned to dictate a persuasive letter to Nasser, the text of which we expected on February 21 or February 22. It was our thought that the Tripartite approach to the Arab States and Israel might hinge upon this document. Mr. Wilkins said that he would be in touch with Mr. Bailey and with the French regarding it. Mr. Bailey thought this procedure would be best under the circumstances and indicated he would inform London accordingly. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–2056)

103. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 20, 1956[1]

SUBJECT

Letter for the President from Prime Minister Ben Gurion

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Government	*Israel Government*
The Acting Secretary	Ambassador Eban
G—Mr. Murphy	Minister Shiloah
S—Mr. Russell	

Ambassador Eban and Minister Shiloah called at their request. Ambassador Eban said that he had been asked by Prime Minister Ben Gurion to deliver the attached letter to the President through the Acting Secretary. Ambassador Eban said he wished to make some supplementary oral remarks. He said that despite the somewhat reassuring statements that Prime Minister Nasser had made to Mr. Robert Anderson on the latter's recent trip to the Middle East, the Israel Government had serious doubts concerning Nasser's sincerity and good will. In the first place, the Israel Government doubts Nasser's desire to work wholeheartedly with the West. It believes he is at best playing off the Soviet Union against the West and his relationship with the Soviet Bloc may be even closer. Also, despite Nasser's statements to Mr. Anderson of Egypt's desire for a settlement, Nasser's public statements continue, up to the present moment, to be violently anti-Israel. Therefore, while Israel earnestly hopes that Mr. Anderson will succeed in his mission and will do everything it can to assist in its success, it is bound to have grave doubts. For this reason, Israel's need for arms is increasingly great. Although the Israel public has not kept its fears at fever pitch since tense feelings, no matter how strong, cannot be maintained indefinitely, the leaders of Israel have a constantly increasing sense of desperation. Ambassador Eban said that he thought that an announcement now that the U.S. was going to supply some arms to Israel would, in fact, make Nasser more likely to take a reasonable position on a settlement. It would also, the Ambassador thought, make Nasser more likely to carry out his promise to use his position with the other Arab countries to obtain their agreement to the Jordan Valley Development Plan. Ambassador Eban said that he thought that this was most pressing as Israel could not delay its water plans indefinitely.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Jan. '56—memos, etc. Top Secret. Drafted on February 21 by Russell.

The Acting Secretary said that Secretary Dulles was returning to Washington on February 22 and the President within a day or two thereafter. [2] He said that he was not sure that it would be feasible to send the letter to the President while he was in Georgia but that, in any event, it would be given to him immediately on his return to Washington. [3] Ambassador Eban said that he saw no reason for sending it to the President before then.

The Acting Secretary inquired whether it would be possible, in the event no agreement was reached at this time on the Johnston Plan, for Israel to announce that it was going ahead with construction which was consistent with the Johnston Plan and that it would divert no more water from the Jordan River than it would be entitled to under the Plan. Ambassador Eban said that Israel would be prepared to do that. He said that the Israel Government had consulted three eminent water experts who had given their opinion that the construction which Israel contemplates carrying out this year is consistent with the Johnston Plan.

Mr. Murphy said that there had been a good deal of interest on the part of the press in the question of arms shipments to the Middle East and that he felt it was in the mutual interest of this country and of Israel that nothing be done to unduly increase public excitement about the problem. Ambassador Eban said that Israel was in a difficult position. If it revealed publicly the extent of its fears, it would increase Nasser's cockiness. If it said nothing it might not get the arms it needs.

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[2] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, Dulles was on vacation and did not resume his duties until February 23. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

According to the record of the President's Daily Appointments, Eisenhower was also on vacation and did not return to Washington until early afternoon on February 25. (Eisenhower Library)

[3] On February 24, Barnes transmitted the original text under cover of a memorandum to Goodpaster and indicated as well that the Department of State would submit at a later date a suggested reply from the President to Prime Minister Ben Gurion. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–2456) For text of the reply as sent to Ben Gurion, see Document 132.

[Attachment]

Letter From Prime Minister Ben Gurion to President Eisenhower [4]

Jerusalem, February 14, 1956.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I thank you for your letter dated January 9th introducing Mr. Robert Anderson, [5] which through inadvertence in Cairo reached me only a few days ago.

I feel that you could not have chosen a more fitting emissary for the noble mission you have initiated with a view to bringing about a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Mr. Anderson has doubtless reported to you on the conversations he conducted in Jerusalem and Cairo and I therefore will not trouble you with a restatement of our position in detail. We have declared our full and unqualified readiness to enter forthwith into contact with the head of the Egyptian Government or with such responsible representatives as he may designate, in order to explore possibilities of a settlement or of progress by stages towards an ultimate peace. We are prepared to engage in such negotiations without any prior conditions as to their scope or the terms on which a settlement might be sought.

Peace holds a paramount place in the national and spiritual aims of our people. It is a supreme imperative of the People of the Bible. It is a national interest of the highest order for a young state which must apply its main resources to the absorption of immigration and the rebuilding of a desolate land. As citizens of the free world, dedicated to democratic values and the freedom of man, we fully realise the significance of peace in this area for the peace of mankind as a whole.

Frankness impels me to say that the position taken thus far by the Prime Minister of Egypt, as conveyed to us by Mr. Anderson, has raised in my mind the following fateful questions:

(a) Does Col. Nasser sincerely desire peace or is he merely seeking to gain time until Soviet arms have been properly absorbed into the Egyptian Army and he will be militarily capable of striking down Israel? My doubts are unhappily strengthened by the fact that Col. Nasser has not undertaken to observe the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt or even to give a cease-fire order to his troops on the frontier—two requests made to him by General Burns

[4] The source text is a photocopy of the original, which is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.

[5] See Document 12.

and Mr. Hammarskjold. Egyptian soldiers continue to shoot daily at Israel settlements and at Israel soldiers.

(b) Even if Col. Nasser's intentions vis-à-vis Israel are peaceful, and although he himself is clearly not a communist, has he not succumbed to Soviet influence and has Egypt not become a base for Soviet penetration to the African continent to such a degree that he no longer enjoys freedom of action in his foreign policy?

(c) Assuming that he does desire peace with Israel and is not a captive of Soviet policy, will he be able to withstand negative pressures from his own colleagues in the junta?

Despite these doubts we shall continue to extend to Mr. Anderson our fullest co-operation for the success of his mission.

Yet, Mr. President, I would not be true to my conscience and to my people were I not to use this opportunity to bring to your attention the grave peril in which Israel finds itself in face of the Soviet arms acquired by Egypt. In all Arab states—particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria—radio, press and official statements forecast Israel's early destruction; the incessant flow of Soviet arms to Cairo lends these forecasts a grim and menacing significance. In the present circumstances our villages and towns are defenceless against air attack. The denial of defensive arms to Israel jeopardizes its very survival. In the absence of a positive response from the U.S. we find it well-nigh impossible to get arms from any other country in the free world.

If attacked we shall fight desperately and with our backs to the wall, for Israel today is the last refuge of our people even as at the dawn of history it was our first homeland. I feel however bound to say to you in all earnestness that the U.S. is assuming a very grave moral responsibility. Every day that passes without our receiving from your country or her allies planes and tanks, not inferior in quality to those supplied to Egypt from Soviet sources—brings the danger ever closer and deepens the feeling that we are being abandoned by our closest friends. Your declaration from Denver on November 9th regarding the legitimacy of defensive arms [6] stirred in us the hope that the U.S. would not fail us.

I repeat that my government and people will extend every possible co-operation to your invaluable initiative to bring about peace between Israel and Egypt. Should you succeed in your efforts, not only our people but the entire free peace-loving world will salute you. Yet even the great might of the U.S. cannot compel Col. Nasser to make peace. It is however within your power, perhaps within your power alone, to prevent a war in the Middle East by affording us adequate defensive means in proper time. It is highly

[6] See the editorial note, vol. XIV, p. 725.

probable that this will also contribute towards peace; no Arab country is ever likely to make peace with a defenceless Israel.

I hope that you will excuse me for having set down frankly what is in our hearts here.

My cabinet colleagues and the entire people of Israel join me in sending you heartfelt wishes for health and strength for many years to come.

Yours sincerely,

D. Ben-Gurion

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104. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

Washington, February 20, 1956.

SUBJECT

British Report on the Military Problems Involved in Action Under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950

Discussion:

Admiral Hedding on February 16 discussed with Mr. MacArthur and Mr. Rountree the question of whether the US military authorities should participate with the British in combined planning with respect to military activity in the Near East if hostilities should break out. [2] It appears to be the British impression that during the bilateral talks with Prime Minister Eden [3] such combined planning was envisaged.

Following the above conversation with Admiral Hedding the latter sent to Mr. Rountree the attached memorandum with which he transmitted a British report on the military problems involved, together with a copy of his memorandum to Admiral Radford on the

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–2056. Top Secret. Drafted by Rountree and concurred in by MacArthur and Murphy.

[2] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[3] See Documents 54–56.

subject.[4] The British Chiefs considered their paper to be the first step in combined planning, and approved it as a basis for discussion.

Admiral Hedding pointed out both in his memorandum to Admiral Radford and in his conversation with Departmental officers that, if combined planning should take place, it would not be difficult for Admiral Hedding and Admiral Currie (of the British military mission) to work out an acceptable revision of the British paper for submission to their respective Chiefs. On the other hand, Admiral Hedding also stated that if it should be determined that we should not undertake combined planning, the British should be so informed and informal comments on the paper submitted to General Whiteley.

Admiral Hedding, acting under Admiral Radford's instructions, sought to ascertain the Department's understanding as to whether combined planning was agreed during the Eden Talks, as well as the Department's views on the British proposal.

I am not aware that any agreement was reached with the British on combined planning. It was, of course, understood that we would review our respective military capabilities and that both the US and the UK, acting independently but with proper coordination, would have their Naval forces indicate a "discreet interest" in the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea areas.

In view of the complications of planning any possible employment of US forces in connection with the present Near Eastern crisis, it would appear unwise at this time to undertake combined planning with the British. While such planning would be on a top secret basis, any possible leak that it was under way might cause serious problems both domestically and abroad. It would seem wise, on the other hand, for us to have a general idea of what the British think in terms of the possible employment of Western capabilities and, perhaps vice versa.

In the circumstances, I would suggest that we inform Admiral Hedding that:

(a) We are unaware of any agreement to undertake combined planning;

(b) We feel combined planning at this point would be unwise; and

(c) We perceive of no objection to informing the British of (a) and (b) while indicating that the US Chiefs will look over the British paper and give them their informal comments.

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[4] Neither Hedding's memorandum of February 16 to Rountree nor its enclosures is attached to the source text. However, they are in Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–1656.

Recommendation:

That you agree to the course suggested in the last paragraph above. [5]

[5] Hoover signified his agreement as follows: "Concur: H." According to a chit from Rountree to Hoover, attached to the source text, Rountree explained that he had "given Adm. Hedding the substance of our position as reflected in this memo."

105. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, February 20, 1956.

SUBJECT

Alternative Courses of Action to Achieve Israel-Arab Settlement

Mr. Anderson, on his next trip to the area, will make every effort to work out a direct meeting between Nasser and Ben Gurion (or some other Israel representative). I am listing in a separate memorandum [2] some of the points which I suggest for Mr. Anderson's use in his discussions with Nasser and Ben Gurion to bring about a meeting. The prospects of achieving a direct meeting, however, are less than fifty-fifty. I believe that before he leaves alternative course of action should be agreed upon in the event it is not possible to obtain a meeting and in the event it appears that the time within which a settlement can be worked out is sharply limited so that it would not be desirable for Mr. Anderson to take time to return here and then go back again to the area. This is likely to be the case. The tension in Israel will increase as long as they receive no arms. On the other hand, the granting of arms to Israel would seriously lessen the possibility of a settlement at this time. In Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world an attitude of cockiness and overconfidence is already showing itself and will probably soon reach a point where it will make it even more difficult than at present for us to obtain cooperation from them in a settlement. The Israel Govern-

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Cost of Arab-Israel Settlement: FHR's memo to S, with Spec. Assistant's reply (Feb 14 and 15). Top Secret; Alpha. Russell furnished copies of this memorandum to Robert B. Anderson, Hoover, Allen, and Director of Central Intelligence Dulles.

[2] Not printed.

ment may commence work on Banat Yaacov any time after March 1, thereby touching off hostilities.

I suggest that a tentative decision be made now between one of the following alternatives as a "last shot" effort in the event a direct meeting cannot be arranged and it appears the time within which a settlement is possible is limited:

1. Mr. Anderson would say to both sides that we have failed in our effort to work out a settlement by the Trieste approach or by a direct meeting and that, as a final means of attempting to bring about a settlement, we would be willing, if desired by both sides, to present a suggested plan of settlement which we would hope both sides would earnestly consider. He should make it plain that the U.S. is not attempting to impose a settlement nor is it itself adopting a rigid position on the terms of what a settlement should be. It would be willing, however, to set forth what it believes, after listening to both sides, offers the best possibility of achieving a settlement that takes into account the vital interests of both sides.
2. An alternative method of putting forth a set of specific proposals would be to have some internationally prominent and objective person, such as Nehru or Hammarskjold, make specific proposals for a settlement. We could then put our support behind them and urge other governments to.

A proposed plan of settlement is attached. It provides for alternative positions on the Negev—one for cession and the other for internationalization of a portion of it.

There would, of course, be difficulties in either of the two proposals. In the case of (1) it would be difficult for us thereafter to serve as a mere intermediary. If the assumption that we only have a short while in which to work out a settlement is true, however, the loss of our ability to play this role is not too serious. It could, in any event, be minimized by Mr. Anderson putting forth the suggestions as his own rather than as a U.S. official position. Another objection is that if we suggest cession of a portion of the Negev, Israel might be resentful. In effect, however, such a suggestion would be going little further than you already have in your statements to Sharett. Finally, such a suggested solution might touch off a decision by the Israel Government to resort to preventive action. We are, however, likely in any event to be faced with such a possibility if no settlement is reached.

The advantages of pursuing one of the two courses of action are: (a) it would, to a greater extent than has been done up to the present time, give focus and concreteness to what is required in obtaining a settlement and the advantages that will flow from one; (b) if alternative No. 2 is taken, it will make it possible to marshall behind concrete proposals the very great U.S. and world public opinion that currently, in an amorphous way, supports the idea of a

settlement; (c) there is substantial opinion that neither side will be able to bring itself on its own steam to make the necessary concessions for a settlement but that each side might decide to undertake to justify concessions to its nationals in the context of (1) or (2) above.

[Attachment] [3]

February 17, 1956.

A. THE NEGEV

Alternative I

The cession to Egypt or Jordan of that portion of the Negev lying between a line drawn from the southern tip of the El Auja demilitarized zone to a point south of Ein Husb (Hotseva), and a line across the southern Negev north of the Wadi Menayieh; . . . free access to the Arabs of the Beersheba road through Israel from Cairo to Amman; free access to Israel of the main road from Beersheba to Eilat.

This could be phrased in more general terms as the cession of the central Negev.

Alternative II

The creation of an autonomous, bi-national region under U.N. trusteeship comprising . . . the El Auja demilitarized zone and the entire Negev lying south of a line drawn from El Auja to the vicinity of Ein Husb; free transit rights on the major roads through the region to Israel and the Arab states; free use to both Israelis and Arabs of the ports of Gaza and Eilat; political status, including freedom of movement within the region, to present permanent inhabitants of the region; demilitarization of the entire region.

This could be phrased in general terms as the internationalization of the Negev.

B. OTHER TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Division of the remaining "demilitarized zones" and "no man's lands" created by the armistice agreements; restoration to Arab border villages of a portion of the farm lands and groves which were cut off by the armistice demarcation lines; other alterations of the demarcation lines for such purposes as improvement of communica-

[3] Top Secret; Alpha.

tions, access to water supplies, establishment of more rational boundaries, etc.

C. THE REFUGEES

The Arab refugees to be offered the choice between repatriation on the one hand and resettlement and compensation on the other, with not more 15,000 refugees to be repatriated per year for five years and 5,000 per year thereafter. Compensation and resettlement to be financed and administered (with assistance from the international community) in such a way as to maximize the appeal of this choice as compared with repatriation. Election of one of the two alternatives to be made within a period of two years after conclusion of a settlement. The refugees repatriated to assume all rights and obligations of Israel citizenship. Israel to renounce the claims which it had advanced against the Arab States for war damages and abandoned Jewish property. No compensation to be claimed on behalf of the Arab refugees for war damages on such items as movable personal property and lost income. Compensation payments to be made to the individual refugees through a quasi-judicial process in a manner to encourage investment in the area and prevent inflation.

D. JERUSALEM

. . . . . .

2. Creation of an international organization for supervising the Holy places in Palestine and maintaining access to them.

. . . . . .

E. TERMINATION OF STATE OF BELLIGERENCY

1. Formal recognition by the Arab States and Israel of the termination of the state of belligerency.

2. Discontinuance of all measures designed to prevent trade with Israel by non-Arab countries and non-Arab firms, and the removal of restrictions, other than normal maritime regulations, from all shipping.

F. COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS

1. Israel to accord Jordan free port facilities at Haifa and free access to port.

2. Mutual overflight rights to be granted innocent civil aircraft.

3. Israel to permit restoration or construction across its territory of telecommunications facilities between the Arab States.

G. UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT OF JORDAN VALLEY

The States affected to agree to proposals for the unified development of Jordan Valley, as developed in discussions with Ambassador Johnston.

H. GUARANTEE OF SECURITY

The U.S., U.K. and perhaps other nations to offer to enter into formal treaty engagements with the Arab States and Israel to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the definitive boundaries established between Arab States and Israel.

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106. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

Washington, February 20, 1956.

Bob Anderson, on the telephone today, asked me to prepare for your consideration a message along the lines of the attached, to be sent . . . to Hank [2] in Cairo. He felt that it would be highly desirable if we could have an answer by the time he comes here next Thursday. [3]

If you see no objection, I should also like to ask . . . Cairo for any thoughts they may have on the same subject to be transmitted together with Hank's reply. If you concur that it is desirable to send this message—the language is mine, the idea Bob's—please let me know and I will get it off immediately with any additions or changes you may wish to make.

As you know, we here are very skeptical as to whether any quantities of weapons can be supplied without threatening the

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Jan. '56—memos, etc. Secret. The following handwritten note by Russell appears on the source text: "2/20. The Under Secretary called A[llen] D[ulles] and told him he approved of the message. FHR."

[2] Henry A. Byroade.

[3] February 23.

disruption of the conversations, but I see no reason why we should not explore all possibilities.

Allen W. Dulles

[Enclosure] [4]

February 20, 1956.

Suggested draft of message to be delivered . . . to Ambassador Byroade. [5]

"Please pass following to Ambassador from Acting Secretary: As will be apparent to you the strongest pressures are building up and finding real support even outside of usual pro-Israel circles for us to agree to supply Israel with some quantities and types of defensive weapons. These pressures have substantially increased as result of publicity on Saudi-Arab tanks. [6] I would appreciate your advising me as quickly as possible through this channel if you can think of any device by which, if this becomes absolutely necessary, we can make our action least offensive and damaging to our interests in Egypt and Arab world and to prospects of pending conversations. What is your estimate of amounts and kinds of weapons we could provide while still retaining hope of convincing Abd'l Nasr that no threat is being created to his security. If action should be taken how should the news be conveyed to Abd'l Nasr and how can he be best brought to an understanding of the overall requirements of the situation which make provision of certain arms unavoidable. Anderson will be here for conference Thursday and would appreciate your views by that date." [7]

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[4] Secret.

[5] On February 21, the CIA sent the Department of State a copy of this message as transmitted to Cairo for Ambassador Byroade. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing telegrams—Jan.–March 1956)

[6] On February 16, the Department of State, in response to a query from United Press, announced that 18 M–41 tanks were to be shipped to Saudi Arabia as part of the reimbursable aid agreement with Saudi Arabia of June 18, 1951. Open criticism of the transaction from some members of Congress and from Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban resulted, and President Eisenhower on February 17 ordered an embargo on the shipment of all arms to the Middle East.

After Departments of State and Defense officials completed a review of all valid export licenses of military equipment to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, the President on February 18 accepted the recommendation to cancel the arms embargo, thereby enabling the shipment of tanks to Saudi Arabia to proceed.

For text of the announcement of the President's decision to suspend the embargo, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 27, 1956, p. 325.

[7] See Document 113.

107. Message to Washington [1]

No. 83 *Cairo, February 20, 1956.*

1. In businesslike meeting this morning Ali Sabri . . . discussed Steps 2 and 3 of timetable (Paragraph 3, Message No. 79). [2] This was first meeting at which Sabri proceeded to business at hand without sounding note of gloom and stressing extent of problems and generally unfavorable situation.

2. On Step 2 Sabri made point that part of this step must be discussion between Anderson and PriMin of Egyptian-U.S. policy as part of "Package".

3. Sabri saw no reason why we cannot proceed immediately to implementation Step 3 following successful completion Step 2.

4. A paper . . . called "Plan for Step 3 of Timetable" was discussed in detail and agreement reached to use this paper as working document at time of second Anderson visit. Paper being pouched. [3] Following is summary main points:

A. Step 3 to consist of two parallel programs:

(1) Program to reduce Arab-Israeli tensions, and
(2) Program to reduce tensions in Arab area.

(This carries out suggestion referred to in Paragraph 3 of Message No. 81.) [4]

B. Programs cannot be expected eliminate tensions. Parties to agreement on Step 3 must understand this effort produce best possible situation for negotiation and announcement settlement but that perfect situation impossible. (This point has been repeatedly stressed in conversation in order counter Egyptian tendency hold back from practical work on plea atmosphere not right.)

C. Program for easing Arab-Israeli tensions to consist of following elements:

(1) Initiation by SecGen of U.N. of program for discussion means easing border tensions.

(2) Discussions to utilize machinery. General Burns to confer with Egyptian and Israeli foreign ministers separately as necessary.

(3) Discussions to explore all measures relieve border tensions.

(4) Egypt and Israel to take all feasible steps at home to reduce border problems.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.

[2] Document 85.

[3] See Document 109.

[4] Document 96.

(5) Effort to be made to devise means improving conditions refugees during this stage and other means prepare them for ultimate acceptance settlement. (Sabri thought this good idea and willing explore further).

(6) Parties to agreement on plan for Step 3 to give U.N. program most favorable propaganda treatment in order encourage attitude in area favorable settlement.

D. Program for easing area tensions. Parties agreeing to plan for Step 3 to review factors contributing area tensions and to take steps eliminate such factors:

(1) Parties to agree to moratorium all efforts change alignment of states in area. U.S. to seek influence Baghdad Pact nations against pressing other Arab States join Pact or otherwise change present pattern relationship area states. Egypt to give equivalent assurances on its side. (Sabri made point that essential problem here is U.K. policy which disturbing calm of area.)

(2) Parties to plan will make efforts stop all public statements and actions which contribute to sense of emergency and feeling there danger war in area.

(3) Parties to plan must stop public statements on plans for action, particularly military action in event of Arab Israeli war.

5. . . . representative and Sabri meeting on 21 February to discuss prospects for improving refugee situation in advance of settlement and formula on refugee issue for settlement.

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108. Message From the Ambassador in Egypt (Byroade) to the Department of State [1]

No. 85 *Cairo, February 21, 1956.*

1. Regret that just after close Saturday [2] conversation with Nasr it necessary for me depart for official ceremony Port Said and facilities unavailable send this report until return Cairo.

2. Conversation soon turned to subject Anderson mission. Nasser stated he much impressed with Anderson but deeply concerned at apparent philosophy that whole thing could be settled quickly. Said he in favor project but time needed and every day must be used wisely to prepare atmosphere making settlement possible. He

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Top Secret.

[2] February 18.

hoped Americans could understand magnitude of political task he undertaking. Mentioned again Abdullah incident.

3. Nasser said he understood Anderson might visit area again soon. He would be glad to see him but felt that he had little more to offer on specific aspects settlement. He felt we were pressing a bit too fast on such specifics without adequate attention to parallel project of working out suitable area policies and attendant lessening of friction in area. Felt all important thing at moment was to create atmosphere in area which would make settlement possible. In this field saw no progress being made and, to contrary, there were new and disruptive factors with West and between Arab States nearly every week. Felt planning on details could proceed but could not be hopeful unless we could give more attention to parallel project of easing strains within area.

4. Told him I had remained Wash to participate high level talks following Anderson's return. I *not* in position however, comment on Wash decisions as had found it desirable return Egypt prior Anderson's meetings with President.[3] Felt it might lead to confusion in any event if he and I talked as in past upon specific aspects of Arab-Israeli settlement and that Anderson upon return would have full flavor President's views. I did however wish assure him from my extended conversations in Wash I convinced that if he willing and able proceed in reasonable fashion upon settlement with Israel we could work out with him a U.S. policy approach towards Egypt, and joint policy approaches on M.E. matters generally, which he would deem satisfactory. I further felt under such conditions we would be able to exert considerable influence upon our friends and allies in terms of their own policy approaches to area. We had, I said, somewhat held back on area policy matters in recent talks with Eden, as we very much in hope settlement could proceed and wished hold policy fluid hoping work out solutions satisfactory to Egypt in connection Arab-Israeli settlement.

5. Nasser said we somewhat in procedural dilemma. He accepted my views as to possibility of working out satisfactory area policies and appeared to understand that it difficult and in some cases impossible to make new policies effective until real progress made upon settlement. Nevertheless he could not see how atmosphere for settlement could be created with continuing dissension among Arab States which at least partially due to difficulties with West. Were there not, he wondered, some steps we could take in immediate future which would ease tension and help produce required atmo-

[3] According to the President's Daily Appointments, Eisenhower met with Anderson at the White House on February 10 at 6:45 p.m. The discussion was "Off The Record". (Eisenhower Library)

sphere. Told him I would be ready continue discussions on this aspect of problem at any time.

6. This discussion highlights my view reported while in Washington that Anderson probably cannot be successful unless we prepared to talk to Nasser seriously about broader area policy. Suggest that line of thought along lines your message dated 20 January 1956 [4] be thoroughly reviewed prior to Anderson's return and he come here equipped to deal with such broader matters. This all of course in context of real and honest effort on part of Nasser to obtain settlement. If Department feels I can be of assistance in this part of problem, I of course stand ready. While it is lengthy, your staff might find useful in this connection our Despatch 748 which Embassy sent to Dept during my absence. [5]

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[4] Your message dated 20 January 1956 beginning "You may, at your discretion, take the etc. [Footnote in the source text. For text of this message, see Document 24.]

[5] Despatch 748 from Cairo, January 11, suggested that there should be a revision of "United States (and British) objectives in the Middle East to meet effectively the new Soviet threat to the Western position in this part of the world." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/1–1156)

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109. Message to Washington [1]

No. 87 *Cairo, February 21, 1956.*

Following is full text of paper agreed to by . . . Ali Sabri as working document for second Anderson visit. Summary this paper previously sent in Message No. 83. [2] "Plan for Step 3 on Time Table". (As revised by Ali Sabri . . . on 18 February 1956).

1. *Step 2*

Step 2 is the essential preliminary to Step 3. Objectives to be achieved at this stage are:

A. Agreement on general plan.

B. Assurances by all parties of intent to work toward a settlement.

C. Agreement on plan for Step 3.

2. *Step 3*

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.

[2] Document 107.

Step 3 will consist of two parallel and inter-related programs, the first to reduce tensions between the Arab States and Israel and the second to reduce tensions throughout Arab area. The objectives to be achieved at this stage are:

A. To create an atmosphere favorable to negotiation and conclusion of a settlement.

B. To create an atmosphere favorable to bringing the Arab State leaders and the Arab public to accept a settlement.

C. To gain time in which to work out the details of final settlement.

D. To provide cover for secret negotiations. (It must be recognized by all parties to the agreement on Step 3 that complete success in achieving the objectives of this step is highly unlikely. The parties must agree to make the maximum effort to reduce tensions and create an atmosphere favorable to a settlement, while recognizing that perfect conditions will probably never come about and that if a settlement is to be obtained sooner or later they must seize a favorable moment and proceed with the plan even though some risks will be involved.)

PART I OF STEP THREE: EASING ARAB ISRAELI TENSIONS

The essence of this part of Step 3 is to be a systematic program under United Nations auspices. For the development and application of measures to reduce incidents along the armistice lines and the tensions that they create.

Initiation of Program

The Secretary General of the UN on returning from his visit to the ME will recommend new project to devise and apply measures to reduce tensions on the Arab Israeli borders. Egypt and Israel will accept the Secretary General's recommendation.

Level of Discussions

Discussions will be carried on in the mixed armistice commission setting. Care will be taken to avoid any steps which would seem to indicate a change in the basic situation and thus give rise to speculation that some understanding has been reached. When proceedings of the mixed armistice commission make it appear desirable General Burns, the UNTSO Chief of Staff, can meet with the Egyptian Foreign Minister and the Israeli Foreign Minister independently to discuss matters which have come up in the course of the discussions.

Measures To Be Explored

It will be the purpose of discussions under UN auspices to review all past recommendations for relieving border tensions and to

seek to devise new and more acceptable measures. Among those measures which will be explored, the following will probably receive major attention:

A. The increase in the number of UN truce observers.
B. More effective means of getting UN truce observers on the spot as soon as an incident takes place.
C. Improvement of UNTSO equip and other resources.
D. Construction of physical barriers at strategic spots on the armistice lines.
E. The withdrawal of forces a fixed distance between the armistice lines.
F. Patrol of the armistice lines by UN personnel.
G. Redisposition of Egyptian and Israeli forces at a greater distance beyond armistice lines.

Other Measures To Reduce Tensions

Egypt and Israel will agree to use all possible means within their own countries to take preventive action, within the limits of their capabilities, to solve the problem of infiltration. Military raids or any other use of military forces in such a way as to create or imply a threat must cease as a part of Step 3.

Refugee Problems

As a part of Step 3 an examination will be made of the possibility of ameliorating the condition of the refugees in advance of a settlement and otherwise preparing them for ultimate acceptance of a settlement.

Propaganda Settlement

All countries which are parties to agreement on Step 3 must agree to give the United Nations program for easing border tensions the most favorable possible propaganda treatment. They must also, of course, take fullest possible advantage of the development of this program to use their propaganda resources to create disposition among members of the general public to favor the idea of a settlement.

PART II OF STEP THREE: EASING AREA TENSIONS

The second part of Step 3 will be a program to ease tensions in the Near East by eliminating factors which tend to disturb the relations of the States in the area, create suspicions among those States and create fear of actions by outside powers. The ultimate objective of this program will be to bring about state of calm in the relations of the States of the area with each other and the Western Powers favorable to the eventual acceptance of an Arab Israeli

settlement. In this field, as in the field of Arab Israeli relations, it must be recognized that no program in advance of a settlement and revision of [*or*] reorientation of Western policy can produce a state of entire calm.

Program To Reduce Tensions in the Area During the Period Preceding a Settlement

All parties to the understanding on the plan for Step 3 must review factors now creating area tensions and agree to exchange views on such factors as can be eliminated by the action of one of the parties involved. They must also give assurances of their determination, within the limits of their capabilities, to cease such actions as they have engaged in in the past which are believed to create area tensions. The following are the principal factors to be reviewed:

A. Alignment of the States of the Area

During Step 3 and up to the conclusion of a settlement all parties must agree to refrain from any action—diplomatic, propaganda, military, clandestine or otherwise—to change the present alignment of the States of the area to create new ties or alliances or to establish new organizations or States. Assurances must be given by the U.S. that all possible efforts will be made to prevent the Bagh Pact nations from exerting any pressure or influence upon any additional Arab State to join the Bagh Pact and to refrain from doing so itself. U.S. must seek to bring UK action into line with this general plan without revealing the existence of the plan. At the same time Egypt will give assurances of its intention during this period at least of refraining from putting pressure on Iraq or otherwise influencing Iraq to break its association with the Baghdad Pact. All measures must be taken to improve relations between Egypt and Iraq during this period. All discussion of Iraqi influence closer relationship with Syria are to be discouraged and assurances given Egypt of the opposition of the U.S. to any such development. Egypt's capability for doing this, of course, will depend on UK action with regard to the Baghdad Pact.

B. The Sense of Emergency in the Area

Public statements, official and unofficial, which create a sense of emergency and of threat of impending war should be discouraged and insofar as possible eliminated. It must be recognized that statements by the Israelis by Egypt by the U.S. or by the UK which indicate fear of impending war between the Arab States and Israel and/or reveal that preparations are being made for war have disturbing and unsettling effect upon area.

C. Plans for Action in the Event of War

Public statements which reveal that any State in the area or out is making plans for action to be taken in the event of an Arab Israeli war not only have disturbing effect upon the area but raise the issue of the sovereign rights of the States within the area and the right of outside powers to take it upon themselves to intervene in the affairs of the States of the area. Such statements must be discouraged and, insofar as possible, eliminated beginning with the inauguration of Step 3.

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110. Message to Cairo [1]

Washington, February 22, 1956.

REFERENCE

Message No. 85, Message No. 86 and Message No. 87 [2]

1. Re Paragraph 6 of Message No. 86 [3] you will have to play it by ear until after meeting we expect to have with . . . Anderson following the return of the Secretary of State tomorrow. [4] You can go as far as you think wise but do not press question of meeting to point which would elicit clear negative or make it difficult for Anderson to reopen subject upon his arrival.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Secret.

[2] Message 85 is Document 108. Message 86 is not printed; see footnotes 3 and 5 below. Message 87 is *supra*.

[3] Paragraph 6 of Message 86 reads:

"6. In view above at first meeting with Nasser I intended attempt sell him on direct negotiations forthwith but will do so without stating that this absolutely essential. Rather I will attempt show that a meeting will overcome major obstacle to advancement this project and that there are ways maintain absolute security. Prior second meeting (presumably evening 22 February) would appreciate further instructions how I should proceed especially with regard upcoming Anderson visit. . . . fully believes that unless Anderson can come prepared discuss project in terms U.S. Government policy for whole area there is no sense his coming." (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I)

[4] According to Dulles' Appointment Book, the meeting began at 3:08 p.m. and continued until after 6 p.m. Participants included Dulles, Anderson, Hoover, Allen Dulles, and Admiral Radford. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) No account of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

2. U.S. Government policy for area is under intense and continuing study and undoubtedly Anderson will be fully briefed this subject before his departure.

3. Re Paragraph 1–B above ref.[5] Our view regarding shortage of time is based upon repeated Israeli assertions that subsequent to some future date, say August 1, they will have lost ability to protect themselves against growing Egyptian military strength in absence of immediate and substantial Israeli rearmament or clear cut international guarantees. We believe Nasr must realize this is Israeli view but how useful it may be to emphasize it we leave to your discretion.

4. Re Message No. 87. We note that working document does not specifically refer to delivery of any arms to Israel as roadblock to carrying out steps indicated. Did Ali Sabri indicate this was implied or did subject go unmentioned.

5. It is now contemplated that Anderson will proceed directly to Cairo Sunday[6] or Monday but preferable you do not so indicate until confirmed following Thursday meeting.

[5] Paragraph 1–B of Message 86 reads:
"B. . . . predicts I will antagonize Nasser in pointing out to him that we have only limited amount of time. Nasser is sure to respond that if there is shortage of time it is only because Israelis plan aggressive action and not he. We cannot moreover, push Nasser by explaining how pressures are building up to give arms to Israel. Mere mention this subject will anger Nasser and tempt him drop operation. Moreover he will think we bluffing since he assumes we will solely be guided by a recognition of the grave consequences which would devolve upon our position in the whole area regardless Anderson mission developments." (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I)

[6] February 26.

111. Message to the Central Intelligence Agency[1]

No. 88 *Cairo, February 22, 1956.*

1. Nasr opened conversation of 21 Feb by stating that he was most alarmed by Lincoln White announcement, which he takes to mean that a U.S. grant to Israel is in the immediate offing.[2] I admitted that this had become a serious possibility, but did not

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.

[2] The announcement has not been further identified.

pursue the point beyond asserting that we were now under extreme pressures not only from the Zionists but from other elements of American opinion motivated by the traditional "American sense of fair play". This brought forth an outburst which almost broke up the meeting. "If the Americans were all that motivated by a sense of fair play there would have been no Israel in the first place". Nasr then went on to enumerate what he considers instances wherein fair play has been notably lacking (e.g. the mild American reaction to the numerous Israeli "Pearl Harbor attacks" on the Arab States at various times and places). He questioned with particular emphasis our idea of fair play as manifested in our conception of the "Balance of Power" between Israelis and Arabs which had enabled Israel to launch "Pearl Harbors" with impunity.

2. Since he appeared to be determined to dwell longer on the Israeli arms question, I asked him what effect a grant to Israel of a relatively small quantity of "Defensive Arms" would have on the Anderson operation. Nasr replied emphatically that this would put an end not only to the Anderson operation but to "Everything". (He added that "Everything" included the career of Nuri Said inasmuch as George Allen's recent statement on the VOA [3] had made it clear to the Arabs that we linked the Baghdad Pact with the question of Israeli security).

3. I then pursued Nasr with questions as to his precise course of conduct in the event of an announcement of arms to Israel. He replied that immediately upon receiving confirmation of such a grant, Egypt and Syria will request a similar quantity of arms from the U.S., and that he thought Lebanon and Jordan might do likewise. He said this would be done in full expectation of having the requests turned down. "After that we shall see what happens".

4. I have never seen Nasr and Zacharia so upset about anything. I unhesitatingly predict that an arms grant to Israel will produce a fearsome reaction and one which will be beyond our power to avert or soften. An hour or so later, and after discussing a number of subjects, I took my leave. At the door Nasr grabbed me by the arm and said he hoped there was "some mistake" involved in the Lincoln White announcement and that a catastrophe like this will not intervene to shatter all the hope we have been nursing along over the past three years.

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[3] Not further identified.

112. Message to the Central Intelligence Agency [1]

No. 89 *Cairo, February 22, 1956.*

1. Session 21 February opened by Nasr, Zacharia participating, on subject of arms to Israel; his remarks cabled separately in Message No. 88. [2] Rest of meeting devoted to Anderson operation and allied matters.

2. I asked Nasr what he thought of the . . . Ali Sabri talks. [3] He replied that he considered the discussions at this level to be of primary importance in that they are subsidiary to the "Big Problem". Nonetheless, he supposed that these conversations have been going well and affirmed that it was his intention to live by whatever is worked out. I then asked Nasr if he were prepared to resume discussions with Anderson. To this he replied that he would be happy to see Anderson at any time but that the question really is whether or not Anderson is now prepared to resume the discussions. This I took to be a reference to the "Big Problem" for Nasr appeared to believe that he made his thinking clear and that it is now up to us to indicate our acceptance or rejection of his position with respect to the basis on which peace with Israel can be obtained. I replied I did not think his position in certain respects was all that clear and that in Washington moreover there were very serious doubts at his sincerity in the op. I then adverted to the topics of Egyptian propaganda recent border incidents, etc and stated that these were part of a long list of indications that he was only stalling for time in the Anderson operation. Nasr did not appear to be upset by this turn of the conversation but he replied he had two thoughts to offer. He wishes to assert, in the first place, that he has in fact been trying conscientiously to take the steps required of him and has been endeavoring to reduce anti-Israeli propaganda to a minimum and to increase the discipline of his troops in the Gaza area. As for the incidents which seemed to have displeased us, he thought we were making mountains out of molehills. In the second place he wanted us to understand that much of the difficulty he is encountering is directly traceable to the atmosphere that we and the British persist in maintaining with respect to the politics of the area. He then recounted lengthily the points he usually makes in this connection all simmering down to the proposition that the British and American activities in support of the Bagh Pact were creating

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] See Documents 85, 96, and 107.

internecine warfare among the Arab States and cited numerous instances real and imaginary where propaganda drives conducted against him (mostly he feels British inspired) are compelling him more and more to soft pedal or abandon what he would consider "Constructive" conduct in the area.

3. I then made the point that we on our part were puzzled as to what he would consider "Constructive" conduct in the area. I added that many of the difficulties he complained of do not spring from any deliberate actions aimed at him but from simple misunderstandings as to what it takes to please him. We were, to put it bluntly, somewhat confused. Here he interrupted to say that he shared my feeling. "We think you have been conducting a comic opera in the Middle East during the past two weeks". He went on to claim that we had issued four contradictory statements with regards to arms policy in the Middle East in a period of 48 hours,[4] and if the consequences were not so serious it would be a laughing matter indeed. I went on to reiterate that not knowing exactly what Nasr wanted in the area was an important factor in keeping us from clarifying our policy. After I labored this point for a while he finally agreed that this might be the source of the trouble. (?)[5] He suggested that although he and Ambassador Byroade have had many profitable discussions (in)? main view of the immediate relevance to the Anderson operation it would be good idea for he (Nasr) and I . . . to get busy at formulating a statement of common Egyptian-American objectives. He warmed to this idea the more he talked about it and emerged with the apparent conviction that this would represent real progress. I indicated that I thought so too but appealed to him not to expect too much of us and that in the friendliest of relationships the parties concerned can never be in 100% agreement. I allowed that we could go on all night matching examples of how each of us had done things which apparently betrayed the interests of the other and that, instead, we should take this opportunity to make a conscientious effort to magnify our points of common interest and minimize our differences.

4. One "Constructive" idea for the area which appears to be of increasing interest to Nasr is the possibility of our granting economic aid to the Arab States on a regional basis. Nasr has apparently given this matter considerable thought and intends at the proper time to take up the question of a Western sponsored economic survey with the Arab League. He doesn't think anything can be done at the

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[4] These statements are not identified. Presumably Nasser is referring to the circumstances surrounding the shipment of American tanks to Saudi Arabia. See footnote 6, Document 106.

[5] This and the subsequent question mark appear in the source text.

moment, however, due to the "Internecine warfare" referred to above.

5. Towards the close of the meeting I had a full scale argument with Nasr on the question of a direct meeting with the Israelis at a suitable high level. Nasr never budged from his negative position on this, but indicated that he was willing to argue about it some more in the next day or two. I think his willingness to talk about it is slightly encouraging and we may have as much as one out of five chances of changing his mind.

6. . . . is going to get in touch with Ali Sabri today preliminary to our holding the discussions called for in Paragraph 3 above. We will probably both meet with Nasr Thursday [6] night.

[6] February 23.

113. Message From the Ambassador in Egypt (Byroade) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

No. 92 *Cairo, February 22, 1956.*

1. Since receiving your message dated 20 February 1956 [2] have given most careful consideration as to how operation in question could best be handled in event it appears to be necessary. Have been able to feel even at this distance situation at home you refer to, and unfortunately so have Arabs. There is here, I believe, a growing feeling that decision in favor of Israel may soon be reached.

2. While addressing myself to the question of method which you pose, please forgive one more statement from me that this action, however carried out or announced, is certain to have the most grave effect upon the U.S. position in the Middle East. Altho many cables have been sent by this Embassy on this subj believe Embtel 1124 sent Dec 12 [3] best summarizes our views. Would hope that msg, which seems to me as valid now as when written, could be available on highest level at time decision reached. You might wish review also Ambassador Moose's 582. [4]

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.

[2] A footnote in the source text refers to the enclosure to Document 106.

[3] Vol. XIV, p. 851.

[4] *Ibid.*, p 866.

3. Situation seems to defy thinking up any new "Device" to reduce damage in Arab World. Regardless of how matter is handled, it will be the subj of such wide press treatment that skill of handling on our part will be completely ignored and lost. Am sorry I have to report that I believe it would be the end of the Anderson mission. I also believe that the feeling that war is inevitable will become accepted by the mass of Arabs.

4. In considering how problem can be handled believe you should attempt divide it in your thinking into two parts. One is the question of convincing Nasser and other Arab leaders privately that "No threat is being created to their security". The other is the question of the political and psychological effect in the area of sending arms to Israel.

5. Under certain conditions first part of problem might be handled. The work of the Anderson mission should first proceed to point of secret agreement between Egypt and Israel on a program for arriving at a settlement (or on a scheduled meeting between two sides for discussion of settlement). If this state achieved there is some slight chance that problem would be manageable from the security viewpoint alone. Nasser might provide us with info as to his actual strength and agree to obtain no more above levels of equipment now on order. We might be able to convince him personally that we could not carry out our part of deal without provision of some arms to Israel which could be used to quiet their populace and help us with our problem at home. In such case Pentagon could advise as to types of equipment for Israel to that which could be best labeled "Defensive", although this fairly difficult when one goes beyond such things as fixed anti-aircraft artillery, radar warning systems, etc.

6. It is the second, and to us most important, part of problem that we can see no way to meet. I think we agree with Nasser that a period of preparation in the area is necessary before any Arab leader could make peace with Israel. There is no single act I can think of on our part that would run so violently counter to the creation of the required atmosphere than the publicity involved in arms for Israel. However the move might be received within U.S., there is *no* doubt in my mind how it will be received here. It will eliminate a substantial body of Arab opinion that the present U.S. administration is much better on the Arab-Israel issue than its predecessor and will destroy all remaining belief in its policy of impartiality. I have considered for some time before committing to writing my belief it will wipe out the gains of three years of effort by Eisenhower team and in view of Sov support to Arabs will set us back farther than we were in 48. Am sorry to be so negative but wish make it crystal clear that in my opinion this part of problem completely overrules

any suggestion made above as to how straight security aspects of problem might be met.

7. As to how decision should be relayed to Nasser, suppose I should do it and perhaps it would be best to do so couple of days prior to announcement. Will of course attempt reason with him in best manner possible, but details of presentation will be relatively unimportant.

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114. Message to the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) [1]

No. 93 *Cairo, February 22, 1956.*

REFERENCE

Department outgoing message dated 20 February 1956 beginning "Please pass following to Ambassador from Acting etc. [2]

1. As you remember, prior my departure Wash I raised possibility of suggesting to Nasr that we may be forced provide arms to Israel and I expressed view we might be able sell him other [3] on basis "You take certain acts we do not like; you are going to have to live with our taking an act you don't like". In event Anderson mission fails I also speculated that it might be possible provide arms to Israel and get away with it in Arab States other than Egypt by somehow blaming the necessity for doing so on Egyptian misbehavior.

2. Since arriving here this trip I am convinced these notions utterly unrealistic and that there is no possibility whatever Egyptians accept our providing arms to Israel in any amount. Unanimous opinion all of us here is that results will be:

A. Immediate termination Anderson mission.

B. Termination of High Dam negotiations with World Bank and possible substitution High Dam aid from Soviets.

C. Conclusion further arms deal with Soviets and encouragement other Arab States do likewise.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.

[2] See the enclosure to Document 106.

[3] At this point in the source text, a handwritten [*sic*] was inserted, presumably in the Code Room, with the explanation: "as received".

115. Letter From the Ambassador in Egypt (Byroade) to the Secretary of State [1]

Cairo, February 23, 1956.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Forgive me for addressing you directly in this manner. I have not done it before—and will not abuse the privilege—but I know of no other satisfactory way to communicate some of my thoughts to you in a way that would not be misunderstood. I would in fact hope that this letter would receive no distribution as I think it might be misunderstood by some of your staff.

The last two days have been one of the most soul-searching periods of my life. I was asked by Hoover how—not whether—the problem of arms to Israel could be handled. [2] You will have seen my answer which, while very negative, was the best that I could conscientiously do. [3] I realize that this reply is not helpful to those who think we must let Israel have arms. They will think that I have lost all sense of appreciation of the situation at home and the problems they confront. Believe me, I do not believe this to be the case. I have not been away from the domestic scene long and have kept, through many channels, perhaps closer to it on this issue than would be imagined.

We are indeed in a most regrettable dilemma. I have sensed from knowing you that one of the things you wanted most to accomplish during your tenure as Secretary was the solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. You have maintained good policies toward that end and in spite of all our difficulties in the area—many of which have been caused by acts of others over which we had no control—you have made real progress. You are now trying to capitalize on your policies in a most sensible fashion by means of the Anderson Mission. This may not work, but it is the only chance of preventing disaster in this area that I can see. Furthermore I am not gloomy about the prospects. If we keep at this it may work—and I know of no other alternative. The great problem is that if we talk about it it will not work—and without talking about it we give the impression of floundering hopelessly with a dangerous situation. I have wracked my brain to think up some cover plan of activity about which you could hopefully talk but have been unable to conceive of any that

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Israeli Relations 1951–1957. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Personal and Private.

[2] See the enclosure to Document 106.

[3] Document 113.

does not carry with it almost the same dangers as exposing the Anderson mission.

It is not my function to advise you on matters at home but I can see only one way out of the present dilemma. We can't remain on the defensive because we cannot expose the strength of our defense. The only answer therefore is to take the initiative domestically.

I was tremendously encouraged while I was home by the change in public opinion in the space of one short year since I have been gone. America never has been able to understand the Arab-Israeli issue—it was too complicated—too far away, and there has been nothing in America to match the distortion of the Zionists. We now have a situation however that the American people can understand—and that is the threat from the Soviet Union in this part of the world. The problem of Israel and of Zionism at home can be put in the proper context for the first time.

I respectfully suggest that this can only be done by the President personally. What I have in mind is a television "fireside chat" type of thing (perhaps I have used an unfortunate phrase!). The President, by laying all the facts on the line (except the Anderson Mission) could probably still take this issue to a satisfactory degree out of domestic politics. I would think he could talk about the overriding interest in this area of America as a whole in such a way as to practically break the back of Zionism as a political force. You can judge better than I whether this is possible but I give you one example. At my appearance before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York [4] there was an unusual turnout of high-caliber people. I gave them nearly the whole picture in as honest a manner as I could. I believe if a vote had been taken of that group after my talk at least 99% of those present would have voted against arms for Israel. I even believe this would have included most of the Jewish people present.

If what I suggest could be done there would be great relief in many circles. I recall my talk with Senator Saltonstall who has a problem of his own regarding this matter. He would be relieved no end if the personality of the President could take the matter far above his own level. I believe many Democrats who are forced into a position on this question, against what their conscience dictates, would be content to ward off future pressures with this assistance. This would not stop them all by any means but neither, in this particular year, would any other action. I am convinced Adlai Stevenson could be counted upon, and possibly by prior collaboration, would even give positive support. I have just had a long talk

[4] Not further identified.

with Sam Kopper who passed through here but did not mention of course the specific idea that the President might take the initiative. Incidentally I believe Sam should be kept better informed by your staff as he no longer has the argumentation to use as ammunition to help Stevenson ward off his pressures. This procedure worked well before the last Congressional elections and I do not believe it's too late to make it effective again.

The kindest act we might make for the long-range good of Israel might be shock treatment to clear up our situation at home. Without knowing any of the details I would bet my paycheck that the activities of Eban in the past two weeks in connection with the Saudi arms deal clearly exceeded that of an accredited foreign diplomat. People such as Nahum Goldman have demonstratedly violated the right to U.S. citizenship. To suggest action along these lines may seem completely rash. I believe however if it is done now we can tide over and control anti-Semitism in the United States. If we wait for what may well happen in the Middle East—when the record will have to be exposed—this may not be possible. I say this in all sincerity although I may be somewhat prejudiced and affected by the attitude of the Middle West as I saw it on my last visit.

All this may make little sense unless one could visualize the type of draft the President might use. You could probably do the best job of drafting if you could spare the time. There are others however who could be put to work on the problem to assist you. If I could be of any help, even at this distance, I would be most happy to do so.

All this comes from an ex-Indiana farm boy who has never had the slightest feelings about race or creed—yet who now is labeled anti-Semitic. Believe me, I make these recommendations in what I consider to be the best interests of the United States—and in the firm conviction that they are in the long-range best interests of Israel—whether they agree or not. [5]

Sincerely,

Hank

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[5] Dulles responded with a personal letter to Byroade on February 29, in which he assured Byroade that he had given his remarks "very careful thought", but went on to say that "I do not see how we can go on indefinitely refusing to let Israel buy any type of armament here, even the most clearly defensive, unless this is essential to some constructive program which has a reasonable chance of success." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Israeli Relations 1951–1957)

116. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, February 23, 1956.

SUBJECT

Middle East Policy

Mr. Hoover asked me on Tuesday to chair an ad hoc committee to recommend policies which should be pursued with respect to Israel and the Arab states, [2] assuming that efforts to find an early solution of the dispute should be unsuccessful. In view of your imminent departure for the Far East [3] and your discussions during the next few days with Congressional leaders, I thought that it might be useful to you to have some quick impressions of the committee, realizing that fuller consideration may well result in a different analysis and recommendations. [4] The attached papers provide such a highly tentative discussion on the following questions:

1. Shipments of arms to Middle East countries;
2. Measures for increasing security and preventing hostilities in the Middle East; and,
3. Measures for dealing with specific situations likely to lead to an early outbreak of hostilities.

F.H.R.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., Feb. 16 to March 31, 1956. Top Secret.

[2] In a memorandum of February 21, Hoover informed Allen, Wilcox, Merchant, Bowie, Phleger, and Russell that, since the United States was confronted "with problems of an especially acute and difficult nature in the Middle East", he was establishing an ad hoc Middle East Policy Committee "that can work intensively on the formulation of policy for this area", with Francis Russell as chairman." (*Ibid.*)

[3] Secretary Dulles left Washington on March 2 to attend the second meeting of the SEATO Council at Karachi.

[4] As of February 29, the Middle East Policy Committee had held four meetings. (Memorandum from Russell to Hugh G. Appling of the Executive Secretariat; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., Feb. 16 to March 31, 1956) No record of these meetings has been found in Department of State files.

[Attachment 1]

U.S. MIDDLE EAST ARMS SHIPMENTS POLICY [5]

Problem:

During the past six months the U.S. has based its policies relating to arms shipments to the Middle East on the dual objectives of: (a) creating conditions most conducive to an Arab-Israel settlement, and (b) preventing an all-out arms race in the area which the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal threatened to touch off. Israel's apprehensions at the shift in the balance of power in the area as a result of Egypt's absorption of military equipment from the Soviet bloc has reached a point where it threatens to embark upon preventive action and where the Western powers must consider their moral responsibility for Israel's security in the face of a shift in the balance of power.

Discussion:

In formulating an arms shipments policy for the period ahead, the following should be our objectives: to lessen the likelihood of war between Arabs and Israelis; to promote conditions favorable to a solution of the Arab-Israel problem; to avoid a position in which the U.S. backs and supplies Israel while the Soviet bloc backs and supplies the Arab states; to minimize Soviet penetration of the area; and to support the Baghdad Pact without unnecessarily complicating our relations with the neutrals.

There are three principal alternative policies:

1. Establish an embargo on arms shipments to the Middle East, with the exception of Libya and Iraq. This policy would require our coming to an understanding with Saudi Arabia regarding our commitments to their five-year plan and the Dhahran air base. Such a U.S. embargo might contemplate both Israel and the Arab states getting limited deliveries of arms from other Western sources, including France and the U.K. The advantages of this policy would be: that it would give the U.S. a favorable moral position, and that it would be less onerous for us in our relations with the Arab states. Among the disadvantages would be the continued pressure to which we would be subjected by Israel and its friends for arms and a security guarantee; the difficulty of getting the Saudis to understand why we were not living up to our commitment to them and preventing them from turning to the Soviets; and likely objections

[5] Top Secret. Drafted on February 23.

by the British and French to our assuming a moral position and putting the burden of arms deliveries on them.

2. Continuing to supply arms to Israel on the basis of preserving Israel's previous ability to ward off an attack from all Arab states combined and making it clear that we were also prepared to sell arms to such Arab states as do not have significant contracts with the Soviet bloc. The principal advantage of this approach would be that it would remove the Israeli incentive to undertake preventive war. The disadvantages of this policy would be that it would foster an arms race, leading the Egyptians to increase their orders with the Soviets and leading towards a situation in which the Soviets backed the Arabs while the West increased its identification with Israel.

3. The Western powers would provide a limited amount of arms to both sides on the following conditions:

a. Israel would agree that it would no longer attempt to maintain an arms establishment equal to that of all of the Arab states combined but would base its security upon (a) a combination of an arms establishment capable of dealing with a sudden armed thrust and blunting an armed attack and (b) the security afforded by the U.N. and the Tripartite Powers. Israel would not maintain a capacity of defeating the Arabs or even holding out indefinitely against them. The object would be to provide Israel with the means of defense during a limited period in which the Tripartite Powers could consult and take necessary action and in which the U.N. could act.

b. The types and amounts of arms to be provided would be calculated on the basis of existing stocks and sources available to both sides apart from those coming from the U.S. In making agreements to provide arms, we would need to secure information concerning the current military establishments and procurement efforts.

c. In addition to making the usual stipulations, such as use for defense only, the recipient countries might be required to agree to other conditions. These might include: full cooperation with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, covering, inter alia, full access by UNTSO at all times to places in the demilitarized zones, withdrawal of troops behind agreed lines, etc. It might also be desirable to obtain agreement upon such matters as the commencement of construction of work at Banat Yaacov.

d. In order to secure reasonable implementation of U.S. arms shipments policies, consideration should be given to strengthening the machinery which now exists to consult on the provision of arms by Western powers to countries in the Near East.

The advantages of such a policy would be: that it would hold out to Israel a reasonable degree of security; that it would terminate a situation, which has been unacceptable to the Arabs, of maintaining a balance between the armed forces of Israel, a state of one and a half million, and those of the six Arab states combined, with aggregate populations of 40 million; that it should not touch off another round of Soviet arms purchases by

the Arab states; that it would give the Western powers some leverage to require of Israel greater cooperation with UNTSO.

[Attachment 2]

PREVENTION OF WAR BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL[6]

Problem:

There is an increasing possibility of an outbreak of hostilities between the Arab states and Israel. For the next few months the principal danger is that Israel, becoming desperate as it sees Arab military strength growing, will set off a preventive war against Egypt and Syria either by overt aggression or, more likely, by non-military action that will provoke a military response from the Arabs. In the subsequent period when Egypt has integrated its new Czech arms into its military establishment, the principal danger will lie in an Arab initiative.

Discussion:

Several proposals have been put forward with a view to preventing an Arab-Israel war.

1. The first of these provides that the U.S., and perhaps the U.K. and France, should enter into bilateral security pacts with Israel and the contiguous Arab states. The primary difficulty with this proposal is that it would not be acceptable to the Arab states unless it were accompanied by boundary changes that would reduce the territory presently under Israel's control. Hence, if the proposal were pursued prior to an Arab-Israel understanding on boundaries, only Israel would accept it and the U.S. would find itself aligned with Israel against the Arabs. It could safely be anticipated that ties between the Arab states and the Soviet Bloc would in this circumstance be considerably strengthened. Moreover, in the absence of at least partial settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute, the present pitch of tension would continue and a security pact, or pacts, would have little effect unless the U.S., and the U.K. and France if they participated in the pact offer, had military forces obviously ready for prompt deployment in the area.

2. A second proposal is that the U.N. be used to prevent war in the Near East. The principal difficulty here is to find a suitable and practicable means of effectively interposing the U.N. between the

[6] Top Secret. Drafted on February 22.

disputants. The Soviet veto in the Security Council and the Arab-Asian strength in the General Assembly make it unlikely that any proposed action unacceptable to the Arabs would be approved—and the Arabs can be expected to oppose any action that does not clearly favor their cause.

Even assuming that Security Council or General Assembly approval for U.N. action could be obtained, the probable types of action would not remove the danger of war. The creation of a new watching and reporting agency, either on an ad hoc basis or utilizing the Peace Observation Commission machinery would not add significantly to the present capability of UNTSO in this area of activity. In fact, such a new body might merely duplicate or seriously interfere with the continued effective operation of the UNTSO. The establishment of a new version of the Palestine Conciliation Commission to make a resurvey of political problems and possible solutions might for a time inhibit the Arab states and Israel from resorting to hostilities but this would be only a temporary palliative. The composition of such a commission, posing as it undoubtedly would the question of Soviet participation, raises doubts as to the advisability of such a body being created now or in the immediate future.

3. The third proposal is that the Tripartite powers, the U.S., U.K. and France, make a new declaration of their intention to prevent war between the Arab states and Israel. This declaration might be in the following sense:

"The Governments of the U.S., U.K. and France reaffirm their deep interest in and their determination to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the Near East and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states intends to violate, or had violated, frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the U.N., immediately take action, both within and outside the U.N., to deal with the situation.

"The action contemplated would, if necessary, include military action as contemplated under Chapter VII of the Charter[7] or under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Its objectives should a significant armed offensive occur, would be to bring about an immediate cease fire and the restoration of the status quo ante and to provide assistance to the state or states subjected to such an offensive.

"The three Governments are in continuing consultation on the means to give effect to their joint commitment to the maintenance of peace in the Near East."

If this type of declaration were to have real effect in the Near East, it would have to be buttressed, as regards the U.S., by appropriate

[7] Reference is to Article VII of the U.N. Charter. (59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031)

Congressional action and, as regards all three Governments, by overt evidences that they were in fact making the military dispositions that would enable them to intervene promptly if the need arose.

It might be desirable to give Turkey an opportunity to associate itself in some way with this declaration. The Turks have previously indicated an interest in participating in arrangements for maintaining peace between the Arab states and Israel, and they have substantial forces at hand. Countervailing considerations are that Turkey is to some extent suspect among the Arab states by virtue of past history and that Turkey's participation might involve its Baghdad Pact partners with consequent embarrassment to Iraq.

As is clear from the suggested language of the declaration, every effort would be made by the Tripartite powers to obtain U.N. approval and sanction for their actions in the event of Arab-Israel hostilities. As these actions will be consistent with their obligations as U.N. members and as the U.N. has heretofore, either in the Security Council or the General Assembly, responded positively to an actual breach of the peace, there is reason to expect that approval and sanction would be given.

Conclusions:

1. Three courses of action to prevent war between the Arab states and Israel have been proposed: i.e., unilateral U.S. security pacts with Israel and the contiguous Arab states; recourse to some form of U.N. action; and renewed and stronger action by the Tripartite powers.

2. In the absence of boundary adjustments that would reduce the territory now under Israel's control, none of the Arab states would accept a U.S. offer of a bilateral security pact, whereas Israel would accept the offer. The net effect would, thereby, be to align the U.S. with Israel against the Arabs. Moreover, unless other steps were taken to lessen the prevailing tension in the Near East, such pacts would not be effective unless they were reinforced by obvious U.S. military forces that could be rapidly deployed in the area.

3. Because of the Soviet veto in the Security Council and the Arab-Asian strength in the General Assembly, it would be very difficult to achieve U.N. action that would be effective in preventing the outbreak of war in the Near East. Should war occur, appropriate action by the Council or the Assembly could be expected.

4. A firm public stand by the U.S., U.K. and France that they would take necessary action, including military action, to maintain or restore peace between the Arab states and Israel offers the best hope of preventing war. If this is to be effective, Congressional

action in support of the U.S. Administration's position would be required.

[Attachment 3]

MEASURES TO MINIMIZE DANGER OF IMMEDIATE HOSTILITIES IN ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE [8]

I. General

This paper is written on the assumption that the measures proposed would be taken in the context of other steps to lessen tensions in the Near East. These could include the strengthening of area security through announcement of intention to take action in the United Nations or under the Tripartite Declaration, and a decision to provide limited military assistance to Israel.

The three most potentially and immediately dangerous trouble spots in the Arab-Israel area are: 1) the Straits of Tiran (Gulf of Aqaba); 2) the Egyptian-Israel frontier (Gaza and the El Auja demilitarized zone); and 3) the Israel diversion project on the upper Jordan River at Jisr Banat Ya'qub.

II. The Straits of Tiran.

A démarche should be made to the Israelis which would include the following points: 1) We support Israel's contention that the Egyptian thesis of belligerency is unsupportable in the light of the Security Council resolution of September 1, 1951; 2) we have made our position clear to the Egyptians and are willing to consider further diplomatic measures which could usefully be taken under the UN Charter and other international undertakings looking toward the gradual relaxation of present restrictions on Israel shipping in the Straits of Tiran; 3) in the light of 1) and 2) above and the generally tense situation in the area, we seek from Israel an undertaking that Israel will eschew the use or threat of forceful or provocative measures against Egypt in the dispute over the Straits of Tiran.

III. The Egyptian-Israel Frontier.

A. General Burns has been charged by the Security Council to put into effect practical measures to reduce tension along the Egyptian-Israel frontier. Among these measures have been suggested:

1) *Separation of forces* by a demilitarized zone perhaps a kilometer deep on each side of the Armistice lines; stationing of UN observers within the demilitarized zones.

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[8] Secret. Drafted on February 23.

2) Erection of *physical barriers* along strategic portions of the Armistice lines.

3) *Joint Egyptian-Israel patrols* along the Armistice lines.

4) Direct *communications between local commanders* on the two sides of the Armistice lines.

5) Use of only *regular forces* by each side in areas close to the Armistice lines.

B. General Burns and his observers require further assistance before they can operate with maximum effectiveness. Problems they face include:

1) *Restrictions on freedom of movement.* Both Israel and Egypt are wont, at crucial times, to disregard the provisions of the Armistice Agreement which accord full freedom of movement to UN observers.

2) *Limitations of men and equipment.* General Burns places major emphasis on his requirement for freedom of movement, but has from time to time indicated that he might use a few more observers and some additional equipment such as helicopters and communications equipment.

C. General Burns should be approached informally and his views sought as to which of the measures set forth above would be the most effective in assuring tranquillity along the Egyptian-Israel frontier and what action the U.S. could usefully take in urging the parties to cooperate in such measures.

D. Once General Burns' views have been obtained, we should approach Israel and Egypt and urge them to cooperate in the implementation of a program of practical measures based on full observance of the Armistice Agreement. We should be prepared to condition assurances and assistance to Israel on Israel's cooperation.

IV. Jisr Banat Ya'qub.

A. The Three Powers are in the course of making démarches to the Egyptians and Israelis on this subject. Ambassador Johnston has sent a personal letter to Nasser, reminding him of his undertaking to obtain Arab agreement to the Jordan Valley plan.[9] The Three Powers' démarche emphasizes our support for General Burns, our belief that unilateral action by Israel in the absence of a decision of General Burns would be a violation of the Armistice Agreement and the Security Council resolution, the fact that the use or threat of force by either party would be contrary to UN Charter obligations. We urge the Arabs to accept the Jordan Valley plan and indicate that Ambassador Johnston is ready to meet with the Arab Foreign Ministers if it is felt that a useful purpose would be served by such a meeting.

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[9] See Document 119.

B. Measures should be considered to strengthen and underline the authority of General Burns in the demilitarized zones. If the above efforts prove unfruitful, it is likely that General Burns will continue to hold that unilateral resumption of work by Israel would be in violation of the Armistice Agreements. General Burns has already indicated to us that he would not change his ruling without consultation with the Three Powers and the UN Secretary-General. In the course of the informal consultation on the Egyptian-Israel frontier (see III. C. above), General Burns' views should be sought as to how his authority in the demilitarized zones might be strengthened by tripartite action.

C. On the assumption that timely Arab acceptance of the Jordan Valley plan will not be forthcoming, ways should be sought to enable Israel and Jordan to begin work to develop portions of Jordan River waters. The possibility of arranging tacit acceptance of unilateral non-competing development should be explored. The key country in any such arrangement would be Syria, because of her rights in the demilitarized zone with Israel and the fact that she is a riparian state on the Yarmuk with Jordan.

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117. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State [1]

Paris, February 23, 1956—4 p.m.

3810. Reference: Embtel 3739. [2] Maillard last night informed Embassy officer that apparently serious confusion still exists in U.S. extension MDAP contract to make 12 Mysteres available to French for delivery to Israel.

In reply to urgent instructions, French Ambassador Couve has now informed Foreign Office that he conferred with Department (Allen) on February 7 [3] and 13. [4] In his telegram to Foreign Office, Couve states that during both conversations he informed Allen that firm French decision to deliver 12 Mysteres had been taken and that French were requesting US Government give necessary instructions for interruption of contract at technical level. According to Maillard,

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/2–2356. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:06 p.m. Repeated priority to Tel Aviv and London.

[2] Document 101.

[3] No account of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[4] See Document 95.

Couve claims to have received assurances from Department both on February 7 and 13 that necessary instructions "had already been issued to Pentagon". However, Foreign Office has contacted Colonel Harroll, Chief Air Procurement Service, Paris (AMFE–CAMA/PAP) who indicated he had received no instructions and no advance information that such instructions would be forthcoming.

In light of above, Foreign Office is replying to inquiries from Israeli Embassy that French Government has made two formal démarches to Department on February 7 and 13 and, despite assurances that appropriate instructions at technical level had been issued, Colonel Harroll has received no instructions.

Maillard stressed fact that Foreign Office is under extreme pressure from Israelis to get on with delivery of planes and from press (Embtel 3789 [5]) to aid Israelis.

It is increasingly difficult for Embassy to understand apparent confusion which exists re US implementation interruption MDAP contract. . . .

Once again ball is back in our laps and both Foreign Office and Israeli Embassy again feel that US Government is responsible for delay. Embassy would be grateful for any guidance Department could give re information to be transmitted to Foreign Office or Israeli Embassy and meanwhile is anxious to be of help should Department need additional information on French Government's position which the Quai d'Orsay has been at great pains to make entirely clear to us here. In view heavy pressure here would appreciate information as to whether technical instructions are in fact being transmitted to US Air Procurement Service. [6] (See paragraph 2 of Deptel 2819. [7])

Dillon

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[5] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 651.74/2–2156)
[6] See Document 130.
[7] Document 74.

118. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and the British Ambassador (Makins), Department of State, Washington, February 23, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Lloyd's Visit to Cairo

Ambassador Makins called at his request and said that Selwyn Lloyd will be stopping in Cairo and seeing Nasser on March 1. [2] He feels that it is important for him to know the state of the Anderson negotiations before he sees Nasser and also important for him to show to Nasser that he has a knowledge of the negotiations. Ambassador Makins said that the extent of his and Selwyn Lloyd's knowledge at the present time is that Ben Gurion is insisting on a direct meeting with Nasser and is reluctant to disclose Israel's position on the various issues to anyone except Nasser; and that Nasser takes the position that a direct top level meeting will take several months of preparation. The Secretary said that that is about the substance of the situation; that it looks as though it might be possible to work out an agreement on most of the issues except the Negev, on which there is a sharp conflict of positions. The Secretary said that he feels our main objective for the time being should be to bring about a situation in which talks could be held. He said that Mr. Anderson was coming to Washington this afternoon [3] and was planning to leave for a second round of talks next week. He said that Mr. Russell would keep Ambassador Makins informed of any important developments.

The Secretary said that we face a difficult problem in connection with Israel's request for arms. If we delay too long in providing any, we may be put in the position of becoming a moral guarantor of Israel. On the other hand, if we provide arms the prospects of obtaining a settlement would be greatly diminished. Because of the recent increase in tension, the time within which negotiations can take place may be fairly short. Ambassador Makins said that the U.K. is in much the same situation as the U.S. with respect to the problem of supplying arms to Israel. He said that he understood the French were about to release some Mysteres to Israel and that the U.K. had sold, but not yet delivered, six Meteors to the Israel Government.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., Feb. 16 to March 31, 1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Russell on February 29.

[2] See Documents 157 and 175.

[3] See footnote 4, Document 110.

The Secretary, in response to Ambassador Makins' request about Selwyn Lloyd informing Nasser that he was aware of the Anderson negotiations, said that he agreed that it would probably be necessary. (Mr. Anderson saw Ambassador Makins the following day,[4] however, and told him that he felt that such a step would probably result in Nasser calling off the negotiations. Ambassador Makins said that he would recommend to Selwyn Lloyd, on that basis, that he say nothing to Nasser about the negotiations.[5] Mr. Anderson reviewed at some length the line that he was taking with Nasser as to why it would be to Egypt's advantage to make a settlement and Ambassador Makins said that he thought Selwyn Lloyd would wish to make the same points.)

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[4] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[5] The Department, on February 27, informed Ambassador Byroade of this conversation and asked him to support Anderson's recommendations with the British in Cairo. (Message 1 to Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing telegrams—Jan.–March 1956) Byroade informed the Department on March 2 that "Selwyn Lloyd told me last night he had never had any intention of mentioning Anderson mission and would not do so." (Message 102 from Byroade at Cairo; *ibid.*, Incoming telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II)

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119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

Washington, February 23, 1956—7 p.m.

1999. You are requested deliver following personal message to Prime Minister Nasser from Ambassador Eric Johnston: "Dear Mr. Prime Minister: When I left Cairo last October following the meeting of the Arab League on the Jordan Valley Plan, it was your opinion that Arab acceptance of the project would be possible after the lapse of several months. A similar opinion was expressed to me at that time by the Foreign Ministers of Lebanon and Syria, both of whom assured me that the action of the League implied only a short delay and not in any sense a rejection of the project.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2356. Confidential. Drafted by Johnston, cleared with Ludlow, and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London, Paris, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Ankara, and Baghdad and Jidda by pouch.

As I told you in Cairo, the constructive influence of the Government of Egypt and particularly of yourself has been a major factor in evolving an economically sound and technically feasible plan which assures and protects the interests of the Arab states. In discussing the project with the President and the Secretary of State, I have emphasized your helpful and forward looking part in the negotiations and your assurance that you would continue to exercise good offices in behalf of the plan's ultimate acceptance. For my own part, I have placed great reliance on your assurance of continued cooperation, and it is for that reason that I now approach you on the question of renewing our active consideration of the matter.

My government continues to regard the Jordan Valley plan as a basic economic development project which need not and should not become involved with political issues. While I am aware that certain political questions bear inevitably on the attitudes of some of the Arab governments toward the project, I am hopeful that the final decision of the Arab states will be made on the basis of economic and social benefit rather than of political considerations.

You will understand, I am sure, that it is impossible for me to leave the matter in abeyance indefinitely; and, since three and a half months have elapsed since the Cairo meeting, it would seem appropriate at this time to reopen the question and to ask when the Arab states will be prepared to take a final, and, I hope, favorable decision on the plan. It is not my intention to press unduly, but I am obliged to try to bring the matter to a conclusion as soon as possible.

I should therefore greatly appreciate any initiative which you might feel it possible to take at this time to support an early favorable decision by the states concerned. While my personal affairs now take me to the Far East for a short time, I am prepared to meet with the Foreign Ministers of the Arab countries at any time and place they choose, either in or out of the region, if it should appear that such a meeting would be productive.

With appreciation for any personal action you may take and my warmest personal regards. Eric Johnston"

Dulles

120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, February 23, 1956—7:01 p.m.

2000. Deptel 1999. [2] Embassies Cairo Amman Damascus Beirut requested convey sense of following to Govts to which accredited: 1) US position on Jisr Banat Ya'qub diversion has been made clear. Deptel 575 to Damascus. [3] Unilateral resumption of work without consent General Burns would be contrary to UNTSO and SC action. At same time threats or attempts by Arab states to use military force would be contrary to members' obligations under UN Charter. 2) UN with active support of US and other friendly powers has succeeded in forestalling Israel unilateral action for two and one-half years. US has always made clear it opposed such action on basis it was violation of Armistice Agreement and our view that Jordan which is international river should be developed on basis of an international agreement. Should Israel be able to satisfy Burns at any time that resumption work would be done under conditions conforming with General Armistice Agreement new situation would be created. During past two and one-half years Arab states have had under study plans for equitable division and development of waters of Jordan, Yarmuk valleys. "Jordan Valley Plan" is result of friendly negotiations with all of states concerned and with active participation of Egypt which has lent highly valued technical and general advice. It is our belief "Jordan Valley Plan" now represents best possible reconciliation of conflicting views and best assurance protection of Arabs interests. We have noted with gratification Arab League technical committee has found that the Plan represents a satisfactory solution. 3) "Jordan Valley Plan" is project for economic development which stands on its own merits and need carry no political overtones. In course of negotiations it has been made clear nothing in Plan would be construed as political agreement between Arab states and Israel or be used to prejudice eventual Arab-Israel general settlement. US strongly urges that early Arab acceptance of Plan be forthcoming so that peaceful economic development of Jordan and Yarmuk valleys, so sorely needed by all states concerned, can commence.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2356. Secret. Drafted by Bergus, cleared in substance with Ludlow, and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Also transmitted to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Tel Aviv. Repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, and Jerusalem and pouched to Baghdad and Jidda.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Document 73.

You should not mention Johnston's letter to Nasser but may say Johnston before leaving for Far East recently expressed willingness meet with Arab Foreign Ministers at any time and place they choose if it should appear meeting would be productive.

Cairo Amman Damascus and Beirut should convey sense foregoing to Govts at earliest opportunity and in manner calculated demonstrate importance USG attaches this matter. Démarches should be carried out as quietly as possible. Tel Aviv should advise Israelis that consultations with Arab states are continuing in Washington, in Arab capitals and through Johnston. Views expressed in para 1 above should be made known to Israelis. Your British and French colleagues should be receiving timely instructions to make similar approaches in support of yours. You should consult with them in advance. Jerusalem inform Burns. [4]

Dulles

[4] Cole reported from Jerusalem, in telegram 363, February 28, that he had conveyed the contents of telegram 2000 to Burns, who was appreciative of the U.S. effort to make its position clear to the governments concerned. (Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/2–2856)

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121. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, February 23, 1956—midnight.

1665. This is message number 1 referred to in Embtel 1664. [2]
Verbatim text.

I spoke to Nasser about the aides-mémoire [3] today. He said that

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/2–2356. Confidential; Priority. Received at 10:15 a.m., February 24.

[2] In telegram 1664, February 23, Byroade informed the Department that he was sending the verbatim text of four messages concerning the Aswan High Dam negotiations that he had received from Trevelyan. Trevelyan was sending these messages to the British Foreign Office. Byroade noted that he was in general agreement with Trevelyan's comments as transmitted in Document 123. (Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/2–2356)

[3] Reference is to U.S. and U.K. aides-mémoire provided to Egypt on December 16. A copy of the U.S. aide-mémoire was transmitted to the Embassy in Cairo in telegram 1282 (vol. XIV, p. 868). No copy of the U.K. aide-mémoire has been found in Department of State files, but, according to telegram 1282 to Cairo, it was similar to

(Continued)

their only concern was with questions of form and arranged for me to go on and see Vice President [4] who gave me detailed comments in presence of Minister Production. [5]

2. The Vice President detailed comments amounted to proposal of following alternatives:

(a) That HMG and USG should write brief letters to Egyptian Government in which they would propose make grants-in-aid for High Dam of amounts specified in aides-mémoire without mentioning any request from Egyptian Government for grants. Grants should be specified as initial grants without any reference to promises of subsequent grants or to division of work into two stages. (See paragraph 4 below) The Egyptian Government would reply to letters. He did not absolutely rule out form of aides mémoire but preferred letters.

(b) That two governments should write to bank proposing make grants-in-aid to bank to be spent on project in accordance with bank's conditions and that bank should deal with these grants in same way as money to be lent by bank. Two governments would then write letters to Egyptian Government saying they had decided give these grants and would put them directly into bank to be spent by bank under arrangements between bank and Egyptian Government.

3. Vice President explained there were three main conditions laid down by bank:

(a) The legal point i.e. [*re?*] division of waters. They had definitely decided they would neither start any of work except preparation of site nor require any amount from grants in aid until agreement had been reached with Sudan Government. He was most anxious reach this agreement as early as possible in way which would help maintain good relations between Egyptian and Sudanese governments.

(b) The availability of foreign exchange. Division of project into two stages had been given up for purpose of agreement with bank. The grants should not therefore be specifically allocated to first stage which need not be mentioned. So far as subsequent grants were concerned bank was safeguarded by provision that they would not lend any money unless foreign exchange was available;

(c) Nature of Egyptian economic policy. The two governments would be safeguarded on this matter through bank.

4. He went through aides-mémoire and made his detailed comments subject to the general considerations set out above. These would be the basis of the letter proposed in paragraph 2 (a) above. I

(Continued)
the U.S. version. In telegram 1729, December 31, the Department transmitted to the Embassy in Cairo textual revisions that the U.S. and U.K. Governments and the IBRD had agreed on.

[4] Wing Commander Gamal Salem.

[5] Wing Commander Hasan Ibrahim.

made no comment. My following telegram contains Vice President's detailed comments. [6] *End verbatim text.*

Byroade

[6] *Infra.*

122. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, February 23, 1956—midnight.

1666. This is message no. 2 referred to in Embtel 1664. [2] *Begin verbatim text.*

Following are Vice President's comments on British aide-mémoire subject to his considerations recorded in my telegram under reference.

(a) Preamble. Omission of the description.

(b) Preamble. Omission of portion relating to division of project into stages (see paragraph 3 (b) of my telegram under reference). [3]

(c) Preamble. Omission of reference to request of Government of Egypt.

(d) Preamble. Omission of sentence beginning "The bank, the Government of the UK and the U.S. Govt have conferred." He thought this unnecessary since documents were now to be given simultaneously by the two governments and the bank.

(e) Paragraph 1. The description of grant as an "initial grant" without reference to stages.

(f) Paragraph 1. Omission of all reference to sterling balance releases as not relevant.

(g) Paragraph 2. Omission of reference to subsequent grant in view of the description of the 5.5 million pounds as an initial grant.

(h) Paragraph 2. Reference to Nile waters rights to be changed to wording in the bank letter i.e. "satisfactory solution of the legal problems affecting the High Dam project."

(i) Paragraph 2. Specific statement that the good offices of HMG should be used in helping the Government of Egypt to solve all the legal points covering the construction of the dam.

(j) Paragraph 2 (a). U.S. grant to be described as "initial grant" omitting mention of first stage.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/2–2356. Confidential; Priority. Received at 9:17 a.m., February 24.

[2] See footnote 2, *supra*.

[3] Telegram 1665, *supra*.

(k) Paragraph 2 (a). Omit the whole of the remainder of this clause.

(l) Paragraph 2 (b). First sentence to be reworded as in the bank letter.

(m) Paragraph 2 (b). Second sentence not necessary since this is covered by the previous sentence.

(n) Paragraph 2 (b). Surely a provision about publicity would not be necessary. The promises of grants were already well publicized.

(o) Paragraph 2 (b). Information should be given by the Government of Egypt to bank since they are to spend the funds and the governments can obtain it from the bank.

(p) Paragraph 2 (c). Wording to be assimilated to the bank's letter.

(q) Paragraph 2 (d). Wording to be assimilated to the bank's letter.

(r) Paragraph 2 (e). Omit reference to "project described in (a) above" and assimilate to wording of the bank's letter concerning international competition.

2. I am checking these comments with Vice President and will let you know any amendments. My comments are in my following telegram. [4] *End verbatim text.*

Byroade

[4] *Infra.*

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123. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, February 23, 1956—midnight.

1667. This is message no. 3 referred to Embtel 1664. [2] *Begin verbatim text.*

The most probable explanation of the Egyptian attitude to the aides-mémoire is as follows. They do not want to appear to be begging the British and American Governments for money. They may regard the use of the phrase "initial grant" and omission of the mention of subsequent grants as being a rather firmer commitment

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/2–2356. Confidential; Priority. Received at 7:57 a.m., February 24.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 121.

than the wording of paragraph 2 of the aide-mémoire.[3] In any case they would not like a document containing promise to consider future aid "in the light of conditions then existing et cetera" which might be interpreted as a condition of good political and economic behavior. They would wish as far as possible to subscribe only to conditions required by the bank and not to repeat their undertakings to the two governments. They would not wish to appear that project was being fathered by the two governments and therefore not entirely their own.

2. I think that considerations such as the above which are understandable enough in the present atmosphere here are sufficient to account for the Egyptian Government's proposals. Paragraph 2 of the aides-mémoire provided that the further support should be given by the British and American Governments in cooperation with the Government of Egypt, the Bank and other member governments of the bank. This would probably not have prevented the possibility of grants-in-aid from the Communist Governments, but its omission would undoubtedly make it easier for the Egyptian Government to accept such grants in aid for the high dam should Communist governments offer them for political reasons. I cannot entirely exclude the possibility that something of this sort is in mind.

3. I recommend that we should accept one of the alternatives proposed by the Egyptian Government subject to suitable wording preferably the first IEA grant to the Egyptian Government. I believe however that we should not do so until we have examined carefully with bank the methods which can be adopted to prevent Communist participation in high dam either by tied grants or by lower tenders for contracts to be financed from Egyptian funds. The briefer exchange of letters without reference to the stages will perhaps make it possible for the bank to ensure that no portion of the work is exclusively financed by funds not provided by the bank or approved governments and to exclude Communist tenders but I am not clear on this point. Mister Black has no doubt been giving thought to this question since I raised it with him. I do not think that we shall get anything better by direct negotiations between governments on this question than an oral understanding the value of which may not survive the whole period of the dam's construction and I believe that the responsibility for excluding the Communists must rest with the bank. I think that they may have a better chance of working out something with the Egyptian Government, if necessary, which will safeguard our requirements on this.

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[3] Presumably paragraph 2 was the same as paragraph 2 of the U.S. aide-mémoire; see telegram 1282, vol. XIV, p. 868.

4. My following telegram [4] contains a draft of an exchange of letters based generally on the Vice President's detailed comments on the aides-mémoire. *End verbatim text.*

Byroade

[4] *Infra.*

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124. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, February 24, 1956—midnight.

1668. This is message number 4 referred to in Embassy telegram 1664. [2] *Begin verbatim text.*

Following is draft of proposed letter to the Egyptian Government.

Begins.

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have followed with special interest the High Dam (Saad El Aali) project and have studied the surveys and reports respecting this project made by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter called the Bank). The Government of the United Kingdom agree with the Government of Egypt that the project holds great promise for the future of the Egyptian people and desire to cooperate in bringing it into realization.

The Government of the United Kingdom will accordingly, subject to the approval of Parliament, provide 5.5 million pounds as an initial grant towards the financing of the foreign exchange costs of the project on the conditions hereinafter set forth.

These proposals by the Government of the United Kingdom are made on the understanding that—

(a) The United States Government will provide $54.6 million as an initial grant towards the foreign exchange costs of the project.

(b) The Government of Egypt will join the Government of the United Kingdom and the United States Government in requesting the Bank to act as the channel through which funds provided by the

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/2–2456. Confidential; Priority. Received at 11:20 a.m.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 121.

latter two governments are to be disbursed. The grant shall be subject to the terms of the letters exchanged between the President of the International Bank and the Egyptian Government signed this day and shall be disbursed in accordance with the terms of an agreement to be entered into between the Egyptian Government and the Bank satisfactory to the two governments.

(c) The Bank will lend the Government of Egypt an amount in various currencies equivalent to $200 million when required for the financing of the High Dam project subject to the terms of the exchange of letters between the President of the International Bank and the Egyptian Government.

(d) There shall be a prior satisfactory solution of the legal problems affecting the project and the Government of the United Kingdom will lend their good offices in helping to solve these problems.

(e) They will be subject to review by the Government of the United Kingdom in the event of circumstances arising which represent a case of force majeure. *End verbatim text.*

Byroade

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125. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, February 24, 1956—7 p.m.

784. Prime Minister-Foreign Minister Ghazzi asked me to see him 5 p.m., February 24. He opened conversation referring to "official assurances" I had given President Quwwatli based on Ben Gurion statement to *New York Times* [2] (Embtels 759 [3] and 763 [4]) and said reports from Tel Aviv had now cast doubt on validity that statement. I pointed out I had given no official assurances but had

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2456. Confidential; Niact. Received at 3:50 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, London, Ankara, Jidda, and Paris.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 98.

[3] In telegram 759, February 17, Moose reported that he had called on Syrian President Quwwatli on February 16 to express his hope that Quwwatli could calm the atmosphere after the Banat Yacov hostilities. Moose informed Quwwatli that the Israelis had decided to defer work at Banat Yacov and that the U.S. position as set forth in the February 7 aide-mémoire (see Document 73) should be a source of assurance to the Government of Syria. (Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/2–1756)

[4] In telegram 763, February 18, Moose reported that Prime Minister Ghazzi agreed that the situation had improved as a result of the U.S. and U.K. positions and Ben Gurion's statement regarding the situation at Banat Yacov. (*Ibid.*, 684A.85322/2–1856)

merely cited press article. I noted, however, that Embassy had reports of Israeli reaction to statement all based on assumption it authentic. Ghazzi said Syrians now had word Ben Gurion had modified his statement and asked whether I could secure official confirmation that original statement is still valid. I replied I had reported Syrian interest in such confirmation as had British Ambassador (Embtel 768 [5]), but had had no answer. Ghazzi then referred to report he had that Embassy Counselor Hart in Cairo had characterized as ill-omened Israeli disregard for US advice to show restraint. Ghazzi said it was very important that GOS know whether original Ben Gurion statement still stands and asked me to request reassurances through my government. I agreed to do so.

British Ambassador was to call on Ghazzi after my visit, also at Ghazzi's request.

Comment: It is clear Syrians anxious for US/UK assurance that Israel does not intend resume work immediately on diversion project. Anything along this line which Department can authorize me to say will be helpful. [6]

Moose

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[5] In telegram 768, February 20, Moose reported on a conversation between Gardner, the British Ambassador, and Quwwatli on February 18. Quwwatli noted that it would be easier to calm the Syrian public if Syria received official assurances from the United States and the United Kingdom confirming Ben Gurion's statement that Israel was delaying work at Jisr Banat Yacub. (*Ibid.*, 684A.85322/2–2056)

[6] See Document 145.

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126. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, February 24, 1956—6 p.m.

3580. Embassy today conveyed to Foreign Office substance instructions repeated in Deptel 4766 [2] as well as text Ambassador Johnston's letter to Nasser (Deptel 4765 [3]). Foreign Office considers instructions admirable and expects send instructions along similar

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2456. Secret. Received at 5:10 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Paris, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Jidda, and Ankara.

[2] Printed as telegram 2000, Document 120.

[3] Printed as telegram 1999, Document 119.

lines to U.K. Embassies Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus and Tel Aviv tonight. Embassies will be told consult U.S. and French colleagues.

Embassy presumes Department has learned from British Embassy, Washington of reports (1) from British Embassy Cairo that Nasser advises against Johnston's visiting area at this time on grounds it would give opportunity to those who wish sabotage Johnston plan, (confirming Fawzi's remarks reported Cairo's 1559 [4]) and (2) from British Embassy Amman that Jordan Prime Minister told British Ambassador HKJ intends inform Syria, Lebanon and Egypt of Jordan's desire raise at Arab League Council meeting scheduled mid March question of answer to be given Ambassador Johnston. Jordan Prime Minister pointed out to Duke he hoped this would demonstrate good faith of HKJ and strengthen hands of Western powers in restraining Israelis from "causing further incidents" or recommencing work on Banat Yakub.

Aldrich

[4] Document 92.

127. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, February 24, 1956—7 p.m.

1683. As indicated Embtel 1664 [2] I agree in general with Trevelyan's views set forth in Embtel 1667. [3] Proposed substitute (Embtel 1668) [4] for aides-mémoire would appear meet requirements for publicity and omission of definition of first phase would seem to be warranted by decision not start project until after Nile waters settlement. In some ways simplification of approach seems to us good. Department will of course have to give fuller consideration possible pitfalls than can be adequately done here. I question however Trevelyan's feeling that new draft alters in practical manner basic problem of Soviet participation which it seems to us existed

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/2–2456. Confidential; Priority. Received at 8:44 p.m.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 121.

[3] Document 123.

[4] Document 124.

even under previous drafts. Doubtful that omission first phase will enable Bank to resist effectively expenditure Egyptian funds on separate parts of project (e.g. generators) and therefore possibility expenditures such funds in Soviet Bloc. Nor would proposed substitute prevent Soviet grant aid from meeting Bank condition regarding availability additional foreign exchange when required. It is even questionable in our opinion whether Soviet aid in form of loan repayable in cotton is precluded for GOE might argue repayment such loan in cotton which could not be disposed of otherwise would not impair GOE capacity to service Bank loan. I have even greater doubts regarding willingness Bank to assume responsibility of excluding Soviet participation.

If Nasser were able to obtain firm commitment from U.S., U.K. and Bank which would assure financing High Dam regardless political developments I have no doubt but that he readily agree exclusion Soviet participation but in absence such commitment think this unlikely. Nasser has consistently sought to avoid any possibility of getting GOE into position where in order obtain continued financing from West GOE might become subject to political pressures. So long as we unable to give firm commitment regarding financing project it seems to us not likely possibility of Soviet participation can be altogether precluded.

There is growing feeling here that U.S. about to supply arms for Israel. Unfortunately emotions on that issue cannot be separated from any of our other dealings with GOE and we are in bad negotiating period. Nevertheless would hope committee in Washington would review new developments coming out of Trevelyan's discussions and advise as soon as possible. [5]

Byroade

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[5] The Department informed Byroade that a staff working group was studying Vice President Salem's comments concerning the aides-mémoire as well as Trevelyan's draft letter. (Telegram 2076 to Cairo, March 1; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614.2–2456)

128. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, February 24, 1956—4 p.m.

360. Burns called at ConGen February 24 and showed me (together with British Consul General) copy telegram which he sent to UN SYG following his conversation with Sharett previous day (Contel 358 paragraph 2 [2]). Telegram states that main obstacle raised by Sharett to implementation UN SYG proposals of November 3 [3] respecting El Auja D/Z was his effort to inject as condition thesis that Egypt should implement article 8, paragraph 3 GAA. As result this most recent meeting Burns concludes that Israel will continue obstruct and delay executing proposals which she had already accepted unconditionally.

Telegram states that question provision GAA just mentioned was revived by Israelis at this time by means lodging complaint with EIMAC about which he is reporting separately. Sharett maintained that investigation this complaint should take place prior to implementation UN SYG proposals. Sharett alluded to possibility implementing at the same time as proposals article 8 paragraph 3 GAA and apparently article 7 paragraph 3 [4] as well. Sharett observed that, since Israel's "unconditional acceptance" proposals, situation had been altered by concentration Egyptian forces in area and by press announcements to effect these forces now equipped with Czech arms.

According telegram Burns called Sharett's attention to circumstance that while he invoking security of Israel as justification for not proceeding implement UN SYG proposals, Egypt similarly pleading security reasons as obliging them ignore provisions article 8, paragraph 3 GAA. Further, Egyptians hold that Israeli military occupation D/Z would continue in any case by reason retention there so-called Kibbutz and police force. Burns continued by observation to Sharett to effect he was not able contradict Egyptian contentions since Israelis do not allow UN observers to move freely

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–2456. Confidential. Received at 1:29 p.m., February 25. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/2–2356)

[3] For Hammarskjöld's proposals, see telegrams 395 and 398, vol. XIV, pages 690 and 702.

[4] Article 7 (3) of the Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement (U.N. doc. S/1264/—Corr. 1 and Add. 1) stated, in essence, that, in the area defined as the western front under Egyptian control, Egypt could maintain "defensive forces only", and that the Egyptians had to withdraw all other forces to the east of this front.

in area of D/Z nor in zone provided by article 7, paragraph 4 [5] of GAA.

Burns telegram then informs UN SYG that while Egyptian restrictions similarly preclude freedom movement observers in area defined by article 8 paragraph 3 he is asking GOE for such freedom in order permit implementation UN SYG first and second proposals, relative marking boundary and removal any Egyptian forces encroaching on D/Z. Burns closed conversation by leaving with Sharett detailed aide-mémoire reviewing history efforts obtain acceptance proposals. Sharett agreed study with view meeting with Burns again early next week.

Will telegraph Burns comments respecting above in next message.

Cole

[5] Article 7 (4) of the Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement declared that, in the area defined as the western front under Israeli control, Israel could maintain "defensive forces only" which were to be based on the settlements, and that all other Israeli forces had to be withdrawn from this area.

129. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, February 25, 1956—10 a.m.

361. Paraphrase of Burns telegram to UN SYG regarding his conversation with Sharett February 23 transmitted by Contel 360 [2] to Department. Burns also made following comments on matter while at ConGen February 24.

While Eytan's letter of January 4 [3] "confirmed" acceptance UN SYG proposals for El Auja, Israelis have continued "stalling tactics" ever since with regard implementation. . . . In any event, Eytan's letter of February 21 (Contel 358 [4]) in addition stating that Egyptians have not yet implemented proposals further stipulates that as precondition GOI action GOE must also implement article 8 paragraph

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–2556. Confidential. Received at 1:26 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] See footnote 2, Document 25.

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–2356)

3 GAA. Thus condition attached to "unconditional acceptance" at last emerges clearly. Burns told Sharett that some time ago Gohar had stated GOE would implement article GAA just cited if Israelis would remove "police" from D/Z.

Burns said Sharett appeared to have little enthusiasm for subject under discussion, and described him as somewhat evasive. Sharett had observed at one point that "he only came into this business in the later stages," indicating possibly that he shouldn't be blamed for mess made by Eytan. Latter "conspicuously absent" from Burns–Sharett meetings. For a time Sharett endeavored maintain argument that one could draw definite distinction between "unconditional acceptance" and "implementation." He thereafter dropped that theme in favor of thesis that new situation has now arisen because Egyptians have augmented their forces and equipped them with Czech weapons. Burns maintained that such considerations should not invalidate acceptance UN SYG proposals but gained impression Sharett doing his best enmesh them in broader context of provisions GAA. Burns recalled that UN SYG had especially wished make progress through obtaining acceptance proposals for El Auja before tackling problems involving wider considerations of Israeli-Egyptian relations. For that reason Burns has refrained from endeavoring see Ben Gurion in order suggest, for instance, possible obtainment "cease fire" Gaza area from Nasser on basis Israeli agreement draw back motor patrols from D/L (Contel 338 [5]). He had feared chances implementing El Auja proposals would be lost amid discussion other outstanding issues.

Burns said that his February 23 conversation with Sharett was limited to above matters and did not include problems with Syrians nor reports Syrians shooting at Israeli fishermen Tiberias February 23. [6] Burns added observers now investigating Israeli complaint, while Syrian MAC delegate [7] has informed chairman [8] orders against firing across D/L will be "reinforced" if allegations verified.

Cole

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[5] General Burns informed Cole on February 6 that the Gaza Strip situation remained unchanged. "He will suggest that Israel's desire for cease-fire be connected with the question of keeping patrols 500 meters from frontier; he will urge that if Nasser issues cease-fire Ben Gurion concurrently accept 500 yard 'buffer zone' to which Nasser has already agreed." (*Ibid.*, 684A.85322/2–656)

[6] The Embassy in Tel Aviv in telegram 841, February 24, informed the Department that, according to Israeli sources, Israeli fishermen had come under Syrian rifle fire on three occasions on February 21, 22, and 23. (*Ibid.*, 683.84A/2–2456)

[7] Lieutenant Colonel Bakri Kottrash.

[8] Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Castonguay of the French Army.

130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the Representative at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [1]

Washington, February 25, 1956—2:24 p.m.

3112. Embtel 3810, February 23. [2] Problem of Mysteres is obviously one which involves considerably more than mere interruption of OSP Contract. It concerns basic question of arms sales to Israel. If French Government in fact desires to sell these planes, French Ambassador here could ask for meeting of Ambassadorial Committee or simply place matter before NEACC at any time. US Government has no basis for taking initiative in matter.

Foregoing has been brought to attention of French Ambassador February 24. [3] He said his Government wanted to clear OSP angle before asking for meeting of Ambassadors. He was reminded of assurances we had given that OSP angle would present no problem. He said he would ask his Government for instructions whether to ask for quadripartite meeting but was certain his Minister would want to know what position other Governments took on basic question of sales to Israel. He was informed that while normal shipments of spare parts are being cleared through NEACC, US Government has taken no decision re major Israeli request. This did not mean that we were advising other Governments to decide question one way or other.

We believe Couve recognizes now that he must take initiative here if French Government wishes subject to be considered on policy grounds.

McGuire, deputy to Assistant Secretary of Defense Gray, informed Department February 25 he would ask Gray, now in Paris, to inform DEFREPAMA Haskell of US position. French authorities should make written application to Haskell if they wish to alter OSP contract. [4]

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/2–2356. Secret. Drafted and approved by Allen who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Tel Aviv and pouched to London.

[2] Document 117.

[3] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[4] The Embassy in Paris informed the Department on February 28 that these instructions were "discussed with Haskell who concurs in Embassy view that French request for alteration OSP contract should be made to contracting officer through normal procurement channels." (Telegram 3906 from Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/2–2856)

131. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, February 27, 1956—noon.

792. After consulting with UK and French colleagues, [2] who had no instructions but who expect them on basis reports they have had from Washington, I saw Prime Minister Foreign Minister Ghazzi February 25, gave him orally substance appropriate parts Deptel 638 [3] and left aide-mémoire. Ghazzi stated this was matter requiring consideration and he would let me know Syrian reaction later. [4]

In course conversation, Ghazzi expressed satisfaction with Secretary's February 24 statement before Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. [5]

Moose

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2756. Secret. Received at 8:02 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Jidda, Ankara, and Jerusalem.

[2] Sir John Gardner and Achille Marie Clarac, respectively.

[3] Printed as telegram 2000, Document 120.

[4] Ambassador Gallman, in telegram 874 from Baghdad, February 28, informed the Department that Ghazzi had told the Iraqi Minister at Damascus that the United States "had seized upon rumors of war in area to press for implementation Johnston Plan. He had, however, told US Ambassador Syrian Government not prepared accept Johnston Plan." (Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/2–2856)

[5] On February 24, Dulles testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. For text of the Secretary's prepared statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 5, 1956, p. 368.

132. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Ben Gurion [1]

Washington, February 27, 1956.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I wish to acknowledge with appreciation your letter of February 14, 1956. [2] My Secretary of State and I have had the benefit of a careful and detailed report by Mr. Anderson of his conversations, and we have discussed with him the steps which might next be taken in pursuit of the peaceful settlement of which you have written so earnestly.

Mr. Anderson's exploratory conversations in the Near East have not advanced as far toward a resolution of the issues confronting us as I had hoped, but a foundation has been laid on which we may hope to build. Meanwhile, the need for a solution has become even more pressing. It is my deepest wish that the United States make whatever contribution it can in this profoundly disturbing situation. With this desire in mind, Mr. Anderson plans to return to the Near East for further discussions within the next few days.

I have taken full and sympathetic note of your statement of Israel's need for arms. Your request is being given the most careful consideration in light of the need both to ensure Israel's security and to create a situation which will be most conducive to peace in the area.

Permit me to renew my warmest good wishes and heartfelt thanks for your friendly cooperation.

With assurances of my deep personal regard,

Sincerely yours, [3]

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. According to Dulles' memorandum of conversation with the President at the White House on February 27 at 4 p.m., the Secretary raised the subject of "Anderson's early return to the Near East and the desirability of his carrying with him new letters to Nasser [*infra*] and Ben Gurion, drafts of which I submitted. The President went over these drafts and approved them and arranged to have them typed up on his stationery while I was present. He then signed the letters and delivered them to me." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

[2] Attachment to Document 103.

[3] The source text is not signed.

133. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Nasser [1]

Washington, February 27, 1956.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I wish to express appreciation for your letter of February sixth [2] and for the time and attention which you have generously given Mr. Anderson on his recent trip. My Secretary of State and I have had the benefit of a careful and detailed report by Mr. Anderson of your conversations, and we have discussed with him the steps which might be taken in pursuit of a peaceful settlement.

Since I last wrote to you, I have grown increasingly concerned over the tensions that have arisen in the Near East. Until the underlying issues which cause them are resolved, the risk of an outbreak of hostilities is constantly with us.

I believe that the present time may offer the best opportunity to work out a settlement which will make it possible for the United States to give increasing assistance in achieving the aspirations of the Arab peoples. I know from your statement of the desirability to eliminate the tensions between the Arab states and Israel that you will want to continue your fruitful conversations. With this in mind, Mr. Anderson is returning to the Near East within a few days.

I have followed with interest the reports of the negotiations on the construction of a High Dam at Aswan and have been pleased to note the progress which has been made. The High Dam represents in finest form the policy of peaceful development for your people of which you wrote. Please permit me to renew my warmest good wishes. Through Mr. Anderson and others with whom you have been good enough to discuss fully and frankly their important problems, I feel that I am becoming better acquainted with you.

Sincerely, [3]

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Regarding the drafting of this letter, see footnote 1, *supra*.

[2] See Document 75. The signed original of Nasser's letter to Eisenhower was transmitted to the White House on February 25 as an attachment to a memorandum of that date from Barnes to Goodpaster. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

[3] The source text is not signed.

134. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State [1]

Beirut, February 27, 1956—7 p.m.

992. Conveyed substance Department telegram 1392 [2] to President Chamoun and Director General Foreign Office in absence Foreign Minister who now in Saudi Arabia.

President expressed appreciation stated Egypt was key to reopening consideration Jordan Valley plan. If Egypt convinced plan should be accepted Syria who represents principal opposition might be won over. Only Egypt can influence Syria. President believed Egypt did not want to be forced into war but if Syria attacked Israel over diversion issue Egypt would come to Syria's assistance. Jordan, Saudi Arabia would probably follow. Lebanon would not attack anybody but would fight in self-defense.

President said Secretary's February 18 [3] and February 24 [4] statements "good" and he recognized US endeavoring prevent hostilities. However, he had received report Israel had taken decision divert waters ignoring US advice. President also mentioned report Israelis had assembled one division troops on line Acre–Safad.

Director General Ammoun listened carefully took copious notes, asked what action US would take in case violations international agreements referred to occurred. I replied it impossible state in advance what actions might be taken in varying circumstances, quoted again statement US would view seriously any action by Israel or Arab States which might provoke hostilities. Likewise stated I could not predict future developments when Ammoun asked what would happen if Jordan Valley plan not accepted. I emphasized however, that US has withheld arms from Israel and has consistently advised Israel against unilateral action; Secretary's recent statements showed US desire contribute peace and stability in area (Circular 584 [5]). Acceptance Jordan Valley plan would be constructive act by

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2756. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:05 a.m., February 28. Repeated priority to Cairo, Amman, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Ankara, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Jidda, and Damascus.

[2] Printed as telegram 2000, Document 120.

[3] On February 18, the Department announced the decision to suspend the arms embargo to the Near East. For text of the statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 27, 1956, p. 325. See also footnote 5, Document 106.

[4] See footnote 5, Document 131.

[5] On February 24, the Department of State, in circular telegram 584, informed the Embassies in Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Amman, Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris that the U.S. Information Agency was transmitting through its channels the details of Dulles' public appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 24. The Embassies could make available to the respective Foreign Offices a (Continued)

Arab States which would contribute much to preservation peace in area and would contrast with previous negative Arab attitude toward various proposals.

Ammoun made no comment on GOL attitude Jordan Valley plan except to express doubt project had in fact been satisfactory technically to Arab States. He took note Ambassador Johnston's willingness meet Arab Foreign Ministers if such meeting should appear productive.

Spoke to my British and French colleagues before call on Foreign Office. British Chargé will see Ammoun tomorrow; French instructions specify only their Ambassador Cairo to make representations. French Embassy is querying Paris. [6]

Emmerson

(Continued)
statement that assured them that the Secretary's statements of February 18 and 24 on U.S. arms shipments to the Middle East represented a continuing desire on the part of the United States to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the area and to the lessening of current tensions through progress toward a settlement. (Department of State, Central Files, 511.00/2–2456)

[6] On February 28, Heath, in telegram 995 from Beirut, informed the Department that the French Ambassador had received instructions to make similar representations to Chamoun and to the Lebanese Foreign Office. (*Ibid.*, 684A.85322/2–2856)

135. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, February 27, 1956—midnight.

1697. Saw Nasser today in compliance with instructions contained Deptel 1999 and 2000. [2] Nasser read carefully letter from Johnston after which I presented orally substance Deptel 2000.

Nasser said his views as to desirability of Jordan Valley plan had not changed. He in quandary however as to how early action could be managed in view of situation in other Arab states. None of the Arab states of course would want to give impression that they had been aroused to action because of open threats from Israel. He

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.5322/2–2756. Secret. Received at 7:13 a.m., February 28. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Baghdad, Jerusalem, and Jidda.

[2] Documents 119 and 120.

felt therefore he could do nothing until March 1 date had been safely (he hoped) passed.

I stated we in need his personal help on this matter. Did not know of course plans of Israel but he must realize their continued delay on this project was not unconnected with United States pressures upon Israel. If Israel again delayed project at our insistence, hoped he would use all his influence with other Arab states for forward move on their part in March. There was scheduled meeting of Arab League about middle of March. Could not Arab states, with his help, take action at that time? He said he would do what he could but it would be mistake for Egypt to inject matter into such a meeting without prior agreement that it would be on agenda so that delegations would be prepared. If matter raised now for agenda purposes it would become public knowledge amid charges Arab states being forced into JVP by Israeli threats.

He finally said he could not make up his mind until talking to Quwwatli here early next week.[3] Situation in Syria he said was most confused and he did not know what, if any, commitments might have been made within Syrian domestic politics on this question.

Nasser was friendly and gave every appearance of desiring to be helpful. He spoke warmly of Johnston but repeated that under present conditions trip by him to the area just now would be very unwise and risk, he felt, setting matter back because of publicity that would be involved.

Trevelyan seeing Fawzi this afternoon. We are suggesting that he raise possibility that GOE might be prepared have Hasouna take initiative to get matter discussed in coming League meeting.

Byroade

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[3] Nasser was referring to the impending arrival in Cairo of President Shukri al-Quwwatli of Syria and King Saud of Saudi Arabia for a series of meetings.

136. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, February 27, 1956—4 p.m.

848. In accordance last paragraph Deptel 594,[2] I consulted with British and French Embassies. French Ambassador has received no instructions and recently informed his Foreign Ministry that he would prefer not to approach Israelis about any matter until subject sale of Mysteres had been cleared up. British Embassy reports it has received copy of telegram from London to British Embassy Washington suggesting that démarche to Israelis be strengthened by strong admonition against resumption work in demilitarized zone at this time and by taking position that General Bennike's order is still in effect.

In view of foregoing, I would appreciate Department's instructions as to whether to proceed with GOI as set forth Deptel 594 or to await new instructions. [3]

Lawson

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2756. Secret. Received at 8:19 a.m., February 28. Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Printed as telegram 2000, Document 120.

[3] The Department of State, in telegram 617, March 2, instructed Lawson to proceed as follows:

"French Embassy here advises Gilbert has been told he may defer démarche view his recent approach to Israelis on Jordan River matter. British Embassy states firm instructions have now gone to Nicholls. Accordingly you should proceed with GOI as set forth Deptel 594." (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2756)

137. Special National Intelligence Estimate [1]

SNIE 30–56 *Washington, February 28, 1956.*

CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

The Problem

To estimate which are the most dangerous aspects of the Arab-Israeli situation over the next year, and at what periods they are likely to be most critical.

The Estimate

1. We continue to believe that Soviet arms support for the Arabs has substantially increased the chances of Arab-Israeli hostilities, in that (a) Israel may risk or even initiate such hostilities while it still enjoys military superiority over the Arabs, and (b) the Arabs' growing military strength may increase their militancy and the explosive potential of border clashes and stimulate Arab readiness for a "second round." [2]

The Role of the Great Powers

2. *The US.* Any estimate of this situation requires the caveat that both Israeli and Arab courses of action, now and for the foreseeable future, will be influenced to a considerable extent by the policies of the US and other Western powers, or by what the parties to the conflict consider such policies to be. We continue to believe, for example, that if both sides could be convinced that the US was prepared to use any means necessary to penalize aggression, it is almost certain that neither side would deliberately initiate hostilities. However, it would be extremely difficult to convince both parties on this point.

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[1] Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Top Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff." This estimate was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on February 28, 1956. "Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

[2] SNIE 30–3–55, "Probable Consequences of the Egyptian Arms Deal with the Soviet Bloc," 12 October 1955, Top Secret. [Footnote in the source text. For text, see vol. XIV, page 577.]

3. Recent US actions with respect to the shipment of tanks to Saudi Arabia have almost certainly affected Arab and Israeli attitudes. While the Israelis may be disappointed by the fact that the blocking of the Saudi tank shipment did not stick, they almost certainly believe that the episode has made it considerably harder for the US to refuse their own urgent request for arms. They will make the strongest efforts in the next few weeks along these lines. The decision to suspend the shipment almost certainly reinforced the belief of most Arabs that US vulnerability to Zionist pressures is a major consideration in US policy toward the Middle East. The subsequent reversal of this decision has probably not significantly affected this belief, though the Arabs have probably been encouraged by the unblocking of the Saudi arms shipment to believe that the US also remains vulnerable to Arab pressures, largely because of its fear of increased Arab collaboration with the USSR, reinforced by Western need for access to oil-producing and base areas of the Middle East.

4. *Effects of US Arms to Israel.* Virtually any shipment of US arms to Israel would entail adverse effects on the US position in the Arab states. Most US representatives in the area have stressed the danger of such US action, and the possibility that it might lead to a rupture of Arab relations with the US and to greatly increased Arab cooperation with the Bloc. Certainly the first reactions of the Arab leaders in these states would be highly emotional.

5. The majority of the members of the IAC [3] believe that if the US were to make even moderate arms shipments to Israel, there would almost certainly be a strong shift in Arab attitudes away from the West and toward the Bloc. This would be accompanied by further Arab arms purchases from the Bloc, establishment of diplomatic relations with Sino-Soviet Bloc countries by those Arab states that have not already done so, general Arab support for the admission of Communist China to the UN, violence to US governmental and private installations and personnel in the area, and moves to expel the US from the Dhahran Air Field. Any US prospects for acquiring base rights elsewhere in the area would be virtually extinguished. Saudi Arabia and Syria as well as Egypt would almost certainly turn to the Bloc for additional matériel, thus promoting an arms race in which the USSR was identified as the backer of the Arabs and the US as the backer of Israel. The governments of Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq would be under strong pressure to align

[3] The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. [Footnote in the source text.]

themselves with the Egyptian Bloc, and in the case of Iraq, to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact. The presently somewhat dim prospects for achieving a settlement of the Jordan water issue would be virtually eliminated, the progress made so far in the negotiations over the Aswan Dam project would be nullified, and the day when progress could be made toward a peaceful settlement of the basic Arab-Israeli dispute would be almost indefinitely postponed. The adverse repercussions in the Arab states of a US decision to provide arms to Israel would also adversely affect the British position in the area, though these effects would be mitigated if the British disassociated themselves from the US action. [4]

6. The Director of Central Intelligence [5] agrees that most of the results described in the preceding paragraph would be likely to follow from *substantial* US arms shipments to Israel. However, he believes that there is about an even chance that the most serious of the consequences described above could be avoided if US arms aid to Israel were moderate in amount, and accompanied by demonstrations of continuing US concern for Arab interests as well—including a willingness to supply them with arms and economic aid. Nevertheless, the risks to US-Arab relations from even moderate shipments would still be high. Such risks would be slightly reduced if the equipment in question was primarily designed for the role of military defense, e.g., radar, mines, antiaircraft and antitank weapons.

7. [6] Should Israel obtain large-scale arms assistance from any source, the internal pressures for "preventive action" would be reduced, but by no means eliminated. Should the Arabs in turn obtain further large-scale arms from the Bloc or any other source, Israeli apprehensions would once again grow. It is unlikely that the Israelis could be convinced that moderate arms shipments met their essential defensive requirements.

8. *The Soviet Bloc.* The USSR's immediate objectives are probably (a) to improve its own position in the Arab states, at Western expense, and (b) to force the West to accept the USSR as a

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[4] The IAC is in agreement that the Arabs would not react as strongly as estimated above to the sale of arms in moderate amounts to Israel by other non-Communist countries, particularly powers less immediately involved in Middle East affairs such as Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, or Japan. However, the Arabs would suspect any large-scale shipments of being sanctioned if not sponsored by the US and if these suspicions appeared to them to be confirmed they would react almost as strongly as if the US itself had made the shipments. Arab suspicions and reaction would be greatest in the case of shipments by countries closely identified with the US and least strong if shipments were made by such countries as Sweden or Switzerland. [Footnote in the source text.]

[5] In contrast to the majority, identified in the first footnote to paragraph 5. [Footnote in the source text.]

[6] The IAC is in agreement on this paragraph and all subsequent paragraphs in this estimate. [Footnote in the source text.]

participant in Middle East affairs. The USSR probably estimates that Arab-Israeli tension and flare-ups short of war will continue to provide it with substantial opportunities to court the Arab side, either through political support in the UN and elsewhere, or through arms and other material assistance. If the Western Powers should seek to deter or prevent hostilities by declaring their determination to intervene, the USSR would probably charge them with "imperialist" designs on the sovereignty of the states involved, and would also renew demands that the USSR and the UN be included in any efforts to resolve the situation. Should an Arab-Israeli war break out, the USSR is almost certainly prepared to exploit such a development, by extending diplomatic and possibly matériel support to the Arab participants and through efforts to play a leading role in UN peacemaking moves.

Critical Periods

9. The precise time at which the risk of major Arab-Israeli hostilities is likely to be greatest depends upon a number of undeterminable factors. As indicated above, the future actions of the great powers, including the US, will significantly affect the choice and execution of policy by Israel and the Arab states in the developing situation. Moreover, there remains a continuing possibility of tensions developing to the breaking point at any time.

10. However, generalizations can be made on the basis of the developing military situation. At present, Israel is capable of defeating all Arab armed forces which might be deployed against it. We have estimated that it will be at least late 1956 before Egypt's new Soviet ground equipment can effectively be used in unit operations. While at least as long a period probably would be required for full and effective absorption of all reportedly purchased jet fighters and bombers, the Egyptian air force is already capable of mounting air attacks against Israel. In these circumstances, we consider the following periods to be critical with respect to the dangers indicated.

11. *Deliberate Initiation of Hostilities by Israel.* We believe that the Israeli government has not as yet reached a final decision with respect to launching full-scale hostilities. Israel will probably tread softly so long as it has active hope of obtaining Western arms and political support. At the same time, the Israelis almost certainly estimate that after the Arabs have acquired and absorbed Bloc arms, Arab military capabilities will be superior to their own, and that the pressure on certain Arab governments to use these capabilities will become difficult to resist. The Israelis are most immediately concerned about growing Egyptian air strength, which already poses a threat of air attack against Israeli cities.

12. If the Israelis were to lose hope of obtaining Western arms at a time when they still had substantial military superiority, the situation would enter a crucial phase. Israel might then decide on "preventive action," in a desperate effort to destroy Arab military power while there was still time, particularly if Israel had at the same time concluded that its integrity would not be effectively safeguarded by the Western Powers or by UN action. On the basis of military considerations, the temptation to take such action would be greatest during this coming spring and early summer.[7] Thereafter, the likelihood of such Israeli action would decline, since growing Arab military strength would make it an increasingly risky proposition for Israel.

13. *Deliberate Initiation of Hostilities by the Arabs.* Despite rising Arab apprehension of an early Israeli attack, the Nasr regime will probably seek to avoid war with Israel, at least while the Soviet arms are being absorbed. Barring serious Israeli provocations, other Arab states will probably follow the same course. However, important elements of the Egyptian armed forces are likely to be over-optimistic as to the state of their operational readiness, and pressure from this source will be an important element in formulation of Egyptian policy. If at a later stage the Arabs actually gain military superiority, the chances of Arab aggression would markedly increase. Whether or not they would actually launch a "second round" would depend on their assessment of how far the Western Powers would go to preserve the status quo and of how much support they could expect from the USSR in event of hostilities.

14. *Accidental Hostilities.* In the meantime, both Israeli apprehension and Arab confidence will probably develop faster than actual changes in respective military capabilities take place. The border situation will continue to be dangerous, as both sides remain touchy about asserting their rights against real or fancied offenses, and unable or unwilling to halt frequent exchanges of fire. The present deployment of the major elements of the Egyptian army in the Sinai area and of most of the Syrian army in positions near the Israeli border adds to the danger of an accidental outbreak of hostilities. In these conditions, Arab harassments of Israel through terrorist activity, or a resumption of Israeli tactics of planned reprisal will continue to involve risks of full-scale war even though neither side may desire it.

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[7] Footnote in the source text not printed.

Main Potential Trouble Spots

15. Areas or issues where hostilities could erupt without either side desiring them or which could be used by either side as justification for the initiation of hostilities include:

a. *Banat Yacub*. This is a critical spot, in view of Israel's avowed intention to proceed with diversion of the Jordan River in the Israeli-Syrian demilitarized zone if the Arabs fail to accept the Jordan Valley Development Plan. If Israeli resumption of the project were not deterred or quickly halted by UN or Western action, Syria would probably fire on the workmen and provoke Israeli retaliation. Should hostilities develop, Egypt would probably give military support to the Syrians. The Saudis would almost certainly encourage Arab resistance by extensive financial support and Jordan would probably become involved, and possibly Iraq and even Lebanon. While Israel has announced that it would not resume the project on the 1 March deadline, in order to allow further US efforts to secure Arab acceptance of the Jordan Valley scheme, it is not likely indefinitely to delay this project in view of its urgent desire to proceed with water development, its claim that the project is justified by Israeli acceptance of the Johnston Plan, and the question of prestige now involved in this issue.

b. *Lake Tiberias*. Syrian firing on Israeli fishing boats on this lake was the alleged reason for Israel's raid on Syrian forces near Lake Tiberias in December 1955. There have been several such firing incidents since then. Further incidents and reprisals remain probable, particularly in the next month or so during the remainder of the fishing season.

c. *The Gulf of Aqaba*. Premier Ben-Gurion has on various occasions in the past voiced his determination to end the Egyptian blockade of Elath, by military means if necessary. He has not talked publicly in these terms for several months, and there is some evidence that both Egypt and Israel are seeking to avoid trouble on this issue at this time. However, the possibility of Israeli military action remains, either as part of a policy designed to keep up pressure on the Arabs or in order to obtain the long-term advantages of the port of Elath. Israel would seek to justify any military action in this respect by citing as the initial provocation the Egyptian blockade of Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal in violation of UN resolutions.

d. *The El Auja Zone*. Although incidents in this area have largely ceased in recent weeks, continued proximity of Egyptian and Israeli forces there, and the failure of both sides to implement (after accepting) UNTSO proposals to lessen local tensions, make this a potential scene of further border clashes and reprisal raids.

e. *The Gaza Strip*. This area continues to be both the scene of sporadic exchanges of fire, and a source of harassments of Israel by refugee elements, inviting Israeli reprisals.

f. *The Jordanian Border*. The armistice line, which divides many villages from their former wells and fields, has in the past been the scene of many incidents, some serious. Forays across this border have lately been less frequent, but tensions within Jordan, increasing

Saudi and Egyptian activity there, and waning British influence create an inflammatory situation.

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138. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State [1]

Amman, February 28, 1956—5 p.m.

446. Saw Prime Minister Rifai noon today. He referred to previous discussion JVP (Embtel 414 [2]) recalling that alternatives between Jewish pressures which might be considered ultimatum and war that naturally it would have to be latter. He said he had considered matter further and felt it desirable endeavor assist in relieving tension between Israel and Syria and thought JVP might be further considered but certainly not within context of any Israeli pressure. After some circumlocution and rationalization he got to point of saying he was awaiting notice of Arab League meeting to be held about March 19 and had instructed Foreign Ministry that on receipt he should send notes to Egyptians, Lebanese and Syrians, expressing Jordan's desire take advantage of meeting for four country discussion of JVP (Embtel 440 [3]). This Rifai felt was positive step and permitted revival of plan consideration without ceding to Israeli pressures. He expressed himself personally as wishing to avoid hostilities and reconsider plan but not because of Israel.

Rifai said that after discussion at League meeting where results might be either to adopt or reject plan that consideration would be given to inviting Johnston again visit area providing results meeting positive. He had thought of this inasmuch as press reports indicated possibility Johnston return. At this point I said that I had received instructions to again take up with him the JVP (Deptel 437 [4]) and that he had taken the initiative from my hands but I could add that

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2856. Secret; Priority. Received at 3:45 p.m. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Jerusalem, and Jidda.

[2] Document 83.

[3] Mallory informed the Department of State in telegram 440, February 24, that Rifai on February 23 had informed the British Ambassador that, in an effort to avoid an outbreak of hostilities with Israel, he had been thinking of asking Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt if they would be willing to discuss the Jordan Valley Plan with him at the next Arab League meeting scheduled for mid-March. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/2–2456)

[4] Printed as telegram 2000, Document 120.

while Johnston had proceeded to Far East he had expressed willingness to meet with Arab Foreign Ministers at any time. Prime Minister thought that the junctures of time might be fortuitous.

As of last night British Ambassador received instructions approach government on JVP but French Ambassador had not. In view previous talk with Duke (Embtel 440) and Prime Minister's statement this morning I plan inform them developments and suggest wisdom delaying additional approaches in order avoid appearance pressure tactics.

Rifai suggested I inform my Government of his thoughts with end in view that Israel be informed further consideration JVP upcoming. This he felt should delay Israeli action at Banat Yacoub. Should Israelis not wish delay then their intentions must be abundantly clear and warlike.

Mallory

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139. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, February 29, 1956—5 p.m.

861. At social event yesterday evening, Colonel Neeman, Deputy Chief IDF intelligence, made following comments USARMA:

(1) Practically the entire Egyptian Army is now in the Sinai area, most elements being close to Israel's borders.

(2) Much of the same situation prevails in Syria, with Syrian Army in process mobilization.

(3) Israel is taking precaution short of substantial mobilization which is extremely expensive and disruptive to her economy and daily life. Israel has been through this before and was learning how to live with such a situation.

(4) Neeman commented on the extreme vulnerability of the Egyptian forces in Sinai, adding that at time of Nitzana incident the army had urgently advised Ben Gurion that an opportunity existed to destroy the Egyptian Army, requesting permission to attack. Ben Gurion who, he said, had traditional and biblical outlook and morality despite the fact he is not a religious man, refused permission to attack.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2-2956. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:25 a.m., March 1. Repeated to London and Paris. Passed to the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force at 9 a.m., March 1.

(5) In view of vulnerability Egyptian forces, the army is now urging Ben Gurion to allow it to strike and destroy Egyptians before it is too late; that within a very short period of time Egyptians would be in a strong position. The Prime Minister had given no answer to date to this IDF advice. After referring to the increment in Egyptian tank strength, Neeman stated the real danger to Israel was Egyptian Air Force rather than Army. IDF knew Egyptian Air Force could bomb Israel in a matter of three minutes from bases close to Israel's border and that all of the aircraft and fighter strength in the world would not prevent them from bombing. He added that Israel desired interceptor aircraft despite this fact, she was willing to take bombing losses but knew that with interceptor aircraft she could intercept Egyptian aircraft returning from their mission and ultimately wipe out Egyptian Air Force due to pilot rather than plane losses.

In conversation previous evening with Embassy counselor, Colonel Harkabi, Chief IDF intelligence, gave a similar estimate of the concentration of Egyptian and Syrian forces on Israel's borders. In response question as to why IDF believed Egyptians would eventually take initiative in attacking Israel, Harkabi said this conclusion was based largely on intelligence information as to what Nasser was telling his own officers. According Harkabi, Nasser was taking line that destruction Israel was the keystone to establishment Egypt's leadership throughout Arab world, which when accomplished would lead to Egyptian dominance Africa and Islamic world.

Embassy comment: Neeman's comments re exchange between IDF and Ben Gurion at time Nitzana incident is consistent with reports received by Embassy other sources which indicated that IDF regarded situation at that time as a "golden opportunity" but that Ben Gurion did not go along because he and Cabinet had already adopted alternative policy obtaining additional arms to offset Czech arms shipment to Egypt.

While Embassy has no information to indicate that IDF intelligence sources are any better than those of USG as they relate to Nasser's intentions, we believe Harkabi's appraisal is of interest because of propensity GOI to rely on its own intelligence estimates rather than assurance Western Powers re Nasser's pacific intentions. Sources close to Ben Gurion report that his current thought processes this subject run along following line. While willing to give limited credence to Nasser's expressions to Westerners of his good will toward Israel his final decisions when he is militarily strong enough will be strongly conditioned in first instance by General Amer and RCC colleagues; in the second instance by the free officers; and, finally, by pressures from the other Arab States. Ben Gurion reportedly believes that somewhere along the line the pressures will

become so great on Nasser as to force him to take the military initiative against Israel.

Lawson

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140. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, February 29, 1956—9 p.m.

865. Spent over hour with Ben Gurion and Sharett today in conversation on Israel's need for yes or no decision on arms question; Secretary's testimony [2] and what conclusions Israel must draw from it. I have never seen Ben Gurion so emphatic, forceful or so emotionally upset and, on several occasions, so near to tears. Sharett was less dramatic but for first time in my experience was unsmiling throughout interview, displaying attitude of undisguised cold bitterness and foreboding criticisms.

Ben Gurion spoke from his own rough notes and what appeared to be *Her-Trib* [3] report of Secretary's testimony. He was obviously most impatient to begin and dismissed amenities in matter of seconds.

He described Secretary's testimony as "very bitter disappointment" he could accept suggestion that peace should not rest on arms alone if it didn't exclude arms to Israel at time when its neighbors and Saudi Arabia and Iraq were supplied with arms.

He was scathing in rejection to suggestions Israel should rely on UN and tripartite declaration. "None of us would be living" he said, "if Israel had relied on UN in 1948. As for tripartite declaration, Great Britain is signatory but its shipment of offensive arms to Egypt and not to Israel bears no relationship to what I think is spirit of tripartite declaration. Israel does not rely on it nor does it intend to".

He professed great worry over Secretary's suggestion Israel's frontiers could not be guaranteed until they were defined by agreement. In his view modification of frontiers implicit in testimony did not mean Secretary favored Israel moving into Sinai or expanding

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/2–2956. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:24 a.m., March 1. Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] See footnote 5, Document 131.

[3] Presumably reference is to the *International Herald Tribune*.

into Syria or to Jordan River. It was obvious he had in mind just the contrary. Pounding on table for emphasis he said Secretary obviously meant—from Israel's standpoint—change for the worse or diminishment of Israeli territory. This would not happen as long as "we are alive. Our girls and boys will fight to the death". He said Secretary had right to opinions on Israel's requirements but whatever they were Israel was entitled to "yes or no answer. If the answer is to be no, please let it be said now. It was question of life or death. We are in mortal danger. Every week arms are pouring into Egypt. If war is declared there will be one military commander able to move all the forces of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria against Israel. Chances of attack are greater than ever before. I know how Nasser will read the Secretary's statement. If US letting Israel down he would regard it as an invitation to attack". He spoke bitterly of his conviction that in same circumstances which prevailed for Israel, if Belgium were to ask for arms it would not have been answered as Israel was—"Certainly not England nor even West Germany."

Ben Gurion brushed aside my suggestion he was probably having to resist tremendous pressure both within his government, his political party and from the public. He declared only pressures on him were pressures of events. It was obvious, and confirmed later by Herzog who was present, that Ben Gurion meant that really effective pressures are those coming from the very heavy personal and official responsibilities he bears—responsibilities the weight of which he has been feeling with progressive consciousness during the past few weeks. This personal responsibility aspect of this attitude is significant of his dangerous attitude for making quick personal policy decisions in his capacity of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. Although he denied the influence of other pressures it is believed that he is under heavy and continuous pressures from the IDF, the mobilization of Egyptian and Syrian armed forces on Israel's border, the GOI, party members and the opposition.

He stressed requirement which time placing on him. Israel could not rely on UN or tripartite declaration. In such grave circumstances they could only rely on themselves. If Israel were given arms he was sure there would be no attack. Without them Israel would have to reorganize its life. This was their land. Their frontiers were as sacred to them as those of America to the US. They would have to reorganize under the pressure of knowing they had been let down by the US on their request while arms were pouring into Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria.

Ben Gurion said that he would be obliged to tell Knesset very soon what dangers were and what measures were necessary for preservation of Israel. In absence of assistance from US, Israelis must assume enormous burdens and make great sacrifices.

They were not going to rely on Secretary's advice when their very lives were at stake. He said he proposed to tell Selwyn Lloyd the same on his forthcoming visit.[4]

Sharett reviewed his personal experiences in pressing Israel's arms request stating that despite various encouraging indications contained in statements by Secretary and President many months have passed. Delay was undignified both to US and Israel. "For you it is undignified to have to demonstrate inability to make up your mind on this burning issue and there is no dignity for Israel in continuing to beg for arms. However, it is not only undignified but dangerous to feed our people for so many months on false hopes".

Sharett said there was inexplicable inconsistency "in the US advising Israel to rely for its security on international rule of law and establishment of peaceful relations with its neighbors whereas for itself and its favored friends in NATO the essential element had been reliance on armed strength". Sharett referred to Secretary's statement to effect that he did not exclude possibility of delivering arms to Israel at time when such deliveries might contribute to peace. He described this as "far-reaching qualification opening way for indefinite delay in same manner that indefinite delay was inherent in suggestion that frontiers could not be guaranteed until their definition was mutually agreed."

Both Sharett and Ben Gurion repeated again and again that delayed US decision was same as negative one. At least twice Ben Gurion said if no decision on arms request was received, "we will have to make the decision ourselves".

Comment: I believe from emotional restraint which Ben Gurion exercised in conversation which, given its content, might have been very melodramatic had he been staging show, that he is very near decision that will set Israel's foreign policy direction, if not action, for some time.

He—and Sharett—are genuinely astonished at apparent US intention to ignore for time being Israel's arms request and provide no indication of ultimate decision. They are resentful and nursing sense of personal grievance.

Ben Gurion has too great feeling personal destiny and responsibility for Israelis to permit events themselves to shape Israel's future. To this sense of personal responsibility for providing solution to all problems confronting country must be added pressures, which he professes to ignore, but which nevertheless weigh heavily on him such as IDF desires for solution by action; government's public declarations that question of war or peace hinge upon US decision

[4] Lloyd spoke with Ben Gurion and Sharett in Jerusalem on March 13. See Document 202.

on arms, and growing strength of Arab forces on its borders. Taken together I am sure they will impel him to decide soon.

His summons to me is probably a last effort to induce an affirmative reply. If it fails—and I think he is sincere in saying that was [*if?*] answer much longer delayed will be considered here as negative answer, decisions he feels obliged to take will follow very shortly.

Furthermore, I think we would have only very short time in which to meet his request if that were our desire. Indefinite answers by US will not win additional time.

While I am persuaded that he is perhaps nearer to policy decision of the scope now confronting him than at any time since establishment of state, they will not necessarily include determination date which they will be put into motion. Decision could range from request Knesset for legislation increasing degree mobilization, for curtailing civilian consumption, etc. to decision to impose settlement upon Arabs by military action.

If we reject this last-minute appeal for favorable reply on arms or an undertaking in future, I am convinced we may have no further opportunity to influence course of events by diplomatic action aimed at Israel alone.

Lawson

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141. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, March 1, 1956.

The President called me at 10:15 February 29 just prior to the Press Conference in which he announced his willingness to be a candidate for renomination. [2]

The President told me that he was a little worried that perhaps we were being too tough with the Israelis with respect to arms. He had in mind particularly interceptors.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Israeli Relations 1951–1957. Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution; Personal and Private.

[2] For the transcript of the President's press conference, which began at 10:31 a.m. and continued until 10:52 a.m., see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956*, pp. 263–273.

He also mentioned that we might consider sending them a battalion of Nike's "if for nothing else, to see if they would work"!

The President was considering a statement, if he were asked a question, that we were making a really sympathetic study because we understood the position the Israelis were getting into.

I pointed out to the President that Bob Anderson was at present engaged in a most delicate mission between Nasser and Ben Gurion and that any indication of a departure from our present position might seriously jeopardize our ability to bring the two sides together. I further pointed out that you had stated the Administration position as recently as February 24 before an open session of the Foreign Relations Committee.[3] At that time you had said that the UN and the Tripartite Agreement afforded Israel a far greater degree of protection than would a few arms and, above all, we did not want to start an open arms race in the Middle East. If such a race started, you pointed out, Israel could not hope to win because 1,700,000 Israelis on the one hand could not hope to match 30,000,000 Arabs on the other, either in the amount of arms that they could absorb or the amount of territory in which they had to operate.

I further pointed out that we certainly had not excluded arms for Israel but we did not think that this was the time or the circumstance in which to make a statement which would in effect announce a new policy.

The President indicated he was in agreement and I gather that he had decided not to make any statement that would be a departure from our present position.

An examination of the transcript of his press conference reveals that no question was raised with regard to arms in the Middle East.

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[3] See footnote 5, Document 131.

142. Message From Cairo [1]

No. 97 *March 1, 1956.*

REFERENCE

A. Out Message No. 1 [2]
B. Out Message No. 2 [3]

1. Ali Sabri says Nasr will be "Out of town" from 3 March until 9 March, that he has made plans he cannot change, and that first possible meeting with Anderson . . . will be Saturday 10 March. (This apparently confirmation rumors of Nasr meeting Aswan with Kuwatly and King Saud). [4]

2. Shortly after receipt Ref A on 28 February, a . . . representative, at previously scheduled meeting with Ali Sabri, pressed for another meeting on 1 or 2 March despite Ali Sabri preoccupation with Selwyn Lloyd meetings with Nasr. The . . . representative stressed urgency proceeding with discussion preliminary details because of probability of quick Anderson return. In lieu instructions from Washington, this was thought best way alert Nasr to possibility of meeting this weekend.

3. On receipt of Ref B, the . . . representative approached Ali Sabri to make appointments as requested in Paragraph 3 of Ref B. Ali Sabri gave reply reported in Paragraph 1 above and said that when he had told Nasr that the . . . representative seemed to think Anderson arrival by March 3 possible, Nasr had said it too late to change his plans. The . . . representative explained that Anderson . . . probably already on way and urged arrangement brief meeting anywhere before 10 March. Ali Sabri replied he thought it impossible. [5]

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II. Secret.

[2] See footnote 5, Document 118.

[3] This message directed that permission be requested from Egyptian authorities to allow Anderson's aircraft to land at Cairo on March 3 at 2 p.m. Nasser was to be informed of Anderson's "impending visit through appropriate channels" and a meeting was to be requested for March 4. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956)

[4] On March 6, King Saud of Saudi Arabia and President Shukri al-Quwwatli of Syria arrived in Cairo to confer with Prime Minister Nasser on ways to coordinate their plans for both war and peace in the Middle East. The meetings concluded March 11, and the participants issued a joint communiqué on March 12. The Embassy in Cairo transmitted a translation of the joint communiqué to the Department in telegram 1827 on March 13; *ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86/3–1356.

[5] Anderson could not wait until March 10. Message 99 from Rome to Cairo, March 1, directed that Nasser be informed of the substance of Message 97 and requested "arrangements for meeting wherever Nasr going, if possible". (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II)

4. . . . expects report on Lloyd–Nasr conversations from Trevelyan through Ambassador Byroade on 2 March and from Ali Sabri through the . . . representative on 3 March. Will forward to Washington and Rome.

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143. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, March 1, 1956.

SUBJECT

Military Discussions in connection with Actions to be taken under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950

1. As a result of the Washington talks between the United States and United Kingdom, the U.K. Chiefs of Staff have submitted a paper entitled "Report on the Military Problems Involved in Action Under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950". [2] The U.K. Chiefs of Staff have approved this report as a basis for discussion, and further emphasize that the report has not been approved by the Ministers and sets out purely military considerations. They further state in the introduction to this report that as a result of the Washington talks the United Kingdom and the United States have agreed as a first step to undertake some measure of combined planning.

2. It is apparent that as a result of the Tripartite Meeting held on February 8, [3] both the British and French expect that military discussions will take place within the framework of the Tripartite Declaration. This has been confirmed by General Valluy, French Representative to the NATO Standing Group, who, in a discussion with me on February 13, [4] stated that he had been advised by the French Ambassador that military discussions would take place.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–156. Top Secret.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 104.

[3] See Document 87.

[4] General Valluy did inform Admiral Radford that the French expected that military discussions would take place within the framework of the Tripartite Declaration and inquired if any military planning or military actions had occurred. Admiral Radford replied that there had only been the Naval demonstrations in the Eastern Mediterranean and that the French Ambassador had been advised of these operations. (Memorandum for the Record by Rear Admiral Truman J. Hedding, Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 13; Radford Papers A–1, Memos for the Record)

3. As a result of my discussion with you on this subject on February 23,[5] it was agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would undertake some measures of combined planning with the British. As an initial step in implementing this agreement, Rear Admiral Hedding, of my staff, and Rear Admiral Currie, Chief of Staff to General Sir John Whiteley, are, on an informal basis, preparing a revision to the British report for submission to the U.S. and U.K. Chiefs of Staff for comment. This was to be followed by the initiation of staff level combined planning conferences in connection with military actions that might be taken under the Tripartite Declaration.

4. Subsequent discussions between Mr. Rountree, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (NEA) and Rear Admiral Hedding[6] disclose the deep concern felt by the State Department in the event the French are brought into this combined planning . . . . I, too, share that concern, however, I am more concerned with the necessity for undertaking some measures of combined planning with the British, planning that will involve detailed consideration of military courses of action that may be required in the event of an outbreak of hostilities in this area. I feel we would be most derelict if we fail to undertake this required planning with the British.

5. My understanding of the State Department proposal in this matter is as follows:

a. We will go ahead with Tripartite Military Discussions, including French participation, within the framework of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and the recent U.S.–U.K. statement from the Washington talks.[7]

b. For the next two or three weeks we will exchange general information only with the British. Subsequently, combined planning with the British will be undertaken.

c. If the above is agreed to, the State Department will call in the British Ambassador, expressing concern over the recent leak in London, and obtaining a firm promise that in the event combined planning is undertaken between the U.S. and U.K., proper security will be maintained.[8]

d. It is hoped that the French will be satisfied with the military discussions to be undertaken as outlined in a. above. Should they not be satisfied or propose combined planning, then the problem will require reconsideration.

6. I would like to comment briefly on this proposal. My first and major concern is with the necessity for undertaking combined planning at an early date with the British, planning that will

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[5] No account of this conversation has been found in Department of State files, but see footnote 4, Document 110.

[6] No record of these discussions has been found in Department of State files.

[7] See footnote 2, Document 65.

[8] Hoover, after receipt of this memorandum, did meet with British Ambassador Makins. See Document 169.

probably be quite detailed in order to provide the degree of coordination necessary in military operations. Nothing less can be acceptable from a military point of view. I further feel that in the military discussions to be held within the framework of the Tripartite Declaration we will be forced to discuss with the French the broad aspects of the military actions that may be required under the Declaration, even though we are successful in keeping from them the fact that we are engaged in combined planning with the British. I feel they will not be satisfied with less, even though it is recognized they will have little to contribute to the military actions. I feel that it is almost inevitable that the French will learn of our bilateral planning with the British. In any event I must again point out that we must proceed with this combined planning with the British whether or not the French learn of this planning and insist on participating. The State Department should therefore be prepared for this possibility.

7. Subject to the above comments, I agree to this proposal and will initiate the following actions in the order as listed:

a. Complete the informal revision of the British report and submit it to the U.S. and U.K. Chiefs of Staff for comment. This will take a minimum of from three to four weeks.

b. Initiate combined planning with the British.

c. Conduct military discussions with the British and French within the framework of the Tripartite Declaration and the U.S.–U.K. statement from the Washington talks. It would be desirable to hold off on these discussions until the comments on the British report have been completed, although this may not be possible.

I would like to point out that we should be prepared to have the French enter into this combined planning almost from the start.

8. This memorandum is being given very restricted distribution and should be handled on a strict "need-to-know" basis. The Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, will take the required implementing actions, keeping holders of this memorandum advised of the necessary details. [9]

Arthur Radford

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[9] According to a memorandum dated April 18 from MacArthur to Hoover, Murphy, Allen, and Rountree, MacArthur inquired about the status of U.S.–U.K. military planning for the Middle East and had learned "that the JCS had reached agreement on the first six paragraphs and paragraph 7a of the letter to the Secretary, dated March 1, on this subject. In other words, the actions thus far were those outlined in the paragraphs indicated above and the JCS was continuing its work and had reached paragraph 7b." (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #3)

144. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, March 1, 1956—4 p.m.

1722. Reference Embassy telegram 1632. [2] Egyptian technical mission to Khartoum returned February 28 after discussion Sudanese-Egyptian currency linkage and commercial matters in general. Mission was headed by Nabih Younis, Under Secretary, Ministry Finance. Younis informed Embassy officer no agreements reached with Sudanese except with regard to terms of reference concerning topics discussed. Younis stated Sudanese reaffirmed earlier request that Egyptian delegation [come] to Khartoum to initiate Nile waters talks. Egyptian Government currently studying this new request. Younis felt that Sudanese seemed uncertain their position regarding Nile waters subject. Younis also commented his opinion general political situation in Sudan highly explosive and that Azhari government could not continue in this situation.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645W.74322/3–156. Secret. Received at 2:56 p.m. Repeated to London and Khartoum.

[2] Byroade notified the Department in telegram 1632, February 20, that during a conversation with Nasser on February 18, he had "asked Nasser his plans for reaching agreement with Sudan on Nile waters." Nasser replied that he expected "negotiations to start in Khartoum and Egyptian technical mission probably will go there this week." When Byroade informed Trevelyan of Nasser's remarks, Trevelyan, in turn, told Byroade that he foresaw "following complication in Nile waters agreement with Sudan. Sudan hopes obtain IBRD financing for at least part of their water development projects prior to reaching agreement upon division of Nile waters. Sudan cannot expect Bank loan until member of Bank and Monetary Fund. Cannot be member of Bank and Fund until it has recognized currency of its own. Cannot work out its own currency until agreement reached with Egypt as to how Egyptian currency now in Sudan is to be repatriated." (*Ibid.*, 645W.74322/2–2056)

145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria [1]

Washington, March 1, 1956—6:01 p.m.

660. Embtel 784. [2] Dept has not had opportunity recently discuss Banat Ya'qub with Ben Gurion and not in position evaluate or give assurances re his statement. General Burns has been exploring this question with Israel and Syria during past few days. Ghazzi may wish question him on matter.

Main present US endeavor should be directed at securing favorable Arab response démarche Deptel 637 and 638. [3] For this purpose we believe pressure should be maintained on Syrians.

You may also wish observe to Ghazzi that final solution Banat Ya'qub question must eventually be found. Israel unlikely postpone development of the Jordan indefinitely. Unless Israel sees some possibility Arab agreement, Israel will be able present strong case in UN and to world at large to continue development water resources of Jordan.

Dulles

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2456. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins, cleared with Ludlow, and approved by Allen who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, and to Baghdad, London, Ankara, Jidda, and Paris by pouch.

[2] Document 125.

[3] Printed as telegrams 1999 and 2000, Documents 119 and 120.

146. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, March 1, 1956—4 p.m.

1724. Reference Embtels 1665 and 1666, February 23. [2] Trevelyan has had further talk with Gamal Salem regarding revision aides-mémoire and has cabled following report to London:

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/3–156. Confidential. Received at 7:08 p.m.

[2] Documents 121 and 122.

Begin Verbatim Text.

The Vice President asked me to see him this morning and confirmed as correct my record of his comments, except one point (see para 3 (a) of my telegram 348).[3] They had decided that they would not start any of the work except preparation of the site until agreement had been reached with the Sudan Government on the legal points. It was not, however, correct to say that they would not require payment of the grants in aid until then. The Vice-President seemed to fear that if the initial grants from the two governments were not appropriated and paid now, the Egyptian Government might in the event lose them or the subsequent grants contemplated. He put it as follows. The Bank had promised to lend them money subject to the Egyptian Government having the foreign exchange necessary. The two governments as a gesture of good will had agreed to provide the foreign exchange initially necessary. If they earmarked the money now the good will gesture would have a good political effect. If they merely said that the grants would be given at some future time after the Sudan question had been resolved, then people would think that it was a trick and Egypt would never get the money. He emphasized that the rumors that he was against cooperation with the West on the High Dam and would like to deal with the Commies on it were quite untrue.

2. The Vice-President said that the Egyptian Government would like to have the grants-in-aid "when the governments were ready to pay them." The governments could pay them either to the Egyptian Government in accordance with intergovernmental exchanges of letters (paragraph 2 (a) of mytel 348) or directly to the Bank in accordance with an exchange of letters between the two governments and the Bank (paragraph 2 (b) of mytel quoted above). He preferred the latter solution of payment to the Bank. I asked him whether they would agree that if the money were not required for some years, the interest should accrue to the governments. He replied that as soon as the money had been paid, he considered that it should be invested for the benefit of the Egyptian Government. I made no comment and said that at this stage I was only concerned to obtain the Egyptian Government's views. *End text.*

Byroade

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[3] Printed as telegram 1665, Document 121.

147. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 1, 1956—1 p.m.

868. Following interpretation submitted regarding conversations reported 861, [2] 864, [3] 865 [4] and 867: [5]

Secretary's February 24 testimony coupled with Allen's interpretation (Deptel 706 [6]) and retardation decision French Mysteres leaves Israel Government with no foreign policy and no defense program. For four months orientation here has been on development adequate defense posture, primarily through procurement minimum number of interceptor jets. Relatively speaking this was policy of moderation.

Sharett's untypical sternness and bitterness reflected his reaction to collapse of his pro-western orientation and of foreign policy which place reliance on US. He finds in ashes his basic approach to problem of Soviet arms to Arabs which was one of maintaining workable defense posture through acquisition of minimal number of high quality defense arms from US and its allies. Sharett is now defenseless against accusations of his opponents within and without Cabinet who, since October last, have argued that Sharett's moderate approach and trust in US would be betrayed.

Ben Gurion's demeanor suggests typical behavior pattern noted by his close associates in periods when he is intensely occupied with some major problem during which he gives evidence of uncertainty and emotional strain. Once he has made his decision he reportedly relaxes, puts his uncertainties behind him and pursues with equa-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.56/3–156. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:32 a.m., March 2. Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Document 139.

[3] Lawson reported in telegram 864, February 29, that during his conversation with Ben Gurion and Sharett on February 29 (see Document 140), he had also asked Ben Gurion about Banat Yacov. Ben Gurion replied that if the Johnston Plan could be accepted soon, he "would be prepared to see short delay. Obviously we prefer peaceful settlement", [but] if it appeared it could not be settled under international agreement 'we will do it ourselves.'" Lawson added that he believed that Israel did not want to delay the work another season. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2956)

[4] Document 140.

[5] Lawson informed the Department in telegram 867, February 29, that following the February 29 conversation, he raised the subject of Mystere aircraft with Ben Gurion and Sharett. Sharett expressed bitterness over the delays. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/2–2956)

[6] Reference should be to telegram 607 to Tel Aviv, February 28, which informed the Embassy that Allen had informed Eban in a conversation on February 28 the "Secretary did not feel it in Israel's interest for US concur in Israel request [for arms] at present moment." Allen remarked that "Israelis should avoid conclusion Secretary's remarks before Senate indicated change in his thinking or an adverse development for Israel." (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/2–2856)

nimity the execution of his formulation. Both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister must be haunted with thought that had they adopted different policy October last (Embtel 861) the Egyptian military threat might have been removed with much smaller loss of Jewish lives than may now prove to be case.

From their conversation with me yesterday it apparent that Ben Gurion and Sharett making one last effort to obtain affirmative US reply and failing that they must assume their policy has failed and new approach developed forthwith. Logic that this is time of decision must appear inescapable to GOI for following reasons: Increment large Egyptian and Syrian military units along Israeli borders is preview of progressively greater future pressures as Arab equipment and ability to utilize expands. With its military manpower on civilian reservist basis, Israeli could not indefinitely meet this challenge except at exorbitant price of progressively larger disruption of its economy and way of life. Furthermore, IDF appears (Embtel 861) to have advised Ben Gurion that only very short time remains before balance of power shifts to Arab side and is urging action before too long delay. It is at this point that there appears to be vital divergence in interpretation of subsequent events as between Israelis and some US observers. Israelis are convinced that given capability the Egyptians aided by other Arab States will attack Israel unless they can achieve same objective through progressive weakening of Israel by forced negotiations. This conclusion which may be correct or incorrect is based on Israel's past experience in dealing with Arabs, statements and actions of Arab leaders and information reaching IDF through its comprehensive Intelligence Services in Arab States. While IDF Intelligence may come up with its full share of false reports on occasion it has proved accurate. (As examples report paragraph 3, Embtel 172, August 27, 1955,[7] subsequently verified by Fedayeen raids and Israel contention September last that Nasser's help to Johnston would be pro forma which appears to be confirmed by Jordanians as per paragraph 3, Amman telegram 427 to Department.[8]) In any event Israelis have firm conviction about Arabs intentions and US arms policy appears to have undermined their ability to meet this threat through balance of power approach and to have provided no satisfactory substitute.

While Ben Gurion made it clear to me yesterday that he considers the forthcoming vital decision his personal responsibility, it

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[7] Paragraph 3 of telegram 172 from Tel Aviv reads:

"3. GOI secret intelligence has learned that Nasser has told other Arab countries that, effective yesterday and until UN General Assembly, he 'intends to engage in most vigorous measures against Israel and felt it his duty to inform Arab colleagues of this'." (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/8–2755)

[8] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 785.00/2–1856)

is apparent that in arriving at his conclusion he will weigh carefully the advice of "his boys" in the IDF that the only remaining alternative to assure Israel's survival is a military showdown. Their views have the support of Achdut Avoda, the militant wing of Mapai within the government and of Herut and many General Zionists in the opposition. While it is known that the progressive and Mapam leadership, as well as the Mapai moderate (Sharett) wing, are most reluctant adopt a policy which may lead to general hostilities, they are unable at moment to present workable alternative. Ben Gurion, while no longer dominant on many questions of domestic policy, still retains the confidence of Israel public in security matters. They will follow his leadership at this decisive moment in Israel's history.

From information available to it from various sources including comments made by Ben Gurion and Sharett to me today, coupled with their grim and determined manner, I believe it is possible to forecast the minimum and maximum ranges of Israel's new formulation of policy and program to replace those which it is now in process of abandoning. At minimum, Israel's economy would be placed on an emergency basis with partial mobilization of reservists. In the Embassy's judgment, once this basic step is taken it will set in motion trend of public attitudes which would make it almost impossible for the GOI to avoid adoption of a militant policy toward specific Arab-Israel issues. This could be accompanied by determination to assure, by military measures if necessary, absolute sovereignty and strict observance of armistice agreements including decision to proceed with Banat Yaacov, to retaliate for any continuation of Egyptian firing across the border which is now daily occurrence, enforcement of transit rights Gulf of Aqaba or Suez. One or more of these measures could be taken with full knowledge that they might lead to wider hostilities but with willingness to accept such risks. As maximum, the IDF might be authorized by Ben Gurion to take off on an offensive against the Egyptian troops in the Sinai with no more pretext than one of the many recurring incidents on frontier. In view of Tiberias action experience,[9] however, it is believed that Ben Gurion's Cabinet colleagues would counsel him that widespread hostilities should develop only over major issue with which world opinion is already acquainted.

Embassy concurs in Ben Gurion's thesis that the Israelis would fight rather than acquiesce to truncation Israel's territory. This is not so much question of loss of so many square miles of territory as it is reflection of firm belief that it would constitute the first of series of

[9] See the editorial note, vol. XIV, p. 854.

weakening measures designed culminate in Israel's eventual extermination.

Embassy does not exclude possibility that at this juncture GOI may make some approach to the Soviet Government to explore possibility obtaining arms. It is known, however, that many Israel leaders believe such an approach would prove abortive and Embassy considers it doubtful whether, even if such step is taken, Israel Government would delay placement its country on war footing pending a reply.

While Embassy may not be fully informed all aspects of the evolution of American policy on arms question, it appears to us that the imminent shift in Israel security policy which will greatly increase possibilities general hostilities in area could still be avoided by supply of minimal number of modern jet fighters. Ben Gurion has been quoted by several associates as saying that he believed Israel could maintain adequate defense posture with 25 percent of the new jets in possession Egypt. This appears to us a legitimate approach in defense terms, and one which, if adopted, might stabilize the situation here so as to make possible progress with the Israelis toward settlement along the lines set forth in Secretary's August 26 address. [10]

Lawson

[10] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1955, pp. 378–380.

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148. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State [1]

Amman, March 1, 1956—2 p.m.

452. Reference: Embtel 446. [2] Ambassador Duke today saw Prime Minister Rifai with Foreign Minister Khaladi present. Rifai stated notice Arab League meeting received. Telegram has been sent to Jordanian Chargé Cairo asking him approach Hassouna proposing that representatives of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon attending meeting be at level of Prime Ministers or Minister Foreign Affairs to

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–156. Secret. Received at 11:39 a.m. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Jerusalem, Jidda, and Paris.

[2] Document 138.

form four-power subcommittee of council. He proposed they come with authorization their government to make a decision on answer to Ambassador Eric Johnston left open at meeting last fall. HKJ is sending message to the three governments of its action and likewise informing their representatives here.

Rifai stated his opinion that decision should be reached but pointed out that he was making no commitment as to what the decision might be and so far as Jordan is concerned the new government still has to study matter and make up its mind.

Duke emphasized desirability of Jordan reaching favorable decision. Rifai admitted action at this time is to forestall Israeli diversion at Banat Yacoub. Duke replied this possible as temporary measure but Israel could not be indefinitely restrained by negative Arab attitude. Duke informing Cairo promptly for use by Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd.

Mallory

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149. Message From Cairo [1]

No. 104 *March 2, 1956.*

Note: This present Message No. 104 was drafted and transmitted prior to Message No. 103 [2] but was received in Washington after Message No. 103. The efforts to arrange a meeting described herein met with success as reported in Message No. 103.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II. Secret.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

REFERENCES

A. Message No. 96 [3]
B. Message No. 97 [4]
C. Message No. 99 [5]
D. Message No. 100 [6]

1. On receipt Ref C, . . . repeated efforts persuade Nasr make appointment this weekend. Ali Sabri meeting with him now and we expect answer shortly. Reports indicate possibility change of Nasr plans go Aswan but station unable say whether this will alter situation.

2. Ali Sabri statement on 28 February that Nasr anxious see Anderson soon (Paragraph 1 Ref C) [7] was expression of favorable attitude toward operation and neither Nasr nor Ali Sabri consider that appointment was made or that they accepted any obligation. . . . hinted at likelihood of 3 March arrival Anderson . . . Even at that point (See Paragraph 3 Ref B) it would have been too late make appointment because Nasr already had appointment with at least 2 Heads of State. In view above . . . feels delivery message in Ref D not advisable and has asked meeting on basis urgency rapid progress Anderson mission.

. . . . . .

4. . . . will continue seek appointment before 10 March but wishes point out:

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[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Part I)

[4] Document 142.

[5] See footnote 5, *ibid.*

[6] Message 100 from Rome to Cairo, March 1, requested that the following message, if appropriate, be passed to Nasser:

"1. I have just been advised . . . after arriving Rome enroute to Cairo that you plan to be away from Cairo beginning March third. This change of plans, as we understood them, concerns me not only from the viewpoint of personal planning which was based on our meeting Saturday [March 3] but as well because our planned meeting is known to my principals as well as others who expect my visit early next week. To alter the combined plans could well cause a lack of confidence in the sincerity attached to our operations. For these and other reasons I urgently hope it can be arranged for our meeting to be Saturday or Sunday at such time and place as best suits your own plans or, if more convenient to you I can arrive Friday for a visit, coming by commercial airlines or by my own transportation if clearance for landing can be arranged. I fully appreciate the great demands on your time and make this request in the spirit of assuring continued confidence of all concerned and of making progress in a matter to which I am sure we both attach the maximum importance." (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II)

[7] Reference should be to paragraph 3 of reference A. Paragraph 3 of Message 96 from Cairo, March 1, reads:

"Ali Sabri says Nasr anxious see Anderson soon and recognizes importance of taking up area policy part of Anderson package."

A. Presence of Saud, Hussein and Kuwatly and press awareness of impending meeting will multiply security problems involved Anderson . . . contact Nasr.

B. Nasr will have extreme difficulty varying or changing program laid on with 3 other Chiefs of State.

C. We run risk antagonizing Nasr if we repeat effort made at time of announcement Constitution [8] to persuade him set aside long planned and important arrangements.

[8] Nasser announced the new Egyptian Constitution on January 16.

150. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, March 2, 1956, 8:50 a.m. [1]

Messrs. Brownell and Sherman Adams, who were with the President when I went into the room, stayed throughout this conversation at my request.

I said to the President I hoped that there would not be White House pressure in my absence [2] to give arms to Israel. This might be necessary, but it would be disastrous to do so during the course of the present negotiations and without a prior exchange of views with the negotiator. I said that the White House staff was subject to strong political influences and might alarm him on the subject. I hoped, however, that they would not put any undue pressure on the State Department during my absence.

The President asked what kind of thinking I had in mind. I referred to the Saudi tank matter [3] and the possibility of Mysteres planes going, etc.

The President referred, somewhat apologetically, to the Saudi tank matter, saying he had been disturbed all of a sudden in the evening when he was relaxed and going to bed, but that he remembered a good rule in war, which was probably also a good

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[2] Dulles left Washington on March 2 to attend the second meeting of the SEATO Council at Karachi. He arrived at Karachi on March 5, attended the SEATO Council sessions March 6–8, and then visited New Delhi, Colombo, Djakarta, Bangkok, Saigon, Manila, Taipei, Seoul, and Tokyo, March 9–19. He returned to Washington on March 21.

[3] See footnote 5, Document 106.

rule in peace, that is not to disturb carefully thought out plans in a spirit of sudden emergency without calm review of the whole situation.

I said I thought it might be useful if I discussed the situation at the Cabinet meeting. The President agreed and I did so at the Cabinet meeting on a confidential basis, pointing out the need we had of accomplishing the dual purpose of (1) preserving the State of Israel and (2) avoiding such a break with the Arab countries as would jeopardize the industry of Western Europe and the military power of NATO. [4]

JFD

[4] The Minutes of Cabinet Meeting for March 2 are in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Papers.

151. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 2, 1956, 12:47–1:40 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

U.S.-Israel Relations

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Government	*Israel Government*
The Secretary	Ambassador Eban
The Under Secretary	Minister Shiloah
Mr. Allen—NEA	
Mr. Russell—S	

Ambassador Eban called at the Secretary's request. The Secretary said that he had no particular pronouncement to make but that the situation in the Middle East is critical and could become acute, and he did wish to have a chat before leaving on his trip to Karachi. The Secretary said that he had the impression from newspaper reports that the Israel Government feels that the Secretary, in his previous talks with Sharett and Eban about arms, had misled the Israelis with respect to U.S. intentions. Ambassador Eban said that he would not use the word "misled" but the Israel Government felt

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 16. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted on March 5 by Russell. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

that there had been a discrepancy between the Secretary's statements to Mr. Sharett in Paris [2] for instance and the testimony which the Secretary had given before the Senate Committee last week. [3] The Secretary said that it must be evident to Israel that intervening events necessarily have to be taken into account. In particular, it has been most important not to do anything that would destroy the possibility of success of the Anderson mission. The Secretary said he had just received word that Nasser would be seeing Mr. Anderson on the evening of March 4 [4] despite other meetings which it had been reported in the papers Nasser would be having with Arab leaders during the coming week.

The Secretary said that he was frank to say that there was not the close working relationship which ought to exist between Israel and the United States; that Israel appeared to be carrying on a form of political warfare against this Administration; that Israel had seemed to be entirely self-centered, there being no evidence that the Israel Government had given any consideration whatsoever to the vital interests of the NATO countries in maintaining accessibility to the oil and other resources of the Middle East. The Secretary said that he had tried repeatedly to get relations between the United States and Israel on a more understanding basis but so far without success. He wished to make a special effort before leaving on his trip to get a better relationship underway in place of the virtual undeclared political warfare that Israel was now carrying on.

Ambassador Eban said that Israel, for its part, felt that the United States does not understand Israel's problems. He said that all that has happened during the past weeks had borne out the IG's belief that Egypt was an instrument of the Soviet Union. This was underscored by the coup in Jordan over General Glubb. [5] Jordan has now gone over to the group of Arab countries dominated by the Soviet Union. Israel is more gravely threatened than any other country of the West. The newspapers have reported that Nasser had agreed to let Cairo be the center of the Communist labor organization (WFTCU) [*WFTU*] after it had been kicked out of Vienna. The Cairo radio is out and out pro-Soviet. That is the kind of man Nasser is and he is in the process of creating a close alliance between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan. Ben Gurion and Sharett interpreted the Secretary's testimony before the Senate Committee as being negative on the possibility of arms for Israel, and negative on the Security Treaty, at least until there was agreement on frontiers,

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[2] See Secto 38, vol. XIV, p. 657.

[3] See footnote 5, Document 131.

[4] See Document 162.

[5] Reference is to King Hussein's dismissal of Lieutenant General Sir John B. Glubb as the commander of the Arab Legion.

which they did not foresee. All the Arab states are receiving arms either from the United States, Great Britain or the Soviet Union. Israel alone is receiving none. The Ambassador said that in his testimony the Secretary referred Israel to the United Nations but no country could get less security from the United Nations than Israel. The Soviet Union would cast a veto against aid to Israel in the Council, and in the General Assembly, there could be no two-thirds majority for Israel against Arab and Soviet opposition. The Israel Government's diagnosis of all of this is that Israel stands alone. Ben Gurion and Sharett's position is that if this is correct the United States should say so, so that the people of Israel could develop the necessary courage and means to deal with their situation.

The Secretary said that he had taken no position in his Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony that was different from what he had said to Ambassador Eban and Sharett before. He had said on many occasions that he does not favor the U.S. giving a security pact to Israel until the frontiers have been fixed. He, therefore, does not see that as a new negative. With respect to arms, we believed on all the intelligence available to us that to have shipped to Israel the arms they requested would have destroyed all hope of the Anderson mission. The Secretary said that he knew that the Israel Government had never held hope for the Anderson mission but we have—not absolute hope but some. We want to explore the possibility of a settlement fully and we do not want to destroy all hope of one by sending arms which would, at best, have a doubtful effect on Israel's ultimate security. The political campaign being waged by the Israelis against the Administration does not make the situation easier; not, primarily, because of the domestic aspects of it but because of the great obstacles it creates to efforts to save the Middle East from Soviet domination. The Arabs have always said they cannot rely on the United States, and they are, therefore, tending more and more to put their reliance upon the Soviet Union. The more the friends of Israel try to exert pressures against the Administration, the more difficult it is to convince the Arabs that they do not need to turn to the Soviets. All the activities that friends of Israel customarily resort to in whipping up pressure—the paid advertisements, the mass meetings, the resolutions, the demands of Zionist organizations, the veiled threats of domestic political reprisals—do not help to create a basis for understanding cooperation between our two Governments. The Secretary said he could not believe that that was a wise way, from the point of view of Israel's interests, to operate.

The Secretary said no change in U.S. policy toward the Middle East should be inferred from his statement to the Senate Committee. The preservation of Israel remains a goal of American policy. We do not, however, intend to move toward that goal in ways that would

destroy the Anderson mission and our influence with Arab countries.

The Secretary said that this Government has plans for dealing with various contingencies in the Middle East. If we had greater confidence in each other, we could talk over those plans. The present veiled hostility which Israel displays toward the U.S. Government is not, however, a good way in which to attack common problems. He said it was a misconstruction of his remarks to say that we are "merely turning Israel over to the United Nations". The Secretary said that everyone that he had talked to, including many members of Congress, had said that the present Palestine problem was one where the United Nations should properly do something. The Secretary said that we talk about the United Nations, not to remit Israel to a hopeless forum, but to have a foundation upon which the United States can act. If the Soviets should veto a sound proposal we would nevertheless have a stronger moral basis for action.

Ambassador Eban said that he thought the Anderson mission would have a better chance if the present imbalance of arms in the area were corrected. As it is, Nasser has everything to gain by stalling. The Secretary said that Nasser has no reason whatever to believe that we may not give the Israel Government arms at any moment. The Secretary said he did not wish to make any promises or statements on which the Israel Government might later base further allegations of lack of good faith, but let us assume that at some point the U.S. decides that the Anderson mission has failed, that is the sort of problem we ought now to be discussing together. Israel cannot possibly acquire from the U.S. or elsewhere arms enough to defend itself without reliance upon outside assistance. We do not think it is wise or possible to get an exclusive security treaty for Israel ratified by the Senate under present conditions. The Secretary said that he had given thought to the possibility of a Formosa-type resolution to deal with the Middle East situation. But the situation is different with respect to the problem of defining the aggressor. In the case of Formosa, it was clear who the aggressor would be and we could enter into an alliance with Formosa.[6] It is not our desire, however, at least now, to make an alliance with Israel against the Arabs. The Secretary said he had also given thought to the possibility of using the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which permits action either by the Security Council or the General Assembly. If a resolution in the Security Council were vetoed by the

[6] Reference is to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, signed at Washington on December 2, 1954. For the text of the treaty, see 6 UST (pt. 1) 433.

Soviets, it would clarify the situation and show the hypocrisy of the Soviet Union. It would make it easier then to take action outside the United Nations. We would be reluctant, for various reasons, to see the matter get into the General Assembly. On all of these possibilities and problems, it would be helpful for us to know more about the thinking of the Israel Government.

Ambassador Eban said he wished to take exception to the Secretary's reference to "political warfare" against the Administration. He said that nothing was happening in this country that does not happen in Sweden, Britain, Switzerland or any other country in the world. Many citizens, not merely Jews but others, have friendly impulses toward Israel and like to see it prosper. He said that he would take every necessary measure, however, in the Israel Embassy to see that its officers behaved properly. The Secretary said that he was not, at this moment, raising the question of the Israel Embassy engaging in improper activities. What he was referring to rather was the situation of the two governments working at arms length. The activities he had referred to would not be going on if Zionist organizations did not feel that they would help Israel. The Secretary said that both the President and he had made the decision to formulate our foreign policies without reference to the effect upon domestic politics. That was, therefore, the least important part of the problem. The bad part of it is that these activities put us in a position where the Arabs believe, however erroneously, that American policy is formulated as a result of Jewish pressures. It makes it difficult for us to do things that we could otherwise do more readily. The Secretary said he assumes that Israel wants peace. Israel could now win at least a few battles but in the long run, Israel must get on a basis of friendship with its neighbors. A battle, even if won, would for a very long time make the situation worse. Israel should be constantly concentrating on the question of how to get into a peaceful relationship with the Arab states. The U.S. has a great many pressures and influences it can bring to bear on the Arabs if Israel does not force us to throw them away. We have many arrows in our quiver, a great deal more than the Israel Government does, but we are in danger of getting in a position where we cannot use them. The oil and cotton markets as well as other economic relations give us opportunities to exert influence. But when the Jews put on mass meetings in this country they create a situation where the Arabs feel it is not safe for them to rely on the United States.

The Secretary said he admires greatly the acumen which Jewish tradition provides but Israel's present policies toward the United States prevent us from benefitting from it.

Ambassador Eban commented that he believes it is not possible to put any trust in Nasser. The Secretary said that he would agree

that, even on the most charitable assumption, Nasser is trying to get the best of both worlds. The Secretary said he does not like that but he is prepared to live with it if that is the necessary price to achieve peace in the Middle East. If it turns out that Nasser is going measurably beyond that, we shall then have to deal with the situation accordingly. [7]

[7] On March 3, the Department transmitted a summary of this conversation to Tel Aviv as telegram 622, to Cairo as telegram 2104, to Amman as telegram 462, to Damascus as telegram 670, to Beirut as telegram 1474, to Baghdad as telegram 656, to Jidda as telegram 416, to London as telegram 4997, and to Paris as telegram 3228. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–356)

That same day, Hoover also informed Anderson of the contents of this conversation with Eban. (Message 6 to Cairo; *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956)

152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, March 2, 1956—7:14 p.m.

518. Hammarskjold at Department Feb. 29 in conversation with Secretary [2] made following points:

1. While any overall real settlement of Palestine question not now possible certain steps toward settlement could be made. Based this on Nasser's apparently helpful attitude toward possible specific steps now which would contribute in long run to agreement between Israel and Arab states.

2. Concerned but not unhopeful at Israelis . . . re border situation. Believed remedying border tension most urgent matter. Constructive steps could be taken. Convinced Ben Gurion will not, can not accept any substantial border change in peace settlement.

. . . . . .

Secretary indicated importance we attached to UN's responsibility for preserving peace in area. UN had been responsible for creation of Israel; had supervised truce and obtained GAAs; had set up PCC,

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–256. Secret. Drafted by Ludlow and approved by Bond who signed for Dulles. Also sent to London, Paris for Lodge, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem; pouched to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, and Jidda.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., Feb. 16 to March 31, 1956)

TSO, and UNRWA. We were presently thinking how best UN could carry out its responsibilities and how US could assist through UN. Indicated our determination not to play political game so far as area concerned and to disabuse Arabs belief US would yield to political pressures on side of Israel. Pointed out that situation in area, however, might make it advisable to give some defensive arms to Israel.

Dulles

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153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, March 2, 1956—7:15 p.m.

519. Following conversation with Secretary Feb. 29 Hammarskjold conversation later with other Departmental representative [2] set forth following views:

1. Stabilization border situation is paramount issue. He hopeful that since neither Egyptians nor Israelis really want war they will as result of further pressing of negotiations by him and Burns obtain workable arrangements for tranquilizing border.
2. Some step toward solution refugee problem urgently needed. His present thinking is that Israelis should be persuaded take back portion of refugees after which major powers and SC would in effect endorse such program of repatriation and provide thereby basis Arabs agreeing resettlement of remainder refugees through acceptance of Jordan Valley and other plans.
3. While in his opinion settlement border question is most "logical" first step he believes such step must await established progress toward settlement refugee question.
4. He does not believe GA has any useful role in Palestine question now or in foreseeable future and believes SC consideration of Palestine question can and should await outcome negotiations on border tranquilization which should take next couple of months.

Department representative pointed out to Hammarskjold his proposal of placing some agreement of repatriation before possible acceptance of Jordan Valley Plan likely to make Arabs put off

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–256. Confidential. Drafted by Ludlow and approved by Bond who signed for Dulles. Also sent to London, Paris for Lodge, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem; pouched to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, and Jidda.

[2] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

decision on plan. Furthermore his proposal ran counter to course of negotiations which Johnston has thus far conducted in area to effect that Arabs could agree to Jordan Valley Plan without prejudice to settlement of outstanding political problems. Hammarskjold indicated he felt forced to confer with other SC delegations concerning his proposals but indicated some appreciation of impact his proposal on possible future Jordan Valley negotiations.

Dulles

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154. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, March 2, 1956—4 p.m.

366. Re Contel 351. [2] Burns has given me following account his conversation with Sharett February 29 with further reference UN SYG proposals El Auja D/Z. [3] Burns regards Sharett's remarks as amounting to Israeli withdrawal tacit acceptance proposals.

In course discussions Sharett indicated Israeli viewpoint was that UN SYG proposals envisaged compliance by GOE with article VIII paragraph 3 of GAA, which not forthcoming. Burns referred to a conversation between Hammarskjold and Ben Gurion during UN SYG's recent visit Israel from which Hammarskjold understood Ben Gurion had given assent orally to proposals. [4] Sharett replied that Ben Gurion viewed matter as mere conversation about the proposals not involving any commitment. Sharett again argued that while GOI had accepted proposals they had not given any undertaking to "implement" them and that in any case a new situation has now arisen owing to increased arms available to Egypt. In addition, he said Egypt has increased numbers her troops in Gaza strip and neighborhood D/Z thus making withdrawal IDF from D/Z impracti-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–256. Confidential. Received at 12:38 p.m., March 4. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Presumably reference should be to telegram 361, Document 129. Telegram 351 from Jerusalem, February 13, deals with separatist sentiment and separatist political activity in the West Bank area along the Jordan River. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.00/2–1356)

[3] See telegrams 395 and 398, vol. XIV, pp. 690 and 702.

[4] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

cable. Burns commented that GOI was aware any increase Egyptian forces in area at time proposals accepted.

There was some further conversation about the GAA with Burns pointing out that if Israel felt it necessary hold out for Egyptian compliance article VIII paragraph 3 Egypt would undoubtedly link that with observance by GOI of article VII.[5] Matters would thereupon become somewhat complicated in view of impediments placed in way of observers who are not able in existing circumstances to verify compliance with article VII, for instance. The role of observers should be to observe and not merely to await an invitation to check upon an allegation made by one party against the other. Sharett agreed to send Burns a letter outlining present GOI position with regard proposals.[6]

In talking to me today Burns expressed opinion that Israeli attitude possibly related in some way to continuing failure obtain arms from US, or possibly merely result fact that original acceptance not in good faith but made simply with idea Egyptians would not accept proposals.

Burns had intended going to Cairo now that GOI attitude proposals reasonably clear. However, he has just received message stating Fawsi and Amer will not be able to see him for next ten days but that Gohar prepared receive him instead. Burns has replied to effect he considered it important that he meet with Amer and Fawsi without delay.[7] He told me that he does not wish to see Gohar in Cairo, or even Gaza for that matter. Since Gohar never assumes any responsibility talking to him is largely a waste of time.

Burns said there were no new developments with respect suggestions for improving situation Lake Tiberias (Contel 358).[8]

Cole

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[5] For the text of Article 7 of the Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement, see U.N. doc. S/1264/–Corr. 1 and Add. 1.

[6] No copy of such a letter has been found in Department of State files.

[7] Cole subsequently reported that Burns was proceeding to Cairo on March 6, and that Burns had also expressed the opinion that "Israeli position El Auja proposals remained as described Contel 366. He recently saw Eytan who had informed him in that sense." (Telegram 371 from Jerusalem, March 6; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–656)

[8] Cole informed the Department in telegram 358, February 23, that Burns believed that "Israelis displaying no great interest suggestions for improving situation which he had made pursuant SC resolution January 19." (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/2–2356)

155. Message From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) to Robert B. Anderson, at Cairo [1]

No. 5 *Washington, March 3, 1956.*

In light developments in area since last conversation with you in Department, suggest you make approach to Nasser on following points and ask him take initiative in securing consideration JVP at forthcoming Arab League Council meeting:

1. After preliminary discussions with Johnston last September, Nasser asked Johnston to let him pilot JVP through Arab League in his own way. Johnston agreed and placed major reliance on Nasser's judgments as to tactics, even to point of requesting U.S. missions to cease pressing for plan. When Arab League Council met in October, Nasser informed Johnston that Arab acceptance not possible at that time, expressing view, however, that it could be carried to successful conclusion "in three or four months". U.S. has counted and still counts on Egyptian initiative and strong support for plan.
2. Nasser has emphasized need to take steps prepare Arab world for peaceful settlement Arab-Israel question. Acceptance JVP would represent important step that direction. While JVP is non-political, adoption would center attention on constructive activity, assist settlement substantial numbers of restless and embittered refugees and pave way for more general accommodation.
3. Since last fall, Lebanon has completed arrangements with IBRD for Litani and Egypt has progressed far in negotiations on High Dam. HKJ must now be given opportunity for its development through Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers. Egypt can strengthen its position in HKJ by helping secure that opportunity.

Nasser is likely emphasize three difficulties: (1) problem of handling Syrians, (2) Arab unwillingness act in response Israel pressure and (3) virtual impossibility securing acceptance JVP within framework forthcoming Council meeting. Suggest you respond to each as follows:

1. Insist that Nasser can bring Syrians around if he makes genuine tries. If Nasser continues express serious doubt as to his ability handle Syrians, you may wish to hint broadly that U.S. will regard his performance as significant indication of his capabilities for Arab leadership.
2. March 1 date highly publicized by Israelis for recommencing work at Banat Ya'qub has passed without incident. (FYI Israel Government has informed us it does not intend in any event plan commence construction prior to April 1.) Arab nations have maintained calm and firm position. This has demonstrated to world that Arabs refuse bow to pressure. Arab League is taking questions up in

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret. Drafted by Troxel and approved by Rountree and Russell.

own good time, in accordance with decision last October, at regularly scheduled meeting of Council.

3. Final approval of JVP at Council meeting neither necessary nor practicable, since Arab League would not be party to agreement. Jordan, Lebanon and Syria as countries directly involved sought advice of League re JVP in conformity their obligations to coordinate policy with fellow Arab states. Logical next step is for Arab League to note findings of Arab Technical Committee, accept technical validity and economic soundness of plan, find it politically compatible with Arab policy and urge states directly concerned to approve it in accordance with their constitutional procedures. Remaining details could then be worked out with states concerned—if desired, by Johnston's return to area.

FYI Present thinking is that Johnston's return to area would not be warranted unless Arab League Council finds, at minimum, that JVP is not inconsistent with Arab policy. End FYI.

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156. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State [1]

Beirut, March 3, 1956—4 p.m.

1029. In conversation this morning, Foreign Minister Lahoud said "speaking personally" that while Eric Johnston would always be welcome, there was no possibility at present of any useful discussion for decision on "Johnston Plan," if unmodified (Embtel 932). [2] I informed the Foreign Minister that Secretary General Ammoun had said that Lebanon would be willing to take part in new discussions on Jordan Valley plan if Syria were willing (Embtel 1013). [3] Lahoud again said he was speaking personally and not as Foreign Minister, but that it was his opinion no government of any of Arab states involved could accept "Johnston Plan" in its present form at present time and remain in office. If GOL approved plan in present heated state of opinion, Lebanese Parliament would reject it and toss government out of office. As an engineer he agreed that really sound

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–356. Confidential. Received at 9:50 a.m., March 4. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Ankara, Baghdad, Jidda, and Jerusalem.

[2] In telegram 932 from Beirut, February 14, Emmerson had reported that Lebanese Foreign Minister Lahoud, in the course of a conversation the previous day, had "stated categorically his opinion no Arab Government could now support JVP and remain in office." (*Ibid.*, 684A.85322/2–1456)

[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 684A.85322/3–156)

plan was Johnston Plan utilizing Lake Tiberias for necessary storage, but that latter element would mean cooperating, dealing, with Israel, and public opinion Lebanon and other states was not only not ready, but entirely hostile to such relationship at present. Personally, he urged consideration be given to "Arab Plan," which called for separate development of Yarmuk without Jordan storage. This would cost somewhat more money and would irrigate a million dunims less land but this extra cost would be offset by fact that this plan could be agreed upon promptly and irrigation Jordanian land could begin at reasonably early date. It would also, he argued, prevent possibility of war because if interested Arab states made this separate development they could raise no objection to Israel's draining off her part of Jordan waters. Later, Lahoud argued, when political tension dissipated, separate plans could be modified and combined into latest Johnston Plan using Tiberias for storage. This would involve greater expense but in his opinion it would be worth it.

Heath

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157. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, March 4, 1956—1 p.m.

1748. Re Embtel 1744. [2] British Ambassador left town immediately following Lloyd's departure and not returning until Monday. [3] However, following represents our best understanding of substance Nasser–Lloyd talks as obtained Egyptian sources close to Nasser . . . and from British and Iraqi Embassies.

1. Area Policy

British Minister [4] (who did not participate directly in talks) Iraqi Embassy officer said independently that Nasser proposed to Lloyd present membership of the Baghdad Pact be frozen and Arab collective security pact be revived with Iraq serving as link between two

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 680.86/3–456. Secret; Priority. Received at 5 p.m. Repeated priority to London, Karachi, Paris, Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Ankara, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Alexandria, Benghazi, Jerusalem, Khartoum, and Port Said.

[2] Telegram 1744 from Cairo, March 3, reported on a press conference Lloyd held before his departure. (*Ibid.*, 680.86/3–356)

[3] March 5.

[4] Francis Ralph Hay Murray.

groups. In this case, Nasser would agree to cease attacks on Baghdad Pact. . . . Lloyd admitted Baghdad Pact had been mistake and agreed that it should be frozen. Iraqi and British sources, however, add that Lloyd actually replied that he would have to consult the other Baghdad Pact members before he could make any commitments not to seek additional adherences. According to Iraqis and British, Lloyd indicated that as prerequisite to adoption Nasser's suggestion British would have to be convinced that Nasser was prepared to work actively for a settlement with Israel. Iraqis add that as evidence Nasser's good intentions Lloyd asked him agree to one kilometer troop withdrawal along demarcation lines. It possible that Nasser may have agreed with this suggestion since . . . reports also that Nasser had agreed with Lloyd that a period of quiet was highly desirable in the Arab-Israel dispute and both Egypt and Britain should do what they could to reduce tensions. This connection Lloyd . . . urged Nasser act to secure success of JVP. Nasser agreed but pointed out his capacity limited since this not appropriate time for Johnston visit area. In any case, he would require time to get other states into line.

Lloyd acting on principle of giving Nasser "bad news" now to avoid subsequent recriminations, said British would give Israel six Meteor fighters. . . . he offered Egypt equivalent number to which Nasser reportedly replied "if you give us six and Syria six, it will be all right". Lloyd allegedly agreed.

Iraqi Embassy source, although disclaiming any knowledge his government's attitude to Nasser's proposals, saw some advantages. Arrangement would reduce domestic pressures in Iraq by bringing Iraqi Government back to Arab fold (this connection he noted with pleasure restrained press treatment of pardoning of Egyptian messenger—Embtel 1743[5]). Revival of collective security pact which had always had Iraqi support would place Arabs in better defensive position in event Israel should attack. On other hand, if settlement reached, pact could be converted into arrangement for support of northern tier via Iraq and bilateral agreements between southern states and West. In either case, Syrian-Egyptian and Egyptian-Saudi bilaterals[6] would disappear in atmosphere of "Arab unity".

2. Buraimi

. . . Nasser promised advise King Saud in strongest terms to be reasonable in his talks with British.

3. High Dam

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[5] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/3–356) Iraq had originally arrested the messenger for activities detrimental to Iraq.

[6] On October 27, 1955, Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed a 5-year defense treaty in Cairo.

. . . Lloyd assured Nasser of British support of High Dam and promised British would do what they could to increase stability in Sudan and persuade Sudanese take more reasonable attitude on Nile waters question.

4. Situation in Jordan (see also Embtel 1746 [7]).

. . . Lloyd and Caccia learned of Glubb's ouster Thursday evening [8] through British Embassy during meeting with Nasser but did not raise matter. Nasser heard of it via press channels prior Friday morning [9] meeting. Reportedly he was surprised and shocked when he learned that Lloyd knew nothing about it in advance. . . . Nasser stated had felt for a long time that Glubb had to go and had expected British would ease him out in May. (He had not envisaged possibility Rifai or Hussein would have sufficient courage move against Glubb.) Nasser according these reports regrets method and timing Glubb's dismissal, because it leaves vacuum in Jordan which cannot easily be filled and it embarrassed him by coinciding with what he considered very constructive talks with Lloyd. He reportedly fears reaction in Britain to Glubb's abrupt dismissal will be directed against him and may undermine arrangements he proposed to Lloyd (see paragraph 1A) and threaten subsidy which . . . he hopes see continued.

Commenting on Glubb's ouster, Iraqi Embassy source took similar line suggesting that if British maintain subsidy they should be able hold Hussein to basically pro-Western line by allowing him pose as Arab Nationalist while still remaining dependent on British funds. This would be much easier than trying to maintain British prestige through Glubb. Alternative would be, in source's view, turning of Hussein to Saudi financing. Iraqi source was aware probability British parliamentary opposition to continuing subsidy view method of ouster but was sure HMG would follow "only sensible course".

Iraqi felt timing ouster and tenor Lloyd–Nasser talks clear indication Nasser not responsible, although he thought Glubb had probably figured in recent Rifai–Nasser talks. He speculated Rifai had actually been responsible for ouster, or alternatively that Hussein had acted forestall Legion coup.

Byroade

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[7] In telegram 1746, March 3, the Embassy furnished the Department with a summary of the Egyptian press reaction to King Hussein's removal of Glubb. (Department of State, Central Files, 741.551/3–356)

[8] March 1.

[9] March 2.

158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria [1]

Washington, March 5, 1956—12:49 a.m.

674. Dept has heard news reports, confirmed by Israeli Embassy, which indicate four Israeli police have been wounded and captured by Syrians in new Tiberias incident [2] and that Israelis had threatened to take necessary action unless men were returned.

Dept has discussed incident with Syrian Ambassador and Israeli Minister this evening and has urged both Syria and Israel to cooperate with General Burns in resolving difficulty and in returning Israeli police who appear to have been fired upon and detained through some misunderstanding. It was emphasized to both Syrian and Israeli representative that in interest of peace U.S. hoped no precipitate moves would be taken. Both were urged to avoid action which would heighten tension and might lead to hostilities.

You are authorized in your discretion and in most effective manner make strong representations to Syrian and Israeli PriMins or other officials regarding foregoing. Syrian Ambassador stated he would telegraph Damascus.

Hoover

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/3–556. Confidential; Niact. Drafted and approved by Wilkins who signed for Hoover. Also transmitted niact to Tel Aviv and repeated priority to Cairo, Baghdad, Amman, Beirut, Jidda, London, and Jerusalem.

[2] The Department received a report at 6:45 p.m., March 4, from the Embassy in Tel Aviv which substantiated this information. (Telegram 881, March 4; *ibid.*, 683.84A/3–456)

159. Message From the Acting Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Cairo [1]

No. 7 *Washington, March 5, 1956.*

1. Dept has just been notified by Shiloah of Israeli Embassy of receipt by latter from his Government of report of following incident which occurred some time early morning Sunday 4 March: Two

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518; Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams, Jan.–March 1956. Secret.

Israeli gunboats fired upon by Syrians near shore North East corner Sea of Galilee. 4 policemen aboard one gunboat wounded and these policemen together with gunboat captured by Syrians. Israeli Govt has served notice on Syrian Govt demanding immediate release and restoration of both policemen and vessel and stating that in event of failure Syrians to comply forthwith Israelis will take such action as may be necessary to enforce compliance.

2. At request of Dept Shiloah agreed cable his Govt stating that U.S. Govt would regard any violent action on part Israelis as matter of utmost gravity and that U.S. Govt strongly urges that no such action be taken. Dept has cabled Moose and Lawson to take all possible steps to insure against precipitated or violent actions or countermeasures on part of either Syrians or Israelis. [2]

3. You are requested to bring this matter to attention of Nasser at earliest possible moment indicating to him that Dept has received unconfirmed report from Israeli Govt to effect indicated in Para 1 above; [3] to convey to Nasser our grave apprehension lest this incident provoke more violent actions; and urging Nasser to use his influence with Syrians to deter any precipitate or violent additional action on their part.

[2] *Supra.*
[3] See footnote 2, *supra.*

160. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, March 5, 1956—noon.

826. Deptel 674. [2] Following account March 3–4 incident given ARMATT by ISMAC observers: Night March 3–4 two Israeli police boats landed eastern shore Sea of Galilee, one approximately one kilometer north of Moussadiyea village, second up small creek one kilometer further north past demilitarized zone and about 400 meters in Syrian territory. Fighting followed, apparently between Syrian civilians and boat crews. Two Israeli policemen killed, two missing, all from second boat. Third boat believed to have been waiting off

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/3–556. Confidential; Niact. Received at 7:28 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Jerusalem, London and Tel Aviv.
[2] Document 158.

shore. Second boat, which had been captured by Syrians, and two dead were returned to Israelis through ISMAC following Israeli threat to shell shore unless they were returned. Syrians claim Israeli boat landed two or three nights ago and that purpose these landings was espionage. Morning March 4 another fight occurred between Israeli police boat and Syrian cavalry patrol with Israelis forced withdraw. Further details in ARMATT message CX–76. [3]

Statement by Syrian military spokesman in press March 5 charged Israelis with attempts land "armed units" for purposes of espionage. Attempts were repelled by "soldiers and local guardsmen" who suffered no casualties. Spokesman characterized incident as "another proof of Israel's aggressive intentions and its disrespect for UNTSO and SC resolutions".

Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Ghazzi is in Cairo with no one acting in his place. I will therefore see Acting President Qudsi at noon today to make appropriate representations. [4]

Moose

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/3–556)

[4] Ambassador Moose reported in telegram 830 from Damascus, March 5, that he saw Acting President Qudsi at noon and stated that officials in the Department were "concerned because Israelis claimed Syrians were holding captives and had, in interest of peace, instructed me to express hope GOS would take no action which would increase tension or chance of conflict." Qudsi replied that Syria was holding no Israeli prisoners, and that strict orders had been issued to Syrian forces to hold their fire unless the Israelis again set foot on Syrian soil. (*Ibid.*)

161. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, March 5, 1956.

This morning I called on the President at 9:45 and reviewed the Middle East situation with him for approximately three-quarters of an hour.

1. I outlined to the President the situation confronting us with the French request to sell 12 Mystere–IV aircraft to the Israelis. After considering all of the arguments on both sides he agreed that we

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Goodpaster's version of this conversation is *ibid.*, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries.

should take a position of offering no objection if the French wished to consummate the transaction, but that it should be fully understood that we assumed no responsibility whatsoever.

2. The Saudis still have a considerable amount of arms, including 105 mm. ammunition, which were involved in agreements made last summer. They have not yet been shipped. The Saudis recently requested a renewal of their export licenses. If we did not go through with our agreement, the Saudis would regard it as a major breach of faith on our part. The President suggested that we talk with Defense and CIA about alternate methods of delivery.

3. The Galilee incident between Israel and Syria was touched upon and I advised the President of the action we were taking in pressing both sides that it should not be allowed to degenerate into further hostilities. He concurred and had no further suggestions to make.

4. I told the President of the preliminary report that I had had from Anderson on his conversation with Nasser, including Nasser's proposal that he would actively further peace efforts and an agreement on the Jordan Dam on condition that the U.S. and U.K. would not attempt to expand the membership of the Baghdad Pact.[2] The President felt, as I did, that this would be a useful subject for Mr. Anderson to explore further with Nasser on his own responsibility before committing either the U.S. or the U.K. Governments.

4. I reviewed the state of the military planning between the U.S., the U.K., and the French,[3] pointing out that the British had leaked to the press in London the fact that we were engaged in such activities. I pointed out that we had protested as strongly as possible to Ambassador Makins, and he had been equally disturbed by these reports.[4] While the Pentagon felt that it was imperative to carry on detailed planning with the U.K. in the event that military action should become necessary, nevertheless they were most hesitant to carry on further talks if the matter was going to be of public record. We had agreed between the U.S. and the U.K. that we would only keep the French advised on a restricted basis and then only those operations which involved "showing the Flag".

5. I advised the President that we were actively pursuing all possible courses which could be taken in the UN,[5] as we felt that

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[2] Anderson transmitted this preliminary summary of his conversation with Nasser on the evening of March 4 to Dulles at Karachi and to Hoover at Washington. (Message 106 from Anderson at Cairo; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson talks w/BG & Nasser. Carbons of incoming and outgoing tels) See *infra*.

[3] See Document 143.

[4] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files, but see Document 169.

[5] See Document 166.

we should exhaust those possibilities before undertaking any plans under the Tripartite Agreement. We would try to put our action in such a way that if the Soviets vetoed it, they would be against peace in the Middle East. I stated further our feeling that we should go through the processes of the UN so that if the Russians vetoed the proposal we would be in a stronger moral position to take action under the Tripartite Agreement. The President agreed and said that we might rapidly be reaching the point where we would have to take military action in the area. He felt that the Russians did not want to get into a war at this time and under these circumstances would probably back down if forced to make a clear-cut decision. I agreed, but pointed out that we would have to think it through with extreme care if we wished to avoid the enmity of the Arab nations for many years to come.

6. The President discussed with me briefly a message which he had received this morning from Sir Anthony Eden regarding the problems in Iraq [6] and a suggested revision of the draft answer we had submitted to him with regard to Sir Anthony's previous message. [7]

[Here follows discussion of the situation in French North Africa.]

H.

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[6] Eden's message of March 4 to Eisenhower noted "developments in Middle East which are causing me much concern." Among these were the Soviet effort to "liquidate" the Baghdad Pact, recent events in Jordan, and Nasser's role in support of the Soviets and in encouraging King Hussein to dismiss Lieutenant General Glubb. Eden believed that the United States and the United Kingdom could no longer continue "a policy of appeasement" in Egypt, and he recommended that the United States join the Baghdad Pact. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File) On March 5, Goodpaster forwarded a copy of Eden's message to Hoover. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eden to Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955–1956. Vol. I)

[7] Eden's message of February 18 requested Eisenhower's assistance in supplying tanks to Iraq, the Netherlands, and West Germany. A copy of the draft response is *ibid.*, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/3–556.

162. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Secretary of State, at Karachi [1]

No. 110 *Cairo, March 5, 1956.*

1. . . . I met with Nasr, Zacharia and Ali Sabri from 2100 to 2430, 4 March. Nasr appeared tired and said he had been in conferences since early morning, terminating with a conference with Ghazzi of Syria. He expressed himself as being surprised by the removal of Glubb and that his first reaction was that it had been planned by the British for his benefit and timed with the arrival of Selwyn Lloyd. We refused to take any such idea seriously. He states he had asked Lloyd if it were so inspired by the British and was informed that it came as a surprise to them also. He had reached the conclusion, and said that he had recent intelligence reports to confirm his belief, that the removal of Glubb was demanded by a group of free officers in the Jordanian Army exerting pressure on the King.

2. He appeared disappointed at his conversations with Selwyn Lloyd [2] stating that nothing new had emerged and that he was still vague (in his mind) as to British objectives in the Middle East and particularly their intentions with reference to further expansion of the Baghdad Pact. We had been previously informed that Nasr felt he had some assurances from Lloyd that there would be no further efforts to enlarge the Pact membership at this time. I asked him directly if such assurances had been given and he replied that they had not, stating that Lloyd had only said that he would have to consult with the other members of the Pact before making any commitments with reference to enlarging the membership. We discussed the further implementation of the Jordanian Water Plan at this point following the suggestions included in Russell's cable (out Message No. 5) [3] and considerably amplifying the arguments along the line that probably no more favorable time would present itself for exerting Egyptian leadership in this direction, and emphasizing that such action would be favorably received by local public opinion and be highly indicative of his capabilities for Arab leadership. We asked if this would not be possible at the next meeting of the Council of the Arab League which occurs in about 10 days. Nasr said that he had just been discussing the matter with the Syrians and that it was going to be difficult if not impossible at this point

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II. Secret. Also transmitted to Washington for Hoover.

[2] See Document 157.

[3] Document 155.

for the Syrians to approve the Plan. He further stated that if he exerted his leadership in this direction he would lose a substantial amount of popularity with the people in Syria and Jordan. We assured him that we would exert our efforts and urge others to do likewise in restoring his standing with the people of these countries. He replied that he would not be so worried about taking the action if it were not for the existence of the Baghdad Pact.

3. I asked Nasr specifically if he would move forward with both the implementation of the Jordan Water Plan and settlement of differences with Israel, if he were confident that no efforts would be exerted to enlarge the membership of the Baghdad Pact in the Arab States. Unhesitatingly he said that he would. I then asked him if he would be satisfied with an assurance that there would not be efforts to enlarge the membership of the Pact and at the same time he give assurance that he would proceed forthwith toward an early implementation of the Jordan Plan and an early settlement of differences with Israel. He implied [*replied?*] by saying that a year ago he had that idiotical [*identical?*] assurance by telegram from Eden and that thereafter the British had in fact put pressure on Jordan to join the Pact. . . .

He emphasized that it was not necessary for the British to exercise pressure directly if they could achieve their objective by exerting pressure indirectly. Later, Nasr said that not only had the British assured him by Eden's telegram that he would not try enlarge the Pact's membership in the Arab States without consulting Egypt, but pointed out that just a few days ago our own country in the declaration between the President and Eden reaffirmed its interest in the Pact and specifically stated that we regarded it as an instrument having political and economic significance.[4] This he pointed out to me was entirely contradictory of our statements that our interest stemmed from it being an instrumentality of defense against Russian aggression. I again asked him if he would be content with assurances which I might be able to give him after consultation with the British that there would be no present efforts to enlarge the Arab membership of the Pact, if at the same time and within the context of those assurances he gave equally emphatic assurance that he would proceed to secure approval of the Jordan Plan and to settle differences with Israel at an early date. Nasr asked why we would want to give assurances in this matter rather than make a public declaration of our intentions concerning the Baghdad Pact. I replied by telling him that we would not want to make any such assurances with reference to the Pact unless it was within the context of his own assurances

[4] Reference is to the Anglo-American declaration issued at Washington on February 1, 1956. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 13, 1956, p. 231.

that he would proceed with the Jordan Plan and the Israeli settlement. That I doubted that he would want these latter two items included in the text of the public statement and therefore had suggested possibility of private assurances from both sides. While Nasr did not definitely commit himself on this point he agreed that it held possibilities and said that so far as he was concerned he would not worry about the approval of the Jordan Pact [*Plan*] and would be much less concerned at making a settlement with Israel if "he had this danger removed from his back". In every meeting which I have had thus far with Nasr he seems as much preoccupied with the Baghdad Pact as any other single thing. I therefore asked him tonight whether he was really concerned with the Pact or whether he was more concerned with the rivalry of Nuri Said. Nasr stated that his primary concern was the fact that there were two schools of thought in the Arab world: One adhering to and one opposing the Baghdad Pact. The existence of these two schools of thought would continue so long as there were efforts to enlarge the Pact membership. Further conversations, however, developed quite clearly that he feels that if Britain and the U.S. announced there [*their*] intention not to enlarge the Pact it would seriously weaken the influence of Nuri Said and thus would be greatly to his advantage. He made the point that the Baghdad Pact divides the Arab world in such a way as to make it extremely dangerous for any single Arab leader to take bold action either in support of the Jordan Valley Plan or in settlement with Israel. Undoubtedly in our judgment, his concern is largely directed toward rivalry with Nuri, Nuri's machinations and financing of activities against him, and particularly Nuri's activities with regard to Syria.

4. We then got into the problem of the Israeli settlement. I expressed appreciation for the work which he and Ali Sabry had done . . . during my absence, stating that this was definite progress specifically pointing to courses of action leading toward a settlement. I pointed out, however, that we were confronted with the fact that his country was receiving arms continuously from a Soviet Bloc country and that in the eyes of world opinion this represented Egypt receiving arms from Russia. That while we appreciated his concern in molding Arab public opinion and the decisive factors he attributes to the Baghdad Pact, it was necessary that some definite actions be taken by Egypt which would establish their alignment with the Western free powers at the same time that we took action helping him to mold Arab public opinion or minimizing his fears with reference to the Pact.

That we could not morally afford the time of weeks and months which [he] has apparently envisioned as necessary to prepare the Arab world for a settlement with Israel. That pressure was increasing

on us to provide some arms to Israel in order not to permit such an imbalance as would jeopardize the country's survival. That this pressure would count [*mount*]. That we had been thinking of ways to establish confidence in Israel and other free nations of his sincerity in wanting to achieve peace. That several possible courses of action had occurred to us such as the deployment of U.N. military elements in the area, resort to other United Nations actions, giving limited defensive arms to Israel, and a number of others. That we realize that certain of these ideas would likely find opposition in Egypt. That we had thought of the possibility of asking Israel to appoint a private citizen to represent them in talks with Nasr, Ali Sabry or Zacharia in Cairo, under the very best security arrangements possible. That this might be sufficient evidence of sincerity to provide some additional time to condition public opinion and at the same time reach a substantial resolution of issues between the respective countries. That our thoughts on these various possibilities have been of an exploratory nature but that if both sides were genuinely sincere we had to take clear, specific and desirable steps which would establish mutual confidence, lessen tensions, slow down the pressure for additional arms and provide some means of securing a reasonably early settlement of the broad problems. Nasr did not disagree with these suggestions although he indicated that some of them would create problems and concern on the part of the Egyptians. The question of his meeting, or allowing Ali Sabry or Zacharia to meet with a private citizen of Israel, he did not comment on. Instead, he suggested that it would be necessary for us to meet tomorrow evening.[5] This we plan to do.

5. We also stated during conversations that if both sides really wanted peace rather than war, there would surely be found ways of achieving a settlement and that if both sides were not genuinely sincere we ought to realize that we might be working at a fruitless task. Nasr quite spontaneously interrupted to say that so far as Egypt was concerned he wanted to make quite clear that his country wanted peace and would not engage in any attack on Israel except in the defense of their own territory and forces. This was perhaps the most spontaneous reply that Nasr has made along this line and was certainly as categoric as any statement he has made at any time.

6. If possible, I would appreciate very much being advised by the Department and the Secretary with reference to such assurances that we might give Nasr to the effect that we would not propose to enlarge the membership of the Baghdad Pact in the Arab States without prior consultation with Egypt in the context of his giving us assurance that he will proceed diligently in his efforts to secure an

[5] See Document 164.

early approval of the Jordan Plan and the early resolution of differences with Israel. We would also like to have your judgment of whether any statement along this line could be made by one or both countries. We made quite clear to Nasr in this connection that unless the problems of the Jordan Valley and the settlement of the differences with Israel could be resolved that we would of necessity have to reappraise our own position with reference to the Baghdad Pact because we would not want, under any circumstances, to lessen our defenses against the Soviets. [6]

. . . . . .

10. We also discussed with Nasr the dangers inherent in a situation where both countries were receiving arms and particularly where there were fanatical elements in both countries. Nasr reacts with almost a fatalistic approach to any suggestion that there is any danger of his country being attacked, whether accidentally or by design. He says that this is a fear which the Egyptians have continuously lived with and that regardless of any circumstances it is not as great now as at some times in the past.

11. During the course of the conversations, the question arose as to what we might do in order to help Nasr with his orientation of Arab opinion to accept the settlement of differences with Israel and the approval of the Jordan Plan. In this connection we stated that if we were assured of a resolution of these problems we could in the context of that assurance probably proceed with such things as an economic survey in the Arab countries and to discussions with him and his associates of specific problems in the various Arab countries where he thought our efforts would be helpful in establishing the kind of atmosphere he wanted to achieve. Nasr seemed pleased by this suggestion.

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[6] Hoover informed Anderson on March 5: "Subject to any advice you may receive from Secretary suggest you tell Nasser you cannot give him firm position until after you have had opportunity communicate with Secretary but that you will recommend following to Secretary: U.S. will immediately hold conversations with U.K. and other members of Baghdad Pact and would expect be in position assure Nasser that at least during period necessary to work out settlement there would in fact be no further accession to Pact; if settlement achieved there would be public statements of policy of no further accession. We would, of course, expect during same period Nasser would make no effort to get any member of Pact to leave it." (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson talks w/BG & Nasser. Carbons of Incoming and Outgoing Tels)

Secretary Dulles informed Anderson on March 6 that he "Agree[d] with Hoover cable (Dir 00820) on assumption that 'no further accession' applies to Arab states and does not bind U.S. I further assume there will in fact be some assurances re. Israel at least privately and preferably a public statement on Johnston Plan." (*Ibid.*)

12. Our conversations tomorrow will probably revolve around the following:

a. What kind of assurances can we give Nasr with reference to not enlarging the Arab membership of the Baghdad Pact at this time and what kind of assurances can he give us with reference to definite steps toward approval of the Jordan water plan and the resolution of differences with Israel.

b. Whether or not he is agreeable to a private Israeli citizen coming to Cairo for talks.

c. An organized program, possibly under U.N. sponsorship, for improving the administration of the armistice tensions along the armistice lines.

d. What kind of proposals we can consider to avoid hostilities until a settlement can be achieved.

e. What actions might be taken on both sides to achieve an Arab acceptance of the settlement of two problems under discussion.

13. Drafted 1000Z, 5 Mar.

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163. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 5, 1956[1]

SUBJECT

U.S.-Israel Relations

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Government
The Acting Secretary
G—Mr. Murphy
S—Mr. Russell

Israel Government
Ambassador Eban
Minister Shiloah

Ambassador Eban and Minister Shiloah called at the Acting Secretary's request. The Acting Secretary said that he wished to express this Government's deep regret at the loss of life of the three Israel patrolmen in the incident yesterday in the Sea of Galilee. He wished also to express this Government's earnest hope that both sides would avoid any enlargement of the episode. In the past there has been a tendency, all too human, for one side or the other to strike back. Given the present tense situation, there would be a great danger that things would quickly get out of hand. The Acting

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 16. Top Secret. Drafted on March 26 by Russell.

Secretary said that his hope that the present episode could be isolated was all the stronger because of reports which we have received that Nasser may be willing to cooperate actively in promoting an agreement on the Jordan Valley Plan and on other issues. This is, therefore, an especially crucial time and the balance between peace and hostilities could be tipped very easily by the actions of either side. The Acting Secretary said that he had been pleased to note that both Israel and Syria were cooperating with General Burns and that we placed greatest importance on handling the matter in this way.

Ambassador Eban said that he would convey to his Government the [Acting] Secretary's expression of regret at the loss of life of the three Israel patrolmen. He said that he was personally gravely disappointed at the continuation of Syrian policy of interference in Lake Tiberias. He said all of the waters of the Lake are in Israel territory and there should be no Syrian activity there at all. Both General Burns and the Security Council had taken the position that any shooting by the Syrians on the Lake is a violation of the armistice agreement. He said he hoped that this Government's representation to Syria would show a differentiation between Syria's and Israel's position as Syria had engaged in the violation and had suffered no casualties. The Acting Secretary said that we did not want to take a position on the merits of the two sides in the present incident until after General Burns had completed his investigation and made a report. It is our desire to cooperate with him and back him up in every way. Ambassador Eban agreed that his request in this respect may have been premature but he believed General Burns' findings would substantiate the Israel Government's contention and hoped that at that time we would make clear to the Syrians our opposition to their activities.

Ambassador Eban said that he would like to mention two other matters. The dismissal of General Glubb by King Hussein had intensified Israel's concerns. The Israel Government had had intelligence in January of conversations between Nasser and Hussein concerning plans for liquidating the British interests in Jordan. The Ambassador said that General Glubb was not an Israel "hero" as he had led Arab forces in the fighting in 1947 but since 1950 British officers have been a restraining influence in the Arab Legion so that the new situation, with power over the Arab Legion going to extremists, must be a matter of grave concern.

The second matter which the Ambassador said he wished to raise was the publicity in the press with respect to consultation between the U.S. and France concerning the French Government's proposed sale of Mysteres to Israel. Ambassador Eban said he doubted the value of such publicity and referred especially to reports

of statements by the Department's Press Officer, Lincoln White. He said Israel had felt that the matter should be handled confidentially and the French had taken the position that the publicity made the matter of the sale more difficult. The Acting Secretary said that Mr. White had merely done his best to deal with a swarm of questions which had been fired at him by correspondents, all based on stories out of Paris. He said he could assure Ambassador Eban we had done everything possible to avoid publicity and that the fault lay elsewhere. With respect to our policy concerning the sale of the Mysteres, there had been no change since Ambassador Eban talked with Assistant Secretary Allen last week. [2]

[2] See footnote 6, Document 147.

164. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Secretary of State, at Karachi [1]

No. 111 *Cairo, March 6, 1956.*

1. . . . I met with Nasr, Zacharia and Ali Sabri at 1745. [2] Nasr said he wanted to review the objectives of the mission, which he understood to be two fold—the first involving an understanding of and the development of agreed courses of action for the settlement of broad economic and political problems in the Middle East; secondly, the working out of the Israeli problem. That he is now somewhat confused as to what he regarded as our insistence with his meeting with a representative of the Israeli Government prior to the development of agreed plans for wider problems in the area and prior to the basic resolution of the differences between Israel and Egypt. He also reiterated a feeling that the West powers were aligning themselves with Israel by public declarations and that he was becoming increasingly fearful of Zionist influence. He pointed out that recently the Defense Minister of Israel had issued a call for technicians, laborers and military volunteers throughout all of Europe and the Western countries to assist Israel in its military effort. [3]

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.-March 1956. Part II. Secret. Also transmitted to Washington for Hoover.

[2] On March 5.

[3] Ben Gurion issued this appeal on February 21 while addressing a meeting of the Histadrut in Tel Aviv.

That this call by Israel had not been challenged by the Western powers and that it was likely to provoke counter action by efforts in the Arab States to rally the Moslem world against Israel. He therefore became increasingly fearful of an East-West struggle with the Western powers and Moslem states opposing each other. He reiterated that even if the differences between Egypt and Israel could be resolved, such a resolution cured only one aspect of the problem since he would not speak for the other Arab States.

2. He repeatedly referred to the fact that he was concerned that our emphasis on an early solution of the problems and the possibility of some meeting between the Arab leaders and a representative of the IG was simply an effort on our part to please Ben Gurion and was not really directed toward the solution of his problem. We reminded him that our objectives have remained constant. We were seeking essentially to avoid war either through aggression or as a result of incidents, that we were, therefore, concerned with maintaining the armistice, reducing incidents which increased tension and of achieving an acceptable settlement of the differences between Israel and her neighbors, that of necessity the element of timing was important, that there were differences in procedural approach to these objectives, that Israel was anxious for an early meeting and an early resolution of the problems, that Nasr was reluctant to meet with representatives of the IG and envisioned a longer period to condition public opinion and to secure the acceptance of other Arab States of settlement terms, that we had accepted his conclusions that he could not meet with BG at this time, that our suggestions of a meeting with a private citizen of Israel was to introduce such elements of confidence as to afford to Nasr the time he obviously wanted to consult with other Arab States and to avoid an arms race or the pressures of [*on*] the respective countries to secure additional arms, that the suggestion was not being made to "please Ben Gurion" but was an effort to produce a period during which negotiations and consultations could be carried out in the absence of tensions, that we were still anxious to work out areas of understanding and cooperation between us and Egypt, looking toward the achievement of Egyptian efforts to better its own economy and to afford a type of Egyptian leadership in the Arab world or toward the maintenance of free governments and free people in an atmosphere of peace. I took this occasion to point to the Syrian-Israeli incident on Lake Tiberias and told Nasr the gravity which we attached to the affair, that we had urged the Israelis not to take retaliatory action. Asked him if he would not speak to the Syrians urging them to return the boat and prisoners.[4] He replied very brusquely that he

[4] See Document 159.

would speak to the Syrians but that such incidents gave him little concern and were "a part of my daily routine", that he had gotten to the point that he frequently did not read the details of reports of such incidents and when he saw the report in the paper he usually "turned the page". He quite obviously will do little more than mention our concern to the Syrians. Despite the unconcern which Nasr had for the border incidents and his feeling that a settlement could not be achieved in the foreseeable future, he several times reiterated that Egypt would not declare an aggressive war against Israel and would wage war only as a defensive measure. He conceded under questioning, however, that despite the declarations of his intentions, war could become a reality as a result of progression from an incident which was not designed to provoke general fighting.

3. I then asked Nasr how, in view of his determination not to meet with any representative of the IG, we could maintain the armistice and avoid war through aggression or accident during the period of time which he regarded as essential to a settlement. He replied by saying that all of this could be accomplished by both sides simply retiring 1 kilometer from the border and by strengthening the UN truce observer group. I asked him if he thought it would be helpful for the United Nations to sponsor wider efforts toward the maintenance of an effective armistice. He thought there might be some advantages in such an effort but continued to reiterate that all that was necessary was the procedure outlined above.

4. I asked Nasr if in the light of his refusal to meet with any representative of the IG he would consider meeting with an American citizen of Jewish faith, either under the auspices of the IG or simply in his capacity as a U.S. citizen, who might be more influential with the IG on account of his faith. Nasr replied by saying "he would still be a Jew". I asked him if I was to take this as declining and he said yes. In our judgment Nasr has now completely closed the door to the possibility of any meeting with any representative of the IG or any direct meeting with any U.S. citizen of Jewish faith on the basis of negotiation. At this point I asked Nasr if he would be willing to get into the details of proposals to settle the differences between Egypt and the IG beginning immediately with details of discussions of the problem of refugees, of the Negev, etc. He replied that he would engage in such conversations if it were completely understood that they were between the Egyptians and the United States. At this point we reviewed our prior conversations with him on the various check list items. He maintains the position which he has heretofore taken item by item. The only problems presenting substantial difficulty remain those of the refugees and the Negev. Neither of these problems he was willing to discuss tonight in detail

but stated that Ali Sabri could begin discussions . . . . He made quite clear that the position which he had taken on the Negev, i.e., the return of all of the Negev to the Arabs, he regarded as a compromise between the partition plan of 1947 and conditions as they exist today. He pointedly did not want to discuss details of either major problem but only to authorize discussions to begin. Nasr then stated that after each point had been agreed to between Egypt and Israel it would then become "his job" to secure as far as possible the agreement of other Arab States to the settlement proposals, although he made clear that certain of the Arab States would likely insist on some changes to agreed proposals between Israel and Egypt, as, for example, territorial concessions in the Lake Tiberias area to Syria.

5. At this point Nasr introduced what we regard as a completely new and discouraging element. He said "even when this is done, Egypt will not put the proposal forward as its own idea but we will then have to discuss the appropriate outside source to make the proposals, which will be submitted to Egypt and the other Arab States for acquiescence. Such proposals might be offered by the U.S., by the UN or some other nation. This we will have to decide at that time". I made clear to Nasr that so far as I was concerned, this was a new element and that we had heretofore thought that Egypt would sponsor a settlement agreement embodying the principles which it had agreed to. . . . Nasr tried to make it appear that this was not something new but something which he had perhaps not made clear. We are personally of the opinion, however, that this is an entirely new element and, while it may have been in Nasr's mind, it was never expressed at any prior meeting. It is inconsistent with the idea that we have continuously discussed that Egypt assume the position of leadership in the Arab world and of having the national prestige and courage to make proposals which the other Arab States could be induced to adhere to. In the course of discussions of the question of Egypt taking a position of leadership in arriving at a settlement with Israel involving Egyptian meetings with representatives of Israel, Nasr said, "you continue to talk of the problems with Israel as if they were my problems which I have to settle. They are, in fact, your problems and you must settle them. My only part is to be helpful in trying to sell an agreed plan to other Arab States. I am willing to discuss Egyptian policy and American policy but you will have to solve the problem of Israeli aggressiveness". To date this has been the most disappointing conference since the beginning of the mission. These points seem fairly clear:

a. There is no possibility in the near future of a direct meeting between representatives of the IG and the Egyptian Government. He is completely haunted by the fear of his own personal safety and

four times during our conversation tonight referred to the fact of Abdulla. He said "I am unwilling to gamble my future or that of my country in any circumstances similar to the Abdulla incident".

b. Nasr has ruled out the possibility of a U.S. Jewish citizen acting in behalf of the IG.

c. He will conduct conversations only with the United States as such and is unwilling or unable to spell out a time table during which such discussions would reach a conclusion.

d. If a set of proposals for the settlement of the IG-Egyptian dispute could be agreed to by both sides, Nasr considers his sole role in the operation to make an effort to sell the agreed proposals to the other Arab leaders. This he believes he could do but only subject to the other Arabs making modifications in the agreed proposals. He said categorically "I cannot lead the other Arab States or I would end up leading myself alone". This is quite a departure from our earlier conversations in which we discussed Egyptian leadership in this area.

e. Any proposals agreed to by the Egyptians and the IG and finally concurred in by other Arab leaders would then have to be sponsored by some outside power or the UN, and this subject Nasr says we should leave for discussion "at that time". He obviously does not look forward to any early resolution of the problem. He repeatedly pointed out that "this has been going on for 7 years and cannot be resolved in the near future". He quite clearly is thinking in terms of a more effective armistice without a settlement during a number of months to come and probably for the foreseeable future. He believes that a more effective armistice can be achieved simply by mutual withdrawal of forces from the border and increasing the observer group. These 2 conditions he categorically accepts.

6. As to any enlarged role of the UN, even to the point of increasing the effectiveness of the armistice, he is exceedingly vague about and has no real suggestions. It seems clear that the U.S. is now confronted with determining its course of action in absence of a settlement. At this time it appears that what we can most realistically hope and work for is not the settlement of the dispute but the avoidance of war.

7. We would greatly appreciate the Secretary and Department's thinking on the effects which a report of this meeting will have on the IG and any guidance which you can give.[5] When the IG is appraised of the current Egyptian position, they undoubtedly will re-appraise their own position, and it seems eminently important that we give our best thinking at this time to the measure of influence which we bring to bear on their re-appraisal and the preparations which we make in the light of possible decisions at which they might arrive.

8. A proper evaluation of the recession from our objectives which seem to come out of today's conference should be evaluated

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[5] See footnote 4, Document 168.

in the light of the fact that Nasr is currently carrying on conversations with the Syrians and the Saudis. The effect of these conversations on his position is something which we can speculate about but cannot now accurately evaluate at this stage. Before leaving tonight I told Nasr that we planned currently to depart for Israel on Wednesday [6] and that some additional conversation might be desirable. He agreed to hold additional conversations tomorrow evening at 1100 P.M. [7] This obviously will be after the meeting with the Saudis. At this moment I doubt the fruitfulness of any additional conversations but wanted to leave the door open. Your earliest advice and comments will be appreciated.

9. We plan to depart Cairo at 1200 noon Wednesday and arrive Athens approximately 300 P.M. Your reply should be sent in accordance with these movements.

10. Drafted 2300Z 5 Mar.

[6] March 7.
[7] See Document 173.

165. Memorandum of a Conversation With the President, White House, Washington, March 6, 1956, 10:45 a.m. [1]

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Hoover
Colonel Goodpaster

Secretary Hoover informed the President of information that continues to reach us indicating that the USSR is continuing to supply arms to the Arab nations. The President thought that if this activity is kept up for very much longer, it might be necessary to give defensive arms to the Israeli—particularly those for ground forces (since air and naval support in event of aggression against them could come from outside sources). He thought it was very important to keep in close touch with the situation in Iraq, and keep the Iraqi aware of our support and interest.

Mr. Hoover said that State Department is drafting a resolution for consideration by the United Nations relating to the situation in the Middle East. The basic thought would be to establish a United

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

Nations mediator with substantial powers—greater, in fact, than those that were held by Count Bernadotte, and greater than those now held by General Burns.

Following further discussion concerning the manner in which intransigence on both sides has contributed to the present situation, Secretary Hoover reported that Mr. Dulles had told Eban that there are pressures for moderation which could be used vis-à-vis the Arabs at the present time, but for the tendency on the part of the Israeli to take extreme actions which deny us the use of these moderating influences. [2]

No decision was taken. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss these matters, with a view to common understanding.

G
Colonel, CE, U.S. Army

[2] See Document 151.

166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France [1]

Washington, March 6, 1956—11:51 a.m.

3252. Eyes only Lodge from Hoover. Secretary and I are so concerned over seriously deteriorating situation in Near East that we feel prompt US initiative in UN Security Council mandatory to take as positive and dramatic steps as possible remedy the situation. Soviet supply of arms to Egypt, increasing feeling of desperation in Israel and talk of preventive war, question of our supplying arms to Israel, Syrian-Israeli border situation, and recent developments in Jordan, in our opinion indicate increasingly serious situation in area. Department would be remiss and subject to justifiable criticism if we did not immediately consider what preventive steps we may take within UN.

Prior to his departure, Secretary directed Department to consider possible plan of action in Security Council which would attempt to achieve his idea that Security Council should appoint some interna-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/3–656. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Ludlow; cleared with Wilcox, Rountree, Wilkins, and Russell; and approved by Hoover. Wilcox signed for Hoover.

tionally known figure with as broad powers as possible to 1) keep the peace in Palestine area; 2) recommend to UN members steps which they may take in assuring hostilities do not recur; 3) bolster conscientious but currently unproductive efforts of General Burns.[2] While we have no illusions as to obstructionist position which Soviets may take we feel we must through some such step in Council demonstrate our determination to use UN if at all possible to tranquilize area promptly.

Will be consulting with UK with idea of early Security Council meeting in mind.[3] Will advise you of progress. We do not expect consult with French until we have had full exchange of ideas with UK. I do not think it will be necessary to ask you to return. Barco will be in constant consultation with us as we proceed.

Hoover

[2] Documentation concerning a possible request from the United States for U.N. Security Council action to keep the peace in Palestine is *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., Feb. 16 to March 31, 1956, and *ibid.*, UNP Files: Lot 58 D 224, Palestine and Originals from Secty—Kashmir & Palestine, and *ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86, 320.51, and 780.00.

[3] See Document 172.

167. Message From the Acting Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Cairo[1]

No. 10 *Washington, March 6, 1956.*

Subject instructions received from Secretary, I suggest following points in final talk with Nasser:

1. Express personal keen disappointment, which you know shared by President, in negative position which yesterday's discussions[2] indicate Nasser now taking toward peace. Nasser's statements yesterday appear be in sharp contradiction with positions taken with you not only on previous trip but in first meeting with him on present trip.[3]

2. US has attempted in its policies in many ways help Nasser in cooperation which he previously indicated he wished extend in

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Secret. Repeated to Karachi for Secretary Dulles.

[2] See Document 164.

[3] See Document 162.

achieving objectives of your mission. We regret that he finds impossible continue in this cooperative effort to achieve settlement.

3. Nasser muse realize risk of war in area increasing dangerously and absence of real prospects for settlement and continuation of present trends will greatly increase that risk. Climate for settlement not likely be more favorable in future. Nevertheless, since settlement is in interest of all countries in area, we hope Nasser will let us know any steps he believes can be taken in that direction.

FYI. It probable French will announce within next day or two decision to ship 12 Mysteres to Israel. While we have waived our off-shore procurement contract rights to delivery, we taking position policy decision deliver planes to Israel is one for French Government alone to make. Drafted 1930Z.

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168. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Secretary of State, at Karachi [1]

No. 115 *Cairo, March 6, 1956.*

We have been analyzing the conversations of last night [2] and thinking in terms of the present position of this operation and possible future courses of action. Our current speculation and analysis is as foll:

1. Small likelihood Nasr may have from the beginning had in the back of his mind a feeling that any settlement with Israel cannot be achieved within the foreseeable future, but has been willing to work toward a settlement which would come at some undefinable future date. His thinking has more than likely been in terms of a settlement if and when the right circumstances developed.

2. He realized from our earlier conversations that we were thinking in terms of a considerably shorter period. As a consequence he has from time to time cautioned that a complete settlement might require "months" but to the best of our recollection the longest time which has been discussed is a period of six months. Even this length of time we have urged was unrealistic and would produce considerable problems. Heretofore he has not wanted to disillusion us and was willing to talk of the three phases leading to settlement in terms

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II. Secret. Also transmitted to Washington for Hoover.

[2] See Document 164.

of making progress as rapidly as possible so as to leave us to hope that by mutual effort the time could be shortened or that secret arrangements could come reasonably soon and be kept secret until an appropriate time came to announce them. Likewise, he has possibly from the beginning resolved that he would not meet with any representative of the I.G. but he allowed us to hope that such meeting at some level was possible. He even authorized me specifically to say to B.G. that the question of a meeting at some agreed level was open and under consideration.

3. Nasr has now concluded that he should frankly make his position that he does not believe a settlement can be made in a matter of even several months and that he is unwilling to assume the kind of leadership in a controversial issue which might make such a settlement achievable at the loss to Nasr of public popularity and which could incur the danger of increasing differences between Nasr and other Arab leaders.

4. Nasr, I think, made clear both in discussing the Jordan Valley plan and the Israeli dispute that he does not want to sponsor any settlement of a controversial issue under either his personal leadership or the leadership of Egypt. This he fears would endanger his prestige in the Arab world.

5. It may very well be that his discussion last night making clear that he would not sponsor an Israeli settlement, but would consider a proposal coming from the outside, may have been influenced by our talks on the previous evening[3] when we urged him to take a position of leadership in the approval of the Jordan Valley plan. He was quite unwilling to lead one side of an Arab controversy looking to the approval of the Johnston plan and therefore may have felt that he should make clear to us that he was likewise unwilling to accept the leadership in the settlement of the controversial Israeli dispute.

6. While Nasr likely had in his mind from the beginning a basic feeling that he was thinking in much longer terms of time than we were, and probably in terms of a different approach, it may well be that his current talks with the Syrians and the Saudis have precipitated his thinking to a point that he felt that he must now make clear to us both his long range concept of any settlement agreement as well as to disabuse our minds that he was going to accept a position of leadership on these issues in terms of sponsoring them with other Arab States.

7. One cannot necessarily conclude that Nasr has not had a change of position since the beginning of our talks and is merely making clear his position at this time. It may be that he has really

[3] See Document 162.

changed his point of view or his estimate of the situation. Sources here have been advised by Labouisse that the refugee situation is made more acute now than at any other time in the past. He may well feel that increased friction among Arab States has made problems more difficult. It has been suggested that he may have gotten to a point where he lacks confidence in his own competence since staff work in support of his efforts is very meager. He may feel, however, that under his current program of caution he is making progress toward achieving a position of increased responsibility in the Arab world and does not now want to endanger that progress prematurely by assuming a position of leadership in issues highly controversial within the Arab States. We think that all of these items of speculation and analysis are deserving of weight.

8. While he is now willing to discuss the terms of a proposed settlement with representatives of the U.S. who would discuss like terms with the IG, Nasr makes clear that he would remain uncommitted to such a plan until it had been likewise approached by other Arab States. Hence the kind of thinking which we much indulged in, i.e. arriving at agreed terms which would be kept secret until some future date at which they would be mutually announced by Egypt, IG and other participating parties, seems out of the question for Nasr would not now commit himself to settlement terms which the IG could rely on as a final future plan to be announced until the other Arab States had also agreed. He does not appear to appreciate the inconsistency between this point of view and the mind of Egyptian leadership in the Arab world which we have been talking to him about and which we have told him we would cooperate in achieving within the context of the approval of the Jordan Plan and a settlement with Israel. If, therefore, we proceed to discuss with Nasr specific terms of a settlement agreement we can only discuss them with the IG as tentative arrangements which Nasr will secretly discuss with other Arab leaders and which he will try to sell to them but not as an agreed basis of settlement which the Egyptians would openly sponsor at some future selected date.

9. Throughout both of our conversations this time Nasr has, on his own initiative, repeatedly asserted that he does not want aggressive war against Israel. His real attitude, I think, requires careful analysis. One is inclined to believe that he would like to see war avoided but that he is not willing to assume aggressive leadership to avoid it. That he is not now so concerned about the possibility of an Israeli attack. There is quite a mixed impression . . . as to whether or not Nasr now is really fearful that the Israelis might attack. There is also an element of fatalism in his attitude toward Israeli danger as well as a feeling among members of the staff here that he feels that the U.S. has sufficient influence with Israel to prevent an attack and

that we now believe it is in our own national best interest that such an attack be avoided.

10. It would seem undesirable at this moment to undertake the kind of task of laying a plan before each party to the dispute, and saying that this represents our very best estimate of what is fairly achievable under all of the circumstances since, at least from the Arab side, it would be discussed only as a document which Nasr would tentatively agree to subject to the acceptance by other Arab States with whatever modification they demanded. Under these circumstances it seems hardly possible that the Israelis would disclose their best terms for settlement. While this is an impression only, it could very well be that if a plan of settlement should be openly laid by the UN or a group of powers before both sides to the dispute including all the Arab States concerned, that while there may be loud clamoring and complaint from Arab States they might well prefer this kind of an imposed settlement to one which would be sponsored by any one or group of the Arab States. This is a matter for our future thinking and consideration.

11. In view of the great importance of the Middle East and its resources to the Western world and the NATO structure, it seems that all variations of speculation should now be carefully weighed and analyzed and perhaps judgment reserved. For example, of real importance may very well be the outcome of the tripartite talks which are now taking place in Cairo which could very well shed light on Nasr's current thinking and the validity of our own analysis. It seems to me that one primary consideration now should be what course of action lies open to us that best preserves our interest in the Middle East and which course most effectively denies the spread of Soviet influence. An analysis of these problems obviously cannot be placed in this cable but should be the subject of all our thinking. Our own feeling here is that added emphasis is now placed upon the proposal of going to the United Nations, seeking strong authorization to enforce the armistice and keep the peace.

12. Whatever may be the reasons motivating Nasr in his conversation of last evening one factor which now concerns me greatly is Nasr's stated unwillingness to assume a position of leadership in the sense of arriving at a program which he believes to be solid and giving it open and vigorous support with other Arab States, even with the assured backing of our government and our best efforts to influence in his interest other Western powers. Rather he wants to assume the position of discussing proposals not on the basis of their representing his best conclusions but on the basis of there [*their*] being possibilities. He also made quite clear that after agreeable conclusions had been reached he still wanted to be in the position of accepting something which others put forward rather than of putting

forward something as a leader which he believed to be to the best interest of the Arab world. Again it is a matter of speculation but one has to consider that Nasr may have concluded that his best chance of securing a position of leadership in the Arab world is to maintain issues around which Arab and Moslem opinion can be rallied. For example, during our discussions concerning the approval of the Jordan Plan he said "I could not openly urge the acceptance of a plan that would destroy the entire case for the refugees."

13. We feel that perhaps the most imminent problem is the reaction of the IG to a realization that a meeting in the foreseeable future is not possible and a feeling of despair that a settlement does not appear possible at any time in the near future. [4]

14. Drafted 1630Z 6 March.

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[4] On March 7, Hoover informed Anderson that he appreciated his "excellent" analysis of the March 5 meeting and told Anderson that he agreed "with paragraph 13 your message No. 115 that most imminent problem is impression that is left with IG as result of present round of discussions. In view of your intimate awareness of all problems involved, am inclined leave to you decision as to how to play it with them. It is clear that IG hope of arranging early direct meeting cannot be realized and that plans for area must be based on assumption that settlement in near future not likely. At same time, am inclined to believe it wise to include in discussion with IG leaders idea that lack of concrete progress at this time due to impasse arising from IG insistence on direct talks and unwillingness reveal positions on issues to an intermediary and of Nasser's position of unwillingness to plan direct meeting though willing discuss issues. Also believe it desirable to reflect, even though indirectly, possibility of other approaches to problem of settlement, such as concentration on separate problems, e.g., resettlement of refugees, or suggestion of terms of possible settlement by some UN official or organ or international leader.

"Believe it also desirable for you to leave definite impression with IG leaders that we fully aware of their sense of insecurity and that we are most actively at work on policies and actions for assuring security of Israel in way that will also preserve vital interests of Free World in area." (Message 12 to Anderson at Athens, March 7; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956)

169. Letter From the Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) [1]

Washington, March 6, 1956.

DEAR ADMIRAL RADFORD: With reference to your memorandum of March 1, 1956, [2] I wish to confirm your understanding, as stated in your paragraph five, of the Department's proposal in connection with military talks with the French and British and combined planning with the British, as conveyed to Admiral Hedding by Mr. Rountree.

I can appreciate fully the importance which you attach to combined military planning with the British at the earliest practicable time. Our suggestion was, as you know, motivated by a desire on the one hand to go forward with essential military plans, and, on the other hand, to maintain maximum secrecy on those aspects which would entail serious difficulty if they should become known.

Following receipt of your memorandum in which you agreed to implement a course of action consistent with the above, I discussed the matter with the British Ambassador. [3] I told him frankly that we had been disturbed by the recent Associated Press story from London which implied that the British and American military authorities had undertaken combined planning. I said that while we fully shared your view that such planning should go forward we attached much importance to secrecy. In view of the obvious French interest in the matter it was a joint view held by you and me that, in addition to the exchange of military information between the British and American Chiefs of Staff leading to combined planning, tripartite military talks might be held with the French within the context of the Tripartite Declaration and pursuant to the communiqué issued after the recent meeting of President Eisenhower and Sir Anthony Eden. [4]

The British Ambassador agreed upon the necessity of absolute secrecy with regard to the combined planning, and also expressed the view that the arrangements suggested for talks with the French would be agreeable to his Government. He undertook to communi-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–156. Top Secret. Drafted by Rountree on March 5.

[2] See Document 143.

[3] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[4] See footnote 2, Document 65.

cate to the appropriate British authorities the substance of our conversation.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Hoover, Jr. [5]

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

170. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 6, 1956—3 p.m.

893. In pursuance Deptel 617, [2] I delivered substance of Department's 594 [3] re Bnat Yaacov to Foreign Minister last night in Tel Aviv underscoring need for continued restraint. He listened carefully to message and then made following comment:

1. In event Arabs consent for Israel diversion Jordan waters not forthcoming he asked what would be U.S. policy?
2. How long does US expect GOI to await Arabs consent?

I replied we doing everything possible to obtain Arabs acceptance JV and do so without delay.

He followed these two questions with statement "Israel is absolutely incapable of waiting indefinitely". He said that time is crucial factor and he hoped that US understood that point. He wondered how long it would be before Arab consent would be obtained saying "US should make it clear to Syria that yes or no answer must be given . . . it is matter of couple of weeks". [4]

He then went on to repeat much of his former argument with regard to this subject pointing up fact that it was impossible for GOI to lose another season . . . already too many seasons had been lost and if another one were lost then project would be at complete end. Arabs would oppose it forever and it could not be revived.

He then asked question "in absence of Syrian consent, what would be US attitude?"

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–656. Secret. Received at 2:13 p.m., March 7. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, London, Paris, Ankara, Jerusalem, Baghdad, and Jidda.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 136.

[3] Printed as telegram 2000, Document 120.

[4] All ellipses are in the source text.

Referring to Department's statement that resumption of project by Israel would be contrary to UNTSO Sharett disagreed categorically. He argued that General Bennike's order to cease operations no longer valid; that order had never been confirmed by Security Council; that there was no Security Council resolution on "actual facts of work", resolution being that note was taken of Israel's consent to await urgent consideration of matter . . . that consideration completed within two months whereas Israel had delayed operations for almost three years. Sharett held that certainly such long period cannot be considered one of "urgent consideration". (This is same line Sharett took with British Ambassador with whom I conferred before seeing Foreign Minister). I replied that our position differed and was as stated that purpose my visit was to again urge continuation that patience and restraint manifested and which gratifying.

He concluded conversation by saying "I desire to ask US Government specific question; 'has US Government told Syria that in US view General Bennike's order is still valid? If so, then Syria is shielded by that assurance. It would be definite inducement to Syria to never agree that Israel start work' ". Sharett thought that US should use its good offices to bring Syria to its senses and should use them with General Burns as well.

Comment: From firmness of Sharett's reply on this and on other recent occasions; from Ben Gurion's determined attitude; and from opinion of other GOI contacts, it appears clear that Israel's present policy is determination to go ahead with project before work season is lost. It seems equally clear that GOI does not accept our thesis that resumption of work without consent of General Burns would be contrary to UNTSO and Security Council and regards US approach to Arabs as hopeless if US has assured Syria Bennike's order is still valid and that matter rests in General Burns' hands. (Deptel to Damascus 575 [5])

Lawson

[5] Document 73.

171. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 6, 1956—4 p.m.

894. In accordance with Deptel 624 [2] I sought immediately and obtained appointment with Sharett in Tel Aviv late afternoon Monday, March 5. Prior to making strong representation along lines of Deptel, I expressed my deep regret and profound sympathy for families of police killed in deplorable incident. Sharett was obviously pleased and expressed sincere thanks. He then went on to explain that shock of mortality among police officers was greater than it would have been among soldiers who by very nature their profession engage in greater risks.

Following my representation he said that incident was regarded by Israel as "extreme provocation". He said Department's statement would be taken into account and he gave impression that Department's counsel designed to avoid action which would heighten tension and lead to hostilities was generally good move. Apparently referring to US representations made to Damascus for that purpose, he said Israel did not share Department's optimism. Sharett said on other hand, by selling arms to Israel the US would greatly enhance chances of peace and urged arms for Israel without delay saying "arms and time are of the essence". He remarked he knew Secretary held different view about arms and he regretted such was the case but his (Sharett's) views were as stated.

In discussing arms question he said he felt that such essentially defensive arms as unarmed reconnaissance planes, anti-tank guns, radar equipment, anti-aircraft guns and similar equipment could have been released to Israel without any reasonable challenge. While there were important needs for tanks and other ground weapons, he said, the great need was for jets. He referred to the tremendous advantage in the air held by Egypt and said "we are not asking for 200 jets to meet the 200 MIGs Egypt is receiving—we are asking for 24 F 86's from the US. We are going to ask France for another 12 Mysteres, thus giving us total of 48 jets of approximate character of MIGs".

At this point I inquired as to possibility of Israel receiving some Meteors from the British. He waved question aside pointing out that they did not meet present requirements of Israel. He then mentioned

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–656. Confidential; Priority. Received at 5:30 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, London, Jerusalem, Beirut, Jidda, and Amman.

[2] Printed as telegram 674, Document 158.

the British Gnat and described it as light weight jet, faster than MIGs but deficient in other respects such as its very limited airflight time. He said he was not sure whether the IDF had approached the British for some of these planes.

Comment: Throughout the conversation it seemed apparent to me that Sharett's emotions had not as yet been greatly aroused by the Tiberias police boat incident. It also seemed evident that he had not been in such close touch with this development as might have been the case had he not been on his present short vacation which I interrupted. I do not believe he has experienced the full pressures he otherwise might have received from the IDF, members of his own party and other political elements which have been urging the government to take strong line. He did confirm that the GOI had informed UNTSO prior to the departure of the second police boat in support of the grounded boat, but it seemed quite clear to me that he expected no fundamental change in the Syrian-Israel situation to develop from United Nations action in this instance. But there was no emotional outburst or usual excited reference to "Israel's impossible position" or the highly agitated public sentiment factor.

Lawson

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172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Karachi [1]

Washington, March 6, 1956—9:24 p.m.

Tedul 9. Eyes only for Secretary from Hoover. Re Palestine. Since your departure I have conferred with Roger Makins on Saturday concerning our idea of Security Council action on appointment of UN Agent General to keep peace in Palestine area. [2] I informed him in general terms nature of our proposal. He indicated desire to be fully cooperative and hopes to have Foreign Office comment shortly. You may wish therefore to raise issue with Selwyn Lloyd. [3] I

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.51/3–656. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Ludlow and approved by Hoover.

[2] No record of this conversation, which took place on March 3, has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Dulles spoke with Lloyd on March 5. They especially discussed U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact: "Secretary said if we tried to build up Baghdad Pact as rival organization to Nasser and Arab League at this time when there still seemed to be chance to get Nasser to do something on Johnston water plan and also with respect to

spoke to President Monday generally outlining our thoughts on this matter.[4]

I have cabled Cabot Lodge telling him of our views as to serious nature of present situation.[5]

During next two or three days we propose discuss plans with UK and then Congressional leaders. From our present schedule we could not hope for start SC debate earlier than Monday March 19. Immediately following telegram sets forth present working draft of resolution.[6] I will be in touch with you on later developments.[7]

Hoover

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moving Egyptian and Israeli forces back from Egyptian-Israeli frontier, we might increase our difficulties and precipitate action in an already dangerous situation." The Secretary continued, "Certainly it was not possible to join this Pact without giving security agreement to Israel. If it were possible to do both, which just did not seem in cards at this time, Secretary felt we would only create greater difficulties for Iraq since Arab states would think Iraq, which they already regard as something of pariah, had agreed to US–Israel pact in return for US joining Baghdad Pact." (Secto 14 from Karachi, March 7; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 670)

[4] See Document 161.

[5] See Document 166.

[6] Tedul 10 to Karachi, March 6, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–656)

[7] See Document 206.

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173. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

No. 117 *Athens, March 7, 1956.*

REF

Outgoing No. 10[2]

1. We discussed the desirability of meeting Nasr at 2300 hours yesterday[3] and concluded that rather than urge an additional meeting we should put the burden on him. Accordingly we advised Ali Sabry that we would be glad to meet but did not at this time have additional proposals other than those heretofore advanced. That we

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518; Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II. Secret. Also transmitted to Karachi for Secretary Dulles.

[2] Document 167.

[3] March 6.

would be pleased if Nasr desired additional conversations, or had affirmative proposals for progress which he could discuss with us.

2. Ali Sabry advised us in late afternoon that Nasr had no additional proposals or information which required discussion.

3. All of the points suggested in ref were quite forcibly urged during the course of our meetings. We particularly urged that this was perhaps the most favorable time in the foreseeable future when Nasr could assure a position of leadership both on the question of the Jordan Plan and the Israeli settlement. He concedes that he would win wide backing from world opinion if he did this but states that the reverse would be true in the Arab world.

4. This morning I suggested to Byroade that we might appropriately call on Nasr on other business during the next 48 hours and make these points: [4]

a. That we were keenly disappointed by his negative position and felt that the burden of making affirmative and helpful suggestions towards progress now rested with him.

b. We hope that he might make such suggestions during this week and that they would afford the basis of our return to Cairo.

c. To suggest that possibly after the tripartite talks in Cairo he might be in a position to advise us with reference to such affirmative steps that he now felt able to take.

d. That we would remain in this area for several days and would be pleased if Nasr had any affirmative suggestions from any source which he would like to pursue with us.

5. Byroade will probably report to you separately, however he discussed with me his conversations with Trevelyan and in the light of these conversations and his own thinking is more inclined to believe that something has occurred during the last few days which has changed Nasr's point of view towards this mission and has probably alerted [*altered?*] his own assessment of his capabilities. He is more inclined to believe that something has occurred to change Nasr's approach than that the attitude which he expressed on Monday night [5] has been in the back of his mind from the beginning.

6. Those stationed in Cairo . . . are inclined to believe that Nasr is more and more preoccupied with the influence of the refugees and inclined to believe that Jordan and Syria would be particularly difficult for him to handle on either of the issues of the Johnston plan or the Israeli dispute because of growing restiveness among the refugees. Sources here also believe that Nasr has a

[4] See Document 191.
[5] See Document 164.

growing concern about the stability of the Jordanian and Syrian Governments on account of the refugee problem.

7. Drafted 1845 hours local 7 March.

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174. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 7, 1956—noon.

899. Reference Bnat Yaacov (Embassy telegram 893 [2]), Foreign Minister requested late last night following additions be made to his comment to me:

1. Re General Burns, will United States request him to permit GOI begin work if in course of few weeks Syrians do not agree to JVP?

2. What would United States do if Israel began work after waiting period brings no results? Will United States in that case inform Syrians "in advance" that United States will support GOI position?

I made no attempt to give categorical replies to either Sharett or Herzog his messenger as he obviously expected me to submit questions to Department for reply either through Israeli Embassy or this Embassy.

Lawson

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–756. Secret. Received at 10:23 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, London, Paris, Ankara, Jerusalem, Baghdad, and Jidda.

[2] Document 170.

175. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, March 7, 1956—6 p.m.

3791. Embtel 3683, March 2 [2] contains summary of Selwyn Lloyd's first conversation with Nasser while Lloyd was in Cairo last week. Embassy has subsequently discussed matter with Foreign Office on several occasions, keeping in mind summary contained in Cairo's 276 March 4, [3] which appears contain several inaccuracies. Following seem to have been main points covered in 2 meetings which Lloyd held with Nasser:

1. Baghdad Pact.

Lloyd told Nasser Her Majesty's Government considered Baghdad Pact effective tool for ensuring defense of Middle East from Soviet threat and for promoting economic cooperation and well-being in Middle East. At present United Kingdom not pressing other Arab States join Pact. In reply Nasser's query whether this would be Her Majesty's Government policy in future Lloyd replied he could not say and furthermore other members of Baghdad Pact would have to be consulted. According Foreign Office Lloyd did not however say Baghdad Pact had been a mistake. Nasser said he did not object to "frozen" Baghdad Pact which he felt could be associated in some manner with revived ACSP with Iraq as member of both Pacts.

2. Israel.

Nasser said primary condition for Arab-Israel settlement was period of peace and quiet on armistice lines and he would be prepared to withdraw Egyptian forces either one-half or 1 kilometer from armistice lines provided Israel agreed do likewise. Said he was not opposed to increasing observers though he doubted usefulness this measure. He was not against erection of fence provided it did not follow armistice lines in their entirety as this would tend give armistice lines character of permanent boundaries. Only since December had he realized strength and feeling of Arab refugees and he was convinced no Arab-Israeli settlement could be achieved unless refugees were given choice of returning to homeland or adequate compensation. Regarding frontiers, he said any settlement must

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 641.74/3–756. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:32 p.m.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 641.74/3–256)

[3] Printed as telegram 1748, Document 157.

provide a land link between Arab countries in Africa and Asia and must provide for border adjustments to reunite Arab villages with agricultural lands. As stated Embtel 3683 he also said there could be no settlement while Arab world was split, although he agreed on need for settlement.

3. Jordan Valley Plan.

As stated in Cairo's 276 Lloyd urged Nasser act to secure success of JVP and Nasser agreed but pointed out his capacity limited since this not appropriate time for Johnston's visit.

4. Anti-United Kingdom Propaganda.

Lloyd pointed out Egypt could not expect United Kingdom's assistance in Sudan and elsewhere so long as Egypt continued its virulent radio and press attacks against United Kingdom, directed both at Jordan and East Africa. Nasser appeared agreeable to calling off such attacks, provided he received assurances regarding area policy outlined Embtel 3683.

5. Saudi Arabia.

Nasser said he felt that Saudi Arabia had been unwise in several instances in use of its money. Nasser has been embarrassed and annoyed by Saudi gift of money to Moslem Brotherhood and by Saudi desire give gratuities to Egyptian paratroopers training Saudi army. Nasser said we should discount rumors of dissension and insecurity of King Saud's position in Saudi Arabia. Nasser indicated he would advise King Saud to be reasonable in his talks with British, but did not speak as strongly on subject as suggested numbered paragraph 2 Cairo's 276.

6. Meteors.

Lloyd told Nasser United Kingdom planning give Israel 6 meteor fighters and indicated United Kingdom planning fill outstanding requests of both Egypt and Syria for number of Meteors. (Foreign Office understands these have all been discussed in NEACC.)

Aldrich

176. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Karachi, March 8, 1956—2 p.m.

Dulte 14. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. There follows speculative exercise by Secretary of State which he and Allen think may be of interest to Department. It is transmitted without recommendation because we do not here have adequate time study the matter nor do we have facilities to appraise feasibility from standpoint of attitude of other countries

Obviously this line of action would be a clear-cut challenge

Obviously this line of action would be a clear-cut challenge to Soviet-Egyptian ambitions . . . .

"1. U.S. will adhere to Baghdad Pact with modification of, or reservation to, Article V so that any state may accede by unanimous approval of the UN members.

2. UK settles their controversies with Saudi Arabia.

3. US by Congressional resolution, preferably responsive to UN-sponsored request, authorizes President act in cooperation with other UN members to insure compliance with Israeli-Arab armistice agreements that the armistice lines shall not be changed except by mutual agreement, it being also understood that, as provided in these agreements, the armistice lines are not necessarily permanent boundary lines.

4. The US would then:

(A) Provide substantial military support to Saudi Arabia and Iraq;

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[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 663. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 5:54 a.m. Hoover sent a copy to the President, whose copy bears a notation indicating that he saw it. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)

(B) Accelerate its programs for Iran and Pakistan; and
(C) Sell defensive arms to Israel." [2]

Dulles

[2] Hoover responded to Dulles' telegram as follows:
"I believe suggestions Dulte 14 most helpful in connection urgent Staff Studies under way here. In light information from Cairo we proceeding on premise Nasser will not cooperate at present in seeking Arab-Israel settlement and is in effect working against West in concentrating on establishment 'non-identified', at best, bloc nations under Egyptian domination. We studying measures which might be taken against Egypt itself and against Egyptian influence in area.
"As you state success of program you outlined would depend on ability split Saudis from Egyptian orbit. We would need to induce at least tacit acceptance Baghdad Pact. Even this process of getting Saudis not to oppose Pact obviously most difficult in view . . . current successes, notably in Jordan, of ESS combine; possibility Saudi adherence in foreseeable future considered virtually nil. On our instructions, Gallman has discussed with Nuri necessity improve Iraqi-Saudi relations and we seeking Wadsworth's advice this connection on basis Nuri's suggestions. To afford reasonable possibilities of success careful planning and coordination with other countries, especially UK, essential." (Tedul 16 to Karachi, March 8; Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–856)
For texts of two of the "Staff Studies", see Documents 192 and 222.

177. Diary Entry by the President [1]

Washington, March 8, 1956.

The attached cable [2] does not represent any fixed plan. It reflects nothing more than some "thinking aloud" by Secretary Dulles. Nevertheless—either through coincidence or because I may have talked about this matter with the Secretary in the past—it does indicate one line of action we might possibly pursue in the Mid East, if present policies fail (as they have so far) to bring some order into the chaos that is rapidly enveloping that region.

Of course, there can be no change in our basic position, which is that we must be friends with both contestants in that region in order that we can bring them closer together. To take sides could do nothing but to destroy our influence in leading toward a peaceful settlement of one of the most explosive situations in the world today.

I cannot help reminiscing just a bit. In 1946 or 1947, I was visited by a couple of young Israelites who were anxious to secure arms for Israel. (I was then Chief of Staff of the Army.) I tried to talk to these

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret.
[2] *Supra.*

young men about the future in that region. The two of them belittled the Arabs in every way. They cited the ease with which the Turkish Empire was dismembered following World War I and in spite of a lot of talk about a Holy War the Arabs, due to their laziness, shiftlessness, lack of spirit and low morale, did nothing. They boastfully claimed that Israel needed nothing but a few defensive arms and they would take care of themselves forever and without help of any kind from the United States. I told them they were mistaken—that I had talked to many of the Arab leaders and I was certain they were stirring up a hornets' nest and if they could solve the initial question peacefully and without doing unnecessary violence to the self-respect and interests of the Arabs, they would profit immeasurably in the long run.

I would like to see those young Israelites today. Their names have now slipped my mind, but they must be recorded in the records of appointments made for me while I was Chief of Staff. They were sent to me by one of the Congresswomen—I believe either Mrs. Rogers or, more likely, Mrs. Bolton.

In any event, we have reached the point where it looks as if Egypt, under Nasser, is going to make no move whatsoever to meet the Israelites in an effort to settle outstanding differences. Moreover, the Arabs, absorbing major consignments of arms from the Soviets, are daily growing more arrogant and disregarding the interests of Western Europe and of the United States in the Middle East region. It would begin to appear that our efforts should be directed toward separating the Saudi Arabians from the Egyptians and concentrating, for the moment at least, in making the former see that their best interests lie with us, not with the Egyptians and with the Russians. We would, of course, have to make simultaneously a treaty with the Israelites that would protect the territory (possibly this might be done through a statement, but I rather think a treaty would become necessary).

In fact, I know of no reason why we should not make such a treaty with Israel and make similar ones with the surrounding countries.

I am certain of one thing. If Egypt finds herself thus isolated from the rest of the Arab world, and with no ally in sight except Soviet Russia, she would very quickly get sick of that prospect and would join us in the search for a just and decent peace in that region. [3]

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[3] Tedul 27 to Colombo, March 10, transmitted a message from Eisenhower to Dulles in response to Dulte 14, *supra*. The message reads in part: "I tend to believe that we should seriously consider getting Libya and Saudi Arabia firmly in our camp, and at the same time, perhaps, give Israel the necessary assurances. Thus, the possibility of trouble in that region might be greatly minimized, if not practically eliminated." (Department of State, Central Files, 110.10–DU/3–1056)

178. Memorandum of Discussion at the 279th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 8, 1956 [1]

Present at the 279th meeting of the Council were the following: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 1 and 2); the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (for Items 1 and 2); the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget; General Thomas D. White for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Special Assistants to the President Anderson and Jackson; the Special Counsel to the President (for Item 1); the Deputy Assistant to the President; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Items 1 and 2); the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of items 1 and 2.]

3. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence indicated that he would deal first with the situation in the Near East. The Watch Committee, [2] he said, met yesterday and had since given us their judgment as to the prospects for hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis. They concluded that Arab-Israeli hostilities could break out without further prior warning. On the other hand, they concluded that no decision to launch such hostilities had yet been made by either side. Finally, they pointed out that hostilities could, of course, arise from miscalculation by either side. . . .

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on March 9.

[2] The Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee of the National Security Council was charged with the responsibility of providing the U.S. Government with the earliest possible warning of hostile action on the part of the Soviet Union or its allies which would endanger the national security of the United States. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence acted as the committee's chairman, and membership was restricted to senior representatives from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force as well as from the Joint Intelligence Group, the CIA, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Dulles then said he would outline the factors which had lately intensified the danger of hostilities in the Middle East. There was, first of all, the border incidents. Secondly, there was the Israeli claim that one of their aircraft had been shot down over Israeli territory by the Syrians.[3] Thirdly, there were fresh incidents on the borders between Egypt and Israel. Fourthly, there were the recent developments in Jordan leading to the dismissal of General Glubb. . . . Colonel Nasser has repeatedly claimed that he knew nothing in advance of the proposal to dismiss General Glubb. Since there was no apparent point in his lying to us, Mr. Dulles concluded that the dismissal was the independent decision of the Jordanian King. Fifteen other high British officers of the Arab Legion will probably now be withdrawn by the British Government. Yet another fifty British officers are under contract to the Government of Jordan, and they cannot be recalled unless the treaty between the UK and Jordan is violated or annulled. In any event, the result of the dismissal of General Glubb has been to disorganize the Arab Legion, which was the best Arab fighting force in the Middle East.

Mr. Dulles went on to point out that these developments had had a most profound effect in Great Britain. There had been a debate on the subject in Parliament yesterday. Sir Anthony Eden had managed to win it, but the going had been very tough. . . .

The fifth point to explain the intensification of unrest in the Middle East was the general decline of British and U.S. prestige in the area.

Mr. Dulles next went on to give the National Security Council a statement of the most recent items of armament delivered by the Soviet bloc to Egypt. He also pointed out that the delivery of such bloc arms to Syria had now begun.

Mr. Dulles then turned to the problem of Colonel Nasser. The latter's attitude had suddenly changed in the course of the last few days, perhaps as a result of the Cairo conference between him, King Saud, and the President of Syria.[4] In any case, his attitude with respect to cooperation to preserve the peace had stiffened, and he seemed to be playing now for time. Nasser may well now picture himself as the leader of all the Arab nations.

On the other hand, the Israelis see time slipping away and ever less likelihood of any decision with respect to the division of the waters of the Jordan River. There were widespread feelings of helplessness and despair in Israel. At the recent debate in the

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[3] On March 5, Syrian machinegunners had shot down an Israeli plane in the frontier area, and, the following day, Syria had lodged a complaint with the Mixed Armistice Commission, which accused the Israelis of having violated Syrian air space.

[4] See footnote 4, Document 142.

Knesset (parliament), the right-wing element had urged preventive war at once. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had opposed this view and managed to secure a rather lukewarm vote of support. Nevertheless, Israel was undergoing a slow mobilization.

[Here follows discussion of French North Africa.]

The National Security Council: [5]

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the situation in the Middle East and in French North Africa.

[Here follows discussion of Southeast Asia and Thailand.]

S. Everett Gleason

[5] The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1525. (Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 279th Meeting held on March 8, and approved by the President on March 9; Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

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179. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, March 8, 1956—4 p.m.

1794. Reference Embtel 1790 March 7. [2] Since sending our comments, Embtel 1683, [3] on possibility Soviet participation in High Dam which again discussed by Trevelyan in cables sent London March 5 cited in reference telegram, we have been thinking about problem great deal and I have discussed it with both Nasser and Kaissouni. Nasser assures me GOE proposals for revision aides-mémoire not related to possibility Soviet participation. This possibility has, of course, existed from beginning and I have made it clear to both Nasser and Kaissouni in my personal opinion we would not and could not support an arrangement for financing High

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/3–856. Confidential. Received at 3:27 p.m.

[2] Byroade reported in telegram 1790 that Trevelyan on March 5 had sent two cables to the British Foreign Office "elaborating further his observations and views regarding United Kingdom and United States aid for High Dam with reference proposed revision aides-mémoire providing therefore. These repeated British Embassy Washington." (*Ibid.*, 874.2614/3–756)

[3] Document 127.

Dam which involved Soviet participation; that GOE, before entering into such an arrangement, would have to choose "one or the other".

While we do not believe there is any chance of getting written commitment from GOE in this regard, for reasons indicated Embtel 1683, or of getting even oral commitment which would be binding for whole period of construction, I think it would be serious mistake to let this issue obstruct conclusion of agreement. After Western financing is once launched on exclusive basis, we will have opportunity of demonstrating to GOE advantages of continuing on this basis while, we can assume, Nasser is encountering some of difficulties which will inevitably develop in his relations with Soviet. Having told Nasser GOE must choose, we believe that, if GOE permitted Soviet participation at any stage, we would have to regard such action as indication GOE prepared abandon cooperation with West. Our policy toward Egypt would then require major revision in which Western financing of High Dam would have no place. By "Soviet participation" we mean Soviet contribution on a scale which would give project appearance of a joint Western and Soviet Bloc operation, i.e. Soviet responsibility in management, planning or engineering sectors, but not necessarily the purchase of some common items of equipment or materials in the Soviet Bloc with Egyptian funds on a commercial basis.

We believe there is every advantage in promptly discussing with GOE their proposals for revision aides-mémoire. Further delay is likely to re-awaken GOE suspicions regarding our intentions toward assisting with High Dam project or to be interpreted as exertion of pressure in favor of settlement of Israeli problem. If delay due to encounter by Department of additional basic issues in its study GOE proposals, we hope be advised soonest in order we may submit such observation as we believe might be useful.

Regarding Deptel 2076.[4] There is no question that views given Trevelyan by Vice Premier represent governmental position which was taken after considerable discussion with Nasser.

Byroade

[4] See footnote 5, *ibid.*

180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General at Hong Kong [1]

Washington, March 8, 1956—6:01 p.m.

3096. Deliver Ambassador Eric Johnston, Peninsula Hotel. From Barnes. Nasser reply through Byroade asserts his continuing desire cooperate but doubts time appropriate. However, without committing himself to initiate matter he hints states concerned might discuss it tentatively scheduled mid-March League meeting probably in Amman. Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai told Mallory he would definitely ask for discussion at League meeting and if results positive states concerned would consider asking you meet with them. Rifai also told British Ambassador Duke he would request side meeting of four JVP states in conjunction League meeting. Ghazzi reply to Moose démarche was that matter required consideration and he would advise Moose of Syrian attitude later. Embassy Baghdad however reports Ghazzi told Iraqi Minister he had told Moose Syria unprepared accept plan. Chamoun replied that only Egypt could influence Syria who represented principal opposition but Fouad Ammoun indicated to Heath Lebanon wanted peaceful solution water question.

Meanwhile Shiloah advises that Israel accepts all four points proposed by us to Eban but in absence any official Departmental expression Israel assurance is given in same informal context as our suggestion was made although Shiloah says Cabinet made the decision.

Department is drafting instructions to embassies concerned to press for JVP consideration at mid-March Arab League meeting. [2] I recommend we suggest League should express endorsement of plan as economic project compatible with Arab policy and authorize Jordan Lebanon and Syria to accept with League blessing. In unlikely event League does this, JV states might request you meet with them late March on way home or early April. Meanwhile believe Department should informally advise Hammarskjold its present course of action. [3]

Hoover

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–856. Secret. Drafted by Barnes, cleared with Troxel and Russell, and approved by Burdett who signed for Hoover.

[2] See Document 183.

[3] The Consulate General at Hong Kong informed the Department in telegram 1776 on March 12 that Johnston had received this message. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–1256)

181. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Secretary of State, at New Delhi [1]

No. 121 *Tel Aviv, March 9, 1956.*

I met with B-G, Sharett, Kollek and Herzog 9 March from 0900 to past 1200. [2]

1. I outlined conversation with Nasr making particularly the points that we had continued to seek a personal meeting with representatives of the IG and Egypt through a suggestion that IG appoint a private person for this purpose. That Nasr had considered this suggestion but again declined due to reasons of endangering his government and personal regime. That Nasr continued to be willing to negotiate with Israel through U.S. representatives. That we had done our very best to secure negotiations directly as desired by the IG and would now proceed to lay documents before the respective governments for their consideration if the IG would approve such procedure. That the interest of our government in peace continued and we felt that every effort toward achieving settlement agreeable to the respective sides must be continued.

That we would continue to work for direct negotiations but since we could not foresee immediate results the only alternative toward continuation seemed to lie in an intermediary presenting suggestions working towards bringing the points of view together.

That I had discussed with Nasr the JVP and had urged him to work toward approval at the earliest possible time, suggesting the next meeting of the Arab League Council. That Nasr doubted that the JVP could be approached at this time due to the instability in Syria and current developments in Jordan.

2. I reiterated the sincere and continuing desire of the President to exhaust every possibility for securing settlement which he regards as essential to the best interest of the people in countries involved as well as the Free World, that the IG must accept the conscientious thought and effort of the Secretary of State concerning the arms problem under consideration. That the Secretary had been exceedingly frank and honest in his approach. That the arms question was not a foreclosed one but that our government and the Secretary in particular was concerned with the best interest of Israel in terms of survival and its being accepted in the family of nations surrounded by vastly superior Arab populations. That I wanted to place special

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II. Secret. Also transmitted to Washington for Hoover.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, Meetings with Israeli Officials. January 1956–March 1956)

emphasis upon the conscientious thought and careful weighing of both the long-term and short-range objectives by the Secretary.

3. B-G made the following points:

a. From the beginning he had little faith in our being able to secure a settlement but had hoped for a "miracle". Particularly since the mission had been conceived and directed by the President. That he had tried to accept Nasr's declaration of peaceful intention and good faith but continued to fear that Nasr could not control his own forces, had become the subject of his own propaganda effort, was essentially preoccupied with endeavoring to establish his prestige in other countries and despite his declarations of good intentions had refused to issue a cease fire order although during recent weeks he had been appealed to by this mission, Hammarskjold and Burns. That he now had increasing doubts as to Nasr's own sincerity and thought he would follow whatever course of action seemed best suited to achieve his own purposes of Arab leadership.

b. B-G stated that efforts in behalf of this mission could be continued "if we wanted to continue them" but that he had now to be concerned with one single thing and that was the defenses and security of his own people. That during recent weeks he and Sharett had deliberately "set their faces against" Cabinet consideration of their position as regards military capability, and that now this became a necessity. That this consideration would take place within "two or three days after my return to the U.S." That at that time they would look forward to an answer from us concerning arms and that if no answer was forthcoming immediately they would regard it as a negative answer.

c. B-G was concerned with statements made at the President's Wed press conference [3] (the text of which I have not seen and which B-G knew about through newspaper reports) stating the President's statement indicated a negative attitude on furnishing arms to Israel. He says it is in contrast to the President's statement of Nov 9. [4] I told him that we had not seen the text of the President's press conference and I was unable to comment but that the attitude of the President continued as I had described it.

d. B-G stated that he wanted to point out there was no validity to the argument that Israel could not absorb arms. That while the population of Egypt was vastly superior to Israel, the IG nevertheless has as many available men for arms as Egypt due to factors of health, mental ability and literacy. That he believed Egypt had now acquired about all the arms it could assimilate and that the converse was true of Israel. That Israel could defend itself with much less arms than Egypt required. For example, Sharett stated that if Egypt had 200 MIGs, Israel would need between 75 and 100.

e. B-G stated he could not believe that we could now morally decline Israel's arms request.

f. Upon being pressed as to whether they would consider continued negotiations through an intermediary by means of laying

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[3] For the transcript of the President's press conference on March 7, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956*, pp. 286–299.

[4] See the editorial note, vol. XIV, p. 725.

prepared documents before their respective sides or otherwise, B-G and Sharett both stated that they felt such an exercise would be a "mockery" until such time as they had assured their own defenses.

g. B-G said he wanted to speak particularly about the tripartite guarantee which he described as "useless". So far as Britain was concerned he expressed a complete lack of confidence that they would be willing to join Israel against either Egypt or Jordan. That so far as U.S. and France was concerned he had some misgivings but even if we would join Israel against Egypt our aid would come too late.

4. B-G made unmistakably clear that his next objective will be to reappraise his situation with his Cabinet and that he no longer will be motivated by hopes resulting from this mission. He also stated that he felt the mission had worked adversely to Israel's interest by providing additional time for Egypt.

5. He stated that the problem was no longer one of securing peace in the near future but of avoiding war and that the latter in his judgment could only be achieved by building up sufficient strength in Israel to deter aggression.

6. Sharett asked to amplify B-G's statement. That he did not believe in Nasr's good faith. That he believed Egypt capable of either direct aggression or provocation. That he felt one of three courses would develop:

a. A direct offensive by Egypt;

b. Provocation through raids and continued border incidents which would provoke Israel to attack;

c. Sending military or suicide squads into Israel so as to create fear in the population, making work and progress impossible. He said quite clearly that the latter action would not be tolerated and if necessary would be ended by force. He emphasized at the end of our conference that any of the above would mean war.

7. I asked B-G and Sharett for their own calculated assessment as to likelihood of war in the near future resulting from one of the conditions which Sharett outlined. They both agreed that they felt this was a most likely course of action.

8. Sharett stated that he now felt that Israel was entitled to an emphatic yes or no on the question of arms and that his government would press for it.

9. I emphasized most strongly that the consideration of this question had been undertaken and would continue to be considered in the best of faith with the best interest of Israel in mind and that we hoped his country would approach the problem not from the sole selfish interest of the problem involving Egypt and Israel but as well from the viewpoint of the international responsibilities of the U.S., its partners in NATO, its dependence upon the resources of the

Middle East and that ultimately all of these responsibilities become in part the responsibility of Israel as well as the U.S.

10. Sharett stated that after the beginning of this mission they had cooperated through statements, desisted from work at Banat Yaacov and refrained from returning Egyptian fire, etc. That Egypt had secured additional arms, consolidated her military planning with Saudi Arabia and Syria, continued to fire on the border and continued to make anti-Israeli statements etc. These factors he urged worked to Israel's disadvantage and imposed additional moral responsibilities.

11. It is clear, and Sharett stated categorically, that this mission could no longer be taken into their own calculations with regard to their military position vis-à-vis Egypt. That they would have to reassess their whole position in the light of settlement not likely being achievable in the near future and in the light of either a decision being made concerning arms within a short time or their taking a lack of decision as a negative answer. They would reconsider their position concerning diversion of the Jordan waters because their internal policies could not be dictated by Egyptian desires or bluff.

12. The conference closed with my urging that they not take precipitate or quick action and that they have an appreciation for our national responsibilities to NATO and the Free World and that all of our actions be assessed and discussed with us in the context of our working as sincerely as possible in the long range interest of Israel.

13. B-G said as we left that he felt confident that his position was understood and that his government and Israel had the goodwill of the President and Secretary of State.

14. We plan to return to Athens arriving there midnight 9 Mar. [5]

15. Drafted 1400, 9 Mar.

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[5] In Message 13 to Anderson at Rome, March 13, Hoover remarked, in reference to this meeting, "You have stated our position most accurately and forcefully to both sides and in a way that I know will leave lasting helpful impression." (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956)

182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, March 9, 1956—5:09 p.m.

5148. Deliver following message from the President to Prime Minister at once. In doing so make clear US position on adherence Baghdad Pact is not frozen.

Begin verbatim text.

Dear Anthony: I share your concern over the current developments in the Middle East [2] and know that Foster has discussed them with Selwyn Lloyd. [3]

We face a broad challenge to our position in the Near East and to our objectives of strengthening our ties with those countries. I believe that our reaction should consist not of isolated moves, but a carefully thought out program.

The Soviets have made abundantly clear even in their public statements their intentions toward the Near East. It is of course true that some of the moves made by Nasser, though for different reasons, have the effect of assisting the Soviets. It may be that we shall be driven to conclude that it is impossible to do business with Nasser. However, I do not think that we should close the door yet on the possibility of working with him. For one thing, such a decision would cancel out any prospects of obtaining now an Arab-Israel settlement.

I agree thoroughly with you on the necessity of aiding our friends and have written you separately with respect to the additional Centurion tanks for Iraq. [4] However, I question whether adherence by the United States to the Baghdad Pact now is the right answer. Measures apart from actual accession to the Pact such as our recent decision to increase aid to Pakistan and Iran may be more effective support for our friends. This is particularly true when drawbacks to adherence are considered, such as the effect on the other Arab States and probable demands for arms and a security guarantee to Israel.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower to Eden Correspondence 1955–1956. Vol. I. Secret. Repeated to New Delhi for Secretary Dulles.

[2] See footnote 6, Document 161.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 172.

[4] The President on March 6 informed the Prime Minister that he planned to request funds from Congress to supply Iraq with 40 additional Centurion tanks. Eisenhower, however, wished this information to remain secret until the administration had formally presented the program to Congress. He hoped to handle the request in a manner which would not increase Arab-Israeli tensions. (Telegram 5037 to London, March 6; Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/3–656)

I do not believe that our assessment of the situation in Jordan is firm enough to permit useful comment on your suggestion that you allot to Iraq some of the aid currently given to Jordan.

I am pleased that you sent me your preliminary thoughts and shall be waiting to hear the results of the discussions between Selwyn Lloyd and Foster. [5]

Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower

End verbatim text.

Hoover

[5] For Eden's response, see Document 204.

183. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, March 10, 1956—6:34 p.m.

2182. Deptel 2000 to Cairo. [2] Dept agrees with Rifai (Amman's 446 [3] and 452 ToDep [4]) that time has arrived for Arab decision on JVP and suggests you support in any way appropriate inclusion JVP for consideration at forthcoming Arab League Council meeting. Following points may be useful:

1. Since last Council meeting Lebanon has obtained loan from IBRD for Litani and Egypt has progressed far in negotiations High Dam. HKJ now entitled opportunity its development through Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers.

2. Consideration JVP at March Council meeting appropriate from standpoint Arab policy. Highly publicized March 1 date recommencing work Banat Ya'qub has passed without Israel action. Arab states maintained firm position, demonstrating to world their refusal bow to pressure. League can now take up question accordance decision last Oct acting own good time at regularly scheduled meeting of Council.

3. Final approval of JVP at Council meeting neither necessary nor expected. Jordan, Lebanon and Syria as countries directly in-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A. 85322/3–1056. Secret. Drafted by Troxel; cleared with Bergus, Burdett, and Ludlow; and approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover. Also sent to Amman, Damascus, and Beirut. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, Paris and pouched to Ankara, Baghdad, Jidda, and Jerusalem.

[2] Document 120.

[3] Document 138.

[4] Document 148.

volved sought advice League re JVP pursuant their desire coordinate policy with fellow Arab states. Logical next step for League Council to note findings Arab Technical Committee, recognize technical validity and economic soundness of plan and find that plan is consistent with Arab policies and consequently states directly concerned should approve it in accordance with their constitutional procedures. Remaining details could then be worked out with states concerned. Johnston prepared return area this purpose if desired.

FYI present thinking is Johnston's return area would not be warranted unless Council finds at minimum JVP is not inconsistent Arab policy. End FYI

Advise British and French colleagues of foregoing.

Hoover

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184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan [1]

Washington, March 10, 1956—6:35 p.m.

491. US, UK and Italian representatives on Ambassadorial Committee indicated on March 6 that decision to ship Mysteres was one for France to make. [2] Each representative expressed opinions indicating proposed shipment had neither been approved nor disapproved.

French representative said he would report to his Government views expressed at meeting and thought he could say to his Government that no objections were raised to shipment. He noted administrative aspects (i.e., US approval of interruption offshore procurement program) of case were settled.

French Embassy has had no comment from Paris but anticipates decision following Pineau's return from Karachi about March 12. If French then decide to ship, as seems likely, Dept anticipates there will be leaks to press indicating shipment made with approval of US and UK.

We hope public and press in Arab states will not take it as shipment of US arms to Israel. Nevertheless there remains likelihood it will be so regarded and that public demonstrations against Ameri-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/3–1056. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins and Hoffacker and approved by Wilkins who signed for Hoover. Also sent to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Tripoli. Repeated to London, Paris, and to Tel Aviv.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, 784A.56/3–656)

cans and American property would follow. Dept believes next week or ten days will be crucial period during which you should take special precautions. You should in your discretion discuss with Americans but such discussions should be most discreet and no publicity given to them at this stage.

Hoover

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185. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, March 12, 1956.

I met with the President for approximately half hour this morning and covered a number of current items with him. Colonel Goodpaster was present.

(1) We reviewed briefly Mr. Anderson's trip to Egypt and Israel. I told the President he would probably be in Washington sometime this afternoon and the President expressed a desire to see him. (The meeting was subsequently set up for 4:30 p.m., and Mr. Anderson and I discussed the Middle East problems with the President for almost two hours. This will be reported on separately. [2])

(2) I outlined our proposed plans for introducing a resolution in the Security Council [3] and stated that although we were talking with the British and the French on a tripartite basis, we were, nevertheless, holding up final decision on the operation until Ambassador Lodge's return to New York on March 13.

(3) The President examined with some interest an intelligence summary which I had with me outlining the disposition of military forces in Israel and the surrounding Arab states. [4] He commented that the Arabs had certainly laid themselves open to a quick thrust

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. The meeting described here took place at 10:30 a.m. The time of the meeting is from Goodpaster's memorandum of conversation. (*Ibid.*, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

[2] *Infra.*

[3] See Document 206.

[4] Reference is to an intelligence estimate, March 8, entitled "The Arab-Israeli Situation", prepared by the Intelligence Advisory Committee's Ad Hoc Working Group on the Arab-Israeli Situation. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., Feb. 16 to March 31, 1956)

by the Israelis and that he did not have much confidence in their military planning.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

H.

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186. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, March 12, 1956.

At the President's suggestion I accompanied Mr. Robert Anderson to the White House this afternoon at 4:30 for a briefing on his recent negotiations in Egypt and Israel. The three of us remained alone for almost 2 hours.

Mr. Anderson described in some detail the conversations he had had with Nasser and Ben Gurion, giving a considerable amount of background and local color. Mr. Francis Russell will give you a memorandum on the substance of Mr. Anderson's report. [2]

While many alternatives were discussed, no attempt was made to formulate a definitive course of action.

However, we seemed to be agreed on the following:

(1) Mr. Anderson said that he believed neither Israel nor the Arab States wanted war but that the situation was inflammable due to great emotional stress and the immediate proximity of hostile armed forces.

(2) A suitable tripartite resolution should be introduced in the Security Council at an early opportunity. [3]

(3) We should make every attempt to try to effect a split between Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

(4) We should consider transmitting letters from the President to Nasser and Ben Gurion in which the President would express his extreme disappointment at the inability of the two sides to get together and our hope that some further conversations could be carried on.

H.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

[3] See Document 206.

187. Diary Entry by the President [1]

Washington, March 13, 1956.

Conversation with Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. and Robert B. Anderson (afternoon of March 12, 1956)

Late in the afternoon Mr. Anderson returned from the Mid East, where he has been serving as my personal representative in an attempt to bring about some kind of rapproachement between Egypt and Israel. This was the second trip he has made into this area.

He made no progress whatsoever in our basic purpose of arranging some kind of meeting between Egyptian officials and the Israelites. Nasser proved to be a complete stumbling block. He is apparently seeking to be acknowledged as the political leader of the Arab world.

In reaching for this, Nasser has a number of fears. First of all, he fears the military junta that placed him in power, which is extremist in its position to Israel. Next he fears creating any antagonism toward himself on the part of the Egyptian people; he constantly cites the fate of King Farouk. Because he wants to be the most popular man in all the Arab world, he also has to consider public opinion in each of the other countries. The result is that he finally concludes he should take no action whatsoever—rather he should just make speeches, all of which must breathe defiance of Israel.

On the other side, the Israel officials are anxious to talk with Egypt, but they are completely adamant in their attitude of making no concessions whatsoever in order to obtain a peace. Their general slogan is "not one inch of ground," and their incessant demand is for arms. Of course, they could get arms at lower prices from almost any European nation, but they want the arms from us because they feel that in this case they have made us a virtual ally in any trouble they might get into in the region.

Public opinion on both sides is inflamed and the chances for peaceful settlement seem remote.

To both Ben-Gurion and Nasser, Anderson held out every pledge of assistance and association that the United States could logically make in return for a genuine effort on the part of both to obtain a peace.

There is, of course, no easy answer. The oil of the Arab world has grown increasingly important to all of Europe. The economy of European countries would collapse if those oil supplies were cut off.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret.

If the economy of Europe would collapse, the United States would be in a situation of which the difficulty could scarcely be exaggerated.

On the other hand, Israel, a tiny nation, surrounded by enemies, is nevertheless one that we have recognized—and on top of this, that has a very strong position in the heart and emotions of the Western world because of the tragic suffering of the Jews throughout twenty-five hundred years of history.

It begins to look to me as though our best move is to prevent any concerted action on the part of the Arab States. Specifically I think we can hold Libya to our side through a reasonable amount of help to that impoverished nation, and we have an excellent chance of winning Saudi Arabia to our side if we can get Britain to go along with us. Britain would, of course, have to make certain territorial concessions and this she might object to violently. If Saudi Arabia and Libya were our staunch friends, Egypt could scarcely continue intimate association with the Soviets, and certainly Egypt would no longer be regarded as a leader of the Arab world.

Hoover, Anderson and I discussed all kinds of possibilities of which the above are mere examples. The emotional tensions in the area are such as to cast doubt on the validity of any proposed suggestion. Even the Jordan River Plan, which would be of tremendous economic advantage to both sides in this quarrel, has really been rejected by both because of these tensions. It is a very sorry situation.

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188. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, March 12, 1956—4 p.m.

375. General Burns gave me following comments March 12 on recent UNTSO developments.

In course his meetings GOE officials during visit Cairo last week [2] Egyptians reiterated their willingness accept UNSYG three proposals re El Auja [3] and emphasized with considerable relish

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–1256. Confidential. Received at 3:49 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Burns was in Cairo March 6–9.

[3] See telegrams 395 and 398, vol. XIV, pp. 690 and 702.

contrast between their attitude this matter and that of Israelis. With regard shooting along Gaza border Amer indicated he would instruct snipers refrain from shooting at Israeli fixed positions. He could not however help much with regard shooting at motor patrols unless these willing remain 500 meters from D/L. Burns said question Israeli "face" involved. They could not very well withdraw motor patrols under "threat" Egyptian shooting. If Egyptians could keep things quiet for time Burns could again raise subject with Israelis. Amer not very forthcoming about this and Burns left with impression that "nothing much would be done improve situation along D/L".

Burns had just seen Sharett discuss outcome his trip to Cairo. Sharett maintained position previously reported (Contel 366[4]) to effect while having "accepted" UNSYG El Auja proposals Israel could not "implement" them unless GOE implemented GAA provisions. Burns left memorandum with Sharett pointing out lack of logic in Israeli arguments subsequent "unconditional acceptance" proposals. Sharett agreed study it with view to another meeting in near future. However Burns has no especial hopes of improvement in GOI attitude. He opined Sharett might wish reach some accommodation but Ben Gurion is dominant and apparently uncompromising factor in situation.

With regard Israeli press accounts that "Israel will ask UN probe massing of Sinai army" Burns said no substantial increase in GOE troops Gaza Strip occurred recently according his information. Forces there now believed consist one brigade plus two battalions. Largest armaments are three inch mortars and 40 mm anti-aircraft guns. As observers not permitted in "non defensive zone" west of El Auja Burns without own sources information situation there. However he understands from military attachés that Egyptians have about two divisions plus an armored brigade in area. He has in mind making some announcement to effect that in view reported military build-up he considers that parties should call for investigation of facts by UNTSO on continuing basis to avoid possibility that troops would be moved away temporarily just before investigation.

Re other matters Burns said on basis information now developed he thinks it probable Israeli police boats on Tiberias were searching for nets of Syrian fishermen when incident March 4 occurred. There had been some earlier minor incidents involving fishing by Syrians. Israelis had discovered them and taken their nets. Syrians retaliated by seizing nets belonging Israeli fishermen. . . . They could have reported situation and permitted observers pave way for boats recovery without shooting and loss of life.

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[4] Document 154.

I asked Burns for his views incident involving murder Israeli farmer at Moshav Nohim March 9 since refusal chairman HJK–IMAC grant Israel request for emergency meeting causing adverse comment Israel press. Burns said chairman did not consider incident warranted emergency meeting. However past practice had been consider any case of killing as "emergency". He thought it might have been better for low [*long*?] established precedent in this case but matter could be argued either way.

Summarizing over-all situation Burns said he could perceive "no grounds for optimism" respecting any of matters within purview UNTSO.

Cole

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189. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 12, 1956—6 p.m.

931. Henry Morgenthau Jr. [2] informed me in strictest confidence that Ben Gurion received unnamed US representative "with access to White House" within past few days to whom Ben Gurion had communicated his position with regard to Israel's need for 50 jets. Morgenthau thought Ben Gurion expecting definite reply within about ten days, saying, "within ten days Ben Gurion will know whether this man has produced the goods." He also fixed April 1 as approximate date on which Ben Gurion would arrive at conclusion whether US arms forthcoming or not although he did not predict any particular GOI action on that date. This appears to be further confirmation Ben Gurion's belief President understands and sympathizes with Israel's present security position. (Embtel 915 [3]) I gave no indication, of course, of knowledge any such activities.

I assume it possible that Ben Gurion may have predicated Israel participation in "settlement talks" on Israel's receipt of jets and other

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/3–1256. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 5:09 p.m.

[2] Secretary of the Treasury from January 1934–July 1945; Chairman of the International Committee of State of Israel Bonds from 1954.

[3] In this telegram, March 9, Lawson reported on the impact of the President's statement of March 7; see footnote 3, Document 181. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/3–956)

US arms or at least assurance some US arms. I also assume "US representative" is one referred to in Deptels 466[4] and 568[5] and concerns matter, development of which I would be kept advised.

Are there conversations also being conducted with Sharett who took somewhat mysterious vacation in Tel Aviv last week?

I would appreciate, for strictly personal secret information, comments on above at earliest convenience.[6]

Lawson

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[4] Document 10.
[5] Document 93.
[6] See Document 214.

U.S. Decision To Withdraw Support From the Aswan High Dam and Egyptian Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, March 13-July 26, 1956

190. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, March 13, 1956—8:45 p.m.

669. Your telegrams 893 [2] and 899. [3] In reply to Sharett's questions we suggest you make following comment:

1. We remain hopeful that Arab consent will be forthcoming as part of acceptance of overall Jordan Valley Plan. We are taking every step we deem desirable to convince Arabs to accept JVP. Contrary to GOI's belief, threats and public indications of understandable Israeli impatience are making it difficult for us to persuade Arabs to accept plan. If Arabs should reject JVP, US policy will have to be reviewed at that time.

2. US hopes that GOI is prepared if necessary to wait longer than Sharett has indicated, i.e. "matter of couple of weeks". US remains convinced that despite its advice to Syrians, Syrians will probably open fire on Israelis should they recommence work in DZ even if Chief of Staff agrees GOI may proceed with work.

3. Re absence of Syrian consent, US policy is as already indicated:

a. Consent to proceed with diversion project in DZ rests with Chief of Staff. Syrian consent is not necessary unless or until armistice agreement is further interpreted as requiring consent.

b. General Bennicke's order to cease operations remains binding on Israel unless or until Chief of Staff revokes it or is convinced that GOI has met points raised in Bennicke's order.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–656. Secret. Drafted by Ludlow; cleared with Russell, Barnes, and Bergus; and approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover. Also transmitted to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, London, Paris, and Jerusalem. Pouched to Ankara, Baghdad, and Jidda.

[2] Document 170.

[3] Document 174.

c. Confirmation by Security Council of order of Chief of Staff under Article 5 of General Armistice Agreement [4] is not necessary, and it is our position that US and Security Council should and will support whatever decision Chief of Staff makes with regard to diversion project.

Re Security Council resolution of October 27, 1953, it is for Security Council alone to determine whether that resolution still binding or not. US does not hold the view that this resolution bars General Burns from making any decision at any time he may see fit.

d. United States cannot use its good offices with General Burns since he is agent of Security Council. However, US will make its position known to him if and when he should inquire. General Burns already knows that US will back his decision whatever it may be. We have taken this same position with Syrians.

4. GOI has yet to bring forward compelling economic reasons necessitating resumption of work inside DZ in matter of weeks or months. Accordingly, we urge GOI remain in close consultation with US on matter and avoid actions which could have probable unfortunate consequences. It is our conviction GOI could easily harm its case in any international forum by unilateral action. [5]

Hoover

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[4] Article 5 of the Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreement of July 20, 1949 (U.N. doc. S/1353/Add. 1 and 2 and Corr. 1) defined the Armistice Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone as instruments to divide the Israeli and Syrian armed forces and established that neither instrument would have any influence upon the ultimate territorial arrangements affecting the two parties to the General Armistice Agreement. Article 5 also stipulated that the armed forces of the parties were not to advance beyond the Armistice Demarcation Line or enter the Demilitarized Zone.

[5] Lawson informed the Department on March 14 that he had requested an appointment with Sharett to deliver the contents of this message. (Telegram 945 from Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–1456)

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191. Message From the Ambassador in Egypt (Byroade) to the Secretary of State [1]

No. 128 *Cairo, March 14, 1956.*

1. Regret not seeing Nasser as agreed with Anderson at time his departure. [2] I wanted wait as long as possible allow Nasser have second thoughts. In view Nasser's schedule and as I thought it wise

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II. Secret.

[2] See Document 173.

not to place request for meeting on subject Anderson mission, waited, waited a bit too long in asking for appointment. After Anderson's departure Nasser sent word he would rather wait until tripartite meetings concluded. He asked me to come to his home for lengthy meeting evening 13 March.

2. After few opening remarks Nasser launched into subject of Anderson mission, thus indicating it much on his mind. Said he disturbed at reports that Anderson had left here discouraged. Said perhaps he had made mistake in being too honest as to what he thought he could and could not do, but he thought it best all around that there be no change of misunderstanding. He thought he had from beginning made it clear that he could not agree now to scheduled meeting with Ben Gurion, Sharrett or other official representative of IG. There was insistence upon this subject to point where he frankly became very jittery about entire project, as we seemed not to understand his situation in this regard. Said he was tense during meeting and had made every effort be clear. Had therefore not spoken as freely as usual in view seriousness of subject. Perhaps Anderson wrongly concluded he had changed his position because of his manner of conducting conversations.

3. As regard second point, ie question of launching agreed formula for settlement, he also could not understand our feeling that he had changed his position. He had never understood that it was our understanding that he would on Arab side "put proposal in the air" as his own. We must certainly know enough about this problem and conditions in the area not to expect him to agree to such a proposition. If the agreed terms could be launched by someone else such as U.S., UM [*UK?*] or some other state he would "do his best" convince other Arab States to accept settlement terms. This he still willing to do even though project looks more difficult in some respects than when first discussed. To agree now to do more would be deceiving us. Regardless of what future might hold as to state of our relations, he did not intend get himself into position where our President could say he had been deceived by him. He was not playing game of stalling until he gained greater arms for striking purposes as Israelis alleged. He was for project and would help to extent of his ability but could do no more.

4. Will report this channel only items in the general discussion that followed which particularly connected with state of Arab-Israeli tension and Anderson mission.

5. In discussion possibility and consequences of war he exhibited a state of relaxation and confidence quite unlike his appearance of apprehension and tension during last summer prior to Czech arms deal. He stated he did not really believe there would be war. He did not think war would come if the Arabs were strong. I told him it

obvious there increasing suspicion with govts and in world public opinion, in wake of important meetings here and other developments in Arab world, that Arabs themselves might start war. His reply was categoric. He said "I have written a letter to your President. [3] I will not deceive your President. I will not start a war with Israel. I give to you and to him my word on that issue, not as a politician but as a soldier". He also said this, which is exact quote: "It must be apparent to you anyway that we could not really win a war if we were foolish enough to start one. Under these conditions you would feel you had to move in. I would then in effect be fighting the U.S. and Britain as well as the Israelis. In such an impossible position I might be compelled to take Russian help and then where would I be going, and where would my program to build my country end up. I do not want another Korea here. I do not want to see a world war. I do not want to gamble so foolishly with the future of my own country". I asked if he thought any other Arab State wanted war with Israel. His answer was equally positive that they did not.

6. Nasser realized during this conversation that he was speaking for the record and did so deliberately and slowly, thus facilitating my writing his exact words—which I have never tried before. (In view of recent doubts, and as high levels in our govt must be aware . . . that Trevelyan has reported . . . that a plan had been prepared during recent meetings here for Arab attack in June, I hope this message will reach same levels.) I do not believe Nasser values U.S. friendship so lightly as to so deliberately deceive us on this vital issue. For my part I am willing to believe that discussion might have taken place as to how Arabs might launch attack if they later came to such decision following new developments, such as large amounts of arms to Israel, which might make them conclude to take a chance. I do not believe however any such decision for attack was taken or seriously considered. My impression is that Trevelyan now believes this also the case, although he of course generally gloomy as to total developments which affect British position in entire area.

7. Nasser, who for some reason does not seem to share fully our concern re preventive war by Israel, said war could come in one of two ways. The first was Banat Yacob issue. Syria felt bound to resist this project. As an insight on this problem in Syria he told me that Kuwatly had stated he had no alternative. Shishakly in 53 had successfully opposed this diversion and had gotten away with it. His position would be untenable if he failed where Shishakly had succeeded and he would be faced with an army coup. (His remarks on the JVP in State cable. [4]) The other possibility was an incident

[3] See Document 75.
[4] Document 195.

along the border which would get out of control. No raids were planned from the Arab side—although retaliation for Israeli raids inside Arab territory could not be avoided. He said this true for Syrian front, as elsewhere. Arrests inside Israel which Israelis label Fedayeen were really intelligence scouts but he could not admit this publicly. As long as Israelis retain their position re El Auja and as long as their posture in Negev as a whole was shifting and unclear, he felt he had occasionally to send reconnaissance groups inside. In discussion of Fedayeen activities he said none were planned and no single one could be sent on a mission without his personal approval. This is a matter in which he would not delegate authority to anyone, not even General Hakim Amer. Furthermore, if time came when he decided use Fedayeen in retaliation, he would tell me first.

8. On question of border incidents and raids there at least was an answer, if Israel would agree to mutual withdrawal of troops. He had favored this position for months but especially wanted it now as means of preventing incidents and also for other reasons, to enable him to bring his army back to Canal Zone. His striking force was no longer there but he still had too many troops across the Canal. In addition there were administrative and morale problems which would be solved by getting his troops out of the Sinai Desert.

9. Nasser said there are three steps that must be taken:

a. The easing of tension along the borders. This he felt could be done through the U.N. The cardinal feature of this would be the separation of troops but other measures such as increased observers probably would be helpful.

b. The easing of tensions between Arab States.

c. With general easing of tensions in entire area accomplished by a and b above the Anderson mission could succeed. It should most certainly not be abandoned but conditions should be created for its success.

10. Will try to convey to greatest extent possible such recommendations as I may have . . . .[5]

11. 1200 14 March.

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[5] Byroade sent a separate account of this March 13 conversation with Nasser to the Department in telegram 1835, March 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–1456)

192. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) [1]

Washington, March 14, 1956.

SUBJECT

United States Policy in the Near East

I. Preamble

United States policy in the Near East during the past three years has followed three principal lines:

1. *Political.* The United States has striven for a settlement between the Arab States and Israel. The Secretary's speech of August 26, 1955 outlines in principle the various ways in which the United States was willing to contribute to a settlement. The United States has endeavored, thus far without success, to bring the Israelis and the Egyptians together on a settlement. Both the Israelis and the Egyptians have proved difficult, but the Egyptians have been the main stumbling block in recent weeks.

2. *Economic.* The United States has maintained a small technical assistance and economic development program for selected Arab States and Israel. It has averaged about $75 million annually. The United States has also continued to contribute to the relief of Arab refugees from Palestine. This contribution has averaged about $22 million annually. The United States has made known its willingness to assist in a number of important regional projects. These include the Johnston Plan for harnessing the Jordan River and the Egyptian Plan for the Aswan Dam to control the Nile.

3. *Military.* The United States has supported Northern Tier Collective Security from its first inception in a loose defense arrangement between Turkey and Pakistan to the formation of the Baghdad Pact. The United States has not joined for a variety of reasons but primarily because of the effect which such action would have on U.S. relations with Israel and with Egypt. The U.S. has approved sales in small amounts of arms to the Arab States and Israel. More recently the U.S. suspended a decision on a large Israeli request to purchase arms in the U.S. because of the Israeli raid in Syria in December and because discussions regarding an Arab-Israeli settlement were continuing.

During the past year the United States has, in general, looked to Egypt under Prime Minister Nasser to take leadership in meeting the

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Egypt—Dam, Miscl. 1956. Top Secret. The source text contains no information to indicate who read it. Document 209, however, refers to it, indicating it was seen.

major problems in the Near East. Nasser has, however, failed to move toward a settlement with Israel; he is now delaying on taking the initiative with respect to the Johnston Plan and has raised a number of serious objections with respect to the provisions of the proposed Aswan Dam agreements; he has inaugurated a series of bilateral military pacts with Syria and Saudi Arabia because of opposition to the Baghdad Pact; he set aside the offer of American arms from the U.S. and made an agreement with Czechoslovakia; his radio and press are now speaking strongly against the U.S. and other Western countries. Against this background there seems little likelihood the U.S. will be able to work with Nasser in the foreseeable future. The U.S. will therefore have to consider other means for obtaining U.S. objectives in the Near East.

U.S. objectives in the Near East (which are listed on Tab A as recapitulated in NSC 5428) include the development of friendly relations with Near Eastern Governments which are willing to resist the extension of Soviet influence and which, at the same time, are willing to cooperate with the U.S. and other Western countries. U.S. objectives also include the reduction of current Arab-Israel tensions through the conclusion of a settlement between the Arab States and Israel and some solution for the Arab refugee problem. All of these objectives and many of the others listed on Tab A have been adversely affected in one way or another by the present attitude and actions of Egypt under Nasser. In fact, the attitude of the other Arab States and of Israel toward the U.S. is being affected to a serious degree by Egyptian actions.

There is attached (Tab B) a plan of action which includes measures which the U.S. and its allies might take with respect to Egypt and the Near East. . . .

II. Discussion with the British and Others

Prior to a U.S. decision with respect to the Plan of Action, it will be desirable to discuss it with the British. The British continue to hold highly important assets in the area. These include British treaty relationships with Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. The success of future U.S. policy would be enhanced by British support and cooperation. It might even be stated that British opposition might undermine the success of the plan of action. It may also be desirable to discuss a certain limited number of these measures under the plan of action with the French, the Turks, and perhaps some other countries. The French and the Turks, for example, have certain interests in the area and would feel that they should have been consulted. A decision with respect to consultation with the French, the Turks and

other countries may be decided on an ad hoc basis in light of developments.

III. Further Discussion with Nasser

Another basic question centers upon desirability of a further frank discussion with Nasser. The U.S. has looked to Egypt under Nasser, as stated above, to take leadership in the Near East. We have discussed with Nasser during recent months various constructive steps which might have been taken in the Near East by Egypt. Nasser has temporized and finally refused. Faced with this refusal, what should we do?

Should we now tell Nasser that . . . we plan to withdraw aid for Aswan and to join the Baghdad Pact unless Egypt cooperates with us? Shall we also ask Nasser if he would now be willing to press the Arab States to accept the Johnston Plan and to cooperate with General Burns in bringing quiet to the frontier between Egypt and Israel?

On balance, we believe that if the U.S. should now approach Nasser with a series of proposals which he would regard as threatening him he would turn them down and make known his action to the Arab world. He would interpret the U.S. approach as a last effort to bring pressure upon him. He would make public his refusal to entertain the U.S. proposals because he would estimate his action would appear a rebuff to the U.S. and would be popular with the Arab world.

We believe it would be preferable quietly to commence the measures, described on the attached Plan of Action (Tab B) . . . . Such measures as delay in the issuance of export licenses, and lack of progress in negotiations on the Aswan Dam should have a useful effect. Nasser would soon conclude that relations with the U.S. were not proceeding smoothly and would raise the question with American officials. The response might be that friendly relations between countries are reciprocal. Further U.S. measures would be keyed to Nasser's willingness to reverse his present policies. . . .

Tab A [2]

To recapitulate briefly from NSC 5428, [3] these objectives are listed as follows:

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[2] Top Secret.

[3] For text of NSC 5428, July 23, 1954, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525.

"7. Availability to the United States and its allies of the resources, the strategic positions, and the passage rights of the area, and the denial of such resources and strategic positions to the Soviet bloc.

"8. Stable, viable, friendly governments in the area, capable of withstanding communist-inspired subversion from within, and willing to resist communist aggression.

"9. Settlement of major issues between the Arab States and Israel as a foundation for establishing peace and order in the area.

"10. Reversal of the anti-American trends of Arab opinion.

"11. Prevention of the extension of Soviet influence in the area.

"12. Wider recognition in the free world of the legitimate aspirations of the countries in the area to be recognized as, and have the status of, sovereign states; and wider recognition by such countries of their responsibility toward the area and toward the free world generally."

"9. a. To deter an armed attack by Israel or by the Arab states, and if an armed attack should occur to force the attacking state to relinquish any territory seized.

b. To reduce current Arab-Israel tensions and promote an eventual clear-cut peace between the Arab States and Israel.

c. To alleviate the Arab refugee problem."

Tab B

PLAN OF ACTION [4]

A. Measures to be Taken . . . (approximately March 15–April 15):

1. The United States will continue to delay the issuance of export licenses covering arms shipments whether purchased under the U.S.-Egyptian Reimbursable Assistance Agreement or from commercial sources in the United States. The United States will continue to delay giving approval to the Department of Commerce for the export of such items as commercial vehicles which are obviously intended for the Egyptian army.

2. The United States will continue to delay the conclusion of current negotiations on the High Aswan Dam.

3. The United States will continue to delay pending Egyptian requests under Title I, P.L. 480. (It is not intended that the United

[4] Top Secret. Drafted by Wilkins on March 14.

States will delay or cancel up to 200,000 tons of wheat already purchased by Egypt under P.L. 480 and P.L. 665.[5])

4. The United States anticipates that the CARE program for 1956 may total as much as $180 million as against approximately $40 million during 1955. A decision on the program for 1956 is imminent. The United States could approve an amount of perhaps $10–$20 million for the first quarter of 1956, leaving a decision regarding the balance until later.

5. The United States would suggest to the British that they immediately slow down the withdrawal of British troops from Suez. Under the U.K.-Egyptian agreement of 1954, 75 percent were to be withdrawn by February 18 and 100 percent by June 18.

6. The United States would commence negotiations with the Sudan, looking toward the extension of technical assistance and possibly economic aid to that country.

7. The United States would continue to take steps to counter Egyptian influence in Libya and to strengthen the position of the West. A program has already been worked out and discussions with the Libyans are planned shortly.

8. The United States would continue to urge the British to make every effort to maintain present treaty relationships with Jordan.

9. The United States would consider with Ethiopia possible Nile development and an expanded economic assistance program.

10. The United States would take practical steps to counter Egyptian influence in Yemen and other Arabian principalities.

11. Commencement of a series of high-level visits to Egypt's neighbors by military and civilian officers from the United States to demonstrate U.S. interest in the area.

12. Interference with hostile Egyptian broadcasts by jamming.

13. The United States and other friendly countries would initiate moves in the United Nations Security Council and, if necessary with the United Nations General Assembly, looking toward the creation of an Agent General for the Near East.

Arab Reactions:

Most of these measures are confined to Egypt. Some of them, however, relate to other Near Eastern countries. Those measures relating to Egypt are relatively mild and would not be known to the Egyptian public unless the Egyptian Government made them known. The initiation of the measures relating to Egypt during the near future should have an immediate effect on the Egyptian Government. Nasser and his colleagues would wonder and probably conclude that the United States was in this way making known its

[5] Reference is to the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

opposition to Egyptian policy. There would be little advantage to the Egyptians in publicizing their apprehension because delays are not uncommon and the United States has not definitely broken off negotiations.

The other Arab states would probably not be aware of the measures which the United States had taken relating to Egypt.

Israeli Reactions:

The Israeli press and public would probably not be aware of the steps which the United States had taken relating to Egypt.

. . . . . .

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193. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, March 14, 1956—1 p.m.

380. General Burns has commented substantially as follows with respect Deptel 196: [2] As regards likelihood major hostilities attitudes of Israel and Egypt should prove conclusively with other Arab States in secondary role.

Statement recently made in Knesset by Ben Gurion to effect "while Israel would not start war she would fight through to victory if attacked" [3] appears valid as presentation Israeli position at present time. That position could change on short notice since Ben Gurion is impulsive and army leaders such as Dayan etc. are believed likely to press for policy of force in dealing with Arabs . . . . Despite such considerations Burns' appreciation is Israel will not herself initiate large scale aggression but should be expected to react vigorously to any aggressive action of neighbors.

Egyptians now cocky and feel confident of themselves but improbable that responsible officers really believe Egypt ready for war. On basis discussion with General Amer and other Egyptian

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–1456. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:18 p.m.

[2] The Department, on March 6, requested Cole to "approach General Burns and seek his personal views on present Israel-Arab tension and general appreciation of situation in light recent incidents and Glubb dismissal. We desire particularly his estimate likelihood outbreak major hostilities." (Telegram 196 to Jerusalem; *ibid.*, 684A.86/3–656)

[3] Ben Gurion made this statement on March 6.

officials Burns has not gained impression Nasser and his associates seriously contemplate taking offensive this year. Egyptians have done little to discourage firing incidents along Gaza strip however apparently wishing to maintain state of tension for political reasons. These incidents nevertheless represent continuing danger since they could get out of hand and lead to hostilities of larger scope. Danger of serious trouble in El Auja area does not appear very great although of course the separation of forces envisaged by armistice agreement no longer exists.

While Burns has no specific information re equipment or present state of training of Egyptian armed forces or of technical ability of their high command he doubts they have yet had time to absorb into their forces arms received from Soviet bloc. He therefore considers it unlikely they will initiate war this summer. In any event it would seem foolish of them to do so.

Removal of restraining influence of British officers from Arab legion [4] obviously constitutes an added threat to peace but still too early to formulate predictions re ultimate effect. Border incidents of last few days would appear to justify fears of resurgence of shooting episode along Jordan frontier with added possibility Arab Legion may be sooner or later committed in course of such incidents to ill-considered retaliatory action.

Most dangerous single threat to peace is however to be found in project at Banat Yacub. On one hand there appears practically no likelihood Arab states will accept Johnston plan within next few months; on other, Israelis have indicated they will not wait much longer. Syrians may now believe that they can block Israel's use of Jordan River simply by leaving matters in status quo indefinitely. Should Israelis insist on resuming work in D/Z it would probably be unavoidable to bring issue before Security Council. This should delay reaction of Syria and obtain indication of attitude of other powers toward Israel's legitimate need to utilize Jordan waters.

Number of danger spots in area together with uncompromising attitudes of parties directly concerned makes outbreak of hostilities distinctly possible. US is in position to influence Israel toward maintaining policy of restraint by applying pressure on Israeli Government when required plus firm indication of sanctions Israel might expect should she determine upon attack against Arab states.

To summarize Burns considers major hostilities this year as within realm of possible but accumulation of dangerous factors does

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[4] On March 5, the British Government, in the wake of King Hussein's dismissal of Lieutenant General Sir John Glubb, recalled 15 top officers from service with the Arab Legion.

not appear sufficient at present time to warrant conclusion that outbreak is probable.

Cole

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194. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Near Eastern Economic Affairs (Gay) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) [1]

Washington, March 14, 1956.

SUBJECT

Israel's Application for an Exim Bank Loan

Messrs. Sherman and Salmon came in to describe Israel's contemplated four-year agricultural development program with respect to which they have already approached the Exim Bank for a $75 million loan with which to purchase equipment in the United States. (Israel's letter to the bank and statement of proposal attached.) [2] Points emphasized in the exposition, given later in the day to Mr. FitzGerald of ICA, were (a) the tremendous upturn recently in the rate of immigration into Israel, particularly from North Africa, and its anticipated continuance and no efforts to restrict it, (b) the belief that this agricultural development program is the most economic means, e.g. in comparison to an immediate concentration on industrial build-up, for the expansion of the Israel economy and one which, by the end of the period, will improve Israel's foreign exchange position through expansion of exports and contraction of imports by around $40 million and, (c) the fact that, although this program contemplates a sizeable extension of irrigation works, it impinges in no way upon the Jordan Valley proposal and will not lessen, in fact will increase, the need for the type of system envisaged under the Jordan Valley program.

Studies under final stages of preparation will presumably demonstrate that as a result of the proposed program, (a) water available for agriculture will be increased over 50 per cent, (b) irrigated area

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 884A.10/3–1456. Confidential.

[2] Neither printed. Ambassador Eban addressed Israel's letter of application as well as its statement of proposal to Samuel C. Waugh, President of the Export-Import Bank, on March 9.

will be increased about 90 per cent, (c) value of agricultural production will be increased by 60 per cent and, (d) opportunity for settlement will be provided for over 10,000 families.

Mr. Sherman thought Ambassador Eban would wish to talk to the Secretary about this program in a few days. It may be that the intense desire of the Israeli Government for the earliest possible implementation of these plans which envisage a United States loan of $75 million out of the $85 million anticipated external cost could provide the Department with a useful leverage in dealing with Israel on other matters.

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195. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, March 14, 1956—8 p.m.

1841. In discussion last night with Nasser he commented freely upon prospects for JVP which he said had been discussed at tripartite meeting here. Gave him substance Department telegram 2182. [2] Said he could not be optimistic in any way as to short range prospects for this plan. There was no question of technical engineering aspects involved as he saw it. Most of Arab politicians had no comprehension as to technical aspects. They were against it for purely political reasons.

I asked if he could see chances of success within a month. He said no he could not. The problem now rested primarily around situation in Syria but Jordan would also present difficulty even though they seemed to want item included in league discussions this month. In Syria all political parties had agreed that no action could be taken. He stated that Ambassador Riad personally believed in project and had been recently in touch with the President, Prime Minister and party leaders. There was no chance that Syria could now agree and probably could never do so as long as parties here were negotiating for position in future government.

Nasser said he could only see one possible chance to get early approval of project which he agreed was technically sound. First of

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–1456. Confidential. Received at 1:53 a.m., March 15. Repeated to London, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Baghdad, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Document 183.

all name must be changed to something else. Every refugee knew name of "the Johnston Plan" or "The Jordan Valley Plan". It had been used in domestic politics and for agitation purposes to point where he felt neither Syria nor Jordan might never be able agree to accept Plan under either name. Secondly could we not separate project into two parts and proceed independently in each of Arab States and Israel with negotiations and actual work while retaining master plan concept which would not be publicized. He stressed that he was thinking of procedural changes in presenting the Plan, not of technical engineering features which he thought would not require major adjustment.

Nasser went into great detail about importance of the psychological in dealings with Arabs (and illustrated his point of view in some amusing stories.) In our logic we might think his suggestion naive or even foolish. Nonetheless, he felt he knew psychology of Arabs which could not be successfully ignored. The problems in ME he added could be solved best by psychologists rather than politicians, and the indirect manner could often achieve the desired result where a frosty approach was doomed to failure. He felt in general we were too stubborn about pressing named concepts after chances for their success had been politically destroyed. He felt that if we were wise we would publicly admit that plan under either of these two names was completely dead and abandoned. We might then approach each individual state, (perhaps through our Ambassadors, so that there would be no emissary to call public attention to fact that new effort was involved), and obtain agreement that work within that state should go ahead through normal aid agreements. This would in end give area the entire project on both sides. Under questioning on such matters as international water control, use of Tiberias, et cetera, Nasser admitted that his suggestion needed study to see if it was practical. However, he thought we should give it a real try.

We are not competent in this Embassy to judge whether Nasser's suggestion could be accepted as being practical. I am aware of fact that Arabs not us insisted on Arab League consideration. However, Nasser was willing last night to admit that Israeli construction at Banat Yacob might be accepted under such a diffused approach. In view of dangers in this issue, would hope Department would give every consideration to some such approach which might remove this issue as a possible causa belli between Arab States and Israel.

Byroade

196. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, March 15, 1956—11 a.m.

860. I saw Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Ghazzi, who returned from Cairo ESS meeting March 13, morning March 14, gave him substance first and final paragraphs Deptel 660 [2] adding that Israel has undisputed rights in Jordan waters, and then offered points 1 through 3 of Deptel 705 [3] adding Johnston prepared return area if visit desired.

Ghazzi first remarked he understood Johnston was going to Tel Aviv, to which I replied that so far as I knew he had no definite plans yet to visit the area. Ghazzi then said Lebanese Chamber of Deputies had by unanimous resolution condemned JVP. I agreed such resolution had been passed but noted small number of Deputies had been present, that Lebanese had talked differently on other occasions and that Lebanese are flexible enough to change. Ghazzi replied he supposed "flexible" was right word.

Ghazzi then asked, with reference point 3 my remarks, why Lebanon would have to ratify JVP. In discussion that followed he advanced notion that Lebanon had no interest in Jordan waters since Jordan River begins at Lake Huleh. I pointed out that discussions of past three years had been based on general understanding that Lebanon has interest in Jordan River and Jordan basin and that this was first time to my knowledge any one had suggested Lebanon not involved. Ghazzi shifted ground at this point, said you are talking about water when this is really a political problem with JVP a scheme designed to lead Arabs into political agreement with Israel. On that account, he said, JVP is politically unacceptable. He asked,

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–1556. Secret. Received at 9:13 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Ankara, Baghdad, Jidda, and Jerusalem.

[2] Document 145.

[3] Printed as telegram 2182, Document 183.

however, for aide-mémoire to study and said he would give me answer later. [4]

Ghazzi was uncommunicative about ESS talks Cairo. He did say that meeting of Arab League Council originally scheduled for March 19 had been postponed to March 29 at his request since he had been away for so long it was impossible for him to leave by the 19th. He stated JVP had been inscribed on agenda at request of Jordan but, in response to question, said Lebanon had not requested inscription (as I was informed March 13 by British Ambassador).

I saw British and French Ambassadors March 13 and communicated to them substance Deptel 705. British Ambassador said he was awaiting instructions but had indications Foreign Office, if Department approved, might be taking new look at JVP involving admission it is political scheme and promoting it as such. French Ambassador said he had no instructions.

Comment: Ghazzi's purpose in raising question of Lebanese interest in JVP was, I believe, to confuse issue. From his remarks and general attitude I doubt he has any present intention of approving JVP. His request for an aide-mémoire for purposes of study and promise of later reply constitute familiar maneuver to which there has been in past no followup. New element, however, is Ghazzi's rigid attitude re political unacceptability JVP. It may be more than coincidence that he displayed this attitude immediately following his return from meeting with Nasser and Saud.

Moose

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[4] Moose transmitted the text of the aide-mémoire subsequently given to Ghazzi to the Department in despatch 308, March 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–2056)

197. Message From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower [1]

London, March 15, 1956.

DEAR FRIEND: I send you herewith a most secret note of Egyptian intentions of whose authenticity we are entirely confident. I thought you should see it even though it adds nothing startlingly new to what we both suspected. It does, however, confirm the wide range of Egyptian ambitions against the Saudis, as well as Iraq and Jordan. May I ask you to treat it as highly confidential? Of course I would expect Foster to see it. [2]

Yours ever,

Anthony

[Enclosure] [3]

March 12, 1956.

EGYPTIAN PLANS FOR A UNITED ARAB STATES
(JANUARY, 1956)

We have absolutely reliable information that at the Conference of Egyptian Ambassadors and Ministers to the Arab States which ended in Cairo on 30th January, 1956, it was agreed that the following policy should be adopted by Egypt in her relations with the other Arab States:

(a) The ultimate aim was to form United Arab States with no Customs, a common educational and economic system and an Arab Currency Bank which would control the financial affairs of all the Arab States.

(b) This United Arab States must consist of Republics amongst whom Egypt would naturally play the leading part.

(c) To this end the following steps were necessary:

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Ambassador Makins forwarded Prime Minister Eden's message to the President, but, according to a cross reference sheet in the lot file containing Presidential Correspondence, this message was filed in the White House. Neither Makins nor Eisenhower sent a copy to Hoover. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eden to Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955–1956. Vol. I)

[2] Hoover forwarded the report to Secretary Dulles on March 21 attached to a memorandum. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 786.00/3–2156) Also enclosed for Dulles' information was a copy of the President's response to Eden; see footnote 4 below.

[3] Top Secret.

(i) The unseating of Nuri el Said, the Iraqi Prime Minister, and the frustration of the Bagdad Pact.

(ii) The overthrow of the Hashemite families in Iraq and Jordan.

(iii) The overthrow of the monarchy in Libya and the establishing of purely Arab republics in Tunis, Algeria and Morocco. If this could be done, Egypt could strengthen her claim to be an Arab State rather than an African country outside the Arab orbit.

(iv) Whilst Saudi Arabia would be encouraged to partake in Egyptian moves against Iraq and Jordan, the long term policy was first to isolate Saudi Arabia as the only remaining Monarchy in the Eastern Arab States and then to remove King Saud. To this latter end Egypt was already in touch with many of the more powerful sheikhs in Arabia.

(d) This anti-monarchical policy was receiving full support from the U.S.S.R., which was sending so-called "technicians" to help in the organisation of intelligence services throughout the Arab World.

(e) In order to implement this policy, Egypt was despatching educational missions to all the Arab States. Several of the personnel of each mission had been trained as intelligence agents before their departure. Their general instructions were to recruit refugees and dissidents and to establish contact with anti-Government movements; but the direction of their activities was the responsibility of the Egyptian Ambassador or Minister to the Arab State in which they were operating. [4]

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[4] Eisenhower's response of March 20 to Eden reads:

"The enclosure you sent me with your letter of March fifteenth is a most interesting report on the intentions of the Egyptian Government. Assuming that the information therein contained is completely authentic, it seems to me to give a clue of how we—your Government and ours—might operate with the greatest chance of frustrating Soviet designs in the region.

"Foster will return in a couple of days, and he and I will then go over this document and a good deal of other information which we have on this subject. In the meantime, thank you very much for sending it to me." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower to Eden Correspondence, 1955–1956. Vol. I)

198. Memorandum of a Conversation, London, March 15, 1956 [1]

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office
Mr. George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State, Washington
Mr. Walworth Barbour, American Minister, London
Mr. Evan M. Wilson, First Secretary, London

SUBJECT

Egypt and Arab affairs

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick began the conversation by drawing a comparison between Nasser and Mussolini. He thought that just as Mussolini had started out by opposing Hitler and had then turned to him for support because his pride was hurt over the Abyssinian crisis, so Nasser had started out to be anti-Soviet but had turned to the Soviet Union for arms because he felt that the West had refused him. In the case of both dictators, it was a question of wounded pride and the consequences for Nasser would be just as disastrous as for Mussolini. He did not see how Nasser would be able to shake off the Soviet connection.

Mr. Allen [2] said that this was an interesting point. He thought that an important objective of both the U.S. and the UK should be to do what we could do to get Saudi Arabia away from Egyptian influence. . . .

. . . Sir Ivone commented that one of the troubles with the Arab world was that the Arabs hated each other. This was particularly true of the feeling of Jordanians toward Iraqis.

Mr. Allen asked Sir Ivone whether he agreed that closer cooperation between Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could improve the present situation, especially if Egypt continues to follow its present course. Sir Ivone said that better relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia were of course desirable, but as far as Kuwait was concerned the Kuwaitis feared Iraq and preferred Egypt. Mr. Allen wondered whether it might be possible for King Feisal, Abdullah, [3] or King Hussein, to make the pilgrimage to Mecca during the coming season. He thought that such a move on the part of one or more of them would be welcomed by King Saud. Sir Ivone indicated interest in this suggestion.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.74/3–1556. Confidential. Drafted by Wilson.

[2] Allen had been with Dulles at Karachi attending the SEATO Council session.

[3] Abdullah al Salim al Sabah, Sheikh of Kuwait.

199. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 15, 1956[1]

SUBJECT

Israel Arms Request

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Government
The Acting Secretary
Mr. Murphy—G
Mr. Russell—S

Israel Government
Ambassador Eban
Minister Shiloah

Ambassador Eban called at his request. He said that he wished to give the Acting Secretary the Israel Government's thinking in the aftermath of the Anderson mission. He said that despite the lack of concrete progress toward a settlement the mission had been necessary and desirable. He said that the conclusions which had to be drawn from the outcome of the mission were somber. It had proved what the IG had thought all along, i.e., that peace with Israel is not in Nasser's calculations. Nasser's objective is leadership in the Arab world. He hopes to achieve this hegemony by a policy that is (1) anti-Israel, (2) anti-Western, and (3) based on playing off the West against the Soviets. This was the IG analysis immediately following the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal. Secretary Dulles had commented at that time that he did not reject that thesis, that time would tell. Ambassador Eban said that now the correctness of the analysis must be clear to all. Nasser had attempted for a while to create the impression of cooperating in the effort for a settlement, but it is now obvious that he is not willing to have any meeting. He cites public opinion as making a settlement impossible but he himself creates that public opinion. He has retreated from his position of helpfulness in getting Arab agreement to the Jordan Valley Plan. He now cites the Syrian Government as an obstacle but there has been no change in the Syrian situation since he first made his promise of help. While he has been misleading us about his attitude toward a settlement, he has consolidated his position with Saudi Arabia and Syria, instigated riots in Jordan, and has been attacking the Baghdad Pact. It has been clear to the IG that the ending of the Anderson mission would be a decisive moment. If the ending was one of success there would be great hope for the future. If it failed, the situation would be worse than before because the possibility of peace would be eliminated as a component of the situation. The

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 16. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted on March 27 by Russell.

Ambassador said that the Israel Prime Minister feels that immediate efforts must be directed not to achieving peace but to preventing war. Israel's desire to add to its defenses is, therefore, greater than ever. The Arabs are getting stronger while Israel is held down by an embargo. Not only has there been no progress on the IG request of November 16, [2] but even routine requests which had previously been granted are now being turned down. Israel is, therefore, in a situation where its defensive capacity is not only not being increased but is in danger of being weakened. The Ambassador said that he feels that at this moment when the Anderson mission has failed the U.S. has a moral commitment to help Israel; first because of the statements which the President and the Secretary have made from time to time that they would give "sympathetic attention" to Israel's request and, secondly, because of Israel's dire need resulting from recent concentrations of Egyptian and Syrian forces on Israel's borders. The Ambassador said that the IG drew two conclusions from all of this: (1) it should discuss with the State Department the problem of Israel's increasing vulnerability in concrete terms, e.g., if Israel gets 12 Mysteres from France it would feel that it should get specifically and immediately from the U.S. 24 F86 fighters and some anti-tank guns; and, (2) the IG would want to be involved more directly in discussions relating to external deterrents to aggression in the Middle East. On this latter point the IG has arrived at certain views: (1) the primacy of Israel's own defenses in assuring its security; and, (2) it does not reject the concept of external deterrents but it should be very conservative in its reliance on them. They should be invoked only after Israel's own effort has been stretched to the fullest. The more the U.S. satisfies Israel's arms requests the more we relieve the American people of responsibility under the U.N. or the Tripartite Declaration. With respect to U.N. action, the IG is not encouraged in view of the possibility of a Soviet veto in the Security Council and the ability of the Arabs and the Soviets to muster more than the necessary third of the votes required to defeat action in the General Assembly. In any event, the U.N. Charter gives Israel the right of self-defense and also gives any state the right to come to Israel's aid.

Ambassador Eban said that he wished to inform the Acting Secretary that the IG had just filed an application with the Export-Import Bank for a loan in connection with water development plans in Israel outside the Jordan Valley. [3] They figured that the projects that would be financed by this loan would save $40,000,000 a year and help in their resettlement program. They compute that agricul-

[2] See the memorandum of conversation, vol. XIV, p. 773.
[3] See Document 194.

tural income would be increased by 60 percent. The total cost of the undertaking would be about $270,000,000. They have asked for a $75,000,000 loan from the Export-Import Bank. The Bank has already loaned Israel $70,000,000 for agricultural development and the IG is applying to the Bank for this loan rather than to the IBRD because the present project would be related to the other program. The project would fit into the Jordan Valley Development Program.

The Acting Secretary said that Mr. Anderson had reported fully to the President and to himself on his last mission [4] and would be seeing the Secretary on the latter's return in about a week. He said that this Government, of course, regretted that there had been no immediate concrete steps toward a settlement as a result of the Anderson mission. The failure had resulted from the fact that Nasser had been unwilling to agree at this time to a face-to-face meeting although he was willing to discuss terms of the settlement with an intermediary while the IG wanted a face-to-face meeting but would not agree to carrying on negotiations through an intermediary. Thus both lines of progress were prevented. Nevertheless, several things have resulted from the effort. Anderson was able to interpret to both sides the positions of the other and was also able to give the Secretary and the President a better idea of the thinking of each. The Acting Secretary said that he wanted to make it plain that Mr. Anderson is ready to resume his talks with both sides at any time that it appeared that anything might result from such a resumption. With respect to possible U.N. action to lessen the danger of hostilities in the Middle East, the Acting Secretary said that the Department was presently considering various alternative types of action and we would be glad to have the Israel Government's thinking. With respect to Ambassador Eban's reference to recent difficulties in obtaining export licenses for routine orders, the Acting Secretary said that we had no intention of declaring a total embargo and that he would look into the matter. There should be no difficulty in assuring that things which were not of an armament nature were permitted to move. The Acting Secretary said that we had long ago informed the French Government that we would take any administrative action that was necessary to release the offshore procurement claims to the 12 Mysteres so that the question of their sale was one entirely for the French Government. [5] The Acting Secretary said that we would, of course, review the whole problem of U.S. arms shipments to the Middle East in the light of the situation as it now exists. He doubted whether there would be any radical change in our policy in the immediate future. Ambassador Eban said that if the

[4] See Documents 186 and 187.
[5] See Document 40.

Israel Government did not receive an affirmative reply by the end of this month it would have to make a decision to dedicate its national energies with 100 percent preoccupation to defense with all that that implied for Israel's national life.

Ambassador Eban said that he wished to give informal notice that the Israel Prime Minister might be raising the possibility of his seeing President Eisenhower in order to present to him Israel's arms need or alternatively of Ambassador Eban seeing the President and presenting to him a message from Ben Gurion, all of this on the assumption that the U.S. had not previously given an affirmative reply to the IG arms request.

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200. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, March 16, 1956.

This morning I met briefly with the President [2] just prior to his departure for Gettysburg for the weekend.

Middle East. I reviewed with him developments in the Middle East and my conversation yesterday with Ambassador Eban. [3] I told him of my impression that the Israelis would soon be putting even greater pressure than ever before on the Administration to give them arms, and that undoubtedly this would be accompanied by approaches to Members of the Cabinet and people on the White House staff.

I advised the President that Ambassador Eban had told us that they were now obtaining 12 Mysteres from the French, [4] and had hopes of obtaining an additional 12, making a total of 24. I said that the Ambassador had then verbally asked if we would provide his Government with 24 F–86's, instead of their original request for 48, and also certain anti-tank weapons. The Ambassador felt that if we

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw this memorandum.

[2] According to the Record of the President's Daily Appointments, Hoover, accompanied by Goodpaster, met with Eisenhower at the White House from 9:20 to 9:35 a.m. (*Ibid.*)

[3] See *supra*.

[4] The Embassy in Paris reported on April 12 that it had learned that six Mysteres left France April 11 and arrived in Israel the same day. Six additional Mysteres were scheduled to leave France April 13 or 14. (Telegram 4734 from Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/4–1256)

could see our way clear to providing these two items, this would satisfy the Israeli requirements.

I told the President that my own thinking went along the following lines but, of course, any decisions would await your return and further discussions between you and him:

(a) The Israelis have never previously sought either defensive or offensive weapons in any quantity from us but have always satisfied their requirements from European sources. The things they were asking from us now were readily available from countries in Europe, particularly from France, which was able to furnish them with modern jet fighters and excellent anti-tank weapons. There was no question in my mind that the pressure on us from the Israelis was due to their desire to have us morally committed to furnishing them with arms for their own purposes in dealing with the Arabs.

(b) It might, therefore, seem desirable for us to give them a very few items, more in the nature of radar equipment than airplanes and anti-tank weapons, and at the same time fulfill some of the requests which we have from Saudi Arabia, where we have an especial responsibility.

(c) Nasser appeared to be becoming a progressively increasing menace. We were therefore giving added attention to methods of splitting the Saudis away from the Egyptians and to obtaining closer relations with the Libyans. (I briefly outlined the negotiations which are shortly to get under way with the Libyan Government, whereby we would increase our aid program and reduce the threat of Russian penetration and, at the same time, increase the size of our base rights.)

I did not ask the President for any decision on these matters but brought the subject up only to keep him abreast of our tentative thinking.

We discussed the proposed UN operation [5] and I pointed out that Hammarskjold very much wanted to undertake the mission to the Middle East himself. I said that Hammarskjold's efforts would probably prevent us from getting enough support for our proposal for an independent Agent General.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter.]

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[5] See Document 206.

201. Letter From Prime Minister Ben Gurion to President Eisenhower [1]

Jerusalem, March 16, 1956.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am deeply grateful for your reply dated 27 February [2] to my letter of 14 February. [3]

I feel an obligation to my people and to you, Sir, to set on record my appreciation for your noble and imaginative initiative to probe the possibility of a settlement between Israel and Egypt and for your having sent Mr. Anderson twice to the area as your personal envoy. If this mission has not produced the desired results, it should by no means be regretted for it may yet bear fruit sometime in the future.

The refusal by the head of the Egyptian Government to sustain his oft-repeated intimations that he was willing to work towards a settlement with Israel confirms—I am sorry to say—our presentiment from the outset, that he would merely utilise Mr. Anderson's mission to gain time for the absorption of Soviet arms by his army. He has made good use of the past months also to cement his aggressive pact with Syria and Saudi Arabia, to intimidate Jordan and to increase disturbances in North Africa. Soviet arms have built up Col. Nasser's prestige throughout the area. In return, he has opened to Soviet penetration the gates of the Arab world and, more dangerous still, of the African continent. The very existence of his regime is now closely tied up with the growing Soviet influence in this part of the world. Our apprehensions at this grave development have been frequently transmitted to your government during the past five months.

It would be presumptuous on our part to suggest to the U.S.A. how to safeguard the vital interests of world democracy in the Middle East and Africa. It is however our compelling duty to ensure our capacity to defend our land and our national revival. Most

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Ambassador Eban on March 23 forwarded the letter along with a covering letter to Dulles. In his covering letter, Eban asked Dulles to arrange a private meeting for him with Eisenhower to enable him to deliver Ben Gurion's letter in person and to convey as well a brief oral message from the Prime Minister. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Jan.'56—Memos, etc.)

According to Dulles' memorandum of conversation with the President on March 26, it was not until then that Dulles gave the letter to Eisenhower along with recommendations that it did not require an immediate response, and that it would be unwise to honor Eban's request for a private session at the White House, since it would require a corresponding visit with an Arab personality. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

[2] Document 132.

[3] Attachment to Document 103.

reliable information indicates that within the next few months the rulers of Egypt will feel in a position to strike at Israel. Even should Col. Nasser personally hesitate to take the plunge, it is difficult to see how he will be able to withstand the pressure of his colleagues within Egypt and of certain ruling circles in other Arab countries that he should use his overwhelming superiority of arms to fulfill the oft-declared objective of crushing Israel out of existence. I am duty-bound to repeat our deepest conviction that only the immediate acquisition by Israel of defensive weapons—planes and tanks—of equal quality to those in the hands of Egypt, even if they be in a minimum number, can deter an Egyptian attack, save Israel from untold sacrifice and damage and the Middle East from a war pregnant with danger to mankind.

The disparity of population between Israel and the Arab States is and will remain for some years irrelevant to our capacity to face up to an Arab onslaught. The respective numbers capable of handling modern arms stand in no proportion to the population figures. The vastly diverse standards of education, health and skilled training in Israel, on the one hand, and in the Arab States, on the other, have created a balance of actual and potential fighting manpower between the two sides which cannot be easily upset in the next few years to Israel's detriment. While Egypt for a long time to come can hardly absorb planes in greater number than those for which she has already contracted under the Czech-Egyptian deal of last September, Israel is yet far from the saturation point, being in a position to man and handle as many planes as Egypt has absorbed and can absorb. In 1948, with 600,000 inhabitants, Israel, having the essential minimum of arms, withstood successfully the combined forces of five Arab States.

An arms race is already in full swing in the area *but it is one-sided.* Egypt is receiving arms from the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, Saudi Arabia and Iraq from the U.S., and Iraq and Jordan again from Great Britain. Israel alone is denied the essential means for self-defence. This denial is contrary to the principles of international justice and morality and incompatible with the intent of the Tripartite Declaration, with your statement of 9 November [4] and with Mr. Dulles' statement to Mr. Sharett in Geneva in October last. [5]

We cannot rest our safety, indeed our very existence, merely on outside intervention. Egyptian planes may wreak havoc on our cities well before such intervention can become effective. Moreover, at the crucial moment intervention may have to be abandoned in view of the risk of counter Soviet intervention. Arms to Israel will not only

[4] See the editorial note, vol. XIV, p. 725.
[5] See Secto 90, *ibid.*, p. 683.

not increase the danger of war but will considerably lessen it. Egypt may become convinced of the futility of its present course and a psychological climate may develop in which your efforts for peace could be pursued with a better hope of eventual fulfillment.

From November to January we were informed that our arms request was being considered. From January till now we have been told that a decision on our arms request had to be deferred pending the outcome of Mr. Anderson's mission. During this entire period peace has not been brought nearer but Egypt has been perfecting her war machine and the danger to our existence has heavily increased. I deeply appreciate your assurance in your letter that our request is being given the most careful consideration but time is running out.

We are now entering upon a phase of crisis and decision. At this fateful juncture it is in your hands, Mr. President, by swift response to our urgent appeal, to avert the tragedy of war.

With heartfelt wishes for your health and strength for many years to come,

Yours sincerely,

D. Ben-Gurion

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202. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 16, 1956—9 a.m.

948. After departure British Foreign Secretary Lloyd on completing his hurried two-hour visit Israel, British Ambassador gave me following highlights Lloyd's talk with Ben Gurion and Sharett in Ben Gurion's office Jerusalem March 13.

1. The principal benefit to Israel from Lloyd's visit was normal psychological [*sic*] and clarifying of general policies which would derive from an exchange of views with Foreign Minister of an important western power (British feel that GOI already decided play down visit as contributing little to better understanding).

2. Israel received little from Lloyd in the way of answer to question of re-assessment of the policy of west, and particularly of the UK, toward area. However, Lloyd did give Israelis broad hint

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 641.84A/3–1656. Secret. Received at 4:52 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, and Cairo.

that British may not now have complete confidence in Nasser's intentions and that area policy re-appraisal in the future was always possible in light of new developments. (Apparently, Lloyd is somewhat disillusioned with Nasser following what he thought was a very satisfactory conversation with him in Cairo recently as Nasser's promise to abandon anti-UK propaganda had not been honored and, in some respects, the propaganda had been stepped up. He was particularly concerned about Nasser's attention to Libya as well as other African areas. This adds support to conviction Cairo's Embtel 1805 to Department [2] that Nasser prepared witness further deterioration relations with west stemming from west's reaction to propaganda attacks and his Arab military alliance activities.) He was careful to give no concrete reply to Israeli's exploration of possible immediate reassessment Middle East policy by the west, subject which is occupying GOI seriously and hopefully at this time.

3. Lloyd did not satisfy GOI's hope that he might reveal some new Middle East policy line by US–UK following his talks with Secretary Dulles at Karachi. (This was to be the principal benefit that GOI expected receive from Lloyd's visit, according to comment made to Embassy by Israel Foreign Office officer.)

4. The general tenor of the talks was satisfactory, being calm and unemotional, even with respect to Ben Gurion who was in complete command GOI and did most of talking for Israel. The "arms question" dominated talks and almost every subject was related thereto.

5. Lloyd thought that Ben Gurion introduced the discussion Israel's position very shrewdly in that he approached the subject on the basis Israel's value in this area to the west especially in view of present strong Soviet penetration efforts. In this regard Ben Gurion was vitriolically critical of the Soviets and left no doubt as to his anti-Communist feelings. (It was interesting to note that at no time during the conversation did he refer to possibility of Israel's applying to Soviets for arms.) Ben Gurion followed the usual line of argument in support of receiving arms from the west, emphasizing Israel's insecure position and Nasser's inevitable decision to strike when ready. Following Ben Gurion's expression of concern over Egyptian aggression, Lloyd asked when Nasser might be expected to strike. Ben Gurion replied, "in two, three or four months". However, he underscored heavily the vital value of the policy maintaining Israel security to the west in its efforts to exclude the Soviets from the Middle East area. Ben Gurion opposed diametrically the west's present thesis of "limited absorption of arms" and no arms for small country like Israel, on the grounds that Arabs were totally incapable

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/3–956)

of effectively absorbing more than a certain amount of arms regardless of total amount supplied them. Ben Gurion made a strong plea for arms from the west and its acceptance of Israel as a strong western oasis in the Arab world.

7. [*sic*] Subject creation of kilometer wide neutral border zone to reduce incidents was advanced by Lloyd but he got nowhere with Ben Gurion who presented usual arguments supplemented by contention that zone would have to be continuous and on all borders, thus relatively large area Israeli land would be involved. Nevertheless, it believed that subject still very much in Lloyd's mind.

8. Subject Banat Yaacov not taken up in meeting but Lloyd believed to have presented UK line (Deptel 617 [3]) to Sharett in short private talk at airport on departing. Therefore Sharett's reply not known but presumed to be along lines given to me (Embtel 893 [4]).

9. Possibilities for an overall Arab-Israel settlement, Lloyd asked Ben Gurion what contributions Israel was prepared to make towards such a settlement. The latter's reply followed very closely the familiar pattern i.e., not one inch of territory to be given up, repatriation of only a small number of "split-family" refugees, compensation for Arab property in Israel, et cetera. With straight face Ben Gurion added that GOI could make the following "very substantial contributions", use of Israel's valuable experience and technical knowledge, acquired through its own immigration program since its inception, in the resettlement of Arab refugees in Arab countries; and the great stabilizing and progressive influence of the existence of such a hard-working, high-living-standard, western type civilization as Israel would offer the entire area.

10. Lloyd left Israel with the firm conviction that it is impossible at this time to move Ben Gurion and Israel further along the line of an Arab-Israel settlement. Lloyd is thinking seriously of approaching the USG with the proposal that the US–UK abandon the attempt to bring about a voluntary Arab-Israel settlement at this time and under the current unfavorable atmosphere and that this policy be so announced to the world. At the same time however, the west's determination to maintain peace in the area by all possible means would be underscored.

11. Lloyd and his party obtained some tangible benefits from their direct contact with the major problems and with the GOI principals, Ben Gurion and Sharett, obtaining in considerable detail the GOI points of view also impressions of the relative seriousness with which these points of view were held. They seemed especially impressed with the difficulties which the western diplomatic mis-

[3] See footnote 3, Document 136.
[4] Document 170.

sions in Israel must encounter in their dealings with an intransigent government.

Lawson

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203. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 16, 1956—8 p.m.

957. I saw Sharett today and conveyed to him in detail substance Deptel 669 [2] re US position on Banat Yaacov.

Sharett had almost verbatim record kept of my remarks, which he said he regarded as most important statement US position despite its oral expression. He would have to give it most careful consideration before commenting. However, his preliminary view was that it raised as many questions as it answered. Moreover, he could not help but conclude that United States Government is apparently quite content if GOI is obliged to wait indefinitely; and that US has set no limit to period it would expect the Israelis to exercise restraint in face of Syrian objections.

Lawson

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–1656. Secret. Received at 6:27 a.m., March 18. Also sent to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, London, Paris, and Jerusalem. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, and Jidda.

[2] Document 190.

204. Message From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower [1]

London, March 19, 1956.

Thank you for your message about the Middle East. [2] The following is just to keep you in touch with our thoughts about the growing dangers in that part of the world.

Selwyn Lloyd discussed these matters with Foster in Karachi. [3] Since then he has visited the other capitals of the Bagdad Pact countries and Israel. In consequence of his report to us we have made a careful re-examination of our policy towards Egypt. Selwyn is sending to Foster a detailed analysis of the situation as we see it. [4] I am sure you will agree that it is essential that we should act together in these matters, and I hope that we shall be able speedily to evolve a common line. I need not emphasise to you the urgency of this task: the situation can deteriorate so rapidly. [5]

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Ambassador Makins forwarded this message as an enclosure to a memorandum to the President on March 19. Ann Whitman sent Hoover a copy on March 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–2056)

[2] See Document 182.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 172.

[4] See the enclosure to Document 208.

[5] The following handwritten notation by Eisenhower appears on the bottom of the source text: "File. No reply, now. DE"

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205. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 20, 1956—11 a.m.

970. Joint appraisal by British colleague and me of Israel's present attitude to Arab-Israel problem and suggestions which might reduce short-term risk of war bring forth following conclusions arrived at with due reservations as to danger of prophecy in this area and fact there are sharp divergencies of opinion within government and opposition. They believed to represent current views of majority of Cabinet including Prime Minister. British Ambassador sending in

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–2056. Secret. Received at 1:11 p.m. Repeated to London and Paris.

similar but not identical statement yet we are in complete agreement on basic principles as reported.

2. Israelis believe settlement with Arabs not possible for long time. Basis their belief not merely that gap between parties too wide to be breached by negotiations under present conditions but conviction that Arabs, from present position of strength, desire no settlement or at best one on terms which would facilitate subsequent destruction of Israel and which would demand all or at least major concessions be made by Israel.

3. Israel distrusts Anglo-American moves for settlement because they fear:

(a) That western strategic interests (including oil) and concern over pushing Arabs into Soviet arms will load the dice heavily against Israel;

(b) That west is deliberately forcing Israel into position of agreeing to settlement from position of weakness from which they would grant concessions which would move Arabs to settlement table;

(c) That Arabs will procrastinate indefinitely in knowledge that their strength is increasing and in belief that west will not wish reduce the chances of settlement by arming Israel;

(d) That west has miscalculated regarding Nasser's intentions and under-rate the force of his expansionist propensities.

4. They regard action under tripartite declaration or UN as affording inadequate protection against Arab aggressions; are convinced that help, if it comes at all, will come too late; are unconvinced that any direct and immediately effective program for action directed at aggressor and for protection of injured party prior to serious destruction by aggressor has been set up; now that USSR has announced reaction to western intervention in area, believe that UN or tripartite powers program would not be directed at Arabs even if latter clearly aggressors or if Arabs conceal an aggressive initiative responsible for Israel's retaliatory action. Specifically, they see in neither declaration or UN protection for Israel against Egypt's jet bombers of Soviet origin.

5. Israel confident can defeat Arab attack if comes within few months or hold one up until end of year if Soviet arms not effectively absorbed by Egyptians. Date possible Egyptian attack not firmly stated here but highest GOI officials talk in terms of July and coming summer.

6. Israel accepts reluctantly that victorious war, which militarily might be possible, would achieve only temporary respite and idea of deliberate preventive war has been shelved. However, in present mood Israel may well react strongly to Arabs renewed use of Fedayeen tactics, to essential military acts such as "push up" in border incidents including Tiberias and Banat Yaacov attacks, to

heavier encircling military build-ups on Egypt's border, to any unusual air threats, or to further interference with Israel shipping. Of these, Fedayeen and Banat Yaacov presently most sensitive.

7. They believe unless present trends reversed Arabs will attain sufficient military superiority capable destroying Israel; fear Arab tendency to shift from under- to over-confidence leading to guerrilla and other harassing activities on Israel's long exposed frontiers thus making life unbearable; do not exclude possibility Nasser using preponderant air power, then withdrawing his troops to west side Suez.

Feeling they must maintain present moral superiority and establish determination to survive, Israel believes it must react firmly and if necessary violently to breaches of GAA and cannot afford surrender to area pressure on disputed points; the smaller her chances of adding military strength the more she thinks in terms of intransigence, and although recognizing this may increase short-term danger war, considers it offers only hope of avoiding war for considerable period. GOI prepared to accept this short-term risk.

8. Israel does not want war; much prefers peaceful settlement outstanding problems from which present tensions derive, but visualizes no early prospects for peace settlement. Israel does not want arms race but wants sufficient arms protect self during initial period of attack and until international agencies can effectively prevent further aggression against her.

9. In judgment British Ambassador and myself, short-term risk of war might be effectively reduced by following immediate actions:

(a) Granting Israel's request for arms in minimum quantities of high quality arms and equipment including supersonic planes. This action might be accompanied with Israeli commitments to assure use for defensive and possibly assurances her behavior pattern concerning cooperation with UNTSO, issue Gulf of Aqaba and other outstanding problems.

(b) Providing evidence Western powers have set limits to extent to which Arabs will be allowed to further exploit Soviet bogey.

(c) Shift present emphasis by US and UK effort toward voluntary settlement to applying measures to prevent war. Sales of arms to Israel might increase Arabs opposition to settlement; on other hand present suspected uses of arms embargo to force her to make concessions increases Israel's resistance to settlement. Risk of war is at present much greater than chances of settlement. Therefore seems to us there is strong case for concentrating on prevention of war.

(d) Exert constant pressure on both Arabs and Israel to convince them that hostilities arising out of unreasonable actions on their part, not merely those classifiable as direct military aggression, will lead to Western intervention.

(e) Present to Israel and Arabs clear and strong evidence Western powers have immediate effective instruments for carrying out intervention and determined to use them.

(f) Obvious detailed blueprint cannot be made public but program should be made unmistakably clear in as definite terms as possible and announced steps of action should give undoubted assurance that aggressor will be designated and done so immediately following condemnable action whether directly or indirectly responsible for hostilities.

(g) Insistence on complete compliance by all parties to all provisions GAA.

(h) Insist on free movement for UN observers to permit observation and fixing of blame at time of incidents rather than afterward. Further supporting details being submitted in despatch. [2] In view possibility settlement Banat Yaacov problem by practical Israel and Jordan programs under basic terms Johnston Jordan River plan yet without involving their formal acceptance as such at this time (see Embtel 960 [3]), problem not discussed therein. British Ambassador agrees our recommended approach reference telegram.

Lawson

[2] Reference is to despatch 583 from Tel Aviv, March 21. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/3–2156)
[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 684A.85322/3–1756)

206. Editorial Note

On March 20, Representative at the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., requested the President of the Security Council to convene an early meeting of the Council to consider the Palestine question. On March 21, Lodge submitted a draft resolution for the Security Council which, if adopted, would: 1) consider that the situation then prevailing between the parties concerning the enforcement of the Armistice Agreements and the compliance given to the Council's resolutions of March 30, 1955, September 8, 1955, and January 19, 1956, was such that its continuation was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security; 2) request the Secretary-General to undertake, as a matter of urgent concern, a survey of the various aspects of enforcement of and compliance with the four General Armistice Agreements and the Council's above-mentioned resolutions; 3) request the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for the adoption of any measures which, after discussion with the parties and the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, he considered would reduce existing tensions along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, including the following points: a) withdrawal of their forces

from the Armistice Demarcation Lines; b) full freedom of movement for the observers along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, in the Demilitarized Zones, and in the Defensive Areas; c) establishment of local arrangements for the prevention of incidents and the prompt detection of any violation of the Armistice Agreements; 4) call upon the parties to the Armistice Agreements to cooperate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution; and 5) request the Secretary-General to report to the Council in order to assist the Council in considering what further action might be required. (U.N. doc. S/3562 and Corr. 1)

For discussion, see U.N. docs. S/PV. 717 through S/PV. 722.

On April 4, the Security Council unanimously adopted the United States draft resolution. The Representative of the Soviet Union cast an affirmative vote despite his unsuccessful attempt earlier to amend the resolution.

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207. Telegram From the Embassy in the Sudan to the Department of State [1]

Khartoum, March 20, 1956—4 p.m.

241. Reference Embtel 232. [2] Summary of Foreign Office note on High Dam and Nile waters: [3] Sudan surprised UK, US, IBRD contemplate loan to Egypt for High Dam which would flood important part Sudan although Sudan not invited discuss. Sudan assumes vital interests not prejudiced. Sudan has not agreed allow any part Sudan be flooded as result High Dam but prepared agree if certain conditions satisfied. Conditions for evacuation Wadi Halfa district: a. Fair division Nile waters; b. Each country permitted build control structures utilize its share; c. Dispossessed persons Wadi Halfa provided by Egypt with alternative accommodation and means of livelihood; d. Egypt compensate Sudan potential loss hydro-electric power; also mineral and archaeological losses. Sudan points out alternative means livelihood disposed persons will require five years and be expensive. Sudan asks categorical confirmation money for High Dam will not

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645W.74322/3–2056. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:59 a.m., March 21.

[2] Beach informed the Department in telegram 232, March 17, that he would soon be receiving a "communication to forward to US Government on subject Sudan interest Nile waters." (*Ibid.*, 645W.74322/3–1756)

[3] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 874.2614/3–1756)

be sent until Sudan agrees evacuation. Sudan Government concerned not in position seek financial assistance abroad because does not possess separate currency. Redemption [*Resumption*] negotiations ended with departure Egyptian delegation. [4] Sudan hopes they will be able resume shortly. Sudan application IMF and IBRD delayed by above. Need for rapid irrigation development as great in Sudan as in Egypt and so is need for financial assistance from abroad. Sudan would welcome discussions this matter. [5] Similar communication sent Mr. Black prior conclusion his recent negotiations with Egypt. [6]

Beach

[4] See Document 144.

[5] The Department on April 19 instructed the Embassy in Khartoum to respond to the Sudanese note of March 17. The response reads in part: "Throughout negotiations with GOE, US Govt has taken fully into account interests of GOS and there has been basic assumption GOE and GOS would have to reach agreement." (Telegram 169 to Khartoum; Department of State, Central Files, 645W.74322/4–1956)

[6] See Document 69.

208. Note From the British Ambassador (Makins) to Secretary of State Dulles [1]

Washington, March 21, 1956.

On Selwyn Lloyd's instructions, I enclose for your personal and confidential information, three copies of a paper on the situation in the Middle East which has been approved by the Prime Minister.

Selwyn Lloyd asked me to explain that it represents their ideas reached after a good deal of thought. He himself, as a result of the visits which he paid [2] after seeing you in Karachi, is very worried about the need for urgent action.

Roger Makins [3]

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eden to Eisenhower Correspondence 1955–1956. Vol. I. Top Secret; Personal. The source text bears a notation indicating that Dulles saw it.

[2] Reference is to Lloyd's visits to the capitals of the Baghdad Pact countries and to Israel.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[Enclosure][4]

Ever since the signature of the Suez Canal Agreement we have taken the view that the revolutionary regime in Egypt under Colonel Nasser was disposed to work with the West and could be brought to cooperate in the task of securing peace in the Middle East. We and the United States Government have hoped that Colonel Nasser would take the lead in the search for a Palestine settlement. We showed willingness to help him over his long term plans for the welfare of the Egyptian people, notably the Aswan Dam. Although he has opposed the Bagdad Pact because of the prominence which it gave to Iraq, we have hoped that he would eventually be reconciled to the need for common defence arrangements for the Middle East. We have relations with the West despite his acceptance of the Bandung policy of non-alignment.

2. These hopes have in recent months become increasingly difficult to sustain. I am afraid the time has now come for a reappraisal of the situation.

3. Since Colonel Nasser decided to obtain arms from the Soviet Union his attitude to the West has steadily deteriorated. Although he is severe with the Egyptian Communists and anxious not to be compelled to rely solely upon Soviet support, he is, I believe more deeply committed to the Soviet than we have thought. He is already becoming a prisoner of his arms policy and may no longer be in a position to free himself from Soviet control. Like Mussolini before him, he has become beholden to a ruthless power. His pride will not allow him to extricate himself. This will be relentlessly exploited by the Russians whose technicians and experts are entering Egypt in increasing numbers (in hundreds) and on whom Colonel Nasser is now dependent for the repairs and spare parts for the armaments which he has obtained.

4. The popularity which the acquisition of Soviet arms has gained to Colonel Nasser in the Arab world is tempting him to seek fresh successes against Israel and there is evidence that he may contemplate an attack this year. The efforts which we and the United States Government have made over the past two years to obtain a Palestine settlement through Colonel Nasser have recently failed. We are driven to the conclusion that he is not prepared to take any real initiative towards a settlement. Why should he? As champion of the Arab cause against Israel he consolidates his position with the Arabs. The more intransigent he is towards Israel the stronger he becomes. Egyptian propaganda has been openly directed

[4] Top Secret.

against the Western position in all parts of the Middle East and Africa even where no direct Egyptian interest is involved. Their attitude towards our relations with Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf states and Libya suggests that they are determined to eliminate British and other Western influences from the whole area. With the aid of Saudi money they are inflaming anti-Western feeling.

5. A final illustration of his double dealing is to be seen in his action since my conversation with him in Cairo.[5] He protested on March 1 that he did not wish to attack the British position in the Middle East nor was he in any way hostile to our bilateral agreements with Arab states. Since that date there has been propaganda directed to the Persian Gulf states against British and the International oil companies. Another attempt has been made to detach Jordan from British association. An offer has been made to Libya to replace the British subvention.

6. Accordingly I have come to the conclusion that we must change our policy towards Egypt. Many things which we have hitherto done or refrained from doing out of concern not to alienate Egypt must now be reconsidered.

7. The following steps seem to me to be those open to us to counter Egyptian policy in the Middle East. The order in which they are set out has no significance.

(a) Increased support should be given to the Bagdad Pact and its members, notably Iraq. This involves a further request to the United States to support and if possible to join the Pact. If a decision to join is still out of the question, the possibility of a declaration of intention should be considered.

(b) Increased aid should be given to the member countries. We ourselves should consider whether there is anything further that we can do, particularly to strengthen the machinery of the pact itself by the creation of an effective international secretariat, and the provision of more technical assistance. The United States should be asked to develop their "solid support".

(c) Iraq and Jordan should be drawn closer together. This process has already begun as a result of the meeting of the two Kings. Its momentum must be maintained.

(d) Saudi Arabia should be detached from Egypt. This involves reinforcing the existing fears of King Saud and his family as to the ambitions of revolutionary Egypt. He must be made to realise that Egypt is aiming at the overthrow of monarchical institutions in the Arab world and the establishment of a union of Arab states under Egyptian hegemony.

(e) Further support should be given to Libya in order to prevent her falling under Egyptian or Communist influence. The further support over the development plan is primarily a task for the

[5] See Documents 157 and 175.

Americans. We, in addition to our large existing subvention, might help over the loan for the Tripoli power station and the English school.

. . . . . .

8. Whatever policy we pursue, we must expect continuing and increasing hostility from Colonel Nasser. He will intensify his efforts against Jordan. We must expect renewed attempts to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy there. There is already fresh evidence of this. Further attacks upon Nuri, including possible assassination, must also be expected. The attack upon us in the Gulf will be strengthened and a general campaign will be launched to stir up hatred against the West and against any Arab leaders who cooperate with the West. It is important not to under-estimate Colonel Nasser. Egypt has powerful means of influencing Arab opinion and is capable of making a lot of trouble for us. It is quite possible that we should suffer some casualties in the conflict. If, however, we postpone taking firm action against Egypt, worse consequences will follow.

9. We must also consider the possibility of more direct action against Egypt herself. The possibilities are as follows—

(a) We could withhold all military supplies, including instructors and spare parts for British equipment.

(b) We could withdraw our offer of financial support over the Aswan Dam.

. . . . . .

(d) We could withdraw our tripartite guarantee of Egypt against Israel aggression.

(e) We could encourage the Sudanese to make trouble for the Egyptians.

(f) We could ask the United States to taper off their economic aid to Egypt.

. . . . . .

10. Since the object of our policy must be to isolate Egypt and to strengthen our position in those Arab countries where we have interests, it is essential that the steps we take should be seen to be directed to the defence of Western interests and not designed to uphold the interests of Israel. One way to strengthen the Egyptian position is for our efforts and those of our friends in the Arab world to become identified with what Arabs regard as undue tenderness towards Israel. For this reason I have omitted any mention of forcing the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba or insisting upon freedom of

Israeli vessels to navigate the Suez Canal. Our policy towards the Arab/Israel conflict must be concentrated upon keeping the peace through United Nations action, and threat of possible action against an aggressor under the tripartite declaration. It will also be necessary to give some defensive arms to Israel.

11. I do not believe that it would be permissible for us to carry through successfully the new policy towards Egypt set out in the preceding paragraphs unless we and the United States work wholeheartedly together. The timing and presentation of these various steps requires careful thought. Above all, the United States and United Kingdom must clearly be seen to be acting together. . . . But in the meantime immediate steps must be taken to hearten our friends, particularly under the Bagdad Pact. [6]

[6] On March 22, Ambassador Aldrich in London reported on a conversation with Selwyn Lloyd during which he asked about the probable U.S. reaction to the British paper. Aldrich refused to speculate, "but in effort to draw him out inquired whether he envisages proposed policy as frontal attack on Nasser and consequently various specific steps put forward as in nature of package plan. His thinking apparently is along line frontal attack, but he envisages priorities among various specific projects." (Telegram 4148 from London; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–2256)

On March 23, Dulles acknowledged receipt of this paper and informed Makins that he anticipated "detailed talks between American and British officials." (Letter from Dulles to Makins; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Unlabelled Folder)

209. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, March 21, 1956.

In reading the attached first draft of NEA's memorandum of March 14 on U.S. Policy in the Near East, [2] several additional points occur to me. The memorandum, I do not believe, emphasizes sufficiently:

1. The accusations leveled against the United States by Nasser on the score of U.S. "colonialism". I am sure that the remarks attributed to him have not benefited the United States.

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518; Omega—Egypt—Dam, Miscl. 1956. Top Secret. The source text contains no information to indicate it was sent to Hoover.

[2] Document 192.

2. The Western position in the area, especially in Jordan, has no doubt been damaged by Egyptian radio agitation directed at the Jordanians. This activity has been and is detrimental to the West.

3. Cairo activities in North Africa and radio and other propaganda efforts directed at French North Africa have unquestionably augmented France's difficulties in the area. These difficulties in turn have exasperated relations between France and the United States and have created strains within NATO. Thus, indirectly, present Egyptian policies and attitudes vis-à-vis French North Africa are harmful to the United States.

4. Nasser has opened the African door to Soviet penetration.

5. The USSR is sending nuclear scientists to Cairo by agreement with the Egyptian Government to set up a research reactor laboratory. [3]

6. In violation of UN Resolution, Egypt maintains a blockade of the Red Sea.

7. Nasser is responsible in large part to a growing notion in other areas of which Libya is a prime example, that the United States will respond by concessions to pressure tactics using the threat of deals with the Soviet Union as a lever. This is complicating our relations with a number of countries—for example, Iran.

8. In this attached plan of action under "Measures to be Taken . . . " [4] 4(d) suggests provision to Israel of limited amounts of defensive arms. If we take that action, the difficult problem no doubt for us will be the eventual reaction by Saudi Arabia. I think that suggestion should be coupled with an additional thought that if we supply arms to Israel we should make an especial effort to satisfy the Saudi Arabians that we are substantially meeting their requests for weapons. This, I think, should be done simultaneously. [5]

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[3] On February 11, 1956, the Soviet Union agreed to establish a nuclear research laboratory in Egypt.

[4] Ellipsis in the source text.

[5] NEA's memorandum of March 14 was subsequently revised. See Document 222.

210. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Adam Watson of the British Foreign Office and the First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Wilson), London, March 21, 1956 [1]

In handing me the attached document, Mr. Watson said that later today Mr. Selwyn Lloyd was going to show the Ambassador the message to Secretary Dulles regarding British policy toward Egypt [2] mentioned in Eden's message of March 19th to the President. [3] Mr. Watson said that he did not wish to make any specific comment on this latter document in advance of the Ambassador's call but that he hoped the Embassy would make it clear to the Department that the conclusions contained therein have been arrived at as the result of an exhaustive study of the facts. The conclusions are not the result of any hasty deductions but are the culmination of a process of re-examination of British policy toward Egypt which has been going on for some time. Mr. Watson said that just because the Foreign Office has not discussed this matter with us in any detail in recent weeks he hopes we will not jump to the conclusion that it does not take a serious view of the present situation. He said that it was as though a man should suddenly tell a friend "I have decided to divorce my wife" and on being asked why would reply "It's a long story". He thought that we should realize that recent British policy in other fields, such as Cyprus and Saudi Arabia, was directly tied in with the Egyptian situation.

Mr. Watson said that basically the British, and he thought the United States, had three objectives in the Middle East: (1) To prevent Soviet aggression by building up the northern tier and Baghdad Pact; (2) to preserve access to the oil of the Persian Gulf; and (3) to prevent the outbreak of an Arab-Israeli war. Recent indications of Egyptian attitudes were causing the Foreign Office to think that the Egyptians, as the conscious or unconscious tools of the Russians, might be working against all three of these objectives. He said that the British had various items of intelligence which were being made available to the Department in Washington . . . and which were evidence of this. One important item was contained in the attached document. I inquired whether the Foreign Office regarded this report as reliable, to which Mr. Watson replied that they were unable to evaluate it completely but at least thought it de-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 641.74/3–2256. Top Secret. Drafted by Wilson. Barbour enclosed this memorandum of conversation with a letter he wrote to Allen on March 22.

[2] Document 208.

[3] Document 204.

served the most serious consideration. He thought that it was highly significant that Trevelyan should have submitted this report, as until recently Trevelyan has been relatively pro-Nasser.

Mr. Watson thought that there was a good chance that we might be faced with a situation in the Middle East like that of the Spanish Civil War, with the Russians using every opportunity to muddy the waters and even to intervene directly if hostilities should break out between Egypt and Israel. In this event, as in Spain, the Russians would have a chance to try out their new weapons. . . . He also mentioned the tone of the Cairo broadcasts, both those beamed at East Africa and those beamed at the other Arab countries. He detected in these broadcasts, in addition to the usual pro-Moslem, anti-British line, a new and insidious note of attack on the entire Western position, with reference particularly to oil, i.e., the suggestion that the oil of the Arab countries should be exploited by the people of the area and not by foreigners.

I asked Mr. Watson whether the Foreign Office thought that Nasser had reached the point of no return in his relations with the Soviets. Mr. Watson replied that he thought that this had not yet occurred, but it appears that it will occur in the relatively near future. Therefore, it may be necessary to re-think our entire approach to Nasser. He said that the document which had gone forward to Washington and which Mr. Selwyn Lloyd would discuss with the Ambassador, did not propose any specific steps other than suggesting that the U.S. and the UK ought to get together to discuss the situation. He said that a corollary was that the UK must bring its relations with Saudi Arabia into line so that Saudi Arabia would be removed from Egyptian influence. He said, however, that both the Saudi Arabian problem and the problem of Cyprus, although they were being affected by the Egyptian problem, were of a lesser magnitude in that the UK could expect a solution of them, whereas he did not know what the solution of the Egyptian problem would be.

I mentioned the categorical statement Nasser had made last week to Byroade that he had no intention of attacking Israel.[4] Mr. Watson said this was exactly what he would expect Nasser to say.

A good deal of what Mr. Watson said confirmed remarks made to me on March 19th by Mr. Bryan Shepherd, his Deputy. Mr. Shepherd pointed out that Nasser's attitude toward the West was very different from that of last summer in that he no longer seemed to show the same desire to cooperate. There was not the same suggestion on Nasser's part that he was being forced to choose between the Soviet Bloc and the West. The inference was that he

[4] See Document 191.

had chosen the former. Mr. Shepherd cited various instances, such as the arms question, the supply of pilots for the MIGs, the situation in Libya, and the fact that in spite of what Nasser had said to Selwyn Lloyd, he had not done anything about the Cairo broadcasts. Trevelyan had again discussed this last point on March 18th with Nasser but had not gotten any satisfaction. Mr. Shepherd pointed out that if Nasser were to attack Israel under present circumstances he stood a good chance of acquiring great prestige with the other Arabs. He thought perhaps Nasser had reached the point of no return.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Prepared in the British Foreign Office [5]

Sir Humphrey Trevelyan has had information from a generally well-informed source that Nasser has already decided to engage in hostilities with Israel and has even decided that June would be the best time (our troops will then be out of the Canal Zone). The report says that the Egyptian plan is to seize the territory they want quickly; and when called on by the United Nations or the three powers to stop, they would do so, but not give up the territories acquired.

2. Trevelyan thinks that this is a possibility which we should certainly take into consideration. Nasser seems to him to have given up the ideal of a Palestine settlement. Specific pointers quoted by Trevelyan are:

(a) Nasser's loss of interest in Alpha and in the Johnston Plan; and Fawzi's warning that "opinion would harden" if the matter were not settled soon;

(b) Nasser's recent statements to Trevelyan that hostilities between Egypt and Israel would be so arranged that there was doubt about who was the aggressor, and that the militarily correct action for Egypt in Palestine would be to capture the Israeli forward base of Beersheba;

(c) the importance Nasser attaches to the moment when British troops will no longer be able to cut his communications;

(d) Nasser's fear that the Israelis will get substantial arms from the Americans and his remark to Trevelyan that if there is to be a preventive action soon the Arabs ought to begin it;

(e) the increase of tension and of firing in the Gaza strip;

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[5] Top Secret. Makins, on March 22, forwarded a copy of this undated British memorandum as an enclosure to a covering memorandum to Hoover. (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1)

(f) the calling-off of the anti-Iraqi campaign and new emphasis on Arab unity;

(g) Egyptian fear that Jordan might not support Egypt, especially while Glubb was there.

3. Trevelyan is afraid that if a clash occurs and the Russians step in with some outrageous statement about it being a clear case of Israeli aggression they will enormously strengthen their position in the Arab world.

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211. Message to Washington [1]

No. 130 *Cairo, March 21, 1956.*

1. In general analysis and review of Anderson mission . . . , Ali Sabri has made points also made by Nasr to Ambassador Byroade (see Message No. 128 [2]) and by Colonel Zackaria Moheiddim . . . (see Message No. 129 [3]), namely Egypt:

a. Stands by early conception of Anderson mission,

b. Is willing to take steps in conjunction with Israel to ease border tension and produce a situation favorable to a settlement,

c. Is willing to work out an agreement for a settlement on the terms outlined by Nasr (see Message No. 74 [4]), and

d. Will use its influence to gain acceptance by the other Arab States.

2. Ali Sabri emphasized, however, Egyptian discouragement with Anderson mission. He said that Nasr had gotten the feeling that he was being led into trap by U.S. Government efforts to get him to make commitments and take positive steps not reciprocated by the Israelis.

3. Ali Sabri said Egyptians had made greatest possible efforts to produce the positive, constructive steps that Anderson asked for. The two most important of these were:

a. Definition of terms of Settlement (see Message No. 74), and

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II. Secret.

[2] Document 191.

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II)

[4] Document 75.

b. Acceptance of the UN SecGen's proposals for the easing of border tensions.[5] Ali Sabri pointed out that Anderson had never reported that the Israelis had presented their terms for settlement. He also strongly emphasized the fact that when the Egyptians accepted the UN SecGen's proposals, the Israelis withdrew acceptance they had previously given. (This withdrawal of Israeli acceptance reported to the Egyptians by General Burns on 8–9 March).[6] Egyptians conclude that Israelis have not tried use Anderson mission to arrive at a settlement and that they therefore must have planned to use it to expose Nasr and damage Arab unity.

4. In discussing the form of possible negotiations between Egypt and Israel, Ali Sabri re-emphasized the political dangers of direct negotiations now. He says no one Arab leader can afford to expose himself to the political dangers involved in initiating unilateral negotiations and the Arab States as a group can probably never get together to initiate direct negotiations. Therefore he believes that the only means of arriving at a settlement would be through a process involving secret preliminary agreement between Israel and one Arab State on general principles and a second stage in which the Arab States as a group, having been persuaded to accept the general principles, would carry out the final negotiations. This conception, he said, guided Nasr's discussions with Anderson and represents Nasr's final position. He repeated the proposition that public announcement of an agreement in principle had better be made by U.S. Government or the UN rather than Egypt although Nasr would do his best to gain Arab support if he accepted such an agreement.

5. Ali Sabri took the position that Anderson mission to date had confirmed the Egyptians' suspicions that Israelis were not ready to work toward a settlement in good faith at this time. He said: Egypt can afford to wait. We have nothing to lose and everything to gain from the passage of time at this stage. We and our fellow Arab States need and desire a settlement but we do not have to have it. The Israelis on the other hand must have a settlement if they are to have the recognition normally accorded sovereign states and if they are to have security and economic opportunities. Eventually they will have to come to us. Eventually they must make the choice between their present precarious existence on the one hand and the acceptance of their responsibilities as a state among other states in this area on the other.

6. Ali Sabri refused allow his analysis of the general situation to be affected by risk of an Israel preventive war. He said he did not believe Israel would launch a war now, that Israel talk of preventive war was simply a means of putting pressure on U.S. Government to

[5] See telegrams 395 and 398, vol. XIV, pp. 690 and 702.
[6] See Document 188.

supply arms to Israel. Ali Sabri took a great deal of time to make a case to the effect that Egypt would not initiate aggressive war now or in the future. His principal argument was that, despite the fact that the Egyptian leadership made up of military men, aggressive war was incompatible with the principles of the Egyptian Revolution and that Nasr was firmly convinced that war would be disadvantageous to him and his country.

7. . . . Ali Sabri's remarks on Anderson mission and on the question of a settlement with Israel has been thought out with greatest care and have been discussed in detail with Nasr. Ali Sabri listened attentively and respectively to . . . counter arguments and explanation. Of U.S. Government position (e.g. explaining nature of U.S. Government pressure on Israel, Israel's reasons for feeling direct negotiations essential, and importance of continuing efforts work out program for easing border tensions) but showed more than usual determination stand by his prepared positions. Ali Sabri expressed willingness discuss any aspect of general problem any time with . . . but was pessimistic about possibility any progress now on U.S. program to ease border tensions. He pointed out repeatedly that Egypt had accepted the U.N. Sec Gen's proposals only to have Israel rescind its former acceptance.

8. . . . [Believe] following are principal points which emerge from talks with Egyptians since Anderson visit:

a. Egyptians adamant on question of direct negotiation.

b. Egyptians will cooperate with intermediary to work out preliminary steps to agreement on general principles but will insist Israelis match their actions.

c. Egyptians will continue to insist on preliminary phase of preparation situation favorable to a settlement.

d. Egyptians probably willing cooperate improvement border situation along lines U.N. Sec Gen's proposals, but will not accept direct negotiations above MAC level.

e. Egyptians willing accept risk of war rather than push toward settlement more rapidly than they believe politically feasible or advantageous.

f. Egyptians believe Israelis unlikely attack for two reasons: (1) Egypt's increasing military, particularly air, power, and (2) U.S. Government will restrain Israelis because war would damage U.S. Government position in area.

g. Egyptians appear believe chances good U.S. Government will not arm Israel because of resulting damage to U.S. Government area position.

h. Egyptians probably hopeful of settlement in year or two by means and along lines discussed with Anderson, providing no U.S. Government arms to Israel.

212. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State [1]

Amman, March 21, 1956—6 p.m.

509. Arab press March 21 reports Ben Gurion told Histadrut convention yesterday "It is incumbent upon us to arrive at agreement very soon with Arab States concerned re utilization Jordan waters if possible. If not possible, Israel will resume work on diverting course of Jordan for irrigation purposes. If evil results, the Arabs are responsible."[2]

This is likely the nail in coffin of our efforts get Jordan acceptance of Jordan Valley plan or any version thereof. Leaders have repeatedly said they will not bow to threats and Ben Gurion's statements look like threat from here.

Mallory

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–2156. Confidential. Received at 2:24 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Telegram 977 from Tel Aviv, March 21, transmitted the verbatim account of Ben Gurion's statement concerning the Jordan River water problem. (*Ibid.*)

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213. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, March 22, 1956.

SUBJECT

Possibility of Securing Israel Postponement of Work at Jisr Banat Ya'qub in Connection with Export-Import Bank Loan

You will recall that at your meeting with Ambassador Eban on March 15 [2] he informed you that the Israel Government had filed an application for a $75 million Export-Import Bank loan to cover the foreign exchange component of a program for developing the water resources of the coastal plain, notably the Yarkon and Kishon Rivers

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 884A.10/3–2256. Secret. Drafted by Troxel.

[2] See Document 199.

and certain of the wadis along the coast.[3] Following that meeting, I asked Ambassador Eban whether the construction he described and other construction outside the demilitarized zone would not utilize all of Israel's construction resources. I commented that if his Government were committed to a large scale development program through such a loan and if Israel could not in any case utilize the waters of the Jordan River for a considerable period of time, his Government might be willing to refrain from work at Banat Ya'qub for a year or more on condition that the United States would agree to taking a position at the end of that time favoring unilateral diversions by Israel and the Arab states of their respective shares of the Jordan River, consonant with the Jordan Valley Plan even though it had not been accepted by all the parties. Ambassador Eban readily agreed that there was no engineering necessity to begin work at Banat Ya'qub for some time. He led me to believe there was some possibility that Israel might refrain from work for an extended period under the hypothetical circumstances I suggested, and said that he would refer the matter to his Government.

It now appears from an examination of the preliminary data sent to the Export-Import Bank that the construction to be financed by the loan would include facilities of sufficient size to carry not only the coastal waters but those waters of the Jordan River which Israel expects to divert to the coast and Negev. This complicates the matter, since if the loan were granted we would be unable to say that it had no connection with Israel's plans for the development of the Jordan River, but it still might be possible to work out a satisfactory arrangement.

[3] See Document 194.

214. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, March 22, 1956—12:16 p.m.

696. Eyes only Ambassador. Re Embtel 931.[2] U.S. representative

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–2256. Top Secret; Alpha; Eyes Only. Drafted by Russell on March 16 and approved by Russell who signed for Hoover.

[2] Document 189.

referred to in Deptel 568 [3] has completed for time being at least, his discussions with top officials Israel and Egypt. While they provided means for exchange of views and elucidation of positions both sides, they have reached impasse for the present. Ben Gurion insists on direct meeting between self and Nasser or other top representatives both sides and is unwilling reveal to intermediary IG's "paying price for peace". Nasser, while prepared discuss all questions with intermediary, not willing hold direct meeting at this time. Department pouching to you reports of conversations. Both Ben Gurion and Sharett took part in discussions, which culminated last week. As renewal of effort achieve settlement would be jeopardized by revelation to officials of either government that others than very few who were engaged in operation had knowledge of it, you should confine to yourself information contained this tel and pouched materials.

While Ben Gurion stated to representative IG's position with respect IG's arms needs, he was informed that question outside scope of representative's authority.

Hoover

[3] Document 93.

215. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 22, 1956—2 p.m.

985. Foreign Ministry official advised Embassy officer March 21 of late news reports (not then carried in press) re US request for Security Council consideration of ME situation. [2] Commented as follows:

GOI could only consider this another delaying tactic designed further to postpone "real solution" of furnishing arms. There had been 3 such delaying steps which Israelis considered we had proposed for primary purpose of justifying continued non-shipment of arms to US public by implying other activities working to preserve peace. These 3 steps were (1) US exploratory talks with both Arabs

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–2256. Confidential. Received at 3:04 p.m., March 23. Repeated to London, Paris, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, and Beirut.

[2] See Document 206.

and Israelis re possibilities settlement, (2) US-UK talks, later amplified to tripartite talks, and (3) call for Security Council meeting.

Since first 2 of these steps had failed, and situation further deteriorating, GOI had impression third step was only another "do nothing" explanation designed to keep State Department "off the hook". Israel particularly disappointed this juncture, since action seemed timed to frustrate growing US public sympathy for Israel which might have resulted its receiving arms. (He cited favorable *Life* editorial March 19.)

He repeated that conditions were sharply worsening, and only deterrent of arms comparable quality would prevent Egyptian attack.

Embassy officer denied validity "three steps" analysis and pointed out: US diplomatic contacts on situation with Arab leaders, "on same pattern as with GOI" by no means pro forma, were intense and continuing; tripartite consultations continuing, as reference of problem to UN was fulfillment of policy earlier announced by President. [3]

Lawson

[3] Reference is to the U.S.–U.K. declaration issued at Washington on February 1, 1956. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 13, 1956, p. 231.

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216. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, March 26, 1956—8 p.m.

4229. On receipt Paris tels 4311 [2] and 4318 March 19, [3] rptd London 694 and 697, we spoke to Shuckburgh re Pineau's approach to Ambs Dillon and Jebb re 3-power ministerial meeting on Middle

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/3–2656. Secret. Received at 4:43 p.m. Repeated to Paris.

[2] Dillon informed the Department in telegram 4311 that French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau had expressed concern about Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt and believed that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had "to do something to stop this arms race. He said he felt that there should be a three-power ministerial meeting in the near future to consider the question and to arrive at definite conclusions." Pineau also proposed that the three ministers appeal publicly to the Soviet Union to initiate measures to stop the flow of arms into the Middle East. (*Ibid.*, 611.51/3–1956)

[3] Dillon reported in telegram 4318 that Pineau advanced the same proposal to British Ambassador Sir Gladwyn Jebb. (*Ibid.*)

East, and inquired as to FonOff reaction. Shuckburgh said FonOff was considering proposal and Emb would be informed when British position was definite.

Subsequently, as Dept aware, Pineau's proposal leaked to press and became confused in public eye with idea also apparently held by Pineau that there should be wider conference on subject including Israel and Arab countries (Paris tel 4435 March 23 rptd London 711).[4] Diplomatic correspondents in past few days have been writing, ostensibly with FonOff inspiration, that HMG would be prepared join U.S. and French in three-power discussion of Middle East immediately prior to NAC meeting in May[5] but that British Government was skeptical of usefulness of trying organize any broader conference at this time.

In discussion matter with Emb rep today, FonOff official took same line and said reply to Pineau's proposal (Paris tel 4318) was being prepared and would undoubtedly indicate HMG had no objection to 3-power ministerial meeting just before NAC meeting. Reply, however, will not cover question of wider conference since Pineau has not formally proposed such conference and since FonOff in fact is not certain just what he has in mind in this connection. Re possible approach to USSR (Paris tel 4311) Emb gains impression FonOff not enthusiastic.

Diplomatic correspondents have also devoted considerable attention in past few days to reported British plan for effective military action within 24 hours of outbreak of Arab-Israel war, as mentioned in *New York Times* for March 22.[6] When queried by press re existence of such plan, FonOff News Dept took care not to deny report outright as this would have created impression HMG without policy. As result, French Emb rep called at FonOff on March 24 to ask re details of plan. Attempts were made put him off by references to consultations re tripartite declaration agreed on at time of Eden visit to Washington but FonOff not sure how far it succeeded.

Barbour

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[4] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 396.1/3–2356)

[5] The North Atlantic Council met at Paris on May 4 and 5.

[6] Reference is to Drew Middleton's article entitled "British Plan Aims To Check Spread of a Mideast War".

217. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, March 26, 1956—noon.

1004. Reference: Deptel 707. [2] GOI officials have discussed informally with Embassy EXIM Bank loan application. They have been informed that as soon as they have provided enough data to make analysis possible Embassy, with assistance USOM technicians, will make economic appraisal and comments to the Department.

As regards political aspects and relation Banat Yaacov, Embassy understands that an informal governmental meeting was held March 22 to consider sounding which Russell had made with Eban re willingness GOI defer work water diversion in return for Exim Bank financial assistance water irrigation. [3] Consensus meeting was that discussion Washington was so nebulous as to provide no basis for presentation to Cabinet or Inner Cabinet group and Eban was requested to obtain more precise proposals.

Embassy believes that driving force for GOI to go ahead with Banat Yaacov work in near future derives from judgment that work in DZ can be completed now without a war, whereas if nothing done Arabs in short time will be militarily so strong as to deny Israel use of Jordan waters forever. Last conclusion is consistent with paragraph 4 Cairo's 1835 to Department [4] most doubtful whether any Syrian leader in the future would agree to water diversion for same reason Quwattly cannot agree because of Shishakly's successful stand in 1953. . . .

With reference specific questions last paragraph Deptel 707, Embassy submits following (1) Believe leverage obtaining one year deferment Israel work in DZ would be greatest if affirmative decision made by US on GOI arms request. Jet planes are considered so vital to Israel's existence that it is believed possible they would accept this condition. Furthermore, availability of these arms and re-establishment military equilibrium would tend dissipate theory that

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 884A.10/3–2656. Secret. Received at 9:44 a.m., March 27.

[2] On March 24, in telegram 707, the Department informed the Embassy in Tel Aviv of the Israeli Government's application to the Export-Import Bank for a loan of $75 million and asked the Embassy for views "as to likelihood that US favorable action on loan request would induce Israel Govt to undertake to refrain from work at Banat Ya'qub for year or two if in addition US were to agree take position at end of that time favoring unilateral diversions by Israel and Arab states of respective portions of Jordan, within limits and terms Jordan Valley Plan, even though JVP still not accepted." (*Ibid.*, 884A.10/3–2456)

[3] See Document 213.

[4] Dated March 14, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–1456)

if canal not completed this year it would be impossible to do so later. (2) If no arms are to be forthcoming, believe there is some possibility GOI might be prevailed upon to defer work this year if there was firm definitive commitment by USG to support work at some defined future date and that commitment take form which can be demonstrated to the Israeli people. As example some small USG financial contribution to the work on the Jordan diversion outside the DZ. (Israelis at official level are understood to have explored an approach along these lines in connection Washington discussion Exim Bank application but without any conclusion having been reached.) (3) Embassy does not believe that an Exim Bank loan for irrigation would reduce Israel interest in financial aid now anticipated in connection JVP. Embassy does not believe that Israel is interested in securing Arab rejection JVP. Irrespective validity Israel position on other issues they have consistently followed policy of desiring a settlement of the water problem and prefer to operate mutually with the Arabs in accordance with the provisions of the technical agreement. The evidence available points to the conclusion that Israel's apprehensions about Arab desires to deny them an equitable share of the Jordan waters are justified and Embassy believes that Israelis are entitled to full USG support in being protected from interminable Arab dilatory tactics.

Lawson

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218. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Director of the International Development Advisory Board (Barnes) to Oliver L. Troxel, Jr., of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs [1]

Washington, March 27, 1956.

On analysis, Nasser's suggestions, as outlined in Cairo's 1841 of March 14, [2] are wholly impractical so far as achieving the original objectives of the Jordan Valley Plan are concerned.

Presumably, his proposal seeks to avoid the political embarrassment of an accommodation with Israel on the water question. In

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 246, Draft Ltr—E.J. to Nasser. Secret.

[2] Document 195.

view of his previous indications of a thorough understanding of the project based on briefings by Mohammad Selim, his suggestions can only be regarded as a deliberate effort to stall an Arab decision.

His proposal in no way eliminates the necessity for some kind of agreement with Israel on particular elements of the Plan unless, of course, the Arabs are willing to sacrifice not 100 Mcm's but nearly 200 Mcm's of water for Jordan. Nasser is certainly aware that 300 Mcm's of storage capacity in Tiberias is crucial to the Arab interests. How does he propose to secure this storage space with necessary arrangements for input and offtake without Israeli agreement? He is equally aware all of the water of the Yarmuk would be insufficient to irrigate Jordan's west ghor lands—agriculturally and politically a most important area.

Even if the United States were willing to play along with the wholly uneconomic Yarmuk-only ideas (which presumably it is not), there would still be a shortage of 100 Mcm's of water unless it were obtained through agreement with Israel. Nasser must also know that any unilateral deal with Israel would necessarily involve a major diversion at Banat Yacov. If he believes that Syria could be pressured into withdrawing its objections to this diversion in some unilateral framework, how much easier it would be for Syria to accept the diversion as part of a valley plan.

These are only some of the more obvious fallacies in Nasser's proposal. I do not believe for a moment that he has advanced them seriously or believes that they offer any real solution of the problem. I should interpret them as a deliberate effort to lead us around Robin Hood's barn and suggest that they be dealt with in that light.

Nor do I doubt for a moment that it is entirely within Nasser's power, if he wishes, to bring about a situation which would enable Syria to act favorably on the proposal. A mere expression by the Arab League to the effect that the Plan is technically and economically sound and not incompatible with Arab policy would almost automatically remove the public opinion barriers to which Nasser refers. There is strong reason to believe that Jordan and Lebanon are both inclined toward the project, that Iraq will speak up for it, and that Libya will not be opposed. The other four states—Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Egypt are certainly controllable by Nasser if he wishes to handle them.

It appears to me that the water plan, along with other U.S. interests in the Middle East, is getting no more than political lip-service from Nasser.

219. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, March 27, 1956—4 p.m.

1910. For Secretary. More than month has gone by since we submitted to Department GOE counter proposal to our aide-mémoire reference High Dam requesting Department's reactions soonest. Two weeks ago (Embtel 1794, March 8 [2]) we pointed out danger further delay and asked for at least some indication problems encountered by Department in order we might comment, but no response.

Fact I am not informed reference Department's thinking notwithstanding my recent trip to Washington will be increasingly apparent to top levels here. [3]

Byroade

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/3–2756. Secret. Received at 3:49 p.m.

[2] Document 179.

[3] The Department replied as follows:

"Problems raised by GOE counter proposal have been under study within Dept sometime. Unable advise you at present on approach we will wish you make. Mindful however difficulties which this silence causes you." (Telegram 2358 to Cairo, March 29; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/3–2756)

220. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) [1]

Washington, March 28, 1956.

DEAR GORDON: The question of arms shipments to the Middle East continues to be a pressing one. Up to the present time, the U.S. has declined to accede to Israel's request for some $50,000,000 worth of arms, including jet fighters. In the meantime, Egypt and possibly other Arab states are receiving quantities of arms from the Soviet bloc, including jet bombers, that will considerably strengthen their military position.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.56/3–2856. Top Secret. Drafted by Russell.

In considering what policy the U.S. should adopt in dealing with this problem, it has to be assumed that a policy of helping Israel to maintain the military superiority which she has enjoyed over the past years, would incur severe Arab resentment and would enable the Soviet Union to move even more dangerously than heretofore to a position of friend and ally of the Arab nations. Such a development would threaten to result in a situation where the Soviet Union would have such dominance in the area that it could deprive the Western Powers of the oil resources of the Middle East and some of the important air bases upon which the West now bases its military strategy.

On the other hand, the U.S. and the other countries who are consulting with it through the Ambassadorial Committee (the United Kingdom, France and Italy) cannot pursue a policy merely of denying to Israel the means of defending herself against the new weapons which Egypt is acquiring.

It is, therefore, important to devise a policy governing arms shipments to the Middle East that will, insofar as possible:

1. Avoid undermining the U.S. position in the area by creating Arab resentments that would furnish the Soviet Union with opportunities for further penetration in the area; and,
2. Provide a maximum of defensive capacity for recipient countries while minimizing the incipient race to acquire large amounts of weapons of mass destruction.

It would be most useful in determining what action we should take upon Israel's requests to us, and what policies we might suggest to the other members of the Ambassadorial Committee, if we could have from the Department of Defense an analysis of the amounts and nature of arms which Israel would have to receive to bring it into a standoff position vis-à-vis the Arab countries.

We would appreciate any analysis and comments the Department of Defense could make on this question. [2]

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Hoover, Jr. [3]

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[2] See Document 331.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

221. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 28, 1956, 3 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Recent Middle East Developments

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Government	*Israel Government*
The Secretary	Ambassador Eban
The Under Secretary	Minister Shiloah
Mr. Allen—NEA	
Mr. Russell—S	

Ambassador Eban called at the Secretary's request. The Secretary said he had handed Prime Minister Ben Gurion's letter of March 16 [2] to the President while he was at White Sulphur Springs. The President had read it carefully and in due course will make a reply. The Secretary said he would suggest that Eban not press the proposal which the Prime Minister had made that Eban see the President. Such a meeting would become known and the various Arab ambassadors would want to present their points of view also to the President. The Secretary said the Prime Minister can count on President Eisenhower being fully aware of the Israel Government's position. Indeed, the letter itself was an eloquent statement of it.

The Secretary said that following the negative results, for the time being at least, of the Anderson mission, we are re-examining our policies toward the Middle East. That re-examination is based on the premise that Nasser may no longer be entitled to the preferential treatment he has been getting on the anticipation that he would cooperate in achieving an Arab-Israel settlement. What the practical results of this re-examination may be cannot be disclosed at this time. In fact, it is not yet completed. The Secretary said he wished the Israel Government, however, to know that it was going on. He said that he doubted that it would lead to a position of identity of the U.S. with Israel in antagonism to the Arabs as a whole. Such a position would not be to the real interest of Israel. It is our hope to devise and follow policies that will lead to an increase of U.S. weight in the Arab world as a whole.

The Secretary said that with respect to the Israel Government's request to purchase arms from the U.S., he hoped that it would look to its customary sources in Europe and that it would not look to the

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/3–2856. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted on March 30 by Russell. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[2] Document 201.

U.S. for arms which it could get from European countries. The Secretary said we had taken a sympathetic attitude toward the Israel request to the French Government to purchase Mysteres and we might be able to do more along that line.

The Secretary said he wished to urge in the strongest possible terms that Israel not take action in commencing construction at Banat Yaacov which could lead to an outbreak of hostilities. He understood that the Israel Government has applied to the Export-Import Bank for a $75,000,000 loan for construction of water development along the coastal plain.[3] Without making any commitment with respect to the action which the Bank would take or the amount of any loan which might be made, the Department would take a sympathetic point of view as far as the political aspect of the question was concerned. If such a loan could be granted, it should permit the Israel Government to utilize its construction resources without undertaking the work at Banat Yaacov at this time. Action at the latter point would be particularly unfortunate at a time when our policies toward the area were in the process of review.

Ambassador Eban said that recent developments have borne out the Israel Government's diagnosis of Nasser's goals. It is clear that a settlement with Israel is low on Nasser's list. The collapse of the Anderson mission only serves to highlight Israel's sense of insecurity. Egypt's acquisition and absorption of arms is proceeding at a disturbingly fast rate. It takes about seven months to train a MIG pilot and it is worthy of note that North Korea attacked seven months after it first received Russian MIGs. With respect to the Secretary's suggestion that Israel look to its customary sources of supply for military equipment, Ambassador Eban said that it was hard to envisage Israel getting any substantial amount of arms unless the U.S took part. The world knows of Israel's application to the U.S. The November 16th application[4] was filed on the basis of the Secretary's statement to Sharett in Geneva[5] that the U.S. would "give sympathetic consideration" to any application made by Israel. The Israel Government's experience in Europe was that unless there is U.S. action other countries hesitate to provide arms to Israel. The French had informed the Israelis they could not act again in furnishing Mysteres if they were to be acting alone. Ambassador Eban said that if the position of the U.S. is that it is sympathetic in principle with Israel's plight but wants Israel to look to Europe for its arms: (1) the Israel Government would like to have an indication of that given to the European countries; and, (2) the Israel Government

[3] See Document 194.
[4] See the memorandum of conversation, vol. XIV, p. 773.
[5] See Secto 90, *ibid.*, p. 683.

would press now especially for 24 F86's and some anti-tank guns from the U.S. If these requests could be granted, the matter would be resolved as far as the Israel Government is concerned, at least for the moment. The Secretary said that the latter request could not be met at the moment, at least while this Government is in the process of reviewing its policies. Ambassador Eban inquired whether that meant there would be no action at all on the Israel Government's request and the Secretary replied that it was not possible to give an answer on that now. The Secretary said that he wished to re-emphasize our belief that we have influences in the Arab world, which, if properly asserted, could help in achieving security and peace for Israel. Until those influences have been proved to be of no value, we do not wish to throw them away. It seems obvious that a clear-cut alliance between Israel and the U.S. would not be in Israel's long-term interest. Ambassador Eban commented that Israel did not aspire to that.

The Secretary said that he was aware that the Israel Government had forecast the failure of the Anderson mission. While the primary responsibility for its failure rested with Nasser, it had to be noted that the Israel Government had not given complete cooperation. With the issues at stake as grave as they are, this Government must make its own evaluation and analysis. The Secretary said that the Israelis might think our assets in the Arab world useless but we must use our own best judgment. We do not believe we can afford to assume we have no influence with the Arab countries, or even with Egypt. We have tried to play it one way. We can try another. We believe we are serving not only the best interests of this country, but those of Israel.

Ambassador Eban said that with respect to construction at Banat Yaacov, it would be important for Israel to know whether it would have the backing of the US in diverting water from the Jordan after the necessary construction outside of the demilitarized zone was completed. The Secretary said that we would go quite a ways to meet that problem. He was not in any way suggesting any permanent renunciation by Israel of its rights in the Jordan. He suggested that this problem be taken up more in detail when Ambassador Johnson returns in about ten days. In the meantime, he said, the Department would be formulating some written suggestions as to how the matter might be dealt with.

Ambassador Eban said that with respect to the Secretary's statement that Israel had not cooperated fully with the Anderson mission, the Israel Government had made clear its full willingness to approach the problem of a settlement on the basis of a direct meeting; it had felt that it was justified in not agreeing to the method of an intermediary because that approach had been tried in

connection with the Jordan Valley Development negotiations and had not, as yet, succeeded. He said that Prime Minister Ben Gurion had, all during the time of the Anderson mission, been preoccupied with the problem of arms. If that matter were adequately dealt with, he felt there may be a good possibility of Israel approaching the problem of a settlement at that time through an intermediary.

Ambassador Eban said he hoped that the Department would consider taking action on some one or more of the items in the November 16th list. The Secretary said that we would give consideration to that request.

Ambassador Eban inquired whether there was anything to the reports that the United States would be giving more explicit expression to its responsibilities under the Tripartite Declaration. Mr. Hoover said that in considering that whole question it had been decided to move under U.N. procedures before taking any action pursuant to the Tripartite Declaration. Ambassador Eban said that one of the Israel Government's problems is that the people of Israel do not believe that Israel can rely upon the United States actually taking military action even if there should be an outbreak of hostilities. He said that the discussion in the Security Council over the past few days on the U.S. proposal [6] had confirmed Israel's fears that the Soviets would support any Arab position and could, therefore, be expected to veto any Security Council action designed to stem Arab aggression. Ambassador Eban said that Israel feels that it is falling seriously behind in the arms situation and that it cannot rely upon outside assistance in the event of aggression; it is, therefore, in an alarming position. The Secretary said that he agreed that the situation was serious and that the Israel Government could be assured that we were taking it seriously. If we do not agree on methods, it does not mean that we do not have the same objectives.

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[6] See Document 206.

222. Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs [1]

Washington, March 28, 1956.

SUBJECT

United States Policy in the Near East

I. Preamble

United States policy in the Near East during the past three years has followed three principal lines:

1. *Political.* The United States has striven for a settlement between the Arab States and Israel. The Secretary's speech of August 26, 1955 outlined in principle the various ways in which the United States was willing to contribute to a settlement. The United States has endeavored, thus far without success, to bring the Israeli and the Egyptians together on a settlement. Both the Israeli and the Egyptians have proved difficult, but the Egyptians have been the main stumbling block in recent weeks.

2. *Economic.* The United States has maintained a small technical assistance and economic development program for selected Arab States and Israel, the program averaging about $75 million annually. The United States has also continued to contribute to the relief of Arab refugees from Palestine, the contribution averaging about $22 million annually. The United States has made known its willingness to assist in a number of important regional projects. These include the Johnston Plan for harnessing the Jordan River and the Egyptian Plan for the Aswan Dam to control the Nile.

3. *Military.* The United States has supported Northern Tier Collective Security from its first inception in a loose defense arrangement between Turkey and Pakistan to the formation of the Baghdad Pact. The United States has not joined for a variety of reasons but primarily because of the effect which such action would have on United States relations with Israel and several of the Arab States. The United States has approved sales in relatively small amounts of arms to the Arab States and Israel. More recently the United States suspended a decision on a large Israeli request to purchase arms in the United States because of the Israeli raid in Syria in December, because discussions regarding an Arab-Israeli settlement were continuing, and because it was believed that a

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1. Top Secret. The first draft of this memorandum is printed as Document 192. See also Document 209. The source text bears a notation that Dulles saw this memorandum.

favorable decision would in present circumstances be disastrous to the Western position.

During the past year the United States has, in general, looked to Egypt under Prime Minister Nasser to take leadership in meeting the major problems in the Near East. Nasser has, however, failed to move toward a settlement with Israel; he is now delaying in taking the initiative with respect to the Johnston Plan and has raised a number of serious objections with respect to the provisions of the proposed Aswan Dam agreements; he has inaugurated a series of bilateral military pacts with Syria and Saudi Arabia because of opposition to the Baghdad Pact and, possibly to prepare for a large-scale attack on Israel; he terminated negotiations with the United States for arms and made agreement with the Soviet Union through Czechoslovakia; his radio and press are now speaking strongly against the West generally including the United States on the score of "colonialism". Egyptian propaganda undoubtedly was an important factor in the recent Jordanian affair, which operated to the detriment of the West; similarly, Egyptian propaganda and material help to anti-French forces in North Africa have greatly exacerbated the situation there; Nasser has opened the African door to Soviet penetration; he has arranged with the Soviets to send nuclear scientists to Cairo to set up a research reactor laboratory; in violation of the United States resolution, Egypt maintains a blockade of the Red Sea. Against this background there seems little likelihood the Western powers will be able to work with Nasser in the foreseeable future. There is a serious danger that, despite his protestations to the contrary, Nasser in fact plans to lead the Arab countries in a war of annihilation against Israel as soon as he feels that victory is assured. In this he would cooperate with the Soviet Union to the extent necessary to obtain Soviet support to counter any action by the Western powers. The United States will therefore have to consider other means of obtaining United States objectives in the Near East.

United States objectives in the Near East (which are listed on Tab A as recapitulated in NSC 5428) include the development of friendly relations with Near Eastern Governments which are willing to resist the extension of Soviet influence and which are willing to cooperate with the United States and other Western countries. United States objectives also include the reduction of current Arab-Israel tensions through the conclusion of a settlement between the Arab States and Israel and some solution for the Arab refugee problem. All of these objectives and many of the others listed on Tab A have been adversely affected in one way or another by the present attitude and actions of Egypt under Nasser. The attitude of the other Arab states and of Israel toward the United States is, in fact, being undermined to a serious degree by Egyptian actions.

There is attached (Tab B) a Plan of Action which includes measures which the United States and its allies might take with respect to Egypt and the Near East. . . .

II. Discussions with the British and Others

Prior to a United States decision with respect to the Plan of Action, it will be desirable to discuss it with the British who also are giving urgent thought to the problem, their estimate of the situation closely paralleling our own. The British continue to hold highly important assets in the area. These include British treaty relationships with Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. The success of future United States policy would be enhanced by British support and cooperation. It might even be stated that British opposition to any important aspect of the program might undermine the success of the Plan of Action.

At the outset of conversations with the British it would be wise to have a frank discussion regarding the need for absolute secrecy in connection with any plans which might be considered. British leaks in the past have created considerable difficulty for the United States. One factor is that the British sometimes feel that public knowledge that they are working with the United States on specific aspects of the Near East problem serves their interest. Recent press stories regarding British reappraisal of their relations with Egypt might be expected to be intensified unless we can come to an absolutely clear understanding on the conditions of secrecy to be imposed in connection with our willingness to engage in joint planning.

It may also be desirable to discuss a certain limited number of these measures under the Plan of Action with the French, the Turks, and perhaps some other countries. The French and the Turks, for example, have certain interests in the area and would feel that they should have been consulted. A decision with respect to consultation with the French, the Turks and other countries may be decided on an ad hoc basis in the light of developments.

This document does not describe military aspects of the problem of military planning which might take place between the United States and the United Kingdom in the light of the possibility that hostilities in the Near East will, despite our efforts, break out.

III. Further Discussion with Nasser

Another basic question centers upon desirability of a further frank discussion with Nasser. The United States has looked to Egypt under Nasser, as stated above, to take leadership in the Near East. We have discussed with Nasser during recent months various constructive steps which might have been taken in the Near East by

Egypt. Nasser has temporized and finally refused. Faced with this refusal, what should we do?

Should we now tell Nasser that we propose to revise our policy of cooperating with him unless he clearly demonstrates a willingness to reciprocate? Should we say that we plan to withdraw aid for the Aswan Dam, economic and technical assistance, deliveries of surplus and CARE supplies, and to join the Baghdad Pact unless Egypt cooperates with us? Shall we also ask Nasser if he would now be willing to press the Arab States to accept the Johnston Plan, to cooperate with General Burns in bringing quiet to the frontier between Egypt and Israel, and to desist from anti-Western policies in the area?

On balance, we believe that if the US should now approach Nasser with a series of proposals which he would regard as threatening him he would turn them down and make known his action to the Arab world. He would interpret the US approach as a last effort to bring pressure upon him. He would make public his refusal to entertain the US proposals because he would estimate that his action would appear a rebuff to the US and would be popular with the Arab world.

We believe it would be preferable quietly to commence the measures, described on the attached Plan of Action (Tab B), ... Such measures as delay in the issuance of export licenses and approval of surplus sales, and lack of progress in negotiations on the Aswan Dam should have a useful effect. Nasser would soon conclude that relations with the US were not proceeding smoothly and would raise the question with American officials. The response might be that friendly relations between countries are reciprocal. Further US and British measures would be keyed to Nasser's willingness to reverse his present policies. . . .

Tab A

To recapitulate briefly from NSC 5428, these objectives are listed as follows:

"7. Availability to the US and its allies of the resources, the strategic positions, and the passage rights of the area, and the denial of such resources and strategic positions to the Soviet bloc.

"8. Stable, viable, friendly governments in the area, capable of withstanding communist-inspired subversion from within, and willing to resist communist aggression.

"9. Settlement of major issues between the Arab States and Israel as a foundation for establishing peace and order in the area.

"10. Reversal of the anti-American trends of Arab opinion.

"11. Prevention of the extension of Soviet influence in the area.

"12. Wider recognition in the free world of the legitimate aspirations of the countries in the area to be recognized as, and have the status of sovereign states; and wider recognition by such countries of their responsibility toward the area and toward the free world generally."

"9. a. To deter an armed attack by Israel or by the Arab States, and if an armed attack should occur to force the attacking state to relinquish any territory seized.

"b. To reduce current Arab-Israel tensions and promote an eventual clear-cut peace between the Arab States and Israel.

"c. To alleviate the Arab refugee problem."

Tab B

PLAN OF ACTION [2]

Immediate Measures to be Undertaken . . .

A. Against Egypt

1. The United States will continue to delay the issuance of export licenses covering arms shipments whether purchased under the United States—Egyptian Reimbursable Assistance Agreement or from commercial sources in the United States. The United States will continue to delay giving approval to the Department of Commerce for the export of such items as commercial vehicles which are obviously intended for the Egyptian army. The United Kingdom would pursue a similar policy.

2. The United States and the United Kingdom will continue to delay the conclusion of current negotiations on the High Aswan Dam. Plans will immediately and quietly be undertaken to re-allocate the $55 million from FY 1956 funds which have been set aside for Phase One of the Dam project, assuming United States–United Kingdom–International Bank for Reconstruction and Development–Egyptian agreement. (If an agreement with Egypt should subsequently prove feasible, funds might be provided from FY 1957 appropriations for the initial United States contribution.)

3. The United States will continue to delay pending Egyptian requests under Title I, P.L. 480. (It is not intended in this phase that the United States will delay or cancel up to 200,000 tons of wheat already purchased by Egypt under P.L. 480 and P.L. 665.)

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[2] Top Secret. Drafted by Rountree and Wilkins on March 28.

4. The United States anticipates that the CARE program for 1956 may total as much as $100 million as against approximately $40 million during 1955. A decision on the program for 1956 is imminent. The United States could delay approval of any sum or approve an amount of perhaps $8 million for the first quarter of 1956, leaving a decision regarding the balance until later.

5. The United States will suggest to the British that they consider means of slowing down the withdrawal of British troops from Suez. Under the United Kingdom–Egyptian agreement of 1954, 75 per cent were to be withdrawn by February 18 and 100 per cent by June 18. It is realized that this suggestion might be impracticable.

6. The United States should consider, in the light of over-all policy implications, making facilities available to other countries for interference by jamming of hostile Egyptian broadcasts. The possibility of offering to Iraq expanded radio facilities to counter Egyptian broadcasts should be studied at once. Further steps might be initiated . . . to counter Egyptian and Saudi anti-west propaganda in local presses.

7. While the United States should not in this phase adhere to the Baghdad Pact or announce its intention of doing so at some future date, it will send, with appropriate publicity, a high ranking military official to participate more directly in military discussions among the Pact members, and will send senior officials to attend economic meetings.

. . . . . .

B. In other countries

In addition to these measures vis-à-vis Egypt, the United States and the United Kingdom should undertake immediate programs in other countries of the area to enhance their position and reduce Egyptian influence. Some steps should be undertaken immediately; with regard to others, immediate planning should be undertaken for implementation as circumstances dictate:

1. The United States and the United Kingdom will commence negotiations with the Sudan, looking toward the extension of technical assistance and possibly economic aid to that country; support Sudan in its contention that the Aswan Dam should not proceed in the absence of a suitable agreement; interest the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in undertaking at least preliminary discussion of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development assistance as soon as the Sudan currency problem is worked out. In summary, we would work with the British in developing . . . a situation in Sudan which would minimize Egyptian influ-

ence and the possibility of Egypt succeeding in undermining the Western position in Sudan.

2. The United States and the United Kingdom would continue to take steps to counter Egyptian influence in Libya and to strengthen the position of the West. A program has already been worked out and discussions with the Libyans are under way. The British are also considering urgently what additional aid they might extend in our joint efforts to persuade the Libyans to reject Soviet and Egyptian offers in favor of firm alignment with the West.

3. The United States would urge the British to make every effort to maintain present treaty relationships with Jordan, and should seek by all means available to prevent a situation in which a pro-Egyptian coup d'état would succeed. . . .

4. The United States would consider with Ethiopia possible Nile development and an expanded economic assistance program. Ethiopia should be assured that the United States, the United Kingdom and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will not take action in relation to the Aswan Dam which would be inimical to Ethiopian interests.

5. The United States would take practical steps to counter Egyptian influence in Yemen and other Arabian principalities. To the extent that Egypt might work with the Soviets (such as, for example, arranging the supply of Soviet arms to Yemen), we might enlist the help of King Saud.

6. A series of high-level visits to Egypt's neighbors by military and civilian officers from the United States should be undertaken to demonstrate interest in the area.

7. The United States will, in the most forceful way feasible, dissuade the Israelis from undertaking work at Banat Ya'cub which might precipitate hostilities and thus endanger the whole Western position in the Near East to the direct advantage of the Soviets. Aside from diplomatic approaches of the type now being made from time to time, we should urge United Nations Secretary General Hammarskjold to take the lead in obtaining an undertaking from the Israeli Government not to proceed, or threaten to proceed, in the immediate future. In addition, a high-level message should be communicated by the United States to the Government of Israel, perhaps through an early meeting between the Secretary and the Israeli Ambassador.[3] At this meeting the Secretary might discuss the Banat Ya'cub problem along the following lines:

a. As a result of the failure of recent efforts to bring about negotiations between Egypt and Israel, and in view of the continuing deterioration of the situation in the area, the United States is now

[3] See *supra*.

reviewing its Near Eastern policies, including its attitude toward the present Egyptian regime. We are hopeful that our new approach to the problem will improve the situation. Meanwhile, however, we are deeply concerned lest any decision by the Israeli Government to proceed with work at Banat Ya'cub, or otherwise to take precipitate action which could spark an explosion, might produce consequences which not only would imperil the Western position in the Near East, but would gravely imperil Israel's own security. It is therefore of utmost importance that such a contingency be avoided while we are reviewing our policy and taking measures which we believe offer the greatest hope for improvement of the basic situation.

b. Our request that the Israel Government not undertake work at Banat Ya'cub or give further indications of its intentions of doing so is made without regard to the question of whether Israel has or has not the right to proceed. This point might be argued either way, but the important thing is to avoid the grave risks which would be entailed if Israel should begin work. The Israel Government has recently requested a United States loan of $75 million for water and irrigation projects elsewhere. While no commitment can be made until the projects proposed can be studied in detail, our initial reaction is that they have substantial merit. We would be willing to give sympathetic consideration to the Israeli application in the absence of precipitate activities at Banat Ya'cub, and plans in this direction would be fully adequate to justify an Israeli decision not to undertake at this time simultaneous work at Banat Ya'cub.

c. In discussing this matter with the Israeli Ambassador, the latter undoubtedly would relate the question again to arms for Israel. He might be informed that, for reasons previously explained, the United States could not sell arms to Israel at this time without jeopardizing our influence with the Arab States. However, if other countries wish to sell arms to Israel we would interpose no objection.

d. All of the foregoing would be placed on an entirely secret basis, obtaining assurances from the Israel Ambassador that our confidence would be respected.

8. For a further indefinite period, the United States will continue to deny export licenses for military items to the Arab states and Israel. Saudi Arabia and Iraq present special problems, however, which might be dealt with as indicated in subsequent sections. This would entail an Israeli reaction with which we would have to live.

9. The United States and other friendly countries will continue to press for effective United Nations action to reduce area tensions. We will support Secretary General Hammarskjold's activities and subsequent action by the Security Council or General Assembly. We will continue to take quiet steps to bring about an easing of tensions between Israel and its northern neighbors.

10. The United States and United Kingdom will find means of strengthening pro-Western elements in Lebanon by an immediate offer of economic aid in the form of grants or loans for projects designed to create the most favorable impact upon public opinion.

While the United States should not in present circumstances offer to sell arms to Lebanon, we might consider an arrangement whereby the French, who have a special interest in Lebanon, would sell limited quantities.

11. Saudi Arabia presents a special problem of considerable magnitude. Their principal concern regarding their relations with the West (aside from the Israeli issue) relates to Buraimi and American arms. We must not permit Saudi Arabia in desperation to turn from the United States to the Soviets for arms. We must find ways, in connection with the negotiation of a new air base agreement, which should be concluded at the earliest possible moment, of assuring King Saud that some of his military needs will immediately be met, and others provided for as soon as possible. Means to provide a United States military mission, without onerous strings, should be found. The importance of a friendly Saudi Arabia with lessened Egyptian influence is of such great importance that the British should undertake a generous agreement on the Buraimi issue, going as far as is necessary in relation to Buraimi itself to assure an early successful outcome of the negotiations. Wherever the site of the negotiations, the British should send a negotiator of high level empowered to make major decisions. The United States should make itself available for any assistance it might render to the parties in finding an acceptable solution.

12. Consideration should be given to a discreet warning to King Saud that the ultimate Egyptian objective is to obtain control of Saudi Arabia and to unseat the King. Relying upon Egypt for arms, whether from the Soviets or from the West, would play directly into the hands of the communists, and the Egyptians. We should immediately undertake planning for a sustained effort to detach Saudi Arabia from Egyptian influence . . . .

13. Every effort should be made to develop cooperation between Iraq and Jordan. The British, by virtue of their position in both countries, would be more effective than the United States in this program. The United States should make a determined effort to bolster the Nuri Government and assure Nuri of our full support despite our present inability to adhere to the Baghdad Pact.

14. The Executive Branch will prepare a draft of a Joint Congressional Resolution which would authorize the President to use military force if necessary in case of aggression by Israel or the Arab states. These preparations should be coordinated as closely as possible with any action which might be taken by the United Nations. . . . Close and continuing consultation with Congressional leaders should be maintained throughout implementation of . . . this plan. A key Senator, such as Senator Mansfield, might be induced to follow developments and the Administration's policies in

the area with especial interest so that he could render maximum assistance in the Senate.

. . . . . .

Arab Reactions:

Those measures relating to Egypt are relatively mild and would not be known to the Egyptian public in the first phase unless the Egyptian Government made them known. The initiation of the measures relating to Egypt during the near future should have an immediate effect on the Egyptian Government. Nasser and his colleagues would wonder and probably conclude that the United States was in this way making known its opposition to Egyptian policy. There would be little advantage to the Egyptians in publicizing their apprehension because delays are not uncommon and the United States has not definitely broken off negotiations.

The other Arab states would probably not be aware of the measures which the United States had taken relating to Egypt.

Israeli Reactions:

The Israeli press and public would probably not be aware of the steps which the United States had taken relating to Egypt. Israeli reaction to arms to Saudi Arabia (paragraph 10 [*11*?]) would be sharp and would be turned to increased pressure to secure arms for Israel. This pressure would be somewhat reduced by the assurances contained in paragraph B–7 above.

. . . . . .

223. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President [1]

Washington, March 28, 1956.

SUBJECT

Near Eastern Policies

In view of the negative outcome of our efforts to bring Colonel Nasser to adopt a policy of conciliation toward Israel, we should, I believe, now adjust certain of our Near Eastern policies, as indicated below.

The primary purpose would be to let Colonel Nasser realize that he cannot cooperate as he is doing with the Soviet Union and at the same time enjoy most-favored-nation treatment from the United States. We would want for the time being to avoid any open break which would throw Nasser irrevocably into a Soviet satellite status and we would want to leave Nasser a bridge back to good relations with the West if he so desires.

The policies indicated below would in the main be coordinated with the United Kingdom.

I. As regards Egypt

1. Export licenses covering arms shipments to Egypt, whether from Governmental or commercial sources, will continue to be denied by the US and the UK.

2. The US and the UK will continue to delay the conclusion of current negotiations on the High Aswan Dam.

3. The US will continue to delay action on pending Egyptian requests for grains and oil under Title I of PL 480.

4. The US will hold in abeyance any decision on a CARE program for Egypt for 1956 (last year's program amounted to $40 million and the present tentative program for 1956 anticipates aid amounting to as much as $100 million) or, alternatively, approve an $8 million program for the first quarter, leaving until later a decision of the balance for the year.

5. Expanded radio facilities will be offered to Iraq to counter Egyptian broadcasts.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Top Secret. The following handwritten notation by Dulles appears on an uninitialed carbon copy of the memorandum "Approved by President—March 28. JFD" (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1)

II. As regards other countries

1. The US and UK will commence negotiations with the Sudan with a view to developing . . . a situation of influence in that country which would minimize Egyptian influence and its control of the head waters of the Nile.

2. Intensify present efforts to stabilize the situation in Libya.

3. Encourage the UK to maintain present treaty relationships with Jordan and help it to prevent a situation in which a pro-Egyptian coup d'état would succeed. . . .

4. Give increased support to the Baghdad Pact without actually adhering to the Pact or announcing our intention of doing so. In addition to accelerated aid to the Pact countries, this support will consist of amending the nature of our participation in the Military Committee of the Pact, such as by assigning high level officers who could join more actively in military discussions than our observers have in the past. We will also display an increased interest in the economic aspects of the Pact by endeavoring to coordinate our aid programs with the Pact organization, wherever feasible, and by sending high level officers to represent the United States in economic meetings related to the treaty organization.

5. We will undertake an intensified program in Ethiopia to enhance the Western position in that country.

6. We will continue to take all practicable steps to counter Egyptian and Soviet influence in Yemen and the other Arabian principalities. King Saud's assistance will be solicited.

7. The US will seek to dissuade the Israelis from undertaking work at Banat Ya'qub, or from taking other precipitate steps which might bring about hostilities and thus endanger the whole Western position in the Near East to the direct advantage of the Soviets.

8. For a further indefinite period the US will continue to deny export licenses for any major military items to Israel and the adjoining Arab States (this excepts Saudi Arabia and Iraq). We would, however, be sympathetic if other Western countries wished to sell limited quantities of defensive arms to Israel.

9. We will continue to press for effective UN action to reduce area tensions.

10. We will endeavor to strengthen pro-Western elements in Lebanon by immediately offering economic aid in the form of grants or loans for projects designed to create the most favorable impact on public opinion. (The French might sell limited quantities of military equipment.)

11. It is extremely important that the American position in Saudi Arabia be strengthened. We must find ways, in connection with the negotiation of a new air base agreement which should be

promptly concluded, of assuring King Saud that some of his military needs will immediately be met and others provided for subsequently. We will press the British to undertake a generous agreement on the Buraimi issue, settlement of which is of paramount importance to the Western position in Saudi Arabia.

III. In addition to the foregoing course of action, planning should be undertaken at once with a view to possibly more drastic action in the event that the above courses of action do not have the desired effect. . . .

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JFD

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224. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, March 28, 1956, 4:40–6:30 p.m. [1]

SUBJECT

United States Policy in the Near East

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of State
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Admiral Radford
George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State
Colonel A. J. Goodpaster
William M. Rountree, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

At the outset of the meeting with the President to discuss the Near Eastern situation, the Secretary of State handed the President a memorandum setting forth a proposed line of action which might be taken in relation to Egypt and other states in the area. [2]

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on March 29 by Rountree. Another version of this conversation is *infra*. Dulles' Appointment Book notes the conversation was to begin at 4:30 p.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers), but the President's Daily Appointments indicates it began at 4:40 p.m. and concluded at 6:30. (Eisenhower Library)

[2] *Supra.*

After general discussion of the various aspects of the paper, the President stated his agreement that we should proceed along the lines indicated. He emphasized the importance of focusing our attention upon Saudi Arabia in order to develop a position of greater strength in that country. He therefore suggested that a concerted effort be undertaken at once to enhance the position of the United States in Saudi Arabia and to encourage the King to assume greater leadership in the Arab world. This would, of course, require that the British make substantial concessions regarding Buraimi, but if the British were to yield in this matter, they would have to see that they were getting something concrete in return. The main lines of our broad program should be coordinated as far as feasible with the British. The President further commented in connection with Buraimi that the King should be made to feel that he obtained a Buraimi settlement because he was cooperating with the Western countries and disassociate any such success from Egyptian influence or assistance.

The President underlined the importance of developing relationships in the Sudan and Libya to assure the establishment and continuation of a pro-Western position and opposition to Soviet or Egyptian influence. He asked that Ambassador-Designate Pinkerton be sent to Khartoum at the earliest possible moment.[3]

In the general discussion regarding the importance of the Near East to the West, the Secretary of State asked Admiral Radford if he would initiate a study of the facts concerning the world oil picture, particularly the extent to which Near Eastern oil is essential to Western Europe.[4] . . .

It was the consensus that, while the United States should not now adhere to the Baghdad Pact or announce its intention of doing so, greater support should be given to the Pact. It was felt that a high-ranking military official should be sent to the area to participate in military planning, and that a high civilian official should be sent to Baghdad Pact Council meetings.

It was also felt that we must exert upon Israel strong pressure to assume a conciliatory attitude and to do all it can to reduce area tensions and thus minimize the danger of an outbreak of hostilities.

It was the consensus of the meeting that Near Eastern resources are so vital to the security interests of the United States and the

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[3] Lowell C. Pinkerton was appointed April 12, 1956, and presented his credentials at Khartoum May 17.

[4] According to a handwritten note by Howe of April 2, Admiral Radford subsequently sent to Bowie for transmittal to Dulles a Department of the Interior memorandum for the record dated March 30 dealing with U.S. strategic and economic interest in Near Eastern oil. Copies of Howe's note and the Department of the Interior memorandum are in Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1.

West generally that we could not accept a situation in which access to those resources would be subject to hostile control. Measures, even drastic, would have to be seriously contemplated.

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225. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 28, 1956, 4:40–6:30 p.m. [1]

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles
Under Secretary Hoover
Assistant Secretary George Allen
Mr. Rountree
Secretary Wilson
Deputy Secretary Robertson
Admiral Radford
Colonel Goodpaster

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss and carry forward the development of a line of action in the Middle East. Secretary Dulles handed the President a memorandum setting forth a series of specific actions to be taken. [2] After reading the memorandum, the President indicated that he was inclined to agree with all of the suggestions, but thought they might be grouped somewhat differently around certain main efforts. For example, one of these might be to build up King Saud as a figure with sufficient prestige to offset Nasser. To do this would probably require a settlement of the Buraimi issue, for which we might ask as a quid pro quo a better attitude on the part of the Saudis toward Iraq.

Secretary Dulles reviewed in some detail the first group of proposals in his memorandum. The President interjected that we should make sure we concert the overall plan with the British—i.e. with Eden and Lloyd.

In a discussion of the possibility of greater U.S. support for the Baghdad Pact, Secretary Dulles said that the U.S. cannot join the Pact without giving some security guaranty to Israel, and that if we were to do so, our action would quickly knock out Iraq. Admiral

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman Files, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted on March 29 by Goodpaster. Regarding the time of the meeting, see footnote 1, *supra*. Another version of the conversation is *supra*.

[2] See Document 223.

Radford said there were reports that if we do not soon join the Pact, it may disintegrate.

There was some discussion of giving a security guaranty to the Israelis directed essentially against Egypt. If Egypt were to attempt to liquidate Israel, there is no question that war would be forced upon us. Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford pointed out that in such a case the result might be that we would have to occupy the entire area, protect the pipelines and the Suez Canal, etc.

The President said he recognized that the matter must be very delicately handled, and carefully concerted and balanced. Drawing on the action suggested by Secretary Dulles, and other possibilities, there was discussion as to the type of thing that might have to be done, the possibility of working out a favorable settlement in Buraimi from the Saudi point of view, informing the U.K. of increased support for the Baghdad Pact, offering Israel some selected type of arms, for example, radar, obtaining Israeli agreement to a more moderate stand and to territorial adjustments, all the while taking steps designed to bring Egypt into a better position.

The President asked who might head up in Washington, with a few top level field agents, an effort such as this. A top flight man, able to give constant attention to the matter, would be needed. Secretary Dulles said he is giving thought to this question. He does not believe the task can be handled as an additional duty for the established elements of the State Department.

In further discussion, Admiral Radford referred to the question of whether Egypt might be receiving support from other areas, for example, India. The President said that, although he did not feel the Soviets were prepared to risk general war over their intervention in the Middle East, it might be that we are seeing only the "surface of the iceberg" in the Middle East, and that the well springs of their difficulty lie elsewhere. Secretary Dulles said that since his talk with Eban some weeks ago, [3] and since clear evidence has been given that this Administration is not going to "cave in" on the Israeli question, the Israelis are showing a much less arbitrary and truculent attitude in discussions with him.

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[3] See Document 151.

226. Diary Entry by the President [1]

Washington, March 28, 1956.

Memorandum from the Secretary of State, dated March 28, 1956, entitled "Near Eastern Policies", [2] was brought to the White House at 4:30 on March 28, 1956, shortly after the President's return from White Sulphur Springs. Accompanying Mr. Dulles were: Herbert Hoover, Jr., George V. Allen, William M. Rountree, Reuben Robertson, Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford. Sitting in on appointment was Colonel Goodpaster, who will also prepare notes. [3]

President dictated, after the meeting, as follows:

"This memorandum (attached) was brought to me by the Secretary of State in response to my request that he prepare a list of the things that *might* be done in the Middle East which could help stabilize the situation and give us a better atmosphere in which to work.

"I have authorized the State Department to start work on all of the attached points. A fundamental factor in the problem is the growing ambition of Nasser, the sense of power he has gained out of his associations with the Soviets, his belief that he can emerge as a true leader of the entire Arab world—and because of these beliefs, his rejection of every proposition advanced as a measure of conciliation between the Arabs and Israel.

"Because of this, I suggested to the State Department that we begin to build up some other individual as a prospective leader of the Arab world—in the thought that mutually antagonistic personal ambitions might disrupt the aggressive plans that Nasser is evidently developing. My own choice of such a rival is King Saud. However, I do not know the man, and therefore do not know whether he could be built up into the position I visualize. Nevertheless Arabia is a country that contains the holy places of the Moslem world, and the Saudi Arabians are considered to be the most deeply religious of all the Arab groups. Consequently, the King could be built up, possibly, as a spiritual leader. Once this were accomplished we might begin to urge his right to political leadership. (Obviously this is just a thought, but something of the nature ought to be developed in support of the other suggestions contained in this memorandum).

"We had a long conversation deciding upon the kind of person who could direct and coordinate the campaign visualized in the memorandum. He will need quite a staff and some field organization, and it will be a real job to find the right man."

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.
[2] Document 223.
[3] *Supra.*

227. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles' Residence, Washington, March 28, 1956, 8 p.m. [1]

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. Pearson, Canadian Minister for External Affairs
Ambassador Heeney
Mr. Merchant

During the course of a conversation after dinner this evening at the Secretary's home, Mr. Pearson mentioned that the Israelis seemed interested in buying F–86's which Canada was manufacturing under license. The manufacturer was obviously anxious to get this business in order to keep its production line going. He inquired as to the Secretary's general reaction. The Secretary said that in his talk with Ambassador Eban earlier in the day [2] he had told Eban that he believed the U.S. would imperil what remaining influence it had with the Arab States if it were to become an important supplier of arms to Israel. We had not been significant suppliers to Israel in past years. In fact, the amounts shipped to them had been relatively trivial. Israel had habitually looked to other sources. He said that he had indicated to Eban that he would see no objection to the Israelis shopping around various other countries to see what they might be able to acquire in the way of armaments. Concurrently, the Secretary said we were considering whether it might not be possible to find some clearly defensive item which we could release to the Israelis. Anti-submarine equipment and mines were some things they wanted and which would meet these requirements but he was not sure of the supply situation. The Secretary said, and Mr. Pearson agreed, that it was important that Israel should not be forced into an attitude of desperation by feeling all doors were closed to it and that it had been abandoned without a possibility of acquiring arms for its own self defense.

Mr. Pearson expressed extreme interest in the Secretary's attitude but gave no clear indication of what the Canadian decision might be. He mentioned that the matter of Israel had domestic political aspects in Canada as well as the U.S.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/3–2856. Secret. Drafted by Merchant. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[2] See Document 221.

228. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Minister of the Israeli Embassy (Shiloah) and the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell), Department of State, Washington, March 29, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Follow-up to Secretary's Meeting with Ambassador Eban, March 28, 1956

Mr. Shiloah asked to see me this morning. He referred to the meeting which he and Ambassador Eban had had with the Secretary yesterday afternoon. [2] He said that, although the Secretary had not been explicit, he and Eban had interpreted one or two of the Secretary's statements as meaning that, while the United States thought it should not provide arms to Israel at the present time, it felt that Israel should receive some of the arms at least in the November 16th list [3] from the European countries which had customarily been Israel's source of supply for military equipment. Shiloah said that he and Eban felt it was further implicit in the Secretary's remarks that the U.S. would make appropriate suggestions to the European countries so that the virtual embargo which they have imposed up to the present time would no longer be applied. Shiloah said that if their interpretation of the Secretary's remarks was correct, they would like to know how we visualized implementing them. Should the Israel Government report to the other countries the conversation which Eban had with the Secretary yesterday? Should the Israel Government sit down with the State Department and decide upon the particular equipment which Israel should receive from each of the other countries and the U.S. then pass the word along to those countries? Or how? I told Shiloah those were questions which would have to receive consideration in the Department before it would be possible to give answers.

I also said I felt the Israel Government should simultaneously be giving most careful consideration to the questions raised in the Secretary's talk with Eban just before the Secretary left on his Far East trip. [4] I said the way in which the problems raised by Mr. Shiloah were answered would have to depend in part upon the atmosphere in which the Israel Government intended to work with this Government. I said if we were to achieve our objectives of preventing Soviet penetration in the area and deal effectively with

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., Feb. 16 to March 31, 1956. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Russell. A note attached to the source text indicates the Secretary saw the memorandum.

[2] See Document 221.

[3] See the memorandum of conversation, vol. XIV, p. 773.

[4] See Document 151.

Nasser's growing tendency to serve Soviet objectives, and if we were to be able to indicate safely and confidentially to other governments that we thought certain shipments of arms to Israel might be in the interest of Western objectives and area security, it would be essential that we not have to continue to operate in an atmosphere of political attack from the Israel Government (such as Ben Gurion's recent statement that if war came in the Middle East, it would be the result of U.S. and Soviet policies in the area [5]) and from its friends in this country. At the time Ben Gurion was making his intemperate statements he knew and we knew about the Anderson mission but, of course, we would not make any public reference to it in answer to his attacks. Similarly, in the period ahead we would be attempting to carry out other policies which could not be made fully public. We would be seriously handicapped if we were subjected to ill-informed attacks from well-intentioned people who took their lead from the Israel Government. Indeed, whether we could wisely pursue a given line of policy might depend upon whether the Israel Government persisted in trying to effectuate its ideas of strategy and tactics at any given moment, over those which we might feel to be most indicated, by whipping up pressures from groups who, in the nature of the case, could not know all the facts. We could hardly carry out the kind of secret cooperation which Mr. Shiloah had just suggested with one hand while trying to fend off intemperate blows with the other. I said that while we were considering the questions which he had raised, I thought it might be wise if he and Ambassador Eban gave some thought to the problem which the Secretary had mentioned on March 2. If they found that they could give some assurance along this line, I was sure Israel's and our common interests in Middle East security would be furthered. Mr. Shiloah said that obviously statements of the seriousness of those that the Secretary had made on March 2 would receive the most careful consideration by the Israel Government and he would see what assurances they might be able to give. As a hopeful indication, he said, Jacob Blaustein had called the Israel Embassy yesterday and said he was thinking of asking for an appointment with the Secretary and wondered whether the Israel Embassy had any suggestion to make. Mr. Shiloah said they had informed Blaustein they were not sure any useful purpose would be served by a meeting at this time.

(I had lunch yesterday, at his request, with Theodore Tannenwald, a New York lawyer, who is legal counsel for the Israel Embassy and currently employed in preparing the Israel Government's presentation to the Export-Import Bank in connection with

[5] Reference is to Ben Gurion's statement in the Knesset on March 6.

the application for a $75,000,000 loan,[6] and who is also an intimate associate of Governor Harriman's and writes many of his speeches that deal with U.S. policy toward the Middle East. While most of the discussion dealt with Israel's present water development plans, I took occasion to make points similar to those above with respect to the harm that is done to vital Free World interests in the Middle East by attacks on present U.S. efforts to preserve Israel's security while safeguarding the Free World's vital interests by persons who cannot know all of the facts. I gave him mutatis mutandis an analysis of current Middle East problems and U.S. policies to deal with those problems similar to the one that I recently gave to Senators Case and Kennedy.[7])

[6] See Document 194.
[7] No record of such a briefing has been found in Department of State files.

229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India[1]

Washington, March 29, 1956—5:58 p.m.

2419. For Ambassador Eric Johnston from Barnes. Arab League meeting originally scheduled for 19th now postponed until April 10 to 15. Jordan reported insisting on discussion JV Plan but no positive assurance this will be done. My present advice is that you should plan return here without stopping in area or transiting Cairo, although as always some unforeseen break in situation may suggest stop-over enroute home.

Latest from Nasser via Byroade is summary of conversation in which he said Plan could never be accepted under present name owing to propaganda build-up against it.[2] Nasser also proposed unilateral approach to each of concerned governments by accredited ambassadors rather than special envoy, thus, in effect, dividing Plan into component parts so as to avoid any implication of agreement with Israel. In view of fact Nasser has been extremely well-briefed by Selim, such wholly impractical suggestions can in my judgment

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.00/3–2956. Secret. Drafted by Barnes, cleared with Troxel, and approved by Wilkins who signed for Dulles.
[2] See Document 195.

only be regarded as further stalling, and I doubt we can count on any real cooperation from him even if League should discuss.

Dulles

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230. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles' Residence, Washington, March 30, 1956, 2:38–3:10 p.m. [1]

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Senator George
Mr. MacArthur

I thanked Senator George for coming to see me, and explained that I wished to bring him up-to-date on the Middle East situation and to give him our latest thinking with respect to it.

On the one hand, our policy was based on the existence of the State of Israel, to which we were committed, and on the other hand on the fact that we wished to retain the good will and friendship of the Arab States, not only because of their important strategic position but principally because of the oil resources which they controlled. If the Soviets could get control of the Arab States, they could cut off the oil supplies to Western Europe. Control of the Arab States by the Communists would enable the Soviet Union to threaten Western Europe with a cessation of oil and this, as blackmail, would be just about as effective as if they threatened them with atomic destruction. If faced with the threat of oil stoppages, it was doubtful that the Western European countries would be able to resist coming to terms with the Soviets. Another aspect of the situation was that at present the pipelines running through the Arab States were mined, and could be destroyed quickly. If, through Communist influence, the pipelines were destroyed and the Suez Canal were blocked, Western Europe would be faced with a desper-

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Israeli Relations, 1951–1957. Top Secret. According to a covering memorandum by MacArthur, MacArthur drafted this memorandum of conversation in the first person for Dulles, and Macomber initialed Dulles' approval on the covering memorandum. The time and place of the meeting are from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

ate situation, since there was not sufficient tankerage to carry the oil, if it were still available at the source, around the Cape of Good Hope to Western Europe, and there was not sufficient oil in the Western Hemisphere to take care of the US and Western Europe. It would mean that the Western European industrial complex would grind to a halt and all the progress we had made there through Marshall Plan and NATO would go down the drain.

Senator George nodded his assent, and said that Communist control of the Arab oil resources would be a disastrous blow.

I then said we had been using our influence with Colonel Nasser to try to get him to take constructive steps which would reduce tension with Israel, and also to forego acquiring further arms from the Soviet bloc. Nasser, however, had not thus far responded constructively. He seemed to be rather full of himself and convinced that he could have the best of both worlds by playing with the Soviets on the one hand and trying to extract more aid from us on the other.

In the light of this situation, and after very careful study, a program of broad scope had been developed by the Executive Branch of the Government. [2] This program [3] had received the President's approval Wednesday afternoon, [4] and I wished to bring Senator George fully into the picture. In essence, the program involved a series of coordinated [5] steps which would result on the one hand in [6] Egypt not getting satisfaction on some of its requests for aid. For example, we intended to continue to delay conclusion of the current negotiations on the High Aswan Dam. Also, we would continue to deny export licenses covering arms shipments to Egypt. We would also delay action on pending Egyptian requests for certain agricultural commodities under PL 480. Likewise, we would delay action on the Egyptian requests for CARE shipments. At the same time, we planned to take certain steps to strengthen the Arab countries which were cooperating, and in this connection, while we did not plan to join the Baghdad Pact, we would send high level observers to attend meetings of the Baghdad Pact. I explained that I doubted the Senate would approve our joining the Baghdad Pact unless we took some steps to conclude a security agreement with Israel. If we did this at this juncture we would alienate the Arabs.

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[2] See Documents 222 and 223.

[3] At this point, in unidentified handwriting, the following phrase was inserted into this sentence: "which for obvious reasons must be held in strictest secrecy".

[4] March 28. See Documents 224 and 225.

[5] At this point, in unidentified handwriting, the following words were inserted into this sentence: "but unobtrusive".

[6] At this point, in unidentified handwriting, the sentence was changed to conclude as follows: "withholding approval of any significant aid to Egypt".

Senator George said he concurred that the Senate would not view favorable adherence to the Baghdad Pact at this juncture, and in this connection said it was not only a question of Israel, but that Indian opposition to our joining was another factor which would be weighed.

I also mentioned that we would try to extend our influence with the new Sudan Government through various steps so that we would be able to exercise greater influence with the Sudan Government respecting the head waters of the Nile.

With respect to arms shipments to Israel, I explained that we would continue to deny export licenses for major military items but that we would interpose no objection if certain Western countries such as France, Italy, and Canada wished to export some military equipment to Israel. From a conversation I had had with Ambassador Eban,[7] I felt that the Israelis were not now as insistent as they had been a month ago that we supply major military items to Israel, since they felt that they might be able to obtain such military equipment from other states (from which they had traditionally purchased such equipment), if the US did not interpose objection. I added that the US had never supplied Israel with major items of military equipment, and that Israel had obtained most of its equipment from European sources.

I then said to Senator George that I had a suggestion which I would put forward for his consideration. This was that I felt it would be extremely helpful if, on an informal basis, Senator Mansfield could take an active interest in the Middle East situation and we could read him very fully into the picture and could consult with him informally so that we could have the benefit of his views and he would know what we were doing. I said Senator Mansfield came to mind since he had made a great contribution in his studies and reports on the Indochina situation. Furthermore, of the members of the Committee, he seemed the least likely to inject a partisan note into this vital issue. We could use Senator Mansfield as a sort of informal liaison link with the Committee.

Senator George said he fully concurred with the high estimate we had of Senator Mansfield. He thought an arrangement such as I had suggested seemed feasible. I said it might raise a problem with respect to Senator Green, who was Chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee. Senator George agreed that there might be a little problem of prestige, but said that Senator Green would not be able, because of his advanced years, to give the time and thought to the Middle East situation that Senator Mansfield could. After some further discussion, and after it was ascertained that Senator Mans-

[7] See Document 221.

field would be in town next week, Senator George undertook to telephone, before his departure from Washington this evening, to Senator Mansfield, explaining the situation and suggesting that he arrange to meet with me next week.

There was some further general discussion of the situation in the Middle East, including a brief reference to Prime Minister Eden. I mentioned that Foreign Minister Pearson was concerned about Sir Anthony Eden and felt that he was exhibiting some of the traits his father had shown. Senator George opined that Sir Anthony was not well, and that in view of his heavy responsibilities, the state of his health, and the fundamental fact that Britain had lost its empire, Sir Anthony's actions were understandable because of the pressures to which he was subjected.

In conclusion, I said that if the arrangement went through whereby we could have close informal contact with Senator Mansfield and could use him as a sort of liaison with us, this would be very helpful. It would not, of course, interfere with the regular consultations that we would have with the Foreign Relations Committee, but with Senator Mansfield we could go into matters on a much more intimate basis.[8] Also, I said we of course attached great importance to keeping Senator George fully informed of all aspects of this and other related foreign policy problems.

Senator George expressed appreciation for the information which I had given him. He said he had been hoping the situation in the Middle East might calm down, but this had not resulted. We should therefore do everything we could to reduce tensions in the area to prevent a Communist take-over.

While Senator George did not specifically endorse the details of the program I had outlined to him, he raised no objection to any of the points, and indicated general understanding and assent.

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[8] Dulles met with Senator Mansfield on March 31 at Dulles' residence. According to Dulles' memorandum of the conversation, Dulles "said that while of course we would expect him to maintain his complete independence, we would want to feel free to give him information on a confidential basis". Mansfield replied, "he would be glad to specialize in the situation as he had with Indochina." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation)

231. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and His Special Assistant (Russell), Washington, March 30, 1956, 4:14 p.m. [1]

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. RUSSELL

R. said Eban wants to see him and asked if the Sec. read the memo of conv. he had with Shiloah. [2] He discussed the substance of it—the Sec. had not read it. He mentioned the importance of getting on to an understanding with them—whether they are going to continue political warfare the Sec. discussed with Eban. R. would like to pursue this unless the Sec. has some objection. Allen and Rountree agree. R. thinks this is the opportunity to put the bite on. The Sec. said all right.

The Sec. said he talked with Pearson about it Wednesday night [3] and told him as far as we were concerned, we would be glad to see them sell some of the F86s to them. P. said they are free to sell them without our consent. He was disposed to go ahead, attaching as a condition that they should not proceed with _____ business. Of course we are subject to criticism at home, said P., but the Sec. encouraged him to do something along this line. The Sec. thinks they knew he was dining with P. and if they won't build it up too much, R. can indicate to him the Sec. expressed a sympathetic view to him. R. would like to take the line we are prepared to go ahead but how will depend on the climate they will maintain. The Sec. does not want to get in a position of bargaining with them on this business. We are doing what we think is right irrespective of them. On the other hand, we probably as a practical matter can do more and be more effective if they were somewhat more sympathetic and cooperative. The Sec. wants more of a cooperative attitude so we feel we are working together. Their only theme is arms. We get no benefit of their thinking, their intelligence etc. What do they think re Syria? Jordan? The problem is more complicated than just arms. If their only contribution is that, our effort will be less successful. R. will develop that. The time is good. The Sec. said not to put us in a position of being pleaders for mercy. We can beat them at that.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau. Dulles was at his residence.

[2] Document 228.

[3] See Document 227.

232. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles' Residence, Washington, April 1, 1956, 4–5:40 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. MacArthur
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. R. W. Bailey, Counselor of Embassy

The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that we had been concentrating for some days on the Middle East problem, and we had now come up with some thoughts which he would like to outline to Sir Roger. Our views might not coincide entirely with those of the UK, but the Secretary felt that any differences of emphasis were reconcilable.

The Secretary then said there were several points he wished to make. In the first place, we wished to cooperate most closely with the UK, but on a secret basis. We did not believe it would be productive for us to cooperate publicly on a joint basis, as it would perhaps carry the implication of ganging up. The Baghdad Pact was an exception, and we planned publicly to support it, although we could not join it at this time. The Secretary recalled that when we had been privately discussing the Suez Base problem with Sir Winston Churchill and Sir Anthony Eden, both Sir Winston and Sir

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by MacArthur. The source text bears a notation indicating that Dulles saw it.

Omega was the code name approved by Dulles and adopted within the Department of State for the handling of all materials pertaining to the implementation of the special Middle East policy that President Eisenhower approved on March 28 (see Document 223). The Director of the Executive Secretariat, Fisher Howe, assumed responsibility for the distribution of all Omega category materials and worked closely with the Counselor of the Department of State, Douglas MacArthur II, who was designated Coordinator of the Omega program by the Secretary of State. In addition to Dulles, Hoover, Howe, and MacArthur, the following Department of State officers were authorized to see Omega materials: Murphy, Henderson, Merchant, Allen, Rountree, Phleger, Bowie, Russell, Armstrong, and Randolph Higgs of the Operations Coordinator's staff. (Memorandum of April 4 transmitting attachments from Howe to Murphy, Henderson, MacArthur, Merchant, Allen, Rountree, Phleger, Bowie, Russell, Armstrong, and Higgs; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega. Mr. Rountree (for NATO Meeting May '56))

Those within other agencies who were personally informed of Omega by Secretary Dulles were Allen Dulles, CIA; Admiral Radford, Joint Chiefs of Staff; William H. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Theodore Streibert, USIA; and Gordon Gray for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. (Memorandum of conversation by McAuliffe, April 2; *ibid.*, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1)

Anthony had pressed us to take a joint, open, and public position vis-à-vis Egypt. We had not been able to agree to take such a joint position, and we believed in the present circumstances that while there could be extensive secret cooperation between the US and the UK, it could not be proclaimed publicly.

He said that the second point he wished to make was that Bulganin and Khrushchev would be visiting London in about two weeks,[2] and he assumed the Middle Eastern situation might be discussed. The US would not wish to be committed to a course of action with the UK if, as a result of the UK-Soviet discussions, the UK position might be materially altered. Sir Roger interrupted to say he did not think there was much chance of that.

The third point the Secretary said he wished to stress was our belief that the key to any constructive program in the area involved the winning away of the Saudi Arabians from their present alignment with Egypt. We believed that it might be possible to win King Saud away from Nasser, and Saud could give important anti-Communist leadership in the Arab world, which was important. However, we believed the winning away of the Saudis from Egypt depended on the UK reaching an accommodation with the Saudis on Buraimi. A settlement of the Buraimi issue was of vital importance, and if an immediate settlement could not be achieved, it might be possible for the UK and the Saudis to agree to some form of indefinite postponement of final decision on the Buraimi matter. The Secretary said he had stressed the importance of a UK-Saudi settlement on Buraimi since if this could be achieved, we believed we could win the Saudis, with whom we had considerable influence, away from Egypt. The Secretary said we had reason to believe that King Saud had some concern over the general philosophy of Nasser and his revolutionary group. Also, King Saud was in a position to exercise religious influence in the area. All these elements might be marshalled and used to separate King Saud from Nasser . . . . We believed it would be extremely difficult to counter the combined Nasser–Saud alignment, and therefore in our view Saudi Arabia represented the key.

. . . . . .

The Secretary then said there were certain positive aspects of the program we had in mind for the Middle Eastern area. In the first place, we did not wish to proceed at this juncture on the basis that

[2] Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were in the United Kingdom on a State visit April 18–27.

Nasser is irrevocably committed to the Soviets. We felt that in the first instance we should proceed on the idea that Nasser might be swung away from his present course of action. This chance might, admittedly, be slight, but as things now stood, regardless of what we ultimately decided to do, we thought the first phase should not involve any open break with Nasser. With respect to Egypt, the program we had in mind involved slowing up and delaying any action on a number of requests which the Egyptians had made. For example, it would involve delaying any decision by the International Bank on the High Aswan Dam. The Secretary said he assumed the UK would cooperate on this. Also, we were not inclined to proceed any further in allocating surplus wheat to Egypt, although we were committed to sending them 200,000 tons. However, the Egyptians wanted an additional 400,000 tons, and we would delay any action on this. The Egyptians also wanted substantially to increase the CARE operation through which they received about forty million dollars' worth of supplies last year. We intended to slow down action on CARE, although possibly we might license modest CARE supplies for Egypt for the first quarter of this year. However, such allocation would be smaller than for the corresponding period last year. Returning to the question of the High Aswan Dam, the Secretary said we planned to reallocate the FY 56 funds which we had set aside for the Aswan Dam. If later the Egyptians cooperated with us, we could allocate funds from FY 57 to cover the operation. To summarize, the Secretary said that without an open break we would see to it that Egypt did not get satisfaction on many of her requests. We would not, however, take an open, public stand denying them the items which they sought. We would simply not take affirmative action.

With respect to the Sudan, the Secretary said . . . . The UK had more assets in the Sudan than the US, but if there were ways in which we could assist, we would be glad to do so. He said it was important both with respect to Egypt and Abyssinia that the Head Waters of the Nile be kept out of Egyptian or Soviet control.

Regarding Saudi Arabia, we were renegotiating our base agreement, and in the course of this renegotiation we would probably have to make further arms allocations to Saudi Arabia. We hoped that by such time the Buraimi problem would be settled. . . .

The Secretary next mentioned Jordan, saying that this was a country where the UK had more influence and assets than we did. It was important to keep Jordan from being absorbed by Egypt or by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. He said he had the impression that the immediate situation looked just a little bit better there.

With respect to the Baghdad Pact, the Secretary said we had studied very carefully the possibility of joining it, and this was just

not possible. He said he had discussed with Senator George and several other Senators this question, and they had said that any proposal on our part to join the Baghdad Pact would stir up a hornet's nest in the Senate. This was true even if it were coupled with a security guarantee for Israel. Another consideration was that the Secretary believed that if we joined the Baghdad Pact and at the same time guaranteed Israel it would have a very bad effect on Iraq, since Iraq would be portrayed by the other Arab states as having sold out with respect to the Arab position on Israel in order to get a few immediate advantages for Iraq. The result of this could undermine seriously the present Iraqi Government. While not being prepared to join the Baghdad Pact, we were willing to send high level observers to the April meeting. Also, we would study the proposal we had received from Mr. Lloyd regarding the establishment of a Baghdad Pact Technical Assistance Board with a working fund. If, as a result of our study, it seemed feasible, we would be disposed to cooperate, but we would wish to examine the effect on SEATO of our contributing funds to such a Board.

Sir Roger interrupted to say that since all the members of SEATO belonged to the Colombo Plan, he thought the line could be held there. Mr. MacArthur said that if it seemed necessary for the US to contribute to such a fund, we could probably hold the line in preventing any undesirable developments in SEATO since, as Sir Roger pointed out, all members of SEATO did belong to the Colombo Plan. Mr. Hoover said we ourselves had had some thoughts about economic cooperation under the Baghdad Pact and this was now being studied by ICA.

The Secretary then said that with respect to Iraq, we were prepared to cooperate through OSP to supply further Centurion tanks. He mentioned that in supplying equipment we would have to be sure it was not supplied so rapidly that it could not be absorbed, and in this connection mentioned that when he had been in Pakistan our people there had said that existing plans for stepping up certain categories of military aid for Pakistan had led them to believe that Pakistan could not absorb the equipment as rapidly as we were prepared to supply it.

With regard to Israel, the Secretary said we did not wish the Israelis to start on the Banat Ya'cub operation since this would in all probability lead to hostilities. As a result of a talk he had had with Ambassador Eban last Thursday,[3] he felt better about this, and believed that if we could give some satisfaction to an Israeli request for an Exim Bank loan[4] for other water development projects, the

[3] See Document 221.
[4] See Document 194.

Israelis might defer any action on the Banat Ya'cub project. We would not necessarily be able to satisfy the full amount of the Israeli request for other water development projects, but we could probably give them something. Sir Roger asked if the other Israeli water development projects were geared into the Johnston Plan. The Secretary said they were in the sense that the Israelis must get water under the Johnston Plan or some comparable plan.

Regarding arms for Israel, the Secretary said we were still reluctant to send any substantial amount of arms to Israel, as we believed this would cause the Arab states to unite in open hostility to us, thus diminishing our influence in the area. The Secretary said he believed that if we could go through the present US political campaign without giving in to Zionist pressures for substantial arms to Israel, this would encourage the Arabs and have a very good effect on them. In terms of domestic politics, it was a political liability for the Administration not to send arms to Israel, but the Administration was willing to accept this liability because of the broader and very important issues involved.

While the US did not plan to ship any substantial amount of arms to Israel, the Secretary said he did not think the same considerations applied to other countries which have historically supplied Israel with arms. We believed that Israel had possibilities of getting defensive armaments from other countries, and we had already told the French we had no objection to their supplying the twelve Mystere aircraft which were being produced in France for NATO through OSP. The Secretary also mentioned that when he had dined with Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson several days ago,[5] he had informed him that we would have no objection to Canada supplying some defensive arms and equipment to Israel if the Canadians so desired. As a practical matter, the Secretary believed it would be salutory to have some increase in Israel's defensive strength, but it was preferable for the equipment to be supplied by countries other than the US for the reasons which he had outlined.

The Secretary then turned to Libya, and said it was of the utmost importance that Libya not fall under Egyptian or Soviet domination, and in this connection the situation looked somewhat better. Mr. Hoover added that we were extending some additional aid to Libya, but in order to avoid the impression that the way to get additional US aid was to flirt with the Soviets, we would also be

[5] See Document 227.

asking Libya for some additional undefined base rights as a quid pro quo for our additional aid.

. . . . . .

The Secretary said this about concluded his outline of our views on the Middle East situation and what we had in mind as a program there. . . .

The Secretary said he had forgotten to mention that we were thinking about giving Iraq some radio equipment and facilities so that it could expand its broadcasts to the Arab world and thus deny Egypt and the Soviet Union a sole monopoly of the Arab air waves. The Secretary reiterated that he believed the program he had outlined might possibly bring Nasser around. He recalled that when he had discussed this matter with Macmillan last autumn he had suggested that without coming out publicly against Nasser, we should play our cards in a way which conveyed the impression that it was just not lucky to flirt and cooperate with the Russians. . . .

. . . . . .

Sir Roger said he would like to make some comments and observations on what the Secretary had said. He did not know, in the first place, whether the Middle East would be discussed with Bulganin and Khrushchev when they visited London, but he did not think there was much chance of the British position veering.

Regarding Saudi Arabia, he said the UK agreed it was very desirable to split the Saudis from the Egyptians. He mentioned that in their exchanges with the Saudis regarding Buraimi, the UK had asked that the talks take place without conditions precedent being established, and the Saudis had agreed. They had asked for high level talks at the Foreign Minister level to take place in New York. The British did not like the idea of talks taking place in New York since they might get mixed up with UN matters, and therefore they were proposing that the talks take place in Saudi Arabia. As to level, the UK did not believe in the first phase it was necessary for the talks to be at the Foreign Minister level, but they would send a high-level Foreign Office group to Saudi Arabia. Sir Roger said that if the Saudis acquainted us with this British proposal regarding talks, he hoped we would support their proposal for talks in Saudi Arabia at the level he had indicated. Sir Roger said he would report to London the views the Secretary had expressed regarding Saudi Arabia.

The Secretary said he strongly believed the situation was so serious that the UK might have to pay a price to split the Saudis

from the Egyptians. He said that when he had discussed with President Eisenhower last week the program he had just outlined to Sir Roger, the President's only criticism had been that our program did not emphasize enough building up of King Saud as a counterbalance to Nasser.[6] Mr. Hoover mentioned that a settlement of the Buraimi dispute would have a direct and good effect on the situation in Yemen, which in turn threatened the British position in Aden, and that therefore it seemed worthwhile to pay a substantial price for it.

Sir Roger said with respect to Egypt that while the British took a somewhat dimmer view of the possibility of bringing Nasser around, he thought that they saw the situation generally in much the same light as we. The Secretary said he did not think it was necessary to reconcile differences as to emphasis at this juncture, since regardless of what we felt we might ultimately have to do, in the first phase the operation would be the same. Sir Roger said he agreed and that in the first phase we ought to keep Nasser guessing.

Sir Roger then said he had received some instructions regarding the High Aswan Dam, and said he would not take the time now, but would like to meet with Mr. Hoover in the next few days to go over them.[7] He felt it was important not to give publicity to the delays which would occur with respect to the International Bank's consideration of the Egyptian request.

Turning to the Sudan, Sir Roger said the Sudanese Government wanted the International Bank to send a mission to the Sudan. The Bank had an understandable rule not to send missions to non-members. The UK had therefore proposed to the Sudan Government that it send a mission to the US to talk with the International Bank people, and on this mission could be included one or two technical people. Sir Roger expressed the hope that we would support this idea. The Secretary commented that the Sudan was a key spot, because control of the Head Waters of the Nile enabled influence to be brought to bear on both Egypt and Abyssinia.

Sir Roger then discussed the Baghdad Pact, and handed to the Secretary a summary of a memorandum (Annex A)[8] which the Turkish Government had handed to the UK Ambassador in Ankara

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[6] See Documents 224 and 225.

[7] See Document 236.

[8] Not printed. The Turks, in the memorandum, expressed concern about the spread of communism in the Middle East and were critical of the U.S. and British policy of trying to be friends with Egypt and other Middle Eastern states which were opposed to the Baghdad Pact. The Turkish Foreign Ministry also furnished the Embassy in Ankara with a copy of this memorandum. The Embassy transmitted an unofficial translation of it to the Department on March 31 in telegram 1638. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.513–3156)

on March 29, together with a copy of the telegram (Annex B)[9] the British Embassy in Ankara had sent to the Foreign Office commenting on the Turkish memorandum. The Secretary glanced at both these documents and said he assumed that the word "Egypt" which occurred nine lines from the end of paragraph 5 should read "Israel". Sir Roger agreed. He added that the Turkish memorandum was "very tough" . . . . Sir Roger particularly mentioned the fact that the Turkish Government considered that the Baghdad Pact had "reached a critical point in its existence when urgent and concerted decisions must be taken by its members and by the US if it is to be preserved".

The Secretary asked who the British were sending to the April 12 meeting of the Baghdad Pact. Sir Roger replied that despite the urging of the Turkish Foreign Minister (see Annex B [*A*?]), it was not possible for Mr. Lloyd to go since he would be tied up with the Bulganin–Khrushchev visit. Accordingly, the British were sending the Minister of Defense[10] and the Chairman of the British JCS.[11] Sir Roger inquired who the US would send as observers, and Mr. Hoover replied that we did not have definite names yet, but Admiral Radford felt the military observer should be of four-star rank, and we were thinking about sending Deputy Under Secretary Murphy on the political side.

Sir Roger asked whether the US observer would be able to say something at the Baghdad Pact meeting regarding the Centurion tanks for Iraq, and the Secretary replied that he understood the British had already let the Iraqis know about our plans in general terms, although not specifying the number of tanks. The Secretary undertook to look into this matter to see what our observers might say regarding tanks for Iraq.

Sir Roger then said the UK was releasing for shipment to Israel six Meteor jet aircraft on which they had been holding action. In addition, there would be some Bofors guns to arm Israeli motor torpedo boats, and in the next few months they might send six more Meteors and a few Mosquito aircraft and some vehicles. Sir Roger said he assumed the US Government would not object to this, and the Secretary said his assumption was correct.

Sir Roger mentioned that London was particularly anxious for US–UK military talks to take place regarding possible courses of action in the Middle East, and this seemed well in hand as Air

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[9] Not printed. The Embassy in Ankara sent a similar message to the Department of State. (Telegram 1641, March 31; *ibid.*)

[10] Sir Walter Monckton.

[11] Air Chief Marshal Sir William F. Dickson.

Marshal Dickson was now en route to the US to talk with Admiral Radford.

The Secretary inquired whether the British had made a study as to what they would do in terms of oil if the pipelines across the Arab states were blown up and the Suez Canal were blocked. He asked what contingency plans or thoughts they had developed with respect to bringing oil around the Cape or from Venezuela. Sir Roger replied that he did not know whether they had any such studies, and the Secretary said that if they did have them, it might be useful to exchange them with us.

Sir Roger next turned to Jordan, and said he had prepared a memorandum for the Secretary (Annex C) [12] setting forth the situation there. The situation was not good and could develop very badly. The Arab Legion was in a disturbed state and much jockeying and maneuvering was going on within it. The British were trying to conclude an arrangement with the Government of Jordan whereby twenty or thirty British officers would remain with the Legion, although not under as favorable conditions as the British would have liked. The British were also trying to arrange a meeting of the UK–Jordan Defense Board to activate this organism. He said Air Marshal Dickson would be in a position to discuss certain military aspects with Admiral Radford. . . . The British had pointed out to the King the bad situation in the Legion, with officers working against him, but the King had clammed up and simply said he knew all about this.

. . . . . .

He then made a brief reference to the situation in Iraq and said it was still manageable, but we should do what we could to strengthen and support the Iraq Government.

He then turned to action in the UN and said that while it looked as if a resolution would be favorably approved this coming week, [13] it would be very limited in scope, and would not permit the UN Secretary General to do very much. London wondered whether the US had any ideas as to other things which could be done in the political field. Was there any way a political deterrent could be further emphasized? The Secretary agreed that the UN resolution was restrictive, but felt that quite a bit could be done if it were not for Hammarskjold's temperament. He wondered whether he shouldn't get Hammarskjold down to Washington before he went out to the Middle East. Mr. Hoover said he thought it would be an

[12] Not printed.
[13] See Document 206.

excellent idea, and we could give him some appropriate intelligence on the disposition of the opposing forces and also alert him to the critical nature of the situation there. The Secretary said he might also consider opening up Hammarskjold's mind to the dangers in terms of war breaking out if a situation developed in the Middle East were Western Europe denied oil. The Secretary commented that he was not certain what our rights were under the Suez Canal Convention, since we were not signatories, but he was inclined to feel that since the Suez Canal was an international waterway, we could make a case as to having certain rights. He indicated that he would speak to Mr. Phleger about this, since we ought at least to know what our position internationally was in the event the dispatch of military forces to the Canal might seem desirable.

Sir Roger said he was grateful for the Secretary's having given him so much of his time. The most urgent matter in his view was the meeting of the Baghdad Pact about ten days hence. He made reference to the Turkish memorandum and said it might be that if something could be done on the economic side such as the Development Board proposed by the UK, and if the US could say something about the Centurion tanks for Iraq and perhaps something about Iran, and if the US had high level representation, the meeting might go off reasonably well. Sir Roger said it was particularly important to have the earliest possible reaction to the UK proposal regarding the economic board under the Baghdad Pact.

Summing up, Sir Roger said he had the following things to do:

1. Give the utmost possible assistance to the Baghdad Pact.
2. Do everything we could to prevent the situation in Jordan from deteriorating. It was in a delicate state of balance . . . .
3. Do everything we could to bolster and support the Government of Iraq.
4. The situation in Saudi Arabia was less immediate, but over a period of time we should try to work that out.

The Secretary said we could not afford to dally regarding Saudi Arabia since in our view it was the key to the Middle East situation. If the UK could reach a settlement with the Saudis on Buraimi, the Secretary felt the odds would shift heavily in our favor.

The Secretary then inquired about the situation in Kuwait, and Mr. Hoover mentioned that Kuwait was very important, since one-quarter of the oil of the area came from there. Sir Roger said there were not close relations between Kuwait and Iraq. In general, the situation in Kuwait seemed satisfactory. The Secretary said Kuwait was assuming greater importance, and we should also be thinking about its role and position in any over-all program for the area.

In conclusion, the Secretary said this entire matter was being held in the strictest secrecy within the US Government, and it was

imperative that similar secrecy be observed by the UK since leaks involving public knowledge would be disastrous.

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233. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 2, 1956[1]

SUBJECT

Arms for Israel

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Russell—S

Israel Government
Ambassador Eban
Reuven Shiloah, Minister
Col. Katriel Salmon, Military Attaché

I saw Ambassador Eban, Shiloah and Salmon today at Eban's request. Eban said that he had reported to his Government the conversation which he had with the Secretary on March 28[2] and had followed it up with a telegram giving his interpretation of the Secretary's remarks as meaning that the United States would use its contacts with other Western governments to help Israel obtain arms from them. Eban said that he had also reported to his government a conversation that he had with the Canadian Ambassador here on March 29 in which the latter said that Secretary Dulles had spoken to the Canadian Foreign Minister at a dinner the evening before suggesting that Canada might make some Canadian manufactured F–86's available to Israel.[3] Eban said that he had just received a telegram from Sharett saying that the Israel Government interpreted the Secretary's remarks to Eban as a turn down of the IG's arms request and that the remarks about approaches to other governments were just a stall. Eban said that he would appreciate anything I could say which would confirm his impression that the Secretary's remarks involved anything more than a stalling operation.

I told Eban that I had talked with the Secretary after the March 28 conversation and had his authorization to say that the United States would take steps to ascertain whether Israel could obtain a

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Memos, etc. from March 24, 1956 to April 23, 1956. Confidential. Drafted on April 14 by Russell.

[2] See Document 221.

[3] See Document 227.

limited amount of defensive arms from other countries. The Secretary also mentioned to me that he had already spoken to Lester Pearson.

Eban asked me how the United States intended to go about assisting Israel to get arms from the other countries. Would it inform them directly that the United States hoped that they would make arms available to Israel? Should Israel inform them of her conversations with the Secretary? Should an Israel representative sit down with a representative of the United States and work out a schedule of particular equipment which Israel should receive from each of several countries and then cooperate in approaches to those countries? I told Eban those were questions that I was not in a position to answer; they would require some further consideration in the Department. I said that the decision on the question of the best method upon which to proceed and the broader question as to the closeness of U.S.–Israel cooperation during the new period ahead to which the Secretary had referred would, in my opinion, depend upon whether Israel continued to oppose and obstruct U.S. policies in the area and to conduct the political warfare against the United States Government that the Secretary had referred to in his conversation with Eban on March 2. [4] I said that the Department would be awaiting with interest some indication from the Israel Government on those points.

[4] See Document 151.

234. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, April 3, 1956, 10:30 a.m. [1]

OTHERS PRESENT

Admiral Radford
Air Chief Marshal Dickson
Lt. General Whiteley

The President welcomed Air Chief Marshal Dickson, asked about the other members of the British Chiefs of Staff, and recalled some of his war service with them. Air Chief Marshal Dickson told the President that the ostensible reason for his being here is to get to

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

know Admiral Radford—his opposite number—better, and to renew past friendships. A more specific purpose, however, is to engage in military discussions concerning the situation in the Middle East. The rest of the meeting was concerned with this subject.

The President and Air Chief Marshal Dickson both saw large hazards in an Arab "bloc" extending from Pakistan to Dakar, with weak and unstable governments and institutions, and resulting vulnerability to Soviet penetration. If it were necessary to protect the canal, the task would be extremely difficult if the whole Arab bloc were opposed to us, much less so if only the Egyptians were opposed.

The President spoke of the importance of our information, propaganda, and political warfare activities in the area. The output from Cairo and Moscow seems to be very great, and we are not making the gains we should in putting our story across. He thought that the United States and the UK should do a great deal toward concerting activities in this field. He said we have very considerable assets in the area, if we would just make use of them. Air Chief Marshal Dickson said that throughout that area, even in Syria, we still have friends, although they are becoming fewer and weaker.

The President thought we should try to build up a "design" for our actions in the Middle East. We should consider what would be the first step to restoring our fortunes there. To this end, each of the major countries might have to contribute, or concede, a little. Air Chief Marshal Dickson referred to the Baghdad Pact and then indicated need for greater US and UK support to it. The President thought there was a great deal we could do, even short of adhering. Air Chief Marshal Dickson mentioned that the Middle Eastern countries are sending their Prime Ministers to the April 16th meeting, whereas the British are unable to arrange for Eden or Lloyd to go. The President asked if it would not be desirable for Lloyd to be there.

Air Chief Marshal Dickson thought that Egypt is taking a bad turn. The British had worked with the Egyptians for quite a while but were now coming to feel that there is nothing to be gained through cooperation. They may initiate war against Israel—and sooner than we think. He said there is a base of anti-Communism in the Moslem religion and the Koran, on which we could build. Syria is in real danger of going Communist. He agreed that there are possibilities for putting the situation on a better basis, in spite of difficulties on every side. He confirmed that a few tentative approaches toward the Iraqis had been made by Saud. There are possibilities in the "greater fertile crescent" idea. It is not impossible that an understanding could be reached with Saud concerning the shiekdoms. The British feel very strongly about Buraimi, but would

consider giving Saudi-Arabia a channel for access to the Persian Gulf.

The President saw need for bringing the political, military, and political warfare people of the United States and UK together to concert action. It is a highly "tangled skein." Actions should be under the direction of selected, very astute individuals.

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235. Message to Washington [1]

No. 132 *Cairo, April 3, 1956.*

1. . . . conferred at length on first April with Ali Sabri who said he and Nasr extremely upset by fears that U.S. Government and U.K. Government have taken some secret policy decision to destroy Nasr and position his Govt in area. Ali Sabri said Nasr had hoped their grounds common after Egypt and U.S. Government work to solution Arab area problems; said he did not say goodbye to Anderson in expectation that Anderson mission was finished. When pressed for explanation Nasr worries about anti-Egyptian policy, Ali Sabri referred two principal concerns:

A. U.S. Government Palestinian Resolution in UN [2] and
B. Propaganda campaign in UK and United States to fix Nasr with Blame for all trouble in area.

2. With respect to UN Resolution Nasr principally disturbed that announcement was made without . . . Ambassador Byroade . . . consulting or informing him in advance. He reported feel his relations with Ambassador Byroade such as would have made decision of Resolution prior to announcement normal and helpful. In circumstances Russian ambassador [3] had fine opportunity make gesture good will to Egypt by offering make any changes in Resolution Egypt desired.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.-March 1956. Part II. Secret. A note dated April 3 attached to the source text indicates that Russell forwarded this message to Dulles and Hoover. The note bears Hoover's initials and a marginal note indicating that Dulles saw the message.

[2] See Document 206.

[3] Yevgeniy Dmitrievich Kiselev.

3. Another source concern was fact that Resolution made without any reference to Anderson mission . . . . He forced speculate on possibility that UN Resolution involved some ulterior motive which not apparent surface, otherwise he could not understand why work of weeks had been ignored.

4. . . . assured Ali Sabri that UN Palestine Resolution was continuation of plans discussed under Anderson mission and that motives and objectives of Resolution were same as those involved in Anderson mission, Step Three. Ali Sabri said Egypt would give full support to UN Resolution and had urged other Arab States to cooperate, though feeling the need for clarification on several points. He said Nasr still feels he has not been given explanation U.S. Government position and objectives and connection present moves with Anderson mission . . . anxious for guidance on this point, suggests it advisable effort be made maintain continuity Anderson mission and good will generated by Anderson visits.

5. On subject anti-Egyptian line in United States and UK Press. Ali Sabri . . . had long and not very profitable conversation. . . . argued that anti-Western line in Egyptian Press equalled anti-Egyptian line in Western Press and that improvement of situation required moderation on both sides. Ali Sabri argued that Egyptian Government could control but not dictate to press and that Egyptian Press about as moderate as possible under circumstances. If anti-Egyptian line maintained in UK Press, he said, the time will come when we can no longer control our press' treatment of the UK to the extent that we do now. Egyptian relations with the UK, said Ali Sabri, are now so bad and are steadily deteriorating that "I don't know what's going to happen".

236. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, April 3, 1956.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Ambassador Makins Concerning Aswan Dam

I understand that you are meeting with Ambassador Makins at 12:15 p.m., April 3 to discuss the High Aswan Dam, and that you wish me to be present. [2]

Since our policy concerning the project has been discussed at length during the past several days, I believe that an extensive briefing will not be necessary. The present situation may be summarized as follows:

1. Following Mr. Black's negotiations with Nasser in early February, the Egyptians suggested a substantial revision of the US and British aide-mémoire setting forth their willingness to participate in the project. The changes recommended by the Egyptians appear to have been motivated primarily by three factors:

a. They wished to extract from the US and Great Britain more definitive and favorable commitments concerning financial participation;

b. They wished the offers to be in terms more satisfactory from the propaganda viewpoint; and

c. The Egyptian Government decided, contrary to earlier expectations, to defer work on the Dam until after concluding an agreement with Sudan on division of the Nile Waters.

2. Even if we were prepared to go forward with the project at this time, substantial amendments in the Egyptian counterdraft would be required. In view of recent developments with respect to Egyptian policy, however, we have not considered it timely to consult with the British and the IBRD on the Egyptian proposals. Unless and until circumstances are such as to warrant our participation in the project, discussion on the details of the offer would be a fruitless pursuit.

3. We have not, of course, indicated to the Egyptians that we might not now be prepared to move forward with the negotiations. We believe that delaying tactics should be employed, at least for the time being, so that we will not be in the position either of breaking off negotiations or of giving the Egyptians encouragement to believe that we are anxious to complete the arrangements.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/4–356. Secret.

[2] No account of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

4. We hope that the British will agree to employ similar delaying tactics and, if queried by the Egyptians, respond along the lines simply that the Egyptian counter-proposal presented a number of difficult questions which were still under study; the fact that Egypt decided to withhold work on the project pending an agreement with the Sudan removed much of the urgency for concluding the arrangements.

5. It is our thought that, in view of the possibility that the Egyptians might decide to enter into a contract with the Soviet Union for the Dam project, we should make every effort to develop a situation in Sudan whereby a Nile Waters agreement between Sudan and Egypt could be blocked. It is important that we gain enough time to set straight our position in Sudan.

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237. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, April 3, 1956.

SUBJECT

FY 1956 Aid to Israel

Discussion:

As the Development Assistance Program for FY 1956 now stands, $20 million has been approved for aid to Israel. Of this amount, only $5 million is available for general purchases, while $15 million is to be given in the form of Section 402 agricultural commodities. [2]

In programming the $73 million for development assistance in FY 1956 for the Near East and Africa, ICA set up a reserve of $20 million, drawing $5 million of the amount needed from a $25 million fund originally planned for Israel. Subsequently, the question of financing the High Aswan Dam arose. The U.S. needed $55 million for its share of the initial work. ICA proposed with State concurrence that this amount be supplied out of the above-mentioned $20

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5–MSP/2–1856. Secret. Concurred in by Robert G. Barnes and Dennis A. FitzGerald. Drafted by Lathram and Troxel on March 20.

[2] Reference is to Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act of 1955 (69 Stat. 283).

million special reserve fund, plus $25 million already set aside for economic development plus $10 million from the general reserve fund under Section 401 (Tab A).[3]

There have now been further changes in the general situation with respect to aid for the Near East. The $20 million level for Israel presents a number of problems which warrant our taking another look at it.

1. The revised program represents a cut of 50 per cent instead of the annual cut of 30-odd per cent ($70 million to $52 million to $40 million) which has been the pattern of declining aid in prior years and to which the Israelis have become accustomed. As the program is to be administered, however, the cut is even more drastic in terms of funds available for general use—$20 million last year to $5 million this year.

2. The Israel Government has expressed "very sharp disappointment" at the $20 million figure, both in financial terms and because of its "enormous political significance" (Tab B).[4] While from a strictly economic view the GOI can adjust to the reduced allocations, it did not anticipate such a low level in preparing its budgets. This, coupled with internal pressures for military and developmental expenditures, creates problems for the GOI in its financial planning.

3. The political implications of a sharp cut are aggravated by the decision to make $55 million available to Egypt, particularly when further funds are being requested for general economic aid to Egypt in FY 1957. The Israelis interpret the allocation of the reserve to Egypt as representing a transfer of funds from Israel to Egypt.

4. Those presenting the FY 1956 program to Congress may have difficulty explaining the cut of $5 million in the amount originally presented for Israel in FY 1956, especially in view of the $25 million requested for FY 1957.

5. The NSC policy directive calls for a progressive decrease in aid to Israel.[5] A request for $25 million for Israel in FY 1957 following an allocation of $20 million for FY 1956 might be deemed inconsistent with NSC policy.

Recommendation:

That aid to Israel be increased from $20 million to $25 million for FY 1956. Of the increase approximately half should be a loan, making the total program $25 million, with $12.5 million loan, and including $15 million Sec. 402 Commodities. Funding arrangements

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[3] Not printed. Reference is to Section 401 of the Mutual Security Act of 1955, which authorized the President to extend special grant assistance to individuals or nations when he determined that such assistance would contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area or to the security of the United States.

[4] Not attached to the source text, but identified as telegram 824 from Tel Aviv, February 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5–MSP/2–1856)

[5] Reference is to NSC 5428, "United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East", July 23, 1954; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525.

for the additional $5 million by ICA should include utilization of available third country currencies. [6]

[6] Dulles initialed his approval of the suggested course of action on April 6.

238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, April 3, 1956—8:26 p.m.

2404. Eyes only Ambassador Byroade. USG at highest level has had under intensive study US policies in Near East in light recent disturbing developments. Crucial factor in determining policies and attitudes has been clear evidence Egypt under Nasser has by various means endeavored disrupt friendly relations between US and other countries of area, notably Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Our determined efforts to work with Nasser in reducing area tensions appear to have produced no results. Whatever his earlier intentions might have been, he now seems to have fixed a course contrary to ours. His Czech arms deal, his attacks against Baghdad Pact, and his assumption leadership in fight against Israel appear to have impressed him to point where, in present circumstances, he will not appreciably change. More important than the fact that it now appears we cannot look to Nasser for area leadership in bringing about a settlement with Israel is clear evidence that Nasser's policies have opened the door to the Soviets in the Near East and, unless changed or effectively countered, situation could lead to a major catastrophe.

Theoretically there are three general lines of policy which we might pursue: (1) continue along present lines; (2) use all means at our disposal to make it clear that we do not intend to cooperate with Nasser and openly oppose him; or (3) endeavor by quiet means to reduce Egyptian influence, demonstrate to the Egyptians that international cooperation must be a two-way affair, and concentrate upon building positions of greater strength in other countries of the area. We believe course (1) likely fail in stemming deterioration in our relations with other Arab states and would permit creation

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–356. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by Rountree and Allen, approved by MacArthur in substance and by Dulles in draft, approved by Hoover, and signed for Dulles by Rountree.

situation in which Soviet penetration of area would thrive. Even if course (2) were consistent with US policy, we believe inadvisable since prospects success at this time not good and public issue would be drawn with Egypt at time Egyptian assets are at peak and would be used in all-out effort counter Western initiative throughout area. Third course offers best chance success and has therefore been basis current planning.

While we plan appropriate coordination with British in implementing our respective policies, consider it important that impression not be given that US–UK policies identical or linked. Supporting validity of this decision are facts: (1) US wishes insofar as possible avoid being tainted with brush of "colonialism" which now operates to the extreme detriment of British in area; and (2) there may be fundamental disagreement with British on certain specific tactics to be employed in carrying out program. In latter connection British statements have already given public notice that UK "fed up with Nasser" and is seriously considering substantial revision UK policies of cooperation with him.

Generally speaking, we intend make no public statements at least for time being . . . . Rather, we intend proceed quietly with certain steps which should demonstrate to Egyptians that expected cooperation from US entails cooperation with US. Thus, in period immediately ahead US will go slow on economic aid to Egypt; hold up export licenses for military equipment and spare parts, as well as approval export civilian type equipment obviously designed for military purposes (such as several hundred jeeps now on order); prolong negotiations Aswan Dam project without, at this time, breaking them off and thus providing Nasser with public excuse for signing contract with Soviets.

It is hoped, as result these measures, Nasser will conclude relations with US not proceeding smoothly and raise question with American officials. If this should occur, you should seek specific guidance from Department as to response, although it anticipated general line would be that friendly relations between countries are reciprocal and if Nasser's over-all policies are changed in their anti-US aspects in the area it reasonable to assume US will adopt more cooperative attitude. Our concern will be expressed on the broad basis that we view with alarm Egyptian policies which, regardless of their real motivation, are leading to a situation in which the independence and integrity of several nations are being undermined by Soviet penetration.

For time being your own and Embassy's attitude toward Nasser and other Egyptian officials should remain unchanged. It highly important you report currently and fully indications effect US poli-

cies and any reactions which you receive from Nasser and other officials, as well as public relations. [2]

Information concerning this matter is being strictly confined on "need to know" basis. You should therefore discuss matter only with your Deputy . . . .

Dulles

[2] Byroade reported on April 4 that he had already "started operation directed on Nasser by seeing that he received from sources in addition to Fawzi" evidence of U.S. concern regarding the situation. In order to avoid officially criticizing the Egyptian Government, Byroade left with Nasser the impression that Byroade's present mood was not the result of new instructions, but due to his personal and friendly concern for Egypt's reputation in the West. Byroade reported some signs that this line was already having a good effect and stated he would see Nasser the next day. (Telegram 1978 from Cairo; *ibid.*, 684A.86/4–456) Byroade met with Nasser on April 5; see Document 252.

239. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) [1]

Washington, April 4, 1956.

SUBJECT

Discussions by Mr. Prochnow with Commerce and Agriculture

I understand that you will request Mr. Prochnow to talk to top officers of the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce concerning certain aspects of our policy in the Near East. You might wish to suggest to him that the discussions be held at the Secretary or Under Secretary level. It might be explained that the Department is proceeding with great care in the implementation of its policies in the Near East area in light of recent disturbing developments. There are certain aspects concerning which we particularly desire the cooperation of the two Departments. It is important, in this connection, that any implication the requests derive from a special new policy of the US with regard to the area should be confined, if possible, only to the Secretary and Under Secretary.

a. *Agriculture* (action requested relates solely to Egypt)

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega. Mr. Rountree (for NATO meeting May '56). Top Secret; Omega.

We have decided that, for the time being, no disposals of agricultural surpluses, beyond those transactions already concluded, should be authorized. This relates to applications now pending for grain, cottonseed oil, greasy wool, etc. Also, we will proceed on a 1956 CARE program on an extremely limited basis for the first quarter, and defer any decision regarding the total magnitude of the program until a substantially later date. It is important that this slow-down in acting upon Egyptian requests should not be publicly announced or generally known. It is expected that such pressure from the Egyptians as might develop for items of this character will be focused primarily upon the Department of State; however it is possible or perhaps likely that the Egyptians will also be in touch with officials of the Department of Agriculture. In dealing with such Egyptian contacts we hope that the Agricultural officers will, on the one hand, give no encouragement to the Egyptians that favorable action is expected to be forthcoming or, on the other hand, indicate that policy considerations prevent Egyptian procurement at this time. Mr. Prochnow might discuss with the officials of the Department of Agriculture how this objective might best be achieved.

b. *Commerce* (action requested relates to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Israel)

It might be explained that in view of the tense Near Eastern situation we wish to proceed with extreme care in authorizing commercial exports of matériel of a military character or of a civilian character which obviously is intended for use for military purposes. We therefore request that the Department of Commerce consult with the Department of State before approving any such exports to the countries mentioned. The Department of Commerce recently inquired of the Department as to whether there would be any objection to the export of several hundred jeeps to Egypt. At the Department's request, a decision upon this item was and continues to be deferred. We hope that the Department of Commerce will continue to withhold its approval, if possible without an outright rejection of the application. Means of employing delaying tactics might be discussed by Mr. Prochnow.

240. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles' Residence, Washington, April 4, 1956, 6:30–7:10 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. MacArthur
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Air Chief Marshal Dickson, Chairman of the British Joint Chiefs

Sir Roger Makins said he and Air Chief Marshal Dickson appreciated very much the Secretary taking time from his very busy schedule to receive them. Sir Roger made reference to his talk with Mr. MacArthur a few hours earlier,[2] and said he had received a flood of additional telegrams and would hope to see the Secretary tomorrow[3] and would try to bring along an informal paper summarizing London's comments[4] on his conversation with the Secretary on Easter Sunday afternoon.[5]

The Secretary said he had received a report from Mr. MacArthur regarding the talk earlier in the afternoon with Sir Roger, but had noted that there had been no British reaction with respect to the points the Secretary had made on Saudi Arabia. Sir Roger said that since his talk with Mr. MacArthur he had received additional messages and hoped that by the time he saw the Secretary tomorrow he would have full comments on their conversation of Easter afternoon.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1. Secret; Omega. Drafted by MacArthur.

[2] During this conversation, Makins showed MacArthur several telegrams from the British Foreign Office that dealt with Makins' meeting with Dulles on April 1 (see Document 232). In his memorandum of the conversation, MacArthur noted that the most important of these telegrams "agreed with the Secretary's summing up of the extent of Nasser's commitment to the Soviets."

"The telegram went on to say that if the US and UK could work out a new policy for dealing with Nasser, it should not be publicized. . . . It was desirable to keep Nasser guessing regarding our intentions, but it would only arouse his suspicions if 'we took smilingly his recent propaganda attacks against us'. The telegram went on to say that at the same time we should do our utmost to strengthen our friends in the area to counter Nasser's activities." The telegram concluded by noting Foreign Office agreement that decision on the Aswan Dam be delayed. (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1)

[3] See Document 242.

[4] See Document 243.

[5] See Document 232.

A.C.M. Dickson then expressed his own appreciation for being received by the Secretary. He said that when he had left London the British had been in a bit of a flap about the situation in the Middle East and felt the current was running against them. More recent messages which Sir Roger had received since Dickson's departure from London seemed to indicate that while there was serious concern, London was not in a state of flap. (Sir Roger told Mr. MacArthur aside that London's messages since Sunday had been considerably calmer in tone than the ones he had been receiving in the last ten days.)

Dickson then said that while a few weeks ago the British had feared the Israelis would attack Egypt, they now felt the situation was reversed and that there was more danger of an Egyptian attack against Israel in the next few months. Since the final withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone on March 31, the British believed Nasser felt he was under less restraint than when there were even a small number of British troops at the Suez Base. The British believed Nasser may have felt that even with a small number of British troops at the Base, these might seriously have interfered with Egyptian communications if Egypt had attacked Israel.

Another cause of British apprehension about possible aggressive action by Egypt was their feeling that Nasser might wish to initiate hostilities with the Israelis in the hope that he could have an early success against them, which would consolidate his position, particularly with respect to Jordan and Iraq, and might enable him to extend his influence over these two countries.

Finally, the Egyptians were unquestionably cocky as a result of their receipt of substantial military equipment and new weapons from the Soviet bloc, and they probably felt they could now successfully take on the Israelis. The British did not concur in this view, although Dickson stated that the Egyptians now had marked superiority in modern and heavy weapons and aircraft. However, they had not fully assimilated these arms, and the Israeli army was a tough little force which if attacked in the next several months would almost certainly make an initial success against the Egyptians.

A.C.M. Dickson then turned to the situation in Jordan, and said it had gone against the UK. . . . He said that if the Jordan situation deteriorated, the effect on Iraq would be very bad. He mentioned that the removal of Glubb Pasha and the British officers from their posts of command in the Legion removed a restraining influence on the action of the Legion, and the King had made the situation worse by moving the Legion to the Israeli frontier. The British hoped to be able to keep 20 or 30 officers with the Legion, but if this were possible, their situation and status would be most unsatisfactory in that they would not occupy any of the command posts in the

Legion. Dickson added that he understood the Israelis would probably not recommence work on the Banat Ya'cub water development project. . . .

Dickson then reiterated that the British were very concerned that the Egyptians might initiate hostilities. He said the concern and flap in London was in considerable part due to the fact that the UK did not feel they had any adequate understanding with the US regarding what would be done in the event of trouble. As military men, he and Admiral Radford had been directed to develop some military concepts as to what could be done militarily if Israel attacked Egypt or vice versa or if the situation developed where the aggressor could not be identified. He said he and Admiral Radford both felt this was not simply a military matter but was riddled with political aspects and difficulties. Therefore, it was essential that the UK and US military have political guidance from the Department of State and the Foreign Office as to what political assumptions they should base their estimate on. He said that while he and Admiral Radford would go ahead with developing the military concepts, this work would be meaningless without political guidance.

He then made brief reference to the disastrous effect on the UK and on NATO should the Suez Canal be closed. He said that if the Egyptians initiated action which would lead to the closing of the Canal, it might be necessary to undertake military operations to open up the Canal under UN auspices.

Dickson mentioned Iraq briefly, saying that when, following the SEATO Conference in Karachi, he had accompanied Selwyn Lloyd to Baghdad, both the King and Nuri were extremely unhappy that they had not received additional radio transmitting facilities to enable them to step up Iraq broadcasts to the Arab world. They complained that the Iraqi people and other Arabs were exposed to listening to the poison emanating from the Cairo radio broadcasts and they hoped as a matter of great urgency that they could be assisted in developing additional broadcasting facilities.

The Secretary said the entire Middle Eastern situation was a baffling problem since it was terribly confused politically. He made reference to the US Congressional Resolution regarding the use of troops in the defense of Formosa, and said that had been a comparatively simple and clear-cut issue and the Congress had responded affirmatively to the Administration's desire. However, the Middle East situation was very confused, and there were all kinds of different possibilities: the Israelis might attack Egypt; the Egyptians might attack Israel; or hostilities might break out under circumstances which would not make it possible clearly to identify the aggressor. He did not believe the Congress would adopt a resolution which would encompass all the various possibilities, and in this connection

made reference to the President's press conference today where the President had said he would not act to send troops to the Middle East in the event of war without Congressional authority. [6]

The Secretary also mentioned that he was having our legal people look into the Suez Canal Treaty, [7] to which we were not signatory, with a view to seeing whether a plausible legal position might be developed for the employment of troops in the event the Egyptians took action to close the Canal.

. . . . . .

The Secretary then said that while he thought the military studies which Dickson and Radford were undertaking were useful, he doubted that a solution to the Middle East problem would be found by military means. He felt for a number of reasons, including our inability to guarantee to take military action, that other means for finding a solution would have to be sought.

The Secretary then mentioned that he had asked Sir Roger whether the UK had a good study on the oil situation and what might be done if the pipelines were blown up and if the Suez Canal were blocked. He discussed the problem in general terms along the lines of his previous discussion with Sir Roger last Sunday, and said that whether we liked it or not, this situation could arise, and there should be a serious and detailed study as to what might be done. He mentioned that he felt the primary Soviet objective was to deny Middle East oil to the West rather than to acquire the oil itself, since the Soviet Union had sufficient production to get along on. The Secretary said that if we had plans as to how to mitigate the loss of Middle East oil, we would be in a somewhat stronger position with the Arabs since if the West did not take their oil they would lose the oil revenues on which they depended.

Dickson said Admiral Radford had mentioned a recent study that the US had undertaken regarding oil, [8] and said the UK was also engaging in studies on what the loss of the Suez Canal would mean in terms not only of oil but other export and import products.

In the course of this discussion, the Secretary said he would direct that our economic people analyze carefully the position of Egypt in terms of what its financial and economic position would be if the Canal were blocked and it received no revenue from the Canal

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[6] For the transcript of the President's press conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956*, pp. 368–381.

[7] Reference presumably is to the Constantinople Convention of 1888. For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1887–1888*, volume 79, pp. 18–22, or *The Suez Canal Problem, July 26–September 22, 1956* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 16–20.

[8] See footnote 4, Document 224.

traffic, if it received no aid of any kind from West, and if its free world market for long staple cotton could be denied it. Sir Roger said he thought this was a good idea, and in this connection the International Bank had a mass of economic material on Egypt which might be useful. The Secretary . . . reiterated that he thought the present struggle going on in the Middle East to prevent Soviet penetration would be won by political, economic, and counter-subversive actions rather than by military actions.

Dickson mentioned again that the Israeli army was out-gunned by the Egyptian army, but for the period of the next six months he believed the Israeli army could defeat the Egyptians in the field. He thought it was a good thing the French were sending some Mysteres and that Canada also might send some planes since it would be a great temptation to the Egyptians if the Israeli level of defense were not somewhat increased. At the same time, he felt that both the US and the UK should not send military equipment to the Israelis as this would impair their position and influence with the Arab states. Dickson mentioned that for a while the British had opposed the French sending Mysteres to Israel as they feared that if hostilities broke out the UK would have to honor its commitment with Jordan, and might be fighting against Israel with Jordanian aircraft which were inferior to the Mysteres. In the light of the recent Jordan action, however, it was extremely doubtful that the UK would become involved on the side of Jordan in a conflict with Israel.

In response to a direct question by the Secretary, A.C.M. Dickson confirmed that the Indians were buying aircraft from the UK, but he said the UK was not sure whether the Indians might also purchase some aircraft and other military equipment from the Soviets.

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241. Editorial Note

Acting in his capacity as Coordinator of the Omega program, Douglas MacArthur II divided into two parts the task of implementing the special Middle East policy contemplated in Document 222 and approved by the President on March 28 (see Document 223).

Fraser Wilkins assumed responsibility for the daily execution and implementation of those aspects of the program that the President had already accepted. Francis Russell took on the task of planning the implementation of additional measures.

To assist and advise Russell, MacArthur established an interdepartmental planning group, chaired by Russell and comprised of the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Herman Phleger, Herbert V. Prochnow, and a representative from the United States Information Agency also attended meetings on an ad hoc basis. (Memorandum for the files by Russell, April 5; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Memos, etc. from March 24, 1956 to April 23, 1956)

On April 6, MacArthur met with Wilkins, Russell, and the representatives of the interested agencies. MacArthur outlined the project, described the respective functions and responsibilities of Wilkins and Russell, and established that the planning group would hold its first formal meeting on April 9 at 3 p.m. (Memorandum of conversation, April 6; *ibid.*, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #2) The group became known as the Middle East Planning Group. (Memorandum from Russell to Allen and Rountree, April 11; *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—ME Policy Planning Group 1956)

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242. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 5, 1956, 12:15 p.m.[1]

SUBJECT

Middle East Policy

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Rountree
Ambassador Makins
Mr. Ronald W. Bailey

Ambassador Makins said he had received from Mr. Selwyn Lloyd the latter's views concerning policies in the Near East which were discussed by the Ambassador with the Secretary on April 1.[2] He stated these views presumably were also those of the British Government. He had reduced to writing the substance of the mes-

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #2. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted on April 6 by Rountree. A notation on the source text reads: "Not cleared by the Secretary 4/9".

[2] See Document 232.

sage and handed to the Secretary and others present copies of this document dated April 5.[3]

After reading the paper the Secretary inquired as to the reason the British did not wish meetings with Saudi Arabia on the Buraimi issue to be held in New York, as suggested by King Saud. Sir Roger replied that they felt the atmosphere in New York, near the United Nations to which the Saudi Arabs had threatened to bring the issue, would not be suitable. Also, the British believed there were strong advantages in sending a delegation to Saudi Arabia where direct access to the King would be afforded.

Sir Roger informed the Secretary that he had just received a message from London setting forth details upon measures which the British were prepared to undertake with respect to the proposed Economic Board and other economic matters to be discussed at the forthcoming Baghdad Pact Council meeting in Tehran. A memorandum on this matter would be provided to the Department later in the day.[4] The Secretary commented that we had been giving some thought to the economic aspects of the forthcoming Council meeting and were formulating a response to the recent British message on this subject.

The Secretary noted that in the paper which Ambassador Makins had handed him the British seemed concerned that many people had concluded that American and British policies in the Near East were different. He commented that the flood of press material from London had played up such differences. The story in the *New York Times* of April 5, filed by Drew Middleton, for example, emphasized this aspect on the basis of information presumably obtained in London.[5] It was being said that our alliance might collapse as a result of US-UK policy differences in the Near East. If the UK felt, as we felt, that it was wise to avoid the impression there were vast differences between us, it would appear that they had to a considerable extent control over what was said to members of the press. He emphasized that it was not our effort to publicize differences; in fact we were disturbed at the publicity which was emanating from London.

Ambassador Makins commented that the point in the message from Mr. Lloyd concerned publicity and attitudes in the Near East area more than in the UK or the US. The Secretary responded that it would be difficult to avoid such news stories being picked up in the

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[3] *Infra.*

[4] Makins transmitted the memorandum, entitled "Baghdad Pact", to Dulles under cover of a memorandum on April 5. Copies of these documents are in Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–556 and *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Re Baghdad Pact 1956.

[5] The article was entitled "Eden Will Stress Mideast to Soviet".

Near Eastern states. He went on to say that, while publicity regarding great differences between the US and the UK was harmful to our respective and joint efforts in the Near East, on the other hand we did not wish to give the impression that in every respect we were working together. If, for example, we claimed solid US–UK agreement on the Buraimi issue our position in Saudi Arabia would be gravely jeopardized. We could not be associated one hundred per cent with British policy which might be considered to be hostile to Saudi Arabia. Such an indication of US–UK solidarity might imply not only that we agreed with the British position at this time but also that we had been consulted by the British and agreed upon their previous actions on the Arabian Peninsula. He had understood that the British had intentionally not told us in advance about moves at Buraimi since they realized that such advance consultation might have placed us in an embarrassing situation.

Ambassador Makins agreed with these observations of the Secretary, commenting that the British did not expect to achieve one hundred per cent the objective of demonstrating US–UK solidarity. They had put forth the thought as a matter of general application with respect to broad policies in the area.

The Secretary emphasized the importance of placing the Buraimi negotiations and general UK-Saudi relations on some basis whereby the Saudis would not intensify their anti-British efforts. This, however, was largely up to the UK since it was clear that a mere demonstration of US–UK solidarity would not have a useful effect in overcoming Saudi Arabian anti-British programs in the Arab world.

Commenting more generally on the British paper, the Secretary said that, by and large, we appeared to be fairly close to agreement.

Referring to the Baghdad Pact, Ambassador Makins alluded to a number of messages which the British had received from other Pact members, disclosing doubt and frustration concerning the American attitude. They felt the US was not giving sufficient support to the Pact or following through in providing adequate material benefits to the Pact countries. Dismay has been caused particularly in Iran and Iraq.

The Secretary observed that one of the difficulties involved was that the member countries did not all view the Baghdad Pact undertaking in precisely the same light as the US. A similar problem existed with regard to SEATO, where the SEATO powers desired to undertake measures enhancing their security against the communists, but they also desired to gain support for their positions in disputes with other Free World countries. For example, Pakistan had in mind that SEATO membership might be extremely beneficial in its dispute with India. From the US viewpoint the purpose of engaging in such pacts was to prevent aggression from the Soviet Union or Commu-

nist China. When we adhered to the SEATO Pact, we felt compelled to make clear this reservation. Part of Iraq's disillusionment regarding the Baghdad Pact probably derives from its desire for our support in their quarrel with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. A considerable amount of the opposition among the Arab states and India to the Baghdad Pact and SEATO results from their concern that the pacts were designed, in part at least, to support countries in disputes with them.

Ambassador Makins said that several of the Pact countries had assumed the attitude that, having joined, they were being subjected to heavy criticism by the Soviets and others who opposed their membership. They therefore were asking themselves whether what they had obtained from membership outweighed this criticism and pressure. They have been impressed with the argument, often used, that non-Pact countries receive almost as much from the US as the members. The British Government had been particularly troubled by this attitude and had therefore instructed the Ambassador to convey to the Secretary certain specific proposals regarding measures which might be taken or announced at the Baghdad Pact Council meeting which would provide substantial encouragement to the other members. These would be included in the memorandum which he previously said would be sent to the Department later in the day.

The Secretary said he had received some indications that new orders for arms had been placed by Egypt in Czechoslovakia. Considering the limited absorptive capacity of Egypt, and the fact that orders obviously far exceed Egyptian requirements, he wondered to what use the arms would be put. He assumed that many would be passed on to other countries, such as Yemen. Receipt of additional quantities also rendered it possible for Egypt to declare as surplus their own Western arms which might be delivered to Saudi Arabia, the latter having indicated reluctance to obtain weapons from communist countries.

The Secretary noted that the communication handed to him by Ambassador Makins expressed doubt as to the wisdom of building up King Saud, suggesting that we should instead aim at a "front to protect Islam against communism." The view was expressed that in order to get King Saud to assume greater leadership in anti-communist policies it would appear imperative to play him up as a spiritual leader of Islam and, as such, encourage him to take the lead in making clear to the Arab world the dangers to Islam of communist penetration. It would seem that if we were to succeed in breaking King Saud away from Nasser, something along the lines of developing his prestige in the Arab world would have to be done. The Secretary thought that the word "front" appearing in the British paper connoted some sort of alliance, presumably between Saudi

Arabia, Iraq and possibly other Arab states. Since this is not now a practical possibility, perhaps the term "movement" would be more appropriate. The Ambassador agreed with the latter observation.

The Secretary commented that current developments in Libya seemed to be quite favorable. Aside from noting that we would be glad to endorse in the Ambassadorial Committee the suggestion in the British paper regarding arms to Israel, the Secretary said he had no further comments to make at this time on the communication.

Ambassador Makins said that an additional point which he wished to raise concerned military planning. He thought that we should of course move ahead with economic and political measures designed to accomplish our objectives in the area, but that at the same time military planning should be completed and held in reserve. He thought it unfortunate, although necessary, that the US must take the public position that military forces could not be employed in the area without Congressional approval,[6] since this gave disruptive elements considerable comfort. He realized, however, that little could be done about it in the circumstances.

Referring to the imminent departure to the Near East of the UN Secretary General,[7] Ambassador Makins said that he had hoped to try to instill in Mr. Hammarskjold more realism before he undertook his task. It appeared, however, that he would avoid Western capitals. In any event, Mr. Dixon would see him in New York and would have a frank talk with him. The Secretary said he would also ask Ambassador Lodge to meet with Mr. Hammarskjold. He observed that both the British and the US had told UN officials that if they wanted more observers, helicopters, equipment, or other forms of help, we would be glad to cooperate; it was surprising that no requests had been made. It appeared that they may be far less concerned than we. Perhaps their evaluation of the gravity of the situation was entirely different from our own.

The Secretary read to Ambassador Makins a proposed press announcement in connection with American representation at the forthcoming meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council.[8] Ambassador Makins thought the statement excellent and expressed pleasure that the US was sending such high representatives to the meeting.

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[6] See footnote 6, Document 240.

[7] U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld left for the Near East on April 6.

[8] Reference is to Department of State Press Release 180 of April 6. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 16, 1956, p. 637.

243. Letter From the British Ambassador (Makins) to Secretary of State Dulles [1]

Washington, April 5, 1956.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: I have had the following comments from Selwyn Lloyd on the views which you expressed to me about the Middle East during our conversation at your house on April 1. [2] Mr. Lloyd believes that our objective should be to agree [on] a general policy for the area and specific plans for each country, and he is glad to think that we are not far apart on the common issues.

However, he has some concern about the desire on the part of the United States Government to keep the extent of Anglo-American understanding and cooperation in this area secret because the result is that many people make the deduction that our policies are different. For instance, it is generally believed in Iraq that the United States is backing the Saudis against the Iraqis.

There will be no change in United Kingdom policy as a result of the impending talks with the Russians in London [3] but a discussion of Middle East questions will be inevitable and I shall shortly be letting you have, for your information, a summary of the line which the Prime Minister and Mr. Lloyd propose to take.

The following are comments on individual countries.

Egypt

We agree with the view which you expressed on April 1st to the effect that so far, Nasser had had it all his own way and that it had gone to his head and his leadership of the Arab world even extended to Central Africa. We think it is essential, without coming into the open in any way, that we should prove that it is unlucky to play with the Russians. If we could split off the Saudis and build up the Iraqis' position, this would in any case be all to the good and it might lead Nasser to have second thoughts. . . .

. . . . . .

We should not publicise this action, it will gradually reveal itself. . . . It will be generally a matter of keeping Nasser guessing about our intentions. We should do all we can to strengthen our policy and that of our friends in the area to counter his activities.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #2. Top Secret.

[2] See Document 232.

[3] Bulganin and Khrushchev visited the United Kingdom April 18–27.

But, at the same time, it would only arouse his suspicions if we took smilingly his recent propaganda campaign against us. Mr. Lloyd agrees with the view that negotiations with Nasser about the Aswan Dam should be allowed to languish and he welcomes the steps which you and the United States propose to take in relation to the allocation of surplus wheat and the C.A.R.E. operation.

I expect to receive some more detailed proposals in the near future for discussions with you.

Sudan

Mr Lloyd agrees that this is a key area. Our aim should be to keep the head waters of the Nile and the principal gateway into Central Africa free from Egyptian and Russian control. He also agrees that in this case, Her Majesty's Government should take the lead, but he is very glad to know that the United States stand ready to help. I expect to receive some suggestions shortly on this point also.

Saudi Arabia

Mr. Lloyd agrees that it is important to wean the Saudis away from their present alignment with Egypt, although they would not go so far as to wish to build King Saud up to the extent to which the United States Government may have in mind. He thinks we should aim at a "front to protect Islam against communism", which because of Nasser's involvement with the Russians would naturally be at odds with him and in which there would be room for both Iraq and Saudi Arabia (and others) without any one being necessarily paramount.

With regard to British relations with Saudi Arabia, I am asked to emphasize that Her Majesty's Government is as anxious to improve them as the United States Government is to see them improved, and that they realize the urgency of attempting to do so. Mr. Lloyd is glad to know that you do not rule out the alternative of postponing the Buraimi problem without a definite settlement. Buraimi is a particularly difficult matter for us and the only way in which we can cooperate over it is by seeking a long and measured negotiation covering all the outstanding problems accompanied, we would hope, by a gradual improvement in relations. Apart from Buraimi, there are numerous frontier matters and a number of other questions which have been at issue for some years, and if our relations are to become stable and friendly, a general settlement is desirable which would enable King Saud's face to be saved over Buraimi. This does not mean that Mr. Lloyd wishes to delay the opening of the talks. On the contrary, he believes that the sooner they begin the better. He therefore proposes to suggest to the Saudi

Government that a British mission should go to Riyadh before the end of the month, as a gesture and to re-establish effective contact between our two Governments. Its task would be to discuss with the Saudis the best way of initiating substantive talks. He would see what emerged from this meeting before deciding on the next stage. There are a number of possibilities, including a visit from the Saudi Foreign Minister to the U.K. I explained to you, on April 1st, the reasons for which Her Majesty's Government dislike the idea of a meeting in the near future of Foreign Ministers in New York.

Israel

Our policy is still to work for an Arab/Israel settlement, but since the prospect of this has now become remote, Her Majesty's Government think that we shall have to concentrate in the immediate future on keeping the peace in the present situation. We have of course supported the latest United States proposal to send the Secretary General of the United Nations to Palestine.[4]

As regards the supply of arms, you already know that Her Majesty's Government have agreed to release six Meteor night fighters and six Bofors A.A. guns to Israel. It is our intention to continue this trickle and we hope that it will be endorsed by the Ambassadorial Committee in Washington.

. . . . . .

Jordan

I confirm what I told you on April 1st. We are anxious to improve our relations with Jordan by making some use of the Anglo-Jordan Defence Board. Our policy is to support the King . . . . Her Majesty's Government are preparing against these eventualities.

Libya

Mr. Lloyd agrees that . . . we should not let the Libyans play us off against Russia and Egypt. But since we must expect both these countries to make serious efforts to undermine our important strategic positions there, we should take corresponding steps to maintain it. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dodds Parker is in Libya at the moment and I shall pass on to you any conclusions he may send about means for keeping Libya on our side. We also hope that the Libyan Prime Minister will visit London during the course of the summer.

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[4] See Document 206.

Meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact on April 12

I await your observations on Mr. Lloyd's message which I sent to you under cover of my letter of March 30. [5]

Yours sincerely,

Roger Makins

[5] In this letter, Lloyd expressed his hope that the United States would show support for the Baghdad Pact by appointing a special representative to attend the forthcoming meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council which was to begin in Tehran on April 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–3056)

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244. Memorandum of Conversations, New York, April 5, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Developments on the Johnston Plan

PARTICIPANTS

United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold
Ambassador Wadsworth, USUN
Mr. Norman Armour, USUN
Mr. James Ludlow, UNP

(Separate Conversations)

Mr. Fuad Ammoun, Secretary General of Lebanese Foreign Office
Mr. Edward Rizk, Lebanese Delegation to the United Nations
Mr. James Ludlow, UNP

Following the Security Council meeting yesterday afternoon we met with Mr. Hammarskjold at his request to brief him on the status of the Johnston Plan. He commenced the conversation by stating that he felt it important that he should know what were the most recent developments with regard to the Jordan Valley Plan. He assumed that despite his carefully circumscribed terms of reference for his forthcoming visit to the area, the Arabs would want to talk to him about the Plan. He said he already had proof of this likelihood since several Arab delegates (whom he did not name) were already putting forward to him the proposals (which Colonel Nasser has already mentioned in a recent talk with Ambassador

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/4–556. Confidential. Drafted by Ludlow.

Byroade). Under these proposals each individual state would merely agree to adopt those parts of the over-all water development plan which relate to it without reference to what Israel would get. He said that it was his opinion, and he had already expressed it to the Arabs, that this was an exceedingly clumsy way of putting the multi-nation plan into effect. He felt that it was important, however, to know precisely how far we had gotten in our discussions with the parties and what further we felt he should know.

I informed Mr. Hammarskjold that we had already ourselves heard of the proposals for the overlapping agreements and we agreed with him that there were serious objections to them. I said that at the time we had concluded our discussions last October we had gotten to the point where there was in effect virtual agreement as to the wording of the plan which on the one side the Arab states would sign, and by separate document the Israelis would sign. The extent of agreement was such at the time that there were nearly five pages of identical understanding with regard to water allocation, storage and the international control authority. Mr. Hammarskjold broke in to say that he found this very interesting information. He had not realized we had gotten so near to full understanding. I said that, as of the time we had decided to return to the United States in October, all the Arab technicians had been in full agreement that the plan was technically feasible and acceptable; that they understood all of the aspects of the problems which we had discussed with them. As for the Israelis, they also had fully understood what we had set forth. The only actual disagreement which had existed at that time of a technical nature related to a small difference on the water quantity and quality to be assigned to Israel and Jordan.

I then went on to point out that we were prepared on the shortest notice to consider with any of the parties any proposals of the technical or legal substance which the interested states might put forward. The qualification, however, was that the proposal should be new and not one which we had already explored with the parties and dismissed. I said that I felt that the counter-proposals he was most likely to face would relate to the nature of the control authority, and to the "high dam" for total storage on the Yarmuk River instead of partial storage in Lake Tiberias. We had already explored these ideas with the parties to the fullest extent and at the "less than political level" all had understood and accepted our views, namely: (1) The nature of the international control authority was such as to guarantee no contact between Israeli and Arab representatives either at signing or at any other subsequent time; (2) There was no known way of assuring full storage on the Yarmuk River on any sound economic basis.

Mr. Hammarskjold expressed appreciation for this information and asked if we had any knowledge as to what the attitudes of various governments were. I said that our present understanding of the attitudes of the governments led us to believe that the Jordanians still were very anxious to have the plan put into effect; that there was opposition to it in Jordan, but we were fairly confident that the King and some of the influential members of the cabinet favored the plan. As for Egypt, it continued to be our understanding that Colonel Nasser favored the plan and would push it if he felt the situation appropriate. The Syrian Government remained opposed to the plan despite Prime Minister Ghazzi's personal assurance to Ambassador Johnston last fall that given time he could get Syrian acceptance. As for Lebanon, it was my estimate that the present Prime Minister, Abdullah Yafi, and Emile Bustane were personally bitterly opposed to the plan. Mr. Hammarskjold indicated that his information coincided basically with what I had said.

Mr. Hammarskjold then went on to say that, as he had indicated while he had been at the Department last month, he felt that the problem of acceptance of the plan was a thoroughly political one. I said that we completely agreed. However, much of Ambassador Johnston's success out in the area, particularly in Jordan, had been based on the fact that the acceptance of the Jordan Valley Plan was a matter separable from other political problems confronting the Arab countries and it was of the utmost economic and humanitarian importance to the Arab countries. We hoped, therefore, that nothing would be done to undermine this position although we of course fully understood that the real stumbling block to acceptance was the Arab governments' political concern that acceptance might constitute a break in the refugee question. I said that in our discussions in the area without either our or the Arabs' saying so in so many words, we both knew of the political impact of acceptance and therefore the position which we had taken had been designed to help the Arab governments in overcoming their political problems. Mr. Hammarskjold said that it was most unrealistic of the Arabs to take this position. I agreed but said that if this were necessary, we were more than anxious to try to help. I then stressed again our earnest desire to pursue negotiations at any time that fruitful discussions could be had, but that we had no intention or desire to renegotiate what had already been explored.

I pointed out that we also desired to be of any assistance to him we could, should the matter be raised with him out in the area. I assumed, in conclusion, that he knew it was our intention that the facilities on the Arab side should be erected under arrangements worked out with UNRWA and we were, of course, thinking of his (the Secretary General's) future role when it came to the setting up

of the proposed neutral body to supervise the plan. Mr. Hammarskjold said that this role was a long way off. He thanked us for the information we had given.

In the course of our exchanging pleasantries in the delegates' lounge Tuesday afternoon,[2] Fuad Bey asked me when I would be returning to the Near East. I replied that I did not know, but I assumed that if for any reason Ambassador Johnston returned to that area to complete negotiations on the Jordan Valley Plan, I would accompany him. Fuad Bey looked a little sadder than usual and, shaking his head, said that he did not know when that would be because there were new plans that were being considered by his government and the other interested Arab states. I asked him if they were "new" and said if they were, of course we would be interested in knowing about them. He merely replied that we ought to talk further about them if we had a chance, and with that the conversation concluded. He seemed manifestly unhappy in referring to the "new plans".

[2] April 3.

245. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 5, 1956—5 p.m.

1037. Sharett called me to Jerusalem Wednesday [2] ostensibly to express "profound shock and disillusionment" with "let-down" contained in Secretary's [3] and Allen's [4] conferences with Eban and most urgently to plead for our unequivocal encouragement to Italy and Canada to release F–86's to GOI.

Sharett started conversation, which took form of long uninterrupted statement, of his reaction to conversations between Secretary and Allen with Eban, as well as reports of Secretary's press confer-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/4–656. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:32 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, and Ottawa.

[2] April 4.

[3] See Document 221.

[4] Memorandum of conversation between Allen and Eban, March 30, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–3056)

ence of April 3,[5] by stating, "I must consider the matter a closed chapter". (Later I made it amply clear that US Government does not regard situation now as "closed chapter"; it continues to reassess its Near East policies as necessitated by trend of events and that connection is giving consideration to Israel's application for arms, but it has not yet completed this reassessment. I then asked him why he considered it a "closed chapter" after exactly 5 months—why not, for example, after 6 months. His reply was that US had matter long enough under consideration and that Israel was no longer to suffer indignity of begging without any firm decision. He saw no reason to entertain further hope that US would change its mind.)

Sharett proceeded to read summary of statements by President and Secretary, conversations held with Eban in Department and a sequence of events which gave GOI reasons, in his mind, to be hopeful of favorable decision by US. He spoke for hour and quarter from most elaborate notes he has ever used with me. Principal points he made follow:

(1) He reviewed all steps in Israel's negotiations from time of his first conversation with Secretary in Europe[6] to document his contention that while US had never made definite promise, there had been consistent expression willingness to "give sympathetic consideration to Israel's arms application", and US had never given Israel solid reason to believe final answer would not be favorable. He laid particular stress on Secretary's conversation with Eban March 2[7] before former's departure for Karachi and President's March 14 press conference statement that neither he nor Secretary had said arms would not be furnished to Israel but US hoped for better solution.[8] Against such background Secretary's position as revealed March 28[9] had had shattering effect.

(2) After Secretary appeared before Senate Foreign Relations Committee,[10] GOI had been forced to debate implications his testimony in Knesset. He had said that if certain of Secretary's statements in that testimony finally crystallized as US policy, he could only conclude US was willing to abandon Israel to its fate. He said he thought that position had been finally reached and that "we are not experiencing grave crisis of confidence."

(3) He questioned US policy of refusing for 5 full months to answer "yes or no". On those occasions in that period when Israel

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[5] For the transcript of the Secretary's press conference of April 3, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 16, 1956, p. 638.

[6] See Secto 38, vol. XIV, p. 657.

[7] See Document 151.

[8] For the transcript of the President's press conference on March 14, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956*, pp. 301–313.

[9] See Document 221.

[10] Reference is to Dulles' testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 24. For text of his prepared statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 5, 1956, p. 368.

attempted to interpret US statements as negative decision on arms, she was told with "some indignation" that reply was nothing of the sort.

(4) Sharett referred to restrained tone of Israeli press which he implied might be attributed in part to public statements of confidence in US policy made here in last few days by Goldmann and Silver. He said he had no knowledge of source of inspiration from which they spoke. GOI itself had issued no press statements and had inspired no editorials since March 28. Prime Minister himself had said development must be most carefully studied and in meantime GOI should refrain from conjuring up open dispute.

(5) Secretary and Allen had mentioned to Eban possibility of help from Italy and Canada. He said both countries were very good friends and Italy in particular for commercial reasons was most anxious to sell planes. Both would certainly ask what was US itself doing. What moral force did US feel it could bring to bear on other governments to supply arms to Israel when US itself was unable to blaze trail.

He questioned any implied credit for US as initiator of Mystere deal action. GOI, he said, was grateful to US for delivery of Mysteres but US had nothing whatsoever to do with generation of "political will" in France to make planes available. Once that will was generated US assistance was most helpful but purely secondary. It was a French gift, not one for which US could claim major credit.

As to US encouragement of other suppliers of arms, he said planes are actually US planes and it required only decision in principle by US conveyed to other governments, particularly Italy, to enable GOI to obtain minimum requirements in supersonic jets.

On strength of references in Secretary's conversation, he said he had already instructed Israel Embassies Ottawa and Rome to make requests to their government. Ottawa interview had been held this very day (Wednesday) and he hoped for answer momentarily. If US had in fact told these governments to make planes available to Israel, he would soon have clear proof in form of affirmative replies.

He hinted and an aide later bluntly promised that they would pledge absolute secrecy and adopt any public attitude we desired on our part in arms transaction if we would only make sure that Italy and Canada clearly understood US wanted Israel to have aircraft. Ultimate Israel public position could be one of censure of US failure to participate or one of praise for opening other doors to them, as we might desire. Important thing was arms.

Comment: Converse of this could be, I think, that Israel would make clear by all propaganda instruments at their command that in their view US Government has categorically and finally denied arms to Israel despite her desperate straits, thus laying foundation for campaign to bring whatever moral pressure they may be able to arouse in US and elsewhere to bear against US. Sharett referred time

and again to restraint his government has exercised in public dealing with arms issue, hinting, I suppose, that there was little reason to continue this policy in face of US indifference. *End comment.*

I made point that it was quite reasonable to believe US position vis-à-vis Arabs was different from that of other countries in position to supply Israel with arms; that we felt we had measure of influence and maneuverability in Arab countries and did not wish to jeopardize that position; that it seemed more advisable for other and traditional sources to be relied upon for supply of arms at this time.

Although he had not mentioned it, I asked if Department had not explained to Eban the distinction we drew between arms to Israel from US sources and arms from allies of the US. Sharett replied Eban had been informed US thought it undesirable to split area into two pieces, Arabs receiving arms from one side and Israel from US. He pointed out Iraq is getting arms from US and so is Saudi Arabia. Neither one of them would boycott US arms if some were simultaneously supplied to Israel. He referred to tanks to Saudi Arabia, commenting that that was package in which something for Israel could also have been wrapped. Regarding his persistent reference to lack of positive action by US to encourage other countries to supply arms, I said that while it is true Secretary made no commitment to Eban as to US positive recommendation, he had made it clear that we would not look with disfavor upon such transactions. Furthermore, as Sharett had already mentioned to me "Secretary Dulles spoke to Pearson, Foreign Minister for Canada".[11] This appeared to me to be very positive step right along lines that Sharett had suggested. He admitted this to be the case, but thought that action might be immediately countered by objections in Canadian Parliament on grounds that US itself had supplied no arms to Israel.

At this point I emphasized importance of possibility US Government might be able do more along this line be matter utmost secrecy. In this connection I suggested that GOI should not attempt interpret purely speculative stories or even press conference replies to questions as statement of US policy. He agreed and said GOI prepared to contribute to such secrecy—what it wanted was arms.

Lawson

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[11] See Document 227.

246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, April 5, 1956—7:07 p.m.

5881. Eyes only for Ambassador. For your information only text of letter from President to Eden follows. For reasons of urgency letter was given to British Embassy Washington for transmission rather than through normal channel of London Embassy. Importance was emphasized to British Embassy of most careful secure handling to prevent leak.

Begin text. Personal and Confidential April 5, 1956

Dear Anthony: When you were here we mentioned the forthcoming visit to London of our Russian friends, and you were good enough to say that if I had any suggestions to make, you would be glad if I would drop you a line on the subject. I have been giving this matter some thought, but I believe your thinking and mine are so close together on the matters that are likely to come up that any suggestions from me would be superfluous.

Of course, at the back of our minds must be the very grave threat in the Middle East. We are, I think, both of us fully alive to what this could do to the well-being and indeed safety of Western Europe, and most particularly the United Kingdom. Whether or not you bring that up must be for you to decide in light of the circumstances. I fully agree with you that we should not be acquiescent in any measure which would give the Bear's claws a grip on the production or transportation of the oil which is so vital to the defense and economy of the Western world.

I shall be following your encounter with intense interest, and I hope that it will result in awareness on the part of the Russians of the dangerous nature of the game they seem to be playing.

As ever, DE. *End text.*

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6141/4–556. Confidential; Priority. On April 4, Dulles sent the text of this message to Eisenhower with the recommendation that he approve its transmission to Eden. (Memorandum from Dulles to Eisenhower, April 4; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)

247. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, April 6, 1956—1 a.m.

397. Serious incidents Gaza area and related developments report in this and immediately following Niact telegrams.

Following is substance UNTSO report UNHQ April 5 incidents Gaza area on April 4 and 5. On April 4 Israeli MAC delegation alleged that at 1300 local time an Israeli army patrol came under machine gun and light mortar fire in Nuseirat area. Two Israeli killed and third has died of wounds. Reinforcements sent to scene were able evacuate dead and wounded by heavy firing.

At 1245 local time April 4 (according to statement of Egyptian delegate) Israeli position in Deir El Balla area (MR 942905) opened automatic fire on Egyptian position which lasted until 1700 hours. One Egyptian soldier killed. In a second complaint Egyptians claimed that at 1820 hours artillery fire was directed at Egyptian controlled territory. 38 shells said to have landed in Deir El Balla village and vicinity.

Four more complaints were lodged by Israelis, one alleging that unexploded mine was found, three alleging firing across D/L by Egyptian position at Israeli patrols.

Only results investigation concerned second Egyptian complaint. Observer found 48 impacts in Deir El Balla village and vicinity and some noses of 25 pounder shells. On April 5 at 1320 local time shelling began in vicinity hill 86 at MR 892878 in Egyptian territory. At 1520 observer stationed in observation post reported concentrated shelling of Deir El Balla village. At 1639 mortar shells reportedly landing Gaza town. Several casualties were reported there together with firing on several places along D/L, with mortar shells landing Gaza main street. MAC chairman requested both parties order immediate cease-fire. At 1714 heavy firing still heard south of Gaza. Chairman estimated some 8 mortar shells landed in Gaza town. At 1928 he again requested cease-fire effective 2000 local time. Later reported all quiet.

Colonel Hommel of UNTSO informed me at 2300 April 5 that according Egyptian statement 42 persons killed in Gaza, of whom 17 were children. In addition 102 reportedly wounded. These figures

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–656. Official Use Only; Niact. Received at 11:18 p.m., April 5. Repeated priority to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, and Tel Aviv.

not confirmed, but Hommel expects further record from MAC chairman very shortly. [2]

Cole

[2] Cole reported that afternoon that Colonel Hommel of UNTSO had informed him that the Egyptians, as of 11 a.m., were claiming that the Israelis' bombardment had killed 46 civilians and had injured 104. Cole also observed that "firing on civilians in Gaza town and in villages appears represent departure more recent Israeli policy of confining retaliation efforts to members armed forces and is evidently largest attack directed against civilian population since Qibya incident. Unclear why Israelis have chosen present moment for this large-scale 'retaliation'." (Telegram 400 from Jerusalem, April 6; *ibid.*)

Cole later reported that the latest UNTSO figures of Egyptian casualties showed that 55 civilians had died and 102 had been wounded, and that 1 soldier had been killed and 4 had been wounded. Verified Israeli casualties totaled 4 civilians and 2 soldiers wounded. (Telegram 401 from Jerusalem, April 6; *ibid.*)

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248. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, April 6, 1956—1 a.m.

398. With reference incidents Consulate General telegram 397. [2] General Burns has informed me of developments summarized herewith.

On afternoon April 5 Burns received letter from Sharett with request he call on Sharett at 1700 local time. Letter stated: "I write to ask you whether you can see any justification whatsoever for opening of machine gun and mortar fire by Egyptians from entrenched and fortified positions on a regular Israel patrol moving perfectly inoffensively on foot along its usual beat on the Israel side of the armistice line? You will be aware that this blatantly aggressive action yesterday cost us three young lives and that it was only by the use of artillery fire that we were able to extricate the surviving members of patrol from what had become a death trap. I should appreciate being informed as to what steps you contemplate taking in order to prevail upon Egypt to put an immediate end to this murderous and monstrously provocative behavior".

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–656. Confidential; Niact. Received at 12:28 a.m. Repeated priority to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, and Tel Aviv.

[2] *Supra.*

During Burns' call Sharett made these points: (1) Israel must reserve full freedom of action in self defense for security of settlements and for protection life its soldiers although she does not wish situation to deteriorate further. (2) Responsibility must be imputed directly to Egyptian Premier by UN for not issuing over-all cease-fire order, in absence of which Israel holds GOE, and especially its head, responsible for situation. (3) UN must warn GOE of grave consequences which may be result her behavior.

Burns informed Sharett that he would transmit gist of above to UN headquarters since he thought warning had best come from UNSYG. Sharett indicated that he wished warning to come from UN rather than from Israel. He said he had "approached no foreign diplomats" and pointed out that governments he usually approached about such matters seemed to have little influence in Cairo at the present time. Burns added that nevertheless he intended informing the local representatives of the three governments particularly interested in Sharett's views as well as UN Headquarters.

In presenting above to UN Headquarters Burns stated that a serious situation now exists with respect Gaza area including exchanges artillery and mortar fire. He has requested both parties declare cease-fire from midnight April 5 if the cease-fire already requested by the MAC chairman should not have become effective before that time. Text of Burns' call for cease-fire is in substance as follows: of utmost importance that situation along D/L be brought under control immediately and that firing across D/L be stopped. Unnecessary stress gravity situation which may develop unless parties exercise firmest control their troops. Unless efforts MAC chairman effective earlier Burns requests parties issue orders for complete cease-fire effective from midnight April 5 and insure their execution. [3]

Cole

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[3] In his next telegram, Cole reported that the situation in the Gaza area had evolved as follows:

"Firing in progress morning April 6 southeast of Gaza consisting Israeli mortar fire against Egyptian position. MAC Chairman has again called for cease-fire and Burns has been in contact with Eytan same purpose. Burns expressed fears firing may again become widespread unless appeals heeded without delay. He described situation in Gaza town as bad. Crowds have formed and their attitude is threatening. As result, observers unable investigate Egyptian reports of casualties said to total 42 killed and 102 wounded. Pending verification, Burns thought these figures should be viewed with reserve." (Telegram 399 from Jerusalem, April 6; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–656)

249. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, April 6, 1956, 8:30 a.m. [1]

[Here follows discussion of prospective ambassadorial appointments; the President's forthcoming address at the annual dinner of the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 21; and the appointment of Joseph M. Dodge, Special Assistant to the President, to undertake negotiations with the British about multilateral restrictions on trade with Communist bloc nations.]

4. I told the President that I would want at a later date to have a meeting with him and some of the appropriate Cabinet officers and Sherman Adams with reference to the political aspects of the Arab-Israel problem. The President reaffirmed that he did not want to be dominated here by local political considerations. As in the case of the Farm Bill, [2] he wanted to do what he thought was best for the country and if this resulted in his not being reelected, that was all right with him.

We then went into a general discussion of the status of our program. I said I had spent Easter Sunday afternoon outlining our views to Sir Roger Makins [3] and that yesterday I had received the reactions of the United Kingdom Government [4] which, in the main, were favorable, although it looked as though Buraimi would be a sticking point.

The President said he thought the advantages the British would gain in other respects were so great that they should be willing to make a sacrifice here. He again emphasized the importance of splitting Saudi-Arabia from Egypt.

I spoke of the possibility of arms (planes) in escrow for Arabs-Israelis. The President thought this was an interesting idea but raised the question of whether or not we could be sure who was the aggressor. I said this would be difficult under certain circumstances but perhaps not difficult under other circumstances. I referred to a UN Resolution that a state which invaded another would be deemed an aggressor unless it returned to its borders within 24 hours. [5] The

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

[2] Reference is presumably to H.R. 12, designated the "Agricultural Act of 1956", which the President vetoed on April 16.

[3] See Document 232.

[4] See Documents 242 and 243.

[5] Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 378 (V) entitled "Duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities". The General Assembly adopted this measure at its 308th plenary meeting on November 17, 1950. For text, see U.N. doc. A/1775.

President thought this might not be realistic in terms of the Arab-Israel situation where if Israel was attacked from the air, the Israeli Army might try to wipe out the Egyptian Army by land.

JFD

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250. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Canadian Ambassador (Heeney) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant), Department of State, Washington, April 6, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Canadian Sale of Planes to Israel

The Ambassador asked if there were a decision on our view of the proposed sale of 24 of the latest F–86 model to Israel, [2] for which Mr. Pearson had asked when he saw the Secretary on March 28. [3] The Ambassador said the Canadian Government would be reluctant to approve the sale unless the U.S. also were supplying defensive arms to Israel such as, for example, anti-aircraft guns. He emphasized that the Canadians were not seeking our approval for export which they wished to make. They had not yet made a decision. He mentioned that his Embassy had consulted MC in the usual way but he wished to discuss the particularly delicate political issues with Mr. Merchant.

Mr Merchant said the Canadian problem had been discussed with Mr. Allen and the Secretary. Our position was that it was of course a Canadian Government decision, but that we had no objection to the proposed sale. If questioned publicly in the event the sale were made, we would say that we were in constant touch with the Canadian Government on such matters, that this sale had been included in such consultations and that we had interposed no

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/4–656. Secret. Drafted by Horsey.

[2] According to Merchant's memorandum of a conversation, Ambassador Heeney on April 4 informed Merchant that "the Canadian Government has now received an urgent request from the Israelis to supply 24 F–86's . . . and are pressing for an answer." Merchant informed Heeney that he "was hopeful that I [Merchant] might be able to transmit to him a reply when he comes in to see me on another matter on Friday [April 6]". (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Memos, etc. from March 24, 1956 to April 23, 1956)

[3] See Document 227.

objection. As to our selling Israel defensive arms, Mr. Merchant told the Ambassador that it was not excluded that we might do this but that no decision to do so had been made as of today.

The Ambassador expressed appreciation for this information. He asked Mr. Merchant to tell the Secretary that, in these circumstances, his personal opinion was that the Canadian Cabinet would decide not to approve the proposed sale.

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251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France [1]

Washington, April 6, 1956—5:29 p.m.

3695. Paris pass USRO. Dept has informed UK and French Ambassadors that Secretary strongly opposed tripartite meeting on Middle East prior NATO Ministerial Meeting [2] for following reasons: 1) Specific mention ME likely result pressure by Italians, Turks and perhaps other NATO members for inclusion, 2) Any tripartite meeting prior NATO meeting runs risk being interpreted by other NATO nations as effort by three powers reach prior agreed decisions on matters of interest to NATO and hence as prejudicial to NATO Ministerial consultations. However, in accordance usual custom at international conferences, Secretary agreeable tripartite meeting not specifically pinpointed Middle East and to be held after NATO Ministerial Meeting. Morning May 6 suggested. In addition, Secretary would see Pineau afternoon May 2 and Selwyn Lloyd May 3.

British and French also informed we desire no press announcement re tripartite meeting. In event press inquiries, we would reply that in accordance usual practice at international conferences, three Foreign Ministers will undoubtedly find occasion to get together to discuss matters of mutual interest and common concern.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–656. Secret. Drafted by Palmer and approved by MacArthur who signed for Dulles. Also transmitted to London.

[2] The NATO Ministerial Meetings were held in Paris on May 4 and 5. According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, he left Washington on May 1 and returned on May 7. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

UK Ambassador has already informed Dept foregoing arrangements agreeable with London. French Ambassador thought they were reasonable and promised report them Paris.

Dulles

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252. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 6, 1956—5 p.m.

1996. Saw Nasser yesterday for long, general discussion subsequent to my talk with Fawzi (Embassy telegram 1989 [2]). Had this week taken steps to see that Nasser received through other sources the same general impressions my general concern as given to Fawzi. Believe this line has had effect upon him and is at least partly responsible for new upturn here in United States-Egyptian relations.

Nasser stated that he concerned I felt Government of Egypt getting such bad reputation abroad and wished to discuss all possible means of remedy. He talked a great deal about the psychological nature of the problems in this area, stating that he had not changed the nature of his thinking on any important aspect since we first came to know him in 1952. He referred often to his own book on "The Philosophy of the Revolution" and to his talk with the Secretary here in 1953. [3] Said he remembered we took record of what he said and wondered whether Secretary would have time to reread that transcript. He felt no differently about the United States and wanted to be friends.

He would like to be friends with the British also, but they were now treating him publicly as an enemy. This was a deliberate plan on part of British. He had collected all newspaper filings of British press reporters here and was certain they were being deliberately briefed to be hostile by British Embassy. The charges that were being hurled at him from London were the same as those that were

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/4–656. Secret; Priority. Received at 1 a.m., April 7. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and London.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 774.5–MSP/4–656)

[3] Dulles and Nasser met on May 12, 1953, at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. For the memorandum of this conversation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 19.

in those reports. He had told press here that they not go on general anti-British campaign but were to throw back at the British every breath of propaganda used by British against Egypt. He is certain that British felt they could intimidate him by this method, but they were wrong. Their propaganda against him was doing two things: It was raising his prestige in Arab World, and it was giving him material to analyze and throw back at them.

Rather than proceeding as direct advocate of British, I talked at length of indivisibility of certain interests between the British and ourselves in this area: access by the West to Middle East oil was no less vital from a security viewpoint to the United States than to the United Kingdom. Furthermore, any disruptive efforts against British oil interests directly affected United States, as contrary to popular impression, over 50 per cent of Middle East oil holdings were American owned. Did he know, for instance, Bahrein oil interests were 100 per cent American owned? This surprised him greatly, as I thought it would. Left with him chart showing extent of American holdings in Middle East.

One example of extent to which things have gone was when he referred to case of 61 drilling leases which have been pending with Socony–Shell combination for many months and on which have been trying to exert some favorable influence. He said he would not give Shell any more leases while Britain was treating him as an enemy. If Socony wished them all, he would finalize the deal immediately. I countered by saying that if Britain was so concerned, it might well be they feared Nasser might eventually move against their oil holdings. This would be a good opportunity for him to prove his intentions. He reaffirmed he had not thought of trying to see Middle East oil denied to Britain, but he would not make any additional agreement of his own with them in the face of their present public attitude. I turned to the question of Soviet influence. Said I believed reassessment in Western world only logical. After analyzing reasons for his arms deal with Soviet Bloc, we had determined to go ahead in constructive manner, although this had not been easy. We had evidenced our willingness to assist on High Dam, and we had withheld arms from Israel for six months which had not been easy for us. Our policy approach had been based upon hope that arms deal would in fact be limited to commercial proposition. Now, however, Western world saw great increase in Soviet Bloc trade and cultural missions and saw an increasing press enthusiasm over Egyptian-Soviet Bloc relations.

Repeated to Nasser as I had to Fawzi my speculation as to Soviet approach to this area (Embassy telegram 1989). He nodded his head in agreement with all my stipulations until I came to Soviet price which was that there should be anti-West campaign. This he

denied saying they had never mentioned any such thing. I said speculation existed there might be agreement between Egypt and Russia to this effect. This he emphatically denied. He said again we should get to the root of the difficulty.

His basic philosophy as always was still one of full independence for Egypt, protection from the Israeli threat, and economic progress for his country. Russia was actively helping in both of the latter. Russia had helped him with arms when he sorely needed them and could not get them, at least in sufficient quantity, from West. Russia was offering attractive economic propositions to area and was smart enough to ask for no political strings. Their prices were cheap and it was possible to trade Egyptian products for theirs. Did I think he should refuse trade missions under these conditions? He had had every delegation here under the closest scrutiny. They talked business and were all smiles and politeness. They never committed mistake of conducting propaganda or asking for anti-Western action.

Questioned him closely as to whether he was really aware of daily acts in his ministries which gave impression that there were political motives behind trend toward more business with East. I knew for instance that one large importer of American goods in Egypt had been closely questioned by intelligence types about his friendship for America and reliance on American products. Nasser said there no reason any officer should consider business trends from a political point of view and he would have this matter investigated. However to understand problem we must again go to its roots. They had recently had Cabinet discussion on business trends and they were in impossible position regarding United States imports. He mentioned 9 million export balance to United States as against 21 million import. They simply had to curtail United States imports because of their dollar position. He did not like this but could not change the facts. Perhaps if we analyzed the problem together we might find some answer.

As regards the charges against him Nasser said he had no plan to try to assume leadership of the area. He was superstitious in that regard and considered anyone who planned such achievement would fail. He was not committing acts against us in other Arab States as we assumed although he felt we working against him in certain instances. He regretted reputation of interference in other's affairs and volunteered that he knew, for example, he accused of using Egypt's many teachers throughout Arab world for this purpose. He felt such activities would only react against Egypt and him and that these people, including some 200 in Iraq, had received specific orders not to engage in political activities of any kind. He did not say when these orders were issued but I am inclined to think recently.

Nasser at end said we should spend more time together and go through everything of any interest our two governments. He said I will answer honestly any questions that you ask. I will tell you completely of any policy Egypt has that you might be interested in. I am not afraid to do this with you and America because I know you will not misuse it against me. Our problem is not one of hostility but one of misunderstanding.

Regardless of inability give adequate picture of such diverse conversation believe this week's operation culminating in this conversation has had some effect. He asked that I see him again next week. Unless instructed to contrary believe I should do so as the image held before Nasser as to how others sometimes see him probably good. Certainly he does not get it from his own people and British relations are such here that I doubt he will receive Trevelyan for a long time. If Department questions this approach please remember Nasser is after all an Arab. His understanding of my approach which hasn't been necessary for me to put to him in words is probably this. "I have explained your position and defended you as a friend. I now wonder where you are taking us both." I believe he wants to try to reply to me to best of his ability and may be more susceptible now to influence than at any time since I have been here.[4]

Byroade

[4] The Department responded on April 12, informing Byroade that it approved "emphasis you have placed in talks with Fawzi and Nasser on concern generated in US by Egyptian policies. . . . We agree further discussions with Nasser could serve useful purpose but believe you should leave initiative to him. We think logic of events likely be more persuasive in inducing sincere desire on Nasser's part to change his present policies than specific suggestions from US at this time. We also believe you will want to avoid playing up importance of Nasser to us or desire on our part to work in collaboration with him on area policies." (Telegram 2484 to Cairo, April 12; Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/4–656)

253. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 6, 1956—11 p.m.

1048. At my request (Embtel 1046 [2]) Foreign Minister Sharett received me in Tel Aviv afternoon April 6. I opened conversation by explaining that I was calling on my own initiative because of the recent outbreak, in order to stress the critical importance of strict cease-fire observance and to emphasize US interest in cooperation with General Burns of both sides. I added that I also wished to obtain information, and particularly his appraisal of events.

Sharett thanked me for this interest, and proceeded to review episodes of April 5 and GOI latest contacts with General Burns re cease-fire.

His rationale followed outline Foreign Ministry statement included Embtel 1039. [3] He examined bona fides of explanations and proposals of Nasser on subject of firing on patrols as follows:

1. Nasser's earlier explanation he could not order no firing across border by his troops and that firing performed only on IDF vehicle patrols because of natural fear his forces these patrols were in act of launching attack was "rabid nonsense." No soldiers in right mind would initiate attack across open country openly exposed in vehicles. Furthermore most IDF patrols were on foot, and Egyptians have now crystallized standard practice of firing on them. Such fire also not limited to patrols but directed at fixed observation points from which attack could not be expected. Thus Nasser's explanation completely nullified.

2. Nasser's conclusion this context that forces should be withdrawn 500 meters from line was based on present disposition Egyptian forces, since their outposts are situated about 500 meters from border. Nasser therefore could "implement plan" with no change his system, whereas Israelis would have make substantial alterations.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–656. Secret; Priority. Received at 1:20 p.m., April 7. Repeated to Cairo, Paris, London, Amman, Beirut, and Damascus.

[2] Lawson advised the Department in telegram 1046, April 6, that an Israeli Foreign Ministry official had informed the Embassy that the Egyptians had broken the previous evening's cease-fire with an attack on an IDF patrol near Kissufim at approximately 8 a.m. that morning. As a result, intensive firing had developed in the area but had stopped by 9:15 a.m. Due to the gravity of the situation in general and because of this disruption of the cease-fire in particular, Lawson had asked Sharett for an appointment that afternoon to stress to him the importance of Israel's observing the cease-fire. (*Ibid.*)

[3] On April 5, an Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman issued a statement that accused Egypt of repeatedly harassing Israel's border without provocation and explained that the subsequent Israeli return of fire on April 5 was "imperative and unavoidable." (Telegram 1039 from Tel Aviv, April 6; *ibid.*)

After dwelling at some length on lone experience of almost daily firing on Israeli patrols which fortunately produced no casualties, and then underscoring April 4 incident which 3 young soldiers killed by Egyptian mortar and machine gun fire, he gave detailed timetable of separate incidents April 5. Sharett said Egyptians opened fire on Israel settlements for first time with mortars at 1500 hours. IDF returned artillery fire to silence outposts issuing mortar fire. Meantime Egyptians extended front by firing on other Kibbutzim. Since IDF artillery bombardment Egyptian outposts failed stop their fire, "at 5 p.m., we directed fire at their villages".

Commenting on April 4 meeting with Burns, Sharett repeated substantially same account as in Jerusalem 398 to Department [4] but made several amplifications. He felt it would not break confidence to reveal that in response to Sharett's questions concerning large number Israeli complaints submitted on firing across line, General Burns replied that he felt in general GOI complaints were justified, although he might have differences on details. When in past General Burns had proposed "palliative measures" to calm border he did so with assumption both sides wanted to cooperate. He now no longer assumed other side was interested.

The Burns–Sharett chat was interrupted by phone call Chairman Egyptian MAC demanding GOI stop fire. General Burns proposed midnight as cease-fire deadline, Sharett communicated this to Ben Gurion, and "Ben Gurion had already given orders to stop fire, purpose testing Egyptian reaction." Sharett added this was at dusk.

April 6 General Burns made special request to Israelis temporarily to suspend patrolling, with understanding this would only be extraordinary temporary measure not to be considered precedential. Ben Gurion agreed to this as measure cooperative action and in view of Hammarskjold's visit to area and as quid pro quo for Secretary General to endeavor obtain Egyptian consent to issue orders no firing across borders. Sharett commented this was not easy decision for Ben Gurion since "it prejudices our position and gives appearance of yielding under pressure criminal violence". In reply my question as to time limitation this agreement he indicated no specific time but in nature few days trial. Sharett said he had recommended as agenda for Secretary General in order decreasing importance:

1. He endeavor secure complete cease-fire covering all surrounding countries (Sharett especially feared Jordan this respect and cited March 30 Wadi Ara ambush).
2. Obtain reduction forces in defensive zones to conformity with GAA provisions.

[4] Document 248.

3. Obtain complete observance all details GAA. Sharett commented Arab States are now expressing negative view they do not wish anything added to area guarantees beyond GAA. GOI desires that GAA at least be rigidly observed, whether or not supplemented by additional arrangements.

I expressed gratification at GOI agreement to General Burns proposal to withdraw patrols and cease-fire, and disposition to work closely with General Burns these critical times. Sharett said he was grateful for my call and pleased to discuss situation.

Comment: Sharett appeared relatively relaxed at interview, and although he mentioned resumption of firing this morning he did not magnify it into portending further deterioration. He seemed anxious to underline basic and continuous provocations which took form of Egyptian firing on foot patrols ultimately resulting Israeli mortalities and especially to point up fact Egypt first shelled Israeli villages before IDF turned artillery fire from Egyptian gun positions to Egyptian villages. Although not specifically gained at interview my impression is that GOI regards reported heavy loss Arab life as retaliation enough and are not planning any further specific moves. Attitude now is probably "wait and see" to judge nature and magnitude Egyptian response, which Israelis believe may be in form Fedayeen (Embtel 1047 [5]). There also some speculation as to ability or desire Egypt to control highly excited Gaza refugees.

Although slight mobilization civilian trucks observed today, there has been no large scale action discernible. Foreign Office informs me "all quiet" Gaza front as of 1800 hours tonight.

Lawson

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[5] Lawson informed the Department in telegram 1047, April 6, that in the course of this conversation, Sharett claimed that Nasser had ordered a renewal of Fedayeen attacks, but that the raids were to come from other Arab countries, especially Jordan, rather than from Gaza or Egypt. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–656)

254. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, April 7, 1956—noon.

402. On evening April 6 Burns gave me comments along following lines expressing his opinions most recent Gaza incidents (ConGen telegram 401 [2] and previous). The Egyptians were clearly in the wrong during earlier stages. Burns had warned them on various occasions against promiscuous shooting across border, stating that such actions would doubtless at some point evoke vigorous and, for them, troublesome Israeli reaction. He had expressed this view at least five different times recently, either to Gohar, Amer, or Nasser. Arguments they had given him to effect that Egyptian posts must be allowed fire their discretion owing fear of attack by approaching Israeli patrols (whether or not actually across D/L) were not valid since Egyptians had also continued firing at Israelis in fixed positions, despite Amer's assurance to Burns that he would have this practice stopped. He considered Egyptians themselves responsible for initiating latest spiral of incidents and reprisals.

While Israelis initially had strong case against Egyptians they had later thrown it away, ... Burns did not believe Israeli slaughter of civilians on this occasion was result any high-level policy decision. He considered the Israelis had simply blundered into the situation through their eagerness retaliate, presumably in accordance with standing orders. Thus, original Egyptian firing at patrol and killing three soldiers had evolved into series retaliations and counter-retaliations, included exchanges fire against villages, which had culminated in unfortunate mortaring of Gaza town. Owing to population concentrated in Gaza latter action was not at all analogous to shelling of frontier Kibbutz in open country, for instance, although Israeli military personnel may not have borne such fine distinctions very clearly in mind at the time. With regard hit on Baptist Hospital, Burns said it was not clear that hospital itself was directly involved. He understood it was possibly annex to hospital in some other building which was hit. Although there was some small arms fire this morning situation believed generally quiet. Civil population Gaza reported under control. Curfew lifted this morning until 1600 hours local time today.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–756. Limited Official Use; Priority. Received at 12:01 p.m. Repeated priority to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 247.

If things remain quiet Burns expects proceed Rome April 8.

Cole

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255. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 8, 1956—4 p.m.

1051. Re Embtel 1050. [2] Spontaneous Fedayeen attacks by Egyptians exceed in recklessness incidence and results the August 1955 series, which as opposed last night previous assaults were 1–3 per night and limited obscure and "safe" target areas such as isolated orange groves. Present raids achieved "deep penetration" first night at Achuzam and Nitsanim. GOI accurately forecast timing of tactic (Embtel 1049 [3]), but so far contrary to prediction most raiders seem to have come from Strip instead of Jordan (although Achuzam is closer to Jordan).

Possibility Israel reaction as well as timing and magnitude probably depends on whether raids continue tonight and subsequently. If tempo and casualty rate of attacks remain constant, let alone increase, situation may well deteriorate very rapidly to same stage extreme crisis as before Khan Yunis [4] and additional other complicating factor is continuation Egyptian firing across border which Israelis combine with Fedayeen outbreak as clear evidence Egyptian intention non-observance of cease-fire. In view Sharett's emphasis obtaining cease-fire as first task for Hammarskjold (Embtel 1048 [5]), and his frequent references serious attitude toward Fedayeen

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–856. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:35 p.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, London, and Paris. Passed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

[2] Lawson informed the Department that "April 7 at 2330 hours Tekoah of FonMin advised Emb officer of resumption heavy Fedayeen attacks generally emanating from Gaza Strip . . . . Known attacks numbered 13 and were directed at individual houses, kibbutz installations, army vehicles, civilian cars and pedestrians." (Telegram 1050 from Tel Aviv, April 8; *ibid.*)

[3] Lawson reported in telegram 1049, April 7, that according to the IDF Foreign Liaison Officer, the Israeli Government had "most definite information that Nasser had ordered Fedayeen activity to begin immediately." (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/4–756)

[4] See vol. XIV, footnote 3, p 438.

[5] Document 253.

terrorist activities, Israelis certain actively to push their interpretation of Fedayeen raids constituting violation both GAA and cease-fire.

Meanwhile, sharp and critical build-up of public apprehension and intensive consideration by GOI and IDF re effective positive means of meeting Israel's almost defenseless position against Fedayeen action will continue. However, no apparent change in mobilization situation as yet.

Lawson

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256. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, April 8, 1956—8 p.m.

404. Reference ConGentel 403.[2] Burns saw Ben Gurion at 4 o'clock this afternoon. He met with British Consul General [3] and myself thereafter and gave us following account interview.

Burns found Ben Gurion in a reasonable frame of mind and stated that he had nothing especial to add to letter he had sent Ben Gurion this morning. Letter pointed out that Burns had protested Fedayeen activities to GOE and asked their recall assuming they were sent into Israel by Egyptian authorities. Letter mentioned that extent casualties caused by Gaza shelling had shocked world opinion and urged Israel refrain any further retaliations, especially since Egypt has now put herself in position of, in fact she ordered Fedayeen raids. Ben Gurion expressed idea that Burns should endeavor obtain unconditional "cease-fire" from Egyptians. He stated that Israelis willing wait until 1200 hours local time April 10 for obtainment GOE undertaking that effect. Unless GOE accepted this

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–856. Confidential; Niact. Received at 5:28 p.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv. Passed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

[2] Cole reported on April 8 in telegram 403 that Burns told him that, due to the Fedayeen attacks, he was endeavoring to see either Ben Gurion or Sharett as soon as possible to urge the Israelis to refrain from initiating retaliatory measures. Burns also noted that he had sent a message to Nasser appealing to him to withdraw the Fedayeen from Israel. The Chief of Staff added that on April 6 the Israelis informed him that they had information indicating that the Egyptians were planning a Fedayeen operation, and that Burns apprised the Egyptians of the Israelis' fears and urged Egypt to cancel any such plans. The Egyptians, Burns said, failed to respond to his request. (*Ibid.*)

[3] Thomas Wikeley.

proposition by foregoing deadline, Israel would "reserve its liberty of action." Burns suggested that in interests accuracy proposed undertaking should specify observance article II paragraph 2 GAA in its entirety rather than "cease-fire." Ben Gurion agreed and indicated GOI prepared give such an undertaking.

Burns has sent telegram to Fawsi recounting above and asking whether Nasser prepared give undertaking in question as soon as possible and not later than time limit stated.

With reference UNTSO investigation Fedayeen activities Colonel Hommel informed me at 1700 local time today that observers have confirmed blowing up of tractor and water tower Ashkelon area and hand-grenade attack against house same vicinity, with killing one woman and injuries two children. Observers have also reported railway track and bridge as blown up plus ambush of army vehicle. However, no complaints received from Israel respecting latter incidents. Investigations continuing.

Cole

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257. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 8, 1956—8 p.m.

2012. . . . informed Israelis reinforcing their positions east of Gaza Strip and Egyptians moving MIGs, AMX and Stalin tanks into forward Sinai region. Egyptians do not, source said, intend defend Gaza Strip itself. Source added "next twelve hours will clarify situation."

I consider it most probable that if Israeli forces repeat their tactics of "retaliation in force" Egyptian forces will in turn retaliate in force and that full-scale war would then be imminent. From Arab area, and at home Nasser is under pressure that would make it extremely difficult for him to refrain from responding in force to

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–856. Secret; Niact. Received at 6:03 p.m. Repeated niact to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and priority to Damascus, Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, London, Paris, Jidda, and USUN. Passed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Khan Younes type of attack. I don't think he would exercise that much restraint. [2]

Byroade

[2] The Department instructed Byroade niact to "approach GOE soonest and in most effective manner support Burns' request for soonest cease-fire". (Telegram 2447 to Cairo, April 8; *ibid.*)

258. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Minister of the British Embassy (Coulson) and the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur), Department of State, Washington, April 9, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

President's Statement on Middle East

Mr. Coulson called on me at my request at 3:30 this afternoon. I said that I had asked him to call to let him and his Government know, on a most confidential basis, that the President planned to issue a statement about the Middle East at 5:00 p.m. this afternoon from Augusta, Georgia. [2] I said that intelligence reports over the weekend were extremely disquieting as to the activities of the organized Arab bands which had been infiltrated into Israel and the possible Israeli reaction if the Arabs did not cease their harassing tactics in Israel by tomorrow. In this connection, I made reference to Ben Gurion's statement as reported in the press. [3] We also had unconfirmed reports that the Egyptians were deploying their forces into battle position since they appeared to expect a strong Israeli reaction to the attacks by the Arab infiltrators. With this in mind,

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/4–956. Secret. Drafted by MacArthur.

[2] In his statement issued from Augusta, Georgia, the President announced that prior to his departure from the White House, he had met with Secretary Dulles to discuss the repeated incidents of hostility in the Middle East. He and the Secretary supported the Secretary-General's mission to the area, and the United States would observe its commitments to oppose aggression and would support and assist any nation subjected to aggression. For text of the statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 23, 1956, p. 668.

[3] An article entitled "Israel Promises Delay of 2 Days in Any Reprisals" in the *New York Times*, April 9, 1956, indicated that Ben Gurion had promised General Burns on April 8 that Israel would not retaliate against Egypt within the next 48 hours to allow time for Burns to obtain assurances from Egypt that these Fedayeen attacks would cease.

and as a deterrent to the breaking out of more wide-spread hostilities, the President was issuing a statement, a copy of which I gave to Mr. Coulson. I explained that the Secretary had seen the President this morning before his departure from Washington to discuss this general situation [4] and that the President had sent word up just a few minutes before that he planned to issue the statement. I concluded by saying that we wished the British to know of the statement before it was issued and the circumstances which led to its issue.

Mr. Coulson read the statement and said he thought it was excellent and would be welcomed by the British Government. He said that pursuant to my request he would handle it in such a way that it would not be leaked and that there would not be any public information that we had consulted with the British before issuance, since he agreed this might raise problems with the French and others as to why we had consulted only with the British. [5]

D MacA

[4] No account of this conversation has been found in Department of State files. According to Dulles' Appointment Book, however, the meeting with the President began at 10:45 a.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[5] Later that evening, the Department transmitted the text of the President's statement niact to the Embassies in Cairo and Tel Aviv. (Telegrams 2455 to Cairo and 754 to Tel Aviv; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–956)

259. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 9, 1956, 10 a.m. [1]

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. MacArthur
Admiral Radford

[Here follows discussion of future United States policy with respect to the Baghdad Pact.]

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by MacArthur.

The Secretary then said he wished to speak to Admiral Radford about another matter. He had been thinking about the question of meeting the Israeli demand for arms without turning over equipment to them, and had come up with the idea that perhaps it would be feasible to locate a pool of US aircraft in the area and notify both the Israelis and the Arabs that if there were aggression, the victim of aggression would receive the aircraft. There was some general discussion of this possibility, in the course of which the Secretary said he had thought about using Cyprus as the place to locate a pool of aircraft and equipment, but this raised political difficulties in view of the Cyprus situation. He was now thinking of Adana in Turkey, where there was an airfield where we had certain SAC rights.

Admiral Radford and Mr. MacArthur expressed the strong doubt that the Turks would agree to our pooling aircraft there to be delivered to the Israelis under certain contingencies. It was also pointed out that the base at Adana was a Turkish base, and while we had some military operating rights and facilities in agreement with the Turks which would permit certain training operations, etc., it was not a US base, as were the bases in Libya and Saudi Arabia. It was also mentioned that while equipment could be stored in Libya, the Libyan Government would not agree to aircraft and military equipment being delivered to Israel from Libyan territory.

Admiral Radford said that while the Secretary's idea was interesting, as a practical matter it was not militarily feasible because if the Egyptians attacked Israel they would bomb the airfields, and planes from outside would be unable to operate from the smashed up Israeli airfields. Furthermore, it would take a certain amount of time for the Israelis to assimilate the planes and to become able to use them in combat. He said the idea did not seem feasible to him. [2]

There was brief discussion of the Hammarskjold mission, and the Secretary said that if Hammarskjold could get agreement on a neutral zone along the present demarcation line between Israel and the Arab States, and if there could be adequate UN supervisory personnel, the danger of aggression would be greatly diminished since it would be fairly easy to identify the aggressor, and neither

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[2] Later that day, MacArthur informed Dulles in a memorandum that Radford had informed MacArthur that any agreement to put planes in Adana would require governmental agreement. The memorandum reads:

"Admiral Radford feels that the proposal to have a pool of military equipment in the area to be turned over to someone who is aggressed against after aggression has occurred is not realistic and does not serve the purpose for which it was intended. He also believes it would lead to irresistible pressures to turn the equipment over to the Israelis before Arab aggression occurred.

"I am inclined to share his views and I do not believe that it would be possible to use any place but Cyprus as an area for storing equipment and Cyprus itself would present us with very serious complications." (*Ibid.*, Omega #2)

the Arabs nor Israel wished to be branded by the UN as an aggressor.

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260. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 9, 1956—6 p.m.

2020. Eyes only for the Secretary. Saw Nasser in compliance Deptel 2447 [2] as soon as Jerusalem's 404 [3] containing data on Burns request for cease fire arrived.

Gave Nasser all arguments I could think of for prompt and positive reply to Burns request for cease fire. Nasser replied he could not honestly agree with immediate cease fire as he was in no position to carry out his promise. He had made decision after Israeli shelling of civilian center in Gaza to retaliate in kind with only comparable effective weapon at his disposal. He had sent commandos inside Israel. Their mission was to insure sixty dead and 100 wounded which was number of civilian casualties in Gaza resulting from Israeli shelling. He could promise Burns that there would be no more commandos sent in if there no more action from Israeli side but he could not stop present operation—commandos take no communication equipment into action—and would not do so even if he could. He drew map to show how Israeli artillery had been brought up to Demarcation Line. From there they could shell effectively heavily populated centers inside Gaza. He had replied with artillery fire but there were really no targets on Israel side of line. Then nature of the settlements on opposing sides of the line were so different that he could not accomplish any results by adopting Israeli tactic. (Produced battle record for me showing that with considerable expenditure of ammunition in one operation Egyptian counter-fire only resulted in damage to one cow.)

I tried to impress Nasser with gravity of present situation, which believe he shares but he repeated often that he had no alternative he could not sit by and do nothing in face of Israeli attack and Fedayeen were really only thing at his disposal unless he

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–956. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Niact; Omega; Limited Distribution. Received at 5:24 p.m.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 257.

[3] Document 256.

chose to launch outright war which he did not wish to do. I told him that sufficient publicity had been given commando activities so that Arab world probably had impression already that Egypt had retaliated sufficiently. He replied that pressure from Arab world were not affecting him. There was nothing political about his decision. It made on military grounds and was designed solely to impress upon Ben Gurion that he would henceforth receive equal retaliation. Nasser recalled that only other time he had made deliberate decision to have major retaliation was on occasion first commando operation last August. He now however had come to conclusion Ben Gurion would be responsive to no other type of persuasion and from here on out he was adopting Ben Gurion's own policy of an "eye for an eye". If the Israelis now launch retaliatory raid of Khan Yunis type of last fall he would take steps to see that there were exactly that many more casualties inside Israel.

Told Nasser that if Israelis wanted war he was walking straight into their trap and reminded him of his dreams for a better Egypt which could become irrevocably jeopardized. He replied that he could not head a government working for a better Egypt if he sat idly by in face of slaughter of civilians under his protection. Ben Gurion must learn that lives of Arabs could not be considered as second class.

Made no effort conceal from Nasser that I felt if commandos could not be retrieved subsequent events might lead to full-scale war. Asked his own opinion as to possible dangers to United States lives and property in Egypt in event war developed. He replied that he thought we would be all right in Egypt itself but things were less stable in some of northern countries where control could not be as effective. He returned to this point after some minutes stating that our protection was his responsibility in Egypt and he did not think we need be concerned, although public would obviously be stirred up if we should take side of Israel in event of hostilities. Embassy has underway preparation of measures to be taken in accordance established plan.

Throughout this conversation he repeated often that what he was telling me should not be passed to General Burns. I eventually told him that he must realize I would have to report to our President. This took him back a bit and I could see him wondering if on basis personal relationship he had told me too much. Nevertheless he did not object.

Fawzi was leaving Nasser's office when I arrived. In brief conversation he told me he was sending message to Burns today which he hoped could be satisfactory. Gained from him gist of message was that Nasser would convey GOE position to Hammar-

skjold and Burns when he arrived Wednesday.[4] Having in mind deadline set by Israel, told him I thought this hardly good enough. Fawzi looked worried.

Comment: We may have additional thoughts and recommendations soon but desire report conversation itself quickly in view of implications. These thoughts however occur immediately. We doubt Israelis will restrain themselves (unless perhaps their anti-commando measures surprisingly effective) and there could be quick buildup to full hostilities within three or four days. Our personnel in the area and particularly Syria and Jordan it seems to us should be alerted. I believe chances are we would have less trouble here but am concerned as to reaction that might develop against us if information given me in confidence by Nasser is suddenly widespread. This I believe could have a bearing upon GOE determination to assist us here. It is for this reason that this message not being repeated so as to give Washington full discretion as to how to disseminate information.

Another thought is that possibly only way to stop hostilities is prevent another retaliation from Israelis. It is difficult to see how this can be done as Israelis will not know that commando activities are to be restricted to equate with deaths caused by Israelis. Department might wish consider most secret high level communication with Israelis as to what state of affairs is, i.e., commando directive is to inflict damage equal that caused by Israeli shelling and that subsequent retaliation measures by Israel will be met to greatest extent possible by equivalent damage inside Israel. This in a way leaves to them the decision as to general hostilities. It might be a deterrent on them to know that we look upon it in this way. They would probably be suspicious as to accuracy of our information. I can only say I convinced Nasser gave me honest picture.

It was clear from Nasser's remarks that he would rely heavily upon Fedayeen type operations in event of war. I begin to wonder whether he does not look upon this as his primary offensive arm and might even plan withholding regular forces forcing Israelis to come after him.

Have not told British here. Leaving this as well to Department. With current mood in London re Nasser am somewhat concerned their reaction.

Byroade

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[4] April 11.

261. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 9, 1956—8 p.m.

2021. FYI only. In view fact commandos normally operate without communications equipment effective cease fire most unlikely next 48 hours. I am now convinced on excellent authority that if Israelis stage another attack against Egyptian forces in retaliation for current Egyptian commando activities Egyptians will respond on scale which will substantially reduce possibility of avoiding full scale conflict. Request all addressees scrupulously observe FYI only restriction.

However I do think it important Israelis be advised we think war likely occur if they stage another Khan Yunis or similar strong attack against GOE forces and that only chance reducing danger full scale war lies in Israelis concentrating on countering commando activities and in achieving sufficient success to withstand pressure for second round retaliation. [2]

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–956. Top Secret; Niact; Noforn. Received at 5:10 p.m. Repeated niact to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Damascus, Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, London, Paris, and USUN. Passed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

[2] At 8 p.m. that evening, the Department transmitted niact the following instructions to Byroade:

"1. USG has made clear to Israelis at highest level on several occasions in past few weeks major reprisal raid could risk general outbreak hostilities.

"2. IG advises Department they conducting extensive operations against Fedayeen.

"3. You might wish suggest to GOE they advise Burns of willingness accept cease fire but practical problems involved require brief extension of time limit, as indicated reftel." (Telegram 2024 to Cairo; *ibid.*)

Byroade responded in niact telegram 2024: "Have urged Nasser speak to Hammarskjold along line paragraph 3, reference telegram, and believe there good chance he may agree cease fire under these conditions." (Telegram 2024, April 10; *ibid.*, 674.84A/4–1056)

262. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, April 9, 1956, 6:36 p.m. [1]

TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRESIDENT

The Sec. said he thought it might be useful to send in the Pres's name if he approved a message to Nasser and Ben Gurion in which the Pres. would refer to his public statement and say he wishes to add a personal word to the effect that he realizes that this is a period of very great strain and tension and where there will be provocation but he hopes neither will indulge in retaliation of a magnitude which will precipitate general hostilities. The Pres. said all right to so do, and suggested aggressive be added at one point. And that he sends the message in the friendliest of spirits. The Sec. told him of his message from Byroade. [2] The Pres. said to get in a word re responsibility—something about irresponsible groups might cause trouble. The Sec. said that for the message to BG but not N.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Bernau.

[2] Presumably reference is to telegram 2020, Document 260, or telegram 2021, *supra*.

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263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, April 9, 1956—8:57 p.m.

2454. Please convey soonest following personal and private message from President to Nasser:

Begin Text. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am just issuing a public statement in connection with Secretary General Hammarskjold's mission to the Near East. [2] By it I commit the United States to the support of that mission in fullest measure and reaffirm our Government's position with reference to possible aggression.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–956. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Dulles and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. On April 11, the telegram was repeated to USUN eyes only for Ambassador Lodge. (Telegram 593 to New York; *ibid.*, 674.84A/4–1156)

[2] See footnote 2, Document 258.

In the friendliest spirit I want to supplement that public statement with a personal and private message to you.

I realize that this is a period of very great strain and tension and that there may occur further provocative actions. It is my earnest hope that in view of the awful calamity which general hostilities would surely visit upon the area, you will even under extreme provocation avoid retaliatory action which could have the gravest consequences.

This is, I am sure you will agree, a time for high statesmanship, through which time will be provided to achieve a result which would be infinitely better than that which would follow from hostilities.

This message is prompted by the hatred of war and knowledge of all of the evil and misery that it produces—a hatred and knowledge which I know we share. Sincerely yours, Dwight D. Eisenhower. *End Text.*

When foregoing message delivered you should also hand Nasser copy White House press statement contained immediately following telegram. [3]

Similar message being conveyed Ben Gurion by Embassy Tel Aviv.

Dulles

[3] See footnote 5, *ibid.*

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264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, April 9, 1956—8:58 p.m.

753. Please convey soonest following personal and private message from President to Ben Gurion:

Begin Text. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am just issuing a public statement in connection with Secretary General Hammarskjold's mission to the Near East. [2] By it I commit the United States to the support of that mission in fullest measure and reaffirm our Government's position with reference to possible aggression.

In the friendliest spirit I want to supplement that public statement with a personal and private message to you.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–956. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Dulles and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 258.

I realize that this is a period of very great strain and tension and that there may occur further provocative actions from what may, perhaps, be irregular elements. It is my earnest hope that in view of the awful calamity which general hostilities would surely visit upon the area, you will even under extreme provocation avoid retaliatory action which could have the gravest consequences.

This is, I am sure you will agree, a time for high statesmanship, through which time will be provided to achieve a result which would be infinitely better than that which would follow hostilities.

This message is prompted by the hatred of war and knowledge of all of the evil and misery that it produces—a hatred and knowledge which I know we share. Sincerely yours, Dwight D. Eisenhower. *End Text.*

When foregoing message delivered you should also hand Ben Gurion copy White House press statement contained immediately following telegram. [3]

Similar message being conveyed Nasser by Embassy Cairo.

Dulles

[3] See footnote 5, *ibid.*

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265. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 10, 1956, 9–10:35 a.m. [1]

SUBJECT

Situation in the Middle East

PRESENT

Senators Lyndon B. Johnson, William F. Knowland, Walter P. George, H. Alexander Smith, Styles Bridges, Leverett Saltonstall

Representatives Sam Rayburn, Joseph W. Martin, Jr., James P. Richards, John M. Vorys, John W. McCormack, Charles A. Halleck, Leslie C. Arends, Carl Albert

The Secretary, Francis Russell, Douglas MacArthur, George V. Allen, William M. Rountree, Robert C. Hill and Roderic L. O'Connor

The Secretary said that he had been asked by the President to meet with the Congressional leaders. He stated that our policy in the Near East had basically two major aspects. The first was the preser-

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by O'Connor.

vation of the State of Israel; the second was to maintain friendly relations with the Arabs in order to preserve the flow of oil from the area. The Secretary described, briefly, the oil situation, pointing out that Western Europe was dependent on Middle East oil. Oil from Iran, Kuwait and Saudi-Arabia came by tankers through the Red Sea and Suez Canal in the amount of approximately 1.2 million barrels a day. Oil by pipeline from the producing states to the Mediterranean total approximately 900,000 barrels a day. The total production of the area is divided, roughly between Iran, Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia and Iraq, although the Iranian production is not yet at full capacity. The oil can be lost by loss of either production facilities or transportation facilities. Pipelines can be blown up and we suspect they are already mined. The Suez Canal can be blocked. The loss of this oil, which represents virtually all of the oil used by Western Europe, cannot be made up by the West. Its loss would be a devastating blow to Western Europe industry and to the U.K. industry and foreign exchange position.

We have long believed that the only way the two policies of maintaining Israel and our position with the Arab states can be achieved is by achieving peace in the area. We have been actively working for that goal during the summer and fall but about a month ago developing events forced us to abandon, for the moment, hope of achieving a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute and to turn to the immediate problem of preventing an outbreak of hostilities. The Secretary recalled his speech of August 26, 1955, in which he outlined a basis on which we felt a long range settlement could be achieved. Since that time the sale of Czech arms to Egypt and other evidences of Soviet support have caused the Arabs to raise their demands for a settlement. The Arabs now entertained hopes of squeezing Israel out of the Near East. Under the circumstances we have concluded that there is no hope for an over-all settlement now. We do still have hope of solving some problems on a piecemeal basis but not in achieving a final settlement of the Arab-Israel problem. Perhaps the Jordan water plan and the matter of refugees can be worked out but our primary efforts now are directed to preventing open warfare.

The Secretary said there was a good deal of thinking in Israel in terms of war. The Israeli feel that time is running against them. They could probably win initial victories in the next month or two but realize that in the face of growing Arab strength they are falling behind. Many Israeli feel that Israel cannot exist at its present size; that it must either expand or be swept away. We do not believe that their thinking has crystallized in this respect but it is tending in this direction.

The Secretary described three alternative policies which have been advocated for the area:

1. To supply Israeli with arms, as much as they can usefully absorb. However, no one believes that we can maintain the balance of arms indefinitely in the face of Soviet shipments to the Arabs. We do not think arms shipments to Israel is the answer because it would alienate the Arabs and result in cutting off Arabian oil. This in turn would greatly weaken Europe economically and bring NATO to a standstill. All the gains of the Marshall Plan would be cancelled and Europe would be forced to turn to the Soviet Union for economic survival and for its oil imports. Thus we would save Israel but lose Europe.

2. Others have suggested that the United States join the Baghdad Pact. The original concept of this Pact was a regional grouping to oppose Soviet expansion. Actually it grew out of the Secretary's Near Eastern trip of May 1953. It has since been exploited by the British for their own purposes in the area. The U.K. has a great interest in Iraq, both because of its oil and military bases. U.K. adherence to the Pact provided a new basis for their relationship with Iraq which previously had been covered by treaties which were expiring. The U.K. has used the Baghdad Pact to build up the Iraqi and to try to spread Iraqi and British influence to the south. The British pushed the Pact rapidly and in some instances without consulting the U.S. It brought Iran into it against our advice. The U.S. has not consented to join the Pact, in spite of British pressure, for a variety of reasons, but primarily because the Pact is not now chiefly an instrument for collective defense against the Soviet Union but has become an instrument of Arab intrigue. The Iraqi are using their position in the Pact in their efforts to build up influence in the Arab world, and to challenge Egyptian leadership. It might be necessary for the United States at some future time to join the Pact in order to prevent its collapse, but at the moment we do not wish to do so because of the many extraneous elements involved in it.

3. Still others have suggested that we publicly unite with the U.K. on joint policies for the area. The British have been pressing very hard for us to do so. We believe that unless and until we can bring the U.K. around to our view, it would be a mistake to identify ourselves too closely with them in the Near East. The Secretary believes the British have made a number of mistakes in the area. They are in a state of undeclared war with Saudi-Arabia. The U.K. broke off arbitration on the Buraimi matter and then took over the area by armed force. They acted in this way without consultation with the United States. In view of our relations with the Saudis and our vast oil interests there (the greatest oil reserves in the world), the British action has put us in a very difficult position. In Jordan the British went ahead against our advice in attempting to force Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact. We counseled against such a move, pointing out that it would involve the Baghdad Pact directly in the Israeli question since Jordan was a neighbor of Israel and also would get the Pact further away from its original northern tier regional concept. The British attempt failed disastrously, largely on account of Saudi opposition . . . . The dismissal of Glubb Pasha

followed. Moreover, in Egypt the British have very bad relations with Nasser.

For all these reasons we are most reluctant publicly to identify ourselves in the area with the U.K. We are working intensively with the British in trying to evolve policies upon which we can agree. However, to accede to heavy pressures from London for premature identification with the British policies would be unwise.

On the matter of arms for Israel, we do not exclude the possibility of shipments when and if we feel it will help the overall situation. We are encouraging shipments of arms from other countries. This follows the historic pattern in which the United States has never been a primary source of Israeli arms. As to the Baghdad Pact, we continue to support it and recently announced sending a very high level delegation to its next meeting. However, we do not think it wise to adhere to it at this time. As for the British, we are working hard for closer cooperation on joint policies and this work continues up to the present time.

Since our efforts to find a settlement for the Arab-Israel dispute have collapsed, we have been concentrating on preventing hostilities. Specifically on the Banat Ya'cub dam project, we have succeeded, at least temporarily, in getting the Israeli to postpone work again as they had threatened in March. We fear resumption of this work would precipitate a Syrian attack which in turn would lead to general hostilities. We are hopeful that Eric Johnston's plan may yet develop on a piecemeal basis.

The Secretary then summarized activity in the last few days. On the 2nd of April an Israeli soldier had been ambushed and killed in the Gaza strip. On the 5th of April the Israeli retaliated with heavy shelling of a civilian village which killed more than 40 and wounded 100 Egyptians. In retaliation Nasser released several bands of commandos for raids behind the Israeli lines. These commandos operate on their own without radio communication. Israel has agreed to a cease-fire if the commando raids are called off within 48 hours, that time limit being up sometime today. Egypt has claimed she cannot control these commandos for lack of communication. At the present time we do not know what the Israeli plan to do in retaliation.

Hammarskjold is at Tel Aviv today and reaches Cairo tonight. He is in the area as a direct result of a UN resolution sponsored and introduced by the United States.[2] We are supporting his efforts by our own diplomatic initiative in Tel Aviv and Cairo,[3] and by the President's statement of yesterday,[4] but no one can tell whether

[2] See Document 206.
[3] See Document 263 and *supra*.
[4] See footnote 2, Document 258.

Israel will now launch a major offensive. We fear that there has been a growing desire on both sides for a war. We hope that the pressures of world opinion and fear of possible economic boycotts will allow reason to prevail. Our own policy is to do everything we can think of, alone or with others, to prevent war. If war comes, we hope to stay out of it. However, we are resolved to do everything necessary to support the action of the UN in resisting aggression.

(At this point the Secretary opened the meeting to questions. I will not attempt to indicate who asked each question but will give only the general tenor of the questions.)

Senator Knowland alluded to the problem of determining who might start the aggression and asked whether General Burns had adequate facilities for this task.

The Secretary said that he did not, but that General Burns has refused to accept additional facilities. We have pressed him to do so. We specifically suggested the creation of a neutral zone with additional inspection personnel and helicopters to patrol it. General Burns thus far has not accepted these offers. We hope Hammarskjold will remedy this situation and we have told Hammarskjold that we will support him with any necessary facilities in this respect.

Congressman Richards asked, assuming that somebody is clearly labeled an aggressor, what do we plan to do about it?

The Secretary replied that the United States will not intervene in force without going to Congress. We believe that if we know positively who the aggressor is, we can, by measures short of war, deal with the matter. Economic boycotts and the supply of military equipment to the victim of aggression might be sufficient. The great difficulty is to identify the aggressor. Whether the United States will be able to tell or will be willing to accept the responsibility for telling who the aggressor is, is the great enigma in this situation.

In response to a question as to British intensions in case of hostilities, the Secretary replied that we were uncertain as to their precise plans but that he thought the British and to a lesser extent the French were, in the event of emergency, giving some thought to coming into the area in strength and taking it over by force. This would be a very dangerous move in our view. It should be remembered that you cannot dig oil with bayonets. The most important thing to be achieved in the area now is to bring about conditions where the aggressor can be identified. However, it appears that neither side will cooperate to achieve that objective. They prefer that the situation should remain fuzzy. Under these conditions we may never know who the aggressor is.

The Secretary was asked as to possible UN action in the General Assembly. Under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution the General Assembly could be called in 24 hours but quick action was very

doubtful. The result would largely depend on who was the aggressor. If Israel was identified as the aggressor, the General Assembly would probably get the necessary vote. However, if the Arabs were identified as the aggressor, it would be very hard to get the necessary votes in view of the Arab-Asian and Soviet blocs. Moreover, any resolution in the Security Council unfavorable to the Arabs would almost certainly be vetoed by the Soviets.

Congressman Halleck asked if we were committed to the preservation of Israel. The Secretary said that we had no formal treaty commitment but that the preservation of Israel was announced United States policy. Moreover under the United Nations Charter we had such a commitment, qualified, of course, as to implementation by the terms of the Charter.

Congressman Rayburn asked what forces we had in the area. The Secretary described the 4 destroyers off the Israeli coast now, the 6th Fleet in the area, our air bases in Turkey, Libya, Morocco, Italy and Egypt. Most of this air power is in NATO and could presumably be withdrawn. Some of it is SAC and can be used independently. There is, he said, ample United States power in the area if needed.

The Secretary reiterated that our fundamental problem was to define the aggressor and that our principal task now was to create conditions under which such an identification could be made. If we could do that, it would create a real deterrent, he thought. Neither side wanted to be labeled as an aggressor. He felt that Hammarskjold, a skillful diplomat, might be able to achieve this result with strong backing from us.

Senator Smith asked what Congress could do now?

The Secretary replied that he did not think Congressional authority was needed at this time and that he had no program or proposal to make to the group. He might have such a proposal in a few days because the situation could blow up, although he did not think that it would. In any event we could not tell today what we might want to ask Congress for. The situation is so fluid that we could not formulate any Congressional program now.

Senator Knowland asked if we were going to follow through on the UN procedures before going to the Congress?

The Secretary replied that he did not definitely want to commit us to going to the General Assembly before asking for Congressional action. He feared that action in the General Assembly might bog down and tie our hands, particularly if the Arabs were the aggressor.

Senator Knowland commented that if we did not go through the entire UN procedures and specifically go before the General Assembly, we would have difficulty explaining our position to public opinion.

The Secretary agreed and said that normally we would, of course, exhaust the UN procedures. However under some circumstances United States national interests might require us getting quicker action and going directly to the Congress. This is what we did with the Formosa resolution. For that reason he did not want to commit us to going to the General Assembly prior to asking for Congressional action.

Congressman Rayburn asked whether the situation could not explode so rapidly that there would be no time to ask for Congressional action?

The Secretary agreed that this was a possibility but said that the President had under these circumstances constitutional authority to act to protect the lives and property of American citizens. The Secretary commented on his and the President's press conference of last week on this point,[5] saying that there has been no conflict between his views and the President's. The President had asserted that he could not declare war without the action of Congress but that position did not exclude military action to protect United States lives or military forces under attack.

Senator Knowland asked if we were taking any action to remove civilians from the area?

The Secretary said we were studying that possibility but that we did not want to precipitate anything in the area and would not want to take any action which would give the impression that we felt war was inevitable. We do not now believe that it is inevitable but our estimate may change in a matter of hours, days or weeks.

There followed a brief discussion of the location and numbers of United States civilians in the area.

Senator Saltonstall raised the question on what our policy of preservation of Israel would mean if Israel were found to be the aggressor.

The Secretary said that we would not support Israel if it was determined that she was the aggressor and said that that position was fundamental to our whole system of resistance to aggression. If we did not maintain this position the entire system of world law and order would collapse.

Senator Saltonstall agreed but raised the question whether any such finding of aggression could be sustained.

The Secretary said that we would not go along with any finding by the United Nations if Israel is the aggressor unless the evidence is very clear. He said we would not concur in any politically motivated decision based on conflicting evidence.

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[5] See footnote 5, Document 245, and footnote 6, Document 240.

As the meeting broke up it was agreed that the Congressman would say to the press that they had received another periodic briefing on developments in the area and, in response to Congressman Vorys' question, it was agreed that they might say that Congress had not been asked for any action at this time. [6]

[6] Dulles subsequently spoke with Eisenhower over the telephone at 1:15 p.m. that day. Dulles "said the meeting went pretty well. There was no particular criticism voiced. Obviously some are worried Israel will be found the aggressor. The Sec. explained that the SC votes on that and we have a vote and won't so vote until we are sure. The Sec. said the cables to Nasser and Ben Gurion went out." In conclusion, "The Pres. said he was glad the Sec. had the meeting. The Sec. said he would keep in touch." (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Bernau, April 10; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

266. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, April 10, 1956—4 p.m.

408. Reference: ConGentel 404 to Department. [2] In response Burns' request Egyptians give undertaking observe article II paragraph 2 GAA in order establish "cease-fire" as proposed by Ben Gurion, who also stated Israelis would wait until 1200 local time April 10 for GOE reply. UNTSO has now received message from Fawsi. Message informs Burns that his forthcoming visit to Cairo together with UNSYG will create an appropriate occasion for a comprehensive discussion of all the points which Burns raised in his recent communications. Fawsi's message continues by stating that "meanwhile GOE will continue to take all measures necessary for the maintenance of security around the demarcation line".

Above message received at UNTSO headquarters about 1030 local time today after departure Burns to meet Hammarskjold at Tel Aviv airport. UNTSO courier expected deliver message to Burns at Tel Aviv about 1230 today. Assume Burns or Hammarskjold will ask GOI to leave above time limit in abeyance in order give them opportunity confer with Egyptians.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1056. Confidential; Niact. Received at 11:38 a.m. Repeated niact to Cairo and priority to Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv. Passed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force at 1:20 p.m.

[2] Document 256.

Understand Burns will accompany Hammarskjold to Cairo today.

Cole

267. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 10, 1956—3 p.m.

2025. Eyes only Secretary. Just returned seeing Nasser at his home deliver message from President your niact 2454 [2] as well as White House statement. [3] Nasser re-read message several times, asked clarification of each phrase that puzzled him due to English complexities, then showed understanding. He obviously pleased with tone of message and appeared to sense a note of understanding on behalf of President. It had a good effect.

As Nasser had given me such complete picture yesterday, [4] and as he knew I had transmitted same, there was little he could add today. Nevertheless am less gloomy than when preparing yesterday's report and feel that if situation can be held another 12 to 24 hours we may again be past immediate crisis point.

Had seriously tried suggestion paragraph 3 Deptel 2453 [5] in yesterday's meeting. He would not agree at that time as he still taking position that he was not telling anyone but me that he had deliberately ordered commandos inside Israel. Tried again today with more success as he finally agreed that his full position if known would be better than if he simply gave impression that he refused ceasefire. Said he would tell Hammarskjold and Burns full story. He also agreed that he might be better off by making his actual position public rather than be in public position of refusing ceasefire. Believe I might have been able convince him to take this step today but hesitated take step affecting Hammarskjold's mission immediately prior to his arrival tonight. Also had feeling that Hammarskjold

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1056. Top Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution—Omega Handling. Received at 2:48 p.m.

[2] Document 263.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 258.

[4] See Document 260.

[5] See footnote 2, Document 261.

might wish to work out statement with him and that might produce better result.

Nasser was awaiting report as to how many commandos returned from Israel last night but said he thought about half of remaining survivors had come out. I asked how many days he thought operation would continue. Counting on his fingers from time they ordered in last Friday [6] he said most of remaining should come out tonight. He said however there may be stragglers and if tomorrow's report for instance showed say five still inside, he would not know whether they had been captured, killed or still attempting carry out their missions.

I suggested he think seriously along following lines:

(1) Tell Hammarskjold exactly where things stood when he saw him tonight or tomorrow morning.

(2) Work out with Hammarskjold as quickly as possible cease-fire and any statement relating thereto that Hammarskjold thought might be useful.

(3) Unconditionally accept cease-fire with Hammarskjold knowing the truth about possible stragglers.

This would give Hammarskjold means of clarification to other side of actual situation if he thought this wise hoping produce atmosphere where few remaining acts would be tolerated without retaliation. Nasser said he thought this looked like good plan.

While above assuring if situation can be held next 24 hours, he told me one thing that may tend increase danger. Said Israelis had sent aircraft over Suez base night before last. They had therefore sent aircraft last night to photograph Tel Aviv and (I think he said) Jerusalem. Even though they dropped flares for photography purposes they had not been molested. Am afraid this will make Israelis think they may be in for early bombing.

Nasser today, as yesterday, was in serious mood but very friendly and quite calm and soft-spoken throughout. As conversation was at his residence, members of press not present upon my departure. As have been seeing much of him publicly lately, he may see some reason for today's meeting not even being mentioned by press. Would hope that under these circumstances fact I delivered letter from President would not be made known publicly at home without at least advance clearance here.

Byroade

[6] April 6.

268. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, April 10, 1956—5 p.m.

409. UNTSO has apprised me of message which now being sent from Hammarskjold to Fawsi for Nasser with reference Fawsi message to Burns of April 10. (ConGentel 408 [2]) Paraphrase follows.

UNSYG message refers Burns communications to Fawsi April 6 regarding Fedayeen (ConGentel 403 [3]) and April 8 re Ben Gurion's proposed "cease-fire" (ConGentel 404 [4]). In addition UNSYG refers to a personal message which he sent to Nasser on April 9 endorsing Burns stand in requesting strict compliance with Article II paragraph 2 GAA in its entirety and to his further message indicating that he would reach Cairo night of April 10. UNSYG then expressed disappointment at contents Fawsi reply of April 10 to Burns, pointing out that it should be obvious his talks with GOE—which he is undertaking on basis mandate of Security Council—could not be conducted with the necessary basis lacking an assurance by the parties that they would observe provisions GAA as just cited.

UNSYG message continues to effect that such an assurance as mentioned in preceding paragraph is a necessary pre-condition for his mission. If GOE will not give it UNSYG states that he would have to reconsider his present loan to enter into discussions with GOE in implementation SC resolution. [5] He therefore expresses hope that upon arrival Cairo he will receive assurance in question. He also voices confidence that Egyptian Prime Minister comprehends gravity of foregoing representations and will extend needed cooperation. [6]

Cole

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1056. Confidential; Niact. Received at 3:20 p.m. Repeated niact to Cairo and priority to Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Document 266.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 256.

[4] Document 256.

[5] See Document 206.

[6] The Mission at the United Nations transmitted the text of Hammarskjöld's letter of April 10 to the Department in telegram 837, April 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1156)

269. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France [1]

Washington, April 10, 1956—3:47 p.m.

3747. On March 28 we advised Israeli Ambassador here that his Government should look to its normal suppliers for primary source military equipment. [2] Israelis have subsequently reported that French authorities are prepared to sell them twelve additional Mystere IV's but hesitate to approach US Government in view of long delay and complications which resulted in previous case. Israelis also report little or no progress in Ottawa, Rome, or London regarding their efforts purchase arms despite position we took March 28.

With reference to twelve additional Mysteres Embassy Paris is authorized to inform French authorities US is prepared to concur in their sale to Israel under similar terms to initial transaction. [3]

Dulles

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/4–1056. Secret. Drafted and approved by Allen who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, Ottawa, and Rome.

[2] See Document 221.

[3] Telegram 4993 from Paris, April 25, reported that the French Defense Ministry would supply another 12 Mysteres to Israel in the next 10 days. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/4–2556)

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270. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, April 10, 1956—3:48 p.m.

2463. You are requested to inform Hammarskjold urgently and discreetly of fact that President has sent personal messages to Prime Ministers of Egypt and Israel [2] reaffirming US fullest support Hammarskjold mission. General substance of President's letter together

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1056. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Ludlow, cleared with Rountree and Burdett, and approved by Wilcox who signed for Dulles. Repeated to the Mission at the United Nations eyes only for Ambassador Lodge. (Telegram 593 to USUN, April 11; *ibid.*, 674.84A/4–1156)

[2] See Documents 263 and 264.

with copy of White House statement [3] should be made available to Hammarskjold. [4]

Dulles

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[3] See footnote 2, Document 258.

[4] Byroade responded on April 12 in part as follows:

"Hammarskjold grateful for being informed President's message. States he appreciates very much efforts made by United States in support of what he trying to do. Says this support has certainly contributed to create atmosphere for frank and he believes, useful exchanges of views with Nasser." (Telegram 2045 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1256)

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271. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 10, 1956—8 p.m.

1063. I delivered President's letter to Ben Gurion [2] at his Tel Aviv office at 11 o'clock this morning. He looked tired from strain of recent days and spoke very quietly but nevertheless forcefully and in manner revealing he is still personally very much in control situation.

He said he would convey letter's content to his colleagues as soon as possible probably tomorrow and because it was from American President it would be given serious consideration it therefore deserved. Personally, however, he found message most disappointing. He could not believe President fully realized situation in which whole population was daily terrorized. (I injected comment that I was confident President well aware of terrorist character of Fedayeen operations within Israel.) He said he would really like to know what we thought his people should do. If people of US terrorized by neighboring countries . . . by marauders sent by neighboring government . . . [3] would they be expected just to take it? There no doubt Fedayeen sent by Nasser.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1056. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 12:15 a.m., April 11. Repeated niact to Cairo, Paris, London, Amman, Damascus, and Beirut. Repeated to the Mission at the United Nations eyes only for Ambassador Lodge. (Telegram 592 to USUN, April 11; *ibid.*)

[2] See Document 264.

[3] All ellipses in this document are in the source text.

Perhaps he could ask President of US but he would ask me "would you expect us just to take it?" Right of self-defense is first right of human beings.

He spoke at length of difficulties of effective defense against Fedayeen. It not possible to accompany everybody everywhere and against such tactics people wouldn't be safe if accompanied by whole company or battalion.

He could not tell his people they must sit helplessly by. They wanted to know why Nasser could not be told that he was aggressor and would be dealt with as aggressor.

Ben Gurion recalled his conversation with Burns (Jerusalem 404 to Department [4]) in which he asked Burns to urge unconditional cease-fire from Egyptians. Burns had asked him to exercise restraint for 24-hours Ben Gurion stating that he replied he would wait until noon April 10 or 48-hours. It was Burns who had suggested cease-fire was not enough but request should specifically include observance Article II, paragraph 2 of GAA in its entirety. He said in another half-hour (it was then 11:30) 48 would have expired.

He said he knew there was battalion of Fedayeen near Gaza and furthermore "this kind of people" were based in all countries surrounding Israel. (He specifically named Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.) Israel knew they planning something "against Tel Aviv" although they had not been able to find out just what.

Some of recent Fedayeen incursions from Jordan even though new Commander of Arab Legion had said he opposed to such tactics. GOI had been prepared to believe him now (inference being that Jordan-based Fedayeen under Egyptian rather than Jordanian control).

At this point I informed him that we doing all possible to get Nasser to agree to cease-fire and stop Fedayeen terrorism and President had addressed personal letter to Nasser [5] who should feel obliged to regard it most seriously.

Ben Gurion replied he saw no reason why Nasser would take it seriously. He obtaining help from Moscow and he knows Secretary of State who had said Nasser was only trying preserve his independence had refused arms to Israel. For similar reasons Ben Gurion had no real hope of Hammarskjold's mission. After all Nasser had paid no attention to man with much greater authority . . . special envoy of President Eisenhower.

He said it difficult not to accept advice of President of US but he convinced President with all his responsibilities simply could not

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[4] Document 256.
[5] See Document 263.

know details or he would not limit himself to advice contained in his letter.

At this point I argued that President did not question any country's right to self-defense but was suggesting Israel avoid action which would jeopardize chances of obtaining peaceful solution in near future.

Ben Gurion said if Hammarskjold did come back with Egyptian agreement to compliance with GAA that would be something but he had failed in his previous attempt so had Burns and so had Allen.

If he did not succeed he could say quite frankly that third paragraph of President's letter would be absolutely meaningless. If Nasser were to launch Fedayeen raids from three countries (excluding Lebanon) or Tel Aviv were attacked he would not tell his people to be quiet, that US was going to come to their rescue.

Israel was once attacked by six states. One helped her. There had been complete embargo in US on arms to Israel. There was embargo again despite fact Arabs receiving aid from Soviets.

In his "humble view" to ask Israelis to rely on US would mean to give then false hopes.

Present situation could not go on. Settlements being sabotaged nightly, people being killed on roads, Israel had to stop travel two nights (Embassy telegram 1055 [6]). Nasser did not think he going to be punished or reprimanded, in view of which he ordered Fedayeen attacks.

He could not reconcile President's November 9 statement in Denver [7] and his earlier letter [8] with US denial of arms to Israel at time when US sending tanks to Saudi Arabia. Every tank to Saudi Arabia is tank for Nasser who is chief of staff of Syria and Saudi Arabia. Against this background he could not understand President's letter.

I asked if it not possible Nasser using Fedayeen tactics in effort to provoke Israel into response that would put Israel in role of aggressor and that was it not reason for Israel to exercise restraint while efforts made to final peaceful solution? Ben Gurion asked rhetorically if that meant we advised him to tolerate Fedayeen. "Should we send murderers into Gaza to perpetuate similar outrages? No, Israel could act only against armed forces and if it struck it would be against armed forces."

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[6] The Embassy in telegram 1055, April 9, catalogued the various Fedayeen attacks inside Israel that occurred during the night of April 8–9 and reported that "Among unusual security measures taken was closure Jerusalem/Tel Aviv road to night traffic, stranding several hundred persons in Jerusalem . . . . Apparently most minor roads in country also closed." (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–956)

[7] See the editorial note, vol. XIV, p. 725.

[8] Presumably a reference to Document 132.

I replied that I am not suggesting patience beyond limit of endurance but until present efforts had been fully explored.

Comment: Ben Gurion spoke in reasonable vein I thought without excitement but leaving no doubt he means to act as he thinks circumstances dictate.

He convinced President for whom his respect and affection tracing from association in Frankfort remain undiminished, not fully aware of shattering effect of Fedayeen on people of small besieged country.

I think he deeply earnest about two remarks made this morning:

(1) He will give Hammarskjold "a little time" to come up with peaceful solution. (I believe although he did not say so that he would require announcement Nasser's agreement to cease-fire and strict compliance with Article II, paragraph 2 GAA before Hammarskjold leaves Cairo).

(2) If and when GOI decides to act it will be by applying military action against military forces and not response "in kind" to Fedayeen incursions.

Although it evident Ben Gurion's patience not without limits and he spoke decisively and firmly I think pressures on him have somewhat subsided. Tension here both within government and public has fallen off peak it attained over weekend (Embassy telegram 1062 [9]). It appears GOI for moment contemplates no extraordinary action if Fedayeen operations are stopped promptly and in absence new provocation.

Lawson

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[9] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1056)

272. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 11, 1956—noon.

1064. Re Deptel 753 and Embtel 1063. [2] The text of Prime Minister Ben Gurion's reply to President Eisenhower's message. The original of reply, which was dated April 10 and delivered to me late last night, follows by air pouch.

"Dear Mr. President,

"I hasten to reply to your personal message conveyed to me this morning by Ambassador Lawson.

"I wish to express my deep appreciation of the motives which prompted you to communicate with me and to issue the April 9 statement from White House. [3] With you, I see in war a tragedy not only in the physical sense, but also for the human spirit.

"We shall, of course, extend the fullest cooperation to Mr. Hammarskjold. At the same time, reality impels me to inform you of my grave doubts as to the outcome of the Secretary General's mission. The essential question is whether Colonel Nasser is prepared to issue an order to his troops, regular and irregular, to refrain from hostile acts. General Burns over many months, and Mr. Hammarskjold on his last visit to the area two months ago, [4] have tried in vain to influence Colonel Nasser to take this preliminary and elementary step to bring about quiet on the frontiers. All attempts to obtain from him an undertaking to observe faithfully all the provisions of the armistice agreement, as we are unequivocally prepared to do, have also failed. As you are aware, Colonel Nasser has rejected all the proposals put to him by your personal emissary, including the request for a cease-fire order.

"During the past three nights, murder gangs have been sent from the Gaza Strip by the Egyptian military authorities to kill innocent civilians, to sabotage installations, and to terrorize the peaceful countryside. The responsibility of the Egyptian authorities is clear to the UN observers. I feel confident that if the situation in all its details were brought to your attention, you would not have

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1156. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Mission at the United Nations eyes only for Ambassador Lodge. (Telegram 593 to USUN, April 11; *ibid.*) A copy was sent to Goodpaster by Fisher Howe. (*Ibid.*) Despatch 631 from Tel Aviv, April 11, transmitted the signed original of Ben Gurion's message (*ibid.*), which was sent by Fisher Howe to Ann Whitman under cover of a memorandum of April 26. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

[2] Document 264 and *supra*.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 258.

[4] See footnote 4, Document 25.

confined yourself merely to an expression of hope that we avoid retaliatory action. I cannot conceive that in the event of continuing Egyptian aggression you would expect us to abandon our country and people to the perils and blood-ridden consequences of a sustained campaign of terror by the murder gangs of the Egyptian Government. I am confident that no other country would passively submit to such a situation.

"The Government of Israel and I recognize to the full the sincerity of your statement from the White House that the United States will oppose any aggression in the area. However, I would be less than frank towards you and failing in my duty to my people, were I not to say, in all friendship, that this statement does not allay our acute anxiety regarding the security of Israel. As things stand at present, Egypt is perfecting her war machine with large supplies of Soviet arms, and is united with Syria and Saudi Arabia in pledged determination to seek the destruction of Israel. On the other hand, Israel is denied the possibility of obtaining essential arms for self defense as a result of an embargo maintained by the Government of the United States. The charter of the United Nations to which the White House statement refers existed already in 1948. Yet no member of the United Nations came to Israel's aid when, on emerging into statehood, she was subjected to invasion by the armies of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan.

"Your denunciation of acts of hostility and of war evoke a deep echo in our hearts. May I, however, say again in all frankness and friendship, that it appears to us paradoxical that this declaration is not accompanied by a positive response to our application for arms for self defense. In the logic of the situation, this is the only effective way of deterring Egyptian aggression and thus saving the area and the world from the horrors of war in the Middle East.

"Colonel Nasser's refusal to cooperate with your personal emissary, on the one hand, and the extent of his military preparations, on the other, unfortunately bear out fully our assessment of his motives in concluding his arms agreements with Czechoslovakia last September. In these circumstances the lack of response from the United States Government to our urgent appeal is source of gravest disappointment to my Government and my people.

"Sincerely yours, David Ben Gurion."

Lawson

273. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 11, 1956—2 p.m.

2036. We called on Col. Gohar this morning to obtain general review situation. Gohar said meeting between Hammarskjold and Fawzi yesterday afternoon (also attended by Burns and Gohar) had been general in scope. However Egyptians had reaffirmed to Hammarskjold their unconditional acceptance Burns' 4 proposals of March 1955 [2] and Secretary-General proposals reference Al Auja [3] and reiterated Egyptian proposal reference 500 meter withdrawal. [4]

Hammarskjold is seeing Nasser at eleven today and will meet with Fawzi this afternoon to "discuss details". Gohar said Egypt had assured Hammarskjold they fully prepared cooperate with U.N. in implementing any proposals which he might make within framework GAA to reduce tension.

Speculating regarding motivation latest incidents along border, Gohar echoed local editorial line. Israel, he said required peace with Arab States in order develop sound economy free from dependence foreign aid. Arabs too were willing effect settlement. Egypt in particular had great need devote its resources economic development. However Arabs could not settle on terms less favorable than U.N. resolutions which unacceptable Israel. Settlement refugee question was particularly important. Gap between two positions was becoming steadily wider (by implication as Arabs grew militarily stronger). Therefore Israel's best chance achieve settlement on terms which she could accept would be provoke tension which Israel would [garble—hope?] would lead West intervene to prevent "threat to world peace" and would result in imposed peace on something approaching Israel's terms.

Gohar said he did not know how long Hammarskjold might remain Cairo but felt it would be at least day or two.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1156. Confidential; Priority. Received at 2:03 p.m. Repeated priority to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, USUN, Damascus, Amman, Beirut, London, and Paris.

[2] See the editorial note, vol. XIV, p. 76.

[3] See telegrams 395 and 398, *ibid.*, pp. 690 and 702.

[4] Reference is to a proposal of June 1, 1955; see *ibid.*, footnote 3, p. 220.

274. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 12, 1956—11 a.m.

1075. Foreign Ministry informs Embassy that 1 a.m. this morning message received from Hammarskjold advising Ben Gurion that Nasser had agreed to conform Article II GAA subject to right of self defense. At 2 a.m. Sharett replied as follows:

"Your message incorporating Colonel Nasser's reply reached me as reports poured in of renewal of dastardly attacks deep in our territory by Egyptian murder gangs throwing hand grenades into peaceful dwellings, firing into school and synagogue and ambushing civilian traffic. So far eight bloody assaults have been recorded tonight with four children killed, fifteen persons wounded. Utter worthlessness and falseness of Colonel Nasser's assurances stand exposed. His revolting behavior calls for immediate and positive public condemnation on behalf of UN. You will also realize inevitable dire consequences of this murderous campaign brazen challenge of which cannot as matter of elementary self preservation be ignored much longer."

In conversation with Embassy counselor re foregoing, Tekoah, Foreign Ministry adviser on armistice affairs, said if Nasser had sincerely wanted to lessen tensions he would have taken steps to stop new incursions Fedayeen upon receipt of General Burns' urgent message last week. [2] Instead he ignored these messages and now makes his commitment to Hammarskjold at time when he knows full well his agents continuing their murderous activities within Israel.

Ben Gurion, who unavailable late last night, being advised Hammarskjold's message and Foreign Ministry promised inform Embassy of any reply which Prime Minister may make additional to that of Sharett transmitted above.

Meantime USARMA reports beginning at approximately 9 a.m. this morning reservists being called up to active duty in Tel Aviv area. Efforts being made to ascertain proportions of this callup. [3]

Lawson

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1256. Secret; Niact. Received at 7:14 a.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, London, Paris, and Jerusalem.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 256.

[3] Telegram 2051 from Cairo, April 12, noted that the Embassy was informed that Hammarskjöld had, in response to Sharett's message, "promptly forwarded reply rejecting Sharett's accusation Nasser acted in bad faith in agreeing conform Article II GAA and pointing out obvious time factor." (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1256)

275. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 12, 1956—3 p.m.

1076. Pass Army, Navy, Air. Fedayeen carried out 8 new attacks night April 11 all within 15 kilometer radius Tel Aviv. Three schoolboys and teacher killed, 5 wounded, 2 seriously, while at evening prayers in Synagogue at agricultural boarding school at Shafrir, 5 kilometers from Tel Aviv city limits; family of three seriously wounded their house and six passengers wounded in bus near Ramle; raiders shot up main gate IDF headquarters camp at Sarafand (Tserifin). Total casualties last night 4 killed, 15 wounded. Negev area relatively quiet.

Comment: Savage aspect of murders, their unprecedented proximity Tel Aviv and insolence Sarafand attack have caused complete reversal two day downward trend of tempers. One source reports IDF "wild with rage" public appalled and emotionally upset by cumulative effect five nights Fedayeen activities.

Shift of attacks to Tel Aviv, where civilian population not psychologically or otherwise so well equipped to bear up as Negev settlers, has had most dangerous impact. Earlier feeling Israelis would "ride it out" predicated on assumption decline in incidents, increasing effectiveness countermeasures, and indications early cessation of raids.

It appears probable Israelis very close to "cannot live with it" stage mentioned by Sharett (Embassy telegram 884 [2]).

Lawson

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1256. Secret; Priority. Received at 1:29 p.m. Repeated to Cairo.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/3–556)

276. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 12, 1956—2 p.m.

1078. On invitation Ben Gurion Tuesday I joined him at his home Tel Aviv last night for after-dinner coffee and chat on existing critical conditions. We were alone.

Although he made effort include wide range general social topics he spent most of hour discussing arms question Fedayeen terrorism and Hammarskjold conversation with Nasser which proceeding that moment. He very tense, jumping up quickly when telephone rang or when messengers knocked at front door which was frequent. He wasted not 1 minute retiring to another room to talk with Chief of Staff Dayan who arrived during my short visit.

While affable and friendly he did not hesitate to express opinion US taken in by Nasser and making big mistake placing confidence there repeating at some length his usual line of reasoning; indicated US (President) only can by quick and strong warning to Nasser reduce immediate danger war and also ultimate Soviet penetration NE area and Africa.

However most immediate concern was Fedayeen terrorism which continuing unabated. He said earlier reports such attacks planned for Tel Aviv (Embtel 1063 [2]) now supplemented by report they delayed until Saturday. However Dayan brought in report of heavy attacks in vicinity Tel Aviv (Embtel 1076 [3]) which may indicate step-up in Fedayeen approach to Tel Aviv. I noted last night and this morning heavy police-soldier patrolling of main highway entrances to Tel Aviv with machine guns prominent and all traffic stopped and searched.

When Ben Gurion cited earlier radio report received in Tel Aviv that Nasser had turned down Hammarskjold's demand for agreement conform article II GAA I cautioned him not to believe report until confirmed as it too early in my opinion for any authentic report to come out of Cairo. I also expressed opinion Hammarskjold would of necessity take firm line with Nasser in that agreement on article II would be essential to Hammarskjold's entire mission. He thought this logical but waiting anxiously for next news broadcast over radio. He again described at length extreme dangers Fedayeen attacks to Israel and reasons Israel could not long endure them.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1256. Secret; Niact; Noforn. Received at 10:35 p.m. Also sent niact to Cairo and repeated to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Paris, and London.

[2] Document 271.

[3] *Supra.*

I left him tired but tense man awaiting further messages during night from his advisors. I unable determine particular reason for his invitation to visit him other than to reiterate and underscore extreme seriousness of Israel's present position under Fedayeen attacks and need for US arms. I left with impression he thinking of extent of Israel enduring current conditions more in terms of hours rather than days but he gave no indication of having actually reached final decision to take violent action. But I felt that action would be triggered if Fedayeen attack reaches Tel Aviv on Saturday [4] or before unless there immediate evidence incursions stopped.

Lawson

[4] April 14.

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277. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, April 12, 1956—noon.

414. Colonel Hommel of UNTSO has given me morning April 12 following details respecting messages exchanged between UNSYG and Israelis in course his talks with Nasser.

In message sent April 11 UNSYG apprised Ben Gurion that Nasser had accepted proposals regarding cease-fire through observance Article II, paragraph 2 GAA in its entirety (ConGentel 404 [2]).

A second message was received at UNTSO headquarters from UNSYG for Ben Gurion somewhat later along following lines. UNSYG expressed himself as pleased Ben Gurion's agreement keep patrols 500 meters back from D/L while Hammarskjold–Nasser talks in progress. Referring again Nasser's acceptance cease-fire UNSYG pointed out that since both sides have accepted he urged steps be taken at once implement undertaking.

However, before arrival second message Hommel had received Sharett's reply to first message. [3] Reply referred renewed outbreaks Fedayeen activities night April 11 and stated inter alia utter falseness

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1256. Confidential; Niact. Received at 8:08 a.m. Repeated niact to Cairo and priority to Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Document 256.

[3] See Document 274.

Nasser's assurances stands exposed thereby, etc. (Understand full text already transmitted by Tel Aviv.) Hommel has not therefore delivered UNSYG second message to GOI. He is reporting fully to UNSYG and expects some further communication in response Sharett's message.

Cole

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278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada [1]

Washington, April 12, 1956—12:36 p.m.

398. From the Secretary. Deptel Ottawa 394, London 6002, Paris 3747, Rome 3278, Tel Aviv 756. [2] Israeli Ambassador Eban called on me on 11th [3] to complain that despite efforts by Israeli Government during past two weeks to buy planes in Europe and Canada, no success had been achieved due in each instance, he felt, to fact that respective foreign governments did not want to sell military planes to Israel unless US itself was ready to sell some significant military items to Israel. I said I did not believe all possibilities in this direction had been exhausted and would be glad to inquire into matter further.

Embassies Ottawa, London, Paris and Rome should discuss subject with respective foreign offices, pointing out that failure of US so far to sell arms is not desired to result in de facto stoppage of sale by other western countries. US has no desire perpetual [*perpetuate*] imbalance.

You will naturally be asked why US advises other countries to do what we have refused to do. You may point out that US has not in recent years been a supplier of arms to Israel and while possibility of future sales by US is not excluded, we believe Soviets might redouble their efforts to arm Arabs if US entered picture and arms race might result. Experience in sale of Mysteres by France shows

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784.A.56/4–1256. Secret. Drafted by Allen, cleared in draft with the Secretary, and approved by Allen who signed for Dulles. Also sent to London, Paris, Rome, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

[2] Printed as telegram 3747, Document 269.

[3] The memorandum of conversation is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/4–1156)

clearly that Arab reaction is less excited if arms are not directed from US even though it is known that US consent was required.

You should make it clear that US is not prepared to give blanket concurrence in advance to unlimited sales to Israel, particularly where OSP or other US interests involved. Each such case where US concurrence is required will be considered separately.

Report your early convenience. [4]

Dulles

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[4] Ambassador Stuart at Ottawa subsequently reported that Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson told him that Canada was reluctant to sell fighter planes to Israel, but that the matter would be discussed by the Canadian Cabinet on April 13. (Telegram 384 from Ottawa, April 13; *ibid.*, 784A.56/4–1356)

Ambassador Dillon at Paris informed the Department that Maillard of the French Foreign Ministry believed that France would probably not make any additional sales of Mysteres to Israel in view of Arab hostility to the most recent French sale of Mysteres to the Israelis. (Telegram 4776 from Paris, April 13; *ibid.*)

The Embassy in London reported that the British Foreign Office position was not one of complete refusal to sell arms to Israel, and that the United Kingdom had in fact recently supplied Israel with six Meteor night fighter planes. Israel's main effort in Great Britain was the purchase of Centurion tanks, which the British were hesitant to sell to Israel at that time because they were in short supply and in view of possible adverse reactions in Jordan and Iraq. (Telegram 4630 from London, April 13; *ibid.*)

The Embassy in Rome informed the Department that the contents of this instruction had been conveyed to the Foreign Office on April 13. The Foreign Office response was that it was questionable "whether Italian Government would supply arms to Israel at this time without United States participation in such shipments." (Telegram 3539 from Rome, April 16; *ibid.*, 784A.56/4–1656)

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279. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, April 12, 1956—5 p.m.

417. With reference last sentence ConGentel 414 [2] UNSYG has addressed a further message to Ben Gurion April 12. It amounts to appeal for restraint on Fedayeen activities night April 11. UNTSO states message delivered Tekoah, who said Ben Gurion "not available", but he offered make "every effort" to deliver it. Text message follows:

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1256. Confidential; Niact. Received at 1:36 p.m. Repeated priority to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, and Damascus.

[2] Document 277.

"I have received your message in reply to my transmittal of the assurance given me yesterday afternoon by the Government of Egypt concerning compliance with Article II, paragraph 2.

"Let me first of all express my deep regret for the serious loss of lives from what I trust to be the last flare-up of the intrusions.

"Simultaneously with the message which has already been delivered to you, I sent to you another message which, in view of your reaction, was not delivered. I have now instructed Colonel Hommel, in spite of last night's incidents, to deliver to you also that second message. I wish to draw your attention to the fact that the substance of this second message has been confirmed by the reported return of the Fedayeens back from the raids.

"The precarious balance which would be established after calling off of the Fedayeen activities, and on the basis of specific mutual assurances concerning implementation of the undertakings under Article II, paragraph 2, can be maintained only by the utmost restraint and the courage to stand up to test on both sides. The matters involved are far too serious to permit anybody to risk upsetting a balance that may lead to quiet by inconsiderate action or statement.

"It is not for the Secretary-General to add to the tension by public statements. He has refrained from doing so after the events of last week. He will refrain from doing so now. The proper body for such condemnation is, as you well know, the Security Council. I am looking forward to your immediate reply to my question in the second message."

Cole

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280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France [1]

Washington, April 12, 1956—6 p.m.

3802. On April 11 French Ambassador informed Secretary contents urgent telegraphic communication from Pineau expressing concern at rapid deterioration Near East situation and view Tripartite Powers could not remain "impassive" when hostilities might break out at any time. [2] Since it seemed possible Hammarskjold peace mission had been overtaken by events, Pineau thought that he, Secretary and Lloyd should meet without delay to discuss evolution

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–1256. Secret. Drafted and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London.

[2] The memorandum of conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #2)

of events. Message expressed no preference as to place of meeting, but stated situation such as to render it inadvisable await scheduled Tripartite meeting Paris May 6.

French Ambassador informed April 12 that Pineau proposal had been given careful consideration by Secretary who, on balance, did not think it would be wise call Ministerial meeting this juncture.[3] Tripartite meeting could be interpreted as competitive with mission Hammarskjold who at present in area talking with both sides. Secretary believed in first instance we should support Hammarskjold mission, and until we knew results it would not be productive for three governments pursue separate course. However, in view tense situation it obviously important for us keep in close touch and senior officers Department available at any time for this purpose. Ambassador undertook convey this reaction Pineau.

British Embassy Washington informed by Foreign Office London similar approach by French there.[4] Understood Lloyd shares Secretary's view Ministerial meeting this juncture inadvisable. He suggested to US possible alternative holding Ambassadorial Committee meeting Washington to discuss situation. In conveying British Embassy substance US position as given French Ambassador,[5] Department expressed reservation re Ambassadorial Committee meeting since publicity which probably inevitable would create many of the problems involved in Ministerial meeting. Department thought it important, however, three governments keep in close touch through normal channels.

FYI only: There are some indications UK desires create public impression Tripartite plans have been refined to point where there clear understanding what powers will do both within and outside UN in case hostilities should break out. Implication would be that military action involved. Because of number factors including Congressional reaction US must carefully avoid any such implication. End FYI.

Dulles

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[3] The memorandum of conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 780.00/4–1256)

[4] The memorandum of conversation between Wilkins and Willie Morris of the British Embassy is not printed. (*Ibid.*, 396.1/4–1156)

[5] The memorandum of conversation between Rountree and John E. Coulson of the British Embassy is not printed. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #2)

281. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Prochnow) to the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) [1]

Washington, April 12, 1956.

SUBJECT

Shipments to the Arab Countries

I have discussed with Harold McClellan, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs, the subject of Mr. Rountree's memorandum to you of April 4. [2] Mr. McClellan will inform the Secretary of Commerce [3] of our discussion.

Commerce is holding up a number of shipments to the Arab countries. This afternoon Mr. McClellan informed me that about 200 shipments, involving approximately $8 to $10 million, are being held up. Commerce would like to discuss with someone from this Department the possible release of marginal items which could be exported. I am having someone from E go over to Commerce tomorrow to determine the character of the merchandise in these shipments to see whether it would be desirable to release at least some of them. Any suggestions you have on this matter would be appreciated.

I have also discussed with True D. Morse, Under Secretary of Agriculture, the subject of the memorandum of April 4. Agriculture will follow the suggestions in the memorandum. In addition, Mr. Morse said that Agriculture would try to "drag its feet" in connection with any shipments under agreements already concluded.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.56/4–1256. Secret.
[2] Document 239.
[3] Sinclair Weeks.

282. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, April 14, 1956.

Mr. Secretary:

There is attached a first rough cut (done on a crash basis) regarding the stockpiling of aircraft in the Mediterranean area.

The paper does *not* deal with the possibility of using aircraft carrier borne planes but Defense will have some information on this Monday. [2] Using carrier planes would involve considerably greater difficulty insofar as training Israelis is concerned, but we will get the dope on this.

We have learned that the Israelis asked the Italians to train Israel pilots in Italy on F–86's last March but the Italians turned them down, because of an adverse U.S. reaction. It seems to me one of the best ways might, if we decided to proceed on this project, be to say to Israel that we would permit (if aggression occurred) Italy to sell Israel F–86's assembled in Italy. In the meantime, we could tell Italy we don't object to Italy training Israeli pilots on F–86's. Then, if planes were turned over to Israel in the event of aggression, they could be flown to Israel via Greece and Cyprus. Israel would have to help get transit rights from the Greeks as in the case of the Mysteres.

I do not recommend this course of action at this juncture as it requires much more thought and has some NATO angles but I believe it might be the least complicated and most feasible way to do it.

I'll be interested in your general reaction. When we have it, Francis Russell and I will re-work the paper.

DMacA

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #2. Top Secret; Omega. The source text bears a notation that the Secretary saw this memorandum.

[2] April 16.

[Attachment]

PROPOSAL FOR STOCKPILING WEAPONS FOR BENEFIT OF VICTIM OF AGGRESSION IN MIDDLE EAST [3]

It has been proposed that between 24 and 48 F–86's be stockpiled at some point in the Middle East from which they could be quickly made available to Israel in the event that the latter were, or appeared about to be, the victim of aggression. This paper considers the practicability of this proposal, the ways in which it might be carried out, and its effectiveness and possible consequences. It will also suggest an elaboration of this proposal in stockpiling additional equipment that might be made available to the Arabs in the event they were the victims of aggression.

1. Place of Stockpiling:

From the point of view of quickness of availability, the two places which suggest themselves are the Adana base in Turkey and the British base in Cyprus. One problem in connection with the use of Adana would be that Turkey is associated with Iraq in the Baghdad Pact and the use of Turkey as the base for planes that were going to be made available to Israel could damage the position of Iraq in the rest of the Arab world and might, for that reason, be protested by Iraq. In addition, the Turkish Government is pressing the U.S. for a number of things and an approach to them on this question might be utilized by them as an occasion for further pressure on us. (Memorandum on storage of aircraft in Turkey attached at Tab A.) [4] Cyprus, of course, is the locus of current violence. Also the presence of F–86's on Cyprus might be regarded as U.S. support for Britain's position there.

Another possibility would be to stockpile aircraft in Italy or alternatively to draw on available aircraft in Italy to meet the need. This would require some understandings within the NATO framework but would appear to be politically feasible. It would also entail problems of transit rights through Greece, which presumably could be obtained. (Memorandum on military transit rights through Greece attached at Tab B.)[4] Brindisi Air Field in Southern Italy offers the best possibilities for storage. The F–86 has an endurance, combat

[3] Omega–Top Secret. Drafted by Russell; Elbert Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff; and Captain D.J. Wagner, USN, on April 14. Captain Wagner, who was Director of Near East, South Asia, and Africa Affairs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, was Gordon Gray's representative with respect to all Omega matters. (Memorandum for the record, by MacArthur, April 4; Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1)

[4] Not printed.

loaded, of 800 nautical miles. The distances are Brindisi to Athens, 472 nautical miles, Athens to Cyprus, 586 nautical miles, and, Cyprus to Israel, 200 nautical miles.

2. Training:

A stockpile of F–86's would be of no use to Israel unless its air crews had been trained in their use. If Israel is to obtain F–86's from Canada or Italy on the basis of our approaches to those governments, this would not be a serious problem. The training time required to convert a Meteor jet pilot to a combat ready F–86 pilot requires a minimum of 4 weeks and 40 flying hours. For ferrying purposes, one week and 10 hours of training is required. All required training could take place in Germany, Italy, France or Greece. Last March Israel asked the Italian Government whether Israel pilots could be given F–86 training in Italy. The Italians were disposed to agree but consulted the U.S. MAAG which, after consulting Defense, said that in view of NATO training requirements, it was inclined to disapprove the proposal but said the decision up to the Italians. The Italians turned down the request. It can be presumed that the Italian Government would be willing to reconsider.

3. Secrecy:

If the Israelis are not to be told of the possible availability of aircraft to them, secrecy could probably be maintained if the whole project is handled unilaterally or as a U.S.–UK undertaking. If, however, the Israelis are to be informed—and it is difficult to see what practical benefits would result from the proposed action unless they were informed—secrecy is obviously out of the question as they would certainly let it be known publicly.

4. Alternative Methods:

The question will arise as to whether the proposal should be made a unilateral action on the part of the U.S., as a joint action with the U.K., or as a Tripartite proposal. It would be difficult to bring this under the U.N. "umbrella."

In any case, if it is to be announced publicly, it would be practicable and desirable to relate it to our plans for economic and financial sanctions against an aggressor, which have already been made known. It could also be tied to the President's recent statement that we would provide assistance to the victim of aggression.[5] The rationale would be that in addition to plans for sanctions, we were

[5] See footnote 2, Document 258.

also making plans for prompt and concrete assistance in the form of aircraft to Israel should it be attacked.

While it would be feasible for us to proceed with the proposal unilaterally, there are various reasons, prominent among which is the need for close coordination generally with the U.K., to take the British into our confidence and to seek their cooperation where it may be helpful. Should we decide that the aircraft can best be stockpiled on Cyprus, British cooperation would obviously be essential. Whether or not we brought the French into the picture would rest primarily on our assessment of the utility of maintaining the Tripartite front.

5. Evaluation:

Unless we made it public that we intended to establish a stockpile of aircraft for Israel, our action would have no effect in relieving Israel's apprehensions or decreasing the prospects of hostilities in the Near East. If we do announce the project, the Israel reaction would probably be one of moderate gratification. They would regard them as replacements for battle losses. They would, however, insist that aircraft outside of Israel and available only on a contingency basis are no substitute for outright additions to Israel's own Air Force. They would probably continue to press for increased deliveries direct to them.

Despite the fact that we would make it clear that these aircraft would be made available to Israel only if it were the victim of aggression, the Arabs would interpret this move as further evidence of our underlying predisposition to side with and support the Israelis. Egypt might well react by seeking additional aircraft from the Soviet Union. Unless and until such additional aircraft were obtained, our stockpile might have a deterrent effect on the Egyptians. This possibility should not, however, be over rated. If the Egyptians are thinking in terms of a surprise air attack on Israel, they may well calculate that they could mount this attack and bomb their important objectives before the stockpiled aircraft could be brought into play. If they were successful in heavily damaging a large proportion of the Israeli air fields, their calculations might well be correct.

6. Balanced Stockpiles:

An alternative to the basic proposal would be to establish in the area a countervailing stockpile of defensive military equipment that would be made available to the Arabs in the event that Israel were the aggressor. If this were done, it would be possible to present the proposal as an even-handed offer to both sides. This would have the

consequence of decreasing Israel's gratification and Arab objections. It must be said, however, that it is fairly doubtful that the equipment for the Arabs could be made available to them in sufficient time to weigh in the initial stages of the battle with Israel. (Further study is being given to the place where equipment for the Arabs should be stored.) We now assume that if the Israelis were the aggressor, they would strike hard and fast with the objective of destroying Egyptian forces presently in the Sinai peninsula. They would very probably accomplish this objective before the stockpiled equipment could be delivered to the Egyptian armed forces. The type of arms suggested for the Arabs are modern anti-aircraft, anti-tank and rocket launchers. However, the Arab states now have more modern equipment than they will be able to utilize effectively for 12 to 24 months. If additional U.S. equipment is furnished, it will appeal to the Arabs only if it is "prestige items" such as the 120 mm AA guns. Training of 120 mm AA gun units will take from 9 to 12 months for effective operation of the equipment and from 18 to 24 months for the technical and maintenance personnel.

The effect on the Israelis of the furnishing to the Arabs U.S. Army material would be one of little concern militarily. They are well aware of the capability of the Arabs to absorb such equipment and know that it will not increase the Arab military potential for a considerable period of time.

7. Conclusions:

a. Further intensive study should be given to the stockpiling proposed.

b. If the proposal is approved, secret preparations should be carried out to stockpile aircraft and other weapons which might be offered to the potential victim of aggression.

c. Israel and the Arab states should not be informed of these preparations unless it appeared that thereby we could prevent precipitate military action by one of the parties.

d. If the parties are informed, publicity should be given to the project, emphasizing that arms would be made immediately available to a victim of aggression.

e. Stockpiling of jet aircraft should be done in Italy. The planes would be moved to Israel via Greece and Cyprus.

f. Advance training of Israeli pilots in F–86's is essential. This could be provided in Italy, France, or Greece, preferably Italy.

g. The British Government should be informed of this operation because of the close work we have been doing with them on the Palestine problem and the good prospects of their maintaining secre-

cy. Because transit through Greece is involved, the Greek government would have to be informed.

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283. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, April 14, 1956—3:51 p.m.

6146. Makins discussed with Secretary April 13 answers Lloyd should give Parliament April 17. [2] Secretary recommended British take following line:

Strong emphasis on supporting Hammarskjold mission; fact that UK Ambassador in close and continuing contact with Secretary; that UK representative in UN in similar close touch with US UN representative; and that similar contacts being maintained by British/French and US/French. If questioned about tripartite meeting, Lloyd might take position that such a meeting would be held when it would serve the best purpose, but at present everything should be done avoid any action which might be construed to conflict with Hammarskjold mission.

Secretary said he thought that generally speaking line he informed British would take with Bulganin and Khrushchev pretty good. [3] He agreed it important emphasize with Soviets action in UN rather than in Tripartite Declaration framework since he agreed Soviets disliked tripartite framework.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1456. Secret. Drafted by William D. Fisher, Staff Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and approved by MacArthur who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Paris.

[2] The memorandum of conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #2)

[3] Lloyd informed Aldrich on April 11 of the four-point presentation the British proposed to make to Khrushchev and Bulganin:

"(1) Make clear to Soviets that situation in Middle East and their activities there may well lead to hostilities which in all probability could not be localized.

"(2) Give them clear statement that 'British are determined to fight for oil in area.'

"(3) Suggest that, if Soviets are really interested in maintenance of peace, they should announce publicly that they will accept and support any recommendations Hammarskjold makes re strengthening UNTSO.

"(4) Suggest that Soviets should agree that in event of hostilities they will not veto Security Council action in (A) naming aggressor and (B) instituting military action to meet aggression." (Telegram 4591 from London, April 12; *ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1256)

Makins confirmed UK opposed Pineau suggestion immediate tripartite ministerial meeting but proposed meeting Ambassadorial level Washington next week. Secretary said he opposed Ambassadorial meeting at this time stressing that primary emphasis at this juncture should be on action through UN rather than three powers. Referring to his private meeting with Congressional leaders April 10, [4] Secretary inquired whether British couldn't do something similar with key members Parliament to reduce pressures for public debate which would only serve create more confusion at this time. Mentioned draft of President's speech next week [5] had only one paragraph dealing with Middle East and in general terms.

Dulles

[4] See Document 265.

[5] Presumably reference is to the President's address at the annual dinner of the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 21. For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956*, pp. 399–409.

284. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 15, 1956—6 p.m.

1098. In conversation with Embassy counselor late last night, Herzog, who had just come from Ben Gurion's home, said that Prime Minister had calmed a bit . . . but was still highly incensed at the "highly arbitrary placement responsibility" on Israel for future developments. Ben Gurion however had decided to wait until SYG's arrival there Tuesday [2] before engaging in further exchanges. Herzog said Ben Gurion's overwrought manner yesterday reflected both the pressures which Prime Minister had been under from some quarters since September to take preventive action, plus "tremendous pressures from all quarters to retaliate" for past weeks Fedayeen activities. He remarked that Friday's [3] special Cabinet meeting (to consider security matters) had been stormy one. Herzog added that Ben

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1556. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:53 a.m., April 16. Repeated priority to Cairo.

[2] April 17.

[3] April 13.

Gurion still withstanding these pressures but next few days would tell the story.

Embassy counselor commented Hammarskjold was being tough with both sides; that this was necessary if results were to be obtained; and it would be a serious mistake for Israel to undertake retaliation at time when SYG was engaged in active negotiations and before enough time had elapsed to give Nasser opportunity to demonstrate whether he was adhering to his commitments.

Comment: Embassy hopes Hammarskjold's activities and Eban's April 11 conversation with Secretary,[4] which is interpreted here as reopening possibilities for arms procurement, may have arrested or retarded Israel reprisal or more serious military action. The situation remains potentially critical however and we believe there are several possible developments which could cause resurge of desperation here and which should receive Department's closest attention.

Firstly, there is question of special Fedayeen squad or squads reportedly within Israel awaiting further instructions from Nasser which apparently weighs so much on Ben Gurion's mind that he has discussed it with me three times within past week. Similar reports have been received by USARMA. Embassy is convinced that GOI places credence in these reports. Tel Aviv for three days and nights has been ringed with thousands of police and troops closely checking all possible entries into city. In view of terrific impact of this operation on their own citizens, it is hardly likely that it constitutes demonstration merely for foreign consumption.

Secondly, we are concerned about possibility of substitutive Fedayeen activities originating from Jordan, Lebanon and possibly Syria (Amman's 553 and London's 4609 to Department[5]). GOI has already received reports that Fedayeen are entering from Jordan and Friday night's incident near Meron lends credence to British Foreign Office report of intercepted messages. While Nasser might have some success before world opinion in disclaiming responsibility for such activities, GOI is, as Department knows, convinced for many months Egypt has established and maintained Fedayeen training activities in both Jordan and Syria.

Finally yesterday's incident near Nirim in which an Israel command car was blown up by mine, with injury reported to total of seven soldiers, points to possibility resumption mining activities from Gaza. Department will recall long period mining activities and

[4] See Document 279.

[5] Neither printed. (Both Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/4–1356)

casualties April–May 1955 which, along with other incidents, served as prelude to small Israeli retaliation.

Lawson

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285. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 15, 1956—6 p.m.

1099. For the Secretary. . . . I gave Ben Gurion a short oral summary Deptel 765. [2]

Ben Gurion thanked me for the information; said your April 11 talk with Eban represented "some advance"; but you "must realize the position of those countries".

In elaboration, and based on conversations in which GOI representatives had already engaged with western countries, Prime Minister cited following:

1. Canada in best position because no colonies or other special Middle East interests. Nevertheless, Canadians sensitive to sovereignty and independence from US and it would be extremely difficult for Cabinet to go to Parliament and explain arms sales on grounds that GOE [*GOI*] preferred that Canada rather than US act as supplier.

2. Position France and England even more difficult because of their critical position in Arab world—France in Algeria and Britain in Aden, Jordan and Buraimi. Difficulties for them this matter increased by fact that Arabs know USG supply arms to Israel.

3. Therefore, they (western countries) say with some reason that if United States would be willing to release a portion of arms needed, they would supply rest. Although they are being told by United States to go ahead, they do not dare.

4. "France and Canada have goodwill toward Israel, perhaps does Italy. Britain may be changing its attitude. They are giving a few night fighters." USG with no colonies, already supplying arms to Baghdad Pact members, and as friends of both sides, is in better position than France or Britain to help Israel. I interposed that France had been able to provide Mysteres to Israel without the violent reaction from Arabs which might have occurred from a similar US transaction. Ben Gurion replied Nasser had protested to Pineau but

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1556. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:47 p.m., April 16. Repeated to Ottawa, London, Paris, and Rome.

[2] Printed as telegram 398, Document 279.

that latter was an honorable man and had stood by promises he had made to Israel.

5. Ben Gurion concluded his remarks by saying "Mister Ambassador, America is not what it was a hundred years ago when it was a provincial state. You are now in position of having replaced Britain as world leader. They (western countries) want at least a token shipment of arms from US. Then they are in better position to go ahead".

When I reminded Ben Gurion of your April 11 conversation with Eban, he replied, "yes, it marks a little advance".

Lawson

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286. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 17, 1956—3 p.m.

1106. At my suggestion Foreign Minister, received me in Tel Aviv Monday for my oral presentation substance Deptel 765 [2] which I thought would convince him we are taking active steps within circumstances to encourage other countries to supply arms and to clarify any misunderstanding regarding US position. I made it clear my approach limited entirely these objectives and furthermore not to be construed as formal message.

He said he "greatly welcomed" two points; a. US intent to bring influence to bear on governments to persuade them to sell arms to Israel and, b. US statement on undesirability of perpetual imbalance in arms. However, he was afraid both points were nullified by other elements in US position.

(1) He was convinced that US influence on other countries would prove uneffective in absence some US sales to Israel. He could report that GOI's "intimate" contact with Canadians had now persuaded him there was little prospect obtaining planes from them without US sales. Nor was he hopeful of further Mystere sales from France; French Foreign Minister had advised Israeli Chargé he not willing that France bear entire responsibility arms supply. However, if US supplied some arms, French were prepared to supply perhaps 75 percent Israel's needs but not 100 percent.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/4–1756. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:40 p.m., April 18. Repeated to Ottawa, London, Paris, and Rome.

[2] Printed as telegram 398, Document 279.

He appreciated US initiative in making clear to France it would have no objection to interruption OSP Assembly [*sic*] to supply additional dozen Mysteres to Israel. But this was not sufficient to persuade France. It appeared that Israel would be left with nothing but 12 Mysteres which it now had "more or less in hand". This was "dismal and alarming prospect." (He put Italy in different category, saying he was not persuaded US as of now wanted Israel to obtain F–86's from that source. "If you have agreed we should have them from Italy, please say so". He said Eban had been told by Department that US representations in Rome would "help with other items". This they did not need. Italy was prepared to make everything available—"in reasonable quantities" which was under its exclusive control.

(2) He argued that for US simultaneously to postulate distaste for arms imbalance and fear of contributing to arms race constituted contradiction in terms. US must make up its mind. If it did not wish imbalance perpetuated there was chance of correcting situation by US sales to Israel. This might set off arms race. He doubted it, but risk must be taken. There was no chance correcting imbalance if US arms were not sold to Israel.

(3) Our reiteration that US policy did not preclude US sales to Israel had long ceased to be any comfort. After months of no sales, statement could be just as logically construed to mean no sales were contemplated. (I argued that our statement that US sales to Israel "were not precluded" might bring little comfort when addressed to Israel, in this instance we were declaring it as policy to other governments which was a different thing. It represented a positive statement of policy and it eliminated any possibility of misunderstanding regarding US position. I felt it a helpful and encouraging action on our part. Sharrett remained unconvinced this would influence other governments to positive action.) As to US dislike to "unlimited sales" (penultimate paragraph Deptel 765) he said none was desired by Israel for economic reasons if no other.

(4) If US really wanted to give practical constructive assistance it was Israel's very earnest and urgent plea that a few items which were "manageable" from US standpoint should be picked from Israel's list and delivered to her. He cited F–84's as example, stating they were for reconnaissance which was purely defensive assignment. If US prepared to do this, it would encourage Canadians to sell F–86's. It would also have marked effect on France and gordion knot would at last be cut.

(5) Developing this theme on basis my remark that US was not traditional supplier major arms to Israel, he said if US wanted to avoid appearance having embarked on new policy as result of Czech deal, it could supply anti-tank and AA weapons which it had supplied in past, thus only continuing established routine policy towards Israel but enabling Israel to persuade other countries to sell items he needed which US could or would not furnish.

Comment: As noted, I prefaced my remarks by explaining Department had addressed the primarily potential sources of arms and no reply was necessary unless he cared to comment. He seized opportunity to restate GOI position with usual alacrity, but it was obvious

that he was rehearsing very familiar story in most details. Of most interest to me were his positive suggestions reported under 4 and 5 above. From Herzog we had already received information that Eban is preparing abbreviated list of arms which, I take it, fits into Sharrett's suggested program.[3] When Israelis renew their presentation to us as they inevitably will in face of uniformly negative response they are receiving in other capitals, it probably will be on this line.

Lawson

[3] Israeli Ambassador Eban presented such a list to Secretary Dulles on April 30. (Memorandum of conversation by Bergus, April 30; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–3056)

287. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State[1]

Ottawa, April 17, 1956—6 p.m.

391. For Secretary. Reference Department telegram 398[2] and Embassy telegram 384.[3] External Under Secretary Leger stated Pearson informed House External Affairs Committee today that Israeli request for 24 fighter planes still under consideration by government. In Leger's opinion cabinet will not reach final decision before two weeks time and then decision will likely be unfavorable. In response to query as to what additional information cabinet would have in two weeks he replied that 1) Canada awaiting clarification UK position on Canadian sale fighter planes as only UK reaction received to date was "no objection", 2) further details concerning Arab reaction to French sale of Mysteres desired and 3) more information concerning results Hammarskjold's mission would be unavailable. Leger expressed opinion that actual fighting and continuing series of incidents were a psychological factor in Canadian reluctance approve sale. He also pointed out Canada not customary supplier of arms to Israel.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/4–1756. Secret. Received at 9:23 a.m., April 18. Also sent to London, Paris, Rome, Tel Aviv, and USUN.
[2] Document 279.
[3] See footnote 4, *ibid.*

Leger believes that unwillingness US sell arms to Israel despite explanation given constitutes major stumbling block for Canada, France and UK. He stated, as completely personal suggestion which in no way represented Canadian Government proposal, that some formula such as a US-Canadian agreement that each would supply twelve fighter planes in response Israeli request for 24 plane squadron might serve break existing deadlock. [4]

Stuart

[4] Stuart reported on April 25 that Pearson had told him the Canadian Cabinet would not act on the Israeli request for 24 fighter planes until after the NATO Ministerial meeting, and that the preponderant sentiment at that moment in the Cabinet was against approving the Israeli request. (Telegram 402 from Ottawa; Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/4–2556)

288. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 18, 1956—4 p.m.

1110. When Ben Gurion and Sharett were informed of my proposed departure for US [2] they immediately set up a meeting in Ben Gurion's home at 9 p.m. last night. This meeting was somewhat dramatized by the assignment of a 5-man police escort to accompany me from Tel Aviv through the Jerusalem Corridor, although the Fedayeen situation no longer appears acute.

Purpose of this meeting was obviously to: (1) Inform me that unfortunate controversy between Hammarskjold and Ben Gurion had been completely and amicably resolved. They wished to clear books completely of this episode in order that there might be absolutely no prejudice on part of US Government with regard to situation.

Sharett did most of talking but everything he said was attended to by Ben Gurion who seemed somewhat tired from their 2 conferences with Hammarskjold during day lasting a total of 5 hours.

Sharett made it clear that this unfortunate controversy had been cleared up; that both sides had agreed to forget incident; that there

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674A.84/4–1856. Secret. Received at 5:47 a.m., April 19. Repeated to Cairo.

[2] Lawson arrived in Washington on April 21 for consultations.

had been a further clarification of Hammarskjold's miscalculation regarding the publication of Ben Gurion's letter; that the "decks had been cleared for action" for the talks; that limited progress had been made during the talks; and that atmosphere was an entirely congenial one.

At this point, Sharett addressed his remarks to Ben Gurion and related some of his conversation with Hammarskjold in the car en route from Lydda to Jerusalem. . . .

. . . . . .

Sharett . . . asked Hammarskjold why he took it upon himself to assure that Nasser does not want war. Hammarskjold replied that he was prompted to this conclusion because Nasser had resisted very strong pressures from other Arab states to take military action after latest Gaza incident. Hammarskjold said he concluded Nasser does not want war now . . . [3] perhaps later he may wish it and after few months he could not say what situation would be. For moment however he convinced Nasser had no war intention.

Hammarskjold said therefore, he had reasoned that getting public commitment from Nasser that he did not want war would create position from which Nasser would be unlikely to move. He thought this would help stabilize situation.

Sharett said Hammarskjold had asked Ben Gurion for letter undertaking that Israel would engage in no shooting and no crossing of lines by regulars or irregulars (he had included irregulars to meet Nasser situation although we do not have any in this country). He said Hammarskjold was at moment engaged in trying to secure similar letter from Nasser. I understood Ben Gurion has agreed to supply such letter. In both instances undertaking will become effective from 6 p.m. Israel time Wednesday night. [4] Although Hammarskjold has Ben Gurion's assurance of letter he is not publishing it until he gets Nasser's reply. He hopes this firm and public undertaking on both sides will assure complete quiet while his negotiations are continuing.

2. To comment on Dulles press conference Sharett referred to radio comment on Secretary's press conference in Washington. [5] He said Dulles was asked about arms from Canada. The report of Secretary's reply was interpreted by both him and Ben Gurion to mean Dulles had merely said he not imposing world embargo on Israel. At this point Sharett turned to Ben Gurion and related to him

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

[4] April 18.

[5] For text of Secretary Dulles' press conference on April 17, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 30, 1956, p. 710.

substance his conversation with me Independence Day (Embtel 1106 [6]) ending up with his proposal re F84s. Ben Gurion nodded complete assent.

3. To comment on new Soviet policy Sharett and Ben Gurion both referred to new Soviet policy statement issued April 11.[7] Sharett referred particularly to Soviets willingness recognize demarcation lines. When I inquired whether this might not displease Arabs, Ben Gurion not sure that it would have any material effect on Arab-Soviet relations, but Sharett convinced there would be what he termed "ripple in Arab press." They considered this completely new development with regard to middle eastern conditions and interpreted good word said for France and Britain as a "sop" . . . [8] a sop to British prior to upcoming visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev and a sop to French before Mollet's proposed visit to Moscow.[9] Sharett is of opinion Soviets giving much more consideration to friendship recently and as they realize there is present favorable attitude of French toward Israel they are a little careful not to upset French in Middle East area. He also referred to UP dispatch from Moscow theme of which was that, despite this new statement of Mollet's [*Moscow's*] regarding demarcation lines, Soviets would retain Arab friendship.

In discussing changes in Soviet Union later and especially the anti-Stalin line now Sharett referred to visit to Russia recently of Syrian Communist who returned to Syria and publicly expressed great bitterness toward Moscow because he feared Soviets not willing to go all out against Israel. Near close of conversation both Sharett and Ben Gurion asked me to convey their most respectful greetings to Secretary.

Sharett concluded conversation by saying "in light of your numerous conversations with Prime Minister and myself we confident you will know what to tell Secretary". I remarked that I should be pleased to give him fair and objective report on exact situation and attitudes which existed here.

Sharett then referred again to his conversations about F84s and other items which United States Government might find "manageable" and thus influence French and Canadian Governments to move in direction of supplying arms to Israel. Ben Gurion made one

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[6] Document 286.

[7] Presumably reference is to the Soviet policy statement of April 17 regarding the Middle East. See Document 291.

[8] Ellipsis in the source text.

[9] French Prime Minister Guy Mollet and French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau traveled to Moscow on May 15 for an official visit. Mollet and his party returned to France on May 20.

remark in this connection saying "if you could bring 72 planes to Israel you would find peace in this area".

Lawson

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289. Message to Washington [1]

No. 133

Cairo, April 18, 1956.

1. A . . . source reports Nasr told Ambassador Byroade on 10 April wished resume talks . . . Anderson. Ambassador Byroade says Nasr did not discuss. . . . unable check back since feels info told him in confidence.

2. Another . . . source on 13 April reported Egypt eager work out problems with U.S. Government, forget past mistakes both sides "Even Baghdad Pact". . . .

3. Possible Nasr may be under mistaken impression he mentioned matter Ambassador Byroade, may be ready resume talks. . . . If report true . . . feels climate here much more constructive than any recent time.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part II. Secret. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw this message.

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290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, April 18, 1956—7:40 p.m.

6231. Eyes only for Ambassador. This message, following message and any other message carrying new slug "Limit Distribution—Presidential Handling" are to be seen only by Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission. Any cable referring to such message

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6141/4–1865. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution—Presidential Handling. Cleared by Goodpaster and approved by Howe who signed for Dulles.

should be slugged "Limit Distribution—Presidential Handling" to ensure most limited distribution and expeditious handling.

FYI following is text of letter delivered by UK Embassy Washington from Prime Minister to President and relates to President's letter (Deptel Eyes Only 5881 [2]) of April 5. For reply see immediately following Presidential Handling Deptel 6232. [3]

Begin text. April 18, 1956

My dear friend, I am grateful for your message about the Russian visit, and for your generous expression of confidence.

We expect the Middle East to come up in the course of a general review of world affairs. We propose to take up the Russian thesis that Palestine questions should be handled in the United Nations and see if we cannot get an undertaking from our visitors not to use their veto in the Security Council to block a Resolution identifying the aggressor in the event of trouble. I have not high hopes of getting it, but I am sure you will agree that it is worth going for.

We shall make it very plain that our Middle Eastern oil supplies are a vital interest and that any attempt to deny them to us will create a most dangerous state of tension since the British are not the kind of people to let themselves be quietly strangled. If the Russians suggest four-power consultation about arms for Egypt or Israel, we shall be very cautious and consult you before we give any reply.

I had a word about all this with Winthrop last week. [4] We shall, of course, continue to keep in close touch with him throughout the talks, and I know that you and Foster will not hesitate to let us know if anything occurs to you that we could do for our common cause. Yours ever, Anthony. [5] *End Text.*

Dulles

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[2] Document 246.

[3] Telegram 6232, April 18, transmitted the President's reply; it reads:

"Dear Anthony: Thank you very much for your cable. I agree with every word you have to say. I am sure that throughout the time of the meeting, Foster and Selwyn Lloyd will find some way of keeping in fairly close touch with each other. As ever, DE." (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6141/4–1865)

[4] See footnote 3, Document 283.

[5] The British Chargé, Coulson, sent the original text to the President under cover of a memorandum dated April 18. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

291. Paper Prepared by Elbert G. Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff [1]

Washington, April 19, 1956.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET STATEMENT OF APRIL 17 ON THE MIDDLE EAST

The Statement

The Soviet statement of April 17 may have been issued solely for propaganda purposes—to improve the atmosphere for the Khrushchev–Bulganin visit to the UK and to win the USSR general approbation as a protagonist of peace. If this is the case, it should become apparent in the course of the British-Soviet talks on the Middle East.

For the purpose of this paper, however, it is assumed that the Soviet statement, at least in part, conveys a serious invitation to the West to seek an accommodation in the Middle East. Two aspects of the statement make this a not unreasonable assumption. First, in contrast to recent Soviet support of the Arabs, the statement is neutral in tone as between Israel and the Arab states. (This neutrality was emphasized by the presence of Molotov and Mikoyan at an Israel Embassy reception in Moscow on April 16.) Second, the statement—again in contrast to the previous Soviet position—recognizes that the Arab-Israel situation presents a real threat to international peace.

The significant points made in the statement may be summarized as follows:

1. The major reason for the tense and dangerous situation in the Middle East is the attempt of "some states" to extend military alignments, such as the Baghdad Pact, into the area.
2. The USSR is "unswervingly opposed" to any breach of the peace in the Middle East.
3. The USSR considers "illegal and inadmissible" attempts to use the Arab-Israel dispute as a pretext "for introducing foreign troops in the territory of the Near East.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #3. Top Secret; Omega. At the Middle East Policy Planning Group meeting on April 18, it was agreed that Mathews would draft a paper analyzing the implications of the April 17 Soviet statement. The statement was issued by the Soviet Foreign Ministry at a press conference. It called for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute and offered Soviet support for measures to facilitate a settlement. A translation is *ibid.*, Omega #2.

At the Group's meeting of April 26, Kirk was asked to circulate copies of this paper to all members. (*Ibid.*: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Meetings of MEPPG (agenda, memos of conv., etc.), 4/9/56 to 6/30/56)

4. The USSR will support UN measures to strengthen peace "in the area of Palestine" and to implement "the corresponding decisions of the Security Council."

5. The USSR calls upon the "interested parties" to refrain from action that would worsen the situation on the Palestine Armistice lines and to "alleviate the difficult position" of the Arab refugees.

6. The USSR considers it essential "to direct efforts toward a stable peaceful settlement of the Palestine question on a mutually acceptable basis, taking due consideration of the just national interests of the interested parties" and is ready to contribute "with other states" to these efforts.

Soviet Motivations and Objectives

It would appear that the Kremlin has estimated that war between the Arab states and Israel would have adverse consequences for Soviet interests, primarily, it may be assumed, because this would in its view lead to military intervention by the Western powers who would remain and re-entrench themselves in the Middle East. This development, in Soviet eyes, could only worsen the existing unsatisfactory situation in which the US and UK by virtue of the Baghdad Pact and other military arrangements in the Middle East are able to threaten the security of the Soviet regime and state from bases in the area.

The Soviet objectives in any negotiations would accordingly be to ensure against Western military intervention in the Middle East, to eliminate the Baghdad Pact and other Western military arrangements and to create conditions favorable to a further expansion of Soviet influence in the area.

US Western Interests and Objectives

Before considering the possibility of useful negotiations with the USSR, a brief recapitulation of the basic interests of the US and its Western allies in the Middle East is required. These interests are access to oil resources, rights of passage, peace and stability, and predominance of Western Soviet influence. As recently as a year ago the last point might have been phrased "exclusion of Soviet influence". It has become clear that, given the tensions and rivalries prevailing in the Middle East, it was not, and is not now, within Western capabilities peacefully to exclude Soviet influence from the area.

To protect basic Western interests, our objectives in negotiations with the USSR would be to maneuver the USSR into a position with respect to the Arab-Israel issue that would disabuse the Arabs of their present belief that the USSR is their champion, to preserve the Baghdad Pact and other existing Western military arrangements and to create conditions favorable to the restoration of Western influence

in the Middle East. Of prime importance for the latter objective are the fixing of permanent boundaries between Israel and the contiguous Arab states and a solution of the Arab refugee problem.

Locus of Negotiations

The Soviet statement refers specifically to UN measures only with respect to strengthening peace and implementing "corresponding decisions of the Security Council" in the Palestine area. In its references to settlement of the Palestine question the statement says only that the USSR is ready to contribute "with other states" to a solution. This leaves the door open to a quadripartite approach or to an Indochina-type conference.

From the point of view of the US and its Western allies it would be desirable to keep any negotiations with the USSR on the Middle East within the UN framework—more specifically under the aegis of the Security Council. This, of course, would not preclude private discussions or even private understandings on the side. The use of the Security Council where the USSR is already present would save us the psychological and propaganda defeat of having to invite the USSR into what had previously been a tripartite forum or to acquiesce in Soviet participation in a general conference of "interested states". The Soviet statement with its one specific reference to UN measures and its several general references to the UN Charter provides a basis for approaching the USSR through the Security Council.

It may be doubted that the USSR would be eager to utilize the quadripartite forum as it would then have to share with the three Western powers the onus of solutions "dictated by the great powers" and its desertion of its erstwhile Arab proteges would be highlighted. The USSR might well, however, be attracted to an Indochina-type conference, believing that it could in such a forum obtain majority support for its objectives of eliminating the Baghdad Pact and ensuring against Western Military intervention in the Middle East. This would be a real danger from the Western point of view and we should avoid a general conference.

Possible Bases of Negotiation

After coordination with the UK and France, the USSR could be informed privately that the three Western powers are prepared to seek with the USSR through the Security Council a general stabilization of the Middle East. We could propose as a first step that the four powers support the UN Secretary General's recommendations following his present survey and that, whether or not the Secretary General so recommends, the four powers support an arms embargo

against Israel and the contiguous Arab states. We could agree to extend the embargo to Iraq and Saudi Arabia on the ground that they participated in the 1948 fighting.

We could say that we had in mind as subsequent steps that the four powers would sponsor Security Council action to induce the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute to fix permanent boundaries and to solve the Arab refugee problem. If necessary, we would be prepared to support Security Council action under UN Charter Chapter VII, [2] not including military sanctions, to enforce settlement of these two issues. We would also be prepared to support a Security Council guarantee against alteration of permanent boundaries between Israel and the contiguous Arab states except by agreement of the states where boundaries are involved.

It may be anticipated that the USSR would raise the issue of the Baghdad Pact either obliquely or directly at an early stage. If obliquely, it might take the form of a counter-proposal that the arms embargo be applied to additional Middle East states including Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. In this event, we would make it clear that Western relations with Turkey, a NATO member, are not negotiable in a Middle East context. As regards Iran and Pakistan we would point out that they have never been parties to the Arab-Israel dispute and no basis exists for an embargo against them. This stand would presumably bring the Pact issue into the open if the USSR had not broached it directly.

The USSR would attack the Pact as an aggressive alliance threatening Soviet security. We, while insisting that the Pact was purely defensive, could intimate that we were not insensitive to Soviet security interest in the Middle East, but that the Western powers also had basic interests in the area, oil being the most obvious, that they were not prepared to relinquish. If there were reciprocal recognition of and forbearance toward these respective interests, which were not necessarily conflicting, some accommodation might be reached.

The negotiation of such an accommodation would present exceedingly difficult problems to the West. If it appeared that we had abandoned the Baghdad Pact and other Western military arrangements in the Middle East without a substantial and evident quid pro quo the Middle East Pact members would charge us with betrayal and SEATO and even NATO would be shaken to their foundations. Even if we obtained a quid pro quo, neutralist sentiment within SEATO and NATO would be strengthened and voices raised urging similar accommodations in their areas. We could not, therefore, at

[2] For text of the U.N. Charter, signed on June 26, 1945, in San Francisco, and which came into force on October 24, 1945, see 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.

this stage of the development of free world-Communist bloc relations accept the dissolution of the Baghdad Pact as part of a Middle East accommodation. We could not, moreover, agree to the merger of the Baghdad Pact into a larger indigenous Middle East collective security arrangement unless we were prepared (1) to relinquish existing US and UK military arrangements in the area and (2) to accept a de facto neutralization of the whole Middle East.

It might well be impossible to reach any accommodation with the USSR without the sacrifice of the Baghdad Pact. Assuming for the purposes of discussion, however, that it would be possible and bearing in mind the desirability of staying with the UN framework, the following possible bases of negotiation are suggested.

1. All arms shipments into the Middle East, Turkey excepted, would be reported to the Security Council prior to delivery. The Council would not, however, attempt formally to control arms shipments, although resolutions recommending against specific shipments could, of course, be introduced.
2. All proposals for the establishment of new binational or multinational bases or for the placing of armed forces of one nation in the territory of another (expecting training missions, etc) in the Middle East, Turkey excluded, would be reported to the Security Council by the participating nations. Resolutions recommending against specific proposals could be introduced in the Council.
3. The Security Council would guaranty all Middle East boundaries against alteration by force.
4. All non-Middle East nations interested in contributing to the development of the area by financial and technical assistance would provide such assistance through existing or new international agencies.

We can determine whether or not we would be prepared to negotiate on the foregoing or similar bases, which would obviously restrict our freedom of action in the Middle East, only in the light of our assessment of (1) probable developments in the area and (2) our capabilities of influencing those developments in varying circumstances. If we estimate that a stabilization of the Arab-Israel dispute would afford us the best opportunity of restoring Western influence in the Middle East and that we probably could not achieve such a stabilization if the USSR works actively against it, we may conclude that some limitation on our freedom of action would be an acceptable price for Soviet cooperation. As this limitation would apply particularly in the military sphere, it may be the more acceptable if we estimate that there is small likelihood of Communist military action in the Middle East.

292. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

Washington, April 19, 1956—8:15 p.m.

6283. For Ambassador from Secretary. Please convey Eden and Lloyd my appreciation message handed me by British Embassy April 18 outlining plans for talks with Russians. [2] I am particularly grateful offer to keep us currently informed of how talks go.

Please also inform them that we are giving careful thought to implications recent Soviet statement on ME [3] as well as to how it should affect our attitude and actions. British will, of course, be discussing matter with Bulganin and Khrushchev and if Eden and Lloyd care to know my preliminary thinking upon certain aspects, you might tell them about as follows:

It would seem to me that the more talks can be directed to Arab-Israeli problem and United Nations the better it would be. In order to test Soviet good will and sincerity, it might be useful to explore with Soviets their willingness to support efforts in UN to find an early Palestine solution along lines common to Soviet statement and UK and US positions. This connection, it might be well to ascertain whether Soviets would give substance to their statement by supporting SC resolution which would call upon Hammarskjold, following his return and report upon present mission, to consult parties to armistices and make recommendations concerning elements of a just settlement. [4]

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6141/4–1956. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Rountree and Dulles and approved by Dulles and Macomber who signed for Dulles.

[2] Neither Merchant's memorandum of Dulles' conversation with Coulson on April 18, nor the telegram from Selwyn Lloyd, the substance of which was given to Dulles in the form of a memorandum, is printed. (*Ibid.*, 033.6141/4–1856)

[3] See *supra*.

[4] In telegram 4770, April 20, Aldrich reported that he conveyed the substance of Dulles' message to Lloyd in a letter rather than in person, in an effort to avoid arousing public speculation. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6141/4–2056)

293. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, April 19, 1956—6 p.m.

2366. Embtel 2357. [2] Whether Soviet April 17 statement on Middle East [3] is precisely responsive to President's statement of last week [4] might be arguable; but one cannot doubt that the statement is a genuine expression of Soviet purpose to participate in any efforts at settlement of Near Eastern problems and particularly and immediately of the Arab-Israel conflict. In both content and timing the declaration must be considered a serious and astute diplomatic move.

The propaganda aspects are merely normal, including distortions, for Soviet statements and do not becloud the seriousness with which the Soviet Government intends to play its role in the Middle East. These aspects, e.g. the placing of the blame for the situation on pacts and groupings, pressures and interferences by monopolies, colonialism, seem largely to serve their purpose of disassociating the Soviet Union from responsibility for causing the situation. They are then tempered by the statement intended to have the appeal of objectivity that "no matter how the causes of the outbreak of this conflict are [garble]." The Soviet Government nevertheless faithful to its UN obligations, is prepared to help preserve the peace.

The statement combines a hardness to be expected in a definition of position on the eve of important negotiations, with ostensible flexibility. The Soviet Government warns the Arabs to muffle their strident voices as it takes cognizance of British (and French) actions which had contributed to the attainment of sovereignty of the parties to the conflict, specifically including in list of such countries

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1956. Confidential; Priority. Received at 12:20 p.m. Repeated priority to London and Paris.

[2] In telegram 2357, April 17, the Embassy in Moscow reported that it had not yet seen it but surmized that the Soviet statement on the Middle East "must be at least a disappointment to the more militant Arab states, and secondly a move which because of its importance must have been under consideration for some time and was designed to clarify Soviet stand on issues involved coincident with arrival Soviet visitors to UK." (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/4–1756) The Embassy in London on April 19 reported that the "Foreign Office considers that there is little basic change in Soviet attitude which continues to be characterized by strong hostility to Baghdad Pact. . . . Foreign Office suspects statement may be designed pave way for Soviet proposal for complete arms embargo to all Middle Eastern countries, which would of course be inacceptable as this would mean end of arms aid to Baghdad Pact countries." (Telegram 4757 from London; *ibid.*, 684A.86/4–1956)

[3] See Document 291.

[4] See footnote 2, Document 258.

both Israel and Iraq; balances its call to both factions to respect the truce, and recognizes that Israel's existence is a fact of life.

However we may regard the legitimacy of Soviet pretentions, it is awkward and impracticable to ignore Soviet offer to support UN and "appropriate" decisions by the Security Council, their appeal to refrain from exacerbating the situation, and their assertion that matters must be directed towards a firm peaceful settlement.

Therefore, whether or not we regard Soviet statement responsive to President's, we, and particularly other two powers of the 1950 declaration, are left Hobson's choice of accepting Soviet participation now, under terms formulated by the Soviets themselves, or of ignoring fact of Soviet presence in Middle East and to compete with them for support from the area for settlements which will eventually involve Soviet participation anyway in the UN.

Here in effect is another instance where the Soviet Union had contributed generously to the creation and exacerbation of a situation which it then uses to demonstrate its peaceful intentions by offers to help settle. There is, however, the possibility that the Soviet Union is worried lest the Arab-Israel conflict, which it has helped to inflame, become unmanageable with a threat of spreading with unforeseeable and grave risks to themselves, as well as to others. While it would be perhaps unwise to assume that this fear is present in the Soviet position it could well be that in the London discussions more evidence will surface in this regard.

Department pass as desired.

Walmsley

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294. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 19, 1956—1 p.m.

2087. Have carefully studied and will be guided by policy directive contained in Deptel 2404. [2] It seems to me however that it might be useful if this Embassy gave Department its thoughts as

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1956. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; Omega Handling. Received at 1:16 p.m.

[2] Document 238.

regards (1) the strategy underlying this policy and (2) tactics by which basic policies are to be implemented.

As regards (1) above, we note that this directive concerns itself almost entirely with Nasser's personal responsibility for current situation in area and that it tends to regard Nasser himself as difficulty which requires correction. While without doubt he could stand correction, respectfully suggest that problem is of much broader scope; and that public and private statements of Britain and Israel, United States press, and to a certain extent area reporting should not serve to blur over underlying and fundamental issues involved. Nasser is the product of an area and an era, and has become as much a symbol of nationalistic forces as he is a leader of these forces.

While he is today the outstanding leader these forces, it is important to realize that trends have been set in motion across the roughly one-third of the world which we call under-developed which certainly go far beyond any personality. We must be very careful to bear in mind from long range point of view that efforts aimed directly at checking or eliminating his personal influence are unlikely to affect these basic forces and are in addition likely to result in increased rather than decreased prestige in symbol of his person. (In this connection wish to express my concern that we make due allowance in evaluating intelligence which has come to use through liaison channels from nations which now have a tendency to shift all responsibility to Nasser for their setbacks and in whose interest it might be to influence our policy.) I have confidence in the quality of our intelligence on this area but wish to urge that steps be taken at high level to survey our own intelligence on Nasser's activities and influence in area. Have no doubt that incriminating evidence would be uncovered but feel that question is how much, how damaging, with what intent, and with what short and long range effect.

While doing this suggest we turn our thoughts towards the underlying causes of our difficulties. This area should be of particular interest to us as it typifies probably at present more than any other the character of the struggle of the future. It seems to us that it is here that the impact of entirely new Soviet approach is being felt most quickly in its full force and it is here that we should develop new approaches and policies of our own which may be of use through all the NEA area and beyond into south and sea. In Egypt and ME itself our problems revolve around issues of colonialism, strength against Israel and generally our attitude towards Israel, collective security arrangements which are believed to be extensions in new form of Western domination, and adverse trade patterns. These go far beyond the reflection of a personality and our action

on matters such as these will determine our future position in area. It is essential that we realize the nature of our problems and that they are not primarily due to an ideological clash between our brand of democracy and Communism. Regardless of specific intelligence Department may have unknown to this Embassy, we believe that the motives for local actions and reactions stem from problems such as these and that a turn towards Communism is not the goal in itself. Some of these problems are emotional (Israel, self determination, et cetera) where sympathetic understanding is in itself of great value. Others are increasingly connected with economic patterns. A real threat in establishment of Russia's position in Egypt, for instance, is that connected with trade and commerce. Egypt's dollar position is intolerable even now. . . . Conversely trade is possible with Soviet Bloc, and under subsidization, is highly attractive. Furthermore it is a necessity. This type of tactic will succeed all across this area regardless of what Nasser does or does not do.

We must face such basic issues as what we really mean by "positions of western influence." Have no doubt at all of our ability to exert considerable influence in this area . . . .[We do not agree that ME oil is in danger if we follow wise policy. Continued British talk about losing it is not very wise. If oil exploitation not connected with political exploitation, there no reason believe that ME desires to see its markets in Europe and Britain lost. On other hand a policy of "we will hold it by force if necessary" seems wholly unnecessary. Furthermore we must look carefully at effect through this whole area of world, of any local action smacking of force or pressure. . . .

Prior to establishment of Israel we were popular in area by simply following a policy of open friendship and understanding. This will still work today and there is no drive against United States per se. Nasser and area are out to cut British (and French) influence down to size of legitimate foreign interests devoid of ability to interfere in local affairs as in past. Believe present intentions are to go no farther unless British (and other) efforts resist turn into hostile acts against what they regard with sensitivity as their sovereign and independent rights.

If we are to be successful in this area, should think first of all our general policies must now be compatible with the moderate elements of Arab nationalism. The growing spirit of area which rightly or wrongly considers it still not free from domination of west must not be minimized. The Communist tactic is to run parallel with this emotional force. If we ourselves attempt head-on conflict with it, we shall fail as surely as the British did in Jordan.

Believe credence should be given to Nasser's own remark to me that World War II now in process taking entirely different form than heretofore. Perhaps the United States alone has the flexibility to

work out policies to meet shift in Soviet tactics which has made them appear champions of local national aspirations. Would logically assume that this process may take some time. If this is true the all important thing is that we not make tactical mistakes during our period of readjustment.

This leads to (2) above. We interpret para four of Dept's directive to indicate that our policy is to stall on all matters dealing with Egypt. . . .

Hope Dept will accept our judgment that as a matter of tactics this method of dealing with Nasser will be counter-productive. Assume Dept knows Nehru well enough to conclude that a policy of pin-pricking irritation, and holding out hopes which we unwilling to finalize prior to his coming to US and how he can cooperate better, would not work. Feel Dept does not know Nasser that well. There are many differences between Nasser and Nehru, but their reactions to this type of approach would be similar.

Suggest we face up to fact that this is focal area of competition with Russia and that greater resourcefulness and initiative on our part rather than less is necessary. It seems to me that the quicker we really start competing the better (by "competing" I do not mean out-bidding in dollar aid). A "stall until they turn to us" approach just isn't good enough. Furthermore, even if we believe such an approach would bring Nasser to us it would be well to work out beforehand just what we want him to do, bearing in mind again that the problems are practical and not ideological. It is somewhat ironical that due to understanding statements by President and Secretary and local efforts, United States-Egyptian relations have greatly improved in past three weeks. GOE has not yet become really aware of expanse of tactical approach in Deptel 2404 . . . . The effect Dept wished to obtain by this approach has been at least partially obtained through other methods. We are in as good a position as we will probably ever be to influence Nasser. It would be well therefore that we try out on Nasser now whatever it is we wish him to do rather than wait until he fully senses tactics of planned approach.

The most important example of where we think stalling is unwise relates to High Dam. It has been over seven weeks since Egypt gave us counter proposal to aide-mémoires.[3] This I assume is part of producing "logic of events" philosophy, but the great danger is that by giving no response at all we may in fact be withdrawing from project. In appraising this statement please bear in mind that Nasser is not certain that United States can and will assist him with Dam to its completion, and he never has been, regardless obvious good intentions shown by Dept. He sees hesitation and delay for

[3] See Documents 124 and 127.

what he considers policy purposes even prior to concluding agreement. He undoubtedly connects this with our disillusionment his ability to move in manner we desired on Israeli settlement. Even if agreement concluded, after that he sees an unpredictable Congress, and future administrations whose policies on Arab and Israeli matters now beyond prediction. We consider it highly probable Nasser thinks he requires definitive agreement for pre-election use. In spite of fact we know Nasser wishes to work with West on this project, if there continues to be no response at all Dept should not be surprised if some day it reads in press that decision has been made to accept Russian assistance.

We believe we should face competition in cultural matters with greater and not less vigor. Am appalled in this connection that we have even been told to stop negotiating on matters such as Fulbright agreement. While we faced with area dilemmas in which our freedom of action necessarily limited, and natural obstacle on matters such as trade, certainly we have inherent capability of out-doing Soviet Bloc in cultural matters and we should lose no time in stepping up our efforts in that direction. Wish urge Dept give most careful consideration following simple propositions:

(1) We should do what we can on roots our problems in area rather that personify them in an individual. (2) We should be wary of information supplied by others having special interests. (3) We should to greatest extent possible adopt policy consistent moderate elements Arab nationalism, above all avoiding head-on conflict with it. (4) There is time for rational approach to problems and no need be stampeded by others into mistakes, (5) acceptance competition in area with the will to win is much more likely to succeed than stalling approach, and (6) before we go any further we should decide exactly what conditions we want Nasser to meet. [4]

Byroade

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[4] Dulles replied as follows: "I have read Embtel 2087 with interest." (Telegram 2544 to Cairo, April 20; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1956)

295. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 19, 1956—4 p.m.

2091. Department telegram 2516. [2] *Al Ahram* reported Political Committee discussed JVP April 9 "since it had been said that Mister Johnston has decided to restudy his project. Discussion concluded that Arab States continued adhere to their previously announced position to hold to Arab plan".

However texts Political Committee's agenda and resolutions and minutes Council which approved them . . . do not indicate JVP was on committee's agenda or discussed by council on considering committee's report. We expect receive more information later this week but would appear that league took no specific action on JVP at this session. [3]

Byroade

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/4–1956. Secret. Received at 2:35 p.m.

[2] Telegram 2516, April 17, instructed the Embassy in Cairo to send a "brief summary Arab League Council deliberations and resolutions re Jordan Valley Plan." (*Ibid.*, 684A.85322/4–1756)

[3] In telegram 972, April 19, Moose informed the Department that Ghazzi the previous day had informed him that the Arab States had reached no final decision on the Jordan Valley Plan at the recent Cairo Arab League meeting. (*Ibid.*786.00/4–1956)

296. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 19, 1956—6 p.m.

1120. Evidence available points to conclusion that GOI believes crisis with Egypt is at an end for time being. Roadblocks into Tel Aviv have been discontinued, home guard brigade demobilized; and portion of reservists have been returned to inactive status.

In our judgment most recent crisis reached much more critical point than any of its predecessors since signing of armistice agree-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1956. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:56 a.m., April 20. Repeated to Cairo, London, Paris, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem.

ments. There were a larger number of troops on active service and positioned for actual warfare than heretofore. Opinion of both public and IDF was highly inflamed during period Fedayeen activities; judgments of both Ben Gurion and Sharett at times appeared to be subject more to emotional than intellectual influences; and finally repeated failures Egyptian Government to respond to General Burn's entreaties, firstly, to adhere cease fire and, secondly, to refrain sending in Fedayeen, placed Israel Cabinet in position of believing onus would be on Egypt in case outbreak general hostilities. Information reaching Embassy from several Israel military sources points to probability that initial decision had been made for a large-scale military counteraction night of April 19–20 and that this was called off at last moment. Department will recall that news of Hammarskjold's success in obtaining commitment from Nasser to conform Article II, GAA,[2] reached Israelis 1 a.m. April 19 and it appears retrospectively that this was factor which resulted change of program by IDF. Influence of Hammarskjold's [garble] presence in area at that moment was greatly strengthened by White House statement[3] and President's personal messages.[4]

We believe that experience past several weeks points to two conclusions. Firstly, we believe underlying situation is such that Security Council can no longer afford to ignore a chronic source of friction between Israel and one or more of the Arab States even if at any given moment such friction appears of small magnitude. Although for a period of several months Nasser's unwillingness to adhere to a cease fire and periodic by firing his soldiers, largely Palestinians, along Gaza strip did not appear serious, time arrived when such a course of action caused Israel fatalities and reprisal tactic of shelling Gaza towns was prompt and disastrous. With Israel approaching point desperation and Arabs with new-found confidence (or possibly over-confidence) in their military power, possibilities in similar circumstances of retaliation and counter-retaliation will be greatly enhanced. Furthermore, situation will remain hazardous as long as the two parties have unusually large military forces in close proximity to each other. The conclusion reached is that on any given issues and after General Burns had had first try at solution and failed, the problem should immediately be seized at higher level.

Secondly, experience in past fortnight has brought out certain weaknesses in UNTSO structure which obviously need correction. There has been serious time lag between occurrences and reports of UNTSO investigations; so much so in fact that had general hostili-

[2] See *infra*.
[3] See footnote 2, Document 258.
[4] See Documents 263 and 264.

ties broken out at any given moment the decisive battles would probably have been waged and terminated before Washington or UN would have had clear picture of circumstances precipitating them or have been able accurately to place responsibility. In addition to need for freedom of movement of UN observers which Hammarskjold is attempting to obtain, it is also apparent that UNTSO badly needs additional personnel and improved facilities such as tracking equipment and its own staff of interpreters if it is going to be able to investigate, analyze and report with reasonable promptness.

Finally, recent experience reinforces Embassy's judgment that no time should be lost by USG in dealing actively with water problem with a view to providing formula which will either solve matter or postpone development of an explosive situation at Banat Yaacov. [5]

White

[5] Ambassador Byroade informed the Department on April 23 that he agreed with the conclusions reached in telegram 1120. (Telegram 2116 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2356)

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297. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, April 20, 1956.

425. Following is text of UNSYG announcement April 19 as released at UNTSO headquarters and UN Information Center Cairo at 4:45 p.m. local time.

"At the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Governments of Israel and Egypt have notified him that as of 6:00 p.m., 18 April, and from that time on, orders are in force to the effect that in implementation of assurances to observe Article II, paragraph 2 of the Armistice Agreement, no military or para-military forces, including non-regular forces, may shoot across the demarcation line or pass over that line for any purpose whatsoever."

Cole

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2056. Priority. Received at 6:27 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Tel Aviv.

298. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 20, 1956—10 p.m.

1122. Rafael, Foreign Ministry advisor on UN affairs, who has been participating with Ben-Gurion and Sharett in talks with Hammarskjold past three days, gave me orally this afternoon following summary progress made these meetings (Department will want to analyze this report in light of UNTSO's version which I assume Consulate General Jerusalem is obtaining).

(1) Implementation Article II, paragraph 2, GAA. Ben-Gurion agreed to following measures:

a. Israel patrols would not operate within several hundred meters Gaza border except in special cases where security required it. Example given of exception was case of actual infiltrator stealing within Israel territory.

b. Israel agrees to maintenance by UN observation posts along border.

c. Israel agrees to UN observer patrols operating along border as long as accompanied by IDF personnel. Rafael said that he understood Egypt has made similar undertakings and that Article II matters are virtually completed. He said that on all matters connected with his article, Ben-Gurion was most cooperative and made "surprising concessions" relative to his previous adamant position of "complete sovereignty".

(2) Proposals under Article I. Israelis took position that in view of fact that SC resolution directed Hammarskjold to survey the GAA's he had an obligation to obtain from Egypt commitments re implementation of Article I, including free passage Suez and Strait of Tiran, no massing of troops in Sinai, no propaganda or threats against Israel, discontinuance state of belligerency, and other warlike acts. Israelis indicated to Hammarskjold that they would be satisfied with de facto rather than de jure arrangements on Suez and Strait of Tiran. Hammarskjold maintained his position that these matters were outside his SC directive but that he was prepared to discuss them with Nasser in his capacity as SYG.

(3) Implementation of Article VIII. [2] Israel position was that they were prepared to trade withdrawal of troops from DZ against Article I but could not do so as long as Egypt was engaging in the

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2056. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:43 a.m., April 21. Repeated to Cairo, Beirut, London, Paris, Damascus, and Jerusalem.

[2] Article 8 of the Egypt–Israel General Armistice Agreement provided for demilitarization of the area comprising the village of El Auja and vicinity. (U.N. doc. S/1264/Corr. 1 and Add. 1)

"aggressive actions" prohibited by paragraph 2 Article I. When I asked Rafael whether GOI prepared comply Article VIII against Egyptian compliance Article VII [3] and VIII, he replied that he was not prepared to comment on that question.

(4) Israel–Syria GAA. [4] Rafael said this morning's discussion centered on relationships with Syria and that GOI had agreed as follows:

a. Will undertake not to send police boats closer than 250 meters to shore, except when required to rescue Israel fishing vessel which may have grounded and would undertake such operation only after notification Syria.

b. Agreed to permit Syrian use Tiberias for water purposes.

c. Reiterated willingness permit Syrians to fish, but only under individual licenses granted by Israel authorities, a condition with which Rafael said Hammarskjold agreed.

d. Told Hammarskjold that he might inform Syrian Government that crew of Syrian vessel and vessel itself would be released from Haifa within next few days. [5]

e. In return requested Hammarskjold to investigate Israelis allegedly detained by Syria.

Rafael said that General Burns had affirmed that he already had undertaking from Syrians not to shoot at Israel fishing vessels any place on lake and not at Israel police vessels beyond the 250 meter line.

(5) Banat Yaacov. Israelis took attitude that Syrians were obligated under Article 1, Israel–Syria GAA, [6] to refrain from firing across line, including any firing into DZ. Rafael quoted Hammarskjold as agreeing with this theory and as saying that he would request of Syrian Government reaffirmation of its compliance with Article 1.

Israelis then raised with SYG question "right of Israel to proceed with Banat Yaacov Canal". Israelis argued that urgent period referred to in SC resolution had long since passed and that they were free to proceed with work. Sharett was quoted as making categorical statement that Israel would not permit this third work season to pass without completing the canal work. Hammarskjold took position

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[3] Article V empowered the U.N. Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to define the areas comprising the western and eastern fronts in Palestine.

[4] Israel and Syria signed a General Armistice Agreement on July 20, 1949. (U.N. doc. S/1353/Add. 1 and 2 and Corr. 1)

[5] Israel seized the Syrian vessel *Faysal* and its crew of four on August 4, 1955. They were not released until May 7, 1956. (Despatch 380 from Damascus, May 15; Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/5–1556)

[6] Article 1 of the Israel–Syria General Armistice Agreement pledged both parties to observe the U.N. Security Council injunction to refrain from resorting to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question. (U.N. doc. S/1353/Add. 1 and 2 and Corr. 1)

that this was a matter outside his jurisdiction and was in first instance a decision for General Burns or, if it so desired, for SC.

(6) At close of this morning's final regular session, Hammarskjold requested secret meeting this afternoon with Ben-Gurion and Sharett to explain "why he was so optimistic about Nasser". [7] Rafael said that he did not know what this meant. It is possible, however, that this conference may be related to a matter which Nahum Goldmann discussed with me briefly this morning. He said he had two-hour conversation with Hammarskjold yesterday afternoon. The latter said that he believed some prospects for settlement had grown out of his conversation with Nasser. Goldmann noted Hammarskjold as saying that much to his surprise Nasser did not appear to be primarily interested in any questions of territory, but felt that disposition of refugees was important problem. Hammarskjold reportedly said that he believed Nasser would be receptive to a formula under which principle would be established that refugees would have option of returning to Israel or being settled otherwise but Israel would be protected by condition in formula setting forth specified criteria for eligibility which would in fact limit the number of refugees which Israel would have to receive to a reasonable total.

White

[7] See Document 306.

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299. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 21, 1956—11 a.m.

2104. For the Secretary. In re-reading Embassy telegram 2087, [2] am concerned that point (6) of last paragraph might be misunderstood. What I had in mind was what positive acts we would wish Nasser to make, as contrasted to those things he is doing which he should not do. Some of latter at least are easy to define and we will,

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–2156. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution; Omega Handling. Received at 7:04 a.m.

[2] Document 294.

of course, keep working away at these without necessity specific instruction.

Byroade

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300. Editorial Note

On April 21, Chargé Walworth Barbour in London informed Secretary Dulles that on the morning of April 20, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai A. Bulganin and Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, along with other Soviet officials, met with British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, and their advisers at 10 Downing Street. Among the topics discussed was the need to achieve a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Barbour reported:

"Eden made forceful presentation seriousness situation importance Israeli-Arab settlement. He took line that it is evident from Sov ME statement and other indications that Sovs look to the UN to handle ME and specifically Arab-Israeli problem. He noted that tripartite declaration had been designed to cover a situation in which the UN should be unable or prevented from taking effective action. The Brit concurred that UN should be the forum for the settlement of this problem and in the Brit view to the extent that UN is effective in the matter the tripartite declaration will recede into the background. He accordingly pressed Sovs to agree to waive veto in Security Council in naming aggressor in case hostilities. Khrushchev reacted violently citing record Sovs vetoes Security Council which he maintained were on matters vital interest to Sovs and completely rejected idea advance commitment not to exercise right granted in UN Charter. Eden pointed out that agreement to waive a right does not prejudice existence of that right but Sovs adamant. However, Kirkpatrick feels that although no progress made on veto it may be useful to have on record for future clear-cut Sov refusal this time.

"Discussion continued on general desirability UN action Arab-Israeli dispute and was finally agreed that representatives both sides would attempt to come up with draft joint statement to be issued embodying measure joint views. As result Kirkpatrick for the UK and Gromyko for the USSR met this morning and have prepared a

statement for submission to principals which Kirkpatrick says contains six points substantially as follows:

"1. Support will be given to UN efforts to maintain peace in the Middle East and to the decisions of the Security Council to that end.

"2. The parties involved in the Arab-Israeli problem will be called on not to increase tension along the demarcation lines.

"3. The UN should take immediate steps to achieve a solution of the Arab-Israeli problem.

"4. The UK and the USSR will support any endeavor to achieve a solution on a basis mutually acceptable to both sides.

"5. The UK and the USSR recognize the importance of the refugee problem and will support any UN action to relieve the hardships of the refugees.

"6. The UK and the USSR hope that other governments will rally to the support of UN efforts to reach a solution. Statement also contains language endorsing independence of ME states in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and recognizing of importance that UN action be such as to take account of the interests of all countries concerned.

"Kirkpatrick noted that point 4 is an effort to incorporate your helpful suggestion (Deptel 6283) with which the Brit concur. Generally Kirkpatrick is pleased with Gromyko's acceptance of a statement as outlined, since he believes that its general impact will tend to put Sovs in the doghouse with the Arabs. Incidentally, he professed surprise that Sovs appear either ignorant or unconcerned at effect such declaration on Arabs. Kirkpatrick said Gromyko had endeavored insert statement that UK and USSR would not intervene in Middle East affairs but that they had declined to do so on grounds of Brit specific obligations to Jordan and also his feeling that should hostilities break out Egyptians although now unfriendly would in all probability seek Brit help." (Telegram 4803 from London, April 21; Department of State, Central Files, 033.6141/4–2156)

301. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Minister of the Israeli Embassy (Shiloah) and the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell), Department of State, Washington, April 22, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Arms for Israel

I saw Reuven Shiloah, Minister of the Israel Embassy, today at his request. In the course of our discussion, I referred to Eban's conversation with the Secretary on March 28 [2] when Eban had said that if Israel could obtain 48 jet fighters and some anti-tank guns, the problem of her arms requirements would be resolved for the moment, in response to which the Secretary had said that we might be of assistance to Israel in obtaining some of her arms requirements from other countries. I said we had instructed our missions in Ottawa, Rome and Paris to see whether another 36 jet fighters, supplementing the 12 Mysteres which Israel had received, might be provided by one or more of the three countries. [3] I told Shiloah that if the Israel Embassy would indicate the country, e.g., Belgium, Sweden or Switzerland, where the type of anti-tank guns that Israel wished were manufactured, we might also be of assistance to Israel in obtaining them.

Mr. Shiloah said that Israel had adequate access to those countries and he did not think that U.S. assistance would be necessary to enable Israel to obtain such equipment. I told Shiloah that American prices were higher than those of European countries and Israel would find it less expensive to obtain such equipment there. He said they were aware of that but that Israel had preferred to buy them here because the impression which would result from the effectuation of such a purchase would be useful to Israel.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/4–2256. Top Secret. Drafted on April 23 by Russell.

[2] See Document 221.

[3] See Document 279.

302. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, April 23, 1956—7 p.m.

884. Re Palestine. Cordier informed Wadsworth today SYG expected announce next Thursday or Friday, April 26 or 27, that observer arrangements had been concluded with Egypt and Israel. He said original agreement approved by Egypt had been slightly modified by Israel and he was returning it to Egypt for final approval.

Arrangements provided for greater freedom of movement and patrolling. He said there was nothing new in arrangements, merely restoration of rights.

SYG will ask for 20 more observers to be provided from Sweden, Norway, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. (Cordier has already informed UN delegates of these countries.) SYG suggested non-big-power countries, fearing approach to US might prompt USSR offer observers.

Cordier also said in view strong feeling of Israelis SYG planning ask Egypt next Tuesday, May 1, discuss Suez Canal restrictions on "personal basis". Believing Egypt will request advisory opinion from US Government on right of SYG discuss this possibility for delaying purposes, SYG requests following be cabled Byroade from Department as basis for answer to Egyptians should they approach him:

"The Secretary-General, as agent of the Security Council, to my knowledge seems to have remained within the limit of his mandate, but as to what the Secretary-General might do on the basis of his constitutional rights as Secretary-General, I neither have reason to express opinions nor any cause now to submit the issue to my government which, in due time, may have to express its view on the personal policy of the Secretary-General."

Identical message and request being passed by Cordier to USSR, UK and French delegations for remittance their Ambassadors Cairo.

SYG believes this will avoid "time delay" detrimental to success this phase his mission. He also urged that this message be conveyed in strictest confidence.

Lodge

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2356. Secret. Received at 8:05 p.m., April 24.

303. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Director General of the Israeli Prime Minister's Office (Kollek) and Robert B. Anderson, Washington, April 24, 1956 [1]

1. On Tuesday, 24 April 1956, Mr. Anderson met in Washington with Mr. Kollek at the latter's request, from 0745 hours until 0845 hours.

2. Mr. Kollek stated that he had been instructed by Mr. Ben-Gurion to contact Mr. Anderson and to express the Prime Minister's thinking on the current situation. Mr. Kollek emphasized that Mr. Ben-Gurion was greatly concerned lest the United States be misled by the Hammarskjold Mission. He argued that at best it was only seeking to bring about a ceasefire—a condition of minor importance when compared with the more necessary objectives of the Anderson Mission. Kollek said that, while the Israeli Government had cooperated fully and had agreed to everything proposed by Hammarskjold in order to relax tension, nevertheless, they were firmly convinced that Nasr had gone along in seeming agreement for the sole purpose of gaining time, knowing that the ceasefire could be terminated effectively whenever it suited his purposes. Kollek stated that his Government believed that the danger period would be in June and July 1956.

3. Mr. Kollek then stated that in regard to the question of arms, the Israeli Government had consulted with various allies and had received a universal reaction that the United States should at least make available a token shipment. He stressed that France felt quite strongly that one item of armament should come from the United States. He said that Canada, though less blunt than the French, had also spoken of a "token" from the United States. Mr. Anderson replied that in conversations with the State Department he had received the impression that energetic steps were being taken to secure the needed weapons from Western suppliers. Mr. Kollek replied that his Government feared that the arms would come too late and that, in any event, they would not have the deterrent effect which Mr. Ben-Gurion believed they should have.

4. In response to a question as to whether the Israelis believed seriously that Nasr would attack, Mr. Kollek replied to Mr. Anderson in the affirmative stating that they were convinced that there would be a provocative, though not necessarily a frontal, attack from Egypt.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Jan. '56—memos, etc. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text.

5. In regard to the Soviet pronouncements in London on the Middle East, Mr. Kollek expressed the view that the Russians were afraid that Nasr would move too quickly into hostilities or at least before they, themselves, were ready for him to move. By way of explanation he pointed out that in recent Communist Party meetings in Stockholm, the Communist delegates from South America and Europe had heckled the USSR representative and expressed concern regarding the sale of arms to Egypt. In Mr. Kollek's opinion, the USSR had to make some gesture of peace in order to offset the unpopularity which they had run into by virtue of the sale. He also stated that the USSR position vis-à-vis Socialist parties was injured by the transaction.

6. Kollek went on to say that he had had several talks with Johnston over the Water Plan, [2] and that Johnston had expressed the view that the Israelis should begin work in the demilitarized zone. [3] Johnston believed that such a step was in the interests of both Israel and the United States, since Nasr would otherwise be convinced that blackmail could be advantageously used against the West. Kollek stressed that it was strongly in the interests of the United States to call Nasr's bluff over the Water Project, arguing that if the work was commenced war would not break out and consequently Nasr would lose tremendous personal prestige amongst the Arabs. Kollek suggested that it would be worthwhile for Anderson to meet with Johnston and review his thinking. Kollek also stated that Johnston did not intend to return to the Middle East. Kollek argued further that, by beginning the work, Nasr's influence would be lessened, which he thought to be consistent with the objectives of current U.S. policy. Kollek then argued that the United States was putting Israel in a very unfair position and was negotiating in order that the seventy-five million dollar loan be used exclusively for other river projects. He stated that this was as though someone negotiated a loan for a car but was presented with the condition that the loan would be contingent on the money being spent for a house. He stressed that these tactics were a source of great embarrassment to the Israeli Government and that the proposals were "unfair". He stressed that the two water projects were in fact separate and that his Government could not afford to abandon the JVP.

7. Commenting on talks in Washington, he stated that in conversations with himself, Eban, and Shiloah, most everyone in the Department of State agreed that the Israeli Government should have

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[2] No record of these conversations has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Ambassador Johnston expressed this view in a conversation with Secretary Dulles on April 14. (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles, April 14; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

token arms from the United States, but that at the level of the Secretary there has been a consistent block "beyond whom we don't seem to be able to pass". He would not indicate by name those in favor of giving the token arms, but did state that on the Secretary level the impasse on this matter contradicted the expressed views of the lower levels.

8. Mr. Anderson returned to the subject of the Johnston Plan, recalling to Mr. Kollek that on a previous occasion in Greenwich [4] he, Kollek, had stated that the Israeli Government would be prepared to build the lower construction of the Project if they could receive guarantees from the United States that water from the North would be made available later. Mr. Kollek acknowledged the previous conversation, stating that the Israeli Government could not afford to expend this sum on the Southern projects without such guarantees. Mr. Kollek then repeated what he had told Mr. Anderson some weeks ago, namely, that if there was not an agreement reached with the Arabs resulting in the implementation of the Plan, the Israeli Government would be forced to go ahead and commence the work in the North on the 15th of May. Mr. Kollek than stated that, from a purely personal point of view (which might be in contrast to Mr. Ben-Gurion's), he believed that if the United States raised its voice strongly enough against the commencement of work, the Israeli Government would desist. He explained that the Israeli Government could not afford to offend the United States as long as they were unarmed.

9. Mr. Kollek stated that he believed that the "paper agreements" between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen [5] were of little consequence and that the struggle for Arab leadership "was as hot as ever". In response to a question, he expressed the thought that, while Nasr possessed the capability for creating a civil war in Jordan against Hussein, he doubted that he would bring it about since this would call for British intervention, to which Nasr is fundamentally opposed. He stated that their information shows that the relationships between Nasr and Hussein are as strained as ever.

10. Mr. Kollek concluded the meeting by saying that Mr. Ben-Gurion desired to know if there were any messages from Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson replied that he remained "on the sidelines" and that, in view of the Hammarskjold Mission, everything must be held in abeyance until it was concluded. Mr. Anderson pointed out that if there should be a leak regarding parallel negotiations it would

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[4] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[5] Egypt concluded a mutual defense pact with Syria on October 20, 1955, and with Saudi Arabia on October 27, 1955. On April 10, 1956, Imam Ahmad ben Yahya of Yemen initialed a similar agreement which aligned Yemen as well with Egypt. On April 21, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen concluded a mutual defense pact.

have a disastrous effect in the UN. Mr. Kollek reiterated that the Israeli Government had little hopes for the Hammarskjold Mission and that, in their view, the only possibilities for peace remained in the framework of the negotiations commenced by the Anderson Mission. Mr. Anderson replied that he was not taking an active part in such negotiations at this time, but that he would be willing to hear anything from the Israelis which they desired to tell him. Mr. Kollek then asked whether Mr. Anderson would also be prepared to discuss from time to time various questions with Eban and Shiloah, even though they did not depend directly on Mr. Ben-Gurion. Mr. Anderson stated that he would be happy to see them since he was not bound by protocol.

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304. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 24, 1956—3 p.m.

2124. A usually well informed source, with comparatively good channels of information, has informed Embassy of a report that considerable friction was engendered in the RCC as result of Nasser's virtually unreserved cooperation with the Hammarskjold mission and Nasser's failure to work out an agreed position with his RCC colleagues beforehand. The report goes on to state that several members of RCC expressed their views in a memo which they asked Gen. Hakim Amer present to Prime Minister. It is alleged that Prime Minister upon being shown the memo by Hakim Amer criticized the latter for having accepted it and for not having dealt with RCC members by setting forth reasons which motivated Nasser in cooperating with Hammarskjold. Connected with this report is rumor that a degree of coolness has developed between Nasser and Gen. Hakim Amer.

Source went on to say that Hammarskjold will, because of RCC reaction referred above, find Nasser less amenable when he revisits Cairo during course of this mission.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/4–2456. Secret. Received at 4 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and USUN.

305. Paper Prepared by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) [1]

Washington, April 25, 1956.

PROPOSAL FOR STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES THAT IT WILL MAKE WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO VICTIM OF AGGRESSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Proposal:

It is proposed that, if the state of tension in the Middle East should reach a point where it appeared that either Israel or the Arab states were likely to initiate hostilities, the United States should announce that it was prepared to make certain weapons available to the victim of aggression. The announcement would be intended to serve the political purpose of creating an additional deterrent to aggression.

While there are a number of considerations which support the thesis that we should limit the announcement to a general statement along the foregoing lines, the situation existing at the time of the announcement might render it a more effective deterrent to be more specific. In this case it could be stated that if Israel were the victim 24 (or 48) F–86 jet fighters would be taken from operational units in Europe together with 30 days' supply of ammunition and spare parts, computed at U.S. wartime rates, and assembled at Cyprus. The planes, together with their ammunition and spare parts, would be delivered at Cyprus to Israel pilots to be flown by them to Israel. Alternatively, if it were desired to create a sharper impression of the immediate availability of the planes, it could be announced that the F–86's were forthwith being removed from their operational units and flown to Cyprus where they would be maintained in an operational ready condition. However, if they were maintained in an operational ready condition on Cyprus, it would require U.S. personnel and maintenance and would tend to inject us more into the Cyprus situation. It would also be stated that there would be loaded on an AKA (attack cargo vessel), to be operated with the Sixth Fleet,

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #3. Top Secret; Omega. According to a chit from Russell to Dulles, attached to the source text, Captain Wagner of the Department of Defense and Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff assisted Russell in drafting this paper; Russell also obtained MacArthur's approval; and a copy was sent to Hoover. The chit also bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw the paper.

On May 5, Fisher Howe transmitted a copy to Dillon Anderson under cover of a memorandum, which requested Anderson to return Russell's paper to the Executive Secretariat after he had read it. Anderson complied on May 7. (*Ibid.*, Omega #4)

for delivery to the Arab states in the event they were found to be the victims of aggression by Israel, the following: 36 AAA weapons 75 mm (Skysweeper), 280 105 mm Recoilless Rifles mounted on 1/4 ton trucks, 1000 3.5 inch Rocket Launchers, 35,000 cubit feet anti-tank mines and 10,000 cubit feet of miscellaneous ammunition.

Advance Notification to Other Governments:

If this proposal is adopted, the British, Italian and Greek Governments should be informed of the possibility of our making such an announcement and their assent obtained for the use of air bases in Italy, Greece and Cyprus for transit or for deliveries.

Training:

This Government is presently endeavoring to induce either the Canadian or the Italian Government to make F–86's available to the Israel Government. If these efforts are successful, the Israel Government would shortly be training pilots in the use of F–86's so they would be in a position to utilize any F–86's which would be delivered to them pursuant to this proposal. In any event, the Israel Government last March asked the Italian Government whether Israel pilots could be given F–86 training in Italy. The Italians were disposed to agree but consulted the U.S. MAAG which, after consulting Defense, said that in view of NATO training requirements, it was inclined to disapprove the proposal but said the decision was up to the Italians. The Italians turned down the request. It can be presumed that the Italian Government would be willing to reconsider and that ground crew training as well as pilot training could be provided. Such training, for pilots who had previously qualified in jet aircraft, requires approximately five weeks.

With respect to the Arab stockpile, recoilless rifles and rocket launchers do not require extensive training. Although the Arabs could not initially employ the Skysweeper with maximum effectiveness, they would be of utility in the defense of urban areas and would be more nearly a psychological equivalent of the F–86 planes in the eyes of the Egyptians.

Availability of Weapons:

All planes, weapons, ammunition and spare parts could be provided from U.S. war reserves. A Presidential authorization would be required to release the war reserves and expedite implementing action. The provision of an AKA to store and carry matériel presents greater problems as all U.S.N. AKA's assigned to the Atlantic Fleet have existing operational commitments. However, if the decision is made, an AKA could be moved from the West Coast.

Delivery of Weapons:

F–86 aircraft could be flown, combat loaded, from U.S. operational bases in Europe to Cyprus in a few hours with stops at Brindisi and Athens. The distances are Brindisi to Athens—472 nautical miles, Athens to Cyprus—586 nautical miles, and Cyprus to Israel—200 nautical miles.

The AKA vessel with the stockpile for the Arab states should be operated with the Sixth Fleet which is within 24 to 60 hours sailing time of Alexandria, Beirut and Latakia.

Action Required:

In order to be in a position to activate this proposal, if subsequently this were deemed desirable, the following steps would have to be taken:

1. Obtain Presidential authorization for:

a. the transfer of F–86's from their operational units in Europe to the Israel Government in the event we decide to go forward with this proposal.

b. the constitution now of an Arab stockpile (as outlined above) from U.S. war reserves and for an immediate assignment of an AKA for the purpose of this proposal. Such action should, of course, be kept secret until such time as a decision may be taken to make a formal announcement. If any "cover" is needed it could be that the AKA and its contents are for the use of the Sixth Fleet. It would be necessary to make the decision on the AKA now, rather than later, as it will presumably take at least several weeks to make the AKA available (it may have to come from the West Coast), and to assemble the equipment dockside.

2. On a strictly confidential basis, inform the U.K. and request its assent to the use of Cyprus as the final storage point for the delivery of the planes to Israel in the event it was decided to implement this program. If this is to be explored with the U.K., the Paris meeting with them on May 3 would provide an excellent opportunity.

3. Inform the Italian Government that the U.S. favors the Italian Government training Israel pilots and ground crews on F–86 aircraft.

4. Immediately prior to implementation and announcement of this program, the Italian and Greek Governments would be informed and their concurrences would be sought in the use of Brindisi and Athens airfields for transit to Cyprus. We should also inform the French Government.

306. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, April 25, 1956—2 p.m.

1136. Inquired of Foreign Ministry last night re substance Friday afternoon meeting [2] Ben Gurion and Sharett with Hammarskjold reported Embtel 1122 paragraph 6. [3] Informed that Secretary General said he had drawn enough encouragement from his Cairo visit to decide explore possibilities Arab-Israel settlement. In view Hammarskjold, territorial problem relatively unimportant and his position refugees was vital question. He arrived at this conclusion by thesis that cession of territory something which Nasser had conceived and it was, therefore, demand which he could unilaterally waive. On other hand repatriation and compensation of refugees were demands to which all Arab Governments committed and issues which had firm foundation among refugees in all Arab countries.

Hammarskjold concluded that key to solution was to give refugees option of returning to Israel and inquired whether Israel Government prepared to cooperate adding that all of this within context of peace (settlement). Sharett replied that GOI prepared to cooperate in this approach subject to three conditions:

1. That approach was within framework of peace;
2. That repatriation formula would not result in flood of refugees but would on face be limited to reasonable number; and
3. That Nasser and Arabs would abandon territorial claims.

Ministry official in commenting on above indicated skepticism that Hammarskjold's presentation reflected Nasser's thinking adding that "some people" in Israel Government thought it more likely that Labouisse, who totally preoccupied with refugee problem had provided basis for Hammarskjold's approach.

White

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2556. Secret. Received at 2:20 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Beirut, London, Paris, and Damascus.

[2] April 20.

[3] Document 298.

307. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, April 25, 1956—3 p.m.

887. Re: Palestine. Letter from SYG to SC Pres,[2] signed in Jerusalem on April 18, transmitted by Cordier today (copies being pouched).[3] After referring to unconditional assurances Egypt and Israel re compliance Article II, para 2 of GAA,[4] letter states:

"In support of the measures ensuring compliance with Article II, para 2, of which I have thus been notified, I have put before the two governments proposals for a strengthening of the observer activities, including the establishment of a number of fixed UN observation posts on both sides of the demarcation line in the Gaza area and occasional UN mobile patrols along the demarcation line. I hope within a few days to be able to inform you about the arrangements to be established. In principle, the proposals have already been accepted by the two governments concerned."

Lodge

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2556. Limited Official Use; Priority. Received at 3:57 p.m.
[2] Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2556)
[4] See Document 297.

308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, April 25, 1956—6:14 p.m.

2591. Re Palestine. UN Secretariat informed USUN April 24[2] Hammarskjold expects announce April 26 or 27 that observers arrangements have been concluded with Egypt and Israel. USUN informed original agreement approved by Egypt has been slightly modified by Israel and Hammarskjold was returning it to Egypt for final approval. Arrangements provide greater freedom of movement

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–2556. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Ludlow and approved by Bond who signed for Dulles.
[2] See Document 302.

and patrolling; nothing new in arrangements, merely restoration of rights.

USUN also informed in view strong feeling of Israelis Hammarskjold planning ask Egypt next Tuesday May 1 discuss Suez Canal restrictions "on personal basis". Believing Egypt will request advisory opinion from you on right of SYG to discuss this problem, SYG has requested you take following line with Egyptians should they approach you:

"Secretary-General, as agent of Security Council, to my knowledge seems to have remained within limit of his mandate, but as to what Secretary-General might do on basis of his constitutional rights as Secretary-General, I neither have reason to express opinions nor any cause now to submit issue to my government which, in due time, may have to express its view on personal policy of Secretary-General."

Department requests you take this position. Soviet, UK and French Ambassadors likewise being requested take this position in Cairo. SYG believes this position will avoid "time delay" detrimental to success this phase his mission. . . .

FYI US understands Hammarskjold has throughout mission made careful distinction between his SC mandate and his constitutional rights as SYG. By this distinction he has avoided Israeli injection of Suez Canal case into context his negotiations to carry out SC mandate. If Egyptians raise matter you might suggest occasion would be admirable one for demonstrating Egypt's determination cooperate fully with SC by announcing they now prepared comply with SC resolution of September 1, 1951. Such announcement could have dramatic and beneficial effect on what further steps SC can take in stabilizing area situation. End FYI. [3]

Dulles

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[3] In telegram 2143, April 26, Byroade warned: "Russian Ambassador here will take initiative without waiting to be approached, telling Nasser of Hammarskjold's request and asking Nasser's views as to how matter should be handled." (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–2656)

309. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, April 26, 1956—noon.

1001. Embtel 998. [2] I called on Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Ghazzi April 25 to enquire about results Hammarskjold visit Damascus. Ghazzi stated:

(1) Satisfactory agreement reached and letters exchanged re improvement situation on Sea of Galilee.

(2) GOS had accepted Hammarskjold's proposal for cease-fire on condition Israel agree abide by all pertinent decisions taken by SC since signature GAA. Ghazzi added that Hammarskjold would ascertain whether or not Syria's condition would be met by Israel, and that if Israel agrees, letters will be exchanged. In response my query, Ghazzi stated these included October 27, 1953 resolution re Jisr Banat Yacub Canal. [3]

Following incomplete report from UNTSO source differs somewhat from information supplied by Ghazzi:

(1) Re Galilee situation

(A) Hammarskjold said that, since Israelis would not give unconditional guarantee keep police boats 250 meters from shore, he preferred phrasing to effect boats would "not approach shore";

(B) GOS informed that Israel would permit use of lake by Syrian villagers for watering cattle and similar local purposes, but not for irrigation;

(C) GOS maintained position it would accept UNTSO control of fishing by Syrians, but would not accept permits issued by Israelis (Embtel 749 [4]);

(D) Syrians agreed to increase in size of observer corps and establishment UNTSO observation posts along shore;

(E) If Israel is approved [*approves*], UNTSO to have patrol boat in Sea of Galilee. According UNTSO source, negotiations releasing tension in area Sea of Galilee to continue under General Burns, since they not integral part of Hammarskjold mission.

(2) Cease-fire—initial Syrian position was that cease-fire guarantees should be linked to Israeli commitment not to resume work at Jisr Banat Yacub. Hammarskjold refused discuss Jisr Banat Yacub,

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–2656. Secret. Received at 9:28 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Telegram 998 from Damascus, April 26, transmitted a Syrian communiqué issued after Hammarskjöld's departure for Amman on April 24. (*Ibid.*)

[3] Reference is to Resolution 100 (1953) adopted by the U.N. Security Council at its 631st meeting. (U.N. doc. S/3128) For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 1389.

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–1156)

saying this was matter for General Burns and SC. Syrians then said they would agree to cease-fire only if Israel agreed abide by all SC decisions post-dating GAA (including inter alia May 18, 1951 decision re status DZ [5] and 1953 resolution re Jordan diversion [6]). Hammarskjold: (a) pointed out Israelis might insist on similar condition vis-à-vis Egypt, which would embarrass latter in view its non-implementation SC decision on Suez Canal, and (b) stated if GOS would not give unconditional cease-fire guarantee under GAA, he would ask for one under UN Charter. In end Syrians agreed "unconditional" cease-fire in return for Hammarskjold's promise negotiate with Israelis re observance SC decisions. Hammarskjold insisted, however, that two matters not be linked and according UNTSO source, appeared satisfied GOS had accepted this position.

Comment: GOS communiqué quoted reftel and Ghazzi's comments to me indicate Syrians continue consider question of cease-fire inseparable from that of Israeli intentions re Jisr Banat Yacub Canal, even if these two questions have been separated for negotiating purposes. Article V of GAA binds Israel as well as Syria not to violate DZ and from GOS point of view resumption work at Jisr Banat Yacub (which lies on Syrian side of armistice demarcation line) would constitute violation just as would Syrian firing into DZ to stop such work (Embtel 874 [7]). GOS likely regard unconditional guarantee not to fire as virtually granting Israelis immunity resume work. Syrians may, therefore, be slow give guarantee proposed by Hammarskjold unless their condition re Jisr Banat Yacub is in some measure satisfied.

Moose

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[5] Reference is to the U.N. Security Council resolution of May 18, 1951, which the Security Council approved by 10 votes to 0, with 1 abstention (U.S.S.R.), at its 547th meeting. For text, see U.N. doc. S/2157.

[6] See footnote 3 above.

[7] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/3–2056)

310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, April 26, 1956—9:44 a.m.

2598. We appreciate careful analysis provided by Embtel 2087 [2] which very useful in connection our continuous review course of action described Deptel 2404. [3] We are maintaining utmost flexibility and keeping constantly in mind objective present endeavors, i.e. induce reorientation Nasser's policies toward cooperation with Free World and lessen harmful Egyptian influence in other countries of ME. We are prepared respond quickly to real change on Nasser's part. However we think acts of substance publicly recognizable as such throughout area are needed and that we must exercise caution to avoid misinterpreting superficial maneuvers by Nasser as indicating genuine change.

Tactically we believe it preferable wait until Nasser concludes relations with US not proceeding smoothly and raises matter with US officials. He has undoubtedly noted press reports US re-evaluating its policy toward Egypt and may have become aware of certain pressures . . . . We believe your first reply to approach by Nasser should be to give what is ostensibly your personal reaction. Our tentative view is that following line might be taken:

1. You might point out to Nasser necessity for reciprocity in international relations emphasizing that US belief in his desire to cooperate severely shaken by Egyptian actions since Suez Base agreement, where we worked hard to bring about early British evacuation sought by Egypt but success did not lead to realization high expectations held out by Egypt during those negotiations.

2. US has not "turned against" him and does not wish pursue policies detrimental to him. However our attitude toward cooperation with him and our ability take those positive steps he would like are inevitably affected by his own activities. Without assuring Nasser of any specific response on our part you might suggest he consider means of demonstrating desire for friendly relations perhaps by steps such as following: a) Public statement by Nasser broadcast to Egypt and Arab world expressing his determination to maintain Egyptian independence and recognizing desirability friendly [4] cooperation with Free World to achieve this end; b) Cessation anti-West press and radio attacks and attacks directed against Baghdad Pact; c) Full support in UN and outside to Hammarskjold's efforts to improve situation and relieve tensions re Arab-Israel problem, including

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1956. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution; Omega Handling. Drafted by Rountree and Burdett; cleared by Hoover, MacArthur, and Howe; and approved and signed by Dulles.

[2] Document 294.

[3] Document 238.

[4] The Secretary substituted the word "friendly" for "close".

acceptance various practical steps proposed by Hammarskjold; d) Dispatch of high ranking official in whom Nasser has confidence, perhaps member of RCC, to attend SC discussion Hammarskjold report (this would evidence Egyptian intention work with UN, and visit could serve as opportunity for US officials Washington to have frank talks with Egyptian in whom Nasser has confidence); e) Suggest to Syria, Lebanon and Jordan they invite Johnston return to resume discussions Jordan Valley Plan on unified basis.

3. In addition foregoing, broader question is Egyptian attitude toward British as reflected in strong anti-British propaganda and activity throughout Near East area. US policies are, of course, directed toward achievement mutually beneficial relationships between US itself and states of the area, independence and progress of which we stoutly support. We cannot, however, be indifferent to developments which tend to undermine interests of Free World in general and efforts of UK to maintain its legitimate interests and mutually beneficial relations with countries and peoples of Near East. These make an essential contribution to Western security and well-being.[5] We have not given British "blank check" in support their NE policies; indeed we have often used our influence to help bring about new relationships between UK and Near Eastern countries (as in cases of Suez Agreement with Egypt, Sudan Agreement, and Iranian oil settlement, and endeavors to settle Buraimi issue with Saudi Arabia). By same token we cannot be expected support broadside attacks against British particularly when such attacks involve general undermining Western position and interests in area including those of US. We would expect other responsible governments similarly recognize dangers such actions and refrain from resorting to them.

4. We aware that in this matter, as in all others affecting international relations, cooperation is two-way proposition. If Egyptians prepared moderate their position re British and cease inflammatory activities against them, US prepared exert influence upon British to pursue similar policies vis-à-vis Egypt.

5. As Nasser aware US has given clear evidence its support Baghdad Pact as instrument collective security against communist threat aggression and economic and psychological offensive. We have never regarded Pact as instrument to build up one Arab state at expense of others or to disrupt Arab unity. We would not associate ourselves in any Pact activities involving intra-Arab politics or in machinations against Egypt. We aware Nasser has had misgivings re objective of Pact but we are unable agree any present[6] validity his fears it directed against Egypt. His acceptance sincerity US position will render it easier for US work toward confining Pact to its basic purpose.

Department would appreciate receiving soonest precise formulation you would suggest re remarks to Nasser and views re timing.

Dulles

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[5] The Secretary added this sentence.

[6] The Secretary added the words "any present".

311. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, April 26, 1956, 11:10–11:50 a.m. [1]

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Rabbi Hillel Silver
Secretary Dulles

Rabbi Silver made a very strong plea for arms to Israel along the conventional lines, picking up all of the arguments of Eban in answering the counterarguments which I had made to Eban. It seemed obvious that Silver had been pretty well briefed by the Israelis. He argued that since we felt that Israel should get arms from somewhere and since they could not get arms unless we did something, therefore we should do something. The President and I explained our desire to be able to exert an influence throughout the area for peace, and that while we were constantly reviewing the question of defensive arms of some kind for Israel, we had not yet concluded that this would really serve the interests of peace in the area. I said that we did not want our policy to seem to be made by the Zionists and that I did not think that the mass meetings and public appeals helped the situation. Silver seemed somewhat resentful of this intimation.

The President said that he was not going to be influenced at all by political considerations and that if doing what he thought right resulted in his not being elected, that would be quite agreeable to him. Silver said, "You can be reelected without a single Jewish vote."

JFD [2]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Confidential; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. The time of the meeting is from the record of the President's Daily Appointments. (*Ibid.*)

[2] William Macomber initialed for Secretary Dulles.

312. Editorial Note

On the afternoon of April 29, British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins visited Secretary Dulles at his residence to inform him of the results of the recently-concluded Bulganin and Khrushchev visit to

the United Kingdom. Makins reported the following on the situation in the Near and Middle East:

"(1) As regards the Arab-Israel controversy, there was a vague implication that the Soviets would not use the veto power. As regards the Middle Eastern oil, the British made it clear that they will, if necessary, 'fight for oil'. It was felt that some progress had been made in persuading the Russians that the Baghdad Pact was purely defensive, and above all designed to defend the British oil position. Nevertheless, the Russians were stubborn in their view that so long as this Pact existed, they would make trouble for the British in the area." (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles, April 30; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation)

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313. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, April 29, 1956—2 p.m.

2165. Reference Department telegram 2598. [2] As this exchange messages has revealed, I tend be more hopeful than Department that by continuing lines followed since last October we should be able obtain at least minimum required support from growing events of Arab world (Nasser) for free world objectives . . . .

Feeling, therefore, that we are again heading into period of tension, believe my most useful contribution can now be to make every effort assure that GOE fully understands our viewpoint, hoping that in process Washington will obtain clearer understanding theirs.

To do this, propose, if Nasser takes initiative of type envisaged by Department (and there is greater possibility that he will not), to follow fairly closely presentation set forth points 1 through 5 referenced Department telegram, prefacing my remarks with general statement US historic policy on colonialism and post-war activities in defense of freedom and independence. Would plan to emphasize particularly stoppage of attack against Baghdad Pact. Would like de-emphasize point 2 (d) as Egypt's present representative Fawzi far more capable handling SC matters than member of RCC and

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–2956. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution; Omega Handling. Received at 2:36 p.m.

[2] Document 310.

shouldn't think it appropriate to push this too far. Would like also to limit 2(e) to less specific suggestion, namely that he do something positive advance objectives of Jordan Valley plan. Believe visit by Johnston should not be pressed as it appears other Embassies in area agree with us that high US citizen in area publicly endeavoring secure approval the project now counter-productive.

In any discussion Nasser now, I will be vulnerable on subject high dam and Senator George's statement [3] may be on his mind. He might ask if we dragging our feet because of failure Anderson mission and in order apply pressure on GOE for "political advantage".

If he takes this tack, I would point out we responded very quickly last November, leaving him draw own conclusions re our present policy and reason therefor. We must anticipate that . . . Nasser's conclusions in this matter will have strong bearing future Egyptian-US relations.

If it now appears we will endeavor have UN mediate broader issues of Arab-Israeli conflict, would it not be advantageous defer implementation . . . policy for a bit . . . in order avoid in short run risks we foresee? Nasser's position in such an effort would probably set tone for other Arab States just as it has on current mission of Secretary General. Nasser's intelligence, which extends inside every political party in area, will tell him immediately of facts which seem against him, and I should think we would not wish this state of affairs if UN effort to be made.

Byroade

[3] On April 27, Senator Walter F. George, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declared his opposition to the U.S. offer of long-term assistance for the construction of the Aswan Dam.

314. Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, undated.

Embtel 2165. [2] Believe it useful emphasize [3] limited nature present . . . operation . . . . In countries outside Egypt we taking steps designed improve position of West and in this context reduce Egyptian influence. With respect to Egypt itself we endeavoring . . . to make clear friendly relations between US and Egypt are based on reciprocity. . . .

Do not believe . . . operation as now being conducted will of itself cause Nasser decide obstruct efforts UNSYG. Nasser must have noted already change in our attitude and some speculation in press re possibility of policy revision. Alteration in Egyptian press and radio and cooperation given Hammarskjold to date may be his way of responding. By such means he may have taken first step indicating he is not unfriendly to West and thereby induce us to resume policy of full cooperation.

With specific reference your proposed remarks to Nasser you may wish take account following:

1. Purpose of 2d Embtel 2598 [4] was to dramatize Egyptian willingness cooperate through UN on Arab-Israel problem. Although Fawzi more familiar with details, his presence at SC would not have same impact in area and we question whether Nasser would entrust him with discussions basic matters bearing on Arab-Israel problem.

2. Re Jordan Valley, we believe it impracticable proceed on piece-meal basis and thus lose momentum achieved during past two years. Our efforts must be directed at securing agreement on unified development. Nasser's assistance and ability to accomplish will represent real test of his sincerity.

3. If Nasser raises High Aswan Dam, you could say Egyptian counterproposal altered premise on which offer of US–UK grant was made for which reason counterproposal required new consideration. This consideration is now taking place. If Nasser further presses question in context of Senator George's statement [5] you could inquire what progress has been made in negotiations with Sudan on Nile waters and related problem of redemption Egyptian currency

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega. Mr. Rountree (for NATO Meeting May '56). Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by Wilkins and Burdett on April 30 and cleared in draft with Rountree. A note from Allen to Wilkins attached to the source text reads: "I don't see that any reply to Cairo's 2165 is called for. We'll carry on this debate forever." No record has been found in Department of State files to indicate this telegram was transmitted to Cairo.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] At this point on the source text, Allen wrote, "to whom?"

[4] Document 310.

[5] See footnote 3, *supra.*

pointing out we understand Egyptians consider Sudan agreement prerequisite to work on High Dam.

Believe we should continue prepare for time when Nasser will question you re US-Egyptian relations. Deptel 2598 as amended by Embtel 2165 and this message indicate US views. We should, however, again exchange views before you have substantive discussion with Nasser for purpose last-minute double-check.

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315. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Ben Gurion [1]

Washington, April 30, 1956.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I have delayed replying to your important letter to me of March sixteenth [2] because of the rapid developments that have been taking place, including notably the mission of Secretary-General Hammarskjold. We are awaiting his report with hope and confidence.

The only reply I can give you at this moment to the chief subject of your letter, the question of the sale of armaments, is a straightforward one. You have presented your case forcefully and eloquently. But there are other factors to which you do not allude, factors affecting the ability of the United States to maintain its influence for peace in the area. We are not persuaded that it would serve the cause of peace and stability in the world for the United States now to accede to your request for arms sales. We continue to weigh the matter carefully in the light of developments, and I may have occasion to communicate with you further. [3]

With kindest personal regard and best wishes,

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #3.

[2] Document 201.

[3] Telegram 822, May 1, transmitted the text of the President's letter to the Embassy in Tel Aviv and informed the Embassy that the signed original had been delivered to the Israeli Embassy the same day. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/5–156)

316. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, May 1, 1956—8 a.m.

1015. Embtel 1001. [2] Reliable source reports following as gist communications exchanged between Hammarskjold and GOS since former left Damascus:

(1). In message to Prime Minister-Foreign Minister Ghazzi April 26 Hammarskjold (a) noted Damascus press reports attributed to "official source" linking GOS acceptance cease fire to question respecting SC decisions (Embtel 998 [3]); (b) stated such reports obviously based on misunderstanding his discussions with GOS; and (c) asserted that, if GOS had insisted on attaching condition to cease fire, he would have been obliged report that it refused abide by its obligations under UN Charter.

(2). In second cable to Ghazzi April 28 Hammarskjold (a) stated Israel had agreed cease fire with all Arab States, and Jordan and Lebanese agreement expected soon; and (b) requested Syrian confirmation unconditional cease fire under Article III, paragraph 2 of GAA [4] with reservation only re rights legitimate self-defense, as agreed during his discussions Damascus, in order permit him report agreement all parties to Chairman SC early week April 30.

(3). GOS replied same day asking Hammarskjold return Damascus for clarification certain points.

(4). In message delivered GOS April 29 Hammarskjold (a) replied his travel plans make return Damascus difficult; (b) stated he assumed clarification desired by GOS related question "legitimate self-defense"; (c) repeated personal opinion previously expressed to GOS that, re specific situation raised by it during his visit Damascus (i.e., Jisr Banat Yacub Canal), determination of what would constitute legitimate self-defense (in event Israelis resumed work) could be made only by SC; (d) again requested Syrian confirmation cease fire; and (e) repeated assurance he would attempt separately obtain Israeli commitment abide by SC decisions.

GOS expected reply today to Hammarskjold's April 29 message. [5]

Local press featuring report from Beirut that Hammarskjold does not consider Israeli diversion Jordan River violates GAA. Typical headline: "UNSYG ignores SC decision and says Syria not entitled

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–156. Secret. Received at 8:20 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Document 309.

[3] See footnote 2, *ibid.*

[4] Article 3 (2) of the Israel–Syria General Armistice Agreement stated that no military or paramilitary elements of the land, sea, or air forces of either party were to commit any warlike or hostile acts against the military or paramilitary forces of the other party. (U.N. doc. S/1353/Add. 1 and 2 and Corr. 1)

[5] See Document 320.

prevent diversion of Jordan". According press this question discussed by Ghazzi with Egyptian Ambassador Damascus,[6] and by Foreign Office Secretary General Tarazi with Lebanese Foreign Minister[7] in Beirut April 29. Most journals allege Egypt and Lebanon will support Syrian position (cf. Embtel 1004[8]).

Comment: Whether GOS continues insist on linking cease fire to satisfactory assurances re Jisr Banat Yacub will probably depend, in part at least, on extent other Arab States willing associate selves with Syrian position. Embassy has so far been able obtain no information here to confirm or deny press reports re what pledges, if any, GOS may have received from Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. First sentence Beirut telegram 1359 to Department,[9] however, suggests Lebanon has adopted Syrian position.

Moose

[6] Brigadier Mahmoud Riad.

[7] Salim Lahoud.

[8] The Embassy reported in telegram 1004, April 26, that some newspapers had been saying "that Jordan and Lebanon will follow Syrian lead in refusing give Hammarskjold cease fire guarantee until Israel agrees terminate Jisr Banat Yacub Project." (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/4–2656)

[9] The first sentence of telegram 1359 from Beirut, April 29, reads as follows: "Foreign Minister told me yesterday ceasefire and diversion Jordan waters tied together and to seek Israel commitment not to divert Jordan waters until agreement for their use can be reached." (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/4–2956)

317. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in Washington and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) in New York, May 1, 1956[1]

Ambassador Lodge telephoned this morning to pass on the following message:

"Secretary Dag Hammarskjold is putting out a release today[2] (6:00 a.m. New York time) stating that in the course of the current negotiations between the parties he has submitted certain proposals to strengthen the observer organization so that a cease-fire agreement can be enforced. He announces this morning that agreement has now been reached, to be submitted for adoption at the next

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #3. Prepared in the Office of the Secretary.

[2] Attached but not printed.

Armistice Commission meeting, which will provide for a number of fixed observation posts and mobile observation posts and an increase in the number of observers."

Ambassador Lodge suggests that Mr. Dulles might wish to say a word of welcome for this favorable development.[3] It is also being put out at the UN this morning so that if he does say something he should do it right away.

[3] An official response to the communiqué was read at the Department's daily news briefing on May 1. (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #3)

318. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State[1]

Tel Aviv, May 1, 1956—2 p.m.

1149. Foreign Minister told me yesterday that when Hammarskjold had advised him that Syrian Government had undertaken to comply with Article 3 paragraph 2 Israel-Syrian GAA, he had sent reply requesting SYG to obtain commitment Article 3 paragraph 3 GAA[2] and also requesting that identical undertakings be obtained from Jordan re similar provision in Israel–Jordan GAA.[3] Sharett said importance GOI attaches to this arises from fact that Article 3 paragraph 3 creates an obligation on part Syria (and Jordan) to control activities civilian infiltrators, whereas Article 3 paragraph 2 relates only to military, para-military and non-regular forces.

Sharett said Hammarskjold sent Vigier to Jerusalem yesterday to attempt dissuade Israelis maintenance this position on grounds absence from Israel-Egyptian GAA any provision similar to Article 3 paragraph 3 might, if matter became an issue, be interpreted by Egyptians to mean they have no obligation to control border activities civilians. Sharett labelled this "clever argument" and indicated

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84/5–156. Secret. Received at 9:53 a.m. Repeated to Beirut, Damascus, Amman, and Cairo.

[2] This paragraph enjoined any party to the agreement from conducting a "warlike act or act of hostility" from territory it controls against the other party.

[3] Israel and Jordan signed a General Armistice Agreement on April 3, 1949. (U.N. doc. S/1302 and Add. 1 and Corr. 1)

he was reserving decision on Hammarskjold's request until their discussion today.[4]

White

[4] See Document 326.

319. Editorial Note

According to his memorandum of conversation with President Eisenhower at the White House on May 1, Secretary Dulles raised the question of providing American arms to victims of aggression in the Middle East:

"3. I discussed with the President the implementing of the concept of arms to be held in escrow for quick delivery to whichever country was the victim of aggression. I said that Mr. MacArthur had been working this out with the Defense Department and that we felt there was a feasible way of handling this if Cyprus were available as a point of transit. I said I might want to discuss this with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd but before doing so wanted to be sure that the President approved it in principle because action would require Presidential direction to our forces to deliver the requisite equipment. The President said that he did approve of the matter and saw no reason why he should not instruct Gruenther to have all ready for delivery whatever planes or other equipment, such as anti-aircraft weapons, etc., which were thought desirable. He suggested that some of this equipment might be sent in to a port by American ships, the presence of which would themselves exercise an influence, particularly as they would be entitled to defend themselves if they were attacked. I said that Mr. MacArthur might be getting in touch with him further on this program during my absence." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

320. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, May 2, 1956—7 p.m.

911. Re: Palestine. Cordier just informed us receipt info from SYG that Syria agreed this afternoon to unconditional cease-fire. Contrary press reports, Lebanon and Jordan indicated similar agreement this morning. [2]

Cordier said SYG now plans submit report in two parts. First part will be progress report with generalized statement of problems SYG faced upon arrival Palestine. UN releasing first part tomorrow. [3] Second part will describe concrete agreements reached and give more detailed study SYG's activities. This part available approximately one week. [4]

In response to query, Cordier said he had no information whether SYG would make specific recommendations for future, but indicated something this nature likely since SYG referred to necessity of full compliance with all aspects armistice agreements.

Lodge

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.86/5–256. Limited Official Use; Priority. Received at 7:05 p.m.

[2] Telegram 1383 from Beirut, May 2, reported that Lebanon and Jordan had agreed to an unconditional cease-fire. (*Ibid.*, 684A.00/5–256)

[3] For text of the Secretary-General's progress report to the U.N. Security Council, May 2, see U.N. doc. S/3594. The text was also published in the *New York Times*, May 4, 1956.

[4] See Document 348.

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321. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, May 3, 1956—10 a.m.

1025. Prime Minister Ghazzi told me May 2: GOS position unchanged on Hammarskjold proposal for cease-fire (Embassy telegram 1001 [2]). Syrian acceptance is conditional on Israeli willingness

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–356. Secret. Received at 8:36 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Document 309.

agree to respect all UN resolutions having bearing on problem. Lebanese and Jordanians take same attitude but not Egyptians. He assumed Hammarskjold who due arrive Damascus 2 p.m. May 2 would report Israeli reaction to proposals previously discussed by Hammarskjold with Syrians.

Comment: GOS position stated by Ghazzi appears differ from GOS position described by Hammarskjold to Israelis (first sentence Tel Aviv's 1149 to Department [3]).

Moose

[3] Document 318.

322. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State [1]

Paris, May 3, 1956—10 a.m.

Secto 2. Subject: Bilateral talk with French. The Secretary, accompanied by Dillon, Merchant, Bowie and Rountree called on Pineau May 2, who was assisted by Daridan and Marjolin. Pineau promptly got down to business by saying that he wished to talk about four subjects:

A. Middle East.
B. Far East.
C. NATO.
D. Disarmament.

Talk lasted nearly two hours and approximately half time was spent on Middle East. Conversations on other items being reported separately.

In opening discussion on Middle East Pineau said there seemed to have been some confusion in U.S. regarding French reasons for proposing three-power conference on Middle East. He said U.S. had seemed to believe French wished continue to handle Middle Eastern question within framework of 1950 tripartite declaration. Pineau said

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–356. Secret. Received at 9:57 a.m. Drafted by Dillon and Rountree and approved by Merchant who signed for Dulles. Also sent to London.

According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, he left Washington on May 1 for the NAC Ministerial meetings held in Paris May 4–5. He returned to Washington on May 7. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

this was not at all the case and that all French wished was to develop common position with U.S. and U.K. for presentation in United Nations. He also said French intelligence had obtained advance information that Soviets intended to make dramatic move in Middle East and he had hoped that West could act first.

Pineau said second thing which French had wished accomplish by three-power meeting was agreement on problem of supply of arms to Israel. He stated the standing French position that peace could best be served by maintaining rough equilibrium in arms capacities of Israel and her Arab neighbors and that this would now require delivery of arms from West to Israel. Pineau pointed out that France was presently almost alone in making arms deliveries to Israel and that this situation was one which obviously could not continue. Pineau then said that a possible alternative to arms deliveries to Israel would be establishment of general arms embargo but that this would require agreement of Soviet Union. Pineau said that French had had no desire to get into basic questions involved in settlement of Arab-Israeli dispute in tripartite conference which they had proposed.

Pineau then commented that question was whether Western powers were ready to allow Israel to defend herself or were prepared sooner or later to sacrifice Israel to Arab States. If we were to save Israel we must do one of two things—either supply arms to Israel and Egypt in equal quantities or alternatively enforce an arms embargo which would require agreement of Soviet Union. Adoption of one of these policies, according to Pineau, was only way to avoid war in the area.

Responding to Pineau's comments, Secretary said U.S. was not traditional supplier of arms to Israel, but that latter had in past looked primarily to European sources; that U.S. sale of arms to Israel in present circumstances would make it appear we were yielding to political pressure from Zionists and had turned away from position of neutrality, thus seriously impeding effectiveness of U.S. in seeking solution basic problem; and that if there should continue to be elements of arms race, it would be better not to create situation in which U.S. was engaged in competition with Soviet Union in supplying arms to area, thus openly engaging prestige of both countries in this issue. For these reasons he hoped Israel could get arms where it normally made purchases in past. We had made clear our encouragement of other countries to supply such arms and were glad to have agreed to technical arrangements necessary for delivery of French Mysteres. Secretary said he planned to speak tomorrow to Pearson [2] re possibility sale by Canada of certain number F–86 jets,

[2] See Document 325.

and expressed some optimism regarding possibility of Israeli purchases from Italy. He said we would, of course, support an agreement, if such were possible, that no further weapons would be sold to Israel or countries bordering upon Israel, after equalization of their arms. This was highly desirable from many points of view, including fact that Israel, in light its small population, could effectively absorb far fewer arms than forty million Arabs surrounding it. Possibility of Egypt remaining static in its arms position would be greater if any additional weapons acquired by Israel should come from sources other than U.S.

Secretary stated that our policy certainly was not one of abandoning Israel. We had made it clear that if aggression should occur, we would take action both within and outside U.N. to assist victim. He realized that this action might come too late to be of immediate assistance in initial assault, but one of our principal purposes in making intentions known had been to deter aggression. There was, of course, no assurance that it would be possible to give Israel adequate means of defending itself alone after an attack should occur. While he fully realized morale factor in increasing Israel's military capability he thought future of Israel could not be preserved by arms alone. Far greater security lies in realization by Arabs that free nations would react in defense of Israel. This "reaction" need not be confined solely to arms; there are a number of economic measures which would have perhaps disastrous effect upon economies of aggressor nations.

Secretary emphasized important role which U.N. can and must play in preservation of State of Israel and was encouraged by effectiveness of measures now in process. He said recent Soviet statement re peace in area[3] in large measure followed initiatives which we had taken. In proclaiming its desire cooperate with U.N., Russians were following recent American lead and obviously were not embarking upon new program or proceeding alone.

Secretary observed many Israelis felt Israel could not exist within small area which it now held, and they believed expansion could be accomplished if there were war in which they had backing of great powers. Fortunately, this not prevailing view but it essential to maintain most careful watch over situation to avoid "being trapped." In U.S. there is large articulate body of Zionists whose attitude toward administration's NE policy might have considerable effect upon Presidential and Congressional elections. President's position was, regardless of any such political considerations, that he would adhere strictly to policies for good of American people and Free World as a whole.

[3] See Document 291.

Reverting to comment by Pineau that French should not be alone in giving arms to Israel, he said that if other countries could not be prevailed upon to join France in such arms sales, we would review our own policy in this regard.

Pineau then commented that he understood U.S. position and was impressed by what the Secretary had said. He felt that Secretary's remarks regarding the necessity of avoiding a prestige contest in the area between U.S. and USSR had explained better than any Frenchman could the basic reasons for French opposition to the Baghdad Pact. Baghdad Pact had created just what we were now trying to avoid, namely, prestige race between Anglo-Saxon powers on one side and Soviets on other.

Secretary said that Soviet suggestion for an embargo upon arms to NE apparently envisaged embargo upon all Baghdad Pact countries. We could not, of course, accept such an embargo, as it would involve Turkey, a member of NATO, Pakistan, a member of SEATO, and Iraq and Iran, who are closely allied with the Free World defense system. While, therefore, questions of embargo embracing members of the Baghdad Pact would be most difficult, that of curtailing shipments to Israel and bordering Arab States would be far less so. He stated U.S. was not author of Baghdad Pact, nor had we joined, although we had been under strong pressure to do so. He said that he had learned about Iraq–Turkey treaty only after it had been signed. Later we questioned desirability of Iran's joining, thinking Iran's adherence might be taken as provocation which would increase Iran's dangers while there would not be enough strength in the pact itself to offset those dangers. Iran nevertheless adhered on its own initiative, and we felt that we must support that action. While it might be argued that it would be better if pact did not exist, its reality is a fact and its abandonment at this time would impose grave problems. Secretary noted his understanding that although French reservations about pact remained, French Government had instructed its Ambassadors in the area to avoid, for the sake of Western unity, any derogatory comments about the pact. He said we very much appreciated this position.

Pineau replied by saying that we seemed to understand each other fully but what is the solution to the problem whose existence we both recognize? The Secretary replied that the solution may rest in action by Canada to which Pineau nodded agreement. Discussion of Middle East then closed with understanding that there would be further opportunity to talk at tripartite meeting. Latter meeting set for 10:00 a.m., Sunday subject to Lloyd's agreement.

323. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President [1]

Washington, May 3, 1956.

SUBJECT

Status of the U.S. Offer on the High Aswan Dam

This problem of progress on the Aswan Dam negotiations is intimately tied up with the question of our overall Near East policy which you will recall the Secretary took up with you on the basis of his memorandum to you of March 28, 1956. [2] I should perhaps discuss this element with you personally.

Meanwhile, the following is the present status of the project:

The United States, together with the British Government, made an offer to the Government of Egypt on December 16, 1955 of support for the first phase of construction of the High Dam. This offer was the result of conversations with the Egyptian Minister of Finance and was closely integrated with possible assistance which would come from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for the second phase. Mr. Black visited Cairo in January and reached substantial agreement regarding financing of the second phase.

The Egyptians have made counter proposals to the U.S.–U.K. offer which basically alter the premise on which the original U.S.–U.K. offer was made. The counter proposals include: 1) firmer assurances for U.S. aid for the whole project rather than part of it; 2) abandonment of the first phase as a separate part and inclusion in the whole project; and 3) Egyptian decision to seek Sudanese agreement before commencing any construction. Previously the Egyptians did not consider Sudanese agreement would be required for the first phase.

Discussions have been taking place between the U.S. and the U.K. in Washington regarding the new Egyptian proposals. Once agreement is reached with the U.K., discussions will be held with the IBRD. The Egyptians and the Sudanese are understood to have had some preliminary talks. No progress has as yet been reported.

The Secretary plans to discuss this subject with the British Foreign Secretary while he is attending the NATO meeting in Paris.

Herbert Hoover, Jr.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. The date is from the Department of State record copy. A note attached to that copy indicates this memorandum was prepared for the NATO side talks.

[2] Document 223.

324. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, May 3, 1956—1 p.m.

1027. Embtel 1025. [2] Reliable UN source reports following re Hammarskjold–GOS discussions Damascus May 2:

(1) Hammarskjold stated he had no assurance from Israel re abiding by SC decision. This, however, implicit in UN membership. He thought Israelis attached importance his views this matter, and therefore not worried.

(2) GOS finally initialed statement re unconditional cease-fire (Embtel 1015, para 2(b) [3]), with addendum to effect it (a) undertook observe obligations under Charter including Article 25 thereof [4] (re carrying out SC decision) and (b) hoped Israel would do same.

(3) In return GOS asked Hammarskjold for statement that he supported Syrian position re respecting SC decisions. Hammarskjold demurred, but did initial statement to the effect his present mission carried out within framework of Article 25 of UN Charter.

(4) Statements cited 2 and 3 above exchanged and Hammarskjold agreed their release by GOS May 3. In conversation May 3 Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Ghazzi told me GOS had given assurances re unconditional cease-fire but had added this done in confidence SC decisions would be observed. In reply my query, Ghazzi explained that statement re SC decisions was addendum, not condition, but that GOS had advised Hammarskjold it would consider Israel resumption of work on Jisr Banat Yacub Canal a violation this agreement.

Press and government controlled Damascus radio May 3 report (a) GOS gave Hammarskjold written cease-fire pledge on condition SC decisions observed, "including that which prevents Israel from resuming diversion Jordan River", and (b) this means Israeli violation SC decisions would release Syria from its pledge. Press quotes Minister Defense Barbada, Minister Interior Buzo, Minister Education Kuzbari and Foreign Office Secretary General Tarazi as confirming cease fire conditioned on Israeli observance SC regulations, particularly that of October 27, 1953, [5] and as stating Hammarskjold's reply to GOS considered pledge by him on behalf Israel that latter will not attack Syrian frontiers.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–356. Secret; Priority. Received at 3:02 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Document 321.

[3] Document 316.

[4] Reference is to the U.N. Charter. For text, see 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.

[5] Reference is to the U.N. Security Council resolution of that date, which the Security Council approved unanimously at its 631st meeting. For text, see U.N. doc. S/3128.

Comment: Hammarskjold–GOS agreement constitutes compromise in language less clear-cut than UNSYG originally sought, without firm assurances re Banat Yacub Canal initially demanded by Syrians. In effect it appears GOS has agreed to unconditional cease fire effective up to point Israelis resume work in DZ.

Moose

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325. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Paris, May 3, 1956—10 p.m.

Dulte 5. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. In private talk with Pearson May 3 with Merchant present I raised question Canadian supply arms to Israel. I told him in deep confidence US considering making arrangements for rapid supply to Israel, in event it victim aggression, of F86's operational in European theater. I said that I hoped Canada would be willing to meet Israeli request purchase F86's since early delivery would enable pilot training.

Pearson's first reaction was that Canadian public would question why Canada should do what US unwilling to do, but he indicated understanding problem and desire cooperate. His suggestion was that Canadians might meet half Israeli request for 24 F86's. He then inquired what was US now supplying or contemplating furnishing Israelis.

I replied comparatively little involved or contemplated.

Pearson in conclusion, after referring Zionist sentiment in Canada, and government's pre-election vulnerability to "merchant of death" charge, promised to look into matter promptly on return. He said that he would personally urge something moderate be done in way delivery F86's with concurrent announcement re value aircraft for training purposes.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/5–356. Top Secret. Received at 7:03 p.m. Drafted by Merchant and approved by Macomber who signed for Dulles.

I emphasized in event aggression against Israel prompt provision matériel easier than troops. Pearson said subject had been left open by Canadian Cabinet pending his return from Paris. [2]

Dulles

[2] Dulles also informed Eisenhower of this conversation with Pearson. (Dulte 3 from Paris, May 3; *ibid.*, 110.11–DU/5–356)

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326. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, May 3, 1956—2 p.m.

1164. Reference: Embtels 1122 and 1136. [2] GOI official who was present at meetings has given me following summary Hammarskjold talks May 1 and 2 with Ben Gurion and Sharett (have requested Consul General Jerusalem to obtain General Burns' appraisal when possible).

1. Israel-Egyptian GAA. GOI discussed at length recent incidents Gaza strip and said that unless they were stopped they would "jeopardize the pledge of reciprocity" which Israel had made to conform to Article 2 paragraph 2. Hammarskjold reportedly said he was convinced Nasser had issued orders to his military groups to conform to said article but that some gap might exist in implementation. Upon his return to Cairo May 3 he would endeavor to get a commitment to private crossings by civilians. Regarding previous discussions Articles 7 and 8, Hammarskjold said he had some hope of getting Nasser informally and unobtrusively to lift (de facto) Suez and Tiran blockades. After discussion and pursuance of this effort, Israel has given SYG a written declaration that as soon as Egypt gives evidence it has lifted the blockade Israel will "implement its compliance with Articles 7 and 8."

2. Syrian-Israel GAA. Hammarskjold reported on his discussions in Damascus and said that GOS had remained adamant on unconditional undertaking compliance Article 3 paragraph 2, maintaining its insistence on statement that compliance would be non-operation in case Israel resumption work DZ. Hammarskjold requested Israelis to

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674A.84A/5–356. Secret. Received at 7:32 a.m., May 5. Repeated to Cairo, Beirut, London, Paris, Damascus, and Jerusalem.
[2] Documents 298 and 306.

give him an intimation that wisdom would prevail and that GOI would not be resuming work in DZ. Such an intimation would enable him to return to Damascus and persuade the Syrians to abandon their attempt to link cease-fire with Banat Yaacov, telling them that they did not have to worry about work resumption. Ben Gurion replied that Israelis were entitled to resume work; that they could if they so desired begin work "when we leave this room;" and that he could not therefore give SYG any pledge. (Source said that Israelis made no reference to discussions water problem now going on in Washington.) After going to Damascus yesterday afternoon for a final effort to persuade Syrians, Hammarskjold is holding another meeting this morning with GOI before proceeding Cairo.

3. Jordan-Israel GAA. Hammarskjold reported that he had obtained letter of cease-fire compliance from HKJ; that while letter contained strong statement re Israel resumption work Banat Yaacov, this did not constitute a condition to acceptance. SYG reported he had made no progress on question of compliance Article 8 GAA (Mt. Scopus),[3] whereupon Israeli delegates requested him to record that fact in his report to Security Council. Hammarskjold indicated he was reluctant to do this because he did not want to evoke any discussions about past performance but rather to concentrate on making practical proposals for progress in future.

In discussion with SYG on local commanders agreements, Ben Gurion made concessions, which he had previously refused to make to General Burns, including agreement for UN observer at meetings whenever higher party so desired. Source said these concessions should now make it possible to go ahead with local commanders' agreements covering critical border areas similar to program already in effect for Jerusalem.

White

[3] Article 8 of the Israel–Jordan General Armistice Agreement of April 3, 1949, established a Special Committee composed of two representatives of each party whose responsibility would be to formulate agreed plans and arrangements designed to enlarge the scope of the General Armistice Agreement and to effect improvements in its application. (U.N. doc. S/1302 and Add. 1 and Corr. 1)

327. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State [1]

Paris, May 4, 1956—11 a.m.

Secto 11. Subject: Bilateral talk with British. Middle East situation discussed by Secretary at lunch May 3 with Lloyd. [2] Others present were Jebb, Caccia and Shuckburgh of U.K., Merchant, Bowie and Rountree. Other subjects discussed bilaterally with British reported separately.

Lloyd reviewed discussions with Soviets on Middle East and expressed view that while Soviets wished make as much mischief as possible for West in area, they anxious avoid war or risk of war. They appeared impressed by British frank statement re importance which U.K. attached availability NE oil which of such degree would cause British go to any length protect it. Lloyd expressed view to Secretary that main immediate objective Soviets in area was to undermine and destroy Baghdad Pact. He said Russians attributed primary responsibility to British for creation pact, and said Nehru had told them Secretary remarked to him that U.S. had in fact opposed pact (Secretary of course set record straight this matter).

Secretary referred to message which he had sent to Eden and Lloyd while Russians in London suggesting possibility of Hammarskjold being asked undertake further Security Council mission, assuming present mission successful, to explore possibilities more permanent solution Arab-Israel problem. [3] He said recent Soviet policy statements led us to believe that if they at all sincere in expressing desire achieve peace in area, it might be wise undertake further action along these lines soon as possible. Factor in present situation was that not only might Soviets be less obstructionist but Arabs might be more amenable to peace efforts if they no longer had feeling they could attack Israel with Soviet support or could look to Soviets for complete backing in any course which they might decide pursue.

Lloyd responded that he favorably disposed toward Secretary's suggestion and agreed fully that we should not let matter drop with cease-fire agreement. Felt decision should depend in large measure upon actual success of Hammerskjold present mission, but if that

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/5–456. Top Secret. Received at 8:15 a.m. Drafted by Rountree and approved by Merchant. Repeated to London.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 705)

[3] See Document 292.

showed good results he thought second mission should be undertaken.

Shuckburgh observed that Hammarskjold had previously expressed view it not now possible achieve overall settlement. Secretary responded while this may be case perhaps progress can be made in certain specific areas such as refugee problem. Matter was left that decision upon next step would be withheld until we learned what Hammerskjold thought might be possible.

In further discussion U.S.–U.K. policies in area, Secretary outlined U.S. position regarding Baghdad Pact. Lloyd expressed appreciation for Henderson's mission to Tehran [4] and for U.S. decisions announced by him there. [5] He thought position regarding pact had been considerably improved thereby.

In reply Lloyd's query what should be done about Aswan Dam, Secretary said we considering in conjunction U.K. officials Washington position which should be taken upon Nasser's suggestions for amendment U.S.–U.K. aide-mémoire. He observed there had been growing opposition members Congress to U.S. financing Aswan Dam and did not exclude possibility effort would be made attach to mutual security legislation rider prohibiting use mutual security funds for this purpose. However, we did not rule out proceeding with Dam and felt neither U.S. nor U.K. should indicate to Egyptians that we had changed our minds. If queried by Nasser we would reply matter still under active study.

Turning to Saudi Arabia, Lloyd reviewed progress Dodds-Parker mission [6] and expressed gratification that first objective of bringing British Ambassador [7] back and commencing talks on relatively friendly basis had been achieved. He thought next phase would be continuation of talks by Ambassador in Jidda and Riyadh. He was also considering inviting Azzam Pasha to visit him in London to discuss matter. He thought such conversations with Azzam would be particularly desirable in view Azzam's influence upon King and Lloyd's belief Azzam perhaps more intelligent and objective than other Saudi Arabian reps who might be dealing with matter. He felt he should himself avoid meeting Feisal until later stages of negotiations.

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[4] Loy Henderson headed the U.S. Delegation observing the Baghdad Pact Council meeting in Tehran April 16–20.

[5] For texts of Henderson's statements, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 7, 1956, pp. 753–754.

[6] A.D. Dodds-Parker, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, arrived in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on April 27 for the purpose of discussing the Buraimi Oasis dispute as well as other boundary questions with Saudi officials in Riyadh on April 29.

[7] Roderick Wallis Parkes.

Lloyd was not optimistic regarding actual settlement of Buraimi issue and placed main hope in possibility protracted negotiations which would keep matter "on ice" for some time during which other elements U.K.-Saudi relations might be improved.

Lloyd inquired whether we felt Saudis were disposed turn away from Egypt. Secretary replied real progress this connection would depend upon success in other directions. Saudis main concern was their disputes with British, with Hashemites and with Israeli. It will require continuous efforts by all of us to bring about situation in which Saudi-Egyptian ties will be less appealing to them. If progress can be made in British-Saudi rapprochement, in an improvement in Iraq-Saudi relations, and in the direction of a solution to Israeli problem, Secretary felt situation in Saudi-Arabia could be much improved. Meanwhile, we were greatly encouraged by fact that Saudis continued refuse Soviet arms and technicians and professed, we believe sincerely, that they desired full cooperation with us. Secretary referred to forthcoming negotiations on Dhahran airfield and said he thought it would be necessary for us to agree to sell some arms to Saudis. Lloyd's only reaction to latter comment was jokingly to ask whether the purpose of arms would be to attack Buraimi.

Lloyd inquired whether U.S. had made representations to SAG re recent anti-British activities. He was told we had issued instructions U.S. Chargé [8] to express our concern re reports provision of arms to tribes in Aden, expulsion British members FAO anti-locust mission, and harsh anti-British propaganda on Saudi radio and in Saudi papers. Lloyd expressed appreciation.

Referring to Jordan, Lloyd said present situation far from clear. While British endeavoring to do all possible maintain stable situation, he not confident this will be possible. U.K. had agreed permit British officers remain in legion, but they would serve in advisory positions since it felt that if they left in commanding positions additional frictions would be created. While King at first displeased this decision, he now appeared agree it was best. Lloyd took some encouragement from report by Kirkbride, British Ambassador Amman, [9] that feeling Jordan against Egypt had grown. Kirkbride felt that order of unpopularity other countries in Jordan was Iraq, Egypt, Britain. We expressed surprise this development and inquired whether Kirkbride's analysis based upon evaluation attitudes Jordanians as a whole or only ruling classes from East Bank. Lloyd and

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[8] Alfred leS. Jenkins.

[9] Sir Alec Kirkbride was British Ambassador in Jordan from June 17, 1946, until he was appointed Ambassador in Libya on December 24, 1951. As of May 4, 1956, Charles Beresford Duke was British Ambassador in Jordan.

his colleagues somewhat uncertain, but thought that to some extent at least attitudes West Bank Jordanians taken into account. We observed our own reports had not confirmed this development.

Shuckburgh commented that continuation subsidy to Jordan had created problem in British Government. In past this paid by Defense Ministry as military expenditure, but in present situation Defense refused bear cost and responsibility had had to be assumed by Foreign Office as political operation. [10]

[10] Dulles informed Eisenhower of this conversation with Lloyd. (Dulte 3 from Paris, May 3; Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/5–356)

328. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, May 4, 1956.

1033. Press May 4 features purported texts letters exchanged between Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Ghazzi and Hammarskjold May 2 and released by GOS following day. Following are unofficial translations:

1. Ghazzi to Hammarskjold.

"I have honor to communicate to you declaration relative to Article III, paragraph 2, of Syro-Israeli GAA.

"I request you consider that declaration in question given within framework of UN charter, and on this occasion I would be grateful if you would take note of following declaration: 'in accordance with provisions of Article 25 of UN Charter, which stipulates that all members this organization agree accept and execute SC resolutions in accordance said charter, GOS reaffirms desire to respect provisions of SC resolutions taken for purpose of preparing way for execution of Syro-Israeli GAA, including resolution taken on October 27, 1953.'

"I consider that this attitude of GOS should be accompanied by similar attitude on part of other party to GAA."

2. Hammarskjold to Ghazzi.

"I have honor to inform you that I have received your letter of today in which you were kind enough to inform me of your declaration re article III, paragraph 2 of GAA.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–456. Priority. Received at 11:32 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

"I appreciate this declaration, of which I have taken note. I have also taken note that GOS reserves to itself right of legitimate defense recognized by UN charter.

"This declaration does not lessen unconditional obligation to respect provisions of Article III, paragraph 2 of GAA. It is therefore necessary to interpret 'legitimate defense' in accordance with provisions of said paragraph and of UN Charter.

"I have also taken note of your declaration re general framework within which cease-fire declaration given. I can assure you that Article 25 of UN Charter is within general framework within which UNSYG's conversations were carried out during accomplishment his present mission."

Moose

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329. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, May 4, 1956—3 p.m.

1168. Reference: Embtel 1164. [2] Foreign Ministry advises that this morning it received communication from Hammarskjold saying he had been successful in obtaining from Egyptian Government statement that it would take effective measures to prevent border crossings and misdeeds of all persons (including civilians) and would punish culprits.

Hammarskjold's message also reportedly said he had obtained "satisfactory reply" from GOE on question informal lifting Suez and Tiran blockades and was forwarding details. [3]

Comment: Israelis for first time are permitting themselves measure restrained optimism re concrete results of Hammarskjold's negotiations. Statement re control civilians precisely what GOI regarded as necessary to provide basis border stabilization. While reserving judgment on SYG's message re blockade until details received, Israelis

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–456. Secret. Received at 12:49 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Beirut, London, Paris, Damascus, and Jerusalem.

[2] Document 326.

[3] Telegram 1171 from Tel Aviv, May 7, concerned an Israeli Foreign Ministry report that quoted Hammarskjöld "as saying Nasser had 'backed out' of agreeing formula under which GOE would lift blockade in return Israel compliance Articles 7 and 8 GAA." (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–756)

appear hopeful that minimum way may have been opened for transmitting Suez with their petroleum imports.

White

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330. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Paris, May 4, 1956—5 p.m.

Dulte 6. I spoke this morning before the Council meeting to Selwyn Lloyd and Sir Harold Caccia concerning the staging matter. Lloyd said that he saw no objection to the project. If it were carried out before there were hostilities we could probably fly the planes for delivery at Tel Aviv. If there were hostilities, and the Arabs were the aggressors, then the operation would come clearly under the tripartite declaration.

Caccia added that there might be a problem if hostilities broke out with no clear aggressor or victim. I admitted that this was inherent in the situation, and equally raised the question of the efficacy of the Tripartite Declaration.

I mentioned to them my talk with Pearson last evening. [2] Lloyd said he would favor Canada sending enough F–86's for training purposes to be supplemented by our "stock pile".

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–456. Top Secret; Omega. Received at 1:49 p.m. The text of this telegram is the same as a memorandum dictated by Merchant from Dulles' handwritten notes of his conversation with Lloyd and Caccia. The memorandum and notes are attached to a memorandum from Merchant to Macomber, May 4, *ibid.*, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #4.

[2] See Document 325.

331. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McGuire) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, May 4, 1956.

DEAR MR. HOOVER: Reference is made to your letter of 28 March 1956, [2] in which you requested an analysis of the amount and nature of arms which Israel would require to bring it into a standoff position vis-à-vis the Arab countries. The attached memorandum contains the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which I concur.

Sincerely yours,

E. Perkins McGuire

[Enclosure]

Memorandum From the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Phillips) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) [3]

Washington, April 25, 1956.

SUBJECT

Arms for Israel

1. This memorandum is in response to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 29 March 1956, [4] subject as above, in which he requested an analysis of the amounts and nature of arms which Israel would have to receive to bring it to a standoff position vis-à-vis the Arab countries.

2. In their memorandum for you, dated 30 March 1956, [4] subject: "Request from the Government of Israel for the Sale of Military Equipment and Services," the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed you that Israel has greater military strength than the Arab States, at this time, and will retain this advantage for 12 to 24 months, depending on the rapidity with which the Egyptians develop a capability to utilize the arms they are receiving from the Soviet Bloc.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered that, in the event Israel initiates hostilities before midsummer 1956, she could, in less

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #4. Top Secret.

[2] Document 220.

[3] Top Secret.

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

than a month, defeat the Egyptian Army in the Sinai Desert and contain the ground forces of the other Arab States. After midsummer, the balance of ground force superiority probably will begin to shift to the Arabs. In the air, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a standoff position between the Arab States and Israel will be reached by the summer of 1956 with the possibility that either side could gain an important advantage if all-out surprise attacks were undertaken. This will be true because of the very limited number of airdromes on which the air strength of each side is concentrated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Department of State be so advised. However, it should be pointed out to the Department of State that there is no known formula or method whereby the military potentials of nations or blocs of nations can be accurately assessed by consideration of their military matériel assets alone. Assessments of military strengths and capabilities are properly called estimates and as such cannot result in certain answers.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to make frequent periodic estimates of the relative combat strengths and capabilities of the Arab-Israeli nations, and will keep you informed of their views.

5. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not participate in the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined in this memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Richard H. Phillips [5]
Captain, USN

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

332. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, May 4, 1956—11 a.m.

1032. Embtel 1001. [2] Reliable UN source reports Hammarskjold touched briefly on sea of Galilee situation during discussions with GOS May 2 (Embtel 1027 [3]). Following were highlights:

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–456. Secret. Received at 2:27 p.m. Repeated to Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, London, and Paris.
[2] Document 309.
[3] Document 324.

(1) Israeli and Syrian positions re fishing permits not reconciled. (In source's opinion, however, danger of incidents arising from this problem will decline for next few months since fishing season almost over.)
(2) Israelis have refused request for UNTSO patrol boat on lake.
(3) Israel is stalling on request for UNTSO observation post on high ground northwest of lake.

According source Hammarskjold will include recommendation re Galilee situation in report to SC.

Moose

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333. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, May 4, 1956—7 p.m.

2474. Since my return [2] there have been no particular indications in Moscow of any further development Soviet attitude on Israeli/Arab question and Near East matters in general. We have not seen any full account of British-Soviet discussions on this point but judging from press and info telegrams from London, Soviets refused to make any commitment concerning future arms deliveries.

Israeli Ambassador, whom I have found very knowledgeable in regard to Soviets (he was born in Russia), is very definitely of the impression that around the middle of April, probably because of stepped up incidents in early April, Soviets finally came to realization that there was a genuine danger of outbreak of open warfare between Israel and Egypt, whereas before, as Department is aware, Soviets had generally taken line that seriousness of situation was being deliberately exaggerated by Western powers for their own purposes. Avidar considers this belated recognition of real nature situation in Near East to be the chief cause of Soviet April 17 statement. He said contrast between his interview with Molotov in early February (Embtel 1779 [3]) and a talk he had with Semenov in

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–456. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:08 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Ambassador Bohlen was in Washington April 8–22 for consultation; he returned to Moscow on April 24.

[3] Telegram 1779, February 8, reported on Avidar's conversation with Molotov on February 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.84A/2–856)

Foreign Office following issuance April 17 statement had confirmed his impression.

Ambassador said he had never believed that Soviets were interested in outbreak of hostilities in Near East which in itself would confront them with choices they would prefer not to make, either real risk of involvement or loss of such positions as they have recently diplomatically established in area.

On arms delivery, based on conversation he had with Soviet Ambassador in Tel Aviv [4] during his leave there, Avidar believes that Soviets might be interested in general embargo of arms to area which would however specifically include Turkey as country geographically belonging to area, but would not be prepared merely to cease deliveries to Egypt or accept any commitments to refrain from deliveries to other Arab countries. He considers, with which I fully agree, that chief Soviet purpose in Near East is to forestall future or disrupt existing Western military arrangements in that region. He envisages possibility that general embargo on shipment of arms to area, including Turkey, might be in Soviet eyes one method of furthering this aim.

Foregoing is of course Ambassador Avidar's personal views but, which as Embassy reports have indicated, I am in general agreement. In view of recent developments in Near East, and particularly reported Egyptian-Israeli truce observance commitment resulting from Hammarskjold's visit, [5] it is possible for moment that Soviets will not take any further initiative.

It would be helpful to Embassy if we could have any information received from British concerning Soviet attitude during London talks. [6]

Bohlen

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[4] Alexander N. Abramov.

[5] See Document 317.

[6] The Embassy in London agreed with Ambassador Avidar's analysis as reported by Bohlen. (Telegram 5122 from London, May 7; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–756)

334. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Paris, May 4, 1965—midnight.

Dulte 8. With further reference Dulte 6 [2] Selwyn Lloyd told me this afternoon that assent he gave me this morning to Cyprus "stock piling" was "a matter of first impression". He suggests definitive talks be held in Washington. He does not want to encourage Soviet pilots to fly planes to Egypt. He believes our plan can be part of our planning under 1950 declaration.

Obviously between two talks, his experts got to him.

Dulles

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–456. Top Secret; Omega. Received at 9:35 p.m.

[2] Document 330.

335. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Minister of the Israeli Embassy (Shiloah) and the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Burdett), Paris, May 5, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Arms for Israel

Mr. Shiloah telephoned Mr. Rountree stating he had received important information from Israel and asking for an urgent appointment. Since Mr. Rountree was attending a NATO meeting Mr. Burdett called on Mr. Shiloah.

Mr. Shiloah said that the Israel Ambassador in Paris had called Mr. Massigli of the French Foreign Office at noon on May 5 to ascertain the status of Israel's request for 12 Mystère IV aircraft. Mr. Massigli informed the Ambassador that the French Government had reached no decision in the matter and that he personally was vehemently opposed to the sale. Mr. Shiloah pointed out that this was directly contrary to the U.S. impression of the French position

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5622/5–556. Secret. Drafted by Burdett.

as conveyed to him yesterday by Mr. Rountree.[2] He urged that the Secretary seek a favorable decision from Mr. Pineau before leaving Paris. The Israel Embassy in Paris deduced that the French were about to open negotiations with the Algerian nationalists. The negotiations would not be successful unless at a minimum Egypt and the other Arab states refrained from opposition. After a short lull the Egyptian state radio had resumed vicious attacks on French policy in North Africa. Therefore, the French wished to avoid any move displeasing to the Arabs. Mr. Burdett stated that we had no new information regarding the French attitude, but that he would convey Mr. Shiloah's report immediately to Mr. Rountree.

Mr. Shiloah also inquired whether any new development had occurred regarding the F86 aircraft from Canada. Mr. Burdett replied that there had been no new development on this matter either and that he could give no indication of the possible Canadian response.

Mr. Shiloah mentioned that he had received additional reports from Israel of continued Egyptian and Syrian preparations for a possible attack on Israel.

At the conclusion of the meeting Mr. Shiloah again requested that he be informed should any developments take place.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (*Ibid.*, 784A.5622/5–456)

336. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State[1]

Paris, May 6, 1956—6 p.m.

Secto 29. Subject, Tripartite Talks: Middle East. Pineau opened discussion by saying he did not think it was up to three powers try resolve all ME problems, particularly delicate Arab-Israel problem; nor should they consider these questions from too general a viewpoint. While their interests not basically in conflict there may be differences between them as to solutions. UK had to protect its oil interests. Because of North African situation French Government had to be extremely cautious in its dealings with Arab countries. He suggested ministers consider two problems: (1) adoption of common

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–656. Secret. Received at 5:44 p.m. Drafted by Rountree and Burdett and approved by Merchant. Repeated to London.

stand regarding Arab-Israel problem in SC, and (2) supply of arms to Israel. On first point, he said Secretary General's report not yet received.[2] However, he thought ministers could direct their representatives in SC to adopt common stand and propose joint solutions. He asked for views of Secretary and Lloyd.

Secretary responded he thought we should always seek common position in SC. Assumed on this occasion matter would come up in two stages: (a) approval Hammerskjold's report (which he thought probably certain) and, (b) decision on further steps to be taken by SC.

In response Pineau's comment that we could not decide on further measures until we had report, Secretary agreed steps would depend in large measure upon what Hammerskjold himself thought. He hoped in any such steps USSR participation would be accepted only within context its membership SC and not as part any four power or other international committee. Three powers should pursue policies which would not permit USSR assume any special role in ME.

Pineau concurred.

Lloyd also agreed common policy essential and that USSR participation in further measures should be related their SC membership. He thought it best, however, if tripartite powers did not present in SC too obviously coordinated position; he saw advantage in fact that past action creating Hammerskjold mission was by virtue resolution sponsored by US alone.[3] We should have understanding among ourselves, but publically should not act as "trio".

Pineau said much more difficult and urgent question was that of arms to Israel. Because of difficult French position in North Africa and fact certain Arab States, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were exploiting deliveries French arms to Israel and undermining French position North Africa, he felt it imperative proceed with caution. Tensions had been created by fact French had in recent months supplied most spectacular items going to Israel. He agreed Israel should have additional arms, but thought Western powers should distribute efforts this field and that other countries, such as Canada, might make sales in order draw less attention to French.

Secretary said he understood Pineau's position. He recalled that he had talked with Pineau May 3[4] and again at NATO Council meeting May 5[5] expressing concern he had regarding US beginning sales which might place US in position backing Israel with USSR

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[2] See Document 348.
[3] See Document 206.
[4] See Document 322.
[5] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

backing Egypt. Emotions would become aroused, which would undermine our efforts find peace in area. He referred to active question now being considered re delivery 12 additional Mysteres to Israel and said he had informed Pineau US prepared to go further now than before in indicating US concurrence in sale. He read draft statement which he would be prepared make this regard and asked for Pineau's comments. Pineau said he felt it important show solidarity re question arms to Israel but thought it possible statement might give rise greater publicity than would otherwise be case. He would prefer if possible to keep matter secret. Secretary responded US would of course prefer no publicity and had suggested statement only on basis his understanding French had wished more open support regarding sale of first 12 Mysteres. If Pineau now thought there should be no publicity he would be willing to communicate statement in private and leave it up to Pineau to decide whether he wished to release it in a few days so that it would not be associated with present meeting. He asked that Pineau inform him in advance if document was to be released. Pineau agreed and, after consideration certain suggestions made by French re text, following was accepted by Secretary and Pineau:

"Government US has indicated its concurrence in French proposal that US agree to a delay in deliveries under its off-shore procurement contract in order enable French Government promptly to complete sale and delivery of final 12 Mystere IV aircraft ordered by Israel." [6]

Pineau said that on basis this conversation French Government prepared make delivery of 12 additional Mystere IV but that this would be last Mystere IV sale to Israel. [7]

Secretary stated he discussed with Pearson [8] possible Canadian sales F86s to Israel and he was not without hope Canada would

[6] On May 11, the Department transmitted, in circular telegram 784, the text of this proposed French statement to the Embassies in Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris, as well as to the Consulate at Jerusalem. The Department also informed these missions that the French Government planned to publish the statement on May 12 with U.S. concurrence, and that the sale of these 12 Mystere IV's would bring the total number of French sales of Mystere IV's to Israel to 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/5–1156)

The Embassy in Paris confirmed on May 11 that the French Government planned to issue the agreed statement late in the afternoon of May 12 for publication May 14. (Telegram 5310 from Paris; *ibid.*)

On May 14, the Embassy in Paris transmitted the text of the French Foreign Ministry statement, which was to be published the following day in *Le Monde*, announcing the sale and impending delivery of an additional 12 Mystere IV aircraft to Israel. (Telegram 5355 from Paris; *ibid.* 784A.56/5–1456)

[7] Maillard of the French Foreign Ministry confirmed in a conversation with an Embassy official that France would not ship any more aircraft to Israel. (Telegram 5436 from Paris, May 17; *ibid.*, 784.56/5–1756)

[8] See Document 325.

agree, although matter was left that Pearson would discuss subject with Cabinet following his return Ottawa. One advantage such sale would be that this was US type plane and if Israel had some for training purposes it would render it possible, if US should later decide provide same type, avoid great loss of time required for training. Secretary inquired whether Lloyd had talked with Pearson on this subject.

Lloyd confirmed that he had, and that his impression same as Secretary's. He confident that 12 F86s would be supplied since Pearson seemed feel very strongly on subject. He commented that difficulty in Canada was that government must announce each sale in House of Commons.

Secretary observed that if situation should become really critical and there were evidence that preparations being made for Egyptian attack, US might reconsider its position since it of course had no desire to see Israel destroyed. Even if Israel had very substantial numbers of planes it would not mean, however, that Israeli cities would not be destroyed under an Egyptian onslaught. Situation was that Egyptian planes would have to fly over Israel territory for only few seconds in order bomb Tel Aviv and Jeruselum. Distances so short in Israel that little could be done about this. He observed parenthetically that even in US if Soviets should send planes over North Pole to attack we could probably not get sufficient planes in air in time altogether to prevent great damage. Value of supplying planes to Israel primarily psychological, so that they would not feel deserted and denuded and thus be tempted to embark upon preventive war. He observed that principle deterrent to Egyptian attack should be foreknowledge that other countries would react against them.

Pineau then referred to question of arms for Israeli ground forces. Israel had asked for huge quantities of such arms, including rockets, tanks, artillery, etc. Obviously France could not alone supply Israeli requirements.

Lloyd said UK also had substantial Israeli requests, including Centurion tanks. British in no position supply latter. Moreover, substantial difficulties involved British supply of significant quantities such arms to Israel, particularly in view reaction in Jordan. They were thinking of providing certain anti-aircraft, anti-tank and self-propelled guns and were sending a list to NEACC for consideration. If policy of "trickle" to be pursued, weapons this nature would appear UK to be most logical. He commented Israel also anxious obtain half-track vehicles and saw no reason not provide some.

Pineau stated problem was provide Israel means for defense without arming it to point where Israel tempted attack neighbors. Western powers should compare orders received and decide which to

fill. Lloyd agreed and suggested matter be handled in NEACC. Pineau commented NEACC beset by many problems and should be provided more precise instructions regarding arms to Israel. Lloyd suggested Ambassadorial committee in Washington might review NEACC procedures. Pineau thought NEACC action not sufficiently prompt and its studies not accurate; committee failed to take into account all orders received from Israel. Lloyd again suggested matter be considered by Ambassadorial committee pointing out Italians would be offended if arms matter discussed further by tripartite powers in their absence. Pineau agreed that it inadvisable risk offending Italians and that question should be examined in Washington. Secretary said he thought NEACC machinery as good as could be devised but agreed with Pineau that intelligence on Israeli arms situation might not be accurate enough.

Pineau stated related matter was distribution among Western Powers of orders received from Israel. Lloyd pointed out none of Western Powers really wanted supply arms to Israel and did so mainly for psychological reasons. He hoped procedure of having Ambassadorial committee and NEACC review whole question would not hold up relatively small list now before NEACC. He felt such delays might impose danger that the Israelis would act in reckless manner.

Mr. Pineau said that he hoped everyone was agreed that all orders should be processed through NEACC. France intended to submit order for 12 Mystere IV's to committee. Secretary and Lloyd agreed.

Pineau stated Israel order to French included request for 12 Mystere II's. He thought this posed no difficulty since planes relatively outdated and useful primarily for training. Secretary said he saw no objection. [9]

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[9] A summary of Secto 29 was sent to the Embassy in Tel Aviv as Polto 1, May 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.86/5–656) Secretary Dulles informed President Eisenhower of the result of this discussion in Dulte 12 from Paris, May 6. (*Ibid.*)

337. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State [1]

Damascus, May 7, 1956—noon.

1043. Embtel 1034. [2] In view apparent discrepancies between texts Hammarskjold–Ghazzi May 2 exchange of letters as released locally by GOS and version described to Embassy by UN source, ISMAC Chairman [3] asked UNTSO Headquarters Jerusalem for copies authentic texts . . . . Comparison UN texts with those published by GOS (Embtel 1033 [4]) reveals following discrepancies:

(1) Ghazzi letter to Hammarskjold accompanied by following addendum which not published by GOS: "GOS, while reserving to itself right of legitimate defense recognized by UN Charter, reiterates its unconditional acceptance of provisions of paragraph 2, Article III of Syro-Israeli GAA".

(2) In first paragraph his letter to Ghazzi, Hammarskjold quoted above statement verbatim. In published version, GOS deleted it and substituted therefor phrase "relative to paragraph 2, Article II of GAA".

Apart from above discrepancies, versions transmitted Embtel 1033 conform to texts supplied by UNTSO with exception minor translation differences resulting from fact Embassy translations based on Arabic version whereas original letters written in French.

Contrary original impression UN source, who not present for entire Hammarskjold–GOS discussion May 2, UNSYG finally agreed to inclusion of reference, in Ghazzi's letter, October 27, 1953 SC resolution.

Moose

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–756. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:43 p.m. Also sent to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Telegram 1034 from Damascus, May 4, described the discrepancies between the letters, and noted, "This may indicate GOS fears accusation it failed secure adequate protection its position this question and possible domestic repercussions therefrom." (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/5–456)

[3] Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Castonguay.

[4] Document 328.

338. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, May 7, 1956—8 p.m.

931. Re report of SYG on trip to Middle East. Wadsworth had lunch with SYG, Dixon (UK) and Alphand (France) today, and Lodge saw Hammarskjold alone later in day. Following is report from Wadsworth:

SYG feels he has achieved two to six months' respite from hostilities in area including some vague commitment from Ben Gurion to effect Israelis will defer digging at Banat Yaacov (SYG pointed out if they don't dig by June, they can't dig for year). Since he has been successful in establishing this respite, he believes 3 powers and later Soviets in "unilateral coordinated steps" must exert diplomatic pressure on "countries concerned" to resolve problems involved in this order:

1. El Auja–Sinai; 2. Suez Canal; 3. water; 4. refugees. As Alphand put it, "il nous a passe le bebe." Furthermore, SYG, while apparently pleased with his temporary success but basically pessimistic, does not care to return to area nor wish for SC meeting. If one is to be called, he suggests not before May 22. He said Soviets do not want one. He will confer with other SC members Thursday and press Friday, having consulted with Brilej (Yugo) and US today.

Other info evolving from luncheon today:

1. SYG has achieved agreement on stringent orders forbidding firing along armistice lines.
2. He reached agreement on increase in observers but not in number, probably 20.
3. He received complete agreement on patroling in Gaza area.
4. El Auja—he had managed to extract some sort of agreement on quid pro quo between Egyptians and Israelis. This was vague and involved some verbal commitment on Fawzi's part to consider lifting Suez Canal restrictions in return for Israeli withdrawal in El Auja zone.
5. He specifically avoided commenting on arms balance question.
6. His "eyes had been opened" on Nasser, but liked Fawzi, got along splendidly with Ben Gurion.
7. He reported Nasser had said he could "beat the Israelis on Egyptian soil".
8. He continued believe political agent or "agent general" as contemplated earlier by US would not be desirable.

Following is result of Lodge's conversation:

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–756. Confidential. Received at 12:52 a.m., May 8.

Hammarskjold told Lodge he had obtained unconditional assurance from Egypt to pull back troops. Israel had agreed but subject to their reserving right to send patrols into area only "for security purposes". Both sides agreed to establishment of 12 posts and of mobile ground patrols. The Israelis, entirely for juridical reasons, rejected Hammarskjold's proposal for UN boat on Tiberias Lake but accepted ground observers.

Lodge asked direct question: "What future action do you desire?" Hammarskjold replied that under no circumstances should there be meeting of SC before fortnight; maybe there should not be one then; if meeting were held it should be very carefully prepared; there should be no great debate and we should follow policy of wait and see.

He felt Suez Canal and El Auja questions "could be worked out diplomatically" outside SC with Govt of Egypt. He pointed out this did not mean outside UN. He suggested France, UK, US and SYG could all take part.

He did not think Israelis would start digging at Banat Yaacov and said idea being advanced in US Govt of not making loan to Israel without agreement to postpone digging "was very wise".

He said he had been very close to an agreement on blockade and on ending troop concentrations.

He had great confidence in Fawzi and said one could go far with him.

Lodge

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339. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, May 8, 1956—noon.

441. General Burns, who returned from Rome May 5, called at Consulate General May 7 and gave me outline of UNSYG consultations with Israel and Arab States summarized in following numbered paragraphs.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–856. Confidential. Received at 2:29 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

Burns prefaced his remarks by stating that "Hammarskjold had avoided diplomats like the plague" while here and that his report to SC, which should soon be available, would doubtless go beyond scope of details on some points he felt free to give me now.

(1) Egypt.

(A) Egypt and Israel had given UNSYG assurances they would observe cease-fire. Egypt also gave undertaking prevent civilians cross D/L as this point apparently not clearly covered by Article II, paragraph 2, or Article V, paragraph 4 GAA. Parties agreed on certain provisions looking toward establishment through agreement in EIMAC of an adequate number of UN observer posts both sides Gaza D/L with view ensuring compliance Article II, paragraph 2 GAA. Terms of this agreement as correctly given in GOI release published in Israeli press May 2. These provide for agreed and equal number of posts each side D/L, for freedom access to these posts by observers, and for right observer patrols move along D/L between posts "when required". Officers of each party to GAA have right accompany observers, will arrange for their passage to and between posts, and will designate a route which observers will follow in doing so. Moreover, accord covers only "limited period" ending October 3, 1956. Despite obvious opportunities for obstruction inherent in above undertaking Burns hopeful it will prove useful. He said Israelis told him they insisted on limiting period its validity in order "preserve their sovereignty" in area.

(B) Although EIMAC has not met for over three months Burns expects see Gohar at kilo 95 May 8 in effort overcome Egyptian obstructions MAC meetings. Egyptians have in effect boycotted MAC as protest against Israeli forces occupying El Auja D/Z. Evidently basing their argument on portion Article X, paragraph 2 GAA, stating "MAC shall maintain its headquarters at El Auja . . . "[2] Egyptian hold foregoing entitles them proceed MAC headquarters by any route, while Israelis will not allow Egyptian delegate proceed El Auja by Ismailia road (ConGentel 373[3]). Although MAC meetings formerly held at kilo 95, few meters within Egyptian controlled territory, pursuant attitude just mentioned Egyptians have more recently refused permit meetings there on alleged "security grounds". Despite foregoing history Burns fairly hopeful

[2] Ellipsis in the source text. Article 10 (2) of the Egypt–Israel General Armistice Agreement (U.N. doc. S/1264–Corr. 1 and Add. 1) reads: "The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at El Auja, and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work."

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/3–956)

he can get parties off dead center through resumption MAC meetings to implement agreement in (A) above.

(C) Burns added that following Gaza incidents early April Ben Gurion gave him oral assurance Israeli patrols would be more circumspect near D/L, indicating patrols would be kept back from immediate vicinity border as a general rule. They would approach border only when necessary cope with infiltration, violations on the part of Egyptian forces, or to protect settlers harvesting crops. Burns believes Israelis observing this commitment.

(D) With regard El Auja D/Z and UNSYG proposals of November 3,[4] Burns said Israelis linked observance Articles VII and VIII of GAA with question Egyptian compliance Article I. In Israeli view Article I includes right freedom passage Suez Canal, as well as cessation hostile statements on part Egyptian officials. Lacking improvement these points Israel has maintained they were unwilling consider compliance with Articles VII and VIII. Hammarskjold pointed out that question Suez Canal was not directly related to GAA but rather was matter for Security Council consideration. Burns stated that Egyptians had shown some indication making further concessions but had lost interest when it became apparent Israel would not give assurances against resumption digging at Banat Yacub.

(2) Syria.

(A) UNSYG obtained "cease-fire" commitment from Syria which is not conditional on Israel giving undertaking refrain work at Banat Yacub. While Syrians asked that UNSYG obtain such an assurance from Israelis in form of statement to effect "Israel bound by resolutions of Security Council," UNSYG did not succeed in doing so.

(B) For prestige reasons Syrian publicity media have endeavored create impression Syria's agreement cease-fire is conditional on Israeli undertaking refrain from work in D/Z.

(C) With regard Lake Tiberias matters progress was made toward acceptance terms Security Council resolution January 19.[5] Israelis agreed refrain interference with Syrians watering cattle in lake and agreed keep police boats from patrolling within 250 meters eastern shore, with reservation covering certain cases necessity. Syrians agreed stop their nationals from fishing in lake pending establishment system of fishing permits. No agreement was reached about latter since Israelis insisted they issue permits while Syria wants them issued by MAC chairman. In Burns' view chairman should not become involved this matter which ultra vires.

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[4] See telegrams 395 and 398, vol. XIV, pp. 690 and 702.
[5] See the editorial note, *ibid.*, p. 854.

(D) With regard UNTSO functions, Israel refused assent to suggestion that observer post be established at Moussadiye on Syrian side Lake Tiberias and on high ground behind Capernaum, and that observers operate boat on lake.

(3) Jordan.

(A) Jordan agreed unconditional cease-fire with Israel, adding some comment about observance Security Council resolutions. Respecting proposed local commanders agreements both Israel and Jordan expressed generally favorable attitude. Israel softened former attitude against allowing observers attend meetings of local commanders through accepting principle that observer might be present if neither side objected. Jordanians maintained observer should be present if either side wished to have him. Details remain to be worked out.

(B) Burns said Hammarskjold will report no progress made respecting matters envisaged Article VIII GAA, which remain in status quo.

(4) Lebanon.

Lebanon agreed to unconditional cease-fire including appeal all concerned respect Security Council resolutions.

Comment: Burns said he considered UNSYG visit had been very helpful, especially in view critical situation early April. In his opinion USNYG had been successful in calming the dangerous situation which had developed at that time. Burns expressed himself as cautiously optimistic with respect implementing provisions on which parties have expressed agreement. With any luck he looks forward to at least a limited period of relative quiet on borders.

Cole

340. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, May 9, 1956.

MR. SECRETARY: I talked to Captain Wagner (Defense member of our Omega Group) regarding the Mediterranean stockpiling project this morning. I said that in the light of the President's approval of the concept [2] and your satisfactory discussions with Mr. Lloyd in Paris, [3] we should now draw up the necessary instructions to put us in a position rapidly to implement the stockpiling project if it were later decided so to do.

In essence, this means:

1. Ordering now an additional AKA (attack cargo ship), loaded with the arms for the Arabs, to be attached to the 6th Fleet. This will take at least several weeks since the arms will have to be released from US reserves and assembled dockside before the AKA proceeds to the Mediterranean.
2. Informing General Gruenther and our people in Europe that plans should be made for the delivery of twenty-four F–86's to Cyprus should they be ordered to deliver the planes there.
3. Stockpiling in Italy (Naples or Leghorn) the spare parts and ammo for the F–86's.

All these preparatory steps are necessary if we are to be in a position to implement the President's statement that we would aid a victim of aggression. [4] *However, the ultimate possible destination of this equipment would not be divulged,* and the AKA with its arms ab[illegible], the stockpile of spare parts in Italy, etc., would be portraye[illegible] as an additional unit to the 6th Fleet and routine reserve stockpiles for US forces in the Mediterranean area.

In order for Captain Wagner to be able to make rapid progress in Defense, it would be most helpful if you would call Admiral Radford [5] and Gordon Gray to say that on your instructions MacArthur has asked Captain Wagner to draw up a plan on which we could get started in the immediate future to have the arms and

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1, Top Secret; Omega. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw the memorandum.

[2] See Document 319.

[3] See Document 334.

[4] See footnote 2, Document 258.

[5] Dulles telephoned Admiral Radford at 3:44 p.m., May 9, to discuss this project. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

equipment, etc., available in the Mediterranean area in the event we wish to implement "Project Stockpile". [6]

You have already received the President's approval of the concept, but just as soon as we have the operational plan outlined by Defense, you might inform Admiral Radford that you would want to go over the implementing steps with the President before proceeding. In such a meeting with the President, you would have along Admiral Radford or Gordon Gray.

D MacA

[6] The next day, May 10, Dulles sent similar letters concerning implementation of "Project Stockpile" to Radford and Gray. See Document 342.

341. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, May 9, 1956—7 p.m.

940. For Secretary from Lodge. Re Palestine. After talking to Secretary this afternoon [2] I met with Dixon (UK) and Alphand (France) to discuss future action on Palestine. Following evolved from our conversation and was agreed to on personal basis by UK and France ad referendum: We must do something to show that SC and UN are still actively concerned with problem and that present momentum does not drop. While entertaining no illusions that various problems such as El Auja, Suez Canal, water, and refugees can be solved immediate future, it must be made clear to press and public opinion we are following up SYG's initial efforts. As soon as possible following release of SYG's report, [3] now understood scheduled for Thursday to govts and Friday to press, [4] there should be SC meeting which would take note report, commend SYG, request parties concerned implement promptly agreements reached with him,

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–956. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:03 p.m.

[2] Lodge and Dulles discussed Lodge's May 7 conversation with Hammarskjöld (see Document 338). The two agreed that the United States should launch some additional initiative to prevent dissipation of the diplomatic momentum Hammarskjöld's mission had begun. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, May 9; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

[3] See Document 348.

[4] May 10 and 11.

request SYG undertake further consultations with parties on other outstanding problems under armistice agreements, e.g., he could follow up on Suez blockade (Alphand and Dixon felt his further undertaking would have to be under armistice agreements in general terms).

It was felt it would be difficult for Soviets interfere or oppose resolution along these lines. If they did it would only put them in position of turning their backs on what they said at London. [5]

In discussion of SYG's reference to diplomatic action by 3 powers and Soviets (mytel 931, May 7 [6]) it was agreed by Dixon and Alphand we should not engage in any coordinated action with Soviets or consultation on this question with Soviets outside framework public SC action. Thus, we would follow same procedure with respect this resolution as was followed successfully in case of last resolution on Palestine question. [7]

Lodge

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[5] Reference is to Khrushchev's and Bulganin's State visit to the United Kirgdom April 18–27.

[6] Document 338.

[7] Dulles and Lodge discussed this again on the telephone on May 14. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, May 14; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

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342. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) [1]

Washington, May 10, 1956.

DEAR ADMIRAL RADFORD: With reference to our conversation yesterday regarding Operation "Stockpile", [2] I attach a memorandum which sets forth the concept and indicates some of the steps which we must take in the near future in order to be in a position to act if we decide to do so at some future date. As I mentioned to you, this concept has the President's approval, [3] although whether we would ever put it into effect would depend on the evolution of future events.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #4. Secret; Omega. Drafted by MacArthur.

[2] See footnote 5, Document 340.

[3] See Document 319.

As you know, Mr. MacArthur has been in touch with Captain Wagner on this matter, I would be most grateful if the necessary list of actions could be developed by the Department of Defense as a matter of urgency so that we can see clearly what must be done.

I have also sent a copy of the attached memorandum to Gordon Gray.[4]

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles[5]

[Attachment][6]

May 9, 1956.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT

Preparations for implementing the President's April 9 Statement (relating to the Arab-Israel situation)[7] to the Effect that the United States is Determined to Support and Assist any Nation in the Middle East Which might be Subjected to Aggression

Background

In connection with the tense Middle East situation, the President on April 9 announced that " . . . the United States is likewise determined to support and assist any nation which might be subjected to such aggression . . . "[8] It is, of course, essential that the United States Government now take such steps as may be required to be in a position to implement the President's statement should this become necessary.

It is proposed that if the state of tension in the Middle East should reach a point where it appeared that either Israel or the Arab States were likely to initiate hostilities, the United States would announce that it had military equipment and weapons in the Mediterranean area which it was prepared to make rapidly available to the victim of aggression. The announcement would be intended to serve the political purpose of creating an additional deterrent to aggression. However, should aggression occur, the United States, on the basis of the plan set forth below, would be in a position to

[4] Gray's copy of this memorandum was attached to a similar letter of May 10. (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #4)

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

[6] Secret; Omega Handling. Drafted by MacArthur.

[7] See footnote 2, Document 258.

[8] Ellipses in the source text.

render assistance (in the form of military equipment rather than use of our armed forces) to the victim of aggression.

Implementation (Operation "Stockpile")

A. Israel the victim of aggression:

If Israel were the victim of aggression, the concept is that we would turn over to Israeli authorities at Cyprus twenty-four F–86's which would be taken from U.S. operational units in Europe and flown via Brindisi and Athens to Cyprus, where they would be turned over to Israeli pilots for onward flight to Israel. Secretary Dulles discussed this proposal on a most secret basis with British Foreign Secretary Lloyd in Paris [9] during the recent NATO meeting, and obtained Mr. Lloyd's tentative approval with the understanding that we would explain the operation in detail to Ambassador Makins in Washington [10] with a view of obtaining definite United Kingdom concurrence.

In addition, a stockpile of spare parts and ammunition for these F–86's should be constituted in Italy, possibly at Leghorn or Naples. On the President's instruction, Secretary Dulles discussed this matter with General Gruenther during the recent NATO meeting in Paris. [11] General Gruenther expressed the view that the plan was feasible, but cautioned most strongly that the instructions to him (on the basis of which the necessary secret contingent planning would be undertaken) should be handled on a most secret basis to avoid any chance of leaks. Similar precaution would have to be taken with respect to constituting a stockpile of F–86 spare parts and ammunition in Italy. Such a stockpile should nominally be considered as reserves for U.S. forces operating in Europe and the Mediterranean.

During the course of the NATO meeting, the Secretary also discussed this possibility in general terms with Mr. Pearson, [12] the Canadian Secretary for External Affairs. The Secretary explained that if Israel were the victim of aggression, we would consider turning over to Israel some F–86 aircraft. If in the meantime the Canadian Government would permit Israel to purchase perhaps twelve F–86's which would enable the Israelis to train pilots and ground crews, the problem of Israel being able to use U.S. planes in the event of aggression would be greatly facilitated. Mr. Pearson undertook to endeavor to obtain Canadian Government approval of the sale of possibly twelve F–86's to Israel for training purposes. If Canada does authorize this sale, the problem of training Israeli pilots so that they

[9] See Documents 330 and 334.
[10] See Document 358.
[11] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
[12] See Document 325.

will be in a position to accept U.S. planes in Cyprus would be greatly simplified since the Israeli pilots could presumably undertake their training in Canada (or if this were not feasible, in Italy.)

B. Egypt or an Arab State the victim of aggression:

If Egypt or an Arab State were the victim of Israeli aggression, we would have an AKA (attack cargo vessel) in the Mediterranean as a unit of the 6th Fleet, on which would be loaded the following military supplies and equipment:

36 AAA weapons 75 mm (Skysweeper),
280 105 mm Recoilless Rifles mounted on 1/4 ton trucks,
1000 3.5 inch Rocket Launchers,
35,000 cubic feet anti-tank mines,
10,000 cubic feet of miscellaneous ammunition.

In the event of aggression by Israel, the AKA could, if it were deemed necessary, deliver the arms stored on it to an Arab port, possibly Alexandria. If, in the light of the circumstances obtaining, it did not seem feasible for U.S. Naval personnel to deliver the vessel to Alexandria, consideration might be given to turning it over on a loan basis to Egypt so that an Egyptian crew could man the vessel at some intermediate point such as Sicily or Benghazi, to proceed to Alexandria.

Action Required

In order to be in a position for the President to make an announcement that we have arms in the Mediterranean area that could be rapidly delivered to the victim of aggression, certain immediate steps are required, including the following:

1. Most secret instructions to General Gruenther to make the necessary plans for twenty-four F–86's to be delivered from U.S. operational units in Europe to Cyprus. The instructions would make clear that this was contingent planning and that the proposal would only be activated if the President so directed.
2. The constitution of a stockpile of spare parts and ammunition for the F–86's, presumably in Italy.
3. The assignment now of an AKA as an additional unit to the 6th Fleet, to be dispatched to the Mediterranean when it had taken on the cargo of arms and munitions set forth above.
4. The transfer from U.S. war reserves or other U.S. military stocks of the arms and weapons for the Arab part of the stockpile, and their early shipment to an embarkation port where they could be loaded on the AKA. Ostensibly, the AKA and its cargo would simply be an additional unit and equipment for U.S. forces operating in the Mediterranean, and strict secrecy would be maintained as to its possible ultimate destination.
5. Final agreement with the British regarding the use of Cyprus as a point of delivery for the F–86's to Israeli pilots.

6. In the event of aggression against Israel, concurrence of the Italian and Greek Governments would have to be obtained for transit rights for the F–86's en route from Europe to Cyprus. To avoid leaks, however, this would not be broached to the Italian or Greek authorities prior to the time when the decision was taken. Similarly, the French should be informed after we have taken the decision, but before announcement.

7. If, contrary to present expectations, the Canadians do not permit the sale of some F–86's to Israel, we might encourage the Italian Government to grant the request made by the Israeli Government last March that Israeli pilots be given F–86 training in Italy. The Italians did not grant the Israeli request largely because the U.S. expressed the view that this would interfere with training of NATO pilots and the Italian air program.

Note: There may well be other necessary steps in connection with the above program which the Department of Defense may deem necessary.

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343. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, May 10, 1956—1 p.m.

2232. Minister for National Production in conversation with Director USOM expressed opinion delay in replying GOE request for modification wording of aide-mémoires re High Dam financing due UK unwillingness proceed and US awaiting UK concurrence. Stated GOE desired finalize financing arrangements to strengthen position for negotiating Nile waters agreement since Sudan arguing no need for haste in reaching agreement because financing not yet arranged. Requested "unofficial" indication whether US willing to go ahead if GOE obtained aid from another Western country to replace British offer. Said he had such an offer and would prefer not have UK involved. Declined name country making offer, saying had not

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–1056. Confidential. Received at 3:22 p.m. Also sent to Khartoum.

informed other GOE officials. Advise what "unofficial" reply can be made. [2]

Byroade

[2] The Department instructed the Embassy in Cairo on May 14 that the "USOM Director might reply by stating GOE request for modification wording aides-mémoire on High Dam financing has been receiving closest attention US–UK Govts. As GOE aware complex new policy questions were raised by its counter-proposals. US unaware any unwillingness on part UK to proceed. US understands GOE has determined conclude agreement with Sudan on division Nile waters before proceeding with project and that negotiations still in progress. Director could inquire whether consideration given by GOE to other legal problems deriving from interest in Nile waters expressed by other riparian states." (Telegram 2727 to Cairo; *ibid.*)

344. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, May 14, 1956—2 p.m.

446. During social call of General Burns at Consulate General last evening I inquired whether he had any further details which I might report regarding progress on matters agreed during Hammarskjold visit. Burns replied in negative sense, indicating quite definitely that there has been no appreciable progress thus far in getting parties to implement the more important undertakings (Consulate General's 441 [2]) which though agreed in principle still require some specific action. I had already asked him on May 9 whether meeting with Gohar on previous day had achieved anything. To this Burns had replied with a terse "no."

In course of conversation yesterday Burns said he thought Egyptians are making genuine attempt avoid incidents Gaza Strip D/L. He expressed skepticism about series recent Israeli reports of alleged incidents which he considered as frequently exaggerated (Contel 445 [3]). Burns going Amman May 14 discuss proposal for additional local commanders agreements with Arab Legion chief.

Comment: Burns expects proceed New York in about ten days attend SC meeting and to take some leave in Canada thereafter.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–1456. Confidential. Received at 9:49 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Document 339.

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–1156)

Chances substantial progress in next few days on outstanding points agreed by parties with UNSYG presumably not brilliant in view foregoing.

Cole

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345. Memorandum for the Record, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) [1]

Washington, May 14, 1956.

SUBJECT

Operation Stockpile

Admiral Hedding (Special Assistant to Admiral Radford) called me this morning about Operation Stockpile. He said that the planning was moving ahead in the Defense Department and that as a result of further consultations with Admiral Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, the Department of Defense would probably propose a slightly different type vessel for the Arab part of the stockpile and also a slightly different composition of armament. I said to Admiral Hedding that we would be disposed to take the Navy's recommendations on these matters and that I assumed we would keep in touch with each other, with which he agreed.

Subsequently, Captain Wagner (Defense member of the . . . group) called on me to convey the same information. He said that it was a question of whether it would be better to have a victory ship or an AKA (attack cargo ship). I told him that whichever type of vessel the Defense Department deemed would be appropriate for the mission would be entirely satisfactory to us. Captain Wagner also said that after consideration and since the Skysweeper (75 mm. anti-aircraft guns) cannot be utilized for almost a year because of the complicated training requirements, the Department of Defense would probably substitute some tanks which were also prestige items and which the Egyptians could utilize quite readily. I said that this seemed quite satisfactory from our viewpoint, particularly since elements in the Department of Defense felt strongly against includ-

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #4. Top Secret; Omega. According to a note dated May 14 from Howe to Macomber, "Mr. MacArthur asked that this be shown to the Secretary." The note also bears a notation that the Secretary saw the memorandum.

ing Skysweepers. The main thing was to have in the vessel in the Mediterranean the type of defensive arms for the Arabs which would indicate that we had done serious planning.

Captain Wagner said that the detailed planning was proceeding rapidly, that it would probably be completed this week and go to the JCS next week, following which he would be in touch with me so that the necessary operational instructions could be issued.

D MacA

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346. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Egyptian Ambassador (Hussein) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, Washington, May 14, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Near Eastern Problems

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Egyptian Ambassador
NEA—William M. Rountree
NE—Fraser Wilkins

The Egyptian Ambassador said he had spoken with the Secretary on Saturday evening [2] at the Gridiron Dinner. They had agreed to postpone their talk scheduled for Monday, May 14, until Thursday, May 17, [3] the day before the Ambassador's return to Cairo for talks with Prime Minister Nasser. The Ambassador said that when he had seen Mr. Rountree last week [4] he had done most of the talking; he hoped Mr. Rountree would be willing to speak today. Mr. Rountree agreed and thought it would be useful again to have a look at such matters as the Aswan Dam, arms for Israel and the Baghdad Pact.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/5–1456. Secret. Drafted on May 15 by Wilkins.

[2] May 12.

[3] See Document 353.

[4] During this meeting, Ambassador Hussein explained that he intended to return to Egypt for consultation and wished to "obtain a clear understanding of the U.S. position which he might communicate to Nasser". (Memorandum of conversation by Burdett, May 10; Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/5–1056)

1. *Aswan Dam.* Mr. Rountree said he had checked with his associates, as he had told the Ambassador he would do, regarding the suggestion that the U.S. deposit $55 million with the International Bank pending U.S.-Egyptian agreement. Mr. Rountree said there was no way of making such a deposit prior to agreement between the U.S. and Egypt. Because we were approaching the end of F.Y. 1956, those funds which had previously been earmarked to cover U.S. Grant Aid for the first stage of the construction on the Aswan Dam would be diverted to other purposes. New funds for use on the High Aswan Dam would, however, be available in F.Y. 1957. The Ambassador inquired whether the Department could write a letter to the IBRD saying the U.S. planned, when agreement was reached, to assist in financing the Aswan Dam. Mr. Rountree regretted the Department could not write such a letter prior to agreement between the U.S. and Egypt.

Mr. Rountree asked the Ambassador whether the Government of Egypt had gone into all the legal aspects regarding utilization of Nile waters, including claims which other countries such as the Sudan and Ethiopia might advance. The Ambassador said that, as we knew, Egypt and the Sudan had begun talks. He had spoken with Prime Minister Nasser by telephone on this subject. The Prime Minister had told him the talks were going well. The Ambassador did not know whether any legal study had been prepared with respect to Ethiopian claims. He did know Ethiopia was endeavoring to make trouble by raising this question with the Government of Sudan. He did not know why they were taking this action because Ethiopia had plenty of rain and water and could not possibly in the foreseeable future need any water from the upper regions of the Nile. He thought that perhaps Ethiopian claims were now being injected for the purpose of Ethiopian advantage.

Mr. Rountree pointed out Ethiopian claims might have some basis in that once the Aswan Dam is built and had been in operation for a number of years, Ethiopian action to dam or withdraw water might be represented as unwarranted. In that sense the Ethiopians might now claim their rights might be impaired.

2. *Arms for Israel.* Mr. Rountree said that according to recent reports from the Near East, the U.S. was strongly being attacked in the press and on the radio regarding shipments of planes from France and other Western countries to Israel. He said this criticism did not seem justified since the U.S. had not adopted an official position of bringing pressure on other countries to make shipments to Israel. He added that, in any event, shipments from the U.S. were routine and mainly replacement such as spares for civilian aircraft and that other items from European countries were small and relatively unimportant. Altogether, none of them loomed very large

in comparison with armaments which Egypt and other Arab countries were receiving from the Soviet bloc. Shipments from the West which were being criticized in the Near East were greatly misrepresented. Furthermore, Mr. Rountree noted that in addition to large quantities of arms going to the Arab states from the Soviet bloc, Egypt was serving as a channel for arms for Syria, Yemen and possibly other Arab states.

The Ambassador said that if the U.S. was not bringing pressure on France and also on Canada, he would think that we might issue an official denial. Mr. Rountree said the Secretary and press officers of the Department had continued to make clear the impartial policy of the U.S. We had not brought pressure on France and even now we had no information that Canada had taken action. The Ambassador inquired whether the U.S. itself planned to ship arms. Mr. Rountree said it was not likely that the U.S. would supply a significant quantity of arms to Israel.

3. *Baghdad Pact.* Mr. Rountree again confirmed the continued strong support of the U.S. for the Baghdad Pact, although it itself did not plan to adhere at this time. It was not U.S. policy to urge other states of the Near East to adhere. Each state should make this decision in the light of its own interest.

[Here follows a brief discussion of British colonial policy in the Persian Gulf; the situation in Algeria; and the Palestine question.]

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347. Editorial Note

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met at 3:45 p.m. on May 14, with President Eisenhower and his Staff Secretary, Andrew J. Goodpaster. Among the subjects considered at this meeting was the Department of State's proposed "Operation Stockpile". The following discussion ensued:

"Admiral Radford then discussed a proposal (which it appeared he had received from State) involving holding a ship loaded with military equipment ready to give to Egypt if aggressed upon, and a 'stock pile' of F–86s (from Italy) to Israel if attacked. He was concerned that such an arrangement would leak out. He said he would like very much to discuss the whole matter with State (there are some significant military questions involved) before any decision in principle was taken. The President said it would be quite all right to talk to State, since his whole idea had been that, if the matter could be worked out in agreement, it would be okay with him."

(Memorandum of conversation by Goodpaster; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

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348. Editorial Note

On May 15, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations David W. Wainhouse and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs Richard M. Rountree sent Secretary Dulles a summary of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's report to the Security Council on the Palestine question. Dulles requested the summary on May 9 and a marginal note on the memorandum indicated that he saw it. The conclusion and comment of the three-page summary for Dulles read as follows:

"C. *Conclusions*: The report does not conceal the very preliminary nature of most of the discussions relating to specific proposals for reducing tensions along the armistice lines. The Secretary-General achieved a reaffirmation of the cease-fire and expressions of willingness to discuss further with General Burns the application and implementation of specific measures. He states in conclusion 'If we have previously experienced chain reactions leading to a continuous deterioration of the situation we may now have the possibility of starting a chain of reactions in the opposite direction.'

"*Comment:* In the light of past experience, and unless there is continued pressure of world opinion on the parties, it is all too possible that early and effective implementation of the rather general undertakings by the parties might not eventuate. The report points out with force that the General Armistice Agreements bind the relations between the parties only to the extent that each party is convinced that the other will abide by the provisions of the agreement and that unhappily, in certain instances, uncertainty as to the scope of the obligations of each of the parties makes enforcement difficult."

The full summary is in Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 58 D 224, Originals from Secty—Kashmir & Palestine. For text of the "Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council Pursuant to the Council's Resolution of 4 April 1956 on the Palestine Question," May 9, 1956, see U.N. doc. S/3596.

349. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 16, 1956, 4:34 p.m. [1]

SUBJECT

Operation Stockpile

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. Gordon Gray
Admiral Radford
Mr. MacArthur

Mr. Gray said that he and Admiral Radford had called on the Secretary to discuss certain aspects of Operation Stockpile. Admiral Radford said that following receipt of the Secretary's letter of May 10, [2] with attached memorandum, he had discussed this project with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Wilson and the President. [3] The JCS doubted that the aircraft would be effective if they were only delivered after aggression had taken place since the Egyptians could be expected to bomb the Israeli airfields from the outset, thus making Israeli air operations most difficult. The President, however, had told Admiral Radford that he thought it was a good idea. Admiral Radford then made the following comments:

1. In his informal consultation with the JCS on Operation Stockpile, they had expressed the view that it might be difficult to keep some information on this project from becoming public knowledge. With respect to the F–86 aircraft there would have to be a limited number of people in Europe informed (including both General Gruenther and General Tunner), since operational plans would have to be drawn up. However, the operational planning could doubtless be handled in a way where information would not leak out and he was not too concerned about any leak on the F–86 planning project. Similarly, he was not concerned about information getting out about the stockpile in Italy of aircraft spare parts and ammunition. . . .

With respect to the use of Cyprus as a point of turn-over to the Israelis, Admiral Radford commented that the present airfield facilities there were not very good. The present airfield was crowded and the additional field under construction would probably not be completed for another eighteen months. He inquired whether we might

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by MacArthur. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) MacArthur recorded another portion of the conversation in the memorandum *infra*.

[2] Document 342.

[3] See Document 347.

also wish to consider turning the planes over to the Israeli pilots at Athens. There was some discussion and it was agreed that Admiral Radford would find out whether the planes had the capacity to make the flight non-stop from Athens to Israel.[4] If they did, we could also keep this possibility in mind, although for planning purposes we would try to firm up with the British on Cyprus.

2. With respect to Arab arms stockpile which is to be loaded on the AKA, Admiral Radford said that since this was Army equipment when it was loaded on the AKA and sent to the Sixth Fleet, there might be some speculation as to its purpose. He was thinking of having the loading take place in the Naval docks at Yorktown, Virginia, but even there civilian employees would have some knowledge of the matter. However, they would not of course know what the destination and purpose of the shipment was, although because of its unusual character and the fact that it was Army equipment going to the Sixth Fleet, there might be some speculation. We might, therefore, have to consider making an announcement if there were press speculation.

Admiral Radford said he understood that it was agreeable to the Secretary to change somewhat the composition of the Arab stockpile and the Secretary confirmed that it was agreeable. In particular, the Defense Department thought that Skysweepers were inappropriate (as it would take over a year to train people to use them) and it would like to substitute other items. The Secretary looked at the revised list of items, which Admiral Radford had with him, and said that the list was acceptable.

3. Admiral Radford said the furnishing of an AKA as an additional unit of the Sixth Fleet was feasible. The Navy had at one moment considered that a civilian-manned vessel might be better but had given this idea up since the cost was $2,000 a day and the security would not be as good. However, since the equipment on board the AKA was Army equipment, there would have to be about 20 Army technicians to care for it as it would deteriorate if it sat for a long period in the ship without proper care. The Navy was a bit concerned that crew members of the AKA in letters home or otherwise might talk about the nature of the cargo. While presumably only the Captain of the ship and perhaps one or two officers would know what the ultimate possible destination might be, information as to the cargo, if it became public, might lead to speculation as to the purpose of the arms. The Secretary said it was important to

[4] According to MacArthur's memorandum for the record, May 21, Admiral Hedding telephoned him that day to say that the F–86 aircraft "could fly from Athens to Israel without stopping at Cyprus." (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5)

do all we possibly could to prevent information from leaking out prematurely. However, at some stage we might wish to make a public announcement that we had arms ready and available in the Mediterranean area to supply to a victim of aggression. In such event, it was particularly important that the exact nature of the arms not be known and, therefore, it was important that information as to the character of all the items of equipment in the AKA not get out since, if we made a very general announcement and if the public knew what was on the AKA, people could put two and two together and come up with an answer as to what we would furnish. It was better to have an air of mystery as to what we might do rather than to have it known in advance. It was agreed that every effort would be made to prevent information from becoming public as to the exact character and detail of the equipment and arms in the AKA.

4. Admiral Radford inquired who would speak to the British to firm up the arrangement regarding the use of Cyprus as a turnover point. Mr. MacArthur said that he would speak to Ambassador Makins about this matter and inquired whether it was all right to go ahead and do so now. Both Admiral Radford and Mr. Gray concurred that Mr. MacArthur could now call in Ambassador Makins and try to button up the Cyprus aspect.[5]

Mr. Gordon Gray said that paragraph 7 of the action required in the memorandum which the Secretary had sent over under cover of his letter of May 10[6] was not strictly accurate. He gave Mr. MacArthur the following re-formulation of paragraph 7 which Mr. MacArthur said he would use to amend the memorandum:

"7. If, contrary to present expectations, the Canadians do not permit the sale of some F-86's to Israel, we might encourage the Italian Government to grant the request made by the Israeli Government last March that Israeli pilots be given F-86 training in Italy. The Italians did not grant the Israeli request probably because the U.S. asked the Italians to consider whether such training would have an adverse effect upon IAF training capability and also to consult NATO authorities as to possible conflicts with Italian training responsibilities to NATO."[7]

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[5] See Document 358.

[6] Document 342.

[7] MacArthur notified Radford and Gray by letter on May 17 that he had amended, in conformity with Gray's suggestion, paragraph 7, page 4, of the memorandum enclosed in the Secretary's letter of May 10 to each of them. (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5)

350. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 16, 1956, 4:34 p.m. [1]

SUBJECT

US–UK Contingent Military Planning for the Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. Gordon Gray
Admiral Radford
Mr. MacArthur

In the course of a call on the Secretary about other matters, [2] Admiral Radford said the US military had just about completed its discussions with the British on contingent military planning in the Middle East. There would be one more meeting which would wind up the talks, and then the job would be pretty well completed.

Admiral Radford said the US and UK military were in pretty complete agreement on all points except that of combined command. The UK wanted to plan for a combined command, but the US was opposed to a combined command except possibly in the case of a special operation where it might be desirable. For example, if there had to be a landing in the Suez Canal area, the US would have to furnish most of the ships, with the UK furnishing ground forces, and in this circumstance the US would wish to have a combined command under a US Flag Officer. [3]

Admiral Radford said the French were not aware that the talks had been taking place, and it was not proposed to inform them.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #4. Top Secret; Omega; Eyes Only.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] According to Rear Admiral Hedding's memorandum for the record, June 7, Lieutenant General Sir John Whiteley, Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission at Washington, called Admiral Radford on June 7 to discuss the status of the U.S.–U.K. contingency planning in the event of an Arab-Israeli war. He particularly wished to consider the problem of command structure. Admiral Radford responded that the Joint Chiefs of Staff intended to designate the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, as their operational commander, and that he would receive orders to coordinate planning and operations with an appropriate British counterpart. Lieutenant Whiteley advised that the U.K. senior airman on Cyprus would be the British representative.

Whiteley then advocated placing all naval forces under one command, but Admiral Radford resisted, concluding with the statement that "he felt that coordination of operations between commanders rather than the establishment of a combined command structure would be the most practical solution, and further it would be better from a political point of view, in that if questioned, it could be announced that the U.S. and U.K. forces were conducting coordinated rather than combined operations." (Memorandum for the record by Hedding; Radford Papers, Memos for the Record)

Should General Valluy raise this question again (he did raise the possibility of tripartite military talks a few weeks ago), it might be necessary to tell him something or go through some motions with him. We would, however, wait to let him raise it and hope that he wouldn't.

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351. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, May 16, 1956—1 p.m.

2260. . . . Nasser working himself into state on believing . . . that decision taken Paris that piecemeal supply armament to Israel by various nations would continue until arms strength of Israel exceeded that of Arabs. He also being told past reassuring statements by President [2] and Secretary [3] part of cover plan to lull Egypt into complacency this subject.

We dismiss latter point saying these men of integrity who would not be party to subterfuge. However believe it inevitable US in end will receive more blame than France or other supplying nations.

We doing indirectly what we can calm situation but are without record Paris talks. Inclined to believe, whatever decision taken in Paris, would have been best to have frankly informed Nasser rather than let him react to . . . perhaps exaggerated . . . reports.

Assume Department has kept in mind frequent predictions by this Embassy that any appreciable arms to Israel will result in additional orders from Soviet bloc. There is some reason to believe talks on this subject already underway with Russians here.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/5–1656. Secret; Priority. Received at 7:19 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Jidda, and Damascus.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 258.

[3] See footnote 5, Document 131.

352. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, May 17, 1956—1 a.m.

2264. Chinese Ambassador [2] (Doyen Diplomatic Corps) just awakened me to say that announcement had been made following late meeting of RCC that Egypt was recognizing Red China. He unable reach Fawzi or any official and asked for advice as to what he should do. Told him we better sleep on problem and confer tomorrow.

Ambassador Ho said that he had had assurances from Fawzi and others that this would not happen prior to notification to him personally. He speculated that reason for this precipitate action was frustration and concern by Egypt over new policy of west to arm Israel. He volunteered that Egypt now considers United States policy on this question to be pure hypocrisy.

As Departmental instructions preclude at present anything but counterproductive discussion with Nasser and as I have feeling Department does not wish me see him in any case we are without our best contact and probably will not find out motive behind this sudden move. Am inclined believe version of Ambassador Ho probably correct.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.02/5–1756. Secret; Niact. Received at 7:25 a.m.

[2] Dr. Ho Feng-Shan.

353. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 17, 1956, 2 p.m. [1]

SUBJECT

U.S.-Egyptian Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Egyptian Ambassador
The Secretary
Mr. Rountree, NEA
Mr. Burdett, NE

Ambassador Hussein called at his request prior to his departure on May 18 for consultations in Cairo. He referred to a recent telephone conversation with Nasser which, he stated, left him convinced that Nasser wants good relations with the United States and that the existing misunderstandings which had arisen in U.S.-Egyptian relations could be resolved. He was seeking an open talk with the Secretary in order that he might report to Nasser what the United States might be able to do and what the United States expected Egypt to do.

The Secretary responded as follows: We appreciate the Ambassador's concern regarding U.S.-Egyptian relations. There is no use of our shutting our eyes to the fact that a deterioration has occurred. The Ambassador will be performing a high duty in attempting now to clarify misunderstandings and reduce the differences to those relatively minor points which always exist. The Secretary said he had been looking over a message sent to Nasser in September, 1955 at the time of the Soviet Bloc-Egyptian arms transaction, and he read to the Ambassador the following portions:

"I wish to bring to you most urgently my deep concern over reports of the conclusion of an agreement by the Egyptian Government for the purchase of arms from the Soviet Union. It is possible that you may not have realized fully the seriousness with which such a transaction will be viewed in the United States and the consequent difficulty of preventing it from marring the existing good relations between our two peoples.

"Since the establishment of the present Government in Egypt, the United States has worked with it in the expectation that a solid basis would evolve for cooperation between Egypt and the nations of the West. We have placed full confidence in your repeated assurances regarding Egypt's identification with the West. We extended assistance during the negotiations of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Sudan and the Suez Base agreement in the belief

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/5–1756. Top Secret. Drafted on May 18 by Burdett. The time of the meeting is from Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

that they would make possible close Egyptian cooperation with the West. Our economic assistance programs, Atomic Energy Program, approval of arms purchases, and my statement of August 26 on the Arab-Israel situation are all based on the same general thought. We have tried to handle our cotton surplus in ways which will not prejudice Egypt's economy and have otherwise sought to support that economy. I am convinced that the economic and social progress you so deeply desire for the Egyptian people can come best through continued association with the West.

"The proposed agreement with the Soviet Union inevitably undermines the basic premise upon which we have worked in the past and sets Egypt upon a course which may well separate her progressively from her natural and long-term friends. The agreement cannot be considered a simple commercial transaction. It has deep political meaning. The record of the Soviet Union in this respect is clear. Initial, supposedly friendly gestures, lead quickly to subversion, inextricable involvement in the Communist orbit, and loss of that independence of action which Egypt rightly values so highly." [2]

Predictions made at the time had been to some extent confirmed by events. The Ambassador could appreciate the efforts of the President and the Secretary in withstanding the extraordinarily hard pressures to support Israel against Egypt. However, the only consequence of their stand seemed to be that in addition to alienating the Zionists and Israel, Egypt was turning against the United States. The Secretary said he did not know how long the United States could continue to follow a policy condemned by both sides. Egypt was stirring up the area against the United States. The latest example was the recognition of Communist China. [3] This event coming on top of the publicity on shipment of arms to Saudi Arabia [4] had evoked a most violent reaction in Congress.

The Secretary continued that allegations that the United States was trying to induce other countries to ship arms to Israel were untrue. To expect the United States not to ship itself and to use its influence to impose a world-wide embargo on Israel is totally unreasonable. Israel has received less military equipment during the last six months than during any other six-month period. The United States, at France's request, concurred in the interruption of an OSP contract to make possible the shipment of 24 Mystere planes. [5] This number is less than 10 percent of what we understand Egypt has received. The Secretary stated he could not see how we could hope to maintain good relations with Egypt if our policy on arms to Israel was made the basis of attacks upon us. What does Egypt expect the

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[2] The complete text of the letter is printed in telegram 1167, vol. XIV, p. 504.

[3] See *supra*.

[4] On March 28, a squadron of Egyptian jet combat aircraft was delivered to Saudi Arabia under the terms of the bilateral defense treaty of October 17, 1955.

[5] See footnote 6, Document 336.

United States to do? Nasser must be aware of the tremendous pressures from Zionist groups which are increased by the Soviet shipments to Egypt. Everything Egypt says and does is a slap in the face of the United States.

Ambassador Hussein said he understood and appreciated the United States policy on arms shipments. However, press stories regarding the Mysteres had indicated the United States was urging its allies to arm Israel. These stories, in the Ambassador's opinion, were responsible for the recognition of Communist China. The Secretary replied that the Ambassador should know that the press stories were inspired by persons attempting to goad Egypt into exactly what it had done, persons bent on disrupting U.S.-Egyptian relations. In Paris he explained why the United States was not shipping major military items to Israel. He did not ask other countries to cut off supplies to Israel, but pointed out that every nation was free to do what it wished. The United States was not trying by dubious means to do what it did not wish to do directly. He had expected questions at his last press conference [6] regarding U.S. policy toward arms shipments to Israel. If he was queried next week, he would reply in the above sense. [7]

Ambassador Hussein requested suggestions regarding what could be done to improve relations. The Secretary commented that the present situation, like most similar ones, was caused by misunderstandings and loss of confidence. Many persons in the U.S., in addition to Israel's usual supporters, honestly believed Nasser had made a bargain with the Devil with the hope of developing his own power and establishing an empire stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. He did not believe this. Still, the United States had yet to see Nasser do anything in the last six to nine months designed to preserve any vestige of friendship with the United States. The United States had tried its best to keep Egyptian friendship despite the effects of its Israel policy on the domestic political situation. Nasser had followed exactly the opposite course. Whenever he saw that popularity could be gained thereby, he had shown no restraint in leading the mob against the West. If Nasser attaches importance to U.S.-Egyptian friendship, as we do, he must be willing to pay a domestic political price for such friendship. Recognition of Communist China has brought about an almost impossible situation. The Ambassador interjected that it was commonly thought that the United States itself would recognize Com-

[6] For the transcript of Dulles' news conference, May 15, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 28, 1956, p. 881.

[7] For the transcript of Dulles' news conference, May 22, see *ibid.*, June 4, 1956, p. 920.

munist China in a year or so and that the UK, France and other countries had already done so. The Secretary emphasized the way in which Egypt had extended recognition, without any advance warning whatsoever. Nasser seemed to be deliberately going about making U.S.-Egyptian friendship difficult. He could hardly have found anything that would make it harder for us to continue good relations with Egypt. Now, an American had only to be anti-Communist to condemn our policy toward Egypt. Nasser had touched a point on which the United States was most sensitive. Does Nasser really want to force the United States to support Israel? When the Ambassador mentioned Nasser's internal problems, the Secretary inquired whether there was any internal demand in Egypt for the recognition of Communist China.

The Ambassador said that he would not be returning to Egypt if he were not one hundred percent certain that Nasser wished good relations with the United States. He inquired whether something might be done with respect to the Aswan High Dam. The Secretary said that assistance toward the Dam was about as unpopular a thing as could be done in the United States. Every time he had appeared before Congress the matter of the Dam was thrown at him. Egypt was not doing the United States a favor by accepting assistance toward the Dam. Should the matter arise today, he did not think it would be possible to get authorization from Congress for the Dam. He hoped the situation would calm down. Congress could easily attach to the Mutual Security Act a prohibition on expenditures of funds for the Dam. The situation in the Congress was boiling over the combination of arms to Saudi Arabia, no arms to Israel, and Egyptian recognition of Communist China. The Ambassador stated he had discussed with Mr. Rountree pending cotton legislation.[8] He was being asked whether the new bill was intended as an economic warfare measure against Egypt. The Secretary replied that the Administration was trying very hard to secure elimination of the objectionable features but that Egypt was making this most difficult. Congress would not be moved by the argument that Egypt would be hurt.

The Ambassador requested the Secretary to try to find a positive approach to U.S.-Egyptian relations and not to decide to drop Egypt. He said that if he felt such a positive approach was not possible, he would resign. With respect to arms shipments, he inquired regarding the feasibility of suggesting to Nasser that Egypt, once it had sufficient defensive arms, refrain from further purchases, provided Israel did the same. The Ambassador emphasized the

[8] Reference is to the Agricultural Act of 1956, which President Eisenhower signed into law on May 28, 1956, as Public Law 540. For text, see 70 Stat. 188.

psychological problem posed by Israel. He said that Egypt was a weak power with great need for economic development and that it had no desire to establish an empire. The Secretary recalled his hope that the Soviet bloc arms transaction would be a one-shot deal. Instead it was still going on and there was no way of knowing when it would end. He thought that the situation might be frozen on some reasonable basis involving no great imbalance and accompanied by positive United Nations guarantees against aggression. The President already had made clear the United States position on aggression.[9] The Secretary had recently told Ambassador Eban that if Israel aggressed it would be confronted with United States economic sanctions.[10]

Ambassador Hussein raised the matter of the Baghdad Pact. He inquired whether an agreement could be worked out limiting the Pact to the "northern tier" countries with the understanding that no other nation would join. The Secretary replied that we had never pressured any country to adhere to the Pact. We recognized the danger of its becoming mixed up in Arab politics and were interested only in a cooperative grouping against Soviet aggression or penetration. We had always regarded Egypt as a leader of the Arab States. Whether we would continue to do so depended a little on which way Egypt was leading. All the matters raised by the Ambassador were discussable and the Secretary thought solvable in an atmosphere in which the United States thought Nasser wanted its friendship. In addition, Egypt should not involve itself in active hostility to the U.K. The U.K. had big stakes in the Arab world, including oil in Iraq and Kuwait. The British would not stand idly by and see their position jeopardized, nor would the United States. We will support a legitimate British economic position in the area. This did not mean we would support British political dominance.

The Ambassador remarked that a solution of specific problems would lead to the creation of a better atmosphere. He mentioned the extreme nationalist feeling in the Arab world regarding the U.K. and suggested an understanding under which the U.K. would abandon its "eighteenth century colonialism" in the Persian Gulf in return for an end to Arab attacks against vital British interests in the area. The Ambassador inquired whether he could inform Nasser that the United States would support a "compromise" with the U.K. such as he had mentioned. The Secretary replied that he was in no position to negotiate with Nasser at this stage through the Ambassador or

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[9] See footnote 2, Document 258.

[10] No record has been found in Department of State files of the Secretary's having made such a statement to Ambassador Eban. See, however, Documents 151 and 221.

anyone else. There was too much danger of misunderstanding. He thought that he understood the real aspirations of the Egyptian people and had amply demonstrated this fact. *If* Nasser wanted the friendship of the United States and *if* he was prepared to keep Egypt independent from the USSR, all these problems could be worked out consistent with the normal aspirations of the Egyptian people. Without this basic desire, negotiations would be folly. Nasser's actions were causing the great body of opinion in the United States to doubt his intention on this matter. The Secretary re-emphasized that he could not deplore too greatly the recognition of Communist China.

Ambassador Hussein pointed to the restraint which Nasser had used regarding the last Israeli attack which had cost him prestige at home and in the area. The Secretary rejoined that he had been trying hard to think of something good that could be said about Nasser, and could say his attitude toward the Secretary General had been good, better than that of Israel.

In conclusion, the Secretary assured the Ambassador of his personal regard and of his confidence in the Ambassador's sincere desire to bring about an improvement in U.S.-Egyptian relations. He was glad the Ambassador was undertaking his present mission. While the Ambassador could not say he was charged by the Secretary with negotiating with Nasser, he could say he had explored these various problems and that if Nasser showed a real desire to have friendly relations, all could be settled. The heart of the matter was set forth in his letter to Nasser of last September. However, he would not say that there was already a certain price that Egypt would have to pay because of actions she had already taken. [11]

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[11] On May 21, the Department transmitted, in telegram 2780, a summary of this conversation with Ambassador Hussein to the Embassy in Cairo. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/5–2156)

354. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in Washington and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) in New York, May 18, 1956, 8:25 a.m. [1]

Ambassador Lodge telephoned this morning to report on his talk of last evening (four hours long) with Hammarskjold. [2] He said that H's estimate of the situation was a little more optimistic than was that of the Secretary. H does not think there will be a war this year at all. He thinks we ought to continue our efforts—even if we did nothing he doesn't think there will be a war. H is actively working for compliance and implementation of the freedom of movement for observers and of the withdrawal of troops. He has a lot of information about the parties . . . . H thinks he is in a pretty strong position to get these things carried out.

The Secretary said that the above was encouraging and asked Lodge if he thought H had solid grounds for his views. Lodge said yes . . . . H has got a much better reaction out of the Egyptians than the Israelis right along. H is continuing to send cables to Ben Gurion and to others and he thinks he can get something done.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Asbjornson.

[2] Later on May 18, Lodge sent a telegram to the Department confirming the contents of this telephone conversation. (Telegram 996 from USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–1856)

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355. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, May 18, 1956—5 p.m.

450. Have discussed matters reported Contel 446 [2] with Vigier and Hommel of UNTSO who have provided details outlined herewith.

Deadlock respecting meetings EIMAC continues with no indication that it may be broken at an early date, and formal adoption in

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–1856. Confidential; Priority. Received at 4:10 p.m. Also sent to Cairo and Tel Aviv; repeated to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, London, Paris, and New York.

[2] Document 344.

MAC of arrangement covering establishment observer posts on both sides Gaza D/L thus is being frustrated. Israelis have continued to maintain that if MAC were to meet at El Auja Egyptian delegate must proceed there by road from Rafiah. Egyptians have insisted their delegates entitled proceed by any road they wish and stated willingness use only road from Ismailiya. Israelis have resisted this evidently because they have military positions along that road which they do not wish Egyptians to observe. On the other hand, Hommel reports that Egyptians have mined the Rafiah road and presumably do not wish remove mines to permit travel over it.

Vigier stated that Israelis have recently broadened the character of their objections to MAC meeting at El Auja, regardless Egyptians route of travel there, by advancing new argument to effect that MAC should not meet there "now that articles 7 and 8 of the GAA may be regarded as in a state of suspense." Israelis have, however, asserted that they would agree readily to MAC meetings at K–95 or elsewhere that vicinity, where meetings were held in past owing convenience that location. Egyptians unwilling accede latter suggestion, wishing as matter of principle maintain rights with respect El Auja D/Z which not already lost through establishment of Kibbutz in D/Z stationing of Israeli troops in D/Z, and Burns concession allowing 30 Israeli "police" there. Egyptians would perhaps be willing meet elsewhere later, but feel they must initially maintain in principle right to meet at El Auja as established by GAA.

According Vigier, Ben Gurion has departed to spend week-end at Sde Boker. Since latter has taken charge of questions arising agreement with UNSYG respecting establishment of UN observer posts each side Gaza strip D/L, such matters appear likely remain in abeyance at least for next few days, although Tekoah assured UNTSO today "he is doing his best" make progress toward reactivating MAC. Since when negotiating on subject with UNSYG Ben Gurion gave no indication that Israelis would place any obstacles in way of MAC meeting to adopt arrangements re Gaza D/L, Vigier pointed out their tactic now raising difficulties this point might well appear as breach of understanding with UNSYG. Vigier added that, anticipating line now being followed by Israelis, Egyptians had proposed that arrangements should be adopted by MAC chairman, rather than by MAC itself. Israelis would not accept this.

In commenting on above, Vigier expressed view that Israelis basic attitude toward UNTSO and observers has not changed. . . . Vigier pointed out similarity this present situation and treatment accorded by Israelis to UNSYG proposals of November 4 relative El Auja.[3] . . .

[3] See telegrams 395 and 398, vol. XIV, pp. 690 and 702.

Comment: While Vigier frequently takes pessimistic view UNTSO affairs . . . , his presentation of facts as related above is doubtless generally correct and his conclusions do not seem unreasonable in light past experience. Perhaps Department and Embassies would wish consider feasibility some initiative with parties overcome deadlock concerning MAC meeting. Burns expects depart for New York May 22.

Cole

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356. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, May 18, 1956—2 p.m.

2285. Reference Deptel 2747. [2] Have nothing that could be called "evidence" that Egyptians now seriously considering acceptance Soviet offer High Dam. . . . Our concern relates more to general growing feeling that West not prepared for policy reasons follow through on its own offer. There is more skepticism now also as trend United States press is watched as to whether US at least could effectively do so as regards funds from Congress.

While we have frequently reported anything connected with arms for Israel takes priority over everything else we speculate that future of High Dam might have stayed GOE hand on recognition Red China but for fact they probably have feeling we not going follow through anyway.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–1856. Secret. Received at 10:37 p.m.

[2] The Department of State in telegram 2747, May 17, asked the Embassy in Cairo if it had "received any recent indications Egyptians seriously considering acceptance Soviet offer assist construction Aswan High Dam". (*Ibid.*, 874.2614/5–1556)

357. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, May 21, 1956—4 p.m.

2304. Have reviewed Embassy cables make certain we have accurately predicted our feeling that Nasser capable of almost any conceivable act in order to insure Egypt and Arabs will have and be able to retain what they believe to be adequate military strength vis-à-vis Israel. We believe our past messages have made this clear.

It may not be entirely clear to Department why GOE (and we presume other Arab States) consider arming of Israel not only against their general interest, which of course logical conclusion, but actually hostile act directed at them. History of Israeli attitude and operation over past several years reveals systematic raids across borders in implementation deliberate policy of vigorous retaliation which Israelis hoped would force Arabs seek settlement. Arabs reason that Israel's superiority in arms lead to her conclusion this safe tactic. Nasser at least feels this type of reckless activity bound to cease as Arab strength grows and that there would not be a repetition of Qibya, Nahhalin, [2] Gaza etc. unless and until Israel decides on full scale war. He feels fact that there has been no such raid now that arms coming to Arabs is significant, and that last Israeli aggression one of shelling across border rather than using troops proves his theory.

Provision of arms to Israel, it is reasoned, is therefore to provide Israel with the means to continue her past tactics without substantial fear for her own security. As they have no doubt that this is what Israel would do, and as they feel we must honestly hold same view, they conclude such assistance as being aimed at themselves.

It seems to me that if we properly assess strength this Arab reaction we would conclude that in future all interests including United States, Arab [States] and Israel, would best be served if we discussed with Arabs beforehand—without seeking their prior approval any substantial shipment arms this area.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684.86/5–2156. Secret. Received at 8:30 a.m., May 22. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Paris, and London.

[2] The Nahhalin incident occurred on March 28, 1954, when Israeli armed forces attacked the Jordanian village of Nahhalin, killing 9 persons and wounding 14 others. See also footnote 1 in *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 1500.

358. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the British Ambassador (Makins) and the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur), Department of State, Washington, May 23, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Operation Stockpile

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. Douglas MacArthur, C
Mr. Fraser Wilkins, NE

Mr. MacArthur said that when the Secretary was in Paris for the NATO meeting during the first week of May he had had a talk with Selwyn Lloyd regarding Operation Stockpile. [2] Mr. MacArthur stressed that this operation was in secret and was being very closely held within the United States Government. He recalled that President Eisenhower on April 9 had issued a statement regarding the Near East, in which he had said the United States would give support to a victim of aggression in that area. [3] It was thought that the statement in itself might exercise a deterrent effect on possible hostilities in the area. Meanwhile, it was necessary for the United States to be prepared to implement the President's statement, and studies were now under way within the United States Government on how such implementation might take place.

Operation Stockpile was, in effect, two different stockpiles. The first stockpile related to Israel. Only the United States was involved. In the event that Israel was the victim of aggression, the United States would support it by flying planes from operational units in Europe. The operation envisions 24 F–86's which would be turned over to Israeli pilots on Cyprus. Mr. MacArthur stressed that U.S. planning was on a contingency basis only. It was very closely held. He asked Sir Roger whether the British would agree that the planes could be transferred to Israeli pilots on Cyprus. Selwyn Lloyd had reacted favorably on first hearing of this matter from the Secretary, but later had suggested that it be discussed with Sir Roger in Washington who would give the final word. Mr. MacArthur noted that if the Israelis currently received Canadian F–86's they would be trained to fly American F–86's.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by Wilkins.

[2] See Documents 330 and 334.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 258.

The second stockpile related to the Arab States who might be victims of aggression in the event of hostilities. The United States was assembling defensive land weapons, including guns, recoilless rifles and other items and plans to store them on a vessel attached to the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Sir Roger said he had had some intimation of the question, but was not acquainted with the details. He did not think the capacity of the Airfield on Cyprus would accommodate a squadron of F–86's. Mr. MacArthur explained it was not intended that a squadron would be stationed there but that, if it were decided to supply Israel with U.S. F–86's, they would be turned over to Israeli pilots there. Sir Roger said he would be in touch with Mr. MacArthur again regarding the question.

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359. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, May 23, 1956—11 a.m.

453. General Burns has postponed his departure for New York owing difficulties obtaining adoption arrangement covering UNTSO observation posts each side of Gaza D/L. According Burns, position as described Contel 450 [2] has however evolved to some extent. It is now substantially as follows:

(1) Gohar has sent Burns letter stating that Egypt willing consider arrangement as in effect without its being "formally adopted in MAC".

(2) While maintaining their position that MAC should not meet at El Auja now that "articles VII and VIII of GAA are in suspense" Israelis have agreed to one meeting at El Auja for purpose formally adopting arrangement, provided MAC representatives agree in advance adopt resolution to effect that pending compliance by the parties with articles VII and VIII subsequent meetings of MAC will be held elsewhere. If Egyptians agree foregoing Israelis have indicated they will allow Egyptian MAC delegate proceed El Auja by any road he wishes.

(3) Burns expects reply about May 24 from Egyptians as to whether they are willing have their MAC delegate attend meeting at

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2356. Confidential. Received at 1:24 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Document 355.

El Auja in circumstances just mentioned. He would proceed New York thereafter.

(4) Hammarskjold takes "dim view" of Israelis idea of holding MAC meeting only on condition of prior commitment as above. If Egyptians unwilling give such commitment Hammarskjold would consider Israelis responsible for obstructing adoption arrangement.

With respect Israeli motives for taking above position, Burns said he assumed Israelis do not consider it advisable at this time to block progress entirely on adoption arrangement establishing observation posts, especially in light publicity attaching UNSYG visit and SC meeting. However, they presumably still wish limit activities observers as much as they can and take any expedient steps maintain habitual thesis re their "sovereignty" in the D/Z.

They also continue relate compliance articles VII and VIII to Egyptian attitude toward article I of GAA, including freedom transit Suez. In this connection Israelis likewise have in mind Egyptian actions such as increase number military units in Sinai and anti-Israeli propaganda.

With respect Gaza D/L which now relatively quiet, Burns opined that Egyptians are making genuine effort control troops and avoid firing incidents, while Israelis likewise keeping patrols back from immediate vicinity D/L. Situation indicative of what parties can achieve in this direction when they wish.

Turning to other matters, Burns said he thought suggestions for improving Lake Tiberias situation (SC resolution January 19, 1956 [3]) are all being observed by parties at this time with exception permission Syrians fish in Lake, which remains as described Contel 441. [4] With regard Jordan–Israel local commanders agreements covering border outside Jerusalem area, Burns said both sides considering proposals for agreement in terms generally similar that of June 8, 1953, [5] which lapsed following Scorpion Pass bus incident. Israelis had just returned proposed draft agreement with their comments, but progress on Jordan side might be delayed by change of government. Burns hopes new agreement will provide that both low level officers near frontiers and high level commanders of military districts concerned should have direct means communication with opposite numbers.

Burns said his opinion was that Jerusalem area commanders arrangement had proven of limited significance at least partly owing to fact Jordanians had named chief of Jerusalem police force as "area commander" for purposes of the arrangement. They did not name

[3] See the editorial note, vol. XIV, p. 854.

[4] Document 339.

[5] A Local Commanders' Agreement between Jordan and Israel under the auspices of the Jordan–Israel Mixed Armistice Commission was reinstituted on June 8, 1953.

officer in charge military area, who would be logical choice since he commands Arab Legion troops in Jerusalem, because when arrangement concluded that post was occupied by British brigadier. Jordanians did not wish British officer have direct contacts with Israeli opposite number. As result "area commander" on Jordan side was in fact police officer with but little force of character and no control troops in Jerusalem. Burns hopeful that with departure British from Arab Legion, Jordanians will feel free give their ranking military officers proper role any such local arrangements in future. [6]

Cole

[6] On May 25, Cole reported the following:

"Burns told me at social gathering last night Israelis have agreed implement arrangement UNTSO observation posts along Gaza D/L without its formal adoption in MAC (Contel 453). Plans contemplate establishment 6 posts each side D/L. Burns proceeding New York May 25." (Telegram 457 from Jerusalem; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2556)

360. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, May 23, 1956.

SUBJECT

Courses of Action in Egypt

The attached staff study reviews recent developments in Egypt and sets forth possible courses of action. I believe that decisions which should be made with the least possible delay lie in the following fields:

a. The extent to which our present policies toward Egypt should be modified, taking into account the continued deterioration in the Egyptian situation;

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by Rountree, Wilkins, and Burdett. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw the memorandum. A covering memorandum from Howe to Dulles indicates that the memorandum and its attachment were prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs and reviewed by the Middle East Policy Planning Group for use at the Secretary's meeting on the Middle East scheduled for 3:30 p.m. that day (see *infra*).

b. The extent to which our approach to other countries designed to minimize Egyptian influence and enhance the Western position should be extended . . . .

c. Whether, before proceeding with stronger measures vis-à-vis Egypt, we should, through a special emissary or normal diplomatic channels, have another frank talk with Nasser;

d. If such a talk is advisable, who should be charged with the responsibility; and

e. Whether there should be any parallel discussions either through diplomatic channels or a special emissary to Saudi Arabia or other Arab countries;

f. What line should be taken in the talks with Nasser.

My comments upon these matters follow:

a. *Modification of Present Policies Toward Egypt*—It is important to note that even though we might wish to adhere to our present policies . . . , to some extent our freedom of action has already been limited by the course of events. . . . Also, because of public and Congressional reaction to Nasser's recent anti-Western actions, and because of basic opposition from Congressional representatives from cotton-growing areas, it is possible that the Administration's hands will be tied in the implementation of the High Aswan Dam project. Aside from these factors, it appears evident that continuation of our present relatively soft attitude toward Nasser will not result in a change in his basic attitude toward Western interests in the Near East, and that further measures will be required.

b. *Operations Outside Egypt*—We propose certain further measures in other countries; however the timing of the actual implementation of these measures would depend upon whether it is decided to send an emissary to Egypt. If so, action would be deferred until after the results can be appraised. The measures contemplated are the following:

. . . . . .

2. *Sudan*—Assuming that we will not proceed in the foreseeable future either under the original proposals made to the Egyptian Government or modifications of that proposal to implement the High Aswan Dam project, it is possible or probable that the Egyptians will accept Soviet assistance. Present indications are that the Egyptian-Sudanese talks leading to an agreement upon the division of the Nile Waters are proceeding with some degree of success. If the agreement should be concluded there would be no obstacle to a Soviet-Egyptian contract for the Dam project. . . . a possible course is for us to suggest that a meeting of all the riparian states be called to discuss the unified development of the Nile Valley. In this connection, the Sudanese are known to oppose the Dam in its present form and the Ethiopians have repeatedly emphasized to us their interest in the Nile and concern that they have not been consulted in connection with the Egyptian project. The British

likewise have an interest deriving from the flow of the waters from British East Africa.

3. *Other Countries*—The actions contemplated in other countries include: . . . expansion of radio activities intended to counter Egyptian state broadcasting system (this would include acceleration of the program in Iraq); assistance to the Turks in establishing a medium wave station carrying Arab programs; . . . advice to certain friendly governments of our concern over the policies Nasser has been following, pointing out that regardless of his motives he is abetting Soviet penetration of the Near East, and that the US consequently is taking a less forthcoming attitude toward Egypt.

c. *Special Emissary*—The question of whether . . . we should have a further talk with Nasser is a difficult one. We believe that such a talk would be fruitful only if the American official charged with the responsibility is fully conversant with all the considerations involved, going considerably beyond US-Egyptian relations per se, and is fully aware of the thinking which has gone into the matter in Washington. It would be extremely difficult therefore, to handle the matter adequately through normal diplomatic channels. It would thus appear that any such mission should be performed by a special emissary, following full consultation in Washington.

The principal advantage of having an emissary talk with Nasser is that it would provide an opportunity to review the full scope of recent developments and to gauge Nasser's attitude and intentions. . . .

The disadvantages include the following: Nasser might gain the impression that the dispatch of an emissary resulted from alarm or fear on the part of the US and encourage him to believe that his recent actions, obviously designed to disquiet the US, had had their desired results. If in the course of conversations with Nasser it should develop that he would make certain concessions on the basis of quid pro quo, we would in fact have relatively little to offer him in present circumstances. We could not, for example, guarantee to proceed with the Aswan Dam, although we might give hopeful indications regarding the possibility of financing the project in FY 1957 subject to Congressional appropriations. We are in no position to assure him that our cotton policies will not be detrimental to Egyptian interests; we cannot assure him that we or our friends will indefinitely not supply arms to Israel; we cannot entertain any notion of undermining the Baghdad Pact. The most we can do regarding these matters would be to assure him that if his attitude and actions should be modified, we would do all in our power to reciprocate in carrying out policies consistent with legitimate Egyptian interests.

In balance, I am inclined to believe that we should nevertheless send someone to talk with Nasser.

d. *Choice of Emissary*—As to the choice of the emissary, it would be unwise in my judgment to send a high-ranking Departmental officer since it would be impossible to keep his presence in Egypt a secret and knowledge of his mission would create many difficulties and would militate against his success. It should, therefore, be someone thoroughly knowledgeable of the entire situation, capable of conducting extraordinarily difficult and complex discussions with Nasser, and whose presence in Egypt would not attract undue attention or at least would not be associated in the public view with a mission of the nature contemplated. This obviously imposes a severe limitation upon the choice of the individual; in fact, it appears that the only logical person would be Bob Anderson. If he should be unable to go Eric Johnston might present a possibility although his association with the Jordan Valley Plan presents a great difficulty in light of the current Arab opposition to the plan and Hammarskjold's expressed view that the project should not be pushed at this time.

It is of course recognized that such a mission undertaken by Anderson poses certain difficulties which should be taken into account. Among these are the following:

1. Nasser might expect that Anderson would be prepared to continue previous discussions concerning an Arab-Israeli settlement, whereas the current status regarding Hammarskjold's role and the latter's attitude render this inadvisable at this stage. It might appear that the US had decided not to rely upon the Secretary General but to embark upon a new peace-making mission of its own. Nasser should be made to understand that Anderson is not prepared to go into this matter.

2. If Hammarskjold should learn of Anderson's mission and be led to believe that it was related to the Arab-Israeli dispute it might serve as an excuse for him to withdraw from active participation in the matter. Hammarskjold might be told by the Secretary that the latter was sending a special representative to talk with Nasser about the Aswan Dam and other matters relating entirely to US-Egyptian relations and inform him that questions relating to the Palestine problem will not be discussed. If it is possible to do so tactfully, it might be well not to mention Anderson by name and Hammarskjold should be requested to treat the matter in utmost confidence. While Hammarskjold should be informed by the Secretary that the official has assisted him on previous missions to the Near East, he should not be informed that the emissary has had discussions with Nasser regarding an Arab-Israeli settlement.

3. It must be assumed that the Israeli would learn of Anderson's presence in Cairo and would be greatly concerned if they concluded that his visit was related to the Arab-Israeli question and he was not visiting Israel. For this reason the Israeli Ambassador should be told in utmost confidence that Anderson was visiting Cairo to talk about matters affecting purely US-Egyptian relations and that he would not discuss subjects affecting Israel.

4. The British likewise would probably learn of the visit. . . . since any step of this nature without informing them would be highly resented, we should perhaps inform them of the general purposes of Anderson's mission.

e. *Parallel Talks with Other Countries*—We believe that Anderson's present mission should be confined to discussions with Nasser, and that he should not at this juncture undertake visits to Saudi Arabia or to other countries.

f. *Line of Discussion with Nasser*—The context of the discussions with Nasser should be on the basis of the emissary visiting Egypt at the request of Nasser to discuss broad aspects of US-Egyptian relations. In this connection, there have been some indications that Nasser would like to have a representative come to Egypt; however, a request in this regard has not been formalized. . . . we believe that this should be done before definite arrangements are made for the visit.

In general, the line to be taken with Nasser should be that followed by the Secretary in his conversation on May 17 with Ambassador Hussein,[2] a memorandum of conversation which is attached. Detailed briefings upon the various subjects which might arise will, of course, be prepared. The subjects will probably include the Aswan Dam, American cotton policy, the Baghdad Pact, arms for Israel, the British position in the Persian Gulf, the United States attitude toward the French position in North Africa, the United States attitude toward Egyptian recognition of Red China, Soviet arms shipments to Egypt and Egyptian efforts to induce other Arab states to obtain arms from the Soviet bloc; and Egyptian broadside attacks against Western interests in Africa and the Near East.

It is important that in the conversation with Nasser a relatively detached attitude should be maintained, although it should be made clear that the US sincerely desires good relations with Egypt but that Nasser's policies and actions have raised great impediments to such a relationship. The object should be to appraise Nasser's attitude and estimate his willingness to change his policies in all essential respects necessary for cooperation with him, even though such changes might entail some political sacrifices on his part. An important element of the evaluation is his attitude toward the Soviets and the extent to which he would go in working with them.

In essence, the exercise would be more one of evaluation and appraisal than of negotiation. It is not intended that the emissary would be empowered to undertake any agreements upon specific issues such as the Aswan Dam, the Baghdad Pact, etc. If the results of the conversations should be such as to indicate an earnest desire

[2] See Document 353.

on the part of Nasser to collaborate with the US and the West and he should inquire what we want him to do, the various points made in the Department's Telegram 2598 of April 26[3] would provide a useful guide for such further discussions. As the Secretary told Ambassador Hussein, if there is a basic desire on the part of Nasser to collaborate with the US, most of the outstanding problems are negotiable.

[Attachment][4]

STAFF STUDY—U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

Problem

To determine in the light of current developments what policy should be followed with respect to Egypt.

Recent Developments

On February [*March*] 28 the President approved the . . . operation.[5] On April 23 a memorandum was submitted to the Secretary reviewing developments to that date and recommending . . . that we should preserve the utmost flexibility and be prepared to respond appropriately to any overtures from Nasser.[6]

The Tripartite meeting at the NATO Conference was followed by a spate of press stories regarding the shipment of arms to Israel. The allegation was made in the press that the United States, while refraining itself from sending arms, was encouraging its allies to do so. A violent Egyptian reaction ensued with an unbridled campaign in the Government-controlled press and radio, including charges of hypocrisy hurled at the United States.

Nasser paid a series of visits to Army posts in the Gaza and El Auja areas the weekend of May 12. The main theme of his speeches was that the West had reached a decision in Paris to arm Israel and that the Arab states must unite against Western imperialism. He

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[3] Document 310.

[4] Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by Burdett on May 23. Further documentation concerning the drafting of the staff study and its review by the Middle East Policy Planning Group is in Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5; *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Meetings of MEPPG (agenda, memos of conv., etc.), 4/9/56 to 6/30/56; and *ibid.*, Omega—Memos, etc. fr April 24, 1956 to June 30, 1956.

[5] See Document 223.

[6] The memorandum, entitled "U.S. Policy in the Near East", is not printed. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega. NE—Mr. Burdett 1956)

asserted that Egypt would receive from its friends many more arms than Israel.

Egypt recognized Communist China without warning on May 16.[7] It became the first country to do so, except for Nepal, since the Korean war and the only Arab country to take this step. (Israel recognized Communist China on January 9, 1950.) Embassy Cairo believes the action was precipitated by the news of Western arms shipments to Israel, but that press stories of a United States re-evaluation of its policy toward Egypt, together with British public attacks on Egypt . . . played an important part in the decision.

Embassy Tripoli reports that the Egyptian and Soviet Embassies cooperated in fomenting riots in Tripoli the latter part of April, and are working to overthrow the present government and eliminate U.S. and U.K. influence in Libya.[8]

The situation in Jordan has continued to deteriorate with the strongly anti-Western Colonel Nuwar assuming a controlling position in the Arab Legion. Following a period of several weeks during which the civilian government lost authority, the King announced on May 20 the appointment of Said Mufti as Prime Minister. Said Mufti was in power during the abortive attempt in December, 1955 to induce Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact, and personally favored adherence. . . . Egypt and Syria are stepping up their efforts to bring Jordan definitely into the ESS camp.

Nuri so far has been slow in responding to urgings on our part that Iraq take steps to improve its relations with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. We are preparing a new message stressing the need for a more forthcoming attitude.[9]

Following a visit to Cairo by Prime Minister Azhari, Egyptian relations with the governing NUP party in the Sudan have improved.[10] An agreement between Egypt and the Sudan on the division of Nile waters, paving the way for the Aswan Dam, is now more likely and could occur suddenly. Egyptian prospects of building up its position in the Sudan have been considerably enhanced.

The British have now submitted an agenda to Saudi Arabia, which should prove acceptable, for continuation of their talks, but they appear still reluctant to accept our view on the essentiality of improving the Western position in Saudi Arabia. We have made numerous representations on the subject.

Ambassador Wadsworth is returning to Jidda to open negotiations on renewal of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement. He has been

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[7] See Document 352.

[8] No record of such reports has been found in Department of State files.

[9] Telegram 980 to Baghdad, May 23, instructed Ambassador Gallman to this effect. (Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/5–656)

[10] Sudanese Prime Minister Azhari visited Cairo April 12–23.

authorized to promise that the United States will supply the military equipment required for Saudi Arabia's Five-Year Expansion Plan, but not to commit the United States to delivery of F–86s or M–47 tanks at any specific time. He is carrying a letter from the President to King Saud, and we are seeking authority to invite King Saud to visit this country. [11]

Although the UN Secretary General obtained cease-fire agreements in principle from Israel and its neighbors, UNTSO has made little progress in securing implementation of the agreements. There is real danger that we will lose whatever momentum Hammarskjold's mission had developed. From a recent conversation with him it is clear he believes that, while the Israelis will not recommence work at Banat Ya'qub during the next six months, no direct efforts to solve the water problem should be taken until the political climate in the area has improved. [12]

Possible Courses of Action

(1) . . . endeavor to appease Nasser by outbidding the Soviets. This course would involve acceptance of Egyptian terms on the Aswan Dam, an understanding limiting the Baghdad Pact and support for Egyptian leadership in the Arab world. It should be rejected for the following, among others, reasons: The effect upon our friends in the area and upon the UK; impetus would be given the game of playing off the United States against the USSR; the results in Israel; United States domestic repercussions; the encouragement which would be given to recognition of Communist China and other Soviet bloc states by additional Arab-Asian countries. In any event, . . . is unlikely to succeed in bringing about a reversal in Nasser's policies as long as his desire continues for arms in substantial quantities which can only be provided by the Soviet bloc.

(2) Continue . . . This would involve a prolongation of the courses we have followed since February [*March*] 28. Over a long period of time such measures might convince Nasser that he should alter his policies and cooperate with the West. However, one of the difficulties in continuing along the present course is that to some extent our freedom of action has already been limited by the course of events. For example, our ability to pursue policies not detrimental to Egypt's cotton exports will be severely impeded by the pending cotton legislation which is likely to pass. Under present circumstances, we are unable to use effectively with the Congress or American public opinion, the argument that the legislation will harm Egypt.

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[11] For text of President Eisenhower's letter of May 14 to King Saud, see vol. XIII, p. 372.

[12] See Document 338.

Another factor is the strength of Nasser's own reactions shown most lately in his recognition of Communist China, which may of themselves force us to respond . . . .

(3) . . . precipitate a head-on public clash with Nasser, who would attempt to damage the West in every way. Tactically, we have little to gain from publicity and telegraphing our moves in advance. First, we should complete our preparation and endeavor to cut back Nasser's strength.

Recommendations

Before determining finally upon a course of action, it may be desirable to probe once more Nasser's intentions to see whether there is any prospect of adjustments leading to long-term cooperation. In his discussion with Ambassador Hussein on May 17, the Secretary made clear repeatedly that it would be impossible to solve problems outstanding unless there was a basic and fundamental desire on Nasser's part for cooperation with the West. While the evidence to date indicates that the possibility of agreement is remote, it may be useful to assess whether even a slight chance remains . . . .

Under the conditions existing in Cairo, the only practical means of obtaining an independent assessment of Nasser's intentions is by sending a high level official on a special mission. There are marked disadvantages in sending such an emissary, foremost among which is the strong probability that Nasser, as in a similar case in the past, might construe it as a sign of weakness and anxiety on the part of the U.S. In weighing the advantages and disadvantages, the following two principal factors should be borne in mind: (1) to remain . . . without incisive urgent action . . . is to run the grave risk of placing Egypt in a position to conclude immediately thereafter an agreement on the Dam with the Soviet bloc. . . . (2) to embark on measures . . . which would inevitably come to Nasser's notice would obviously create new and grave problems in our relations with Egypt. . . .

If, despite the obvious and serious risks of misinterpretation, it is determined, on balance, that a high official should proceed, the emissary should depart in the immediate future. The official should work on the basis of a carefully developed plan designed to minimize the danger of Nasser's concluding that the United States is seeking to appease him. If at all possible, matters should be arranged so that the initiative towards high level talks would come from Nasser. It is not inconceivable that Nasser will request such talks on the basis of Ambassador Hussein's report of his discussion with the Secretary. If the official proceeds to Cairo, he should in general

parallel the presentation of the Secretary to Ambassador Hussein. He should endeavor to create the impression of relative detachment and merely of a desire to know what we may expect from Nasser in order that we may act accordingly.

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361. Memorandum for the Record, by Roger Kirk of the Executive Secretariat's Reports and Operations Staff [1]

Washington, May 28, 1956.

SUBJECT

Meeting on the Middle East with Secretary on May 23, 1956 [2]

The Secretary approved, in substance, a telegram to Cairo, Khartoum, Addis Ababa and London requesting comments from the addressees on the feasibility of inducing Sudan or Ethiopia to call a conference of riparian states to discuss the unified development of the Nile Basin before additional major works utilizing the Nile waters are undertaken. (Deptel 226 to Khartoum sent 5/25/56 [3])

The Secretary approved, in substance, a telegram to Cairo authorizing further discussions on the Aswan Dam, but without committing us to proceed with the project at this time. (Deptel 2815 to Cairo sent 5/25/56 [4])

The Secretary approved a visit to Egypt for discussions with Nasser by a special emissary provided the emissary was ostensibly merely passing through Cairo. [5]

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 16 D 417, Omega #6. Top Secret; Omega. The date is the drafting date. Cleared with MacArthur and Rountree and distributed to Murphy, MacArthur, and Rountree.

[2] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, this meeting began at 3:35 p.m. In addition to the Secretary, Hoover, MacArthur, Bowie, Rountree, Hare, Russell, Roosevelt, Wilkins, and Burdett attended. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) A summary record of the meeting is in Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Egypt—Dam, Misc. 1956.

[3] *Infra.*

[4] Document 365.

[5] See Document 381.

362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Sudan [1]

Washington, May 23, 1956—6:25 p.m.

226. Recent reports indicate Egypt and Sudan nearing agreement on division Nile waters. Other reports state GOE may turn to Soviet bloc for assistance on Aswan Dam. Last Dec US–UK and IBRD offered assist Egypt in financing Dam. [2] Egypt presented counter-proposals in Feb which still under study. [3] At present juncture US would have difficulty in responding favorably on Dam because, among other factors, precipitate Egyptian recognition Communist China and growing Congressional opposition.

Completion Egyptian-Soviet deal would give dangerous impetus to Soviet bloc penetration ME and project it into Africa. . . .

In Feb counter-proposals, GOE recognized necessity agreement with Sudan on division Nile waters before commencing construction Dam. Even if Dam commenced prior to agreement, it could not be carried far without Sudanese consent because resultant flooding Sudanese territory. Egypt would run dangerous risks in ignoring Sudanese objection because of up-stream location Sudan and Sudanese ability obstruct flow of Nile.

Under existing circumstances we believe most feasible way . . . may be induce riparian states call publicly for international agreement on unified development Nile Valley prior to commencement other major projects utilizing Nile waters. This could block separate Egyptian-Sudan agreement. Sudan and Ethiopia might be persuaded to call publicly for discussions including Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, British East African territories and Belgian Congo.

Sudan known to believe unified plan soundest hydrological approach to development of Nile and to hold strong reservations Aswan Dam in present form. Ethiopia has protested construction Dam without prior consultation. British East African territories also expressing concern. Thus riparian states might respond readily if they thought West would support general international agreement. Once call for conference made, it could receive full backing from US and UK.

Proposal solidly supported by legal arguments. Also technical information indicates unified integrated development preferable over individual project from hydrological and economic viewpoint. Pro-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–2356. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett, approved in substance by Dulles, and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Addis Ababa, London, and Cairo.

[2] See telegram 1282, vol. XIV, p. 868.

[3] See Documents 121–123.

posal would have strong popular appeal in countries affected where importance water widely recognized.

Best means broaching matter requires careful consideration. Key appears to be Sudan. Prime Minister Azhari might take initiative . . . .

Addressees requested comment urgently on general concept and best tactics.[4] London indicate probable British attitude.[5] Addressees should not repeat not mention to govts at present under any circumstances.

This message exploratory only and should not be construed as Dept decision proceed along lines indicated.

Dulles

[4] See Documents 370 and 371.
[5] See Document 367.

363. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State[1]

Cairo, May 23, 1956—11 p.m.

2318. Saw Hussein briefly right after his initial meeting with Nasser. Hussein had following points of interest on this first encounter.

(1) He personally felt completely reassured that Nasser had no intention of attacking Israel.

(2) Nasser's feeling on question of arms for Israel was intense. He obviously operating under some type of intelligence unknown to us which indicates that definite decision was made to try to keep Israel as strong as Arab States. He feels blame must be shared but mentioned Eden particularly. He apparently wonders whether things have reached point in Britain where British would even spur Israeli aggressions against Egypt. He felt that real motivation behind rumored arms blockade again lay with Eden and that Eden envisaged type of blockade which Israelis could circumvent as in past hostilities. I told Hussein to pass to Nasser that I absolutely convinced he operating under false information. Truth was almost entirely to

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/5–2356. Secret; Priority. Received at 11:45 p.m., May 25. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris.

contrary as Eden had been annoyed at Russian suggestion of arms embargo to Middle East which he saw as move on their part to wreck Baghdad Pact.

(3) Secretary should not feel that motive behind recognition Red China was slap at US. Timing of this act had been related solely to establishing new source of arms because of Nasser's feelings as above on question arms for Israel. Hussein said Nasser asked that I be told this officially and that he regretted apparent misinterpretation in United States.

Byroade

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364. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, May 24, 1956.

MR. SECRETARY: Admiral Radford called me this morning regarding "Operation Stockpile". He said that while the Department of Defense was moving ahead to implement this operation, he felt you should know that he and all the other Chiefs have the gravest doubts about the convinced that it could not be held secret and that the convinced that it could not be held secret and that the story, or at least parts of it, would get out in the next several weeks. He said it was impossible to load and send a ship with Army equipment to the Sixth Fleet without the story leaking.

With this in mind, he felt that it was important that we talk with Jerry Persons or someone in the White House and assess the domestic political effect of a leak on this operation and then decide how it would be handled. Admiral Radford concluded by saying that Defense would move ahead on this operation but implied that the political results of a leak would be on our heads here in State.

I told Admiral Radford that I would bring his views to your attention this morning since you would be seeing the President [2]

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5. Top Secret; Omega. A note on the source text indicates that Dulles saw this memorandum.

[2] Secretary Dulles met with the President at 2:15 p.m. Concerning "leakage" regarding Operation Stockpile, the President said "he did not assume that any leakage would be fatal and indeed he thought that probably some public statement would be wise." Dulles agreed. "The President asked where the vessel would be. I said

(Continued)

before your departure tomorrow[3] and might wish to mention it to him.

I am convinced that Admiral Radford is correct in that the Military cannot hold the operation secret. I was shocked to learn yesterday that some of the Military students in the National War College are aware of the plan through apparently injudicious comments by friends who are working on it in the Pentagon. I think the real point is the extent to which a partial leakage about the plan would create domestic and/or international difficulties for us.

For example, if the story about the AKA and arms leaked, could it be handled without causing political difficulties simply by saying that the President had said on April 9 that we would help the victim of aggression[4] and that we accordingly had made plans to make available some military equipment to assist the victim of aggression whomever it might be.

I believe a leak on the F–86 side of the project might be more damaging both in the Arab World and domestically in that it might lead to pressures for the immediate supply of some F–86s by us for training purposes.

D.MacA

(Continued)
somewhere in the Mediterranean. The President said he assumed perhaps Malta." (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles, May 26; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

[3] On the afternoon of May 25, Secretary Dulles departed for Duck Island on Lake Ontario and did not return to Washington until June 5.

[4] See footnote 2, Document 258.

365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

Washington, May 24, 1956—7:01 p.m.

2815. Subject instruction last paragraph you should call on GOE and in manner deemed most appropriate discuss matters relating High Aswan Dam.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–2456. Secret. Drafted by Rountree and Shaw, approved in draft by Hoover and in substance by Corbett, and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London and Khartoum.

Useful recall that US made its offer assist in this project on December 16 [2] after extensive discussion Washington with Egyptian representatives in line with Egyptian plans at that time for proceeding with work in phases in order comply with Egyptian wishes for immediate action. Thereafter GOE submitted certain counter-proposals to British representative in Cairo based upon new premise that work would not commence without prior agreement on division Nile waters and containing number other suggestions for modifications which raised certain problems which have been under consideration by US in consultation with UK.

You should point out fact that US offer for grant contribution to first phase of project based upon funds earmarked from FY 1956 MSP appropriations, but in view approaching end of year and fact Egyptians have decided not proceed in absence Nile waters agreement, it clear US participation will have to come from subsequent Congressional appropriations. Under US law obligation of funds would require agreements with GOE and IBRD and therefore funds cannot be turned over IBRD in advance such agreements. US intends that, assuming necessary agreements concluded, funds will be set aside from FY 1957 appropriations subject, of course, to favorable Congressional action.

We would appreciate in this connection learning of current views GOE re prospect agreement on Nile waters and would be glad learn GOE thoughts with respect to future talks.

FYI Foregoing line designed give GOE some interim information without either a) indicating that US had decided drop idea participation in dam or b) commenting at this time substantively on GOE counter-proposals which might imply immediate willingness to proceed with project on some basis. While it unlikely in present circumstances US could proceed with project we wish avoid giving Egyptians pretext for announcing agreement with Soviets on basis US refusal End FYI.

British Embassy Washington informed foregoing message. London should consult Foreign Office [3] and Cairo discuss with British

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[2] See telegram 1282, vol. XIV, p. 868.

[3] The Embassy in London reported on May 25 that it had approached the Foreign Office "and learned Foreign Office is informing Trevelyan there no objection to Byroade's proceeding along lines Department . . . telegram." (Telegram 5481 from London; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–2556)

The following day, Willie Morris of the British Embassy informed John Shaw that the Foreign Office concurred in the action proposed in telegram 2815. (Memorandum of conversation by John F. Shaw; *ibid.*, 874.2614/5–2656)

Embassy.[4] Before proceeding confirm Trevelyan has received no objection from Foreign Office.

Dulles

[4] See Document 379.

366. Memorandum for the Record, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) [1]

Washington, May 25, 1956.

SUBJECT

Operation "Stockpile"

Pursuant to the Secretary's instructions, I called Admiral Radford today about Operation "Stockpile".[2] Admiral Radford was absent from his office and so I talked with Admiral Hedding (Admiral Radford's Special Assistant, who is fully familiar with "Stockpile"). I made reference to Admiral Radford's call to me yesterday[3] when he expressed fear that Operation "Stockpile" or certain aspects of the matter might leak. I said that I had conveyed Admiral Radford's message to the Secretary who had subsequently discussed this with the President. I said that both the Secretary and the President agreed that we should go ahead with Operation "Stockpile" despite the possibility of a leak. At the same time, I had been instructed to draw up a statement which we could make to the press in answer to queries should this operation leak. The statement would be general in character and would make reference to the President's April 9 statement that the U.S. would support the victim

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5. Top Secret; Omega. A note attached to the source text indicates that the memorandum was forwarded to Hoover.

[2] At a meeting in Dulles' office that day, the Secretary instructed MacArthur to call Radford to inform him that the President wanted to proceed with Operation Stockpile. Dulles wished to have a public statement along the following lines ready for release:

"In view of the April 9 White House statement that the U.S. would aid the victim of aggression in the Near East, we have made arrangements to have in close proximity to the area stockpiles of military equipment which we would make available to the country which had been subject to attack in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter." (Memorandum for the record, May 25; *ibid.*)

[3] See Document 364.

of aggression in the Near East and say that we had made arrangements to have a supply of military equipment in close proximity to the area which we would make available to any country which had been subject to attack in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Admiral Hedding said he would convey the foregoing to Admiral Radford. He added that he was not as concerned as some people were about the effect of a leak. He thought it was an excellent idea to have a statement up our sleeves in the event Operation "Stockpile" or any aspects of it should leak.[4] I said to Admiral Hedding that after we had drawn up a draft statement I would pass it to him for any comments or suggestions that Mr. Gordon Gray and Admiral Radford might have. I indicated that we would do this early next week. He expressed his appreciation.

I then asked Admiral Hedding where Operation "Stockpile" now stood in the Pentagon. He replied that Admiral Radford was presenting to Mr. Wilson a draft letter from Mr. Wilson to Secretary Dulles[5] indicating that Operation "Stockpile" would be put into effect and enclosing copies of directives to the Secretaries of the Navy, Army, and Air Force, instructing them to get out the necessary instructions to their people to implement Operation "Stockpile" in terms of having the AKA and weapons available in the Mediterranean as envisaged and having the Air people do the necessary planning so that the planes could be delivered if such a decision was taken.

D.MacA

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[4] See Document 382.

[5] Wilson's letter of May 24 to Dulles, along with copies of Wilson's directives to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, is in Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5.

367. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, May 25, 1956—7 p.m.

5482. Reference Deptel 7084, [2] Embassy has not recently discussed Aswan Dam project at highest level in HMG but discussion today at Foreign Office working level basis Deptel 7122 [3] confirmed Embassy's impression British disposed to stall on project as long as possible. British are aware of probable Congressional attitude mentioned first paragraph Deptel 7084.

Possibility of establishing international Nile Valley authority was debated in House of Commons May 18 when Parliamentary Under-Secretary Dodds-Parker, speaking for Government, expressed belief such body may well come into being at some future time if circumstances should permit but he also said present High Aswan Dam project was not inconsistent with such international authority. (See Emb despatch 2893, May 24. [4]) Taking these statements as cue and without of course referring in any way to proposal outlined in Department reftel, Embassy officer in conversation at Foreign Office yesterday inquired as to current thinking of HMG regarding international authority. Foreign Office official replied HMG has given practically no thought to Nile Valley authority and therefore does not know its full implications. He expressed belief it would take long time for riparian states to agree regarding a concept of this nature which he pointed out had only been advanced in the most tentative form. He stated HMG would oppose international Nile Valley authority at present time.

Although foregoing discussion took place in a different context from that of proposal Department has in mind in Deptel 7084 it appears to Embassy on basis conversation summarized above that initial British reaction to proposal would probably be unfavorable at this time.

While Embassy of course appreciates reasons which cause Department to consider proposals of this sort, we question whether this particular proposal (1) would not be transparent to Egyptians as stalling tactic (interest of certain of riparian states mentioned Department reftel, i.e., Belgian Congo and British East African territories would appear to be distinctly marginal) and (2) might not also

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–2556. Top Secret. Received at 9:12 p.m. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Cairo, and Khartoum.

[2] Printed as telegram 226, Document 362.

[3] Printed as telegram 2815, Document 365.

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–2456)

result in loss for U.S. of future maneuverability in a changing situation.

Aldrich

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368. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

Washington, May 26, 1956.

SUBJECT

Request to Mr. Robert Anderson that he call at the Department

Discussion:

At the meeting with the Secretary on May 23, [2] it was agreed that it would be useful for a special emissary to proceed to Cairo for further discussions with Nasser, but that it should be made to appear that he was merely passing through Cairo on other business. This procedure would provide an opportunity to bring forcefully to Nasser's personal attention the depth and nature of United States concern at current Egyptian policies and would permit a further evaluation of Nasser's current attitudes without incurring the disadvantages which would stem from an elaborately arranged special mission to Cairo. By sending the emissary we could be fully satisfied that we had exhausted every possibility of reaching an understanding with Nasser.

It was also agreed that Mr. Robert Anderson should be asked to undertake the mission. Mr. Anderson possesses business interests in South Africa and he could ostensibly pass through Cairo in connection with them.

We believe he should depart as soon as possible . . . . Therefore, we hope that he will come to Washington early next week. One trip to Washington should suffice for making the detailed arrangements and briefings. However, Mr. Anderson might wish to return again for a final talk with the Secretary immediately before leaving for Cairo.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #6. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by Burdett.

[2] See Document 361.

We are preparing the necessary briefing papers.

Recommendation:

That you telephone Mr. Anderson in New York requesting him to call at the Department for further discussions as soon as he can conveniently do so. [3]

[3] Hoover initialed his approval of Rountree's recommendation. For Hoover's summary of his conversation with Anderson, see Document 381.

369. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) [1]

Washington, May 26, 1956.

SUBJECT

Ambassadorial Committee Meeting on May 28, at 3:00 p.m.

Discussion:

Following the recent NATO meeting in Paris, the Secretary had a meeting with the British and the French regarding various Middle East questions. One of these questions related to the Ambassadorial Committee. At the suggestion of the French Foreign Minister, it was agreed that the Committee would review the procedures of NEACC with special reference to the orders placed by Israel with the different Western powers. It was clear that the French wished a common decision regarding which Western powers would supply which Israel orders. During the Tripartite discussions, the US concurred in a French proposal to supply Israel with a final twelve Mysteres. The French also said they planned to sell Israel twelve Mysteres II, to which the Secretary said he saw no objection. (Tab B) [2]

Mr. MacArthur later discussed with the French Ambassador a French request for an Ambassadorial Committee meeting, regarding the work of the military experts of NEACC. Mr. MacArthur said it

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 480.008/5–2656. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins.

[2] Tab B, a copy of Document 336, was not attached to the source text.

would be more useful if an Ambassadorial Committee meeting took place after the military experts had completed their work; otherwise, there would be little basis for discussion. Our principal concern was that a meeting might become known publicly and have a disquieting effect. At that stage there was some excitement in the Near East following the French shipment of Mysteres to Israel.

It was finally agreed that the Department, as secretariat of the Ambassadorial Committee, would circulate a French request that the military experts of NEACC complete their work by June 4. This request was scheduled for discussion at the May 22 meeting of NEACC. (Tab C) [3] However, the British and Italian representatives had not received their instructions by this date. The French Ambassador has therefore requested an Ambassadorial Committee meeting for the purpose of formally instructing the NEACC to arrange that its military experts complete their work by June 4. The French wished the military sub-committee to analyze the military strength of Israel and the Arab States, to estimate in what respects Israel or the Arab States were deficient in military strength and to inventory all Israeli orders. (Tab D) [4]

An Ambassadorial Committee meeting, under your chairmanship, has been arranged for May 28 at 3:00. [5] This date has been set because the French Ambassador is scheduled to leave Washington for Paris on May 29 and wishes to be in a position to report to the French Foreign Minister that he has been successful in having an Ambassadorial Committee meeting with respect to arms shipments to Israel.

Recommendations:

That you speak at the Ambassadorial Committee meeting on May 28 along the lines of the attached talking paper. (Tab A)

[Tab A]

TALKING PAPER FOR AMBASSADORIAL COMMITTEE MEETING ON MAY 28

(1) The United States has been happy to respond to the French request that an Ambassadorial Committee meeting be held. May 28

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[3] Not attached to the source text. Tab C consisted of two diplomatic notes from the French Embassy: No. 247 of May 18 and No. 258 of May 23; copies are in Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/5–1856 and 480.008/8–2356, respectively.

[4] Not attached to the source text. Tab D consisted of a French diplomatic note, No. 257 of May 22, filed *ibid.*, 480.008/5–2256.

[5] See Document 373.

was selected because of the imminent departure of the French Ambassador for Paris on May 29.

(2) You recall that neither the existence nor the membership of the Ambassadorial Committee is known to the public and that for it to continue to perform a useful function it is essential that its existence and its activities remain on a highly confidential basis.

(3) The agenda consists of a request from the French Ambassador: Instructions to NEACC regarding the work of its military experts. Extra copies (Tab C) are attached for distribution.

(4) The United States supports these instructions, with the following suggestions:

(a) As it is now May 28, it is doubtful that the military experts of NEACC will be able to complete their work by June 4. It is therefore suggested that no date be set at this time but that the military experts be asked to indicate how much time will be required for their work.

(b) It is suggested that the military experts of NEACC be asked to express an opinion whether they will be able to supply an evaluation as requested in paragraph (b) of the French request.[6] If the military experts find this evaluation would not now be possible, further discussion regarding the subject of paragraph (b) might be reserved for a later meeting of the Ambassadorial Committee.

(c) It is understood that it may not be possible for some members of the Committee to submit an inventory of all Israel requests. The United States, for example, only submits to NEACC those orders which are approved within the U.S. Government. To submit all requests might create the impression they have been approved. Furthermore, in some cases requests are made to the United States Government on a confidential basis. Therefore, it would be difficult for the United States to reveal these requests to NEACC. Paragraph (c) of the French request is satisfactory to us if it is interpreted in this light.

(5) The instructions, as amended, should be forwarded to NEACC for action by its military experts.

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[6] See footnote 3 above.

370. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, May 26, 1956—4 p.m.

2346. Reference: Deptel 2798. [2] Subject: High Dam. Agree that if U.S. cannot or will not assist in financing High Dam, every effort should be made minimize gain which Soviets can obtain through this key project. Difficulty we have here is conceiving of methods by which this can be done. I feel most strongly that scheme outlined reftel is certainly not the method. Consider it would not only fail to deny Soviets this possibility but would most probably in end substantially enhance Soviet influence by undermining diplomatic and moral position U.S. in Egypt and area.

Rightly or wrongly we made decision long ago to pursue course quite opposite, and this decision has long been public knowledge. It was with our blessing that IBRD undertook serious survey High Dam in cooperation GOE officials in absence survey of total Nile Valley. Again it was with our blessing and indeed urging that Bank understood public negotiations culminating in highly publicized agreement. It is also public knowledge that U.S. and U.K. had been prepared to commit public funds this project even in advance of agreement with Sudan and that GOE itself reversed this position.

From practical point of view there seems to us no possibility at all that this . . . approach could escape becoming public knowledge. Even if this could be avoided doubt if we could keep knowledge from Egypt and most certainly we could not if we so much as mentioned this concept to anyone in Sudan. . . . GOE has already been alerted to possibility of such a switch by debate House Commons last week which prompted statement GOE spokesman that issue to be resolved by "agreement between ourselves and brothers in Sudan without interference from any quarter".

Should think without doubt when Egypt sees this type of approach it would accept Soviet offer. She has reacted strongly for years to any approach which would subordinate her very real present day need to up river areas who have done little or no planning. . . . It should not be overlooked that Sudan and Egypt might still go ahead with agreement and part of deal might be Soviet construction in Sudan in exchange for Sudanese products. If things did not work out this way we would on other hand be in position of encouraging Sudan-Egypt differences and creating new area of con-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–2656. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 8:36 p.m. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa, London, and Khartoum.

[2] Printed as telegram 226, Document 362.

flict and tension, for it must be expected that GOE will react with all-out effort subvert any government in Sudan going along with suggested scheme.

We are dealing here with most fundamental of problems and cannot afford a mistake. My feeling on this question goes far beyond any difficulty such a scheme might create for us at this particular post. . . .

What is involved is future of Egypt over long period years and whether there can be any stability in this country regardless in whose hands lies control of government. It is an issue that should in our own interest transcend to greatest extent possible current political irritation. Fact that millions of people are now living at what approaches near starvation level, with unalterable worsening demographic situation, has political implications of its own as regards basic U.S. interests as well as involving cause of humanity. While Department is correct legal argument could be used, these factors certainly should not be ignored and furnish basic reason why Egypt has perfected plans while others have not.

Department's suggestion comes at time when situation already deteriorating and when, whether logical in our opinion or not, there is deepest suspicion and feeling around our intentions towards Egypt. We are daily impressed with depth of emotion which, surprisingly enough for Egypt, is not being manifested in all its intensity as yet by local press. It is almost a certainty that if things continue such as they are there is going to be long-term impression left as regards negotiations both on arms and High Dam that Egypt's security requirements and most basic economic program have been subordinated by us to protection of interests of state of Israel.

If we really believe that Congress will refuse to approve funds which include High Dam as illustrative example under regular economic aid appropriations on yearly basis for this area, we would be better off to admit this frankly the case and prepare ourselves as best we can to live with what comes thereafter. Other countries have never accepted such statements without grain of salt, but at least it is an honorable position and can never be disproved against us. We should at same time maintain positive approach this project and suggest to GOE that despite developments which limited administrations ability follow through on original concept, we are still interested in project and are willing explore with them possibility of developing European consortium, perhaps with major West German participation.

In any event let us try to avoid public posture of trying to prevent this necessary work by an essentially negative approach

which really seems to me unworthy of our country's traditions and full of danger for our long-term interests.

Byroade

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371. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, May 26, 1956—6 p.m.

2347. Deptel 2798 [2] reference High Dam prompts following observations in this restricted channel in addition those in Embtel 2346. [3]

History on High Dam indicates that we thought vaguely about trying help Egypt on High Dam for number of years. It was our hope day would come when this would be possible. Word that Russians might do project prompted desire quick action. We then undertaking Anderson mission which added additional stimulus our own desire of appearance of pushing project. Our thinking on High Dam had thus become naturally but unfortunately overly concentrated around political issues connected with East-West or Arab-Israeli matters. Merits of project as dramatic example America's desire help under-developed countries and raise standards of living became to extent at least submerged.

Although we knew that odds were against success due to practicalities in area, time had come when effort such as Anderson mission should be tried. This I wholeheartedly agreed with. My concern from moment of being first informed this mission was entirely around question of what would happen if it failed. Spoke of this often in East and with Anderson at that time. I felt it only human nature that there would be reaction against Nasser and Egypt. Detailed analysis as to whether Nasser or Anderson was more reasonable, under practical considerations confronting them, would soon be forgotten. Point would remain that we had placed our hopes in an Arab leader to accomplish settlement and there would be sharp disillusionment with him if it did not work. Fact that he would be honest enough to tell us frankly and bluntly what he felt he could

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–2656. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution; Omega Handling. Received at 10:51 p.m.

[2] Printed as telegram 226, Document 362.

[3] *Supra.*

and could not do rather than play us along in typical manner Middle East probably only increased the danger.

Nasser and Egypt have done many things to displease us, but it seems to me that real change in our attitude came about at time we concluded no early miracles towards settlement could be accomplished through Nasser. Our special stimulus for High Dam was off. Other countries including Israel continued receive economic aid, PL 480 supplies and other assistance. Nothing new has been approved for Egypt since that time. We have been very good in public statements trying to preserve a position here, but did not an element somewhat akin to punitive thinking become at least a part of our private attitude? I repeat do not wish ignore acts of Egypt inimical to our interests but to extent, if any, the above may be true, respectfully suggest this is negative thinking which does not put us in proper frame of mind to carry out best policy approach to our problems.

Above is furnished in effort be constructive and not critical, as my disappointment lack success of Anderson mission as keen as any. If this analysis useful at all, perhaps it relates itself now for action only as regards other states of this area with whom we wish to retain good relations and special interests. I should not think, for instance, we would wish Nasser to use his influence with persons such as King Saud convince them that cooperation with America would someday be cut short unless they could help us as regards Israel—for we would be taking long chance indeed if we doubted that history both arms negotiations and High Dam negotiations will not leave this long-term impression.

Byroade

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372. Telegram From the Embassy in the Sudan to the Department of State [1]

Khartoum, May 26, 1956—4 p.m.

328. Reference Department telegram 226.[2] Embassy has no information indicating Sudan–Egypt agreement on division Nile waters is imminent and believe Sudan will find reasons to delay it for

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–2656. Top Secret. Received at 1:05 a.m., May 27. Also sent to Cairo, London, and Addis Ababa.

[2] Document 362.

several months. Finance Minister says he does not need Nile agreements until December 1957. Latest reports here are that Sudan is awaiting additional technical data before continuing negotiations and both Foreign Minister and Finance Minister say they will not negotiate until currency agreement reached. Wide divergence of opinion exists here as to possibility favorable outcome present currency talks in Cairo but Finance Minister says he will introduce currency bill Parliament May 28 to show Egypt Sudan is serious in its determination have independent currency which Finance Minister says will be placed in circulation October-November this year regardless results negotiations with Egypt. Need to work out plans for resettlement Wadi Halfa population which will require several months will also be used delay Nile agreement. In present uncertain state internal politics and question stability present government, complete Cabinet support to enter such controversial agreement as division Nile water would be difficult alternate even if he favored it unless it meets Sudan's full requirements. Despite its reported determination delay agreement Sudan will not refuse to negotiate for fear of arousing full strength Egyptian propaganda which might disturb present precarious working agreement among parties participating in government.

In view likelihood indefinite delay in Nile agreement believe initiation move toward international control would be advisable at this time unless needed convince Egypt reliance on USSR is not possible. Quick Egypt-Sudan agreement might become desirable later if Egyptian policy toward USSR should change. If international agreement should be deemed essential suggest Ethiopia with which Sudan is on excellent terms be used to raise question as consider Azhari too weak and other parties participating in government too divided to raise issue, but they might be expected to support it if it were raised since it is in accord with overall Sudanese position.

Pinkerton

373. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 28, 1956[1]

SUBJECT

Fifth Meeting of Ambassadorial Committee on Coordination of Arms Shipments to the Near East

PARTICIPANTS

France	*United States*
M. Maurice Couve de Murville, Ambassador	Mr. J. E. Coulson, Minister
M. Charles Lucet, Minister	Mr. Willie Morris, First Secretary
M. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor	

Italy	*United States*
Signor Manlio Brosio, Ambassador	Mr. Robert Murphy, G
Signor Giuseppe De Rege Thesauro, Counselor	Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA
	Mr. Fraser Wilkins, NE
	Mr. John W. Jones, WE
	Mr. Ernest Lister, BNA
	Mr. Aubrey Lippincott, MC
	Mr. Richard B. Finn, G
	Mr. Lewis Hoffacker, NE

The French Ambassador, who had requested the meeting, recalled that at the March 6, 1956, meeting of the Ambassadorial Committee,[2] the US and UK representatives had differed with the French view that some arms should be shipped to Israel to correct at least partially the arms imbalance arising from the Czech-Egyptian arms deal. He observed that the Italian representative seemed to stand between the "Anglo-Saxons" and the French on this point. Now, it seemed to the French Ambassador, there appeared to be a narrowing of the gap between the two positions since the US was not standing in the way of other friendly powers' arming Israel and the UK and Italy were making some deliveries to Israel. It seems therefore that since there appears to be agreement on principle to ship some arms to Israel, the next step was to determine what the pattern is to be. As set forth in French Embassy note number 247 of May 18, 1956, as amended by note number 258 of May 23, 1956,[3] the French Ambassador proposed the following preliminary steps towards establishing a quadripartite pattern of shipment:

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/5–2856. Secret. Drafted by Hoffacker.

[2] See Document 184.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 369.

"The military experts of NEACC are asked to present on the 4th of June, at the latest, to the Committee of Ambassadors:

(a) An evaluation of the respective forces and armaments of Israel, of the Arab states, especially of those adjacent to Israel, at the earliest possible date, and taking into account all the information received on deliveries originating in countries other than those represented on Committee.

(b) An evaluation, from the technical point of view, of the volume and nature of the military matériel which will be necessary to Israel for it to be in a position of defending itself if need be against aggression, without, however, giving it means capable of encouraging it to launch a preventive war.

(c) An inventory of available information regarding requests for armament made by Israel to the four powers, members of the Committee, and whenever possible, on the basis of available information, to other friendly countries."

As a result of reasons put forth by Mr. Murphy, the Italian Ambassador, and Mr. Coulson, it was agreed that the military experts of NEACC would be asked to present by June 15, 1956, to the Committee of Ambassadors the land forces data called for in paragraph (a). Naval and air force data would be presented as soon as possible.

Mr. Coulson, on instructions, voiced strong opposition to paragraph (b) since his government has feared for some time that any quadripartite plan aimed at establishing a pattern of arms shipments to Israel would become known outside the Committee and would cause grave repercussions in the Arab world. For this reason, he could not accept any form of paragraph (b), which seemed designed to provide the first step toward just such a four power plan. The British Government prefers an "ad hoc trickle." The French Ambassador rebutted that his Government hoped that on the basis of the study called for under paragraph (b), the Committee might consider what arms Israel might require and take steps to supply them in a "more systematic" manner than was possible through NEACC. Mr. Murphy pointed out that even if we had the requested data today, the Department would not be in a position to say whether certain arms should be supplied to Israel. Mr. Rountree commented on the almost impossible task of keeping the Arabs from taking strong exception to any arms shipments to Israel and underlined the inevitable argument that Israel's defense should not be based solely on arms but on other means as well. The French Ambassador said that even if one government could not participate in subsequent shipments, its opinions on the subject would be taken into consideration. The discussion on paragraph (b) ended with a recognition that it was not acceptable to the Committee as a whole and would therefore be omitted.

At the Italian Ambassador's suggestion, it was agreed to request the military sub-committee of NEACC to make an inventory of arms requests not only for Israel but for the Arab states, especially the bordering states. Paragraph (c) was amended accordingly. Mr. Murphy pointed out that it may not be possible for some members of the Committee to submit an inventory of all Israel requests. The U.S., for example, submits to NEACC only those orders which are approved within the US Government. Mr. Coulson indicated that his government did likewise. The French Ambassador had hoped that all arms requests, whether approved or not, would be laid before the Committee for consideration. Mr. Murphy said that this suggestion might be discussed at a later date.

At the Italian Ambassador's suggestion, the initial sentence of the French proposal was amended to relate it directly to Article 8 of the Committee's Terms of Reference. [4]

At the suggestion of the French Ambassador, "friendly" was omitted in paragraph (c).

The French Ambassador, who leaves tomorrow for a week's consultation in Paris, said he looked forward to the next meeting of the Committee shortly after his return.

The amended instruction to the military sub-committee reads as follows:

"In accordance with Article 8 of the Committee's Terms of Reference, the military experts of NEACC are asked to present to the Committee of Ambassadors as soon as possible:

(a) An evaluation of the relative military strengths of Israel and of the Arab states, especially the bordering states, taking into account all the information received on deliveries originating in countries other than those represented on the Committee. Land forces data should be presented by June 15, 1956. [5] Naval and air force data should be presented as soon as possible thereafter. [6]

(b) An inventory of available information regarding requests for armament made by those states mentioned in paragraph (a) to the four powers, members of the Committee, and whenever possible, on the basis of available information, to other countries."

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[4] Article 8 of the Terms of Reference of the Ambassadorial Committee on Coordination of Arms Shipments to the Near East, approved at the fourth meeting of the Committee on March 6, called for an immediate and careful study "to establish a comparison between the relative military strengths of Israel and the Arab states, and especially the bordering states." (Memorandum of conversation by Hoffacker, March 6; Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/3–656)

[5] At the June 12 meeting of the NEACC, the members agreed to approve NEACC D–9/4 entitled "Ground Weapons Strengths of Israel and the Arab States." (Minutes of the NEACC meeting, June 12; *ibid.*, G/PM/MC Files: Lot 66 D 428, NEACC Minutes M–42 to M–72) NEACC D–9/4 is *ibid.*, NEACC Central Files. NEACC Documents, D–1 to D– .

[6] At the July 3 NEACC meeting, the members agreed that the military experts should meet to prepare reports on the air and naval strengths of the Arab states and Israel. (*Ibid.*, NEACC Minutes M–42 to M–72)

374. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State [1]

Addis Ababa, May 29, 1956—11 a.m.

722. Reference: Deptel 527. [2]

1. Re general concept set forth reference telegram, despite special and urgent needs Egypt for Nile waters, Embassy continues see long-term harm US interests in deviating from policy of unified development which we have advocated for such other international rivers as Jordan. In view long history international discussions, plans, treaties, etc., among riparians re Nile waters original agreement to assist in developing Egypt's use of these waters without consulting other riparian countries is deeply resented by Emperor. Believe Ethiopia will not now or in future admit that Aswan Dam project restricts its future use Nile waters. Embassy has always assumed that in due course Ethiopia and other riparians would be consulted and their agreement reached prior to beginning Aswan Dam construction. This implied in statement Deptel 402 [3] that Department was certain neither IBRD nor any of the governments interested in Aswan Dam would undertake project which might adversely affect Ethiopia, and particularly would not do so without full consultation and agreement Ethiopian Government. Embassy believes that departure from this position will continue unfavorably affect our interests in Ethiopia and possibly elsewhere in area. Therefore Embassy believes our objective should be to move away as possible from preliminary approach set forth paragraph 2, Cairo's telegram 2346 [4] repeated London 356, toward unified development proposal mentioned Deptel 527, and in any case to see that all riparian states consulted before decisive action taken.

2. Ethiopia's situation naturally impels it favor unified river development approach. 1902 treaty with UK [5] restrains it from constructing any works across Blue Nile, Tana or Sobat which would arrest flow of waters into Nile except pursuant to agreement with UK and Sudan. Official and inspired press articles and editorials support unified development approach.

3. If success of plan set forth reference telegram depends on its not being attributed to US, as appears be case, believe virtually no chance of success. We would have to talk with certain degree

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–2956. Received at 7:25 a.m. Also sent to Khartoum and repeated to Cairo and London.

[2] Printed as telegram 226, Document 362.

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/2–1156)

[4] Document 370.

[5] For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1901–1902*, vol. 95, pp. 467–471.

frankness to Sudanese and Ethiopians; while not much tendency leak here, situation may be different Khartoum and in any case if Khartoum and Addis Ababa made proposed statements followed by our "acceptance" no one in area would question that we had engineered entire operation.

4. IEG would most likely be willing make suggested statement for unified river development if it thought this would help thwart Egyptian High Dam project. If saw no danger implementation of project either by US or USSR, would probably not make statement. Believe we would need commit ourselves definitely to unified development approach. Should note that although relations amicable Ethiopians consider Sudanese to some extent tactical opponents in question Nile waters so some sparring between them might take place.

5. On balance, while Embassy supports general concept of Departments plan, believe sudden shift to tactics envisaged would, particularly if we tried conceal our hand, have adverse effect our interests Egypt and elsewhere in area. Embassy would recommend that, to extent our record in discussions thus far permits, we should at chosen occasions say openly we have always considered consultations and agreement other important riparians essential to Aswan or any other project Nile development. If we thus proceeded more openly but slowly than suggested reference telegram might stand chance achieving objective desired without its adverse effects. [6]

Regret unavoidable delay this message.

Taylor

[6] The Department informed the Embassy in Addis Ababa on June 2 that it was "continuing study feasibility riparian conference re unified development Nile Valley (Embtel 722). In interim, believe Ethiopia would be well advised in own self interest if it has not done so, notify governments Egypt and Sudan formally of its interest in any arrangements allocating Nile waters." (Telegram 549 to Addis Ababa; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–2956)

375. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Minister-Counselor of the Israeli Embassy (Argaman) and the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell), Department of State, Washington, May 29, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Jordan Waters and Arms for Israel

Mr. Argaman, Minister Counselor of the Israel Embassy, asked to see me and we met at lunch. After some general discussion about present Soviet intentions in the Middle East, Mr. Argaman raised two specific points.

First, he asked whether the Department had formulated its views in connection with the possibility of giving a statement to the Israel Government, in return for an agreement by the IG not to start work at Banat Yaacov, that the United States would support Israel's right to divert Jordan water at a later date. I told Mr. Argaman that the matter had been under careful study; that there had been serious question about the reaction that might be expected if it appeared that the United States had bargained a $75,000,000 loan for Israel's agreement to delay work at Banat Yaacov; and that in general we had felt that a decision on the question should be delayed pending clarification with respect to the nature of Security Council action on Hammarskjold's trip to the Middle East [2] and with respect to possible next steps by Hammarskjold. I gathered from Argaman's remarks that the IG was not presently thinking in terms of a tie-in between the Export-Import Bank loan and the Banat Yaacov question, but was interested in an agreement between the two Governments whereby Israel would agree to defer action at Banat Yaacov and the United States would agree to support Israel's right to divert water from the Jordan at a later date.

Secondly, Argaman said that the IG was extremely anxious about its arms acquisitions. He asked whether I had any information that would bear on that. I told him that the latest word from Canada was that no action had been taken by the Canadian Cabinet but that it might act on the matter next week.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Memos, etc. fr April 24, 1956 to June 30, 1956. Confidential. Drafted on June 1 by Russell.

[2] See *infra*.

376. Editorial Note

Between May 29 and June 4, the United Nations Security Council discussed the report that Secretary-General Hammarskjöld had submitted to the Security Council on May 9 (U.N. doc. S/3596) and considered a draft resolution initially submitted by the United Kingdom on May 25 (U.N. doc. S/3600) and then revised on May 29 (U.N. doc. S/3600/Rev. 1).

The revised draft resolution, noting the need to create conditions to promote a peaceful settlement, on a mutually acceptable basis, of the dispute dividing the parties who had signed the General Armistice Agreements: (1) commended the Secretary-General and the parties for the progress already achieved; (2) declared that the parties should speedily carry out the measures already agreed upon with the Secretary-General and should put into effect the further proposals of the Secretary-General and of the Chief of Staff; (3) declared that the full freedom of movement of United Nations observers must be respected in all areas along the Demarcation Lines, in the Demilitarized Zones, and in the Defensive Areas; (4) endorsed the Secretary-General's view that the re-establishment of full compliance with the Armistice Agreements represented a stage which had to be passed in order to make progress possible on the main issues between the parties; (5) requested the Chief of Staff to continue his observations of the cease-fire pursuant to the Security Council's resolution of August 11, 1949; (6) called upon the parties to the Armistice Agreement to take steps necessary to carry out this resolution; and (7) requested the Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties and to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

After extensive debate, the United Kingdom Representative revised his draft resolution on June 1 to accommodate Arab concerns. (U.N. doc. S/3600/Rev. 2) The revision deleted, in operative paragraph 3, the words "in all areas", and inserted, in operative paragraph 7, the words "with a view to full implementation of the Council's resolution of 4 April and full compliance with the Armistice Agreement." On June 4, the United Kingdom Representative accepted an Iranian amendment to delete the phrase "on a mutually acceptable basis" in the preamble noting the need for promotion of peaceful settlement. Again the revision was to meet Arab criticism. On June 4, the United Kingdom draft resolution, as revised and amended, was unanimously adopted (U.N. doc. S/3605).

377. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 30, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Israel's Arms Position; Request for U.S. Financial Assistance

PARTICIPANTS

Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Yohanan Meroz, First Secretary, Israel Embassy
Col. Katriel Salmon, Military Attaché, Israel Embassy
G—Robert Murphy
NE—Slator C. Blackiston

Ambassador Eban opened the conversation by stating that he desired to review Israel's efforts to procure arms but prefaced his remarks on this subject with comments on Arab armed strength.

At the present time, according to the Ambassador, Egypt has received 89% of the arms promised by the Soviets. Twenty more IL–28s have recently arrived, making a total of 60 of this type of aircraft in Egyptian possession and Nasser has already received 200 MIG–15s. Mr. Eban confirmed that Egypt had not received any MIG–17s. Arab strength in other countries is constantly increasing, and he pointed to the receipt of 20 MIG–15s by Syria. Equally important was the growth of the armored strength of the Arab nations. The movement toward a central command of the Arab armies boded ill for Israel. The Ambassador felt that Jordan was even more caught up in the Egyptian web since the fall of the Rifa'i Government [2] and Israel expected increased Armistice violations on the Jordan border. During the past week Jordan was condemned three times by the MAC, and Israel intelligence reported the likelihood of an early renewal of fedayeen activity based in Jordan. Against this unfavorable background Mr. Eban claimed that the Secretary General felt no real prospect for maintaining the momentum towards easing of tensions which his visit to the Near East had generated, and the Ambassador stated that there was likewise no progress toward peace on the diplomatic front.

Turning to the subject of Israel's attempts to obtain arms from various sources, Mr. Eban opined that the French hope Canada will fill Israel's order for F–86s since this would remove some of the pressures generated by the Mystere deal. The Canadians have given no real reason for not filling the Israel order. Public opinion in Canada was not unfavorable to the transaction and Canadair, the

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/5–3056. Secret. Drafted by Blackiston.

[2] Said al-Mufti replaced Samir al-Rifai as Prime Minister of Jordan on May 21.

manufacturer, is anxious to supply and can give immediate delivery. Despite the previous, Mr. Eban stated that the F–86 matter was not moving and his government did not know quite what to do about it. At present Israel has enough planes to annoy Nasser but not enough to deter him.

Mr. Murphy replied that our views had been made known to Mr. Pearson and there was no question of a possible misunderstanding of the U.S. position. The matter was before the Canadian cabinet and we understand that no final decision has been made. Mr. Murphy pointed out the need for the U.S. to act circumspectly in dealing with our Canadian friends so that we did not give the impression that we were interfering in Canadian affairs. Mr. Murphy asked whether the Israel Ambassador in London had sought a UK approach to the Canadians. Mr. Eban replied that the UK was known to be sympathetic but that he would bear in mind Mr. Murphy's suggestion. Mr. Eban stated that even if Canada agreed now to fill the Israel order, because of the delay in shipment, the target date of this summer for receipt of F–86s could no longer be met.

In seeking alternative suppliers Israel has turned to Italy for purchase of F–86Ks. The Italian position, according to Mr. Eban, is that the decision on the sale is up to the U.S. He therefore sought our assistance in facilitating this transaction.

Mr. Murphy said that the apparent Egyptian reaction to U.S. participation in the Mystere sale was Egypt's recognition of Red China. There followed some discussion of whether or not such recognition would not have taken place in any event and Mr. Murphy agreed that it was a moot point.

Replying to Mr. Murphy's question, Col. Salmon explained that Israel wanted twelve F–86Ks since this model was an all weather interceptor and could be used both as a day and night fighter. This versatility appealed to Israel. Securing 12 F–86Ks from Italy was predicated on obtaining 24 F–86s from Canada. If the Canadian deal did not materialize Israel would want 36 Italian F–86s. Fiat, the Italian firm involved, is anxious for the contract, said Col. Salmon, and would bend every effort to fill the order as quickly as possible although they could not give immediate delivery.

The French have stated, continued the Ambassador, that in the absence of U.S. participation in the supply of arms to Israel they can help no further. Israel does not intend to approach the French again unless the Canadian and Italian transactions fall through.

Turning to the subject of ground forces, Mr. Eban claimed that the growing Arab armored strength was as frightening as their air superiority over Israel, and he wished to raise the question of obtaining tanks and half tracks through our good offices. Super

Sherman tanks were available in European countries but their transfer required our concurrence in view of the conditions attached to their original sale by the U.S. Mr. Murphy requested Mr. Blackiston to determine what strictures existed governing the sale of the Shermans mentioned by Mr. Eban.

Col. Salmon stated that Israel desired to buy 100 Shermans but pointed out that many would be used for cannibalization. Asked by Mr. Murphy the size of Israel's standing army, Col. Salmon replied that it was a difficult question to answer due to the Israel practice of calling up reserves each year for duty. In full mobilization he said 200–250 thousand men and women could be put under arms. Ambassador Eban interjected that such extreme mobilization would wreck Israel's economy.

Ambassador Eban also expressed the need for half tracks which, though no longer manufactured, provide the mobility which Israel needs for her armed forces. In all, 250 half tracks are desired.

The Ambassador then stated that Israel intended to submit a new arms list which would bring her needs up to date. Certain items no longer desired and included on the earlier requests would be eliminated. These were: 10,000 semi-automatic rifles; 80 75 mm recoilless rifles; 40 F–51Ds. However, the new list would include the following items which were especially needed: 5 H–19 (S–55) Sikorski helicopters; 18 C–82 cargo aircraft with engines and accessories; 50 half tracks. Colonel Salmon averred that since we had supplied Israel with the above equipment in the past there should be no difficulty in the sale of additional quantities of the same items.

Ambassador Eban declared that the financial burden placed on Israel by purchase from European countries which extended no credit of such expensive items as the Mysteres had become staggering although new sources of revenue had been developed as the result of Israel's critical situation. The Ambassador asked whether U.S. economic aid to Israel could not be increased but said that he did not mean to imply that the U.S. should stand the burden of Israel's arms program. The Ambassador said he understood that of some $73 millions appropriated for Near East economic aid this fiscal year $36 million was unused and if unspent by June 30 would be returned to the Treasury. This unspent balance had been earmarked for the Aswan Dam. Israel sought the use of part of these funds. Another possible means of assisting Israel was described by Col. Salmon who stated that France, owing to last year's drought, planned to buy wheat from the U.S. under P.L. 480. Israel would like the use of the francs generated by this transaction.

Mr. Eban referred to the fact that no decision had been reached on Israel's request for a $75 million Export-Import Bank loan for internal water development. Mr. Murphy stated that the Secretary

was favorably disposed toward the loan but that final decision would come from the bank. Concerning the JVA plan, Mr. Murphy said that the plan had not been dropped and that we were merely waiting for a propitious time to press it. He confirmed that agreement on the JVA plan was not tied to the Export-Import Bank loan.

Mr. Eban said that he had met the Indian Ambassador to Cairo,[3] who was now in the U.S. on a visit. The Indian Ambassador averred that Nehru was impressed with Ambassador Johnston and the JVA plan and could not understand the Arab attitude of obstruction. There followed a discussion of the advisability of using Nehru's influence to gain acceptance of the project.

On the subject of the Secretary General's report[4] and the SC discussions[5] Mr. Eban said that Israel would commend the SYG for the progress already made and support further action of the SYG to improve the situation. He did not feel, however, that the world should become unduly complacent.

Ambassador Eban offered to discuss the points which he had made with the Secretary on his return from vacation if this was deemed advisable by Mr. Murphy. Mr. Murphy felt that such a discussion should take place.[6]

[3] Ali Yavar Jung Bahadur.
[4] See Document 348.
[5] See the editorial note, *supra*.
[6] Ambassador Eban and Secretary Dulles met on June 8. The memorandum of that conversation is not printed. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

378. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State[1]

Cairo, May 30, 1956—1 p.m.

2365. Information from different sources today added up to interesting picture.

In general discussion with Hussein he was speculating on type of statement Nasser might make which if followed through with concrete action would serve to reassure West. At one point discus-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–3056. Top Secret; Omega Handling; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:45 p.m. Transmitted under cover of a separate memorandum on June 1 to Allen Dulles. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #6)

sion I mentioned Nasser's intentions regarding Israel. Hussein said Nasser extremely sensitive this point as he thought British activity against him so extreme that they would lose no opportunity discredit him in other Arab States. Any moderation on his part on this subject they would see to it was used discredit him for being "soft" on Israel. Told Hussein I could visualize conditions where United Kingdom might not be alone in thinking it in general interest to counteract Nasser outside Egypt, but could not conceive of British using this one as they shared our keen desire to see conditions created to make settlement possible.

. . . Was informed that Nasser had found out we had told British about Anderson mission and that Selwyn Lloyd had in turn told Said Nuri. He, Nasser, had found out of this breach of confidence through sources in Iraq.

This fairly serious for 2 reasons: It shows Nasser's impression as to how far British will now go to "get him". More important as far as we concerned is serious breach of confidence on a matter in which he had placed himself with considerable risk in our hands and in the hands of Ben Gurion. [2]

Byroade

[2] At the end of this telegram, Wilkins wrote on the source text: "I do not have impression Nasser has ever been in Bob's [Anderson] hands."

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379. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, May 30, 1956—9 p.m.

2370. Trevelyan not enthused about approach in Deptel 2815 [2] but had no objection. Called upon Kaissuny this morning comply with these instructions.

Kaissuny confused by approach but believe was able end conversation at point where it best served purpose Department. His first remark was that Egypt could proceed with first phase as far as language of agreement with Bank and tentative language United

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–3056. Secret. Received at 11:24 p.m. Repeated to London and Khartoum.

[2] Document 365.

States and United Kingdom aides-mémoire [3] was concerned before agreement with Sudan. Told him I would have to review language but we were proceeding on assumption it was stated intention of Egypt to secure agreement with Sudan first. He said this correct, and they certainly were endeavoring to follow such a course.

In order insure there be no misunderstanding, I read to Kaissuny language second, third and fourth paragraphs above reference telegram, putting stress on fourth paragraph stating wished inform Washington as accurately as possible of status of Sudan talks. Was able to keep discussion fairly well concentrated on this except Kaissuny remarked once that he could see only one of two reasons for this approach. Either we wished to find out whether there possibility 56 funds might still be needed or whether we wondering what to include in 57 appropriations. Told him I thought neither the case.

As regards talks with Sudan, he said there had been most serious exchange of views and Sudan was much more reasonable now on waters agreement. The currency talks were underway and they were having great difficulty on the subject of compensation regarding Wadia Halfa. He made same statement as Trevelyan that he believed waters agreement itself would not cause much trouble. Could not, however, get him to estimate probable date when talks might be successfully concluded.

In general manner, he said construction of High Dam was still cornerstone of Egypt's development policy. This reported as there have been rumors that Egypt might be losing interest in High Dam for various reasons.

Discussion accomplished very little except to let us say we have talked recently on subject High Dam with GOE. [4]

Byroade

[3] See telegram 1282, vol. XIV, p. 868.

[4] Telegram 2394 from Cairo, June 2, reported further on this conversation: "Entire tone of conversation was Kaissuny's concern that we could not go ahead and finish negotiations. He asked at one point if I could not get instructions to allow negotiations be resumed on specific language of aide-mémoire." (Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–256)

380. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, May 30, 1956—5 p.m.

1226. On Monday May 28 I called on the Foreign Minister in Jerusalem to pay courtesy visit following my return from the United States. The principal purpose of the visit was to review in general terms my visit to Washington, to inform him of the persons on whom I called and the general character of discussions, some impressions I had gained, and especially to point out that our basic policy with regard to the Middle East area and the sale of arms to Israel had not changed. I also stressed the fact that Israel's problems and position within the area were matters which were fully understood and appreciated, and were matters of very great interest at all official levels. To reinforce that statement I pointed to the very positive and what we believe effective conversations the Secretary had in Paris with the French and Canadians [2] and the need for realization of the fundamentals of our problems not only with relation to Israel and the Arab States but to world in general.

Sharett expressed gratification and appreciation of these comments. He realized, he said, that United States problems were world-wide and the United States carried terrific responsibilities; that our problems were not single ones involving one or two nations only; therefore, it required longer for us to work out matters than Canada, for example. He said he set great value and hope on the influence of the United States on France, Italy and Canada and at the same time was anxious for results without loss of time. He recalled that 8 months had passed since his conversations with the Secretary in Washington [3] but volunteered the information that 18 French Mysteres were virtually in Israel's hands and 6 more were expected to arrive soon. For this he gave large amount of credit to the Secretary for speeding up these deliveries. This total of 24 jets, however, stood out against Egypt's total of 250 Russians MIG's and bombers; certainly they were "better than nothing" but Israel's air defense still remained far from the indispensable minimum of 72 jets. He said the fact that Syria was now receiving Czech arms including planes, further increased Israel's air imbalance. "Where are we to get the additional 48 planes?" He said we must consider that the United States is out as a source of supply for the moment and that

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.84A/5–3056. Secret. Received at 9:43 a.m., May 31. Repeated to London, Paris, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, and Amman.

[2] See Documents 322, 325, and 336.

[3] See vol. XIV, pp. 793 and 826.

inasmuch as Italy was dependent on the United States for F–86's for processing, (and he was not pressing us in this connection) France and Canada remained the only two sources for jet fighters. Israel had made no further approach to the French since the return of Pineau from Moscow [4] but France's earlier statement that she would make no further deliveries until there was a change in United States policy remained for the time being their only guide as to France's attitude. (In response to my question Sharett admitted planes from Canada would help to change Paris attitude.) He mentioned that France was being hard-pressed in Algeria but that the French Minister Defense [5] had just come out with a strong statement against Nasser. [6] However, Sharett was not sure "what hands France was playing with Nasser" at this time.

Regarding the Canadians he referred to Eban's visit to Department May 23 [7] to report no action from Canada and requesting some assistance in that connection. He referred to character of opposition in Canada to the proposed supply of planes. He said Israel would apply every peaceful persuasion, with United States direct help—combined Ottawa and Washington action—and "we will see where we stand in fortnight". He thought that with effective help 24 planes could be obtained from Canada, in which event he was reasonably hopeful that further 24 could be obtained from France. "But if there are no planes from Canada and no change in United States attitude, Israel will face a blank wall in France. This will be terribly disappointing, especially after the encouraging speeches at the NATO meeting."

In connection with arms supply and Israel's need for defensive weapons, Sharett underscored the very high defense budget which it must meet in some way. Even if there is favorable reaction from Canada and France, Israel will have to make unusually great efforts and sacrifices in order to meet the bill. In this same context, he referred to Israel's hope that the ICA program this fiscal year might be upped by $5 million. He thought this was entirely within the discretion of the United States which had in the past followed a

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[4] French Foreign Minister Pineau had accompanied Prime Minister Mollet on Mollet's State visit to the Soviet Union on May 15–20.

[5] Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury.

[6] On May 27, the *New York Times* quoted Bourgès-Maunoury as saying that "The ambitions of the Egyptian dictator are without limit. According to his own writings, he plans to bring under his grasp not only the Middle East and North Africa but a very large part of Africa south of the Sahara as well."

[7] No record has been found in Department of State files to indicate that Eban visited the Department of State on May 23 to discuss Israel's prospects for purchasing F–86 fighter aircraft in Canada. Eban, however, did meet with Rountree on May 22 to consider this matter. (Memorandum of conversation by Bergus; Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/5–2256)

policy of helping friendly governments with free arms (although these funds would not be applied directly to military budget). He thought if the United States concludes Israel should be able to defend itself and aid in the preservation of peace in the Middle East yet could not give arms to Israel, it seemed reasonable that this additional financial aid could be supplied. He was confident this could be done in such manner as not to involve any embarrassment for the United States or Israel and "could be done within the economic framework". Obviously he did not consider this as substitute for any other possible aid which might help Israel buy arms or as a complete substitute for the inability of Israel to purchase arms in the United States. (I agreed to transmit his comment on this matter to the Department. He informed me that Abba Eban had taken up subject with Under Secretary Hoover.[8] Hale, Director USOM, has transmitted informally to ICA/Washington and informal request received from Teddy Kollek, Prime Minister's office, for an additional $5 million but has received no formal application as yet. I would appreciate Department's preliminary thinking on this request which possesses primarily political justification factor.[9]

I questioned him about his attitude toward the time element in matter of procurement of arms by Israel. He said there was no doubt that Nasser at sometime would attack Israel if the arms imbalance continued but made it clear that he was not predicting any date when Nasser might attack. "That would border on prophecy." However he went on to point to the usually cited factors which in his mind were convincing that Nasser would attack unless Israel procured more arms especially jets, which would make Nasser think twice before attacking.

I asked Sharett why in his opinion Nasser should have recognized Red China, and particularly at moment. He is convinced that neither the principle involved nor the timing had anything to do with Israelis receiving arms or planes from any source at this time. He said it was completely within Nasser's established pattern of action and merely underscored his constant assertions of his capacity to defy the West. At this point he said the Egyptian correspondent

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[8] Eban saw Hoover on May 8 and raised the issue of increasing U.S. economic aid to Israel. (Memorandum of conversation by Rountree; *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

[9] The Department responded on June 4:

"Dept informed by Eban May 30 Israel finding financial burden arms purchases European countries increasingly oppressive. Eban stated Israel hoped for additional economic assistance from US and inquired of following possibilities:

"1. Increase in FY 56 aid from unobligated NEA funds.

"2. Increase in FY 57 aid.

"3. Making available to Israel francs generated by wheat sales to France under PL 480." (Telegram 882 to Tel Aviv; *ibid.*, Central Files, 611.84A/5–3056)

Izzat in an attempt to defend Nasser's arms deal with the Soviets, stated with great positiveness that the deal was made by Nasser to show the West he is capable of defying it. Sharett was convinced that Nasser's recognition of Red China had some of its roots in the Bandung Conference where he was feted and praised so much. This developed in Nasser's mind a concept of three great leaders in north Afro-Asiatic bloc; namely Nehru, Chou-en-Lai, and Nasser. Furthermore, Nasser had developed very closed personalities with Nehru. Also by recognizing Red China he was able to link with him two important allies. The suggestion was also made by Shiloah Counselor-Minister of the Israel Embassy Washington, that the Soviets were pressing Nasser to recognize Red China in ample time before upcoming UN assembly meeting; that large Egyptian cotton sales to China were in view.

Sharett, speaking with some animation, then referred to what he terms "the dangerous situation in Jordan". He reviewed the deteriorating features of the situation which Israel was regarding with some concern, such as the replacement of the Prime Minister by a pro-Egyptian official[10] and the elevation of a definitely pro-Nasser military officer to Commander of the Legion[11] and the growing number of undisciplined elements in Jordan. Sharett's particular fear seemed to be likelihood of Jordan-based Fedayeen operations and increased and widespread border incursions by undisciplined as well as organized groups from Jordan. He suggested that the United States asked the Jordan Government to see "That nothing happens to open the question on self-defense for Israel". In this connection, I asked Sharett if he felt Nasser could "turn on and off" Fedayeen operations based in Jordan as he had done in this connection with those in the past based in Egypt. He answered question by saying "I am confident Fedayeen operations from Jordan would not occur if Nasser objects".

Comment: It seemed obvious to me that Sharett was more relaxed and less concerned about his responsibilities and, with the exception of Jordan's situation, attacked the several subjects with less fire and determination. It was noteworthy that he is apparently convinced that we have not yet altered our basic policy re arms for Israel; that he is appreciative of the Secretary's positive steps taken at Paris recently; and that he finally admits the great breadth and time-consuming character of our many world policy problems.

Lawson

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[10] See footnote 2, Document 377.

[11] On May 24, Lieutenant Colonel Ali Abu Nuwar was named the new commander of the Arab Legion.

381. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) [1]

Washington, May 31, 1956.

I talked with Mr. Robert Anderson today regarding the possibility of another trip to Cairo.

He told me it would be virtually impossible for him to leave before the annual meeting of his companies which takes place on June 12.

He said that he could probably arrange to make a trip to Johannesburg approximately June 15 on business, and could take care of the situation in Cairo on his way there.

I promised to keep in touch with him regarding these developments.

HHJr.

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #6. Top Secret; Omega.

382. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, May 31, 1956.

MR. SECRETARY: I attach a draft announcement which might be issued in the event "Operation Stockpile" leaks or in the event we wish to issue an announcement as a deterrent to the outbreak of hostilities. This draft has been cleared by Mr. McCardle and Mr. Rountree, and is concurred in by Admiral Radford and Mr. Gordon Gray. (However, Admiral Radford feels that in the event of a leak we may be pressed very hard by the news people and might have to give out something more in detail. I do not agree with this and I believe it is your thought that we should purposely keep the

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #6. Top Secret; Omega. The source text bears notations that Secretary Dulles, Hoover, and Rountree saw this memorandum.

anouncement vague with a certain aura of mystery as to exactly what we have stockpiled.) [2]

When the draft announcement has your approval, I think we should:

1. Talk to Mr. Hagerty about it at the White House so that we can get an agreed draft which we would have up our sleeve in the event of having to make a statement. I think we would all recognize that before issuing such a statement we would look it over again to see whether any modification were necessary. But in the meantime, it would be extremely useful to have an agreed draft (such as the attached) up our sleeve. [3]

2. Consider who would issue this statement. Again, we would not make a final decision now but would you envisage it being issued by

a. The White House?
b. The State Department?
c. The Defense Department? [4]

When I have received your comments I will, if you concur, discuss this with Mr. Hagerty.

D MacA

[Attachment]

DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT [5]

On April 9 a statement was issued by the White House regarding the serious situation in the Middle East. [6] The statement declared that the United States is determined to support and assist any Nation in that area which might be subjected to aggression and expressed confidence that other nations will act similarly in the cause of peace.

Pursuant to this statement, the United States Government has made arrangements to have in close proximity to the Middle East Area certain stockpiles of military supplies and equipment which it would make available to any nation which might be subjected to aggression in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

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[2] Secretary Dulles wrote "agree" in the lefthand margin next to this paragraph.
[3] Secretary Dulles wrote "OK" in the lefthand margin next to the final sentence in this paragraph.
[4] An unidentified individual drew lines through options a and c.
[5] Top Secret; Omega. Drafted on May 25.
[6] See footnote 2, Document 258.

383. Telegram From the Embassy in the Sudan to the Department of State [1]

Khartoum, June 1, 1956—6 p.m.

337. Reference: Deptel May 29 [*23*]. [2] Following is elaboration last parts 328. [3]

Immediate primary Sudanese interest is centered on obtaining adequate allocation Nile water for greater Fizera (Managil and Kanana schemes including Roseires Dam) expanding pumping schemes and Atbara River development (estimated additional need around 16 billion cubic meters) but Sudanese counterproposal storage Aswan as presently conceived with its high evaporation losses call for considerations storage possibilities equatorial lakes (Victoria, Kioga and Albert) and Tana. Such development would require international agreement all countries involved. It is possible therefore Sudan might support international control if issue raised, particularly if it raised by Ethiopia with which Sudan on excellent terms. Consider Azharis political situation too insecure and other parties too divided to risk arousing open hostility Egypt by proposing questions themselves, they might not even dare support it at this time. Possible claims other riparian states are two-edged sword. On one hand, they might tend support demands against Egypt and on other excessive claims could squeeze both Sudan and Egypt.

Unless international Nile Valley control essential prevent USSR penetration Egypt and Sudan and Department believes it would be effective, it inadvisable for US take any initiative to raise our support such issue now. Most Sudanese officials firmly convinced agreement with Egypt on water division remote in spite optimistic statement result this visit Cairo by Minister of Agriculture [4] and inauguration complicated international control attempt keep USSR out of area does not seem necessary.

Pinkerton

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–156. Top Secret. Received at 9:03 a.m., June 2.

[2] Reference is presumably to telegram 226, Document 362.

[3] Document 372.

[4] Mirghani Hamza.

384. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, June 2, 1956—1 p.m.

5584. Pursuant Deptel 7221 [2] Barbour explored with Kirkpatrick yesterday general concept proposal riparian Nile conference outlined Deptel 7084. [3] While Kirkpatrick was aware in general way of possibility internationalization Nile waters agreement, specific concept Dept's proposal had not been previously raised with him. His initial reaction which he emphasized he expressed on purely personal basis was to see merit in idea. However he was particularly concerned with difficulties of working out procedure whereby idea could be broached without US or UK initiative becoming known. Direct US or UK approach to Sudan would he thought immediately be passed on to Nasser. Conceivably this difficulty could be overcome if suitable third party could be persuaded to undertake initiative and in that connection he had in mind some possible European power.

With general reference US–UK position on Aswan Dam, Kirkpatrick mentioned conversation between Secretary and Lloyd at Paris (Paris tel Secto 11 [4]) which he said British have summarized as two Secretaries having concluded that Aswan project should "languish". He thought "languish" is subject to two interpretations and it has not been clear that Secretary and Lloyd were in agreement whether by languishing they meant (1) languish to point of death, or (2) languish but be kept alive for further consideration. With regard to basic US–UK objective in fostering Dam project to forestall Soviet penetration in Egypt and Nile valley, Kirkpatrick's own thinking, as Department will be aware, is that Soviet relations with Nasser are already so close as to have virtually accomplished Soviet penetration we seek to avoid, and he is consequently extremely dubious about continuing with project. He also mentioned that like ourselves he would anticipate that UK Government would have difficulty with Parliament in pressing project further at this time. Consequently Kirkpatrick's interest in Department's concept of international conference is as device frustrate Soviet undertaking project rather than delaying tactic with view to possible reactivation US–UK participation later date.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–256. Top Secret. Received at 12:16 p.m.

[2] Printed as telegram 2815, Document 365.

[3] Printed as telegram 226, Document 362.

[4] Document 327.

Kirkpatrick will have Department's suggestion considered fully as matter of urgency and will give us UK's further more formal reaction soonest. Meanwhile in conversation with Embassy officer working level said draft instructions to Washington were being prepared proposing high level approach to Department to determine whether US and UK should (1) proceed with High Dam project, (2) withdraw their support from project or (3) consider other alternatives among which might be included, when circumstances warrant, conference of riparian powers along lines suggested by Department.

Aldrich

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385. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, June 2, 1956—4 p.m.

2396. Re Department telegram 2780. [2] Latest estimates deliveries Soviet bloc equipment by Military Attaches as follows. Attaches stress inability determine accurately types or quantities all items.

Army: 250 T–34 medium and 34 JS–3 heavy tanks; over 100 BTR 152 armored personnel carriers; 51 SU 100 self-propelled artillery; in excess 4 truck mounted rocket launchers. Concerning AA guns, anti-tank mines, bazookas, Bangalore torpedoes, light arms and ammunition, other military vehicles, artillery type rockets, field artillery, no information available. [3]

Navy: 4 190 foot T–43 class minesweepers; 12 class 627 torpedo boats. Existence 3 to 6 landing craft probable plus unknown quantity naval mines and 21-inch torpedoes.

Air: 11 IL 14 transports; 35 IL 28 jet bombers actually observed; 21 MIG 15 jet fighters observed in reconnaissance all major air bases, but estimate 30 operational. Latest . . . report indicates total 65 or 70 MIGs in Egypt. These figures include U–MIGs and U–IL 28s. No indications any YAK–11s here. No information available re airborne

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/6–256. Secret. Received at 5:46 p.m.

[2] See footnote 11, Document 353.

[3] On June 4, the Embassy in Cairo asked the Department to delete "artillery type rockets" from the last sentence of this paragraph. (Telegram 2407 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/6–456)

radar equipment, however, believe limited number early warning installations received.

Although Embassy aware reports new arms deals (Embassy telegram 2361 [4]) Embassy has no information about "additional sizable deliveries in process and contemplated".

Byroade

[4] Telegram 2361 from Cairo, May 29, reported that the Iraqi Ambassador had informed Byroade that Egypt and Czechoslovakia had recently concluded another arms deal. (*Ibid.*, 674.87/5–2956)

386. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, June 5, 1956.

SUBJECT

Next Steps Toward Settlement of Arab-Israel Dispute

Discussion:

Nasser's present attitude toward the West and his recent posture toward Israel make it unlikely that the U.S. can serve effectively in the near future as an intermediary in bringing about a settlement between Israel and Egypt. While our first concern now must be the bolstering of the West's position in the Arab world, we should continue to give thought to the most likely ways of making progress on the Arab-Israel dispute. The impossibility of direct U.S. efforts at intermediation does not mean that the principles enunciated in the Secretary's August, 1955, speech are invalid but merely that new approaches may have to be sought. The purpose of the present paper is to explore fresh ways of working toward those objectives. If the proposals in the following paragraphs appear to be feasible on general considerations, comments should be sought from the field and from the offices and agencies that would be directly involved. Any concrete action pursuant to the proposals should be checked

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/6–556. Top Secret. Also addressed to Hoover. The source text bears a notation that Dulles saw this memorandum. Another copy of the memorandum is *ibid.*, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #6.

before it is taken with respect to any possible adverse effect it might have on other objectives we are pursuing in the Middle East.

Proposals:

1. Hammarskjold has indicated in private talks that he believes, if relative calm can be maintained in the area for a period of several months, progress could be made on specific issues such as the Jordan waters and the use of the Suez by Israel. We might indicate to him our desire to support him effectively in any approaches he may find it possible to make and discuss with him ways in which such support could be most effective.

2. In the April 17 statement from Moscow,[2] in the London communiqué,[3] and in the May 31 statement of the Soviet representative on the Security Council,[4] the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to support continuing "efforts until a lasting and peaceful settlement of the whole Palestine problem has been achieved." The Soviet position on Syria's request for amendment of the resolution which the U.K. introduced in Security Council,[5] to be sure, showed that Soviet support of steps toward a settlement will not be allowed to go so far as to incur any great loss of Arab good will. Ambassador Lodge, in his May 25 telegram,[6] said that we would in all probability be faced with future proposals for four power sponsorship and that we should be giving consideration to our policy position on the question. While there is doubt about the wisdom of four power sponsorship, we might let the British carry the ball in probing the Soviet position. It would be a normal follow-up to the Soviet-UK discussions in London. Furthermore, the British, as members of the Baghdad Pact, would be in a logical position to give intimations of willingness by the Baghdad Pact powers to give assurances with respect to additional bases in Arab territory and possibly certain other assurances in return for concrete progress on a Palestine settlement and Soviet assurances on such things as arms shipments. In short, the British would probe Soviet willingness to support specific steps by Hammarskjold at such time as Hammarskjold was willing to embark upon a step by step approach to the Palestine issues. This would avoid the "four power" approach which

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[2] See Document 291.

[3] Reference is to a British-Soviet communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Bulganin–Khrushchev visit to the United Kingdom, April 26. The text was transmitted to the Department in telegram 4888 from London, April 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6141/4–2656)

[4] For text of Arkadi Aleksandrovich Sobolev's statement to the Security Council on May 31, see U.N. doc. S/PV.725, pp. 32–34.

[5] See Document 376.

[6] Reference is to telegram 1030 from USUN, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–2556)

the Soviets appear to be seeking. Needless to say, we should make no commitments with respect to the Baghdad Pact except in return for concrete and completed measures that would constitute an adequate quid pro quo. There are obvious risks in such an approach but these risks must be balanced against the alternative risks arising from the fact that Nasser is still making progress, that the Soviets are in a fair way to share in it and that the extent of our capacity to stem this development is still problematical.

3. It cannot be assumed that the efforts suggested in the preceding paragraphs will provide a solution of any of the Palestine issues. Other measures should, therefore, be simultaneously considered. One such would be a new and indirect effort to secure Arab support for the development of the Jordan waters. There appears to be slight prospect of getting Arab agreement now to the Johnston Plan in its present form and with its predominant U.S. sponsorship. The attached memorandum (Tab A) suggests that we support Lebanese Foreign Minister Lahoud in his proposals for initial separate construction on the Israel and Arab sides of the Jordan which could later be coordinated.

4. As an integral part of this approach, steps should be taken at the next General Assembly to shift the administration of funds for refugee support from UNRWA to the governments in the Arab countries where the refugees are located (Tab A). Henry Labouisse, Director of UNRWA, recommends this step. If it is decided to move in this direction, it could be suggested to him in a discreet way at an early date that he prepare detailed proposals which could be introduced in the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the next General Assembly. This would be resisted by the Arab Governments but, if they were confronted with a possible cessation of refugee aid otherwise, it might be effected. Such a step would tend to bring about the gradual integration of the refugees into the Arab countries. We should endeavor to have the initiative taken at the General Assembly by some other government than the U.S. We should, however, be prepared to indicate U.S. willingness to contribute to development schemes in the Arab countries that would facilitate such integration.

5. Partly for the reason mentioned in the preceding sentence but also because of the intrinsic psychological and political advantages that would accrue, we should move as rapidly as possible to put ourselves in a position to announce a program for making available in the Middle East new methods for purifying saline water (Tab B)[7] and for additional river development projects. Pilot operations in the purification of saline water are on the point of fruition. The Depart-

[7] Not printed.

ment of Interior has well advanced projects based on solar evaporation. An ionic membrane process, which might be linked to atomic energy, has been brought to an advanced state of development by a number of firms. The Department of Interior's program, however, is in danger of being greatly slowed down by the denial of funds in Congressional appropriations. There is patent litigation between American and Dutch firms with respect to the ionic membrane process. If a member of the White House staff were charged with responsibility, he might be able to have alternative funds, which would not have to be large, made available to the Department of Interior by the President. He might also be able to bring the parties to the dispute over the ionic membrane patents to an agreement permitting the use of the process for the purpose suggested herein. It would then be possible for the Secretary or the President to make an announcement at an appropriate time that we would give financial support to utilization of these processes in the Middle East and possibly also assist further in conventional river development, notably in Syria. Such an announcement would help to counter-balance for other Arab countries the recent concentration on the Aswan Dam.

Recommendation:

That, if it is decided that a new approach to the problem of a Palestine settlement should be sought, staff work, including solicitation of views from the field, be undertaken preparatory to:

1. Instructing Ambassador Lodge to inform Hammarskjold in accordance with paragraph 1 above.
2. Arranging for the Secretary to discuss with Ambassador Makins the possibility of proceeding in accordance with paragraph 2 above.
3. Responding to Foreign Minister Lahoud's proposals in accordance with Tab A.
4. Suggesting to Henry Labouisse that he prepare specific proposals in accordance with paragraph 4 above.
5. Discussions by the Secretary with the White House on steps to carry out the proposals in paragraph 5 above.

[Tab A]

AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE JORDAN VALLEY PLAN[8]

Foreign Minister Lahoud of Lebanon is in secret touch with Ambassador Heath in an effort to find some means of resolving the

[8] Secret. Drafted by Troxel on June 5.

Jordan River impasse. Beirut's telegram 1405 of May 5[9] reports that Lahoud has asked "Ambassador Johnston and his experts" to come up with a plan which he might present to his fellow Arabs. The following is a proposed "Lahoud Plan", to be put forward as his own brainchild, to which we would agree if he secured sufficient Arab support. Each component of the plan is set forth in the terms Lahoud would probably find advantageous, followed by a brief explanatory comment. While the basic plan contains no new elements, some new ideas are brought to bear which should increase the prospects of success.

1. "The Arab states are capable of planning and working out their own destiny, and they are determined to guide their future with their own hands. This applies to decisions respecting the development of their water resources, as well as to the other decisions facing the Arab world."

One of the major obstacles to the acceptance of the Jordan Valley Plan has been its sponsorship by the United States, with the consequent fear that it has some hidden pro-Israel motivation. It is doubtful that United Nations sponsorship would produce any better results; the history of the partition of Palestine and the controversies surrounding the Truce Supervision Organization do not augur well. Sponsorship by the U.K. or another nation would be still less effective. Arab sponsorship, taking advantage of growing nationalist sentiment, is, therefore, the most likely solution.

2. "As a first stage in the Arab development of the Jordan River basin, a diversion dam should be constructed at Adasiya, a canal should be built down the West Chor in Jordan, and Lebanon and Syria should speed up the exploitation of the Hasbani and Banyas Rivers, before they flow into Israel."

The "exploitation of the Hasbani and Banyas Rivers" is window dressing, with little meaning. It is provided for in the Jordan Valley Plan. The division dam at Adasiya is the key to the solution of the Banat Ya'qub question, since both diversion points lie in demilitarized zones. General Burns has made it clear that permission to work on the Adasiya diversion would leave him no alternative but to grant similar permission to the Israelis. For that reason, Syria has in the past refused to cooperate with abortive Jordanian efforts to secure agreement on construction at Adasiya. This cooperation is essential since Syria controls both banks of the Yarmuk at that point, and it is not considered likely that Lahoud's sponsorship

[9] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–556)

would in itself overcome Syria's reluctance to provide Israel with a tool for use at Banat Ya'qub. The following techniques are therefore proposed to overcome Syrian opposition:

(a) An arrangement should be worked out with Israel whereby the Israelis would apparently abandon, at least for the present, the proposed diversion at Banat Ya'qub in favor of a diversion north of Lake Huleh, where there is no demilitarized zone and where Israel controls both banks of the Jordan. A diversion at such a point would be difficult from an engineering point of view and would involve costs which would probably make the diversion uneconomic. Nevertheless, with some effort and with the cooperation of Israel (on both counts, the problems are considerable and would justify a separate memorandum, but they are amendable to solution), a convincing showing can be made that Israel is not dependent upon work in the demilitarized zone to carry its own plans through to fruition. Such a showing, properly timed, would take the spotlight off Banat Ya'qub and would greatly ease Lahoud's task. It would not be necessary to carry the alternative diversion through to completion.

(b) We should make arrangements with Israel and General Burns so that permission for the Israelis to resume work at Banat Ya'qub will not be effective or used until construction is well under way at Adasiya, and the Arabs have tangible evidence of their water development.

(c) Lahoud should be placed in the position of holding out the hope of United States financing for a storage dam on the Yarmuk, suitable for power for Syria, to be built at a later stage. This hope is provided by the remaining elements of the plan, as described below.

3. "The next stage would be the construction of a high dam on the Yarmuk at Maqarin. This dam would store the waters of the Yarmuk on Arab soil, and would provide power for industrial use in Syria and Jordan. When this dam has been built, it will be possible to complete the canal network in the Ghor and irrigate the Jordan Valley clear to the Dead Sea. We would not, however, abandon Arab rights to store water in Lake Tiberias at some later date if it is advantageous to us and is carried out under conditions that are completely suitable to us. But before we will consider any Tiberias storage, we insist that primary storage be constructed first on Arab land."

This part of the plan involves the U.S. in some financial risk. If we get into a position where we must assist in paying for a "high dam on the Yarmuk" (a 300 MCM reservoir is meant here), but with inadequate assurances that the dam will be tied into an overall program which has a very high cost per acre and on which there will be little refugee resettlement. The political benefits might warrant our proceeding, however, if the following steps are taken to minimize the risk:

(a) In the detailed plan, the assertion of "Arab rights to store water in Lake Tiberias" would be so phrased as to imply a commitment to store water there if the advantages are clearly demonstrated on engineering grounds. The Israelis have already agreed, in effect, to hold storage space available for the Arabs for several years.

(b) In considering the extent of our commitment (see below), we would exclude any help in financing the expensive costs of land preparation, construction of laterals, drainage, etc., except in connection with specific refugee projects.

(c) Most important of all, we must make the decision to insist during the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly on instituting a progressive transfer of the responsibility for the administration of refugee relief to the individual countries concerned. This transfer will be strongly resisted by the Arab countries and will be very difficult to accomplish. Nevertheless, it is the only way we can protect ourselves from the prospect of an ultimate refusal by the Arabs to use the water conserved by "Lahoud Plan" facilities in resettlement of refugees. The Jordanians, in particular, argue with some logic that the refugees cannot have a prior claim on the best potential farm land in Jordan, and that the refugees are no more in need than many other impoverished Jordanians. A case can be made that the refugee problem can be solved only by general economic development, through which refugees and non-refugees alike would participate in the new opportunities offered. But if UNRWA is not to resettle the refugees in its charge, removing the refugees from its ration rolls one by one as they reach the point of self-support, we must be in a position to make reductions in total relief expenditures in each country which are proportionate to the contribution toward its general development, leaving to each country the adjustment of rations within its borders.

4. "The plan would be financed by a Jordan Valley Development Authority, run by and for the Arabs. This Authority would obtain its funds through capital lent on a no-interest basis by the Arab states, and it would welcome loans from other countries on a similar basis, except that the principle of Arab control would at all times be maintained. Many nations speak much of Arab friendship; the reaction from the world to the financial needs of the Authority would show which countries really have Arab interests and objectives at heart. The Authority would receive income from the sale of electric power and from water fees, which in time would restore the funds expended."

Contributions from most Arab countries would be nominal, although Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia might provide significant help. There is a possibility that the Soviet Union or one of the satellites might contribute, though this seems unlikely. If there is no Soviet contribution, of course, we would gain an important public relations advantage. Most of the funds would of necessity come

from the U.S., although some help could probably be secured from the U.K. and several of the Commonwealth nations. France is unlikely to make more than a gesture of assistance.

It would not be expected that the Authority would in fact be able to repay the loans which constitute its basic capitalization, but it would be wise to make it as nearly self-liquidating as possible for two reasons: (1) To the extent that it produces an income which can be re-invested within the Valley, it will reduce the pressure for additional aid, and (2) the theory of a self-liquidating operation makes loan assistance, as opposed to grant assistance, more plausible. This is not only preferred by our Congress, but would probably make it technically easier to attach conditions which will keep in our hands a measure of control over the Authority's dollar funds, despite the Arab control over the Authority as a whole.

Conclusion:

This proposal has a fair, though not better than that, chance of success. The major question is whether we would find it worth the cost and effort, assuming it were to succeed. Certainly, it has a better chance than the Jordan Valley Plan as it now stands.

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387. Memorandum for the Record, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) [1]

Washington, June 5, 1956.

SUBJECT

Operation Stockpile

1. General Wilton B. Persons of the White House telephoned Mr. Hoover yesterday saying he would like to be brought up to date regarding "Operation Stockpile" which the President had mentioned to him. Pursuant to Mr. Hoover's request, I called on General Persons at the White House today and explained the nature and scope of "Operation Stockpile" stressing that it was a contingent planning exercise. Whether or not it would ever be implemented would depend on the evolution of events and the decision of the

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #6. Top Secret; Omega. Sent to Macomber with copies to Hoover, Murphy, Russell, and Rountree.

President. Subsequently, Mr. Hagerty joined us and I also informed him of this exercise of which he was aware and also told him that for planning purposes we had drawn up a draft announcement which might be issued: [2]

a. In the event of a leak; or
b. In the event the situation became very tense and it were deemed desirable to issue some announcement to serve as a deterrent against aggression by one of the parties.

Both General Persons and Mr. Hagerty had been under the impression that the Arab part of the stockpile would be shipped in a merchant vessel and they were very apprehensive about leaks. They felt considerably reassured when I explained to them that the arms would be carried in a U.S. Naval AKA vessel which would be nominally assigned as an additional unit to the 6th Fleet. I said that after the Secretary had seen the draft announcement and I had his comments, I would get in touch with General Persons and Mr. Hagerty to go over it with them.

2. Yesterday I asked Captain Wagner when the AKA would be loaded with arms and on its way to the Mediterranean. Today he called me to say it should be loaded and on its way by June 28. I said I assumed a very routine announcement would be made saying that the vessel was being assigned to the 6th Fleet. He said that such a routine announcement had already been issued by Admiral Wright in Norfolk, under his US hat as CINCLANT (Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic). The announcement was made on May 29, 1956 and reads as follows:

"The Attack Cargo Ship USS *Oglethorpe* will sail from Norfolk, Virginia, the latter part of June with personnel replacements for the Sixth Fleet and additional equipment for the reinforced Marine battalion now serving in the Mediterranean, it was announced by Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet. The replacements, according to Admiral Wright, will relieve personnel whose enlistments will expire prior to the time their units are scheduled to return to the United States and will relieve men who have been selected for special schooling or new duty stations. Approximately 102 replacements will be transported. The USS *Oglethorpe*, a veteran of three major amphibious operations in the Korean conflict, is commanded by Captain C.S. Hutchings, USN."

It is encouraging that thus far the routine announcement has not caused a ripple in terms of questions by the press, etc.

DMacA

[2] See the attachment to Document 382.

388. Memorandum to the File, by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) [1]

Washington, June 5, 1956.

The Israel Government is, and will with increasing insistence, be pressing us for a formulation of our position with respect to the diversion at Banat Ya'qub. There has been discussion between the Secretary and the Under Secretary and Eban about a possible tie-in between that question and the IG application to the Export-Import Bank for a $75 million loan. As a result of discussions with Ambassador Johnston and as a result of careful consideration of the various factors involved, the following is suggested as a position which we should take:

1. It would not be desirable to tie-in the Export-Import Bank loan with an agreement between the U.S. and the IG on the commencement of work at Banat Ya'qub. The Export-Import Bank loan should be considered on its own merits.

2. The United States should not give a specific commitment to the IG that it will, at any given time, give any formal support to the IG in the commencement of work at Banat Ya'qub. The furthest step we should go in this respect is to point out to the IG that we have for several years now been giving the greatest possible amount of support to progress in the cooperative utilization of the waters of the Jordan River. This will continue to be a primary objective. There are several reasons why we cannot be more formal or more specific. One is that the United States cannot appropriately assert the right to make a decision on this question which is partly one of international law between Israel and the Arab states and is partly one of which UNTSO and the Security Council are concerned. Another reason is that Israel's policy of raids such as that at Galilee on December 11, 1955, just before the meeting of the Arab League Council that was going to deal with the Johnston Plan, makes it impossible for us to say ahead of time whether the political conditions at any particular time would be such that we could afford to give our support to a particular IG position. Nor is it feasible to attempt to work out in specific detail any agreement with respect to such raids even if the IG were willing to make commitments as other political or military action might be equally preventive of U.S. support.

3. Our position, therefore, should be that:

a. The Export-Import Bank loan should be decided on its merits;

b. We believe that the IG should show restraint with respect to construction at Banat Ya'qub, not continually threatening to commence construction and keep tension at a high pitch, proceed with

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Memos, etc. fr April 24, 1956 to June 30, 1956. Secret.

other necessary construction first and cooperate with UNTSO and the Security Council; and,

c. We will continue to give such support as we believe desirable under all the circumstances to steps that will further the use of the Jordan waters, both by Israel and the Arab states.

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389. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, June 6, 1956.

SUBJECT

Aswan High Dam

Discussion:

Before your departure you requested that a statement be prepared for use in case it was decided not to go forward with the Aswan High Dam project, couched in such a manner that it would be embarrassing for the Egyptians to seek assistance from the Soviet Union. [2] You suggested that we might indicate that the magnitude of the project was such that Egyptian independence of action would be endangered if Egypt was beholden to any foreign country for construction of the dam. A draft statement is attached for your consideration (Tab A).

Other developments regarding Egypt include the following:

In accordance with the Department's instructions (Tab B) [3] Ambassador Byroade discussed the Aswan High Dam with the Egyptian Minister of Finance and requested current Egyptian views on the project. The Minister replied that Egypt is anxious to resume negotiations (Tab C). [4] We do not interpret this reply as indicating the Egyptians have decided to take further steps immediately. In the

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–656. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett and Shaw.

[2] During a meeting on May 25 with Hoover, MacArthur, Rountree, Wilkins, and Kirk, Secretary Dulles "suggested that we might make a statement that the magnitude of the task was such that we felt Egyptian independence of action would be endangered if they were beholden to any foreign country for its construction." (Memorandum for the record, May 25; *ibid.*, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5)

[3] Tab B is Document 365.

[4] Tab C is Document 379.

meantime, the British have informed us that they will be raising the entire project with the Department shortly. [5]

We have received comments from our missions regarding our suggestion that a regional conference of riparian states might be used as a device to block an Egyptian-USSR agreement on the dam. Khartoum reports that an immediate Sudan-Egyptian agreement on division of Nile waters is unlikely, which makes the riparian conference project less urgent. [6] Cairo is strongly opposed, [7] while Addis Ababa thinks Ethiopia will probably cooperate. [8] The British have agreed to let us have their considered views quickly. Kirkpatrick's initial reaction was favorable.

Recommendation:

1. That we commence further talks with the British regarding the High Dam and the riparian conference. [9]

2. That we defer a public statement (Tab A) on the Dam at this stage but hold it ready for use in an emergency. It would be necessary in any event to discuss the Dam further with the Egyptians before issuing a statement. We prefer to avoid a public clash with Egypt at this moment. Meanwhile, we would conclude our talks with the British.

[Tab A]

DRAFT STATEMENT ON HIGH DAM [10]

In response to a request from the GOE the US joined with the UK and IBRD in December, 1955 in offers to assist through grant economic aid in the construction of a High Dam on the Nile at Aswan. In January, Egypt commented upon these offers. In addition Egypt has sought agreement with the Sudan on division of Nile waters prior to commencing construction.

The Dam and its ancellary features will cost about $1.3 billion and will require about 16 years to complete. The magnitude of the project is such that it would require the GOE to impose stringent economic and financial controls, channeling much of its available foreign and domestic resources to this project; draw heavily upon foreign technicians; and borrow abroad a large percentage of the

[5] See Document 384.
[6] See Documents 372 and 383.
[7] See Documents 370 and 371.
[8] See Document 374.
[9] See Document 395.
[10] Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett and Shaw.

funds required thus mortgaging a sizeable portion of its future income over the next 25–50 years.

The US has been studying carefully whether a project of these dimensions and as now conceived could be carried out usefully for the benefit of the peoples of the area under existing conditions. The factors which have been taken into account include: (1) the availability of required Egyptian funds, particularly in view of the other purposes to which that government is now putting its resources; (2) the effects in the present climate of opinion of the introduction into Egypt of a large number of foreign technicians and the contraction of large foreign loans; (3) the need for area stability to permit the successful conclusion of the project and (4) the requests of other riparian states for consideration of their interests in the waters of the Nile prior to construction of major works.

Against this background the US for its part believes it would be wise to defer commencement of the project until conditions in Egypt are such that Egypt could participate fully without undue reliance upon outside assistance and without apprehensions of impediments upon its full independence of action, and until the necessary understandings have been reached with the riparian states. The US remains deeply interested in the development of the Nile and is prepared to consider at an appropriate time and at the request of riparian states what steps might be taken towards the equitable utilization of the water resources for the benefits of the peoples of the region.

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390. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, June 7, 1956—11 a.m.

5650. Shuckburgh told Emb yesterday that as result Barbour's discussion of Aswan Dam June 1st with Kirkpatrick (Embtel 5584 [2]) proposed instructions to Brit Emb Washington mentioned reftel have been held up since main purpose of instructions was to ascertain Dept's current thinking. Shuckburgh said Dept's concept for riparian conference now being actively examined by HMG and Foreign

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–756. Top Secret. Received at 8:35 a.m.

[2] Document 384.

Office expects revert to subject with US next week after matter has been considered by ministers. His preliminary view was that HMG would probably support Dept's idea, at least to the extent of trying it out and seeing the action of the riparian countries including Egypt. Confirmed Kirkpatrick's remarks in reftel re difficulty which HMG would have in going forward at this time with aid for High Aswan Dam project, both because of financial considerations and because of Nasser's attitude. He thought it was becoming more and more plain that the British must help their friends in the ME rather than some who had shown no real disposition to cooperate with the West.

Shuckburgh added time is approaching when US and UK must make basic decision whether go forward with High Dam or not. In latter event, he pointed out, we must work out in advance what we will say to Nasser when as anticipated he threatens go ahead with project with aid from Soviet Bloc. In this connection he expressed interest in knowing details of Dept's recent information regarding possibility Nasser might seek aid from Soviets for High Dam. He seemed to think it might be necessary for US and UK to run risk of having Nasser seek Soviet support for project, particularly if as British were beginning to suspect High Dam was not as practically sound as originally believed. Shuckburgh expressed opinion that out of our further discussion of matter with Egyptians there might emerge some proposal for a less ambitious project which would be more consistent with the unified approach to the Nile problem and in which the West might be able to offer some assistance.

Aldrich

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391. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, June 7, 1956—3 p.m.

2428. Hussein—confronted with a Nasser who apparently has no regrets for any of his actions or stands he has taken because he believes them best for Egypt, and myself—under injunction from Department to keep on saying same thing we have said many times

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/6–756. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:13 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.

but not move into specific constructive suggestions—have in past week been able to accomplish very little. He has held off seeing Nasser, hoping to work out with me positive program but feels he should wait no longer and has asked for another appointment.

Hussein and I agree almost entirely as to roots of sharp clash and lack of mutual confidence. Some of these, from a practical point of view may well be beyond correction. Hussein not entirely pessimistic, however, as he still hoping after next talk to find a way to start thing back on better track. Have told him probably most fundamental question he should seek answer to as far Department concerned is whether or not Nasser really wants to have friendship of America.

On our side have feeling we may not be totally realistic in setting our own goals. We have lost heavily here and must recognize rather than fight this fact if we are to retain any position at all. We have assumed that through our military and economic assistance programs around world we would obtain political benefits and we must recognize that same applies to others.

As illustrative example, would assume that our pre-Cyprus influence in Greece stemmed to great extent from fact we provided military equipment when they felt they really needed it, and that we assisted greatly their economic development. In eyes of leaders in Egypt, they needed military equipment in interests security of country as much as Greece did. In Egyptian viewpoint West would not approve or effectively implement a policy to help Egypt become safely stronger than Israel but Russia would, and hence gained genuine respect if not gratitude of GOE. Trade that has been established with Eastern Bloc is more important to Egypt than any economic aid we are likely to give. Under these conditions to expect Nasser be decidedly pro-Western not very realistic. On matters of ideology we can expect continued leanings toward West of bulk of educated people. On practical politics we can have neutralism but to expect more now probably just won't work.

At end of our session yesterday Hussein made impassioned plea as regards Israel. He stated that following talks with all walks of life here, including well-educated normally pro-United States elements quite apart from government, he concluded that almost all of our problems went back to this sore point. United States and Egypt basically had no real problems except for this one. Even when we accused of assisting imperialism and colonialism, the thought in peoples' minds was not North Africa or some far-away place but they were really burning inside about Israel.

Hussein said our present policy was getting us nothing but enmity of both sides and he felt we would have to make up our mind pretty soon or lose completely. We could no longer in fact be

friends of both Arab States and Israel and he did not know which choice we would make but said a decided choice was needed soon. He did not believe we should side with Arabs on policies which would lead to destruction of Israel nor did he think that necessary. What he strongly argued for was that we publicly support a settlement using the 1947 partition boundaries as a basis for negotiating. He carried argument that this would require force by admitting obviously we could do no such thing, but whether settlement achieve this basis or not was not so important. What we needed was a public stand which would be interpreted as just in Arab world and this could gain us very much. He thought taking position that this our view was consistent with our policy of supporting United Nations and that we should withhold assistance from either side that would not accept. His final remark was that if we did not take opportunity do this very soon he felt surely Russians would and then we would be in impossible position.

While I would not go so far as to withhold assistance and while I realize difficulties, must say that from purely foreign policy point of view believe Hussein probably right. Nor am I certain adopting such a course would be worst thing for Israel, as fact that time is running on side of Arabs cannot as practical matter now be reversed, and in not too distant future Arab asking price may be shockingly greater. However I do not believe Israeli question alone need be insurmountable obstacle to better relations if Nasser and United States prepared give high priority for reversing current disintegration.

Byroade

392. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) [1]

Washington, June 12, 1956.

SUBJECT

F–86's for Israel

The Israeli Ambassador talked to the Secretary about F–86's last Friday. [2] The Secretary said he would raise this subject with Pearson on Monday. [3] The new Israeli Counselor [4] called me this morning asking if I had anything to tell him. I told him I had no information but would call him later today.

I have checked with Douglas MacArthur and find that only Burke Elbrick was present when the Secretary discussed F–86's with Mr. Pearson. [5] Burke Elbrick tells me that Mr. Pearson said the Canadian Cabinet had gone into the matter on several occasions and had decided to take no action for the present. The Cabinet thought it would be unwise at this time because the Security Council Resolution on Hammarskjold's report was then pending [6] and because it was a highly controversial subject. Furthermore, the Canadians had been subject to pressure from the Arabs as well as from the Israelis.

Mr. Pearson also said that he wished to talk with General Burns not because he was a Canadian, but because he was the UNTS. Mr. Pearson thought Egypt was not arming to attack Israel, but in order to strengthen its standing in the Arab world.

The Secretary said the U.S. did not wish to confront the Soviet Union in the Near East through U.S. support for Israel, while the Soviet Union supported the Arabs. Some pressure had been brought to bear upon the Government to supply arms to Israel, but the Administration had decided not to act. It was, however, prepared to intervene in the event of an emergency, and, for this purpose, was carrying equipment in the area which would be supplied to the victims of aggression. The Secretary suggested that if there was a

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/6–1256. Confidential.

[2] The memorandum of conversation, June 8, is not printed. (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

[3] June 11

[4] Zev Argaman.

[5] The memorandum of conversation is not printed. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

[6] See Document 376.

delay by Canada in supplying F–86's, it might be possible to provide Israel with pilot and maintenance training for Israeli personnel.

Mr. Pearson reacted favorably to this suggestion and said he would look into it and present it to the Canadian Prime Minister. Canada would not be able to take any action with respect to F–86's until Mr. Pearson returned from Europe in July.

There was additional discussion regarding the recent Security Council Resolution and Egyptian acquisition of submarines from the Soviet Bloc. Burke Elbrick is sending down a copy of the memorandum of conversation as soon as it is ready. [7]

[7] Eban discussed the results of Secretary Dulles' meeting with Murphy on June 14:

"Ambassador Eban added that if these efforts should be negative, the question would arise regarding alternative sources of supply. There were only two other sources: the U.S. and Italy. If the U.S. was not in a position to sell F-86 aircraft, he hoped that they could be obtained from Italy. Mr. Murphy made no commitment regarding alternative sources of supply." (Memorandum of conversation by Wilkins, June 14; Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/6–1456)

393. Memorandum From James M. Ludlow of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) [1]

Washington, June 12, 1956.

Status of Implementation of Hammarskjold Proposals

1. While the cease-fire has been observed except for a few isolated shooting incidents on the Jordan-Israel frontier and the Gaza frontier, as the Security Council debate indicated, the Syrians have not unconditionally accepted the cease-fire. They still maintain the condition that if Israel attempts to divert the Jordan River at Banat Yaqub they will fight on the grounds that such action by Israel constitutes an act of aggression.

2. With regard to the Gaza border situation no agreement has been reached on the location of the proposed fixed UN observer posts on each side of the line. Both sides are still attempting to make an issue of the location of the meetings of the MAC which would

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/6–1256.

be for the purpose of setting up observer posts. The Egyptians have indicated a somewhat higher degree of cooperation than Israel.

3. There is still no agreement on the Israeli-Syrian observer situation on Lake Tiberias, although both sides have tended to observe the early suggestions which General Burns laid down with regard to Israeli shore patrolling rights and Syrian fishing and watering rights.

4. As a result of the Secretary General's request twenty-one new military observers have been added to the UNTSO bringing the total number on duty to sixty-one. The twenty-one new observers came from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden. The breakdown of the number of military observers by country is as follows: Australia 4, Belgium 7, Canada 10, Denmark 4, France 8, New Zealand 7, Norway 4, Sweden 9, and the United States 8.

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394. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, June 12, 1956—4 p.m.

2470. We speculate Shepilov–Nasser talks during former's visit Cairo [2] will include:

1. Financing of High Dam (Embtel 2438 [3]).

2. Palestine question: This might involve Egyptian effort obtain Soviet undertaking that if latter finds it necessary become involved in efforts develop Arab-Israeli settlement Soviets will insist such discussions take place under UN auspices with GAA resolutions as point of departure.

3. Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty: From several sources we have heard speculation that this subject might be discussed. One source has suggested initiative this subject comes from Egyptians who might be seeking less expensive "guarantee" against Israeli attack than arms imports. Source understands Soviets have dragged feet believing such treaty would provoke violent Western reaction.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6174/6–1256. Secret. Received at 5:04 p.m. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, Alexandria, Amman, Bahgdad, Beirut, Benghazi, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Port Said, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli.

[2] Shepilov arrived in Cairo on June 16 and left for Damascus on June 22.

[3] Telegram 2438, June 8, reported: "Soviets are now exerting strong pressure on Egypt to conclude High Dam deal. . . . Soviet offer now totals 450 million dollars worth equipment credits payable in cotton over 30 year period at 1 and 1/2 percent interest and Soviets are offering complete dam within 6 years." (Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–856)

We inclined believe that GOE thinking on this subject (which at first glance seems inconsistent previous GOE views on non-Arab "pacts" not yet crystalized. Proposed Nasser visit Tito [4] might indicate Nasser desires discuss developments along these lines with man who best knows problems which would be involved.

Current GOE belief West unprepared and probably unwilling cooperate with Egypt probably another factor in development atmosphere favorable increased cooperation with Soviet Bloc.

Byroade

[4] Nasser visited Yugoslavia July 12–19.

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395. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) and the British Ambassador (Makins), Department of State, Washington, June 13, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

High Aswan Dam

Ambassador Makins called on Mr. Hoover to leave with him the attached message which was telegraphed by the British Ambassador in Cairo concerning the possibility that the Soviet Government will undertake during Shepilov's visit to Cairo an agreement with Egypt for financing the High Aswan Dam. [2]

The Ambassador also showed Mr. Hoover a copy of a brief and rather cryptic message . . . relating to Egyptian-Soviet negotiations in Moscow. [3] The message indicated that the Egyptian Ambassador to Moscow felt that there were substantial difficulties involved in overcoming Russian demands that they have security for a loan for construction of the Dam. There was also the implication that part of the question involved was admission of substantial numbers of Soviet technicians. The Egyptian Ambassador commented to Cairo that they should probably yield to the Soviet demands in order to

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #7. Top Secret. Drafted by Rountree. A notation on the source text indicates Secretary Dulles saw this memorandum.

[2] Not printed. The message is summarized in the British Embassy memorandum, *infra*.

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

avoid either (a) subjecting Egypt to Western domination by virtue of an agreement with Western countries for the construction of the Dam or (b) putting off implementation of the project.

It thus appeared that the Egyptians might in fact be actively negotiating with the Soviets on the Aswan Dam. Mr. Hoover and the Ambassador discussed various communications from the American and British Ambassadors in Cairo which would appear to lend credence to this supposition.

Ambassador Makins said that he was expecting momentarily to receive instructions from the Foreign Office to discuss the present problem with the Department, and thought he would be prepared to set forth London's views as to what should be done.[4] He said that he would be in touch with Mr. Hoover as soon as possible to arrange a meeting for this purpose. Mr. Hoover informed the Ambassador that we also were giving active consideration to the matter. In this general and brief discussion he made the following main points:

a. In view of the fact we no longer have FY56 funds available we cannot undertake a firm commitment at this time to proceed with the project.

b. Any commitment would have to be generalized to take into account the fact that FY57 funds had not been enacted by the Congress and we could in no event give firm assurances regarding participation beyond that contemplated in the original Phase I.

c. We were considering taking the initiative in making a statement before the Shepilov visit, although such a statement might in fact increase the chances that an Egyptian-Soviet deal would be consummated during Shepilov's stay in Cairo.

[4] See *infra*.

396. Memorandum From the British Embassy[1]

Washington, undated.

ASWAN DAM

The following is the substance of a telegram sent by the Foreign Office to Her Majesty's Embassy, Washington, on June 14, 1956:

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–1456. Top Secret.

We have now reconsidered the whole problem in the light of the latest information. In so doing we were impressed by Sir H. Trevelyan's view that in order to prevent Nasser from being able to say that the West has refused to go further in the matter we should have to make a definite proposal for tripartite negotiations on the "Aides-Mémoire." Moreover, in view of Shepilov's visit we should have to do this immediately.

2. We also agree with Sir H. Trevelyan that the proposal for a conference of Riparian States would not by itself be sufficient to provide a stalling formula.

3. In these circumstances we think that we should take a line:—

(i) which would be sufficient to keep the Egyptians in play if they are not going to commit themselves to the Russians; and

(ii) which would give us a reasonable public position if the Egyptians now turn to Moscow.

This would amount to a combination of (A) and (B) of para. 2 of your telegram under reference.[2] That is, we should propose early tripartite discussion on the "Aides-Mémoire"; we should make it plain that we shall require cast-iron assurances that there will be no Russian participation; we should suggest that before final decisions are reached, the Egyptian Government should call a conference at which, in addition to the three powers, Riparian States would be represented to discuss the whole problem of the Nile water use.

4. On the latter point a conference of Nile Valley states would, in our view, be desirable in itself for the following reasons:

(a) It is more rational to plan the use of Nile waters as a unit than piece-meal by countries.

(b) The Aswan High Dam scheme as now proposed calls for a dam on the Atbara to resettle the Sudanese population of Wadi Halfa and has other implications upstream.

(c) The Sudanese feel somewhat neglected by the International Bank and the West and consider that their own Nile Valley schemes such as the Roseires Dam would have equal priority with the Egyptian project.

(d) Her Majesty's Government have a direct responsibility on behalf of our East African territories.

(e) The Ethiopians have expressed a desire to discuss Nile waters problems in a general context.

(f) Mr. Black of the International Bank warmly welcomed the idea when I asked him about it.

(g) There is strong feeling in Parliament on both sides of the House in favour of calling such a conference.

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[2] No copy of this British Embassy message has been found in Department of State files.

5. If the United States agree with our analysis and our proposals, we should be glad if they would take the lead in approaching the Egyptian Government at once. Her Majesty's Ambassador would, of course, be instructed to give immediate support. Our reasons for this are that Nasser is already more hostile to and suspicious of this country [3] than of the United States and that the United States contribution to any scheme would in fact be a larger share.

[3] At this point, an unidentified person wrote the following: "(the United Kingdom)".

397. Editorial Note

On June 15, at the 288th meeting of the National Security Council, with Vice President Nixon presiding, Allen Dulles, in his review of developments affecting United States security, presented a report on Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov's impending visit to Egypt. The memorandum of discussion reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles pointed out that the new Soviet Foreign Minister, Shepilov, will visit Cairo on the 18th of June as the ranking visitor during the week of celebration to be staged in Cairo on the occasion of the British departure from the Suez base area. The arrangements for Shepilov's visit had been worked out before he became Foreign Minister, and there is some evidence, said Mr. Dulles, that Nasser is slightly embarrassed over the fact that, despite his new status, Shepilov is nevertheless coming to Cairo. It is thought that Shepilov will bring pressure on the Egyptians to make some dramatic gesture during his visit. For example, Shepilov may try to induce the Egyptians to come to a new decision to accept Soviet assistance for the construction of the High Aswan dam. On this point Mr. Dulles added that this project is certain to cost a great deal more than the Egyptians have estimated to date.

"Secretary Humphrey interrupted to express the wish that the United States were out of the High Aswan dam project altogether. While the Egyptians are holding an option on our assistance on the dam project, they are shopping around to see if they can get a better bargain elsewhere.

"Continuing with his briefing, Mr. Dulles indicated that another possible Soviet move during Shepilov's visit would be an official announcement of Soviet support for the 1947 UN resolution on the Israeli state. This would, of course, be very embarrassing to the West. Yet another possibility was the announcement of some kind of treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Egypt and Syria on the other. In any event, concluded Mr.

Dulles, fireworks were to be anticipated in the course of the visit." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

398. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, June 16, 1956—1 p.m.

5809. In talk with Selwyn Lloyd yesterday, I inquired whether Brit consideration US concept convocation riparian Nile conference presented Kirkpatrick June 7 (Embtel 5584 [2]) had progressed sufficiently for him to give me any info. As response he showed me exchange messages with Washington June 14 [3] and 15 [4] related forthcoming Shepilov visit Cairo.

It appears that Brit not only endorsed US concept but have adopted it as their own and in essence presented it as Brit proposal with added twist that US should take initiative. Lloyd did not provide any elaboration UK thinking in addition that contained exchange mentioned above except that in response specific inquiry he confirmed that proposal to proceed with further tripartite consideration aide-mémoires does not imply any Brit intention proceed with Aswan Dam project this time. Brit not in position obtain Parliamentary approval appropriations and now inclined question more and more engineering etc. feasibility project. Lloyd thought fifty–fifty chance Shepilov offer Egyptians substantial assistance on Dam but unlikely offer undertake whole scheme.

Will appreciate any instructions Dept may have for guidance in further conversations with British. [5]

Aldrich

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–1656. Top Secret. Received at 1 p.m.

[2] Document 384.

[3] See Document 396.

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

[5] The Department informed the Embassy in London on June 18 that discussions with the British had taken place in Washington regarding "usefulness further action at this time forestall possible Egyptian-Soviet agreement Aswan High Dam. British now concur best tactic is await developments. We drafting statement setting forth our position for possible use if Egyptian-Soviet agreement announced." (Telegram 7590 to London; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–1656)

Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Hoover on June 20 approved a draft text of a statement for possible use if the Egyptians and Soviets announced the conclusion of an agreement on the Aswan Dam. The text of this draft statement is *ibid.*, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #7.

399. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, June 16, 1956—4 p.m.

2515. There will be some repetition of previous messages contained herein but as we see similarity between where we stand now on subject High Dam and where we were last fall on question arms it seems to us following summary compiled from record might be useful to Department.

According . . . Nasser's own talks with me which were reported, Russian Ambassador Solod May 21, 1955 offered Soviet technological and economic assistance including help on High Dam.[2] During same conversation Nasser reportedly queried Solod regarding military assistance. From that time until September 1955 Nasser attempted secure arms from United States under conditions which he felt would permit him refuse Soviet offer in spite of contrary pressures from Egyptian army. Finally faced with increasingly hostile actions of Israel and failure United States act affirmatively on his request for assistance in financing arms purchases unless he was willing accommodate himself to proceeding on Palestine settlement he accepted Soviet offer. I reported at that time that he felt he had to make this move to retain control and that I felt he probably was correct in his assessment.[3]

Appears to us Soviet financing of High Dam may be about to be completed on similar pattern. As Ambassador Hussein told Secretary July 29, 1955[4] "High Dam is most important element in Egyptian economic development and without it Egypt cannot make progress". This Embassy has also stressed on many occasions importance Egyptians attached to Dam. As we said in Embassy telegram 12 July 2, 1955[5] "Egyptians have so far been wary of Soviet offers but if IBRD and/or other forms of Western financing fail materialize Soviet offer if renewed may appear more interesting".

When Hussein returned Cairo August 1955 he reported Nasser had talked to him at some length of problems he faced with his military supporters. Nasser related how Shepilov had said Russia was prepared finance High Dam in exchange for cotton to assist Egypt in economic development and to supply MIGs and latest

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–1656. Secret. Received at 11:35 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Jidda, and Damascus.

[2] See vol. XIV, p. 261.

[3] See telegrams 528 and 547, *ibid.*, pp. 497 and 508.

[4] See *ibid.*, p. 332.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 275.

weapons payable in cotton (Embassy telegram 234 August 15[6]). We commentated (Embassy telegram 235 August 15[7]), "competition in economic fields with Soviet Bloc in Egypt must perhaps be faced up to although Nasser has so far refused Bloc help. It is in fact difficult for me to see how he can continue refuse their offers assistance in implementing economic development progress particularly High Aswan Dam".

Observations we made last year are even more germane today. Generally speaking Egyptians are satisfied with Soviet arms program. Consequently when pressures are being renewed by Soviets in favor Soviet financing High Dam reluctance which many Egyptians still have over deals with Soviets because of possible "strings" is, to some extent at least, fading. Doubts Russia would follow through rarely heard now as Soviet economic drive contrasted with West's own failure complete negotiations begun with United States and United Kingdom following Black's January visit. Those Egyptians who argue Western financing Dam essential in national interest to balance Soviet military aid prevent subordination Egypt's economy to Soviet Bloc and enable Egypt maintain "independent policy" vis-à-vis East and West find their position equally difficult maintain as United States and United Kingdom not only stall but give public impression of perhaps being unable move due congressional and parliamentary sentiments.

At same time urgency of announcing plans for project increases as time nears for inception parliamentary regime in Egypt. Government aware it must soon take vigorous steps meet domestic problems and High Dam as primary effort this end must therefore be begun without delay or at least plans made firm in order avoid public criticism which might be difficult suppress.

Combination of circumstances therefore in almost all respects parallels those leading to arms deal: 1) compelling need; 2) appearance of Western indifference; 3) Soviet eagerness help.

I have pointed out in several messages this spring that our failure move forward on High Dam negotiations would lead Egyptians conclude we were merely stalling to conceal fact we had reached decision not extend assistance High Dam financing at this time (Embassy telegram 1794 March 8,[8] Embassy telegram 1910 March 27,[9] Embassy telegram 2251 May 15,[10] Embassy telegram 2285 May 18[11]). We do not consider approach made in compliance

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 355.
[7] See *ibid.*, footnote 3, p. 353.
[8] Document 179.
[9] Document 219.
[10] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–1556)
[11] Document 356.

Department telegram 2815 May 24 [12] to be of any significance as far as record is concerned.

Hussein told me yesterday Nasser had told him recently he now convinced we would not follow through on High Dam. (We should remember in connection any statements we may make if Russian offer accepted that Nasser's own conclusion coincides with public feeling as well as local foreign press representatives who seem to be supplied their own information from visiting press or possibly from home office.) This connection might be well repeat what we said in another message on April 19 [13] "please bear in mind that Nasser is not certain if United States can and will assist him with Dam to its completion and he never has been, regardless obvious good intentions shown by Department. He sees hesitation and delay for what he considers policy purposes even prior to concluding agreement. He undoubtedly connects this with our disillusionment his ability to move in manner we desired on Israeli settlement. Even if agreement concluded after that he sees an unpredictable Congress and future administration whose policy on Arab and Israel matters now beyond prediction. We consider it highly probable Nasser thinks he requires definitive agreement for pre-election use. In spite of fact we know Nasser wishes to work with West on this project, if there continues to be no response at all Department should not be surprised if some day it reads in press that decision has been made to accept Russian assistance".

It should therefore not come as surprise to Department that we now begin hear reports implying GOE has almost decided accept Soviet financing High Dam. We speculate that Soviet offer (terms of which might be substantially similar those suggested Embassy telegram 2438 [14]) might possibly be part "package deal" along lines Embassy telegram 2470 [15] in which Egypt in exchange Soviet financing Dam, Soviet support Arab viewpoint in United Nations discussions Arab-Israel issues and possible treaty of friendship incorporating guarantee against Israeli aggression would be asked cooperate with Soviets on peace move in Palestine on basis United Nations resolutions and coordinate with Soviets on "anti-imperialist tactics" in Near East and Africa.

Soviets would probably hope announce acceptance during Shepilov's visit. While have felt this probable for some days now am not at present so certain this will be case as there seems to be new evidence that Nasser hopes get through upcoming ceremonies and

[12] Document 365.
[13] Reference is to telegram 2087, Document 294.
[14] See footnote 3, Document 394.
[15] Document 394.

visits without statements or announcements that would irritate West. It may be therefore (we just don't know at this stage) that we will have short period of grace between Shepilov's visit and July 23 (or perhaps opening of Parliament—or Nasser visit Russia) during which Egyptians as they did in arms deal might seek "final test our intentions" against concrete Soviet proposals perhaps to establish record for defense their action against criticism they went too far in creating dependence upon Soviets. Even if we should be given this "grace period" do not know whether it is possible at this late date to salvage situation since our ability to do so might well depend on whether sufficiently persuasive arguments could be offered to match possible Shepilov package offer which if offered would most probably be "leaked" locally to obtain popular support.

Purpose this message is therefore three-fold (1) to summarize the record as of possible use to Department in event of sudden move here (2) to reiterate that although time is running out it may still be possible counter Soviets by concretely reaffirming sympathetic attitude towards High Dam project to which (as explained in Embassy telegram 2346 [16]) I believe we stand for better or worse publicly committed (3) to express as clearly as I can my conviction that GOE is determined proceed with this project come what may and that we had best prepare ourselves if we are unable to resume negotiations to meet with the maximum political skill of which we are capable consequences which in my opinion will make things really difficult here and I fear will extend again as in case of arms deal considerably beyond Egypt's own boundaries.

Byroade

[16] Document 370.

400. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) [1]

Washington, June 18, 1956.

1. . . .

a. Nasr would like to invite Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., to come to Egypt at his earliest opportunity for substantive discussions of all outstanding American-Egyptian problems. If Mr. Hoover is willing to go to Egypt, a formal invitation will be extended. It is understood by the Egyptian Prime Minister that Mr. Hoover, should he plan to accept this invitation, would not be expected to visit Egypt during the Freedom Week celebrations, 17–23 June 1956.

b. . . . stated that Gamal 'Abd-al-Nasr is now making a strong effort to stabilize Egypt relations with the West and is determined to turn a deaf ear to any blandishments of Soviet Foreign Minister Dimitri Shepilov during the latter's visit to Cairo.

. . . . . .

2. This information has been transmitted to Ambassador Byroade.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Egypt—Dam, Miscl. 1956. Secret.

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401. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McGuire) to the Under Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs (Barnes) [1]

Washington June 18, 1956.

SUBJECT

Suspension of Action on Egyptian Cases Numbers 4 and 10

1. References:

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.5–MSP/8–356. Confidential.

a. Department of State memorandum to the Department of Defense, 12 April 1956, [2] subject as above.

b. Letter from Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Department of State to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), 23 May 1956, [3] concerning subject cases.

2. In accordance with request contained in reference 1a. above, the Department of Defense suspended all action on RMA cases Egypt 4 and 10.

3. In view of the time which has elapsed since request for purchase of these items was made by the Egyptian Government (see attached chronology), [4] and the fact that another government's funds are being held by the United States, the Department of Defense is of the opinion that unless release of the shipment is to be made shortly, the cases concerned should be cancelled and a refund made of moneys now on deposit. In addition, the Department of the Army has another requirement for the meteorological station, mobile, (case No. 4) if not to be made available for Egypt. Also, since these cases were fully approved at the time of the original request, inquiries are being made by the foreign government's military representatives concerning the status of these transactions. The Department of Defense is at a loss to know what answer should be made to these inquiries.

4. It is, therefore, requested that the Department of Defense be authorized either to cancel the cases and refund the moneys on deposit, or to make available the items for shipment. [5]

Perkins McGuire [6]

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[2] This memorandum requested the Department of Defense to suspend action on Egyptian Cases No. 4 and 10. (*Ibid.*, 784A.5–MSP/4–1256) Egyptian Case No. 4 involved a mobile meteorological station; Egyptian Case No. 10 involved 75-mm. artillery shells.

[3] This letter requested the Department of Defense not to sell the equipment involved in the two cases to other buyers. (Letter from Rountree to Gray, May 23; *ibid.*, 784A.5–MSP/5–2156)

[4] Not printed. The Egyptian requested purchase of Case No. 4 on June 23, 1954; of Case No. 10 on March 25, 1955.

[5] A note attached to the source text indicates that the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs was assigned action on this memorandum.

[6] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

402. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) [1]

Washington, June 19, 1956.

SUBJECT

Operation Stockpile

I have just received the attached letter from John Coulson [2] informing us that the Foreign Office has agreed that planning should continue on the assumption that aircraft could be transferred to Cyprus. The letter states that further discussions on the subject can be conducted between the British Joint Services Mission and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that the British Mission is being instructed accordingly.

While the letter is unsigned I am sure that this is a result of an oversight.

I have not sent a copy through S/S to the Secretary, Mr. Hoover or Mr. Murphy, but assume that you will wish to report this development when you next bring them up to date on the operation.

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, ... Top Secret.
[2] Not printed.

403. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Counselor of the Italian Embassy (De Rege) and the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins), Department of State, Washington, June 20, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

French Intention to Increase French Arms Shipments to Israel

Mr. De Rege asked me if we had any opinion with respect to the French intention to increase French shipments of arms to Israel. He said the French Embassy had submitted a long list of items to NEACC. He added that de Laboulaye had informed him the French

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/6–2056. Confidential. Drafted on June 26 by Wilkins.

thought Israel very jittery at the present time and that it was essential that any discrepancy between Israel and the Arab states be rectified. Thereafter an arms embargo could be imposed. I said I had not been informed of the French intention, but would check into it. [2]

[2] Willie Morris, First Secretary of the British Embassy, also told Wilkins on June 21 that the French had apparently decided to increase their arms shipments to Israel. (Memorandum of conversation by Wilkins; *ibid.*, 784A.56/6–2156)

In the course of a conversation with Wilkins on June 21, François de Laboulaye, First Secretary of the French Embassy, confirmed that France had submitted to NEACC 11 documents describing items that France wished to ship to Israel. (Memorandum of conversation by Wilkins; *ibid.*, 784A.56/6–2256)

On June 25, de Laboulaye informed Wilkins that the French Embassy had received additional instructions from Paris to inform NEACC of France's desire to fulfill several additional Israeli requests for ground and air equipment. (Memorandum of conversation by Wilkins; *ibid.*, 784A.56/6–2556)

404. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State [1]

Ottawa, June 21, 1956—noon.

470. For the Secretary. Israeli Ambassador [2] called on me this morning report tenor Saint Laurent's reply to Ben Gurion's letter and also results his talk yesterday with Prime Minister [3] whom he had requested see prior Prime Minister's departure for London tomorrow. [4]

Reply to Ben Gurion friendly, sympathetic but non-committal concluding with statement question supply F–86s to Israel under study by Canadian Government.

In talk with Prime Minister Israeli Ambassador reached conclusion (1) no definitive Cabinet decision reached nor now possible until after Prime Minister's and Pearson's return from London in second week July, (2) Pearson only advocate in Cabinet of transaction and all will follow without opposition Prime Minister's conclu-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5622/6–2156. Secret. Received at 1:53 p.m.

[2] Michael Saul Comay.

[3] The Embassy in Ottawa had informed the Department on June 15 that the Israeli Ambassador, under instructions from Tel Aviv, was "renewing pressure on Canadian Government for reply on F 86s." (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5622/6–1556)

[4] Prime Minister Saint Laurent was traveling to London to attend the Commonwealth Conference of Prime Ministers.

sion when reached; (3) Prime Minister, while recognizing strong Israeli case and sympathetic some righting of arms balance for its deterrent value, is unwilling have Canada act except in collective framework which would include US certainly and preferably UK as well; and (4) any further urging of Canada by us that it act alone at this time would generate strong Canadian resistance. Israeli Ambassador now sees no appreciable hope of obtaining F–86s except in some form package deal which would include some degree open participation of US.

I agree further efforts by us persuade Canadians act independently would be counter-productive. I also agree that Saint Laurent key figure, struggling with sense moral responsibility, presence domestic political risk in some degree and traditional Canadian reluctance act internationally except in company US and UK. Under present circumstances I believe Canadian Government will keep Israeli request under continuing consideration and defer indefinitely delivery a definite reply.

Merchant

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405. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) and the Israeli Chargé (Shiloah), Department of State, Washington, June 21, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Statements by Reuven Shiloah

I met with Mr. Shiloah, Chargé d'Affaires of the Israel Embassy, today at his request. It was our first meeting since he returned a short time ago from a visit to Israel of several weeks. In the course of discussion he made the following statements:

1. There will be no change in Israel policy as a result of the resignation of Mr. Sharett as Foreign Minister [2] and the assumption of that post by Mrs. Myerson. He said that the difference in temperament between Ben Gurion and Sharett had for a long time caused more or less strained relations between the two and that for

[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Memos, etc. fr April 24, 1956 to June 30, 1956. Secret. Drafted by Russell.

[2] Sharett resigned on June 18.

various reasons the situation had just now come to the breaking point. I told Shiloah that nevertheless the departure of Sharett at this time was bound to cause disquiet in many quarters over the extent to which IDF influence in the Israel Foreign Office would increase. Shiloah said that Sharett's inability to obtain arms from the West, particularly the United States, and other failures of his policy had weakened his position. I said that it must be obvious to the IG that the major part of Israel's difficulties stemmed not from the Sharett policies but from those for which Ben Gurion was responsible. I said I had not had much contact with Mrs. Myerson when I was in Israel but the one or two experiences I had were not reassuring. I referred particularly to a speech she gave to a group of American Jews in Israel in the spring of 1954 in which she asserted that the blood of Jewish youth who had been killed in fighting against the Arabs was on the hands of the American Department of State, that the Department had always been callous of Jewish lives, even those suffering under Hitler, and that the members of her audience should go back to the United States and so inform their fellow American Jews.[3] I said that, aside from the expression of such sentiments, the fact that she had uttered them at a meeting when the United States Chargé d'Affaires also was a speaker on the same platform was bound to raise a question about Mrs. Myerson's attitudes and the policies she would be likely to follow as Foreign Minister.

2. In referring to the article by Drew Pearson this morning predicting that Ambassador Eban would be retiring and that Shiloah would be taking his place,[4] Shiloah said that there had been discussion about Eban's replacement when he (Shiloah) was in Jerusalem. Shiloah said that General Yadin, former head of the IDF, had been mentioned. Shiloah thought it unlikely that Yadin would accept the position as he is busy with archeological excavations in the Huleh. Shiloah said that his own name had been mentioned but that he preferred to return to the Foreign Office.

3. With respect to possible resumption of construction at Banat Yaacov, Shiloah said there would be no such resumption as long as the IG felt there was real hope of a plan which would provide for a solution of this problem. Israel would take action on its own only if it felt that everyone concerned had abandoned planning and negotiations and that Israel had no other alternative. I commented that I thought this was an encouraging improvement in the IG position.

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[3] Reference is to a speech by Golda Myerson, Israeli Minister of Labor, to an audience of Israeli and American members of Hadassah on May 4, 1954.

[4] Reference is to Drew Pearson's column entitled "Aldrich and Eban To Quit as Envoys;" see *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, June 21, 1956.

4. Shiloah said he thought that Nasser's present military planning was based upon an intention to put Egypt in a position where it could, if Nasser should so decide, attack Israel at any time after July–August. (This appears to constitute a change from Eban's and Shiloah's previous estimates, namely that Nasser was definitely planning to attack some time in July or August.)

5. In commenting on the policy that the West should adopt toward Nasser, Shiloah said he felt at the present stage of developments, it would not be wise to attack Nasser politically head-on but to act by way of strengthening other elements in the area, specifically Israel. He said he thought the Western countries should attempt to identify and work with elements in Egypt who were unhappy with the present Nasser policies; that they should strengthen their relations with the Sudan and Ethiopia; and that such things might be done as having Western Ambassadors in other capitals of the world give marked attention socially to Egyptians in those countries who were anti-, or at least not pro-, Nasser.

6. Shiloah said that he had talked on the phone with the Israel Ambassador in Ottawa and had been informed that there was no prospect of any decision by the Canadian Government on the F–86's for at least a month and very little reason to believe there would be a decision at that time unless Canada felt it was acting as part of a general program of assistance to Israel by the United States and other Western countries. Shiloah asked me what I felt the U.S. Government's position on arms to Israel was likely to be in the light of this information. I told him I had been away from the Department for a couple of weeks and did not feel I could express an opinion.

406. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, June 21, 1956—3 p.m.

2538. Black departed for London this morning following talks with Kaissuny and Nasser last evening. [2] Visit went well in spite of obvious difficulties facing Black on stop here at this time.

Black reports he found both Kaissuny and Nasser extremely friendly. He described both as giving appearance of being "disappointed, puzzled, and a bit hurt" over fact that no word has been received from US or UK to their suggested changes in aides-mémoire [3] for 16 weeks, but that neither showed any sign of bitterness. Black, who says he often used by foreign dignitaries to bear brunt of indirect criticism of acts of member governments, said this was not case on these visits, although Kaissuny was very disturbed that there had been no 56 funds allotted at all for Egypt. Kaissuny said he guessed he did not have any right to be critical as decision entirely up to us, but found this very difficult to understand and explain to his colleagues.

There was no mention by Nasser of any deal with Russia and Black remarked that conversation proceeded just as though Shepilov had never appeared on scene. Black assumes of course that discussions have been under way with Shepilov but attitude he received was one of "we want very much to follow through with negotiations started with West. Please help us with US and UK governments".

Nasser talked much of question of population pressure and that Egypt's immediate problem was one of land. He said he did not agree with those around him who believe everything depends upon industrialization as this in his mind was no alternative to problem of providing additional land for Egypt's people.

Nasser appeared to have no doubt but that negotiations with Sudan could be carried forward successfully and stressed that High Dam project should proceed immediately thereafter.

Following visit with Nasser, Black and Kaissuny had additional talk late last night. In effort draw Kaissuny out, Black stated that there had been some criticism of him for appearing willing to go ahead with High Dam in view of Egypt's policies. He said he would like to really know whether Kaissuny thought Egypt was by choice going down a path leading to domination by Russia. Kaissuny said

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/6–2156. Secret; Priority. Received at 5:52 p.m. Repeated priority to London.

[2] Black visited Cairo, June 19–21, on his return from an official visit to Iran and Saudi Arabia.

[3] See Documents 121–124 and 127.

he felt definitely not, although there were a couple of ministers who had leanings in that direction. Kaissuny then almost pled with Black not to "force us to take aid from Russia". He said he was well aware of dangers of getting too much involved with Russia and cited as example their manipulation of cotton in which Russia and satellites were acting as a bloc. They could all buy cotton or as easily stop all purchases to apply pressures. Kaissuny said if Russians ended up doing High Dam he would probably resign but that would make very little difference because problem was far bigger than personalities. Russia would then have opportunity of almost complete control of Egypt's economy and hence eventually policy.

We believe our prediction that no agreement would be signed while Shepilov is here will turn out to be correct. . . . reports available to Department have indicated probable nature of Soviet offer which if true we obviously unable to match. Whether or not Nasser would go through with present Western approach we cannot tell, but seems that there is still a chance this would be so.

I can think of no new argument to try to convince Department that proceeding on this project is in our best long range interests. Even if we are in the end out maneuvered by Russians and fail, would like to see our own record much better than it is at present. Earnestly hope high levels in Department will set aside adequate time discuss with Black situation here, as this probably more effective means present current atmosphere, even though his visit was brief. [4]

Byroade

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[4] On June 22, Rountree provided Ronald Bailey and D.B. Pitblado of the British Embassy with the substance of telegram 2538. Bailey informed Rountree of Trevelyan's comments, as follows:

"If the Soviet proposal on the Dam was of the scale reported, it is questionable whether the Western powers could meet the terms. Although the language of the aides-mémoire given Egypt in December, 1955, could be construed to cover an agreement with all the riparian states, the discussions made clear that we had in mind only an understanding with the Sudan. The Ambassador urged that the US and UK carry through with the offer made in December arguing that the conditions prevailing now were essentially the same." (Memorandum of conversation by Burdett; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–2256)

407. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, June 22, 1956—4 p.m.

2545. As Hussein had told Nasser everything he had to say, when he requested appointment referred to in Embtel 2428 [2] he indicated that he did not wish to press seeing Nasser during his intense schedule of past few days. He has therefore not had appointment since dispatch above reftel and probably will not have until sometime next week.

Hussein yesterday, however, was somewhat encouraged. He felt Nasser's speech [3] was one of moderation. It was an ideal occasion for real rabble-rousing and he found encouraging fact that Nasser did not so use it. He also very pleased at Nasser's remarks about British and fact that Baghdad Pact was not even mentioned.

He also encouraged by recent talks with Fawzi who gives impression Nasser becoming more moderate and desirous of not letting relations with West get any worse. He reports that Fawzi has had five talks with Nasser since his return on subject relations with West. Hussein feels there is definite reaction setting in in Egypt about too close dependence on Russia. He does not know whether government clearly senses this as yet but believes it may already be having some effect. I agree with Hussein that there is some increase in feeling here on this subject.

Fawzi assures him that no agreements or commitments had been reached here with Shepilov. He thinks Fawzi in position to know as he thinks he attended all meetings. (We unable verify this.) Fawzi showed him communiqué to be issued today [4] which also pleased him as it was very general. Fawzi hopes communiqué will not be badly received in West. He stated it would be a disappointment to many Egyptians who have been expecting something dramatic. Hussein aware of course that communiqués are seldom really finalized until just before issue and this one might be changed.

Hussein says he does not believe the talks have been as specific as would be indicated by . . . reports. He says he himself has heard these same stories from highly responsible people but is inclined to

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/6–2256. Secret. Received at 4:49 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Document 391.

[3] Reference is to a speech by Nasser at Cairo on June 19, in which he proclaimed the lifting of martial law and the ending of all press censorship in Egypt. (Telegram 2539 from Cairo, June 21; Department of State, Central Files, 874.424/6–2156)

[4] Text of the communiqué, released at Cairo on June 22, was transmitted in telegram 2546 from Cairo, June 22. (*Ibid.*, 033.6174/6–2256)

take Fawzi's word that the talks have been of a more general nature. Hussein concludes that if High Dam deal is done with Russia that final agreement and announcement will not be made until Nasser's trip there in August.

Believe we may be entering stage where Nasser's supreme confidence he handling things properly and conviction that he is making progress for Egypt will be reflected in lack of criticism of policies of others. He gives every impression of pride of accomplishment, one might hope now he would have desire base his appeal to public more on positive record of achievement and less on rabble-rousing charges against "imperialist" powers in West.

Byroade

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408. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, June 23, 1956.

SUBJECT

Israel request for increased economic aid

Discussion

In the attached letter (Tab A), [2] Ambassador Eban states that the U.S. has the "legal and financial capacity" to make increased financial aid available to Israel, either under the Mutual Security Act [3] or in combination with Public Law 480, and he asks that a decision to provide such aid be made urgently in view of the expiration of the fiscal year on June 30. This letter is the most recent in a series of approaches made by the Israelis to the Department (Tabs B, C, and D). [4]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5–MSP/6–2356. Confidential. Drafted on June 21 by Troxel and concurred in by Barnes.

[2] Not printed. Eban's signed original of the letter to Dulles, June 18, is *ibid.*, 611.84A/6–1856.

[3] Reference is to the Mutual Security Act of 1955.

[4] Tab B is Document 377. Tab C is a memorandum of conversation between Dulles and Eban on June 8, not printed. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) Tab D is an aide-mémoire from the Israeli Embassy to the Department of State, June 3, not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 611.84A/6–356)

The legislative authorization under PL 480 has been exhausted for the current fiscal year. While some third-country currencies accumulated under PL 480 are available, the Israelis have informed us that their proposal for a triangular transaction designed to obtain some French francs (Tab B) is still under discussion with the French and cannot be submitted as yet for our consideration.

Israel has received the full amount of aid which was included in the Mutual Security program presented to the Congress for this fiscal year. Some funds could conceivably be made available to Israel from transfers within the Mutual Security Act, but this would be administratively difficult to accomplish and would probably be unwise at this time. We are unable to make any firm judgment as to Israel's legitimate needs for Mutual Security assistance in advance of a decision on Israel's request for a loan from the Export-Import Bank. [5] Even if clearly warranted, additional financial assistance could hardly be granted at a more inopportune time, in view of the negotiations in progress on the Dhahran Air Base and of Shepilov's presence in the Near East.

Recommendations

1. That you inform the Israelis:

a. We are not in a position to make an additional allocation of aid before June 30;

b. Israel's interest in assistance for FY 1957 will be kept in mind, but no decision can be taken until after the Congress concludes its legislative action.

2. That if it is not convenient for you to inform the Israelis yourself, you authorize Mr. Murphy or Mr. Allen to do so. [6]

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[5] See Document 194.

[6] A notation on the source text indicates that Secretary Dulles approved Murphy or Allen informing the Israelis. In a conversation on June 28, Allen informed Shiloah that the United States was unable to make any additional economic aid available to Israel before the conclusion of the current fiscal year on June 30, and that the Department of State would be unable to determine the level of assistance for Israel during Fiscal Year 1957 until after Congress had concluded its legislative action. (Memorandum of conversation by Bergus; Department of State, Central Files, 611.84A/6-2856)

409. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, June 24, 1956—4 p.m.

2558. Iraqi Ambassador [2] summarized today his understanding Shepilov-Egyptian talks as follows:

1) Political: A) Soviets had frankly told Egyptians they would support any United Nations move in direction peaceful settlement of Palestine question. Egyptians had replied they favored United Nations moves reduce border tensions and obtain full implementation of GAA, but would not go further. B) In harmony their desire promote peaceful settlement and in support principle self-determination Russians would support Arab move for discussion Algerian case in Security Council. However Russians did not think taking of Algerian case to Security Council was useful move.

2) Economic: A) Russians renewed offer construct High Dam using Soviet technicians. Work to be completed within seven years and financed by long-term low interest loan payable in cotton. B) Soviet Bloc prepared build any factories which Egyptians might request on similar financial terms. C) Soviets prepared construct atomic reactor in Egypt.

Rawi did not believe Egyptians had accepted any economic offers as yet and thought that there was some indication Egyptians might be more concerned over implications of closer dependence on Soviets. He had pointed out dangers this course to Nasser recently to which Nasser had replied, "we want to remain neutral between East and West". In Rawi's opinion United States should move with all speed to conclude High Dam agreement. "I know", he said, "there are many who say it is wrong to aid your enemy. If Nasser were alone I would agree. However, behind him is Soviet Union which is our real enemy and if you fail aid Nasser you are not halting your enemy, you are actually strengthening him."

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6174/6–2456. Secret. Received at 4:01 p.m. Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, Belgrade, Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda.

[2] Neguib el-Rawi.

410. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 25, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Aswan Dam; Iran; Saudi Arabia

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Eugene R. Black, President, IBRD
Mr. Andrew N. Overby, Assistant Secretary, Treasury Department
The Secretary (for part of meeting only)
The Under Secretary
NEA—Mr. Rountree
NE—Mr. Burdett

Mr. Black, who had just returned from a trip to Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia, called to provide the Department with his impressions. He first described his one day's visit to Egypt during the Independence Day celebrations. The Egyptians were embarrassed that Shepilov accepted, as Soviet Foreign Minister, an invitation extended to him as the Editor of *Pravda*. Mr. Black had written to Finance Minister Kaissouni of his plan to stop in Egypt on his return from Iran and Saudi Arabia for one day without knowing of the Shepilov visit. He described both Kaissouni and Nasser as extremely friendly and courteous to him, despite the demands upon their time imposed by the events then in progress. Both appeared surprised, a little hurt, and disappointed that there had been no reply to their counter proposals on the Aswan Dam, but there was no trace of bitterness. Nasser explained that he thought agricultural development was the key to Egypt's future and not industrialization as advocated by some of his advisers. Therefore, he was most anxious to move ahead with the Aswan Dam. Nasser said agreement in principle with the Sudan on division of Nile waters had already been reached. He admitted that the matter of compensation for the flooding of Sudanese lands posed a greater problem, but he thought that it could be solved. Nasser made no mention of Shepilov and did not hint that he was considering a Soviet offer on the Dam. Kaissouni expressed disappointment that Egypt would receive no assistance from FY 56 appropriations and that this would mean a year's delay in starting the Dam. In private conversation with Mr. Black before the meeting with Nasser, Kaissouni hinted that Nasser might speak of a Soviet offer and that he, Kaissouni, was fearful of seeing the pattern of the arms negotiations repeat itself. He most earnestly urged Mr. Black to

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.14/6–2556. Secret. Drafted on June 26 by Burdett.

prevent Egypt from having to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union.

[Here follows discussion of Black's visit to Saudi Arabia and Iran.]

The Secretary joined the meeting at this point.

[Here follows a continuation of Black's remarks regarding his visits to Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.]

The Aswan Dam was then discussed in considerable detail. Mr. Black expressed the opinion that the situation now was not much different from that prevailing in December 1955. He thought that the Egyptian economic situation had not deteriorated. Egypt had just succeeded in floating a $25 million internal bond issue. In reply to a question from the Secretary regarding the effects of our discontinuance of PL 480 shipments and cutting back on CARE, Mr. Black said the Egyptian officials were quite concerned and disappointed. The Secretary inquired whether the Aswan Dam project was not too big for the Near East, whether it would not necessitate too great a degree of austerity in Egypt. Mr. Black replied that it would involve a certain degree of austerity; Egypt would have to give up other things, but no other project would have the same impact. . . . . However, he thought that if the West did not proceed with the project, the Soviets would make a deal during Nasser's Moscow visit in August, and that this would have a tremendous impact. Whether or not the Soviets would succeed in building the Dam was another question, at least they would try to do so. The project is popular in Egypt and Nasser has committed himself politically. The Soviets are putting forth fancy offers. There is some talk of no interest and repayment over a very long period by shipments of cotton. The West cannot match these terms. However, Nasser gave every indication of preferring to make an agreement with the West; perhaps because he feels the hot breath of the Russians uncomfortably close to the back of his neck.

The Secretary described the knotty difficulties with Congress over the project. It had contributed to the alienation of southern Senators. If the project were pushed today, a rider would be introduced prohibiting the use of funds for the Dam. [2] Such a rider might be tacked on any way. Mr. Black inquired whether it would not be advisable to explain the situation to Nasser. He thought that any statement should be made before a possible agreement with the Soviets, since it would be much weaker if made afterwards. He inquired what the reaction in Congress would be if there were an

[2] The legislation under reference became the Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1957 when President Eisenhower signed it into law on July 31, 1956. (Public Law 853; 70 Stat. 733)

Egyptian-Soviet deal. The Secretary explained that if we discussed Congressional opposition with Nasser now, we would be implying a willingness to proceed with the Dam after the bill was passed. He thought that regardless of what members of Congress might say, that they would be relieved to see a Soviet-Egyptian agreement. There is a belief in Congress that the Soviets would make a mess of the project; that it would be wise to call the bluff of certain countries threatening to turn to the Soviet bloc. The Secretary added that the Dam had already cost us much, not only in Congress, but in the form of political support from friendly countries. He thought that it would be difficult to complete the project without also antagonizing the Egyptian people who were bound to be pinched by the required austerity measures. He was not sure that the USSR could undertake the project and earn lasting credit thereby. He did not wish to imply that he was definitely opposed to proceeding with the offer, but he saw a good many hazards. Mr. Black referred to the political risks involved in accepting an Egyptian-Soviet agreement. The Secretary agreed Egypt was a bad spot in which to let the USSR obtain a foothold.

Mr. Black remarked that the press had asked him whether the IBRD would participate if an agreement were made with the USSR. He had replied that the matter had not come up and had refused to discuss such a hypothetical question.

Mr. Black mentioned that the Suez Canal Co. was proposing to have Electric Bond & Share conduct a study of future Canal traffic and then recommend how the problem might be met. Kaissouni had been disturbed that the Company had not discussed the project beforehand with Egypt. Mr. Hoover said that the oil companies were also considering the construction of super tankers, which in the long run might not involve much more expense, and the possibility of a pipeline through Turkey.

The Secretary left the meeting at this point.

. . . . . .

Mr. Hoover stated that in any event the best we could do would be to return to the December offer.[3] Mr. Rountree said that it would, in fact, be necessary to ask for additional conditions. We no longer had available grant aid funds; it would be necessary to include provisions specifically banning Soviet participation; it would be necessary to provide for agreement by all the riparian states on the use of Nile waters. Mr. Black said that he would agree to these conditions.

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[3] See telegram 1282, vol. XIV, p. 868.

A discussion ensued regarding the probable availability of funds from FY 57 appropriations. It was pointed out that the overwhelming sentiment in Congress was in favor of loans. Under the best possible bill which could now be anticipated, only 25 per cent of the total funds would be available for grants. To give all of this to Egypt would wreck other vital programs. It was suggested that an IBRD loan could be supplemented by long-term ICA loans and the shipment of agricultural commodities under PL 480, with repayment in local currency over a long period. PL 480 commodities would serve to generate needed local currency.

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411. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, June 27, 1956.

SUBJECT

Shepilov's Visit to Egypt . . .

The attached report summarizes the information on the Shepilov visit to Egypt . . . .

Allen W. Dulles

[Enclosure]

SHEPILOV'S VISIT TO EGYPT . . .

A. Background of the Visit

1. The invitation to Dmitriy T. Shepilov to visit Egypt during the Evacuation Week celebration was issued some months prior to June, 1956, when Shepilov was still editor of *Pravda*. Following the announcement that Shepilov had been appointed to succeed V.M. Molotov as Soviet Foreign Minister, the Egyptian Government professed embarrassment at having Shepilov come on what would seem like an official visit. In an attempt to lend an appearance of political balance to their ceremonies, the Egyptian Government sounded out

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.74/6–2756. Secret. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw this memorandum and its enclosure.

the British on having Sir Anthony Nutting come as a representative. When Nutting could not attend, an invitation was extended to General Brian Robertson, last British commander in Egypt. . . . Prime Minister 'Abd-al-Nasr finally decided to invite all foreign ministers of the Arab states and to revamp the reviewing stand seating arrangements to prevent Shepilov from occupying a position of honor as the ranking foreign diplomat.

2. In the days immediately prior to Shepilov's scheduled visit, rumors of his probable purpose centered around these principal points:

a) that Shepilov would have a new plan for Soviet financing of the Aswan High Dam;
b) that the USSR would announce support for the 1947 and 1949 UN resolutions on Palestine;
c) that Shepilov would offer 'Abd-al-Nasr a Soviet friendship pact.

3. . . . the GOE, although expecting Shepilov to present many new social and political proposals, actually had no advance knowledge of any specific Soviet offers. . . . 'Abd-al-Nasr intended to listen to all Shepilov proposals but to commit himself to nothing during the discussion.

B. Shepilov's Proposals

1. . . . Shepilov offered the following proposals to 'Abd-al-Nasr on 17 June 1956:

a) a Soviet plan to finance the Aswan High Dam over a ten-year period. The USSR offered $400,000,000, interest-free loan, half in sterling, with repayment to be spread over 60 years;
b) the Soviet bloc would buy all of Egypt's cotton and pay for it in sterling;
c) the USSR would require no further payments for arms Egypt has already received;
d) the USSR would build a new steel factory for Egypt and construct other factories on very favorable terms.

2. Shepilov told 'Abd-al-Nasr that the USSR is aware of the strong pressure exerted by the West on Egypt to take actions which would weaken its economy. The USSR desires to help Egypt resist these pressures.

3. There is no evidence that Shepilov made any proposals or direct comments on the Israel problem, or offered a treaty of friendship.

C. Egyptian Reaction to the Shepilov Proposals

. . . . . .

2. On 22 June, in discussing the financing of the High Dam . . . the Egyptian Premier stated that nothing could be done until an agreement on the division of the Nile water was reached with the Sudan. Although the Soviets did not make this a pre-condition, he said, there was no other way to build it than by force; this would lead to a Sudanese appeal to the UN and a probable setback for Egypt.

3. During the week of Shepilov's visit, Cairo was flooded with communist tracts stating that although the communists are basically opposed to 'Abd-al-Nasr's domestic policies, it was now necessary to support him in order to protect Egypt against imperialism and international capitalism. . . . this line was now being followed by the three major communist factions in Cairo.

4. As far as can be determined, no specific, firm agreements emerged from the Shepilov–'Abd-al-Nasr meetings. A joint communiqué declaring the complete unity of opinion on all subjects discussed and acknowledging a common interest in developing Soviet-Egyptian relations in political, economic and cultural fields was issued before Shepilov departed.

5. . . . 'Abd-al-Nasr . . . is apprehensive of Soviet offers and has definite misgivings about committing the nation to long-range economic dependence on the Soviet bloc. 'Abd-al-Nasr would prefer to receive major economic assistance from the United States and the West. He told a confidant that he would not accept the Soviet offers at this time but would wait until his departure for Yugoslavia (12 July) to see whether the United States would make a firm counter-offer.

D. Comments . . .

1. Shepilov apparently presented a series of attractive offers but 'Abd-al-Nasr seems disposed to think them over carefully, perhaps leaking information on them to the United States, hoping for some balancing offer from the West.

2. Indications are that 'Abd-al-Nasr still has as a primary objective the maintenance of an independent position between Soviet and Western blocs. The Shepilov discussions, although an outgrowth of ceremonies originally planned for Evacuation week, provided 'Abd-al-Nasr with another opportunity to put pressure on the West.

3. 'Abd-al-Nasr is probably anxious to avoid a break with the United States. His judgment as to how far he can safely go with the Soviet bloc without precipitating such a break, is probably affected, however, by his determination to settle the Israeli issue on Arab terms and to continue his campaign against British and French positions in Africa and the Middle East.

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412. Memorandum of Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 28, 1956 [1]

Present at the 289th Council meeting were the following: The Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 1, 2 and 3); the Secretary of Commerce (for Items 2 and 3); the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director, International Cooperation Administration (for Item 2); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board (for Item 3); the Chairmen, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (for Item 2); the Under Secretary of State; Assistant Secretary of State Bowie; Mr. Victor Cooley, Office of Defense Mobilization (for Items 2, 3 and 4); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Special Assistants to the President Anderson and Jackson; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on significant world developments with specific references to reaction outside the Soviet bloc to the publication of Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress and to the subsequent de-Stalinization campaign.]

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on June 29.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that, owing to the length of the previous discussion, he would shorten the remainder of his intelligence briefing. He did wish, however, to mention a few developments. There was a report . . . that when the new Soviet Foreign Minister, Shepilov, visited Cairo he had offered to assist the Egyptians to build the High Aswan dam. Allegedly the offer consisted of a loan of 400 million for 60 years, with no interest. The report states that Shepilov also offered to cancel in toto the Egyptian debt for all bloc arms acquired by Egypt up to this time. Lastly, he had offered to take all of Egypt's cotton crop and to build a steel mill at very low interest rates.

Secretary Humphrey said he was glad to hear of the Soviet offer to build the High Aswan dam, and be hoped the Egyptians would accept it, since that was the best possible thing that could happen for the United States.

With respect to the Russians taking over the High Aswan dam project, Secretary Dulles commented that the immediate results would be bad for the United States, but that the long-term results might be very good. Whatever nation undertakes to carry through this project was bound to end up by being very unpopular with the Egyptians. The building of the dam was bound to place a heavy burden on the Egyptian economy and standard of living, and the Egyptians would blame the austerities they suffered on the nation which was undertaking this great project. Moreover, the Egyptians would continuously ask for further financial assistance from this nation. In short, the project of building the dam would prove a terrific headache to any nation that undertook it.

Secretary Humphrey again commented that he hoped that the United States would not be saddled with this undertaking. Governor Stassen inquired as to whether the immediate reaction would be bad if the United States actually withdrew its current offer to assist Egypt in building the High Aswan dam. Secretary Humphrey replied that he did not care how we did it, but if there were any way for the United States to back out of the offer, he desperately hoped that we would seize upon it.

Continuing his briefing on the Soviet Foreign Minister's tour of the Middle East, Mr. Allen Dulles said that in Syria [2] the Syrian Prime Minister had attempted to get a strong anti-Israeli statement out of Shepilov. [3] He had failed to do so, and the results had been bad for Shepilov ever since then, as was shown by the critical

[2] Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov visited Syria June 22–25.

[3] The Syrian Prime Minister tried to get such a statement of support for the Arab cause from Shepilov on June 23.

statement on Shepilov issued by the Government of the Lebanon.[4] In Egypt, Colonel Nasser had apparently been very cautious in his dealings with Shepilov, and Mr. Dulles said he doubted if, on balance, Shepilov's visit had significantly changed the situation in Egypt.

[Here follows discussion of the situation in Iceland and in Guatemala.]

The National Security Council:[5]

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to reaction outside the Soviet bloc to the publication of Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress and to the subsequent de-Stalinization campaign; the behavior of Soviet leaders at the Kremlin reception for visiting Air Force delegations; the Soviet Foreign Minister's trip to the Middle East; and the situations in Iceland and in Guatemala.

[Here follows discussion of East-West exchanges, United States civil aviation policy toward the Soviet Union and its satellites, and United States policies toward the Near East.]

S. Everett Gleason

[4] Shepilov visited Lebanon June 25–28.

[5] The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1576. (Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 289th Meeting, June 28, and approved by the President on June 29; Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

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413. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State[1]

Cairo, June 28, 1956—3 p.m.

2589. Reference Department cirtel 904.[2] Specific information lacking reference subjects discussed with Shepilov. Seems probable discussions were primarily economic and we believe they centered

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6180/6–2856. Secret; Priority. Received at 7:40 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Benghazi, Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, Alexandria, Port Said, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Belgrade, Athens, Rome, Tehran, Karachi, and New Delhi.

[2] Circular telegram 904, June 23, requested the Embassies in Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, and Tel Aviv to furnish an analysis of the Shepilov visits. (*Ibid.*, 033.6180/6–2356)

on reiteration Russian preparedness finance or participate in financing High Dam. . . . . In addition appears probable Russians may have made firm offers to purchase (perhaps to some extent with sterling) bulk of Egypt's exportable surplus cotton and to have undertaken construct factories in Egypt. We have also heard Russian project construct atomic reactor progressing favorably but details as yet unclear. . . .

In political field no specific information available other than that obtained via Iraqi Ambassador (Embtel 2558 [3]) to effect Soviets had expressed intent go along with U.N. efforts towards Palestine settlement (with GOE concurring only in so far as reduction border tension involved) and had generally expressed support Arab position on Algeria without specific endorsement Arab tactics. We have heard no reports reference discussion "anti-colonialism" or Baghdad Pact (which we assume took place) nor has there been any mention discussion friendship treaty or other political agreements.

Reaction in Egypt to Shepilov visit appears mixed. General Egyptian assumption appears to be that irrespective vagueness communiqué, general agreement was reached in foreign policy and cultural fields and Soviets have left with GOE specific proposals in economic field. Reference latter Egyptians now appear expect increasingly closer association with Soviet bloc. While there is some skepticism in banking and commercial circles and among other sophisticated elements (including some army officers) regarding Soviet motives and compatibility present trend with Egypt's interests, these groups currently politically ineffective and their doubts are, we believe, generally offset by widespread belief in left wing and nationalist circles that it is wishful thinking to expect West finance Dam on terms compatible Egyptian sovereignty, that dangers of dealing with Soviets in present era of "détente" have been exaggerated, and that in any case Egypt must move forward politically and economically irrespective risks.

Results of Shepilov visit will not, we think, be immediately apparent. Nasser has gone out of his way to play down visit by having communiqué drafted as vaguely as possible and by subordinating its treatment in press to celebration evacuation, referendum and proclamation new regime. Visit has, however, most probably provided GOE with concrete proposals which Nasser can fall back on if he fails obtain from West equally firm (although not necessarily so extensive) commitments as to extent to which West willing go meet Egypt's economic requirements. Since it is doubtful that Nasser believes West is now prepared to follow through on High Dam project, we expect that even during this "period of grace" news

[3] Document 409.

media may begin prepare Egyptian and Arab world for announcement acceptance Soviet economic offers on excuse Western indifference, stalling or insistence upon "conditions" incompatible Egyptian independence and sovereignty. Extent to which Western "culpability" and "perfidy" will be stressed in such output probably depends on general atmosphere then prevailing in area, Western reaction if Soviet offer is accepted and domestic need quench any opposition such acceptance. We inclined believe that in absence resumption negotiations by West, Soviet High Dam offer will probably be accepted prior opening of parliament and possibly prior Nasser's return from Moscow.

In political field, Nasser apparently still hopes (and we have no evidence that Shepilov has sought dissuade him) that Egypt can follow genuinely independent foreign policy maintaining good relations with West as well as East providing West is prepared accept his definition as to what is in interests Egypt and Arabs. Seems probable this concept will be reaffirmed in course his forthcoming meetings with Nehru and Tito in Yugoslavia. In long run however probable Western refusal collaborate with Egypt in economic and political fields substantially on latter's terms combined with increasing pressures from domestic leftist and nationalist elements in favor more active "liberation" policy suggests chances success this policy are at best problematical.

Instead, we can probably expect that increasing Egyptian economic dependence on Soviets and continuation general Soviet endorsement Egyptian foreign policy will be reflected externally by continuing Government of Egypt emphasis on dangers to Egypt, Arabs and Africans from "imperialists" and internally by trend away from Western influenced economic and political concepts in direction socialism. Speed at which this trend will develop will depend, among other things, on role of army which although nationalist has strong middle class conservative economic and social sentiments, on reaction other influential elements opposed to more intensive cooperation with Soviet bloc and on extent to which labor, intellectuals and other leftist-nationalist elements possibly supported by youth and peasants are able exert contrary pressures. We consider it likely that withdrawal Western support from Egypt would shortly be followed by further development strong indigenous nationalist movement whose internal policies would be authoritarian and whose foreign policies would be increasingly anti-Western.

Effect such development in area as whole cannot be predicted from here with certainty but we can surely expect that Soviet-Egyptian partnership will be carefully followed by peoples Near East

and Africa for proof whether, as Soviets claim, Arabs with help their new-found friends can achieve status as power to be reckoned with.

Byroade

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414. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, June 28, 1956—8:10 p.m.

3099. Eyes only for Ambassador.

Dear Hank:

You will recall our talk last January [2] about the desirability of shifting you to a new post where you would have somewhat less strain than is now the case. We both agreed then that this should not be hurried and not occur under conditions which would lead to any seriously false impressions as to alterations of our policy. I have come to conclusion that now would be a good time to make the shift of which we talked, and intend to propose to the President your appointment as Ambassador to South Africa. [3]

I need not, of course, go into detail with you about the importance of South Africa to us at this crucial stage of its development, and that of all Africa. You are as aware of these matters as any American; and have, I know, given them much thought. I want you to know, however, that I am personally convinced your presence South Africa will be in interest US and will contribute to your own development and to your value to the Service. I am also convinced, as I think we both agreed, that after more than 4 years of identification with the nerve-straining problems of the Near East, a change of environment and change of pace would be in your long-term interest.

I want to take this occasion to repeat again with greatest earnestness what I said to you before, namely that I consider you one of the very able members of the Foreign Service and have

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123–Byroade, Henry A. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Hanes and Dulles, cleared with Hoover, and approved by Secretary Dulles.

[2] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, he met alone with Byroade on January 5 from 12:18 p.m. to 12:55 p.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[3] President Eisenhower appointed Byroade Ambassador to South Africa on July 26, 1956.

tremendous admiration for the resourcefulness and perseverance which you have displayed in the various tasks which have come to you, most recently that at Cairo. I believe that you have a great future before you.

I would appreciate a prompt cable in response as you can understand other changes are involved. [4] Sincerely yours, John Foster Dulles.

Dulles

[4] See Document 448.

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415. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the First Secretary of the Israeli Embassy (Arad) and James M. Ludlow of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, Washington, June 29, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Immediate Developments in the Palestine Question

Arad and I had one of our "regular" luncheons today at his request. I commenced our conversation by asking him if he had any information or ideas as to what would be Mr. Sharett's future now that he was no longer Foreign Minister. Arad replied that from here it was difficult to see what Sharett's future might be, but we might all know a little more about it and his Government's plans after this weekend. When I asked him what was planned for the weekend he merely laughed and said that he assumed that the Embassy would have some later news on Mr. Sharett's status.

I said that I was sorry to see Mr. Sharett leave his post. Despite all the difficulties and differences of opinion which might have occurred between the United States and Israel, Mr. Sharett had represented a degree of caution and moderation which was essential if there was ever to be any peace and stability in the Near East. In saying this I did not mean this to be any reflection on Mrs. Myerson. I certainly trusted that things would continue in their present relative state of lack of tension. I felt that in Israel's and our

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.13/6–2956. Confidential. Drafted on July 2 by Ludlow.

interest it was of real importance at this stage of the game that nothing be done to upset a perhaps uneasy but nonetheless calm which prevailed in the area. From Israel's point of view there was everything to gain and nothing to lose by avoiding any untoward difficulties or incidents. Shepilov had now had his trip to the Near East and he had returned to Moscow leaving the Arabs apparently empty-handed. While it was, of course, impossible to know for sure what might have been the "under the table deals" which Shepilov might have made with Nasser, it seemed superficially clear that the Arabs had not gotten the support for their point of view from Shepilov which they had expected to get. From what I could gather this was a particularly bitter disappointment in Damascus and Beirut. In both capitals much more forthright commitments from Shepilov had obviously been expected, and now because they had not gotten what they wanted there might be a very definite period of disillusionment and reconsideration as far as Arab policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was concerned. I was sure that Arad appreciated that once an Arab discovers that someone he thought was a friend was really not as much of a friend as he thought the bitterness and reaction which set in was extreme. It was possible that the Shepilov visit might engender new doubts and suspicions in the Arab mind as to Soviet objectives in the area and this would be all for the good so far as Israel and the free world were concerned.

Arad agreed with my suggestion that the Arabs were probably quite disappointed with the Shepilov trip and asked me what my analysis was as to why Shepilov had not made all the dramatic promises and gestures which many of us pessimistically expected during the trip. I replied that, as he and I had previously discussed, I thought there was basis for believing that the Soviets actually were somewhat alarmed that the arms deal had almost overcommitted them to support the Arabs in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. This was not what they desired, certainly at this stage of the game. Accordingly, they had probably felt it necessary to chill the emotions and irrationalities of the Arabs, particularly the Syrians, otherwise they might find themselves being called upon to support military activities in the area which they could not sustain, at least not now.

Arad said that assuming my analysis were correct, and he was inclined to think that it probably was, the fact could not be dismissed that new deals might have been made between the Soviets and Egypt. More arms might be coming into the area and the military situation would thereby become even more unbalanced. I said that it was, of course, always a possibility, as I had already mentioned, that deals might have been concluded or the Soviets might have deals planned for Nasser's visit to the Soviet Union. For

what it was worth, however, it was my guess that the Soviets would not now pump further munitions into the Arab countries and therefore the military imbalance would not necessarily be increased. Rather the only developments in the immediate future might be some further assimilation of the war matériel by the Egyptian armed forces which they had received from the Soviets.

Arad then asked me what the latest news was on the Aswan Dam and particularly what had been the results of Mr. Black's visit to Cairo. I said that personally I was not familiar with the details beyond gathering that what Mr. Black had said to the press was a full enough description of the present situation, namely, that the status of the various offers so far as the Aswan Dam was concerned had not really changed materially since last February. [2] This seemed to me to be another possible indication of the fact that the Shepilov visit had not been up to what the Arabs had expected. This again tended to underscore my conviction that in the possible period of quiet reflection that ought to follow the Shepilov visit the Israelis should not do anything which would tend to force a public realignment between the Arab countries and the Soviet Union. Arad merely replied vaguely that we would all have to await developments in this regard although he saw my point.

He then asked if it were true that Secretary General Hammarskjold was becoming increasingly concerned over the Arab-Israeli situation. (Having asked the question, he then said that Hammarskjold had so indicated recently to Mr. Kidron in New York.) I said that it was my guess that Hammarskjold was uneasy over possible developments in the area and I thought that that was an uneasiness which was shared by many. Arad wanted to know if it were developments within the Arab states or if Israel had something to do with it. I said that it was developments both in the Arab states and Israel. Having said this, I wanted to stress particularly what might be the basis for increasing uneasiness so far as Israel was concerned. I repeated that I was not in any way reflecting on Mrs. Myerson, but rightly or wrongly many people throughout the world were bound to be somewhat concerned by Mr. Sharett's dismissal because we all knew him to epitomize the counsels of caution and moderation in his government. It might very well be that from Israel's point of view there would be distinct advantage in the days ahead where its leadership would be far less predictable than had been the case with Mr. Sharett. I didn't question Ben Gurion's sincere desire for peace in the area. How he arrived at it, however, was something which had a direct bearing on the ways and means of the United States and other peace-loving countries assisting in achieving that peace.

[2] Black's statements to the press have not been identified.

We clearly could not be at the mercy of forces which we could not predict. It was bad enough to estimate what the Arabs were going to do, and our problem was simply compounded by the possibility of not knowing what Mr. Ben Gurion was going to do.

Arad interjected very fervently that I should understand that Ben Gurion was a man of peace and that it was only through his personal power and leadership that Israel had not reacted completely and violently to the Fedayeen attacks of last summer and this April. I replied that I already said that I believed Ben Gurion was a man of peace. I was sure he had been a deciding influence for peace so far as Israel's reaction to the Fedayeen raids was concerned. I also thought that it was perfectly clear that he had been responsible for the Gaza raid. Arad retorted immediately that this couldn't be, since he wasn't in the government at the time. When I reminded him that Ben Gurion had succeeded to the Ministry of Defense only a week before the Gaza raid and must have known that it was going to be perpetrated if he did not direct it, Arad subsided and protested again that Ben Gurion was *the* major force for peace in Israel. I repeated a third time that I believed he really was a man of peace, but how he got peace was something which was going to require international cooperation and not unpredictable unilateral actions. What he, Arad, had told me more than ever convinced me of the fact that from now on the foreign policy of Israel would be far more identifiable with the personality and decisions of Ben Gurion. It was for this reason that I again stressed my hope that Israel would see the enormous advantage of a period of calm which would provide reflection by the Arabs on their relations with the Soviet Union and perhaps arising therefrom a greater degree of Arab rationality which might lead to significant developments in bringing peace in the area.

Arad again said that he saw my point, but concluded bitterly that the United States had done nothing in the past to make a policy of moderation "pay off" in Israel.

416. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State [1]

Ottawa, June 29, 1956—noon.

482. For Secretary and Allen. I talked at some length this morning to Paul Martin on Israel. He is acting for Pearson in latter's absence. He told me cabinet decided after Israeli Ambassador's talk with Prime Minister last week [2] that Canada definitely would not act alone in supply of fighter aircraft Israel. Prime Minister, however, was authorized explore with Eden in London possibility of Canada acting collectively in matter. Actual furnishing arms by US would not be sine qua non but some public benison and sharing of moral responsibility would be expected of us.

I explained at length reasons underlying our policy. It came out that, in Martin's mind at least, controlling negative factor is belief Canada has potentially useful mediator role with Arabs in various upcoming issues in UN involving Arab bloc. He is opposed to jeopardizing this Canadian position which he thinks important in our common interest. Martin confirmed that since your talk with Pearson in Paris last month, [3] latter had been strong, consistent but sole advocate supply Israel by Canada of F 86's.

I believe any possibility independent action by Canada in this matter is gone.

Merchant

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5622/6–2956. Secret; Priority. Received at 3:24 p.m.

[2] See Document 404.

[3] See Document 325.

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417. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, June 30, 1956—1 p.m.

465. General Burns told me following yesterday. At interview with Ben-Gurion and Myerson June 28, Ben-Gurion raised two main

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/6–3056. Secret; Priority. Received at 1:53 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Tel Aviv.

points (1) Jordan border incidents, and (2) alleged Jordanian non-compliance Article VIII of Israel–Jordan GAA. Burns frankly alarmed at what he believes may be Ben-Gurion's intentions for dealing with both problems.

1. Ben-Gurion emphasized deterioration Jordan border, culminating in Qalqylia incident June 24 (Contel 464 [2]). Ben-Gurion alleges public threats of King Hussein and Abu Nuwwar responsible, as they naturally translated by Jordanian frontier guards into action. Ben-Gurion told Burns he does not consider that cease-fire arranged by UNSYG [3] precludes Israeli retaliation such incidents. . . . If events follow this order, Burns says it may be almost impossible for him to name aggressor. He considers that UNSYG's cease-fire does not permit retaliation, though self-defensive fire if other party crosses DL and perhaps covering protective fire may be allowable. . . . Burns hopes to persuade Abu Nuwwar on July 2 to exercise greater control over frontier guards, prevent cycle of incidents. He thinks Egypt does not want war now but cannot gauge extent her influence on Jordan border.

2. Ben-Gurion alleges Jordan longstanding violation of Article VIII of GAA concerning Israel access to cultural institutions Mount Scopus, religious sites, and direct Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road via Latroun. Ben-Gurion claims this violation invalidates rest of GAA, therefore "the armistice line does not exist." Burns comment: Article VIII guarantees no rights to either side, merely provides for a committee to discuss the matters referred to. Ben-Gurion refuses to recognize this, refers to "Israeli rights". . . .

. . . . . .

New subject. Burns has told Israelis verbally to remove fortifications in central DZ on Syrian border. He is drafting written request. He does not expect Israeli compliance.

Sabini

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[2] Cole informed the Department in telegram 464, June 29, that an incident had occurred on June 24 near Qalqylia which had resulted in the deaths of two IDF frontier police and the wounding of one member of the Jordanian National Guard, and that the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission on June 28 had adopted a "Jordanian resolution condemning Israel for firing across lines in border incident of June 24 caused [*causing*] withdrawal of Israel counter resolution and condemnation of MAC by both Doron and Israel Foreign Ministry spokesman for 'white-washing' Jordanian aggression and equalizing blame". (*Ibid.*, 684A.85/6–2956)

[3] See Documents 317 and 320.

418. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, July 2, 1956—noon.

1. General Burns came to see me last night on what he termed important business. He felt as result his recent talks with Ben Gurion and Myerson (Jerusalem 244 to Department [2]) that Israel now likely take unilateral action with Jordan in event border incidents continue. According to Burns Ben Gurion made it clear if neither UN or Jordan authorities able prevent future border firing by Jordanians Israel would have to take its own measures. Ben Gurion remarked there was King of Jordan and commander of military forces who should maintain order and prevent border troubles by their military. Instead they busy threatening Israel. Myerson asked how Jordanian soldier on border could be expected be restrained when his leaders loudly proclaiming Jordan going to destroy Israel.

Second point made by Ben Gurion was his interpretation of article VIII of GAA establishing in principle right of Israel access to Mount Scopus through creation of committee charged with finding practical ways for such access. Burns description Ben Gurion's comment this point followed closely reftel adding ref also made to access to Wailing Wall. In view extent of discussion this subject and emphasis placed thereon Burns thought GOI may have some well-devised plan for action in direction assuring access Mount Scopus in event Jordan border incident gives Israel excuse retaliate. Burns said he told Ben Gurion he did not interpret GAA as he did; that committee was agency to decide practical solution problems connected with access Mount Scopus. These statements taken in connection with Ben Gurion's unequivocal assertion to Burns he did not share UNSYG's contention that retaliatory action by Israel would be in fact violation of GAA (Ben Gurion maintaining such action to be defensive) seemed to upset Burns who has reported conversation to UNSYG. He thought I should know situation. He informed British Chargé [3] also in view of fact Ben Gurion expected to call him in and discuss direct British interest in Jordan actions.

Burns told me he is visiting Amman Monday July 2 and will inform Jordan authorities Ben Gurion attitude re continued border

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–256. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:02 p.m. Sent also to Amman and repeated to London, Paris, Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus.

[2] Printed as telegram 465, *supra*.

[3] Peter Alan Westlake.

incidents and Mount Scopus.[4] He said he expected "blast" from them as well. He will see British Ambassador Duke.

Telegram with comments and suggestions follows.[5]

Lawson

[4] See Document 421.
[5] *Infra.*

419. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State[1]

Tel Aviv, July 3, 1956—noon.

4. Reference: Embtel 1.[2] In Embassy's opinion, Ben Gurion's conversation with Burns constitutes (1) assertion of what might be termed "doctrine of reciprocal non-compliance with GAA" under which GOI considers itself morally and legally free to ignore GAA when they are violated by Arabs (cf. Embdes 844, June 28[3]) and (2) reasserts adherence to policy of retaliation against border incidents instigated by Arabs.

Both policies were enunciated in Ben Gurion's June 19 Knesset speech, complete English version of which only now available to Embassy.

Re (1) above, he said: "This government has announced it is prepared, as before, faithfully to observe GAA to letter and in spirit, but this is also duty of other side. Agreement which is violated by other side is not binding upon us, and we did not say this merely for sake of verbosity".

Re (2) "another thing we said . . .[4] to UNSYG was that if armistice lines are open to murderers and saboteurs they will not be closed against defenders. It is impossible to permit enemy to terror-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–356. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:05 p.m. Repeated to Amman, London, Paris, Cairo, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Damascus.
[2] *Supra.*
[3] Despatch 844 from Tel Aviv reported that the Israelis were increasingly resorting to invoking Article I of the General Armistice Agreements in their disputes with the Arabs. The Israeli thesis was that if the Arabs were not observing the provisions of Article I, then Israel could ignore or formally nullify or refuse to comply with certain clauses of the General Armistice Agreements. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/6–2856)
[4] Ellipses in this paragraph are in the source text.

ize us—an enemy which wants to destroy us by economic blockade and terrorization of population, in order to uproot and shatter our existence. We will not put up with this . . . I should like to congratulate UNSYG for his success, at least temporarily, in obtaining renewed guarantees from all our neighbors for total and unconditional cease fire and forbiddance of crossing of borders,[5] even though I do not believe they will observe their guarantees for very long. We told him under no circumstances, regardless of what those in higher echelons will say, will we submit our country and population to terror of our neighbors. We will stand against them with all our might and main".

This part of discussion with Burns dealing with border problems may have had practical purpose of putting Jordan on notice such incidents as Qalqiliva risk retaliation by IDF in force.

It may also be preparation before the fact of defense Israel would make to world opinion if Ben Gurion decides to move against Jordan responsive to mounting public pressures generated here by continuing violence and Israel deaths on border.

Furthermore, it is probable GOI watching carefully developments Jordan and wants to be in flexible position . . . .

Still another motive may be recapture of initiative and maneuverability he feels he lost in concessions to Hammarskjold mission thus far unmatched by Arab concessions, and spurned, as he sees it, by Security Council in its emasculated resolution of June 4.[6]

Citation of Article 8 obviously not responsive to important internal political pressures. Local public opinion has viewed dormant state of "access" issues with composure for months, if not years. More likely, it reflects renewed determination confront UN at every point with what GOI considers violation of GAA and failure UN to rectify, and is part of widening campaign to demonstrate to world opinion inability of UN to provide durable remedies to complex problems. In Embassy's view, GOI's recent invocation of Article 1 against remarks by Arab States, and Canal Zone blockade is related effort.

If Department concurs, I propose to visit Minister Myerson and inquire as to significance and purpose of Ben Gurion's reported admonitions to Burns concerning both border and Article 8. Depending on reply I could urge caution before taking any precipitate action GOI might later regret. Re Article 8 could suggest renewal of efforts

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[5] See Documents 317 and 320.

[6] See Document 376.

to establish committee therein envisaged as advisable Israeli preliminary any further stand.[7]

Simultaneously suggest Department may wish to consider advising Embassy Amman to talk to Jordanians, conveying in most suitable manner desirability of exerting maximum control to avert incidents capable of being interpreted by Israelis as violations of cease-fire.

Although Jordan only other country involved this stage, we should not overlook probability GOI will intensify complaints re SS *Panagia*, which apparently still detained at Suez.[8] On balance, believe GOI hopeful Burns will be successful his efforts in Amman to establish order, tranquility, particularly because Israelis regard Egypt as key enemy at this stage.

Lawson

[7] Telegram 7 to Tel Aviv, July 4, informed Lawson of approval of his proposal to see Myerson and inquire about possible Israeli military action against Jordan and establishment of fortified settlements in the demilitarized zone. Lawson was instructed to "underline wide repercussions which these activities might have and effect they may have on efforts which US is making to assist Israel in strengthening its security. You should avoid discussion of Article VIII at this stage." (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–356)

[8] The S.S. *Panagia* was a Greek vessel detained by the Egyptians when it sought to transit the Suez Canal on a voyage from Haifa to Eilat.

420. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Israeli Ambassador (Eban) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen), Department of State, Washington, July 3, 1956[1]

SUBJECT

Resignation of Sharett; Israel's Need for Fighter Planes

Ambassador Eban, who has just returned from a week in Israel, gave me interesting information concerning the resignation of Sharett. He said it had been entirely at the instance of Ben Gurion, who had "suddenly woke up one morning and decided to get rid of Sharett". Eban compared it to a couple who had been living together for forty years and suddenly decide to divorce. Ben Gurion and

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.13/7–356. Confidential. Drafted by Allen.

Sharett have quarrelled over various matters for many years but nothing whatsoever has happened recently, according to Eban, to worsen their relationship. He declared that no policy question whatever was involved in the resignation and that it was purely a personal clash. Eban emphasized that any speculation that Israel might now go over to a preventative war policy was entirely incorrect. He said the resignation had caused very considerable internal turmoil in Israel, which has no written constitution and no basis for judging whether Ben Gurion was legally justified in requesting Sharett's resignation. . . . Ben Gurion's tendency toward dictatorial methods have apparently increased with age.

Eban said he was under instructions to take up two matters with the Secretary during his interview early next week.[2] He had been told to avoid theoretical discussions and try to obtain practical results on obtaining F–86 fighter planes from either Canada or Italy. He asked my opinion whether Israel had any chance of obtaining such planes from Canada or whether he should concentrate on Italy. I said I thought there was still a possibility that Canada might sell.

The second matter was to get prompt action on the Export-Import Bank loan for developing coastal waters. Eban said that if the Secretary asked for assurances that Israel would not cut the canal at Banat Ya'qub "the day after the loan", he could obtain such assurances readily.

[2] Eban spoke Dulles on July 10; see Document 451.

421. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State[1]

Amman, July 3, 1956—5 p.m.

6. Re Jerusalem's 465 to Department;[2] Tel Aviv's 1 to Department.[3] King Hussein summoned representatives of Arab countries and tripartite signatories to Palace at noon today. After talking with

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–356. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:59 p.m. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Document 417.

[3] Document 418.

Arabs as a group he called in British, French Ambassadors [4] and myself together.

King said matter had arisen of such urgency he felt it necessary inform the interested governments. He referred to information passed him on July 2 by General Burns regarding the latter's recent interview with Ben Gurion and Myerson. According to King, Ben Gurion claimed Jordan is violating Article VIII of GAA by depriving Israel of access to Mount Scopus and Wailing Wall as well as use of Latroun road. King said Ben Gurion insisted that unless Jordan changed its position regarding these matters Israel would be forced to consider that the armistice line does not exist.

King Hussein emphasized past efforts of HK to maintain peace on 600 kilometer border in spite of repeated Jewish aggression. He assured us he and his government and officers would do everything possible to prevent incidents originating from Arab side of line. He stated however that General Burns felt Ben Gurion may be planning aggressive action of some sort. Should such develop Jordan will be forced to defend itself in strength. If this happens the other Arab States will come to Jordan's aid. Thus Jewish aggression at this time would produce most unfortunate results whose consequences would be widespread.

Ambassador Duke asked if King had in mind any specific recommendations which we should make to our governments in this regard. King said he left that up to us. He had merely called us in to make us aware of situation and to request that we pass on his views immediately to our respective governments. The French Ambassador volunteered that Ben Gurion might be taking his present line for purposes of internal consumption in Israel or else to test out Arab reactions but King indicated no agreement with either of these suggestions.

In conclusion Ambassador Duke emphasized our hope that there would be no provocation either by words or deeds from Jordan side of line. [5] The King replied he would continue to do everything in his power to prevent incidents arising but that should Jewish aggression occur he would have to meet force with force. On our leaving he again asked that we inform our governments of this situation at earliest possible moment.

Sanger

[4] Sir Charles Beresford Duke and Pierre-Louis Falaize.

[5] The Department instructed Sanger on July 5 to reiterate to King Hussein, when it was appropriate, this statement. (Telegram 13 to Amman; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–556)

422. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, July 3, 1956—2 p.m.

2. Re Department telegram 237. [2] In absence Burns in Amman and Cairo, have consulted Hommel, Vigier, and Bayard on Kibbutzim El Auja DZ and marking DL.

No new Kibbutzim established in DZ. One new Kibbutz built immediately north of DZ on Beersheba Road, two others in planning stage further north on road. Bayard thinks all three military installations. June 30 UN observer reported partial erection three barrack-type buildings in tent camp at Birein in DZ. Camp in existence since February, water pipeline recently completed, tested once but not in use. This site probably part of projected Negev settlements reported Consulate telegram 421. [3] Camp is strategically located, strongly fortified with extensive mine fields. Though permanent Kibbutz not yet established, Hommel says prefab buildings could go up over night, and recent construction may indicate imminence establishment Kibbutz.

UN observers do not have right visit settlements or military positions in DZ. They are confined to "main roads" in DZ, have been fired at several times as warning not approach certain areas. However, Hommel and Vigier say observers can see all they need from distance.

On marking DL, Israelis refuse permit UNTSO personnel do marking. They insist joint marking be done through agreement selves and Egyptians, or will allow Egyptians erect markers their side DL. According Hommel, Burns pointed out Israelis agreed to UN marking with UNSYG. Israelis replied many subjects discussed with SYG but not agreed on. When asked for copy verbatim report of SYG's negotiations, Israelis replied it "being edited". Bayard believes Israelis desire Egyptians mark DL to impress refugees, Israelis holding that marking primarily designed stop infiltration. UN holds marking primarily necessary to enable military positions both sides determine if crossing DL by civilians or military patrols has actually occurred. Bayard says even UN observers have mistakenly alleged

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–356. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:09 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Damascus, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Telegram 237 to Jerusalem, June 29, transmitted a report by the Army Attaché in Tel Aviv that the Israelis had established two new kibbutzim in the demilitarized zone and were refusing to permit U.N. marking of the demarcation line. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–2956)

[3] Telegram 421, April 14, informed the Department of Burns' report to the United Nations that the Israelis were preparing to begin establishing new settlements near the El Auja demilitarized zone. (*Ibid.*, 784A.00/4–1456)

crossings, as present Israeli ditch invisible from many positions. Vigier sees no early prospect Israeli agreement to marking by UN.

Sabini

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423. Memorandum From the Representative of the British Chiefs of Staff (Denny) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) [1]

Washington, July 5, 1956.

SUBJECT

American Action in the Event of Arab Aggression

On the instructions of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff I am writing to you in connection with recent discussions between the State Department and the Foreign Office on the United States proposal to provide Israel with a number of F.86 aircraft in the event of Arab aggression against that country.

2. As you will be aware the United Kingdom has agreed that planning for this operation should proceed on the assumption that the aircraft could be transferred in Cyprus. At the same time it was proposed through diplomatic channels that further discussions could now best be conducted between the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the B.J.S.M. and it is hoped that this arrangement is agreeable to the Joint Chiefs. [2]

3. In anticipation of these discussions, the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff are currently engaged in a study of the proposal as it would affect the United Kingdom and, in particular, in connection with the arrangements which would be required on Cyprus. To assist them to make a realistic study they have asked me to obtain certain additional information.

4. In making this request the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff wish to point out that the facilities and accommodation in Cyprus would be at a premium in conditions envisaged and the handover to the Israelis would have to be carefully phased in, if offensive operations were not to be prejudiced. While therefore appreciating that the Joint Chiefs of Staff ideas may not be finalised at this time

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5622/7–556. Top Secret.
[2] See Document 402.

they would be grateful for the following information as early as possible:

(i) Number of aircraft involved and rate of flow.
(ii) Will the handover arrangements be planned to phase in with the proposed redeployment of U.S.A.F. F.86 units to Cyprus.
(iii) Approximate size of handover and servicing parties for accommodation purposes.
(iv) Will main logistic backing necessary for Israeli operation of F.86's be passed through Cyprus or shipped direct.
(v) Confirmation that no training or familiarization for Israeli pilots will be required in Cyprus.

5. In addition to these specific queries the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have suggested that as it has been proposed that detailed planning for operations under the Tripartite Declaration should eventually take place in Cyprus or London, it might be desirable to undertake planning for the F.86 handover, as it affects the United Kingdom, at that time. The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff would be glad to have the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff views on this proposal. [3]

Michael Denny [4]
Admiral

[3] The U.S. reply, handed to Makins on July 16, is printed as the attachment to Document 462.
[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

424. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State [1]

Amman, July 5, 1956—3 p.m.

8. Rome for RLG. Burns talk with Hussein has stirred up veritable hornets nest here. King much disturbed (Embtel 6 [2]) and many rumors circulating in Jordan re likelihood Israeli attack.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–556. Secret; Priority. Received at 1:48 p.m. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Dhahran, Jerusalem, London, Rome, and Tel Aviv. Passed to the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force at 2:35 p.m.
[2] Document 421.

Number of Legion officers attending July 4 reception last night called out suddenly and Americans returning to homes delayed by troop movements going west through Amman.

Counselor British Embassy [3] told me this morning he understood troops involved included first reserve infantry regiment, most of tank regiment and substantial parts of two armored car regiments. Most of these forces reported to have crossed Jordan River, some going towards Jerusalem, others north towards Beisan. He said only one regiment of infantry and a few tanks left at Zerqa.

British Counselor, who handles operational contacts with Legion for Ambassador Duke, also told me he was approached this morning by Issak Assis, Finance Director Arab Legion, with urgent request for approximately one million pounds worth ammunition including rifle and machine gun shells, artillery shells and barbed wire. Counselor indicated he thought HMG would meet such a request within the limits of the subsidy and might go beyond limits of British subsidies to Jordan if latter put up proper financial cover. Jordanians requested material be supplied from British ME stocks on most urgent basis. Counselor's personal opinion was that British would give favorable consideration so doing if this action would not cut into British global munition supplies.

At start of telephone call to American Consulate General Jerusalem this morning Embassy officer making call instructed by monitor to talk only in Arabic. MA reports all Arab Legion leaves cancelled including administrative staff.

Undersecretary Foreign Office [4] confirmed to me extensive Jordanian troop movements taking place towards West Bank. He said Syrians and Egyptians also moving up troops and certain units Iraqi army were standing by near Jordanian border. He said "we have been warned of likelihood of an Israeli attack and we do not intend to be caught unprepared".

British Ambassador disturbed and has requested British ME Command standby on 48 hour notice in event evacuation becomes necessary. We are alerting chief wardens to possibility activation of warning system may be necessary but not issuing any warnings or instructions to rest of personnel.

Comment: We hope Burns knew what he was doing. If purpose his visit here was to bring calm to border, opposite purpose has been served. Jordanians consider he was alerting them to possibility immediate attack and have overlooked any message he may have carried about restraint and holding back the hotheads. Chances of

[3] Robert Heath Mason.
[4] Azmi Nasashibi.

serious border incident now greatly increased and only slight provocation needed to cause strong reaction by Legion.

Sanger

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425. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 5, 1956—3 p.m.

17. Met with Burns yesterday at his request. He referred to his conversations with Ben Gurion and Myerson (elsewhere reported) [2] and described his talks in Jordan with Hussein and Abu Nuwwar. [3] He said that both had assured him that Jordan was doing its best avoid border incidents. However Jordan would be compelled respond any Israeli attack and would be supported by all other Arab States. Burns said he had told Jordanians of Israeli complaint that "provocative" speeches by Jordanian leaders were not conducive to maintenance calm along borders. Hussein would make no commitments in this respect reiterating fundamental Arab position that Palestine was Arab territory.

Burns communicated views Ben Gurion and Myerson to Fawzi July 3 and urged Egyptians use any influence available to them to help maintain calm. Fawzi replied Egypt's policy was to avoid tension and Egypt would do what it could.

Among specifics which Burns discussed with Gohar were:

1. Marking of DL in Gaza area (Jerusalem's 2 [4])—Burns told Egyptians Israelis unwilling allow UNTSO mark DZ and suggested Israelis and Egyptians might proceed mark DL in their respective sides. Gohar replied that if UNTSO officially informed Egyptians of Israelis unwillingness cooperate with UN, Egyptians would be prepared study such other proposals as UNTSO might make especially Israeli marking on Israeli side. Burns characterized Israeli position this point as consistent pattern of minimizing functions of UNTSO.

2. Al Auja—Gohar raised question "kibbutz" at Bir Ain in DZ. Burns replied legality of kubbutzes DZ had been submitted to SC by

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–556. Confidential. Received at 8:20 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Jidda.

[2] See Documents 417 and 418.

[3] See Document 421.

[4] Document 422.

Egypt although latter had not been pressed for SC consideration. He therefore considered question matter for SC, not UNTSO. Burns is of opinion camp (whether kibbutz or not) is probably "military installation".

3. No progress on resumption MAC meetings. Gohar reiterated his previous proposal that MAC could meet alternatively in Al Auja and at K 95 but said Egyptians were willing consider any other proposals Israelis might make. Burns considers Egyptian tactic due their desire avoid UNTSO proposals in derogation strict terms GAA believing such modification would subsequently be used by Israelis argue UNTSO had by implication acquiesced in Israeli occupation DZ.

4. Prisoners of war—Burns said Israelis had asked him raise specifically with Egyptians question prisoners of war exchange. Exchange has been complicated by problem of definition. Egypt held three Israelis including two "policemen" captured in region Al Auja. Israelis held 16 commandos in addition to 57 soldiers captured at Kuntilla and Sabha. Israelis had contended commandos were not prisoners of war but spies although they had charged during commando raids that commandos were part of Egyptian regular forces. At same time Israelis had difficulty accepting Egyptian contention "police" should be included in exchange as prisoners of war. Burns made no progress since Egyptians continue insist on total exchange. Burns had also been asked raise question of Greek ship.[5] Burns had not done so, however, since he knew nothing about case which had never been subject formal complaint to UNTSO.

Asked Burns whether it was true as press had reported that Secretary General was expected in area within next two weeks.[6] Burns confirmed Secretary General was expected in Jerusalem but he had not heard that he might visit Cairo as press had suggested. He commented that news had obviously been "leaked" but he was not sure by whom.

Burns seemed satisfied Jordan and Egypt doing best they can avoid flareup but recognizes matter largely in hands Israelis. He said he intends express to Israelis strong rejection Ben Gurion theory that retaliation is permissible and will point out regarding Mount Scopus that Israel's remedy is to seek reactivation committee. . . .

Meanwhile press today under headlines Israel masses forces to threaten in editorials linking reports troop concentrations to Sharett ouster, Jordan front-pages Jordanian reports of Burns mission and affirms Arab determination repel any Israeli attack.

Byroade

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[5] See footnote 8, Document 419.

[6] On July 10, U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld announced his intention to visit Israel and Egypt July 19–22 as a followup to his previous peacekeeping mission.

426. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, July 6, 1956—11 a.m.

6. Reference: Department telegram 3. [2] At 1000 zone time (0800 GMT) July 6 Burns confirmed substance Consulate Telegram 4 [3] that no Israeli troop massing and no military action Jordan border has taken place.

Burns believes origin unfounded rumor was his warning to Hussein and Nuwwar July 2 of Ben Gurion's threat of retaliation Jordan border incidents. He opines his warning magnified in transmission from Hussein via Arab Ambassadors to Arab Governments.

Sabini

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–656. Confidential; Niact. Received at 6:31 a.m. Also sent to Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, and Tel Aviv.

[2] Telegram 3 to Jerusalem, July 5, requested information concerning troop movements on the Jordanian-Israeli frontier. (*Ibid.*, 684A.85/7–556)

[3] Telegram 4 from Jerusalem, July 5, reported that rumors of Israeli troops massing on the Jordanian border were false. (*Ibid.*)

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427. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 6, 1956—3 p.m.

23. Trevelyan has told me that Fawzi yesterday reopened subject of Palestine settlement with him in some detail. He said Fawzi while circuitous as usual gave impression of speaking with authority about matter which has been discussed with Nasser and well thought out in advance. Fawzi said he also wanted to talk to me on same subject. As have not seen Fawzi for some time and as he about to leave for Brioni plan to seek appointment early next week see what he has to say. [2]

Copy Trevelyan's report to Foreign Office sent Roger Makins. [3] So that Department may obtain most accurate picture Trevelyan

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–656. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; Omega Handling. Received at 5:03 p.m.

[2] See Document 440.

[3] See the attachment to Document 433.

wiring Makins that I suggesting Department contact him on this subject.

Trevelyan's general view is that Egypt does want settlement and that Russia for motives of her own may prove to be helpful. He believes Russia fears, in event hostilities, that tripartite declaration will be used in some manner to reinstall Western troops Middle East and that they may be advising Nasser that this would be case with Suez Base. He believes Russia feels their new approach to Middle East and eventually down through Africa of open friendship and economic penetration might be jeopardized by Arab-Israeli war and therefore such conflict not now in their interests.

Byroade

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428. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, July 6, 1956—6 p.m.

9. Burns informed Amman's 8. [2] At 1130 time he had no reports of troop movements in Jordan, but said this not conclusive as UN observers do not operate throughout Jordan. He is investigating and if movements a fact, will telephone Nuwwar to advise caution. He does not plan proceed Amman.

Burns surprised alleged effect his talk July 2 with Hussein and Nuwwar. Their immediate reaction was acceptance warning, agreement caution indicated. Nuwwar explicitly said he would order no troop movements. Burns repeated this conversation to Fawzi and Gohar July 3. [3] He does not see how his statements either occasion could be interpreted as alleged. He is also puzzled at two day lapse between his conversation Hussein and Jordan troop movements reported Amman's 8.

Sabini

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–656. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:02 a.m., July 7. Repeated to Amman and Tel Aviv.

[2] Document 424.

[3] See Document 425.

429. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, July 6, 1956—1 p.m.

83. Reference Tel Aviv's 1 July 2 [2] and Amman's 6 July 3 [3] to Department. Foreign Office inclined to believe that Burns probably overstated Israel's aggressive attitude and that King Hussein consequently became unduly alarmed over situation. Foreign Office says Burns has in fact stated in Cairo that Jordanians have exaggerated his remarks to King Hussein, which he intended primarily as warning to Jordanians to prevent incidents along Israeli border. Nevertheless Kirkpatrick has called in Israeli Ambassador and expressed HMG's apprehension regarding border situation, at same time pointing out that HMG obliged under United Kingdom–Jordan treaty to come to Jordan's aid if Jordan attacked.

According to Foreign Office report from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (as of July 4) there appeared be no alarming buildup of Israel military along Jordan border although there were indications Israelis planning customary maneuvers. In this connection British Ambassador Tel Aviv pointed out that Israelis should be warned that any "overs" during such maneuvers which might land in Jordan territory might well cause serious flare-up.

Foreign Office says reports from Amman indicate Jordanian troops are on general "stand to" orders along Jordan–Israel border. Nuwar has however assured British Embassy in Amman that he has issued strictest orders to Jordan troops against creating incidents or firing across border. He pointed out, however, that if Israel should start something Jordan and other Arab countries would repel attack with everything at their disposal. Foreign Office appears reasonably convinced that Jordanians do not intend to create incidents.

Aldrich

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–656. Confidential. Received at 11:02 a.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, Paris, Cairo, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Damascus.

[2] Document 418.

[3] Document 421.

430. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, July 7, 1956—5 p.m.

17. Following is substance my discussion with Foreign Minister Myerson re matters raised Deptel 7. [2]

Ben Gurion's warning to Burns: [3] I asked her if she did not agree that spate of rumors probably could be traced to Ben Gurion's talk with Burns which had somehow been interpreted by Arab leaders as threat of Israel aggression. She denied that Prime Minister's move represented deviation from past policy. It was no more than perfectly logical appeal to highest local UN authority requesting him to make all possible efforts to establish border peace supposed to have been achieved by Hammarskjold Mission in cease-fire agreement. (She remarked that had Israelis chosen to react to border violence other than by appeal to Burns, world would have been sure to point out that he was in Israel, why hadn't GOI taken its problems to him?) Between April 26 and present, she said, there had been 86 incidents on Jordan border, many of them of no great importance, but nevertheless including Israelis killed and 6 wounded.

When Ben Gurion asked Burns to approach Jordanians to urge restraint, latter agreed, saying he had planned to go to Amman anyway. War scare was inexplicable to her except in terms of screen for internal machinations in Arab world. Arab states bordering Jordan are getting into position to move swiftly, not necessarily in military sense alone, in event of its collapse. Reported movement Iraqi troops to Jordan border may have been at request of Nuwwar seeking to balance threat from Nasser. Build-up of myth of imminent Israel aggression was convenient way to justify military aspects of race for position. Without going into details, Myerson said Selwyn Lloyd had called in Elath on July 4 to express British concern over aggressive Israel posture. It was important for UK to strike such attitude which could be expected to have favorable effect in Amman or Baghdad. To support contention there was no casual relationship between Ben Gurion's talks with Burns and outbreak of mobilization rumors, she said that on June 28, very day talk with him was held, GOI was already informed Iraqi troops were moving up to Jordanian border, definitely establishing that Arab scheme, whatever it might be, was shaping up well before Israel concern

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–756. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:23 a.m., July 8. Repeated priority to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, and Paris.

[2] See footnote 7, Document 419.

[3] See Documents 417 and 418.

with Jordanian border violence prompted Prime Minister's appeal to Burns.

(*Comment:* In my view, war scare can be explained in terms of Arab reaction to Ben Gurion's warning to Burns with possible exception of reported Iraqi troop movements which, as Myerson insists, appear to have been planned, if not set in motion, before Burns relayed Ben Gurion's warning to Hussein. But struggle-for-Jordan theory, briefly suggested in Embtel 12,[4] has apparently become official GOI interpretation.)

Military construction in northern DZ: On my expression of concern over reports of military construction within DZ, Myerson said there had been inconclusive discussion with General Burns of Syrian accusation such construction was underway contrary to GAA. Myerson admitted there was construction work in DZ kibbutzim but it was not military installation and purely defensive. Justification, if any needed, lies in troubled state Israeli borders. Settlers had been encouraged to farm these exposed areas and were entitled to protection. In case of war, they would be first in direct line of attack. They must have some means of self defense until IDF arrives. Under circumstances, Israel could not be expected to rely on goodwill its neighbors for security these citizens. To my questions, especially whether this was not violation of GAA, she replied emphatically that construction was defensive and in her view no violation GAA.

(*Comment:* As reported in Embtel 9,[5] I think border kibbutzim are being fortified according to national plan. Defenses under construction are probably similar those described in Embassy Despatch 798, June 11,[6] for Gaza Strip kibbutzim, suitably modified to meet geographical peculiarities area near Banat Yaacov and their proximity to focal point Jordan River diversion controversy).

Construction activities in El Auja demilitarized zone: In view conflicting reports as to construction underway near Nitzana (Embassy Despatch 827[7]), I did not mention reported establishment kibbutzim in area, but merely said we had had disturbing accounts of new construction there. With unexpected candor she said she assumed I meant new kibbutzim, one of which had been established to be followed by others if Israel wished. When I questioned her as to her views on principle of kibbutzim construction in the DZ, she

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[4] The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported in telegram 12, July 5, that wire service and radio reports from the Arab capitals alleged that the Israelis were massing troops on Jordan's borders. The Embassy indicated, however, that it had no evidence of any unusual Israeli troop and vehicle movements. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–556)

[5] Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

[6] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/6–1156)

[7] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 869.181/6–2256) The reference is evidently in error, since despatch 827 from Tel Aviv deals with an unrelated matter.

said she did not think UN was in position to take decision in matter. It was never intended DZ should be barren waste. GAA prohibited military installations. When Israel had set up first kibbutz there, Egypt had protested to UN which had first ruled in Israel's favor. When Cairo appealed decision, Security Council took question under advisement where it remained to this day. Israelis are constructing kibbutzim to utilize water and advance their colonization plans. Settlements in DZ were no more military than those at Lachish which was also in close proximity to international frontier. In fact, Israel would have very few settlements if it abandoned those near frontiers.

(*Comment:* While Myerson's statement admits presence of at least one new kibbutz in DZ, I am not sure she knows whether any new settlements in south are actually in DZ or merely near it. At any rate, it is clear enough she considers Israel has right to establish them there as GOI deems necessary.)

Balance of our hour and quarter conversation was largely occupied her recital Israel views long familiar to Department on inexplicability US and Western refusal to arm Israel to balance Egypt's growing might; Nasser's ambitions; and speculation Soviet motives, this time as reflected in Shepilov tour.

I might note two items:

(1) To my question, she said Iraq as a neighbor might be worse but at most no better than Jordan despite latter's uncertain precarious state. Iraq had attacked Israel with great force in 1948, she had refused to sign GAA and is technically still in state of war with Israel. GAA might not be most perfect institution yet devised, but it was a contractual relationship providing legal frame of reference for relations with Jordan which would not exist with Iraq.

(Embassy does not exclude possibility that if Arab states begin process partition Jordan, Israel may proceed take over West Bank in self-defense. Press here already hinting Arab troop movement into Jordan would nullify GAA. Alternatively, Israelis might invoke "rights" under article VIII as basis their troop movement into West Jordan collaterally with entrance Iraqi or other Arab troops into East Jordan.)

(2) Re US refusal to supply arms to Israel, Myerson developed extensively theme that I think she probably exploits effectively with American visitors that attitudes of Arab enemies and Soviet bloc toward Israel were perfectly comprehensible while attitudes of Israel's friends, notably US, were beyond understanding. Manner in which US denied arms to Israel yet seemed unable to resist desires of Arab States, left Israelis with feeling that they were suffering more than abandonment—that frightening force was attacking very fabric heretofore strong Israel-American relationship.

Conclusion: While conjunction of Ben Gurion's warning to Jordan, via Burns, with increasing complaints para-military activities in demilitarized zones can be read by some as a departure from Israel foreign policy following naturally on Ben Gurion's dismissal of Sharett, I question this had that much significance, at least initially.

I think Ben Gurion meant to jolt Jordanians with warning stiff enough to persuade them to tighten border controls or risk serious consequences. It is possible he under-estimated impact move would have, not only on Jordanians but other Arab States, who apparently have interpreted his implied warning of retaliation as a threat of military invasion.

Myerson seemed so genuinely grateful when I told her that our démarche was not only to Israel but also to Amman (Deptel 13 to Amman [8] repeated Tel Aviv 12) that I think it likely she is surprised at Pandora's box they seem to have opened with move that was not meant to bring about Jordan's dissolution or mobilization other Arab armies. Principal danger now seems to be that nervousness on both sides of frontiers could set off explosion, neither wanted nor anticipated at this moment by any party.

Lawson

[8] The Department instructed the Embassy in Amman in telegram 13, July 5, to inform King Hussein and other Jordanian officials, when appropriate, that the United States hoped that Jordan would not provoke the Israelis. (*Ibid.*, 684A.85/7–556)

431. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State [1]

Amman, July 7, 1956—4 p.m.

19. King Hussein granted me interview two o'clock today at my request. I reminded him his recent conversation with tripartite representatives and his request that serious view he took Israeli intentions be passed on our respective governments. [2] I noted that all reports we had, including those of Embassy Tel Aviv and UNTSO indicated no evidence available unusual troop movements in Israel or signs of

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–756. Secret; Priority. Received at 1:10 p.m. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, and priority to Tel Aviv.

[2] See Document 421.

aggressive build-up there. I emphasized our keen interest in peace in this area and our hope there would be no provocation either by words or deeds likely to upset the situation on the border. (Deptels 13 [3] and 14 [4]).

The King thanked me, assured me Jordan Government and Army exercising all possible restraint at this time and stated there would be no provocative words or deeds insofar as he was concerned. Hussein went on to say recent events had shown Jordan ready to defend self and interests of Arabs. He said he had been deeply disturbed by information passed on to him by General Burns along with reports he had received of two and half Israeli brigades moving into Jerusalem area plus removal of certain strategic mine fields there. Because of these factors he had felt it necessary to put his army into advanced defensive positions, to ask Arab neighbors stand ready assist in emergency and inform American, British and French friends of danger he believed threatening Jordan. King admitted these were unusual steps but he felt they had been justified by fact that Israeli aggression had not occurred. Said he was grateful for interest and help of USG in this crisis. In reply to my question the King stated there were evidences of lessening tension on border and he hoped crisis was about over. [5]

Sanger

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[3] See footnote 8, *supra*.

[4] Telegram 14 to Amman, July 5, instructed Sanger, if there were any evidence of troop movements on the border, to approach Jordanian officials at the highest level to point out the dangers. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–556)

[5] Telegram 22 from Amman, July 9, reported that there had been no border incidents or troop movements over the weekend. (*Ibid.*, 684A.85/7–956)

432. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 9, 1956.

SUBJECT

Suggested United States Policy on Israel-Arab Relations

I concur with the attached memorandum with the following exception and comment:

I am not certain that the danger of an Arab-Israeli outbreak during the next six months will stem principally from the Israel Government. Hasty or ill-considered action such as the recent movement of Jordan troops towards the frontier may result in hostilities by accident, even though the Arab Governments may not intend or even desire such an outbreak. Inter-Arab quarrels over dividing up Jordan might also precipitate hostilities with Israel, possibly through a dash across the Negev by Egyptian forces. It seems to me the danger of trouble is about even from the Arabs and Israelis.

As regards F–86's, I believe we should inform the Canadians that we would be willing to consider allowing Italy to sell a few such planes (six or perhaps twelve) if such action would satisfy Canada's desire that we share some part of the responsibility for Canadian sales. I would not favor a direct sale by the US at this moment. The position we have taken of refusing such direct sales is a useful one and should not be lost unless no other alternative can be found.

As regards suggested steps towards settlement of the Israel-Arab issues, I would add to Mr. Russell's suggestions the thought that we consider returning to the 1947 UNGA Resolution insofar as it calls for the creation of separate Arab and Jewish states in Palestine, linked through close economic ties. The Israelis may feel that they are now strong enough economically to achieve gradual economic domination of the Arab state, and Ben Gurion might conceivably be brought to make some territorial concessions to the new Arab state, as long as it was separated from Jordan and could serve as a buffer.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Memos, etc. fr July 1 to August 31, 1956. Top Secret. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Hoover saw this memorandum.

[Attachment]

Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State [2]

Washington, July 6, 1956.

SUBJECT

Suggested U.S. Policy on Israel-Arab Relations

1. *Short Term Problem: Israel Activism.* The danger of an outbreak between the Israelis and the Arabs during the next six months will stem principally from the Israel Government. It is unlikely that the responsible Arab leaders will feel during that period that they have achieved a military position which will justify them in initiating hostilities. The Israel Government, on the other hand, will feel that it is a critical time. The debate in Israel circles between forcing the issue on the one hand and moderation on the other will come to a head. The proponents of the first have recently forged ahead. This is indicated by the dismissal of Sharett and such actions by the Israel Government as the construction of fortifications in the demilitarized zone at Banat Yaacov, the building of kibbitzim at El Auja, the effort to ship Israel cement through the Suez Canal and Ben Gurion's recent talks with General Burns. Ambassador Eban recently asked for a meeting with you, saying that he was not asking for a general discussion but only for an answer on Israel's requests for arms and for a $75 million Export-Import Bank loan. [3] The nature of your response to Eban will undoubtedly have some effect on early decisions by the IG. It is suggested that in your meeting with Eban you state that:

a. We are following most closely the changes in Arab effective military strength as a result of Soviet arms shipments; that it is still our conclusion that Israel's total effective military strength is superior to that of the Arabs and that the Arabs do not intend to launch an attack in the near future; that there are indications that the Soviet Union may not wish to support the Arabs to the point of an attack on Israel and may, in fact, use their influence within limitations to deter them; that as long as Israel maintains a position of military superiority, we believe it would lessen these deterrents if the United States were to change its position on the shipment of heavy arms at the present time.

b. The reports from Ottawa are not encouraging with respect to the likelihood of Canadian shipment of F–86's to Israel, although we

[2] Top Secret. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Hoover saw this memorandum.

[3] See Document 420.

are waiting for Pearson's return from his present trip to Europe for a final answer; at that time we intend to explore other possibilities on the basis of the Canadian decision. (Although it would probably be better not to be too specific with Eban, the French have recently filed with NEACC statements indicating their desire to ship substantial additional quantities of arms to Israel and it is not impossible, despite their recent statements to us, that they would be willing to provide another 24 Mysteres. There is good reason to believe also that the Italians, if we gave them our approval, would be willing to sell F-86's to Israel.)

c. The Export-Import Bank has not finished its study of the IG application for the $75 million loan and we are, therefore, not in a position to make a final decision on this. If the Export-Import Bank should find that the loan is economically feasible, in whole or in part, we assume that the Israel Government would be prepared to forego construction in the demilitarized zone at Banat Yaacov during the period of time that the construction on the coastal plain which was financed by the Export-Import Bank loan was in process.

d. Our ability to pursue the policies set forth in the preceding paragraphs will, of course, depend upon the pursuance by Israel of policies that are conducive to peace in the area and especially upon Israel's cooperation with Hammarskjold and UNTSO.

2. *Longer-Term Problem: Increasing Arab Sentiment for Showdown with Israel.* The longer term problem with respect to peace in the Middle East lies in the increasing Arab sentiment for a showdown with Israel as a result of the confidence stemming from the receipt of Soviet arms. It is difficult to formulate now the steps which will be most effective in dealing with this development. It will probably not come to a head until next year. In general, the most effective deterrent will be to work toward a situation in which the armed forces of Israel and the Arab states will be in a mutually stand-off position, with neither side finding it practical to initiate hostilities. We should continue to support Hammarskjold in his attention to the Middle East problem and to support action by the Security Council whenever indicated. We should also continue to follow closely and, where possible, probe the extent of the apparent Soviet policy of stopping short in their support of the Arabs at the point of Arab launching of military action against Israel. From time to time, as circumstances indicated, we might find it desirable to reiterate our continued adherence to the principles of the Tripartite Declaration.

3. *Steps Toward Settlement of Israel-Arab Issues.* Although the likelihood of a general settlement of the Israel-Arab dispute is not bright, there may be a possibility of progress from time to time on particular issues. Instances of this would be the Lahoud approach on the Jordan River,[4] i.e., parallel construction on the Israel and Arab sides which could later be coordinated in something similar to the John-

[4] See Document 386.

ston Plan; the transfer of administration of refugee funds from UNRWA to the Arab Governments in such a way as to promote absorption of the refugees into the Arab communities; and a proposal for repatriation of substantial numbers of Arab refugees in the Galilee section of Israel territory that would have gone to the Arabs under the 1947 resolution.

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433. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 9, 1956.

SUBJECT

Fawzi Approach to British Ambassador on Israel-Arab Settlement

Mr. Bailey of the British Embassy has just left with me the attached telegrams. One of them, from Trevelyan to the Foreign Office, reports a new approach by Fawzi, authorized by Nasser, to an Israel-Arab settlement. It would be based upon initial conversations by Hammarskjold with both sides, to be followed by final recommendations on the terms of the settlement by a group of outside powers. The second telegram gives the initial reaction of the Foreign Office.

The Foreign Office intends to cable Trevelyan asking him to express to Fawzi the tentative U.K. views before Nasser leaves for Brioni on July 12. The Foreign Office would like our comments before cabling Trevelyan. [2]

F.H.R.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #8. Top Secret. Also addressed to Hoover.

[2] See Document 438.

[Attachment 1][3]

Washington, July 9, 1956.

PALESTINE

The following information was telegraphed to Foreign Office by Her Majesty's Ambassador, Cairo, on July 5:—

Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs today raised the Palestine question with me. After urging that everything should be done to prevent the Israelis taking aggressive action against Jordan following the information given by Burns,[4] he outlined his ideas on progress towards a settlement of the whole Palestine question.

2. The first step to be taken was to ascertain what the gap was between Cairo and Tel Aviv and to narrow it as far as possible. This might be done secretly through Hammarskjold or through other means, and the process might begin as soon as the present tension between Israel and Jordan was removed.

3. He then contemplated a second stage, which he thought could only take place after the American elections. There would undoubtedly be a gap remaining between the Arab and Israeli ideas. At this stage certain outside Powers could come into the picture and should try, in consultation with Cairo and Tel Aviv, to produce a scheme for a settlement. During this process, Egypt would consult the other Arab States and obtain an all-Arab view. The terms proposed by the countries concerned could then be given shape in a United Nations resolution sponsored by as many States as possible and United Nations authority could if necessary be used to insist upon the acceptance of the settlement of Arabs and Israelis.

4. In discussing this second stage, Dr. Fawzi said that there were three possible means of proceeding:—

(a) Through Hammarskjold. He believed, however, that Hammarskjold would not have sufficient authority to carry the affair through.

(b) Through the tripartite Powers. This the Egyptians would oppose as having an appearance of foreign influence in it.

(c) Through a mixture of outside States. He first talked about India, Indonesia, Burma and some Latin American States, but subsequently discarded this idea and made a precise proposal of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan. I asked him about the French. He said that he had not put their name in as he wanted to get away from the usual patter, but he did not absolutely exclude them.

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[3] Secret.

[4] See Document 425.

5. In answer to my question, Fawzi said that they had not discussed this with the Soviet Government. At this stage they would only wish to discuss it with the Americans and ourselves. However, it might be discussed with Nehru and Tito at Brioni, or subsequently with Nehru here, and they would also, I gathered, be prepared to discuss it with Hammarskjold who wanted to come here and whom they hoped to invite here shortly. [5]

6. In answer to another question, Fawzi confirmed that they intended that this machinery should be limited to the question of Palestine and should not be used to consider other Middle East problems. He said that this was only "a chat" and in no way a formal proposition. They wanted to be helpful and were therefore taking this initiative. He would not want any formal reply, though he would naturally be ready to have another informal talk in the light of any ideas which I might receive from London. He agreed with my presumption that the views which he expressed were in accordance with the President's [6] ideas. I confined myself to saying that I was glad that he was seriously contemplating resumption of efforts to solve the Palestine question and was prepared to take an initiative in the matter.

[Attachment 2] [7]

I welcome this Egyptian initiative and think we should encourage the Egyptians to follow it up. My preliminary comments are as follows.

2. The idea of proceeding in two stages is promising and we have always had in mind that Egypt should lead for the Arabs as regards a Palestine settlement. I agree that Hammarskjold is probably the right person to handle the first stage. He is already in the picture and plans to revisit the Middle East (paragraph 7 of New York telegram No. [8]). On the other hand the first stage may prove more complicated and prolonged than Fawzi seems to think, if the inevitable gap between Egyptian and Israel views is to be substantially narrowed. This will require confidential negotiation with the two Governments alternately, and Hammarskjold may be too public a figure and too occupied with other duties to undertake it. We might then have to fall back on preliminary negotiations through

[5] On July 10, U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld announced his intention to visit Israel and Egypt July 19–22 as a followup to his previous peacekeeping mission.
[6] On June 23, Nasser was elected President of the Republic of Egypt.
[7] Top Secret.
[8] The telegram number was crossed out on the source text.

Anglo-American intermediaries, although ideally I should prefer some neutral person.

3. Fawzi's idea of the second stage seems to be a conference attended by Egypt, who would present the all-Arab view, Israel and a mediator or group of mediators. I agree that neither Hammarskjold nor the Tripartite Powers as a group would be suitable for this latter role. I should prefer a group consisting of say India, Pakistan, Burma, a Latin-American state (perhaps Uruguay) and perhaps Italy. None of these has previously been involved in the Palestine dispute, their sympathies would about balance: and there would be no great Power. We ourselves would thus avoid the odium which has usually come to us for "Great Power meddling" and of being cast inevitably for the role of Israel's supporters. We should have an excuse for excluding the Russians. If the Egyptians insist, however, on the Soviet Union as one of the group we and the Americans clearly cannot stand aside; and the Israelis for their part might well refuse to attend a conference if we and the Americans were not there (Tel Aviv telegram No. [9]). Furthermore since we and the Americans have already stated our willingness to help financially with regard to the refugees we shall clearly have to become associated with the conference even if only at a further stage.

4. I agree that it would be a good idea to formulate the terms of a settlement in a United Nations resolution which would then formally supersede those of 1947 and 1948. But it is essential that the settlement should first be accepted by both Israel and the Arab States. I hope the Egyptians do not intend to try and force through a United Nations resolution which is not acceptable to all concerned.

5. Please discuss these ideas with the State Department and telegraph their views. I should like to authorize Her Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo to tell Fawzi before July 12 at least that:

(a) We welcome his initiative which we think is constructive;

(b) We agree with his proposed first stage and suggest that his idea should be put to Hammarskjold on the latter's next visit to Cairo; and

(c) We are considering further his ideas on the second stage which will necessarily depend in part on the success of the first.

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[9] The telegram number was crossed out on the source text.

434. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

Washington, July 9, 1956—2:27 p.m.

52. Embtel 2515 [2] presents interesting viewpoint towards developments in Egypt as seen in retrospect. However Department desires draw Embassy's attention to following cardinal aspects of US-Egyptian relations since these factors might be important in discussions with friendly elements in Egypt.

1. Clearly demonstrated US desire cooperate with present regime as evidenced by: coaching given General Naguib in early days; conclusion reimbursable military assistance agreement December 10, 1952; [3] $10 million technical assistance program concluded March 1953; [4] part played by US in Sudan Agreement; protracted assistance towards Suez Base Agreement; conclusion economic development assistance agreement November 6, 1954; [5] attempts associate Egypt in Middle East defense arrangements (CA–2594, October 19, 1954; Deptel 732, November 10, 1954 [6]); continuous efforts restrain Israel; $40 million economic development assistance program for FY 1955; [7] restraint exercised in development Baghdad Pact; large CARE and PL 480 programs; efforts of US and West to avoid arms race by exercising restraint in meeting Israel arms requests despite large Soviet bloc shipments to Egypt.

2. Clearly demonstrated US readiness provide Egypt arms in legitimate quantity on terms compatible with Egyptian sovereignty and solvency. Grant military aid offered Egypt August 2, 1954 immediately following conclusion Suez Base Agreement (Deptel 144 July 28, 1954 [8]). Offer kept open until January 1955 despite strong opposition in US and finally rejected by Nasser with specious contention US demanded signature "defense pact" impinging on

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–1656. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett, Geren, and Hoffacker; cleared with Russell, Allen, Rountree, and Wilkins; and approved by Hoover. Pouched to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Amman, Addis Ababa, Ankara, Belgrade, Bonn, Karachi, Khartoum, London, Madrid, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Rabat, Rome, Tangiers, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and Valletta.

[2] Document 399.

[3] TIAS No. 3565; 7 UST 844.

[4] The agreement was concluded March 19, 1953; TIAS No. 2843; 4 UST (pt. 2) 1761.

[5] TIAS No. 3156; 5 UST (pt. 3) 2985.

[6] CA–2594 is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.82/10–1954) Telegram 732 to Cairo is printed as telegram 548 to Ankara in *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 557.

[7] See footnote 5 above.

[8] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 2, p. 2289.

Egyptian freedom action. Inconclusive conversations June 1955 with Nasser in which he first stated intended purchase arms from Soviet bloc (Cairo 1881, June 9, 1955 [9]) and later retreated somewhat (Cairo 1928, June 17, 1955 [10]) but never revealed intensions clearly. Agreement in principle to approve Egyptian purchase arms in US given June 1955 (Deptel 2214 June 17, 1955 [11]). Submission Egyptian arms request June 30. Specific statement by Nasser first July he would pay in dollars (Cairo 10, July 2, 1955 [12]). Agreement in principle by US sell Egypt entire $27 million arms requested (two minor exceptions) with initial increment $11 million and special expedited delivery certain key items (Deptel 244 August 6, 1955 [13]). Immediate request by Nasser for special credit facilities and US consent explore with utmost care all possibilities assisting Nasser with respect financing (Deptel 325 August 20, 1955; [14] Deptel 515 September 15, 1955). [15] Revelation by Ambassador Hussein August 14 that negotiations with Soviets well advanced (Cairo 234, August 15, 1955). [16] Termination of negotiations by US upon announcement Soviet-Egyptian arms agreement September 23. US did not make arms sale contingent upon Palestine settlement but stated from political standpoint difficulties posed by Nasser's request for special financial terms would be greatly increased by hostile reaction to Secretary's August 26 speech (Deptel 325, August 20, 1955). Reconstruction events suggests Nasser had in fact determined conclude Soviet deal prior to request for special financial terms and this request and subsequent statements made permit him maintain public position approach to West rebuffed.

3. US efforts assist Egypt with Aswan High Dam. Offer September 1953 finance IBRD engineering study Aswan Dam site and concurrently desk survey Nile Valley (Deptel 309, September 17 [17]). Concentration on Aswan Dam from 1954 in exceptional effort meet Egyptian political desires. Endeavors bring about Sudan-Egyptian agreement on division Nile waters (Deptel 324, August 20, 1955; [18] Deptel 1067 November 23, 1955 [19]). Prolonged efforts expedite and assist IBRD economic and engineering studies. Invitation to and subsequent negotiations with Finance Minister in Washington culmi-

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[9] Vol. XIV, p. 237.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 255.
[11] See *ibid.*, footnote 2, p. 256.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 270.
[13] See *ibid.*, the first footnote 2, p. 339.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 376.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 471.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 355.
[17] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 874.211/9–1753)
[18] Vol. XIV, p. 371.
[19] See *ibid*, footnote 6, p. 801.

nating in US-UK-IBRD offer including $54.6 million in US grant aid in December 1955 (Deptel 1282, December 16, 1955 [20]). Discussions by Black of IBRD with US–UK participation in Cairo, January 1956. Agreement by US consider vague, oral Egyptian counterproposals (Deptel 2076, March 1, 1956 [21]). Egypt decided "they would neither start work . . . [22] nor require any amount from grants and aid until agreement had been reached with Sudan Government" (Cairo 1665, Feb 23, 1956 [23]). Nasser assured Embassy counterproposals not related to possibility Soviet participation (Embtel 1794, March 8, 1956 [24]) but reports now received indicate he in interim actively negotiating in Moscow (London 5752 June 13, 1956 [25]). Reiteration US interest in project March 1956 (Deptel 2815, May 24, 1956 [26])

4. Progressive unveiling true nature Egyptian policy as one of maintaining US expectations future Egyptian cooperation while demanding immediate US assistance and in fact pursuing policies detrimental US objectives. Examples Egyptian promises include: RCC statement to Caffery September 1952 "They (RCC) are completely on side of US and unalterably opposed to communism . . . [27] in exchange (for military and financial assistance) they are prepared to give in secret certain commitments concerning long term objectives of movement including MEDO and/or partnership with US" (Cairo 730, September 18, 1952 [28]). Statement by Egypt after conclusion Sudan Agreement of great friendship, pro-Western sympathies and intention eventually to cooperate Middle East defense March 1953 (Cairo 2064, March 15, 1953 [29]). Assurances by Naguib in exchange letters with President June 1953 of Egyptian intent after Suez Base settlement cooperate loyally with its allies and do its full part in building military strength and economic and social stability (Cairo 44 of July 11, 1953 [30]). Fawzi statement that upon conclusion Suez Base Agreement Egypt would be able come out publicly and flatly on side Western World and especially US (Cairo 1588, June 24, 1954 [31]). Expressions appreciation by Nasser on conclusion Suez Base Agreement and assertion time propitious for new leaf in Near East (Cairo 136, July 31, 1954 [32]). Statements by Nasser to Allen subsequent to

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 868.
[21] See footnote 5, Document 127.
[22] Ellipsis in the source text.
[23] Document 121.
[24] Document 179.
[25] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 641.74/6–1356)
[26] Document 365.
[27] Ellipsis in the source text.
[28] *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 2, p. 1860.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 2019.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 2115.
[31] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 641.74/6–2454)
[32] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 641.74/7–3154)

Soviet arms deal to effect he even more concerned than Secretary Dulles to prevent communist activity through military technicians because Egypt country directly involved (Cairo 632, October 1, 1955 [33]). In contrast Egyptian acts include: violent attacks on Baghdad Pact; support of leftist elements in Syria (Damascus 870, March 19, 1956 [34]); massive, continuing purchases arms from Soviet bloc and efforts peddle Soviet arms to other Arab states; large scale dispatch technicians for military training in Soviet bloc; cooperation with Soviets against West in Libya; active intervention against interests of West in North Africa; activities in Saudi Arabia undermining US position (Jidda 575, June 20, 1956 [35]).

5. Deceptiveness re Israel. Expression by Fawzi of desire get along with Israel August 1954 (Cairo 162, August 4, 1954 [36]). Fawzi stated he in complete agreement our suggestion on general approach and timing on Israel problem (Cairo 1458, April 3, 1955 [37]). Nasser agreed develop approach to Israel question further after Bandung Conference (Cairo 1482, April 5, 1955 [38]). After Secretary's August 26 speech Fawzi suggested further discussions (Cairo 461, September 14, 1955 [39]). In November, Fawzi stated "Egypt prepared to work towards settlement Arab-Israel issues at earliest date" (Cairo 976, November 17, 1955 [40]). Nasser confirmed Fawzi position (Cairo 1027, November 27, 1955 [41]). In January 1956 Nasser indicated . . . willingness start at that time definitive negotiations. [42] Nature proposals he later advanced and his attitude in March revealed clearly speciousness his assertions.

6. Current US attitude towards Nasser as clearly presented to Ambassador Hussein by Secretary (Memorandum of Conversation of May 17, 1956 [43]), stems from actions by Egypt in Near East furthering efforts Communist bloc. US record since Soviet arms deal clearly shows present situation not result vindictiveness or failure Nasser respond on Palestine problem. US has been and remains ready to respond to acts by Nasser proving he sincerely wishes cooperation and good relations.

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[33] Vol. XIV, p. 537.
[34] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/3–1956)
[35] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 711.56386A/6–2056)
[36] *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 1598.
[37] Not found in Department of State files.
[38] Vol. XIV, p. 141.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 468.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 781.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 807.
[42] The agreement was concluded March 19, 1953; TIAS No. 2843; 4 UST (pt. 2) 1761.
[43] Document 353.

To summarize—from beginning, present Administration has based its Near East policy in large part on cooperation with Egypt often at considerable political cost, both domestic and foreign, relying upon repeated assurances Egypt intended work with West. US took numerous concrete steps showing its support while Egypt made vague promises contradicted by acts. By summer 1955 Egypt intentions had become apparent. Nevertheless US made further effort by offer sell arms and offer on Aswan Dam. These in turn rebuffed by Soviet bloc arms deal, recognition Communist China and strongly anti-US and anti-West propaganda and activities in Egypt and abroad. US relied to outer bounds of prudence upon Egypt's promises. In face of record Department would be negligent if it continued proceed on faith while Egypt follows course detrimental to US. It beside point argue for reaffirmation sympathetic attitude or that Egyptian regime represents new force with which US must do business. Regime bears responsibility for emergence of forces which it now may be powerless control and which pose serious problem for US future in Middle East. Further moves in direction appeasement with nothing more than vague hope of still eliciting positive Egyptian response would involve abandonment soundly conceived positions with possibility far reaching adverse repercussions and result in further strengthening regime extent whose activities against US and West becoming steadily more apparent.

Dulles

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435. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, July 10, 1956—10 a.m.

21. Reference: Embtel 16. [2] Accepting standing invitation to tea at Ben Gurion's home Jerusalem, I had short informal talk with him in calm atmosphere immediately after talk with Myerson.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–1056. Secret. Received at 9:41 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, and Paris.

[2] Telegram 16, July 7, reported on Lawson's meeting with Myerson during which she denied reports of Israeli troops massing on the Jordanian border. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/7–756)

He was not in his usual "battle dress", was most affable and cordial as he, Mrs. Ben Gurion and Herzog enjoyed a friendly cup of tea. He expressed regret he unable to attend our fourth July party and remarked that context of letter of regret to me (friendly and written by him and will be pouched [3]) represented his genuine feeling. "I meant what I wrote", he said.

Apparently Herzog, who present at Myerson talk and departed hurriedly, had briefed Ben Gurion on nature of talk; therefore I referred to Arab rumors of Israeli troop concentrations. He in very relaxed and unexcited mood denied categorically existence of concentrations. He took very much line taken by Myerson but with far less detail and discussion. I gathered he inclined to believe Burns may have given Hussein somewhat more alarming message than Ben Gurion in fact sent but latter made no direct charge to that end. He believed Jordan used incident for own purposes but did not attempt to list them. He did remark, "the real story is that troop concentrations are taking place on the other side". He referred especially to report of Iraq troops on Jordan border showing, by this and subsequent remarks, that ultimate possibility of enemy troops adjacent to Israel and neither subject to nor protected by a GAA was very much in his mind.

During entire conversation I received no impression he had desired to suggest to Burns early military action or assume a threatening war posture, although Burns in fact received that impression. I gather Ben Gurion very much surprised at speed, intensity and extent of Hussein's reaction.

In response to my question, he thought Hammarskjold may have discussed with Moscow on current visit the idea of separate implementations by Jordan and Israel of parts of Johnston water plan but under UN. Hammarskjold had discussed something of the idea with him. He knew Hammarskjold was much concerned over situation in NE and had written he would discuss with Ben Gurion on July 19 on arrival in Israel.

As I left, he expressed hope that US would soon find it possible to sell arms to Israel, referring at same time to President Eisenhower's letter to him which had said US cannot supply arms now (at time letter was sent [4]).

Lawson

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[3] Not printed. (Despatch 31 from Tel Aviv, July 13; *ibid.*, 811.424/7–1356)

[4] Reference is to Document 315.

436. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State [1]

Jerusalem, July 10, 1956—11 a.m.

12. Hommel yesterday supplied following fill-in recent UNTSO matters.

UNSYG arriving Jerusalem July 19, has appointment Fawzi July 21. He plans discuss with Ben Gurion latter theory "reciprocal non-compliance" GAA and cease-fire, retaliation threats, Israeli activities in demilitarized zones, and restrictions on movements UN observers. Burns has asked permission make official démarche to GOI stating retaliation prohibited by cease-fire. SYG has instructed him wait his arrival.

Burns has written GOI requesting them cease and demolish fortifications northern demilitarized zone. On contrary, Israelis appear to be erecting more.

Number buildings at Birein in El Auja demilitarized zone is now 6, not pre-fabs but more permanent type. Both men and women in camp, though Hommel unaware population figure or if numbers recently increased. Military position detected 3 kilometers from camp. Since restrictions, Birein no longer susceptible UN observation.

. . . . . .

Sabini

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–1056. Confidential. Received at 12:14 p.m. Also sent to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, and Tel Aviv.

437. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 10, 1956.

SUBJECT

Egyptian Suggestions Regarding Arab-Israel Settlement

Discussion:

Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi has broached to the British Ambassador in Cairo the possibility of moving toward an Arab-Israel settlement and suggested this be done in two stages: First, through Hammarskjold and then by an international conference. (Tab B [2]) Ambassador Byroade is seeing Fawzi this week and may receive the same suggestions. The British Foreign Office welcomes the initiative and has instructed the British Embassy to discuss the matter with the Department. (Tab C [3])

In considering the matter we think that the following factors should be kept in mind:

1. The many instances in the past in which Egypt has talked of a willingness to move towards a settlement.
2. The possibility that this is another Egyptian maneuver to retain Western support, despite acts of collaboration with the Soviet Union.
3. The extreme position, particularly with respect to the Negev, taken during the talks with Robert Anderson in January and March.
4. The likelihood, despite Fawzi's disclaimers, that this particular program was discussed and perhaps worked out with the USSR.
5. Implicit in the suggestion is support for Egyptian leadership in the Arab world which would run completely counter to our present policies.
6. Recent indications the Soviet Union does desire a détente in the Middle East. Ambassador Bohlen has reported that Hammarskjold is convinced the USSR does not want an outbreak of hostilities and is willing to cooperate in working toward a settlement. [4]

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Egyptian Suggestions Re Arab-Israel Settlement. 1956. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted on July 9 by Burdett.

[2] Tab B is attachment 1 to Document 433.

[3] Tab C is attachment 2, *ibid.*

[4] Ambassador Bohlen on July 7 informed the Department in telegram 46 from Moscow that he had learned that Hammarskjöld was convinced the Soviets did not want war in the Middle East; that the Soviets hoped to contribute to creating an atmosphere in which the parties could negotiate; that the Soviets were not committed to the U.N. resolutions of 1947 as a point of departure in any Arab-Israeli negotiations; and that Shepilov had informed Hammarskjöld that it was his impression that (Continued)

Shepilov's refusal to support the Arabs publicly against Israel during his recent visit lends credence to this thesis.

7. Hammarskjold's apparent desire to work alone on the Arab-Israel problem, without interference from the major powers.

8. The dangers of being maneuvered into a position of supporting Israel while the USSR supports the Arab states, either at an international conference or in the UN.

9. The need to maintain, at least publicly, a position of support for any moves which could lead to a settlement. Your speech of August 26, 1955 gives a firm position upon which to stand.

Recommendations:

In view of the above factors, it is recommended that you:

1. Reply to the British along the lines of the attached talking paper. (Tab A)

2. That we do not permit this gambit to divert us from proceeding with the other measures we are taking within the area, designed to reduce Egyptian influence.

3. That, despite considerable initial skepticism, we await the results of Hammarskjold's further talks with the Egyptians before determining definitely what position to take. [5]

[Tab A]

TALKING PAPER [6]

As the British are aware from the Alpha operation, we are prepared to make large contributions to secure an Arab-Israel peace and had thought that Egypt was the key to any such arrangement. Our position on the general nature of such a settlement remains as set forth by the Secretary on August 26, 1955.

However, we cannot fail to regard the present Egyptian move with considerable skepticism in view of the attitude taken by Nasser during the talks in January and March and the likelihood that this particular plan may have been worked out with the Soviet Union. It has been a favorite Egyptian maneuver to try and retain Western support by talking about peace with Israel, while building up Egypt's own strength in the area and collaborating in acts with the Soviets.

(Continued)

Nasser was concentrating on Egypt's internal political and developmental situation. (Department of State, Central Files, 315/7–756)

Hammarskjöld was visiting the Soviet Union as part of his first Eastern European tour as Secretary-General of the United Nations. He visited the Soviet Union on July 2–5.

[5] Dulles initialed his approval on the source text.

[6] Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett on July 9.

Nevertheless, we do not think we should avoid exploring the present opening to see whether any real possibilities exist. We accordingly are in accord with the proposed British reply to Fawzi and are prepared to instruct our Ambassador in Cairo to take a similar line if he is approached by Fawzi. We would suggest in addition emphasizing to Fawzi the need for concrete steps indicative of a real intent to proceed, such as cooperation with Hammarskjold on his suggestions regarding the border and abandonment of the Suez Canal blockade. Also, we would avoid showing an undue interest in the proposal and would not imply to Fawzi support for any particular procedure in the second phase.

We believe that both of us should study carefully all the implications, but refrain from any definite determination regarding further steps pending the results of Hammarskjold's next visit to the area.

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438. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 10, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Response to Egyptian Proposal on Palestine; Position on Aswan High Dam

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Ronald Bailey, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Willie Morris, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. William C. Burdett, NE
Mr. Paul F. Geren, NE

Mr. Bailey explained that the Foreign Office had received an emergency telegram from the British Ambassador at Cairo indicating that he is seeing Fawzi at 11 a.m., July 11. The British were obliged to send their Ambassador instructions on a reply to Fawzi's Palestine proposal of July 5. [2] Accordingly they wished to know the Department's position in this matter.

Mr. Burdett said that the matter had been considered by the Secretary who had approved the following position. [3] At Mr. Bailey's

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7-1056. Secret. Drafted on July 11 by Geren.

[2] See Document 433.

[3] See *supra*.

request he gave the British representatives a copy of the attached paper explaining that it was to be considered entirely informal. After Mr. Bailey had read the paper Mr. Burdett elaborated the US doubts concerning the Fawzi initiative especially because it came right after Shepilov's visit. We should not discount the possibility that the Egyptians and the Soviets had agreed on this approach. Nevertheless we do not wish to oppose any proposal for a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question regardless of its prospects. Mr. Burdett expressed the Department's hope that Egypt will recognize the necessity of proving its words by deeds and that the British may seek to impress the point on Fawzi. In the present case, for example, we might make it clear to the Egyptians that they could give an earnest of their intent by full cooperation with Hammarskjold's suggestions regarding the border and abandonment of the Suez Canal blockade. We believe it is inadvisable for the US and UK to take up the sponsorship of the Fawzi proposals or to exhibit undue interest in them at this time.

Mr. Burdett continued that if the scheduled Hammarskjold visit to Egypt turns out fruitfully we will need to consult carefully on the next move especially with a view to avoiding being maneuvered into the role of supporting Israel against the Arab States supported by the Soviets. It seems more appropriate for the UK than for the US to acquaint Hammarskjold with this development and with our views since Fawzi had approached the British in the first instance. Our suspicions concerning the Egyptian initiative are naturally for the private ear of the British. It is a project which should be allowed to develop further and we will then consult on the basis of developments in the first stage. Mr. Burdett said that we planned to send Ambassador Byroade instructions along the above lines. [4]

Mr. Bailey said that this information, which met the immediate British needs, would be despatched to the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Cairo. He also agreed to recommend that the British inform Hammarskjold.

Mr. Burdett then turned to the Department's present views on the Aswan Dam. We regard the existing situation as similar to that obtaining before the Shepilov visit to Egypt. We have no information that the Egyptians concluded an agreement with the Soviets on the Aswan High Dam during his visit but believe it likely such an agreement will be concluded, possibly at the time of Nasser's visit to the USSR, unless some positive word is forthcoming from the US, UK and IBRD in the meantime. There remains a slim chance that Nasser will not make an agreement with the Soviets on the Aswan

[4] Telegram 70 to Cairo, July 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1156)

High Dam and it is most important not to reduce this chance. Accordingly, the Department considered the following alternatives: (1) to await developments before doing anything further in respect to the Aswan High Dam; (2) to agree to proceed on the December 1955 proposals; (3) to stimulate a conference of the riparian states; (4) to tell Nasser privately we are not able to proceed; (5) to withdraw the US–UK offer in a public statement.

Of these alternatives we believe number (1) is preferable. It is impossible to give a positive answer at present for various reasons including the attitude in this country to pro-Soviet actions by Egypt; the unavailability of funds, and the effect on pro-Western states in the area. At the same time, definite indication to Nasser that the West was not prepared to assist would likely precipitate an agreement by Egypt with the Soviets. The remaining alternative appeared the least objectionable and would hold open the slim chance that Nasser would decide it was not in his interests to make a deal with the Soviets.

Mr. Bailey said that the Department's position was clear. The British Government's current views had not been received from the Foreign Office, but were expected momentarily and would be presented to the Department when they arrived. [5]

Mr. Burdett and Mr. Bailey agreed that a working level meeting on the Suez Canal question be held on Thursday morning July 12. [6]

To Mr. Morris' question concerning the position which Secretary Dulles might take with the Israeli Ambassador, Mr. Burdett replied that he had not had an opportunity to read a full account of the conversation between the Secretary and Ambassador Eban [7] but understood that the Secretary declined to agree with the Israel Ambassador that the arms balance had swung sharply against Israel. The Secretary had reminded Ambassador Eban that there are other deterrents besides Israel arms to Arab aggression. He had not discussed in detail with Ambassador Eban the Israel application for an Ex-Import Bank loan and the Banat Yacoub problem.

Mr. Burdett added that we thought Israel does not need to dig at Banat Yacoub for about two years. We have not yet decided whether the Ex-Import Bank loan should be linked to Israel assurances regarding Banat Yacoub. We have also not reached a conclusion on whether to advance alternative plans to Ambassador Johnston's proposals for the development of the Jordan Valley.

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[5] See the attachment to Document 442.

[6] Burdett, Shaw, and Geren met with Morris and Pitblado of the British Embassy on July 12. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/7–1256)

[7] See Document 451.

[Attachment] [8]

As the British are aware from past discussions, we are prepared to make large contributions to secure an Arab-Israel peace and had thought that Egypt was the key to any such arrangement. Our position on the general nature of such a settlement remains as set forth by the Secretary on August 26, 1955.

However, we cannot fail to regard the present Egyptian move with considerable skepticism in view of the attitude taken by Nasser during the talks in January and March and the likelihood that this particular plan may have been worked out with the Soviet Union. It has been a favorite Egyptian maneuver to try and retain Western support by talking about peace with Israel, while building up Egypt's own strength in the area and collaborating in acts with the Soviets.

Nevertheless, we do not think we should avoid exploring the present opening to see whether any real possibilities exist. We accordingly are in accord with the proposed British reply to Fawzi and are prepared to instruct our Ambassador in Cairo to take a similar line if he is approached by Fawzi. We would suggest in addition emphasizing to Fawzi the need for concrete steps indicative of a real intent to proceed, such as cooperation with Hammarskjold on his suggestions regarding the border and abandonment of the Suez Canal blockade. Also, we would avoid showing an undue interest in the proposal and would not imply to Fawzi support for any particular procedure in the second phase.

We believe that both of us should study carefully all the implications, but refrain from any definite determination regarding further steps pending the results of Hammarskjold's next visit to the area.

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[8] Secret.

439. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 10, 1956—3 p.m.

45. Had long talk with Hussein at Alexandria on Sunday which not reported as we covered same ground as in previous talks. Immediately thereafter Hussein spent 8 hours with Nasser at Borg Elarab.

Nasser asked Hussein to return quickly to Washington to try convince Secretary to go ahead with High Dam. He probably leaving here Friday. [2] Nasser said he wanted very much to resume negotiations with the West and gave impression that changes Egypt had suggested to US and UK aide-mémoires not really important (said some changes necessary to correspond to changes made in agreement with Bank) and that if US and UK wished proceed language should not be great difficulty. Hussein told him he believed one cause of delay by the West was fear that Egypt might be planning subsequent participation by Russians in project. Nasser became a bit irked at this, reminded Hussein he had told me some months ago that this would not be the case (this I reported [3]), and reiterated that there was no question of Soviet participation in project blocked out with Black.

Much of conversation was straightforward advice from Hussein on internal matters which seemed to impress Nasser. As regards foreign affairs, Nasser says he truly wishes be a friend of US. He irritated that we seem believe reports that he is working against us here and there in specific areas in Arab world and will not take his word that he is not. Says he has no desire to see US lose its airbases in this area and he is not taking any measures that direction. Similarly he is not working against oil interests of US and British.

He became quite stirred up at one point, mentioning specific cases in which officials in other governments were lying to our officials for purpose of their own gain, but said it was not his job to report these things specifically to US Government. Said he had heard we felt he was urging other countries recognize Red China and mentioned specifically Libya this regard. He offered upon return to Cairo to show Hussein cable traffic with Libya on this subject to prove this was not the case.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–1056. Secret. Received at 3:27 p.m. Repeated to London, Addis Ababa, Belgrade, and Khartoum.

[2] July 13.

[3] See Document 1.

Will not go into greater detail as Hussein leaving soon to report in person. Would urge that Secretary allocate sufficient time to let Hussein fully convey his impressions. Believe Department agrees with me that he will do this honestly.

Other subjects: Nasser said he did not expect any special results from Brioni meetings. As regards currency and water division talk with the Sudan he gave impression these could be brought to agreement quickly and without too much difficulty.

Byroade

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440. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 11, 1956—noon.

46. When I called on Fawzi last evening Hussein was present. Conversation quickly shifted to subject of Palestine settlement. Fawzi said he had asked Trevelyan to talk to me and was glad I had come. He said his remarks to Trevelyan were in nature of exploration of two problems that were hindering better relations with West i.e. Palestine and Algeria. As regards Palestine he felt initially we should explore all possibilities to keep situation quiet. Egypt was cooperating in every way with such efforts. Secondly he felt that a new effort should be made quite secretly to find out how near or how far apart the positions of Israel and Egypt really were. If this gap could be made narrow enough through ultra-secret means then perhaps outside nations might find a way of bridging gap.

Unlike the talk with Trevelyan Fawzi did not circuitously approach problem of what "outside" states might be helpful. He named United States, United Kingdom, Russia, India and Pakistan saying France had been omitted for obvious reasons.

I asked Fawzi his idea as to procedure and he at first evaded question by going into substance. He spoke of Jerusalem, refugees, territorial adjustments et cetera giving positions much the same as he had given to Trevelyan and me last November (Embtel 976 [2]). He later however, returned to my question saying that first stage should

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684.86/7–1156. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution; Omega Handling. Received at 12:20 p.m.

[2] Vol. XIV, p. 781.

be very secret and possibly handled by agent from Washington. He gave as an alternative use of Hammarskjold but rather discounted this in his later remarks.

Fawzi stated he not putting forward proposition to be done in hurry but definitely wished to throw out idea to see what possibilities were. He said time had to be right and in this regard Egypt as well as other states might have a problem. He was obviously including US elections in problems connected with timing. When queried as to whether he envisaged latter phase through UN he first said he guessed it did not matter as long as results were achieved. His later remarks indicated however he thinking of UN action and in Assembly rather than SC. He said at one point he thought it might be fortunate that Assembly would not finish its work this autumn but reconvene early next January (again I think referring to US elections).

In reply my direct question as to whether other nations he had mentioned would know that secret negotiations were underway he replied definitely not. During first stage when another effort would be being made secretly he felt only US and UK should know. If progress made there then could be discussions with US as to how to broaden out responsibility.

Fawzi said if Egypt were not worried about its relations with West it would probably let matter drift. He personally felt that it was too dangerous to allow this problem to drag on and said that frankly it was giving Moscow too great benefits in Middle East. Told Fawzi I unable give him any preliminary comment but would report his conversation to Secretary and Hussein of course could carry it personally. Fawzi said he seeing Nasser again this morning and might have additional word for me.

My feeling is that there is a chance today either Fawzi or Nasser will ask if Anderson can return. There was no mention of Anderson but Fawzi's reference to "agent from Washington" (which he did not refer to in conversation with Trevelyan) probably indicates that he aware of past effort. Perhaps he did not mention it because of Hussein whom I believe still uninformed.

Our comments will follow after seeing today's developments and discussion with Trevelyan. [3]

Byroade

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[3] See Document 447.

441. Letter From Arthur H. Dean to the Secretary of State [1]

New York, July 11, 1956.

DEAR FOSTER: Ambassador Eban and Minister Shiloah of Israel came to see me this afternoon at 3:30 at their request. Ambassador Eban made the following points:

(1) The recent changes in the office of Foreign Secretary of the Israeli government came about largely as a result of a sense of frustration on the part of the Israeli government over its relations with the government of the United States, over the general relations with the Arab countries, and in particular over the arms question with Egypt. But he reiterated the change predicated no major change in the foreign policy of the Israeli government or any so-called "tougher" policy.

(2) He reviewed with me his conversations with you, with Secretary for External Affairs of Canada Lester Pearson and with Foreign Minister Pineau of France. He said that despite your able speech in Paris [2] and your subsequent conversations, the Canadian Cabinet and the French government definitely did not feel that they could break the deadlock in arms unless they were doing it in partnership with the United States. He said that on his return from Paris Pearson ran into a Cabinet situation and also ran into a feeling of resentment in Canada about the effect of American capital in Canada and a feeling of resentment on the part of certain sections of the Canadian population with respect to the activities of American firms in Canada. He said further that the visit of Shepilov in Cairo had strong repercussions in Israel as did the parading of the Egyptian military equipment at the time of his visit.

(3) He said that the arms situation had not materially changed so far as Israel was concerned and that it was essential that something be done on this matter within the next few weeks and he regarded both the result and timing as of fundamental importance. He also said that he thought the Arabs would not be particularly influenced by whether the arms came from Canada and France at the suggestion of the United States or whether they came from all three in partnership with the United States [*Kingdom*?] and he quoted both Pearson and Pineau on this point.

(4) He said that they were very anxious to proceed with their Export Import Bank loan for water improvements in the interior of

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Israeli Relations, 1951–1957. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw this letter.

[2] Reference is presumably to Dulles' speech at Paris, May 4, to the North Atlantic Council. See Polto 2018, May 5, vol. IV, p. 61.

Israel, but that Sam Waugh had made it very clear that while the EXIM Bank favored the loan in principle, it was not really a bank transaction but a policy question and that they could not seriously proceed with the loan unless it was cleared by the Department of State. He said people in the State Department had advised him that they understood you were in general sympathy with the EXIM loan but you did not want to wake up some morning and be faced with the fact that Israel had already started to dig the Jordanian canal on the Syrian border and thus precipitated World War III. He said that the EXIM loan was most important and he thought that they could give you any reasonable assurance that you wished on their not going forward with work on the Jordan River canal except on a joint plan worked out with Eric Johnston and Secretary General Hammarskjold. He favored the joint plan worked out by Eric Johnston as he would be able to command U.S. money. He felt that the implementation of the EXIM loan was essential to raise morale among the Israeli people.

(5) He said there was one point that he could not speak about to you even though he valued your personal friendship highly and that was that the Israeli government had come to the serious conclusion that it was not in its best interests to have its affairs batted about in a presidential election campaign by people running for office in the United States that one party or the other was more favorable to the aspirations of Israel. He said further that if some prompt action could be taken on the arms question to break the deadlock even though the shipments fell far short of the November request [3] and if something could be done on the EXIM loan, he believed, although he had no authority to make such a statement, that he could get clearance to say to responsible people now agitating the Israeli question in the United States that there were no essential points of difference between the Israeli government and the United States. He then said that he did not see how the relations between Israel and the United States could be made a point of issue in the political campaign if the Israeli government could say that it was quite satisfied with the discussions which it had had with the United States government on these points.

(6) He said that the government of Israel viewed with as grave misgivings as did the United States the practical abandonment of the Anglo-Egyptian Pact, the bringing of the Soviet into the Mediterranean, the arming of Egypt, the extension of Egyptian influence into Algeria, Libya and the Sudan and the attempts of Nasser to set up an Arabian hegemony in the Middle East oriented to the Soviet orbit. He said that he felt that as a small independent nation Israel

[3] See the memorandum of conversation, vol. XIV, p. 773.

could play an important part in working with the United States toward an effective solution of this problem quite apart from the arms question and that if Israel could receive a significant but small shipment of arms in the near future, that it would avert rather than precipitate action by Egypt.

He was deeply appreciative of the time and attention which you had given to him yesterday [4] and he said that he felt that if you would give this matter your personal attention within the next few days, it would have a very important bearing upon the relations between the two countries.

In closing he again reiterated the great feeling of frustration of the people of Israel about the deterioration of their relations with the United States and their feeling of hopelessness about the continued build up of arms in Egypt by the Soviets.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur H. Dean

[4] See Document 451.

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442. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 11, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Aswan High Dam; Military Assistance to Iraq

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Ronald Bailey, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Willie Morris, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. William C. Burdett, NE

Mr. Bailey left the attached memorandum analyzing the present situation in Egypt and possible courses of action with respect to the Aswan Dam. The memorandum requests the Secretary's views.

Mr. Bailey remarked upon the similarity between the Foreign Office observations and those of the Department conveyed to him yesterday. [2] I said that Ambassador Byroade had just reported that Egyptian Ambassador Hussein was expected to leave Cairo for

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–1156. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett.

[2] See Document 438.

Washington on July 13 and had been charged by Nasser with discussions principally on the Aswan Dam. Ambassador Byroade indicated that the Egyptians were prepared to suggest agreement on the basis of our December 1955 offer. [3] I commented that it would probably be necessary to give Ambassador Hussein some reply next week and that we would be in touch with the British on the matter shortly.

With respect to the British suggestion for a Nile Development Board which is essentially similar to the US proposal for a riparian conference, I informed the British representatives that Ambassador Pinkerton thought the Sudan would not be attracted by the idea. The Ambassador is of the opinion that the Sudanese think they can obtain a better deal by negotiating directly with the Egyptians and that involvement of other countries will result in a reduction of the total amount of water allotted to them. Ambassador Pinkerton also doubts that the Egyptians and Sudanese will finally resolve the question of a division of Nile waters in less than a year. Mr. Morris said that should a Soviet-Egyptian deal on the Aswan Dam materialize, it would set a bad precedent for the Sudanese and would immediately expose the Sudan to Soviet penetration.

Mr. Morris stated that the Crown Prince of Iraq [4] recently had urged an increase in the supply of weapons by the West. The Crown Prince thought that the flow of Soviet Bloc armaments on a large scale to Egypt was having a particularly bad effect among junior officers. Mr. Morris asked that the US do everything possible to speed up a final decision with respect to additional offshore procurement in the UK. I explained that the appropriations legislation had not yet been passed and that in view of the prospective deep cuts it would probably be some time before we were able to arrive at definite decisions.

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[3] See telegram 1282, vol. XIV, p. 868.

[4] Amir Abdul Ilah.

[Attachment]

Memorandum From the British Embassy to the Department of State [5]

Washington, July 10, 1956.

ASWAN DAM

Although Shepilov left Cairo without any announcement about Russian aid for the High Dam, evidence continues to mount that Nasser may shortly accept a Russian offer in some form. He may, before setting out for Moscow, ask us point blank where we stand. We must therefore consider what line we are to take.

2. Since we and the United States Government made our offer of a grant in November [*December*?], our political assessment of Nasser's position has become more unfavourable. One of our main reasons for making the offer was to help him limit the Czech arms deal to what he called a "once and for all" transaction and keep other Communist technicians out of Egypt. This hope has been progressively contradicted by events. Moreover Nasser is already enmeshed in the Russian net (though he himself may not realise how much). This involvement is economic as well as political. Politically Nasser continues to work against Western interests, for all his fair words; and seems in particular to be developing sinister ideas about acquiring some control of oil in other Arab countries. We have therefore been considering whether it is in our interest economically or politically to maintain our offer of a grant to build this dam for Nasser now.

3. The arguments for continuing our offer are substantial. We must draw a distinction between Nasser with his pro-Soviet policy, and the people of Egypt for whose long term interests a dam is essential. Egypt remains the most influential Arab country, and in the long run we want a friendly Egypt. If we now withdraw our offer, or leave Nasser a case for arguing that we have done so, we shall risk a serious propaganda defeat in the Middle East and Russia will be able to pose as a humanitarian benefactor who attaches no political strings. In any case we are substantially committed to a specific and detailed offer.

4. On the other hand apart from the major political considerations in para 2 above, there are substantial reasons for not maintaining our offer of a grant. Economically it would land the United

[5] Top Secret. Not attached to the source text but filed separately in Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–1056.

Kingdom with a large open-ended agreement against limited resources which we might find on further examination could be used to greater general advantage in other ways. Nasser has devoted a substantially greater share of his economic resources to building up armaments and has run into other financial difficulties of a more serious kind than we foresaw when the scheme was drawn up, and is paying for imports from the Communist bloc by selling to them increasing quantities of cotton on which he must rely for the major part of the foreign exchange necessary to finance his share of the dam. Moreover we have to suffer the serious disadvantage of doing more for a regime whose actions are consistently hostile than for our friends.

5. There are several possible courses, the most important of which are set out below.

A. We might take the initiative and *make public our withdrawal.* This would encourage friendly governments in the Middle East; and force Nasser either to turn to Russia, thus making unmistakably plain his Russian connections, or go without his dam. It might also encourage the opposition to Nasser of elements in Egypt who do not wish to quarrel with the West. Against this we should be revealing prematurely our confirmed hostility to Nasser, and not only risk an intensification of his anti-Western activities (from which the United Kingdom would be the first and most severe sufferer), but also shake the confidence of many Egyptians and other Arabs in our good intentions towards them, and prejudice our chances of reverting to our offer with a more friendly Government.

B. We could *toughen up our financial terms.* This might also give Nasser grounds for claiming that we were never serious, and give him a pretext for turning to the Russians.

C. We might *do nothing,* but continue to let our offer languish. This gives us no adequate reply if he asks us point blank what our position is, or offers to clinch the deal on the basis of our offers.

D. We might *make a specific proposition to Nasser:* asking him what side he is on, and what evidence he can give us of the value of his reply. This is unlikely to produce realistic results.

E. We could *try a new approach.* We could say that the present scheme is too exclusively focussed on Egypt's needs: that we want a wider scheme bringing in a lot of other affected states. We are prepared to go on with the scheme on this wider basis, with a Nile Development Board and equal opportunities of access by the Sudanese and others to the capital available, so that Egypt does not scoop the pool on Nile development. This would be a difficult charge for Nasser to answer without seriously upsetting the Sudan. Unless some additional arguments were adduced this would however expose us to a charge of breach of faith.

6. We see considerable merit in the last idea which is in line with the thoughts put forward by the American Minister on June 1

when he asked for our views on the proposal to call a conference of riparian states. [6]

7. We should much value Mr. Dulles' views, especially on para. 5(e) above. [7]

[6] See Document 384.
[7] See Document 454.

443. Staff Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs [1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Hammarskjold Mission to Palestine in Relation to Fawzi Suggestions Regarding Arab-Israel Settlement

While we can not fail to consider most carefully any indigenous initiative toward a Palestine settlement, we remain highly skeptical of Egyptian intentions in suggesting at this time a move toward such a settlement. Despite Ambassador Byroade's talk with Foreign Minister Fawzi (Cairo's 46 [2]), the Egyptian position is by no means clear. It appears doubtful that the Egyptians have worked out in detail a method of procedure or the substance of a possible settlement. Fawzi's remarks about finding the proper time and references to the US elections in this connection indicate that any progress is likely to be slow.

We have discussed the matter with the UK along the lines of the talking paper approved by the Secretary on July 10 [3] and have concurred in the UK proposal that the British Ambassador should reply to Fawzi to the effect that: we welcome his initiative; we agree with the first stage and suggest the idea be put to Hammarskjold on the latter's visit to Cairo; we are considering further his ideas on the second stage which will necessarily depend in part on the success of the first. The British informed us that their Ambassador was scheduled to see Fawzi on July 11 and presumably he has spoken along

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #8. Secret. Drafted by Burdett, Bergus, and Ludlow on July 11. Prepared for a meeting with Secretary Dulles on Middle East problems scheduled for the afternoon of July 12. See footnote 1, Document 445.
[2] Document 440.
[3] See Tab A to Document 437.

these lines. We have instructed Ambassador Byroade to take a similar position in any further talks he may have with Fawzi. [4]

The British have undertaken to advise Hammarskjold of the approach by Fawzi and of the response which the UK and US Governments plan to make.

The position adopted gives us an opportunity to assess all the facts before committing ourselves, and avoids premature support of what may well be a devious Egyptian initiative. We think it is preferable for the SYG to serve as the intermediary between Israel and Egypt at least at this stage. He would probably resent the intrusion of any other person, and if an American were substituted it would unnecessarily commit us to the operation before its nature has become clear. We do not think that there is any appreciable possibility of matters moving quickly to the second stage or to any agreement on how to proceed in the second stage. Fawzi's idea for a conference, including the US, UK, USSR, India, and Pakistan is not acceptable to us on first examination, but there appears to be ample time later on to make this known.

On the other hand, Ambassador Bohlen reports that Hammarskjold during his visit to Moscow was convinced that the USSR did not wish to see hostilities precipitated in the Near East and that it is prepared to cooperate in working toward a settlement. Hammarskjold is known to incline to the belief that more direct USSR participation in efforts towards a settlement is probably necessary. We are not too sure that the British are as reluctant as we are to acquiesce in more direct USSR involvement in the Palestine matter. These factors raise the question of whether it might be prudent at this stage to make known to Hammarskjold our lack of enthusiasm for a conference on Palestine outside the UN including the USSR. This could presumably be done by a message to Hammarskjold in Geneva through USUN and Cordier at the same time stressing our hopes for a successful result to his efforts in the first phase.

Our conclusion is that the action we have already taken is adequate to meet the present situation and that we should await the results of Hammarskjold's trip before taking further steps. We attach importance to avoiding at this stage indications of undue interest in the project or giving it an aura of US sponsorship. Any more detailed approach to Hammarskjold now would inevitably have such an effect.

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[4] See Document 438.

444. Staff Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs [1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Relationship of Special Emissary Proposal and Hammarskjold Mission

A message was received just before the Shepilov visit to Egypt . . . purporting to come from Nasser and stating that Nasser would like Mr. Hoover to go to Cairo for a general discussion of U.S.-Egyptian relations. [2] In his talk with Ambassador Byroade on July 10, Fawzi mentioned a desire to talk with an "agent from Washington". [3] Thus, the Egyptians do appear to wish a general discussion at this time.

On balance we still believe that it would be desirable to send a special emissary, preferably Mr. Robert Anderson, to explore thoroughly with Nasser before his visit to Moscow the causes of U.S.-Egyptian differences and to emphasize the need for acts by Egypt to rectify the situation. We do not believe that the emissary should become involved in any detailed negotiations regarding Palestine at this time, and, therefore, do not think there would be any conflict with the Hammarskjold mission. Also, we anticipate that the Secretary will advise Ambassador Hussein of the current U.S. position on the Aswan High Dam, and that the emissary would not concern himself specifically with this project.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Egypt—Dam, Miscl. 1956. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by Burdett on July 12. Prepared for a meeting with the Secretary on Middle East problems scheduled for the afternoon of July 12. See footnote 1, *infra*.

[2] See Document 400.

[3] See Document 440.

445. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) [1]

Washington, July 12, 1956.

SUBJECT

Meeting in Secretary's Office July 11

At the meeting in the Secretary's office yesterday afternoon: [2]

1. There was a discussion about Eban's renewed request for arms for Israel. [3] The Secretary said there should be immediate approval of the following routine items: 18 Piper Cub aircraft, 40 ANTRC–1 transportable radio sets; spare parts for M–4 (Sherman) tanks, $43,000 worth of half-track parts, and aircraft parts for P–51 aircraft. The Secretary requested that a telegram be drafted to Ambassador Merchant authorizing him to inform the Canadian Government of the equipment we have released to the IG during the past six months so that they will not be under the misapprehension that we are presently engaged in an embargo on all military supplies to Israel; and also authorizing Merchant to indicate to the Canadians that in the context of the release of F–86's by Canada and possibly similar releases by other Western powers, the U.S. would be prepared to release to Israel the following: 400 50 caliber heavy machine guns for use on aircraft, 130 White scout cars (half-tracks), 5 S–55 helicopters, 15 dismantled M–7 and M–7B 105 mm Howitzer gun carriages. [4] The Secretary approved Mr. MacArthur's suggestion that at such time as we decided to inform the IG of approval of the foregoing items, we would make it plain that the approval was conditional upon assurances by the IG in connection with such things as retaliatory raids and cooperation with UNTSO. The Secretary did not approve the IG application for 18 C–82 aircraft (used for military cargo and paratroop operations).

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #8. Top Secret. Prepared for a meeting with the Secretary on Middle East problems scheduled for the afternoon of July 12. According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, the meeting, attended by Dulles, Hoover, MacArthur, Bowie, Burdett, Bergus, Russell, Bond, Ludlow, and Kirk, was held from 2:29 to 3:36 p.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[2] The meeting on July 11 began at 3:06 p.m. Dulles, Elbrick, Allen, MacArthur, Bowie, Bergus, Russell, Kirk, and Burdett attended. (Dulles' Appointment Book; *ibid.*)

[3] When Eban met with Dulles on July 10, he told the Secretary that there "had been little progress on Israel's routine procurement efforts in the United States." (Memorandum of conversation by Bergus, July 11; Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5–MSP/7–1156) See also Document 451.

[4] See Document 471.

2. The Secretary said that he felt that an announcement should be made on "Operation Stockpile" in some form in the near future. The Secretary indicated his approval of a suggestion by Mr. Bowie that the announcement be made in the form of a letter from the Secretary to Hammarskjold telling him in general terms that we have arranged to have equipment in the area which would be made available to the victim of aggression. [5] This letter could subsequently be publicized.

The subjects for the meeting in the Secretary's office this afternoon are:

A. Additional questions in connection with "Operation Stockpile".

B. Our reaction to Fawzi's proposals for steps towards an Arab-Israel settlement.

C. Position to be taken by Secretary in meeting which Hussein is expected to request for next week on Aswan Dam (Cairo's telegram 45, July 10. [6]).

[5] See Document 456.
[6] Document 439.

446. Editorial Note

On July 12, at the 290th meeting of the National Security Council, which began at 9 a.m. with Vice President Nixon presiding, Allen Dulles, in his review of developments affecting United States security, analyzed the current situation in the Middle East. The memorandum of discussion reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles pointed out that tension in the Middle East had increased considerably in the last two or three weeks, in part because of the alarm that General Burns had created in the minds of the governing group in Jordan. Moreover, the Arab governments were worried about the change in the Israeli government and the departure of Sharett, whom they considered a comparative moderate. Mr. Dulles predicted that this tension would continue to increase, but was not likely as yet to result in the outbreak of general hostilities." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

447. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 12, 1956—3 p.m.

60. As Nasser's time limited last night between functions, discussion with him on Palestine problem lasted only about 25 minutes. He had talked to Fawzi and knew of London's initial response as given by Trevelyan earlier in day. Nasser said he was afraid Fawzi had given us too much hope and he had not known until yesterday morning Fawzi had been so specific. He seemed also a bit irked that Fawzi had had Hussein present in his discussion with me. [2]

He said he had told Fawzi he afraid timing was not right. He then launched into general discussion of matters in Arab world, including agitated state of emotions and public opinion generally, particularly in northern states with emphasis on Jordan. He very strongly gave impression that nothing positive could be accomplished in Jordan in near future.

I asked if he thought all these factors should preclude secret talks of some kind. He said "perhaps not" but he was not sure of basis on which to proceed. I told him I had impression from Fawzi he thinking of no public action until possibly early next year. Could he foresee that emotions could be calmed down and other things could be right in that time period? He said perhaps but doubted anyone could be sure now. He then said "you Americans always think I am trying to deceive you. I want you to know right now that I am not hopeful that positive results could be obtained at this time".

During call on Fawzi on other matter late last night, I raised subject with him and told him had found President not very optimistic. Fawzi said he had warned us that this was matter which could only be explored and that both of us might have timing problem. However, he thought we should go ahead and explore it from our side and they would do same. He did not feel it wise to just let matter remain dormant. I asked in view Nasser's lack of optimism if he thought effort should be made just now through some secret procedure. He said he thought so but concluded we should probably all do no more than restudy problem until Hammarskjold's arrival here on July 21. He thought at that time he would talk to Hammarskjold as he had to us and see what Hammarskjold's reaction was. Perhaps after single discussions by Hammar-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1256. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 7:24 a.m., July 13. Repeated priority to London.

[2] See Document 440.

skjold in Israel and Egypt he could have better idea as to how to proceed.

Both Nasser and Fawzi denied categorically that approach suggested had been worked out or even discussed with Moscow. Fawzi himself raised subject, saying he supposed this might be of concern in Washington. He stated that as he inclined to think final action should come through United Nations, he could not see successful results unless Russia were brought into picture at some time prior to United Nations action. He had thought it would be better to place them in a position of accepting a share of the responsibility. Furthermore, if an attempt was made to proceed without Russia, and Russia did not like proposal, he could foresee them working perhaps with other Arab states against proposal.

Toned down a bit by Nasser, Fawzi said everything he had mentioned was completely flexible. I asked Fawzi's views on one point of procedure. He envisaged initially secret negotiations via third party between Egypt and Israel. This would place Israel in position of negotiating with one Arab state without knowledge of additional demands of other Arab states. How could Tel Aviv proceed with assurances in such an arrangement? Fawzi said this dilemma had always caused him concern. He felt it impossible to bring other Arab states in initially. Therefore, he could see no way out but to proceed as he proposed with our realization that Egypt was not likely to be so foolish as to accept things which it felt could not be sold to other Arab states. He said "this is more our problem than yours and we would be in very difficult position of tight-rope walking". Egypt did not really like to be in such a position but he could see no other way of taking any initiative.

Am uncertain as to how to evaluate all this. It is not like Fawzi to assume this much initiative. There are many local reasons to lead us to believe that Fawzi and entire Foreign Office have been given orders to work for better relations with West. As Fawzi sees this to be chief stumbling block to such relations it may be under this general instruction that he raised subject on his own. I also feel Nasser may have backed up a bit due to alarm that knowledge of renewed talks on such delicate subject had spread so fast so far. Also there no doubt in my mind that Nasser feels part of his troubles with Washington is his failure to produce settlement in past efforts. He would therefore be over-cautious about giving us another opportunity blame him for raising false hopes.

These discussions have been very informal and have been careful to give no indication of what Department views might be.

Our general feeling is that what Fawzi has in mind is attempt to obtain United Nations action backed by major powers, which would be favorable to Arabs. With such backing he may assume that

sufficient pressures could be brought to bear to make Israel acquiesce. There are of course considerable dangers to us in such an approach. It would not be well, as an example, to start down this road if we alone might later have to back out because of Arab demands on Israel. On other hand do not see at this stage that we should walk away, and my conclusion is that we should now wait to see if anything results from Hammarskjold's visit. Fawzi said he would be glad to see Trevelyan and me in the one days time between his return here and talks with Hammarskjold. Department may wish to send some instructions for such a meeting.

Byroade

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448. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 12, 1956—3 p.m.

61. For Secretary. I felt it best to tell Nasser directly of my recall, [2] which could not be arranged until last evening. I later on delivered formal papers to Fawzi. I told Fawzi of our timing problem due to Senate [3] and he promised to do his best to leave instructions that we receive written agreement during their absence. He told me just now at airport that he had been unable do this as their predeparture schedule was just too crowded. Am sending you my personal letter summary of last night's discussions. [4]

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123–Byroade, Henry A. Secret; Eyes Only. Received at 3:58 a.m., July 13.

[2] See Document 414.

[3] Byroade's successor, Raymond A. Hare, was commissioned August 14 during a recess of the Senate. Hare presented his credentials on September 25, 15 days after Byroade's departure.

[4] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 123–Byroade, Henry A.)

449. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 12, 1956—4 p.m.

62. Much of discussion last night with Nasser was on generalities which will not be reported in detail in view of similarities with past discussions. Saw him at his home when he was relaxed, extremely friendly, and gave every evidence supreme confidence. I said I glad he was returning Hussein to Washington. Nasser, apparently thinking I had High Dam in mind, replied that things had apparently reached state where no specific, even High Dam, was as important as lack of mutual confidence that had grown up. He aware from various reports that Washington felt he working against our interests outside of Egypt and in conjunction with Soviet Union. Said Harry Kern [2] had told him this was the case in Libya where Washington felt he working against continuation Wheelus Field. He wanted me to know that his people were not working for any outside power but only for Egypt. He had been so disturbed by this accusation that he had asked for all messages to and from Libya in past four months, and had himself read all of them that had anything to do with policy matters. There was nothing in these cables however, Foreign Office or otherwise, that could give any substance to our suspicions. He said there was one phrase that he wished Hussein had taken time to locate and that was statement made by Egyptian Ambassador in Libya [3] that in his view it was not in Egypt's interest to see West lose its position in Libya. He personally knew and trusted his Ambassador in Libya. It is true, he said, that Soviet Ambassador in this area [4] makes a point of close association with Egyptians and his Ambassador there also on friendly personal terms with Russian.

He then returned to Saudi Arabia. He had heard through one of his own confidants in press that he being blamed for United States difficulties in base negotiations. He had sent King Saud word that he disturbed about this and asked King to be certain none of his advisors gave such impression. He said "I have not been following these negotiations and have not been informed as I have been on Buraimi talks. I knew practically nothing about Dhahran negotiations until yesterday when one of King Saud's representatives (did not catch name) gave me full briefing." He went on to state salient

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/7–1256. Secret. Received at 8:35 a.m., July 13. Repeated to Jidda, Tripoli, and London.

[2] Director of *Foreign Reports*.

[3] Ahmed Hassan El-Faki.

[4] Nicolai Ivanovich Generalov.

features of talks fairly accurately. Nasser said emissary asked for advice at end of briefing and he replied he considered it entirely a matter between Saudi Arabia and United States and that it was really none of his business. He had only explored matter because of reports he was involved. I did not comment.

Nasser said "now I want to tell you something. The Arab world will no longer tolerate colonialism. I am not foolish enough to think that it will tolerate a form of Egyptian colonialism or domination either. Perhaps we have taken a lesson from you, or perhaps we have learned from our own mistakes, such as in the Sudan. Such a policy would not work in the long run. We give our advice when asked by Arab neighboring states, which is admittedly very frequent, but we do not attempt to force others to do other than that which they wish to do. All of our people, including teachers outside Egypt, know that this is my policy."

As time had come for more specific subjects there was only opportunity to again review for him briefly our views as outlined by Secretary to Hussein.[5] General discussion ended with reassertion by him that he guessed he could not help it if people would not take his word for some of these things. Course Egypt had adopted was very simple and clear and perhaps only time could convince West that Egypt not willfully working against its interests, but solely in the interests of people of this area as they themselves saw those interests.

Byroade

[5] See Document 353.

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450. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State[1]

Cairo, July 12, 1956—7 p.m.

64. Hussein has just given me plausible reasoning behind apparent contradiction we tried to assess in third from last paragraph

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1256. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 6:25 a.m., July 13. Repeated priority to London.

Embtel 60.[2] Told me he saw Fawzi before his departure this morning to seek explanation.

Fawzi said that what he had told Trevelyan and me had in fact been discussed in detail with Nasser. Nasser had not been aware that Fawzi at this particular time would launch project with us (it happened during call by Trevelyan on another subject). When he discovered it already done and of much interest in London and Washington and subject of quick reply, he became overly cautious. Fawzi says Nasser worries greatly about being personally exposed in Arab world by some leak in early stages. He therefore decided to personally pull back and hold himself more aloof, but to let Fawzi with authority go ahead. This would leave Nasser in position of being able to say "Yes, I was aware some informal discussions had taken place, but I said in the very beginning I thought it would not work."

This may well explain both unusual initiative by Fawzi and Nasser's own discouraging remarks last night. Essential fact seems to be that Fawzi says Nasser does want talks to proceed.

Byroade

[2] Document 447.

451. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, July 12, 1956—8:34 p.m.

30. Israel Ambassador saw Secretary tenth.[2] Eban opened by summarizing present situation NE, emphasizing military strength displayed by Egypt at evacuation ceremonies June 20. Two major factors in NE were dramatic growth of USSR influence; concomitant growth of Nasser threat to independence of NE states. Eban authorized by Israel PriMin indicate Israel willingness cooperate with US in safeguarding independence NE states—not only Israel but others. Other disturbing developments included growing turbulence frontier with Jordan. Eban asked US support of UN efforts tranquilize

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1256. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Dulles. Pouched to Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Ottawa, Paris, and Rome.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 445.

border. New Egyptian restrictions on Suez Canal. Israel might be raising this in SC.

Eban continued there were two ill-considered ideas current about present situation in NE. One was Selwyn Lloyd's statement in Parliament that military balance in area now in Israel's favor.[3] Actually Israel inferior in armor and air strength. There had been suggestion in US press and elsewhere that in seeking arms from US Israel was attempting identify US with Israel. This also untrue. Israel's objective in seeking arms from US pragmatic, not attempt embarrass US foreign relations.

Israel efforts procure arms Canada and France had come up against attitude those countries could take no action unless US associated itself by example. Similar attitudes indicated on part Italians, British, French.

Eban mentioned continuing Israel interest in EXIM loan for water development and asked if it could be stated to Bank that Department is sympathetic and wished approval. Also requested US FY 1957 economic aid and PL 480 programs in Israel take into account massive demands on Israel economy of present military effort.

In course of reply Secretary stated he not sure US would disagree with analysis of NE situation stated by Selwyn Lloyd. According to best US information there had not yet developed serious disparity favoring Egypt or Arabs generally. Israel's own military strength had improved over past months. Egypt assimilating new weapons at slower rate than either Israel or others had predicted. As for air defenses, Secretary knew of no way in which Israel could get sure protection from sudden air attack. US always felt Israel must rely on other deterrents which US was in part ready to provide. Eban asked if it were known in area what US would do in event of aggression against Israel. Secretary felt it was known that aggressive action would risk US response. Eban felt US position should be clarified so that it could have full effect as deterrent to would-be aggressor. Secretary replied we were giving this possibility most careful study.

Re Canadian arms sales to Israel, Secretary's information was that Canadian PriMin had in mind organizing pool of Western powers (not necessarily including US) among which arms shipments to Israel would be allocated. Was not sure US sale to Israel would

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[3] Reference is to a statement by Selwyn Lloyd on July 2 in the House of Commons in response to questions about the British Government's policy of exporting arms to Egypt. For text, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 555, cols. 988–990.

precipitate favorable Canadian action. In any event, Secretary would be seeing Canadian FonMin shortly and would look into situation.

Re EXIM loan Secretary stated there no broad objection to principle that Israel should be in position borrow money from EXIM Bank.

Dulles

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452. Editorial Note

On July 13, Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower, in the course of a conversation at the President's residence at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, discussed the "stockpile" operation as well as the current status of the Aswan Dam project:

"(5) I discussed with the President the general Arab-Israeli situation, pointing out that while it was still tense the prophets who had anticipated Israel being over-run in June were already proved wrong. I did say, however, that I felt it was important for us to make some statement promptly about our 'stockpile' operation which had now been advanced to a point where a vessel with necessary supplies was in the Mediterranean. I showed the President a proposed message to Hammarskjold on this subject. The President read it carefully, asked some questions, and then said that he approved of it.

"(6) I said that on the Aswan Dam, we had sat tight while Shepilov was in Egypt and that instead of this leading to a Russian proposal to build the dam as many had anticipated, the Egyptians were now back saying they would take our proposal on the original terms and withdraw their own counter proposals. I said we were not in a position now to deal with this matter because we did not know of the legislative situation. Also our views on the merits of the matter had somewhat altered. I said we were considering this carefully and would consult with the President next week." (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

453. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 13, 1956.

SUBJECT

Aswan Dam

Discussion:

Ambassador Byroade reports that Ambassador Hussein is leaving for Washington on July 13 and has been sent by Nasser principally to discuss the Aswan High Dam. Ambassador Byroade indicates that Nasser now does not consider important the language differences between the US–UK–IBRD offer of December 1955 and the Egyptian counterproposals. In an interview with INS on July 12 Ambassador Hussein stated Egypt has decided to deal with the West on the Aswan High Dam and that he was flying back for the final negotiations.

There is no concrete information on exactly what transpired during the Shepilov visit with respect to the Aswan High Dam. Reports . . . indicate that a specific Soviet offer was made involving a $400 million loan repayable over sixty years in cotton, without interest. [2] Other . . . reports state Shepilov emphasized industrial enterprises. The British have provided us with a report . . . which alleges that Shepilov made no firm offer on the Aswan Dam but instead talked in generalities regarding development projects. [3]

. . . Hussein's sudden return and press interview tend to confirm the report of the Indian Ambassador. It is possible to speculate that Nasser, having no offer from the Soviet, recognizes that unless he obtains a commitment from the West before his trip to Moscow his bargaining position will be severely deflated and that he may end up with no Dam at all. He also may be exerting pressure on the Soviets to improve their offer. We estimate that Nasser would prefer to conclude an agreement with the West on the Aswan Dam while remaining free to collaborate with the Soviet bloc in other activities in the area and to accept continued Soviet military and economic assistance.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #9. Top Secret; Omega. The source text bears a notation indicating that Secretary Dulles saw the memorandum.

[2] See the enclosure to Document 411.

[3] Prepared by the British Ambassador at Cairo, not printed. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #8)

We are faced with the same general alternatives existing prior to Shepilov's visit to Cairo, that is: (1) await further developments without another approach to the Egyptians; (2) agree to proceed with the Dam on the basis of the US–UK–IBRD offer of December 1955; (3) stimulate a conference of riparian states to discuss unified development of the Nile Valley with the objective of obstructing a Soviet-Egyptian agreement; and (4) withdraw or postpone the offer either publicly or privately.

Prior to news of Hussein's return we had concluded the best course was to make no further moves at this time in order to keep open the possibility that Nasser would not conclude a deal on his trip to Moscow. We informed the British of this position on July 10.[4] On July 11 the British Embassy here submitted to us a memorandum from the Foreign Office in which the analysis of the situation and courses open is similar to our own.[5] The British tentatively favor efforts to stimulate unified development of the Nile Valley.

In view of Hussein's return it is no longer possible to avoid a further discussion. To proceed with the December offer would be contrary to our entire policy towards Egypt. Also we would be faced with Congressional and public opinion opposition at home, the absence of FY 56 grant aid funds, the opposition of the other riparian states and a serious reaction from pro-Western states in the area, particularly Iraq, Turkey and Iran. Under the circumstances, our best course appears to be to make clear to the Egyptians privately why we are unable to proceed at the present moment, but at the same time hold out the hope of future assistance providing Egypt indicates by actions a desire to cooperate.

Recommendations:

1. That NEA discuss our proposed position with the British before a final decision is made.

2. That you discuss the matter with Ambassador Hussein using as a point of departure your talk with the Ambassador before he left for Cairo (attached).[6] You could state that the United States remains as interested as ever in helping the Egyptian people with their long term economic development. However, such cooperation is inevitably a two-way street, and before concluding negotiations on the Dam, Egypt should demonstrate by actions a desire to work with us. Since the December offer was made, such factors as the following have entered the picture: the growing reaction in the Congress and

[4] See Document 438.
[5] See the attachment to Document 442.
[6] See Document 353.

among the American people to Egyptian collaboration with the Soviets, the interest of other riparian states in being consulted, the diversion of Egypt's economic resources to continuous large scale purchases of Soviet bloc military equipment, and the unavailability of grant funds from the FY 56 appropriations. These difficulties are serious but we believe they may be overcome if Egypt really desires to make the Dam possible and is prepared to demonstrate this desire by acts of cooperation. [7]

[7] The following handwritten notation in an unidentified hand appears at the end of the source text: "Not approved."

454. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 13, 1956, 4:05 p.m. [1]

SUBJECT

Aswan Dam

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. R.W. Bailey, Counselor, British Embassy
The Secretary
NEA—George V. Allen
C—Douglas MacArthur
NE—William C. Burdett

Sir Roger Makins stated he understood that we had been considering making no further moves with respect to the Aswan Dam at this time, while the UK has been thinking of a plan for the unified development of the Nile Valley. A new situation has been created by the prospective return of the Egyptian Ambassador to Washington, presumably with a message that Nasser wished to proceed with the Dam. The British had heard from Cairo that the Egyptians were prepared to simplify very much their counter proposals. These developments seem to place the U.S. and U.K. in an awkward position since we had made a firm proposition. What line should we take now?

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–1356. Secret. Drafted by Burdett. The time of the meeting is from Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

The Secretary agreed that we were in an awkward predicament and said that we had been giving a lot of thought to the matter but had not yet come to a final conclusion. He had mentioned the Dam to the President today [2] and wanted to talk to the President further before reaching a final conclusion. [3] We were moving in the direction of wondering whether we could go ahead with the project on the present scale. There was the question of money from Congress. We might still get a rider on the appropriations bill. [4] Sentiment was increasing against the conspicuous "neutrals". The Administration was fighting strongly to prevent such riders for they were not sound constitutional practice. In any event the authorizing legislation restricted the funds which might be expended on a grant basis. It would be very difficult to amass $50 million for Egypt. We would be obliged to steal from everyone else. Also, we were having increasing doubts regarding the benefits which would inure to the West. For a few days we would receive big favorable newspaper headlines, but over the long haul, for 12 or 15 years, it was a different matter. The Egyptian people would have to put up with considerable austerity. We would be placed in the position of attempting to exercise control over aspects of Egyptian foreign policy; for example, expenditures on military equipment. Egypt cannot at the same time have the Dam and indulge in foreign ventures. Gene Black was beginning to worry more than before. In sum, the project appeared to be too big a thing for Egypt to swing in the present state of affairs. Our policy towards Egypt was unsettled. There was the problem of Israel and of Nasser's ambitions elsewhere. For all of the above reasons we were increasingly dubious. We recognized that if we said no it would involve quite serious risks. In desperation Nasser might invite the USSR to build the Dam on its own terms. The Dam was a big factor in his political position at home.

Mr. Allen commented that until March Nasser had maintained the line that work must commence immediately upon the Dam. Then he suddenly switched and was now saying that it must be preceded by an agreement with the Sudan. This change caused not a ripple internally, apparently.

The Secretary posed the question of how the matter should be handled if we determined not to proceed. Should we tell Nasser bluntly, evade the issue, or drag the matter along by holding out hope for assistance at a future date? We had reached no clear

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[2] See Document 452.

[3] See Document 473.

[4] Reference is to the Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1957, which President Eisenhower signed into law on July 31.

decision but expected to have a position by the middle of next week. Our present inclination was to tell Nasser what the situation is. We could hold out the hope that we might assist him later with less grandiose projects. We would not like to see Nasser go to Moscow with a bid of ours in his pocket. If we withdraw our offer beforehand, the Russians may overplay their hand and ask so much that it would react against them in the Arab world.

Sir Roger Makins said that the U.K. largely concurred in the diagnosis given by the Secretary and also had its doubts regarding how the matter should be handled. The British were thinking of going beyond the U.S. idea of a riparian conference to that of a regional development program. The Secretary replied that we also had been considering this approach and recalled the previous exchange of views with the British on it. He asked about the current situation in the Sudan. Sir Roger said that it was most confused; the British were not sure that one of the two groups in the new Government, the Umma, was not in Egyptian pay. The position of the Government was not strong. Mr. Allen commented that our Ambassador to the Sudan considered the present Government not worse than its predecessor and perhaps better.

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455. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 13, 1956—midnight.

70. Deptel July 9 sent Cairo 52. [2] It is not unusual for there to be an honest difference of opinion as to interpretation facts between Department and field. In our opinion the factual record in reference telegram, as far as it goes, is some 90 percent accurate, although it records a far more complete explanation of United States than of Egyptian policy and in certain vital aspects we believe the facts themselves are expressed in misleading manner. Reference telegram ignores developments in and around Egypt during period under discussion, which cannot be disregarded if we are to understand nature and reasons for our current difficulties in area. Since Suez

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–1356. Top Secret. Received at 3:47 p.m. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Amman, Addis Ababa, Ankara, Belgrade, Bonn, Karachi, Khartoum, London, Madrid, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Rabat, Rome, Tangier, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and Valletta.

[2] Document 434.

evacuation agreement was signed there has been very basic change in Soviet tactics, and Western statement after discussions with Soviet leaders have added to impression Soviet policy has, at least for near future forsaken use of dangerous military adventures. Most of all however I am concerned over fact the "why" of things is entirely omitted from reference telegram. I believe this "why" is pretty important ingredient in foreign affairs analysis and absolutely essential to positive thinking about developments this area.

Expanding area of Arab-Soviet cooperation results primarily from Soviet initiative in coming to the Arabs rather than Arabs running after the Soviets. In accepting the Soviet cooperation Egypt is motivated by what its leaders consider to be compulsion to move in direction of meeting basic national requirements. GOE does not consider its aspirations to be contrary to legitimate Western objectives in area. It is a misinterpretation to view this cooperation as a reflection of basic Egyptian sympathy for Soviet Union in its struggle with West.

Those aspects of American foreign policy directly related to our efforts organize forces of area to resist Soviet aggression have had only limited appeal in this area. Unfortunately they appear to be even less welcomed in face of a growing belief in pacific intentions of Soviet Union and growth of neutrality sentiment as apparent parallel between Soviet and Arab objectives became more apparent.

Telegram under reference strongly suggests we continue to judge Egypt solely by whether—measured by our own criteria—she is for us or for the Soviets. It appears to dismiss possibility that from national Egyptian viewpoint GOE might have a legitimate reason for close cooperation with Soviet Bloc. We ourselves have repeatedly announced we believe Soviets do not want make war and that we would welcome more cordial relations if Soviets would meet our criteria. In effect we give impression we expect Middle East to adopt our views and those of our European allies that cordial relations with Soviet Union would only be justified if Soviets met Western positions reference Germany, disarmament, greater freedom in satellites et cetera. We apparently expect Arab states attach so much importance such Western objectives that they will defer their own objectives, rejecting Soviet cooperation in Arab-Israeli dispute, Soviet arms required for defense against Israel, Soviet support in freeing Arab world from colonial domination and substantial Soviet economic cooperation and assistance.

These are basic and deeply felt objectives of Egyptian foreign policy. Department knows that while economic assistance provides a very useful lubricator for foreign policy operations which become closely intermeshed with those of other countries as result of joint approaches to common objectives, economic assistance does not in

itself establish basic common bonds between US and recipients and does not buy repudiation of national objectives which may not coincide with our programs and policies for containing Soviet threat. For example economic aid will never resolve our difference over Israel just as it could not buy Greek abandonment of concept of enosis. Value of offer to sell arms to Egypt was offset by announced American policy of maintaining existing ratio whereas Egyptian requirements was for substantially greater shipments in order to achieve what they considered to be prime national requirement—an adequate defense posture. I do not know in what terms Department defines "legitimate" defense requirements but it may be well to bear in mind that proportion of Egyptian economy devoted to defense is less than that of many of our allies some of whom have gone higher at our own urging.

Relationship between basic Egyptian, Soviet and United States policies rather than record contained in telegram from Department under reference, is key to Arab-Soviet cooperation which has as one of its main objectives displacement of colonial influence in this part of world. In long run such a move if successful would also engulf American military base positions as it did British position in Suez. We should resist any efforts to push us out but if we are to resist effectively and protect these and other interests we should lose no time in recognizing fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult for governments in this area to justify foreign manned bases against Soviet threat when an increasingly large part of area is becoming more and more dependent upon Soviet Union for support against an Israeli threat and for general build up of their forces.

Neutralism exists over a large portion of this part of world. If we fail to develop means of fruitful cooperation with this large body of people and continue to consider them as being either in enemy camp or as "fellow travellers" I fear that before too long we will begin to appear in eyes these people as being the unreasonable member of East-West struggle. If we are to adopt in this area positive type of thinking which is necessary to developing successful policies we should be less concerned with reacting against neutralists and devote our best efforts towards developing policies and programs which would create a community of basic interests. We believe such basic interests can be found without resort to appeasement of Egypt or abandonment of soundly conceived positions elsewhere in ME. This Embassy has on several occasions emphasized its hope such positions would be strengthened by communication with Department and in talks with George Allen last September.[3] But we may not be able in end to hold these positions unless we can

[3] See telegrams 632 and 654, vol. XIV, pp. 537 and 551.

address ourselves positively and with greater understanding to those issues which encourage drift around us toward neutralism or anti-Westernism.

Byroade

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456. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General at Geneva [1]

Washington, July 13, 1956—6:27 p.m.

39. Eyes only Consul General from the Secretary. You are requested to seek earliest convenient appointment with UN Secretary General Hammarskjold and to deliver into his hands for his eyes only following message from me:

"As you know, on April 9 a statement was issued by the White House [2] regarding the serious situation in the Middle East. The statement declared that the US is determined to support and assist any nation in that area which might be subjected to aggression, and expressed confidence that other nations will act similarly in the cause of peace.

"Pursuant to this statement and to enable it to act promptly and effectively thereunder, the United States Government has completed arrangements to maintain in close proximity to the Middle East area certain stockpiles of military supplies and equipment earmarked for delivery to any nation subjected to aggression arising out of the Arab-Israel dispute, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

"We believe that our readiness to provide such assistance will serve as a deterrent to any country contemplating aggression and assurance to any country attempting to pursue peaceful policies. We felt that you should know about this program although we plan to withhold any public announcement until some time following your visit to Jerusalem and Cairo. None of the parties to the dispute knows of the foregoing but I wished you to know of our plans for your own information." [3]

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1356. Top Secret; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Ludlow; cleared by MacArthur, Allen, Wilcox, and Russell; approved by Macomber; and signed by Wilcox.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 258.

[3] That same day Wilcox informed Lodge of the transmittal of this message to Hammarskjöld. (Letter from Wilcox to Lodge; Department of State, USUN Files)

457. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations [1]

Washington, July 13, 1956—8:20 p.m.

13. For Lodge from Secretary. Following should be discussed orally with Cordier:

"We believe that the British have already informed Hammarskjold of the informal proposals which the Egyptian Foreign Minister has made to them and to us of steps that might be taken toward a Palestine settlement. Subsequent conversations which our Ambassador has had with Fawzi leave some question as to the firmness of the suggestions. Nevertheless, Fawzi has informed us that he intends to discuss the matter with Hammarskjold when he is in Cairo. In view of the fact that Fawzi has broached the proposals to us, Hammarskjold may wish to have our reactions to them.

The United States would welcome any exploratory talks with the parties to the dispute such as Fawzi suggested as a first phase. In particular, it would seem to us useful if the Egyptians and the Israelis were to indicate their general thinking on the terms of a possible settlement. The mere fact of discussions looking toward a settlement would seem to be all to the good.

With respect to Fawzi's proposal for a group to be composed of the UK, US, USSR, India and Pakistan to make recommendations resolving the gap in the positions of the two sides, it is our belief that such a group would be unwise. Experience to date has shown that a multi-lateral group of this kind has not proven to be suitable for this purpose. Moreover, it is our belief that discussions among major powers on questions relating to the Palestine problem should take place within the framework of the Security Council which is presently seized of this problem.

Hammarskjold will, of course, have our support in any effort that he may find it possible to make in bringing the two sides toward a settlement of their dispute." [2]

Dulles

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–1356. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Russell; cleared with Allen, Wilcox, and MacArthur; and approved by Dulles. Repeated to Cairo and London on July 16. (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/7–1656)

[2] In connection with these instructions, Lodge reported the following on July 16:

"Crosthwaite (UK) informed us UK Delegation heard today from UK Embassy Washington that we intended inform SYG Hammarskjold thru Cordier of Egyptian démarche and our reactions. He urged in interest of security that we reconsider using this channel to SYG. We later informed Crosthwaite of Department's continuing desire we act in accordance reftel. Crosthwaite said he would have to protest.

"Fawzi had made it clear they would repudiate their position in event of leak and UK felt that while Egyptian initiative might not be productive it was important enough not to jeopardize it. Suggest Department consider informing SYG via Geneva. We understand SYG leaves Geneva 7 p.m. on 18th." (Telegram 52 from USUN; *ibid.*, 674.84A/7–1656)

458. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State [1]

Ottawa, July 13, 1956—5 p.m.

22. For the Secretary and Allen. Reference Embassy telegram 482. [2] Canadian Cabinet decision of July 12 on F–86's for Israel embodied in secret aide-mémoire dated July 13 which quoted below. Foreign Minister Pearson has orally informed Israeli Ambassador today of Canadian Government's decision. Canadian Government considers consultation process this question continuing with US and other interested countries. Prime Minister will respond any further questions in Parliament by stating consultation continuing. Following is text aide-mémoire which given Embassy by Under Secretary Leger this afternoon:

"It has been decided that Canadian Government will not unilaterally release F–86's to Israel.

"In certain circumstances, however, it will consider joining with US to provide some aircraft.

"Such a release would depend (A) upon joint or collective decision of countries more directly concerned that provision of such aircraft desirable in their own interests and in interests of security in Middle East, and (B) upon joint action to assist Israel's defensive position.

"Such collective action could involve the release perhaps of 12 F–86's by US and a like number by Canada (this could possibly be accompanied by release of some defense equipment by other Western countries such as UK, to give a further indication of collective action). Exact form of collective arrangements can be considered later if it appears that other governments concerned willing participate.

"If US administration is willing consider such action, meeting of representatives of countries directly involved might then be arranged, preferably in Washington, since Ambassadors there of France, Italy and UK [3] have been accustomed in recent months meet from time to time with senior officials of State Department to discuss questions relating to Middle East. If it is so desired in Washington, Canadian Ambassador [4] there could arrange meeting with Ambassadors of France, Italy and UK together with suitable representatives of State Department. It will be purpose of that meeting seek correct judgment on whether or not it desirable for

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5622/7–1356. Secret; Priority. Received at 10:52 p.m.

[2] Document 416.

[3] Maurice Couve de Murville, Manlio Brosio, and Sir Roger Makins, respectively.

[4] A.D.P. Heeney.

Israel be provided with modern jet fighters in addition to those which have gone from France and, if so, to explore in preliminary way possibility of coming to collective decision on lines suggested above.

"Any specific proposal would naturally have to be referred to Canadian Government for consideration."

Merchant

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459. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Morris) and the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Burdett), Department of State, Washington, July 14, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Egyptian Suggestions Regarding Arab-Israel Settlement

Mr. Morris showed Mr. Burdett a telegram from London commenting upon the views expressed by the Department on Fawzi's initiative with respect to the Arab-Israel settlement. [2] The Foreign Office stated that it also had no illusions about the Egyptian intention. The British also agreed with us that we should not give the Egyptians any excuse to say that we had killed their initiative and therefore should encourage them to develop the project. The Foreign Office also agreed with the Secretary's comment that even if we put the worst possible construction on the matter, that is, that it was an agreed Egyptian-Soviet approach, we should still not discourage the initiative. The British are informing Hammarskjold of Fawzi's initiative by letter and are mentioning to him their misgivings about the concept of a five-power conference on the second stage. [3]

Mr. Burdett informed Mr. Morris of Ambassador Byroade's talks with Fawzi and Nasser on the matter. [4]

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1456. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

[3] Telegram 247 from London, July 13, informed the Department of this British initiative. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1356)

[4] See Documents 440, 447, and 450.

460. Telegram From the Consulate General at Geneva to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, July 14, 1956—5 p.m.

35. Eyes only for the Secretary from Gowen. Mytel 34 [2] and urtel 39. [3] Your message delivered to Hammarskjold in person by me today six pm Geneva time.

After reading it he said "I am extremely grateful to Secretary Dulles for this message. It is extremely helpful to me.

I shall keep it buried in my heart. I am immensely grateful to Secretary Dulles also for saying that this matter will not be made public until some time after my coming visit to Jerusalem and Cairo. This time I shall have to be much tougher than I was before. Both sides are extremely difficult to handle but Ben Gurion is absolutely explosive. The psychological factors involved are so very complex. The situation remains very serious. But somehow I still hope matters may improve. Please tell Secretary Dulles how deeply grateful I am to him for this message and that it is of vast help to me." [4]

Gowen

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1456. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Received at 3:15 p.m. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw this telegram.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

[3] Document 456.

[4] Secretary Dulles showed this message to President Eisenhower on July 16. (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

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461. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, July 14, 1956—4 p.m.

37. Embtel 39. [2] Message of Cabinet decision authorizing Ben

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–1356. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Burdett and Geren, cleared with Bond, and approved by Allen who signed for Dulles. Repeated priority to Amman, London, and Jerusalem.

[2] Telegram 39, July 13, transmitted an Israeli source's report on a special session of the Israeli Cabinet on July 11 during which the following actions were taken:

(Continued)

Gurion take reprisal action against Jordan in event future serious incident apparently intended place US on notice. UK has received message with same import from Eytan.

In effort forestall possible Israel action and to leave no doubt re US position, Ambassador instructed call on Myerson and emphasize US concern at attitude taken by Israel Cabinet.[3] SC and US have repeatedly made clear incidents should not be construed as justifying resort to retaliation. As GOI knows, Jordan Government making strong and apparently sincere efforts curb infiltration. Reprisal by Israel would be particularly unfortunate on eve Hammarskjold's visit. Also would prejudice sympathetic consideration US and other countries Israel's desire acquire arms for defense.

Dulles

(Continued)

"1. It was decided that there would be no reprisal for previous incidents.

"2. In case future serious incident or incidents originating from Jordan, Ben Gurion was authorized to take necessary action without further Cabinet consideration.

"Source said that hope was expressed in Cabinet that retaliation could be avoided pending Hammarskjold's arrival in area but that this was dependent on developments re 2 above." (*Ibid.*, 684A.85/7–1356)

[3] See Document 470.

462. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the British Ambassador (Makins) and the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur), Department of State, Washington, July 16, 1956[1]

SUBJECT

Operation Stockpile

Sir Roger Makins called on me this morning at 10 o'clock at my request. I gave to Sir Roger a copy of the attached memorandum of July 16 indicating that the US did not wish contingent planning with respect to Operation Stockpile to be treated as a part of other US/UK contingent military planning for the Middle East nor within the context of the Tripartite Declaration.

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, ... Top Secret. Drafted by MacArthur. Copies were sent to Dulles, Hoover, Murphy, Bowie, Russell, Burdett, and Elbrick.

Sir Roger was familiar with Admiral Denny's memorandum of July 5 to Admiral Radford.[2] He read the memorandum which I handed him and said he fully understood that we were handling this matter outside regular channels and he fully understood why we did not wish it to be a part of US/UK or tripartite contingent planning. He said he would pass the memorandum on to his Government, and felt quite sure they would understand. He added that the British fully agreed that contingent planning with respect to Operation Stockpile, as well as other US/UK contingent military planning for the Middle East, was being handled on a most secret US/UK basis and that the French were not being brought into the picture. He said he would let Admiral Denny know of our talk this morning and the contents of the piece of paper which I had given him.

I also said to Ambassador Makins that if we ever had to implement Operation Stockpile, we might try to make the turn-over of planes in Greece rather than in Cyprus because of the strain which the operation might place on the fairly limited resources in Cyprus. This, however, was simply a possibility which I wished him to know about, and we would only make a decision about this in the event we should decide to implement the delivery of the F–86's. I said that even though this was a possibility, we still wished to go ahead on the basis of contingent planning for the hand-over in Cyprus. Ambassador Makins said he would make personal note of this but did not plan to pass this word on to London since it might simply confuse them.

I also said to Sir Roger that as I had told him when I originally discussed this operation with him, we might wish at some time to make a general statement about Operation Stockpile to serve as a deterrent. Such a statement would not, of course, mention Cyprus or the details of our contingent military planning. If we at some future date decided to make a general statement, I said to Sir Roger that I would let him know in advance of the issuance of any such statement.

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[2] Document 423.

[Attachment]

Memorandum From the Department of State to the British Embassy [3]

Washington, July 16, 1956.

With reference to paragraph 5 of Admiral Denny's memorandum of July 5 to Admiral Radford, the President on April 9, 1956, in connection with the tense Middle East situation, announced that " . . . the United States is likewise determined to support and assist any nation which might be subjected to such aggression . . . ". [4] The United States contingent planning with respect to the possible provision to Israel of a number of F–86 aircraft is to place the United States Government in a position to implement the President's April 9 statement should this become necessary.

The United States does not believe that this contingent planning should be treated as a part of the US/UK contingent military planning which has been in progress since last April with respect to possible operations against an aggressor in the Middle East. Although it has a bearing on certain aspects of such US/UK contingent planning, it is not in the first instance being dealt with by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in its corporate entity but is being handled by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The United States believes that knowledge of the possibility that the United States might provide Israel with F–86 planes in the event of aggression against Israel should be restricted to the United States and the United Kingdom. This procedure is, of course, not intended to suggest that if implementation of this plan becomes necessary it could not be done within the context of the Tripartite Declaration. The United States believes that the exact context in which this operation would be carried out (i.e., as a US action with British support and approval through use of the facilities in Cyprus; as a bilateral US/UK operation; as an implementation of the Tripartite Declaration; or in support of a possible UN Resolution) can only be determined by the conditions existing at the time when such an operation might be put into effect. In the interim, the United States attaches the highest importance to secrecy and to limiting knowledge of this operation, as well as the US/UK contingent military planning for possible operations against an aggressor, to the smallest practica-

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[3] Top Secret.

[4] Ellipses in the source text. See footnote 2, Document 258.

ble number of persons in the United States and United Kingdom Governments on a need-to-know basis.

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463. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Counselor of the French Embassy (de Laboulaye) and the Officer in Charge of Egypt-Sudan Affairs (Geren), Department of State, Washington, July 16, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Canadian Arms Proposal; French Arms Problems; Aswan Dam

Mr. de Laboulaye asked whether the Canadian Government had secured United States concurrence in its proposal for a multi-national consideration of the whole question of arms for Israel and the creation of an armament pool for that country. Mr. Geren replied that the Canadians have discussed the Near East arms question with us several times and we understand that they are discussing the multi-national idea with other friendly countries. We are not in a position to predict the final outcome of this matter. Mr. de Laboulaye explained the current French position on arms shipments to Israel as follows: Various elements in the French Government including several Ministers and many members of the Defense Ministry wish to send huge quantities of arms to Israel. The Quai d'Orsay, however, is anxious to preserve the best possible position with the Arab countries. It is difficult for the Quai d'Orsay to resist the pressure of other elements of the French Government in the arms matter and some maneuvering is required. At the last NEACC meeting the French presented their list as "arms requested by Israel". The British, Americans and Italians took the position that they could only pass on the matter after the French had declared their intentions to deliver. [2] Mr. de Laboulaye appreciated this position. His Ambassador has been instructed to request a meeting of the Ambas-

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/7–1656. Drafted on July 18 by Geren.

[2] The minutes of the NEACC meeting held July 3 are *ibid.*, G/PM/MC Files: Lot 66 D 428, NEACC Minutes M–42 to M–72.

sadorial Committee in the hope of getting a concerted policy on shipment of arms for Israel. . . .

. . . . . .

Mr. Geren replied that previous Ambassadorial Committee meetings indicated it would be difficult for the French to secure a joint assessment of the Israeli need and the creation of a pool from which to meet the need; that United States Representatives in the previous NEACC meeting had said we inclined to sympathetic consideration of the French request, once it was stated in the form of an intention to deliver; that sympathetic consideration did not necessarily mean approval of every item and in the precise quantity requested; and that Mr. Geren had no authority to commit the United States in advance about its position in the NEACC meeting.

On the Aswan High Dam, Mr. de Laboulaye wished to know whether a decision one way or the other would come out of Ambassador Hussein's visit with the Secretary upon his return. [3] Mr. Geren said that we have had this matter under consideration and still have it under consideration, and that no decision had been taken yet. Mr. de Laboulaye recalled his prediction in a former conversation that the United States would reach final agreement to do the Aswan High Dam. Mr. Geren refused to verify the prediction and said there were indications on both sides and that the matter could only be settled by a decision at a high level. Mr. de Laboulaye recalled Mr. Lincoln White's statement of last week that the offer still stands. [4] Mr. Geren said he would prefer the language: The offer has not been withdrawn. Mr. Geren emphasized the necessity of Egyptian agreement with the Sudan as a condition which the Egyptians themselves had said must be satisfied before construction can begin.

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[3] See Document 478.

[4] On July 6, White issued a statement to this effect, but pointed out that the funds originally earmarked for the Aswan Dam had been allocated to other projects. (Transcript of the Department of State Daily Press Briefing, July 6; Department of State, S/PRS Files: Lot 77 D 11)

464. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, July 16, 1956—2 p.m.

43. Re Deptel 37. [2] Inasmuch as fact information (Embtel 39 [3]) was obtained at Embassy initiative on highly secret basis with specific request by informant that it not be reported in Washington in his name and what we believed apparent desire we not report information coming from official source, do not see how I can emphasize concern to Myerson on Cabinet attitude which presumably secret.

At same time I desire to draw Department's attention to what I believe may be certain misconceptions originating from UK sources. Firstly, according to British Chargé here, UK has never received any message from Eytan through Embassy regarding Cabinet decision authorizing Ben Gurion at his discretion take reprisal action. Eytan's only recent discussion with British Embassy was on July 10, two days before Cabinet meeting under reference was held. At that time, according to British Chargé, Eytan took line similar to that of Ben Gurion with Burns, [4] urging British use their good offices Amman with HKJ to bring Fedayeen activities under control. Furthermore, I wonder whether definite threat of US reprisal on arms aid question can be used effectively at this time unless we are in fact prepared to modify our present position and desire to use this moment to announce it. Department may feel that expression of US concern in general terms plus GOI realistic knowledge of probable effect of Dewrisah [?] raid before Hammarskjold's visit may have tempering effect on Israel attitudes.

Embassy has difficulty understanding line taken by British Foreign Office reported London's 253 to Department [5] except as one of those flights from reality which has periodically characterized UK analysis developments in this area. Facts of case are that in past three weeks there have been several serious incidents resulting in

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–1656. Secret; Niact. Received at 11:25 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Jerusalem, and London.

[2] Document 461.

[3] See footnote 2, *ibid.*

[4] See Documents 417 and 418.

[5] Telegram 253, July 13, reported the British Foreign Office belief that the Israelis were trying to create "suitable atmosphere in which to engage in reprisal venture. Foreign Office points out that contrary to Israeli allegations, Jordan's border has been relatively quiet in past few months with no incidents of magnitude sufficient to make Israelis feel that reprisal necessary. In fact Foreign Office says that Jordan complaints outnumber Israel complaints by two to one." (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–1356)

death of five Israelis, including three civilians, and wounding of two others. Several of these incidents have resulted from incursions by armed bands well within Israeli territory and bear the earmarks of Fedayeen type activity, thesis supported both by Israel intelligence sources and by Amman's 35 to Department. [6] Embassy believes that Israelis want a quiet Jordan border; that warnings which they have transmitted to HKJ were designed to accomplish this and that they will adopt reprisals against Jordan only with reluctance and because there appears to be no practicable alternative method of insuring security of Israel citizenry from incursions from Jordanian territory.

In these circumstances, and if Department still feels approach should be made, would it not be advisable that I convey to Foreign Minister US concern in general terms, for example; pointing out that our people in Amman have again taken up with HKJ question frontier incidents and urged all possible restraint; reciprocally urging similar attitude on part of GOI, particularly in view its importance relative Hammarskjold's visit; also acknowledge GOI posture towards Jordan and restraint it has exercised throughout 1955 and thus far in 1956 in avoiding reprisals against that country in spite of local pressures generated Israel, particularly in recent weeks, by Jordan's unwillingness or inability to control murderous incursions.

Please instruct niact. [7]

Lawson

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[6] Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

[7] The Department responded as follows:

"Department desires you emphasize to Myerson points Deptel 37. In view considerations urtel 43 you may omit mention Cabinet decision instead basing your approach on general situation re borders. You may recall to Myerson that matter also discussed Amman." (Telegram 42 to Tel Aviv, July 16; *ibid.*, 684A.85/7–1656)

465. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General at Geneva [1]

Washington, July 17, 1956—12:41 p.m.

50. You are requested arrange immediate appointment with Hammarskjold and convey to him for his information only following which you should deliver orally:

"We believe that the British have already informed you of the informal proposals which the Egyptian Foreign Minister has made to them and to us of steps that might be taken toward a Palestine settlement. Subsequent conversations which our Ambassador has had with Fawzi leave some question as to the firmness of the suggestions. Nevertheless, Fawzi has informed us that he intends to discuss the matter with you when he is in Cairo. In view of the fact that Fawzi has broached the proposals to us, you may wish to have our reactions to them.

"The United States would welcome any exploratory talks with the parties to the dispute such as Fawzi suggested as a first phase. In particular, it would seem to us useful if the Egyptians and the Israelis were to indicate their general thinking on the terms of a possible settlement. The mere fact of discussions looking toward a settlement would seem to be all to the good.

"With respect to Fawzi's proposal for a group to be composed of the UK, US, USSR, India and Pakistan to make recommendations resolving the gap in the positions of the two sides, it is our belief that such a group would be unwise. Experience to date has shown that a multi-lateral group of this kind is not suitable for this purpose. Moreover, it is our belief that discussions among major powers on questions relating to the Palestine problem should take place within the framework of the Security Council which is presently seized of this problem.

"You will, of course, have our support in any effort that you may find it possible to make in bringing the two sides toward a settlement of their dispute."

Dulles

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1756. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution Consul General Only. Drafted by Russell; cleared with the Secretary, MacArthur, Ludlow, and Burdett; and approved by Russell who signed for Dulles.

466. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee (Hayden) [1]

Washington, July 17, 1956.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you know the Senate Appropriations Committee has included in its report the following language:

"The committee directs that none of the funds provided in this act shall be used for assistance in connection with the construction of the Aswan Dam, nor shall any of the funds heretofore provided under the Mutual Security Act as amended be used on this dam without prior approval of the Committee on Appropriations." [2]

I am concerned by statements which I have seen in the press as to the reported background of this statement and as to the commitments which I am said to have made to the Committee on this subject. I would like to be certain that before the bill is acted on in the Senate there is no misunderstanding as to what assurance I actually gave.

You will recall that this matter was discussed at some length during my appearance before the Committee on June 19 and I was asked to give an assurance that the Committee would have an opportunity to consider the matter further before the United States Government made any commitment of funds to this project. I replied that I could not give such an assurance at that time because the United States is not alone in this project, the United Kingdom and the International Bank also being interested in it. I added that I would consult on this matter and see what I could properly do having regard to the fact that the United States has these partners in the project.

On June 26, I sent you a letter assuring "that none of the funds which may be appropriated for Fiscal Year 1957 will be committed to finance the Aswan Dam without specific prior consultation with the Committee". A copy of this letter is enclosed. [3]

I think I should make clear that the Executive Department of the Government would not feel bound by the language in the Senate Appropriations Committee report.

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #9.

[2] Reference is to U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Appropriations, Report No. 2579, "Mutual Security Appropriation Bill, 1957", July 14, 1956. 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 6.

[3] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–2656)

I should appreciate your taking whatever action is appropriate to make certain there is no misunderstanding on this matter.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles [4]

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

467. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 17, 1956.

SUBJECT

Aswan High Dam

Discussion:

Ambassador Hussein is now expected in Washington July 17, and we anticipate that he will seek an appointment with you shortly.

Apart from the technical difficulties of mustering sufficient funds and domestic political considerations, we do not believe the West should proceed with the Aswan High Dam as now conceived in the absence of a change in Egyptian policies. Our quarrel with Egypt is not that it is following a "neutral" course in declining to align itself with either the East or West but that for reasons largely irrelevant to the East-West struggle, Nasser is pursuing policies in the Near East opposed to reasonable U.S. objectives and supporting Soviet objectives. Nasser is not guided appreciably by "cold war" considerations but by his own vision of "Egypt's destiny". His pamphlet entitled "The Philosophy of the Revolution" envisages Egyptian preponderance first in the Arab world, next in Africa and then in the Moslem world as a whole, with Nasser as "the man on horseback". The East-West contest only provides him with opportunities to extract the maximum from each side. He has already turned to the USSR with respect to arms. He is negotiating with the Soviets

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #9. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett on July 16. The source text contains no information to indicate that Allen sent it to the Secretary.

on the Aswan Dam and will undoubtedly do so on other matters, regardless of whether or not we extend assistance. To achieve his own objective Nasser is demonstrating a naive readiness to collaborate with the USSR in undermining the Western position. The West will be the loser if Nasser achieves his ambitions and may be vitally damaged if the USSR succeeds in using Egypt to establish itself in the area.

Although the measures so far taken by the United States have not brought into existence a common ground upon which an accommodation may be reached with Nasser, we believe that an accentuation of Western pressures offers the best prospects of bringing home to him and to the Egyptian people the fallacy of hoping to play off the West against the USSR. There are some grounds for hope that the process may be accelerated by disillusionment over what may actually be obtained from the USSR.

We believe it is desirable to withdraw the December offer clearly, but also to leave open the possibility of assistance at a later time in some major development, not necessarily the Aswan Dam as now conceived, which would make available large additional quantities of water for irrigation. The population pressures in Egypt are such that some such enterprise is essential for Egypt's survival. Unless the West holds out hopes of eventual assistance Egypt would be compelled to accept a Soviet offer almost regardless of the terms. Prior to supporting the Aswan Dam we suggested in 1953, but Egypt rejected, a survey of the Nile Valley as a whole. Tentatively we see possibilities in a series of works of moderate size scattered among the major users of Nile waters. The program would be designed to avoid excessive financial commitments to any one project, while making available the necessary amount of water for irrigation and avoiding an excessive long-term financial burden upon the Egyptian people. The first step could be an engineering and economic survey by the IBRD, perhaps financed by U.S. grant funds.

The Dam has become symbolic of the Western attitude towards Egypt. Therefore, we should not underestimate the strength of Nasser's reaction to a withdrawal of the December 1955 offer. We anticipate that at least he will try to make a deal with the Soviets, although we cannot be sure of the USSR response or that Nasser will accept any offer made. An analysis of his possible reactions is attached (Tab B).

In the short term at least, the problem of the Dam dwarfs other types of economic assistance which we might extend to Egypt. Offers of other types of aid are unlikely to have an appreciable public impact now or to mitigate Nasser's reaction to a withdrawal

of the offer on the Dam. The situation with respect to economic aid is outlined in Tab C. [2]

The public interest in the matter and the knowledge that Ambassador Hussein is returning principally to discuss the Dam make it inevitable that our action will become public. Therefore our statement to Hussein should be prepared in the light of its effects on the Egyptian people, the other countries of the area, and the U.S. Congress and public, as well as on Nasser. Since the press will be waiting for Ambassador Hussein when he leaves your office, it may be desirable to issue a press statement at that time. A draft is attached for your consideration (Tab A). [2]

Recommendations:

1. That in speaking to Ambassador Hussein you:

a. Clearly withdraw the December offer on the Aswan Dam.

b. Hold out prospects for eventual Western aid in water development to meet Egypt's acute need for more arable land.

c. Advise Hussein the U.S. is prepared to consider other types of economic assistance in the interim, but that such assistance will depend upon whether Egypt ceases to engage in acts inimical to interests of the West.

d. State to Hussein that we anticipate the discussion will inevitably become public, therefore we have prepared the attached press release (Tab A). You may wish to give the Ambassador a copy.

2. If you approve this approach, we will prepare an appropriate memorandum for discussion with the President [3] before the final decision is made.

[Tab B]

EGYPTIAN REACTIONS TO WITHDRAWAL OF OFFER ON ASWAN HIGH DAM [4]

The most likely consequences of United States withdrawal of its offer on the Aswan High Dam may be summarized as follows:

1. Nasser will be sorely tempted to launch a campaign of "broken promises" against the U.S. If some faint ray of hope of getting the dam is left for him, this may temper the Egyptian fury.

2. He will approach the Soviets, but in a weaker position than ever before, having let it be known he wished to do the dam with

[2] Not printed.

[3] No record of such a memorandum has been found.

[4] Secret. Drafted by Geren on July 16.

the West and having been rejected. The Soviets are thus in a position to demand the complete economic collaboration of Egypt as their price.

3. Nasser may initially refuse the Aswan High Dam from the Soviets on these terms, but will continue creeping economic collaboration possibly by means of a program to build factories in Egypt, using Soviet capital goods and technicians.

4. Nasser's position in Egypt will be considerably, but not irreparably, damaged. It will not suffer from this cause in the rest of the Arab world with the exception of Iraq.

5. Reaction in Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the Sudan will be good.

6. Nasser will explore any possibility of doing the dam with any combination of other countries.

Nasser is symbolically tied to the promise of the Aswan High Dam for the Egyptian people. It was to have been the fulfillment of "the Revolution" in the economic sphere and a counterweight in economic development to the arms transaction with the Soviets.

Nasser's reaction to a U.S. withdrawal of its offer will be sharp with cries of "broken promises" and "betrayal" coming from the Egyptian propaganda organs. If the announcement of U.S. withdrawal leaves a small possibility of going ahead with the Aswan High Dam at some time in the future, it is conceivable that Nasser might cover up to save face. In any case, he is likely to step up anti-western activities in Saudi Arabia and Libya, adding to them a marked anti-U.S. note centering on Wheelus Field in Libya and the Dhahran Airfield in Saudi Arabia. The Suez Canal problem and Middle East oil will also be considered as fertile fields for Egyptian action against us.

Nasser will consult with the Soviets on their offer. This "offer" has been more celebrated by the Egyptian propaganda organs than by the Soviets and has been employed in a typical Egyptian fashion to frighten the West into making a swift and favorable arrangement on the project. The Soviets have apparently made an offer on the dam, but its exact conditions are not known. . . . reports inform us that during his recent visit to Cairo Shepilov offered, in addition to the Aswan High Dam: (a) to purchase the entire Egyptian cotton crop; and (b) to engage in a program of industrialization by which Egypt will quickly gain new factories, including a mill for rolling steel and fabricating steel shapes. If Egypt were willing to turn its entire cotton crop to the Soviet bloc, the Soviets would doubtless attempt to build the dam and to assist in industrialization. If, however, Egyptian-Soviet collaboration is to continue to be partial and creeping, there are reasons for believing the Soviets prefer the industrialization and the proletariat it creates to the strengthening of a land-holding peasantry. Soviet technicians in the urban factory

centers of Cairo and Alexandria would be more effective at subversion than a similar number working in the comparative wilderness at Aswan. A part of the Arab cry of imperialism against the West, including U.S. aid programs, is that the West desires to keep the Arab world in agricultural pursuits and prepare it for joint exploitation by the West and industrialized Israel.

Thus, the Soviet posture after Egypt had been turned down by the West might well be to offer the Aswan High Dam and industrial projects if Egypt is ready to go the whole way symbolized by the sale of the entire cotton crop. The industrial projects could be offered in any case. The Soviets will no longer need to attempt to pre-empt the project and can demand the full price of exclusive economic relations. Nasser might decline, at least initially.

Internally this would be a blow to his prestige. He has been assuring the Egyptians, and the world, that he can gain the favors of both the West and the Soviets without suffering the domination of either. The Egyptian discernment of his failure to deliver would be expressed more in cynicism about Nasser than in immediate plots against him. The situation would present a temptation to him to whip up the war fever against Israel to an increased pitch as a means of making disappointment on the Aswan High Dam more nearly tolerable.

Failure to carry through on the Aswan High Dam would not hurt Nasser significantly with the other Arab states, where his leadership rests on Arab unity around an anti-Israeli principle rather than on economic development. The Sudan would be just as happy if the Aswan High Dam were not built. Lebanon and Jordan would feel their U.S. aid more secure with the Aswan High Dam off. Syria would prefer for Egypt to devote its energies to the ESS Pact and anti-Israel activities rather than economic development in Egypt. Saudi Arabia probably does not care whether Egypt builds the Aswan High Dam or not. Iraq will be able to point to its own development projects and contrast the Egyptian failure to get started on the Aswan High Dam. Iraq, Turkey and Iran will receive the U.S. decision with great satisfaction.

While trying to decide whether to abandon themselves to the Soviets as the price for the dam, the Egyptians may try a number of alternatives. They may try to persuade the IBRD to extend a loan without U.S.–U.K. grant participation. They may try to persuade other western nations, notably West Germany and Italy, to give them assistance. Germany could probably make a serious offer.

468. Telegram From the Consulate General at Geneva to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, July 18, 1956—1 a.m.

41. Your niact 50. [2] Message delivered by me to Hammarskjold in person orally for his information only at 11:20 p.m. July 17 in Geneva.

After expressing appreciation and asking me to convey his thanks to Secretary Dulles Hammarskjold said he had received the British message and added:

As to the first stage I shall see in the next few days what possibilities there may be to initiate an exploration of Jerusalem and Cairo stands. If the exploration as seems possible would be a time consuming operation we would have to consider the best machinery to follow it up. I believe we must get the present trouble with Jordan out of the way before anything really useful can be done.

As to the second stage he continued I agree that if the operation should be staged with other nations taking part the Security Council provides appropriate forum. However, I know too little of what the Egyptians have in mind to have formed a definite opinion he said.

Personally, Hammarskjold added, I consider direct negotiations the best perhaps the only possible procedure. I think, he continued, the possibilities in that direction should be tried. They would meet with Israeli approval and I do not exclude, he remarked, convincing the Arabs as my view has Soviet and Yugoslav support. Hammarskjold concluded by saying that as soon as possible after his return to Geneva on July 23 from the Middle East he would give me in person another secret message for Secretary Dulles. [3] This message will give his evaluation of the seriousness of the Egyptian proposal and of the Israeli atmosphere.

Hammarskjold leaves Geneva evening July 18 by KLM for Beirut. Leaves Beirut July 19 5 am by UN plane for Jidda. Motors thence to Jerusalem. To remain there until July 21 am. Flying to Cairo same day by UN plane. Remains Cairo till July 23 am. Flies Geneva same day arriving Geneva about 8 pm July 23 for 3 day visit. Further travels now undetermined.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1856. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 10:38 p.m., July 17.

[2] Document 465.

[3] See Document 497.

469. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 18, 1956 [1]

SUBJECT

Aswan High Dam

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Ronald Bailey, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Willie Morris, First Secretary British Embassy

Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA
Mr. William C. Burdett, NE

Mr. Bailey stated that the British Ambassador had intended to provide the Secretary the latest British views on the Aswan Dam. Selwyn Lloyd had asked the Cabinet to consider the matter but because of the press of other business a definite Cabinet decision had not been arrived at. However, Selwyn Lloyd wished the Department to know that the message previously given the Department, [2] quoted below, still represented British thinking:

"I am inclined to think that we shall have to tell the Egyptians that in the six months since the Aides-Mémoire were drafted we and the Americans have become even more worried at the apparent trend of Egyptian financial policy. We believe for example that the Egyptians contemplate Russian financial aid for other projects than the Dam and we know from the activities of the Egyptian Quartermaster-General in this country that they are thinking in terms of setting up a vehicles industry, to say nothing of the shipyard at Alexandria and continued purchase of arms. In other words, they are not giving the Dam the priority which was assumed in the draft Aides-Mémoire."

Mr. Bailey added that the British were very conscious of the importance of the decision and the possibility that Nasser might turn to the USSR. They were increasingly doubtful about Egypt's ability to carry the project financially. Mr. Bailey said that a heavy drain was occurring on Egypt's sterling balances, despite large releases of blocked sterling.

Mr. Rountree said that we had not yet reached a final decision. However, our present thinking was in line with that of the British.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–1856. Secret. Drafted by Burdett on July 19.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

470. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, July 18, 1956—midnight.

50. Re Deptels 37 [2] and 42. [3] Although a religious fast day I saw Myerson yesterday and in accordance with instructions presented orally and firmly to her our views in substantially following language:

The Department is concerned over possibility Israel might retaliate following incidents on Jordan border. I have been instructed to make US position clear and reiterate views expressed in SC and United States Government that incidents should not be construed as justifying resort to retaliation; to recall to you that US Government has discussed border situation with Jordanian Government and we believe latter is making strong and apparently sincere efforts to curb infiltration. That any reprisals by GOI especially at this juncture would be especially unfortunate not only for reasons stated but in view imminent arrival of Hammarskjold; that she be made aware of prejudicial effect resort to reprisals might have on sympathetic consideration by US and other friendly countries to Israel's desire to acquire arms for defense.

Her reply had two principal elements:

(1) Reaffirmation of right of retaliation as made necessary by Israel's defense requirements.

(2) Rejection of our suggestion that HKJ is making strong and sincere effort curb infiltration.

She made no commitment on restraint but pointed out Hammarskjold's visit less than two days away.

Her reaction one of real surprise and obvious dejection and at first seemed undecided as to her line of comment. She seemed especially upset over suggestion that Israeli reprisals would prejudice US consideration of Israel's arms request saying "this is a shock" and "implausible" in view of US negative attitude on Israeli arms requests to date.

"I am glad what you tell me does not have to go to newspapers and that it will not be necessary to tell our public. After killings we have had and injuries our people have suffered since Hammarskjold left I would hate to have to tell them US contribution to their problem is demand they behave. It is really most discouraging thing

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–1856. Secret; Priority. Received at 11:45 a.m. Repeated to Amman and London.

[2] Document 461.

[3] See footnote 7, Document 464.

I have heard in long time. If we do strike back at these murderers it is just another reason you will argue, for not giving us arms which we were not getting anyway".

She remarked that US position explicable to her only as reflection of US conclusion that Israel, like US if [it] were in similar straits, must be at limits of its patience with Jordanian transgressions and might be expected to react violently if not urged to hold itself in check. "That would be US reaction if it were in same circumstances. Your people assumed we must be in same mood". If situation were reversed, she said, "I can just imagine Mister Dulles telling Congress that US had neighbor sending infiltrators to kill, plunder, and burn, but never mind, Israel wants US to sit tight." She reviewed Israel's efforts to obtain arms from Canadians and French expressing some appreciation of US efforts there, but remarking that favorable answers everywhere in west depended on US. She pointed out Canadian Prime Minister's recent statement to Parliament that despite their own inclination to be helpful Canada did not want to move without some US participation; and reiterated that French continued to say they could do no more in absence of US contributions.

In rejecting my statement we had discussed border situation with Jordan and believed it making strong and apparently sincere efforts to curb infiltration she cited fact Jordanian public and military had been greatly excited by their leader's inflammatory remarks and more important Jordan actively recruiting and training Fedayeen. Result had been many border incidents despite cease-fire agreement.

I referred to assurances we have received from Jordan and to provisions made by Jordan to set up and control border strip which plan had been publicized in Israel. In view of these manifestations of Jordan's good intentions and concern did she not believe Jordan not making an all out effort? She said "I do not. I will believe their good intentions when I see them translated into acts. They not training Fedayeen for any purpose but to commit murder and sabotage in Israel. Look what happened last Friday night.[4] An organized gang of 4 passed within 50 yards of an Arab Legion border post in Jordan to enter Israel . . .[5] not to murder one man only as they did, but perhaps to blow up something at Lydda airport or elsewhere (Embtel 41[6]). We do not know, but to me, this does not reflect genuine effort by Jordan to control situation."

At end of conversation I summarized my understanding of her comments to mean Israel believed she had right to retaliate as defensive action under certain conditions and does not consider it

[4] July 13.
[5] Ellipsis in the source text.
[6] Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–1556)

violation of GAA; and she did not believe Jordan making an all-out effort to control border situation. She said this was clear and correct description of her position.

Comment: I felt Myerson's strong assertion of Israel's right to defend herself, serious responsibilities of government to people in this respect, determination of people to "fight to bitter end if attacked and die honorably if necessary", reflected GOI policy to "dig in" for defense of their security whenever threatened. Despite Myerson's rather bitter reaction I felt it was far less vigorous than Ben Gurion's would have been or even Sharett's. Although immediate reaction to effect of reprisal on US "sympathetic consideration" arms problem was one of incredulous surprise and bitterness, it may have some temporary deterrent effect, when coupled with imminence Hammarskjold's visit and desire Israelis avoid sacrifice of what they believe is their superior moral position created by virtue of their record of compliance with cease-fire.

In view of fact that Israelis will study carefully question whether my use of terminology implies real US intent to act affirmatively on arms aid or will prove as disappointing to them as similar statement in past, analysis of longer-term effect my démarche will have to be deferred.

Lawson

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471. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada [1]

Washington, July 18, 1956—9:31 p.m.

24. Embtel 22. [2] Canadian desire for joint responsibility entirely understandable.

We have declined supply F86s to Israel because we wish to avoid action which might lead step by step towards hardening of lines between US and USSR in Middle East. Public pressures to supply arms to Israel known to be considerably heavier in US than in any other country and psychological effect direct supply F86s by US would create more dangerous possibilities in view of overall

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5622/7–1356. Secret. Drafted by Allen and Burdett on July 14; cleared with Elbrick; and approved by Dulles.

[2] Document 458.

US–USSR relationships than supply by Canada. We also see hazards in concerted action by Western powers to arm Israel as suggested by Canada which would place West in opposition to Arab states armed by Soviet bloc. However, we believe Israel has justifiable need for small [3] number F86s for training purposes [4] in interest ME security.

We hope Canadian objection to acting may be overcome by explaining extent to which other Western countries meeting Israel requests on continuing basis. Sales by US since January 1 have exceeded $3,500,000. We now considering additional releases, including 5 helicopters, 400 heavy machineguns and 130 White scout cars. France has supplied 24 Mystere Mark 4s, AMX tanks and artillery, and is delivering 12 Mystere Mark 2s. UK delivered 2 destroyers and preparing deliver 6 Meteor Jet Fighters. Netherlands discussing sale 10 Meteor Jets and artillery. Italy selling ammunition various types. Thus, sale by Canada would be consonant with action by other Western countries. Piecemeal sales tend avoid unfortunate confrontation Soviet and Western blocs as units in Near East.

Please discuss with St. Laurent or Pearson along above lines.

Dulles

[3] The Secretary inserted the word "small".
[4] The Secretary inserted the following: "F86s for training purposes".

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472. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Your Appointment with Ambassador Hussein July 19 at 4:00 P.M.

Discussion:

The Ambassador is expected to assert that Egypt wishes to cooperate with the West and has decided to accept the offer made

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #9. Secret. Drafted by Rountree and Burdett on July 18. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw the memorandum. Prepared for Ambassador Hussein's visit (see *infra*), the memorandum was discussed during a meeting in the Secretary's office on July 19. No record of that meeting has been found.

last December to assist with the Aswan High Dam. He may also mention Egyptian desires for PL 480 assistance and an expanded CARE Program.

In accordance with previous discussions we have prepared a draft press release, attached, for issuance after the departure of the Ambassador. [2]

Recommendations:

After listening to the Ambassador's presentation you may wish to comment along the following lines:

1. We welcome the Ambassador's remarks regarding Egypt's desire for cooperation with the United States. We are certain that the Ambassador during his stay in Cairo continued to use his best influence toward an improvement in relations between the two countries. The comments made to the Ambassador before his departure for Cairo still hold true—the United States is most anxious for good relations with Egypt; it will be quick to respond to acts by Egypt showing a reciprocal desire for cooperation. We have thoroughly demonstrated our desire to assist the Egyptian people in their legitimate aspirations for complete independence and progress.

2. As the Ambassador knows, our offer to assist in the Aswan Dam was an indication of a sincere desire of the United States to cooperate with Egypt. We recognize, of course, that success of undertakings of this type depends upon a basic mutuality of interests between the countries participating. The offer was made in light of the situation which existed in December and the expressed attitude of the Egyptian Government, which led us to believe that this was a feasible program which justified the extensive assistance which was envisaged. The offer was not accepted, and a good many months have transpired in the course of which events have taken place which render the proposal less practicable than at the time it was made.

3. Our proposal, supporting offers by the World Bank and the British Government, presupposed an Egyptian determination to concentrate on this monumental program. It also foresaw agreement regarding the Nile water rights, and Egypt, in February, determined that an agreement on the division of waters should be a prerequisite to commencement of even preparatory work. Egypt has shown a disposition to divert its resources to other purposes and it is far less certain now that, with the added large commitments which have been made, it would be possible to finance that portion of this vast undertaking which would be supported by the Egyptian economy. Also, the other riparian states have advised of their strong desire to be consulted prior to commencement of work, and the necessary agreements have not been concluded.

4. Under present circumstances, the success of the enterprise would require, even with utmost prudence in the management of Egyptian economic affairs, a heavy degree of austerity. The United

[2] Not printed.

States would not wish to be placed, through participation in the project, in a position of appearing to be responsible even in part for the hardships which would certainly be involved, or to open itself to accusations of limiting Egypt's freedom of action which might arise if the plan were now to be implemented.

5. We have therefore concluded that, despite our desire to continue to assist in the development of Egyptian resources and the improvement of the welfare of the Egyptian people, it would not be feasible in present circumstances for us to proceed with the project. In arriving at this decision, the United States recognizes fully the problems posed for Egypt by population pressures and hopes that a foundation of cooperation will develop whereby we can assist in the future.

6. Because of the wide public attention which has been centered on this project, we have prepared a press release to be issued after the Ambassador's call, which the Ambassador may wish to see.

7. With respect to other aid requests mentioned by the Ambassador, we will be glad to consider them. The Ambassador will appreciate that our ability to respond favorably will naturally depend also upon Egypt's own actions. We earnestly wish to cooperate with Egypt, but cooperation must, of course, be a two-way street. We recognize that the Ambassador is a sincere proponent of closer relations between our two countries, and the type of cooperation upon which effective and far-reaching American assistance must be based. We earnestly hope that he will continue in his valiant efforts in this regard.

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473. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, July 19, 1956, 9:40–9:52 a.m. [1]

SUBJECT

Aswan Dam

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary of State
Under Secretary of State

After the NSC meeting of July 19, 1956, [2] the Secretary outlined to the President the present situation existing in relation to Egypt

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–1956. Secret. Drafted by Hoover and initialed by Dulles indicating his approval. The time of the meeting is from the record of the President's Daily Appointments. (Eisenhower Library)

[2] The question of Egypt and the Aswan Dam was not discussed during the NSC meeting.

and the Aswan Dam. The Secretary pointed out that the Egyptian Ambassador was returning to Washington with the publicly announced intention of accepting the US–UK–IBRD offer of financing, which was originally made on December 16, 1955. Internal economic conditions in Egypt had changed markedly during the seven months since the offer was first made, and the Nile waters problem appeared to be farther from solution than ever before, notwithstanding Nasser's professed optimism. The Secretary also pointed out that whoever undertook the venture would undoubtedly become unpopular with the Egyptian people due to the degree of austerity that would have to be imposed upon their economy before the project could be completed.

Furthermore, the Soviets would find considerable embarrassment in explaining the continued low standard of living to their own people and the satellites if they undertook such a large project for the benefit of the Egyptians.

Another problem was the increasing difficulty of working with the Nasser regime, and the fact that a successful prosecution of the project would require great cooperation and confidence on both sides.

The President concurred with the Secretary's view that we should withdraw the U.S. offer upon the occasion of the Ambassador's visit.

The Secretary showed the President a rough draft of a statement that we might make following the interview.[3] The President approved its general line.

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[3] Not printed.

474. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 19, 1956, 11:20 a.m. [1]

SUBJECT

Aswan Dam

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Roger Makins, Ambassador, British Embassy
Mr. J. M. Coulson, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. R. W. Bailey, Counselor, British Embassy
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
NEA—George V. Allen

The Secretary informed Sir Roger that when the Egyptian Ambassador comes to see him at 4 o'clock this afternoon, he planned to tell the Ambassador that in view of developments during the past six months, the US Government did not feel that Egypt could concentrate the resources necessary to carry out the Aswan Dam project successfully. These developments have included the pledges of substantial amounts of Egyptian cotton for arms purchases. Moreover, agreements with other riparian states on division of the Nile Waters have not been reached. The Secretary said he would point out that the decision that the project was no longer feasible did not in any way alter our friendly feelings for Egypt. The essential point was that the project was too grandiose. Any outside country or group which undertook it would find it necessary to control Egyptian economy so closely that irritation and resentment would inevitably result.

The Secretary then referred to another aspect of the Government which he would not go into with the Egyptian Ambassador, but which was important. He said the Senate would debate the foreign aid bill tomorrow. [2] Unless it is clear that the Aswan project has been put aside, a rider will inevitably be attached to the appropriation, requiring that no funds be spent for this project.

Sir Roger commented that the British Government would have liked to have had a chance for a further exchange of views with us before a definitive decision had been reached. He did not believe the British Government had yet taken a Cabinet decision on the matter, although he thought the general view in London was similar to our own. The Secretary said he would have welcomed such an exchange

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–1956. Secret. Drafted by Allen. The time of the meeting is from the Secretary's Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

[2] Reference is to the Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1957, which President Eisenhower signed into law on July 31.

also but that the forthcoming Senate debate made action necessary today. He pointed out the desirability of action being taken by the Executive Branch of the Government rather than through a legislative rider. He was not certain that a rider might not be attached any way. If Ambassador Hussein left his office with any doubt whatever that the project was definitely closed, this would be reflected in press articles and a stiff rider would be inevitable.

Sir Roger said that he or Mr. Coulson would telephone to London before the Secretary saw Ambassador Hussein. He commented that he would let his Government know that the Secretary would have preferred to have received London's further "advice" if there had been time. The Secretary, amid general laughter, remarked that it depended on what construction was placed on the word "advice". Sir Roger said he would find a less objectionable word.

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475. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, July 19, 1956—6 p.m.

344. Reference Embtel 247, July 13. [2] Foreign Office tells Embassy that Lord John Hope on July 17 delivered letter to Hammarskjold, who expressed appreciation for advance information. He expressed general agreement with Selwyn Lloyd's views as contained in letter, [3] agreed he could probably undertake stage one and said he shared HMG's misgivings regarding stage two. He added that he would prefer not to be involved in stage two.

Aldrich

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1956. Secret. Received at 3:14 p.m. Repeated to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 459.

[3] A copy of Lloyd's letter to Hammarskjöld, dated July 14, is attached to Burdett's memorandum of a conversation on July 18 with Bailey and Morris of the British Embassy. (Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #9)

476. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 19, 1956.

SUBJECT

Contact with Ambassador Hussein this Morning

. . . . . .

1. He asserts on his personal honor that any belief that the Soviets have not made a firm offer on the Aswan Dam is without any foundation. Shepilov made an offer to Nasser and it is "frighteningly good."

2. Nasser is "hell-bent" to go ahead with the Aswan project. He feels that it is a firm political commitment he has made to the Egyptian people.

3. Nasser is very much worried about accepting the Soviet offer for the following reasons:

a. He is concerned over the growth of pro-Soviet sentiment in Egypt. In the moving picture houses after Shepilov's visit, when newsreels were shown of Shepilov and also of Nasser, Shepilov got much more applause than Nasser did.

b. The Soviets have not kept their word to him with respect to secrecy on the offer which they made on the Aswan Dam.

c. A number of his close advisers who have previously been urging him to accept Soviet arms and other forms of Soviet cooperation are now beginning to be worried over Egypt's position as between the West and the Soviet world.

4. Hussein personally . . . hopes that we can keep our offer open and then convert the undertaking into something more practicable.

5. Hussein asserts on his word of honor and without any equivocation or condition that if the US–UK–IBRD offer is not made firm, Nasser will accept the Soviet offer.

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Memos, etc. fr July 1 to August 31, 1956. Secret.

477. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles), Washington, July 19, 1956, 3:40 p.m. [1]

TELEPHONE CALL TO ALLEN DULLES

The Sec. referred to someone's talk with Hussein. Hussein said it is certain if we don't go ahead they will go ahead with the Soviets. It is an attractive offer indeed. The Sec. said he is seeing him at 4 and expects to tell him we are not going ahead definitely. If the Sec. does not, Congress will chop it off tomorrow [2] and the Sec. would rather do it himself. AWD said he would say that anyway. The Sec. has the feeling that if they do make this offer we can make a lot of use of it in propaganda within the satellite bloc. You don't get bread because you are being squeezed to build a dam. The Sec. is inclined to go ahead. AWD knew that was in the wind. AWD thinks you have to assume that rumor they were not going ahead with an offer was not very sound. The Sec. said it just costs them propaganda. . . . AWD asked if the Sec. had good ground, and the Sec. said he would put it on the ground that since the offer was made, the situation has changed and so on. On the whole it is too big an affair to swing today. Not going to put it on the lack of peace in the area. We will give out a statement afterwards. [3] The Sec. said he told Makins this a.m. [4] and they were going to phone London and no reply so the Sec. guesses it is all right. M. said that is along the lines of their thinking but they would have liked more time but in view of Congressional situation, they understand. They agreed it is hazardous but AWD is inclined to think it wise in the long run. The Sec. mentioned Congress again. They mentioned getting together tomorrow.

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[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Bernau.

[2] Reference is to the Senate's debate, scheduled for July 20, of the bill that became the Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1957 on July 31.

[3] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 30, 1956, p. 188.

[4] See Document 474.

478. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 19, 1956, 4:10–5:07 p.m. [1]

SUBJECT

High Aswan Dam

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Ambassador of Egypt
NEA—George V. Allen
NEA—William M. Rountree

The Ambassador called at his request following his return after several weeks consultation in Cairo.

The Secretary began the conversation by saying he wished particularly to discuss the question of the High Aswan Dam, a matter which concerned both Egypt and the United States concretely at the present time. He had reluctantly come to the conclusion that it was not feasible at present for the United States to go forward with this undertaking. There were a number of reasons for this decision, which he hoped the Ambassador would appreciate. The Aswan Dam was a huge project, involving $1,300,00,000 of which $900,000,000 represented internal costs. This represented a heavy burden upon the Egyptian economy. The project involved not only Egypt, but was of direct interest to other states through which the Nile waters flowed. There was no present agreement with the Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, etc., covering the use of these waters. While that aspect of the problem could be explored and quite possibly solutions could be found, there were other elements which made it appear far more feasible at this time to consider lesser projects than that presently envisaged.

The Secretary said there were two elements which deserved special mention. First was the long-range impact of the project upon relations with the Egyptian people and Government. Implementation would impose a period of from 12 to 16 years of austerity on the part of the Egyptian people, and a major portion of Egyptian resources would have to be dedicated to this particular work. Over such a period there undoubtedly would be resentment and a feeling by the Egyptians that the limitations imposed tended to interfere with the independence which they so cherished. The situation in the area was troubled, and we thought from the standpoint of our

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–1956. Secret. Drafted by Rountree on July 20. The time of the meeting is from the Secretary's Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

relations with the Egyptians over the next decade, it would not be wise to undertake this project which might superimpose such strained feelings upon the difficulties in relations which now existed. He recognized that the immediate impact of an announcement that the project would receive American assistance might be good, but felt that this would be unlikely to last very long.

The other element, the Secretary said, related to the impact upon our own people. He stated in all frankness that from the United States standpoint developments during the past six or seven months had not been such as to generate goodwill toward Egypt on the part of the American public. He was not referring to various classes of Americans who might be prejudiced for one reason or another, but had in mind the rank and file of the American people and the Congress, who felt it doubtful that the attitude of the Egyptian Government toward the United States and what it stood for was such as to render it feasible and wise for us at this juncture to undertake as partners with Egypt a program of this magnitude. We doubted that we could obtain funds from Congress to carry out the work even if the Executive Branch wished to do so, and commented that no single project in the Mutual Security Program was as unpopular today as the Aswan Dam. He recognized that this unpopularity of the Dam project itself derived in part from opposition of certain groups—for example, persons interested in the effects of a possible increase in Egyptian cotton production in competition with American cotton growers. However, the basic opposition derived from a feeling that the Egyptian Government was working closely with those hostile to us who sought to injure us wherever they could.

Continuing, the Secretary said he hoped that this situation was not a permanent one, that it could soon be improved and that tranquillity would return in United States-Egyptian relations so that we could achieve the kind of cooperative efforts which we earnestly desired. However, as things stood today, the United States Government had come to the reluctant conclusion that we should not participate at this time in a program of this magnitude, the success of which would require a close working relationship. He emphasized that this did not imply any lack of friendship toward Egypt or lack of desire to cooperate with the Egyptian Government and people. We were willing to do everything possible to improve and maintain relations.

The Secretary expressed the view that in light of the existing situation and programs which the Egyptian Government has undertaken, Egypt should get along for the time being with projects less monumental than the Aswan Dam.

The Ambassador inquired whether he was to understand from what the Secretary had said that a final decision had been reached that the United States would extend no assistance for the Dam project, and that discussions on the previous proposal were to be terminated.

The Secretary responded affirmatively. At this point he showed the Ambassador a draft of a press statement which he intended to release later in the day. He commented that he knew that this decision was personally as disappointing to the Ambassador as it was to him to have to make it. He realized that the Ambassador had worked hard to develop and maintain the best possible relations between Egypt and the United States, and expressed deep appreciation for what the Ambassador had done. He expressed the belief that when the Ambassador thought over the things which the Secretary had said, he would realize that the situation had become such as to render it impracticable and unwise to implement the project at the present time. Many things had happened which we of course wished had not happened. Our two countries seemed to be "out of step" in many respects. Successful implementation of an undertaking such as the Dam would be impossible without the existence of the right kind of relationship; without it, it was inevitable that resentments would be engendered. He believed that in the long run the decision would be in the interest of good relations between the two countries, and should not be taken as an indication to the contrary.

The Ambassador said that in Cairo he had met a number of times with Nasser and discussed with him all of the points which the Secretary had mentioned before the Ambassador's departure. He had found Nasser anxious to reach an agreement on the basis of the December offer. Discussions with the Sudan upon an agreement on the Nile waters were progressing nicely, and Nasser was hopeful that they would soon be concluded on a reasonable basis. The Egyptian Government had always been aware of the need for such an agreement with the Sudan, but had not contemplated negotiating an agreement with Ethiopia which had never been able to make appreciable use of the Nile waters. Ethiopia, he said, had never previously concerned itself with matters affecting the Nile in Egypt, and had never made any previous claims. Nasser had hoped that it would be possible to start the project without delay. He realized that it was a huge undertaking, involving large sums of money, but all studies had shown the project to be the only solution to the population problem and also to the problem of providing adequate power. He did not ignore the difficulties involved. The Egyptian people had heard much about the scheme and expected it to be undertaken at once. The Ambassador shared the view of the Egyptian Government

that the project was of such importance that the Egyptian people would not resent the sacrifices which its implementation would entail. By spreading the expenditures over a number of years, and with reasonable foreign aid, the burden upon the Egyptian economy could be held to manageable proportions. He thought that this project clearly would be far more effective than other smaller schemes in meeting Egyptian needs.

The Ambassador said he had earnestly hoped that for the good of Egypt the project could be financed by the World Bank and by the United States and British Governments. He had felt that if we cooperated with Egypt on a project of this nature a better atmosphere would be created which would result in the elimination of many things which had caused misunderstandings between our two countries.

Referring to the question of Egyptian arms purchases from the Soviet Bloc, the Ambassador expressed a view that the commitments made were not nearly as substantial as the United States had been led to believe, and that payment could be made as scheduled without endangering the Egyptian economy or jeopardizing success in financing the Dam project. He commented that the numbers of military items, such as planes and tanks, acquired by Egypt had been grossly exaggerated.

The Secretary observed that the initial cost of procuring substantial military equipment was, we had found, only one factor in determining the economic burden resulting from their acquisition. The upkeep was a most significant item.

The Ambassador responded that even with the new acquisitions the Egyptian army was still small compared with its population; smaller than that of Israel. He said Nasser had informed him that Egypt had actually acquired only eighty MIGs, rather than 200 as reported in the United States. At the same time, Israel has received eighty more modern planes which were superior to those purchased by the Egyptian forces. He said that Israel had deliberately played this up in an effort to get more military equipment from the United States and other Western countries.

In his conversations with Nasser, the Ambassador said, he was assured that Egyptian recognition of Red China was not in retaliation for anything done by the United States, nor did it represent an effort to hurt the United States. Nasser had felt that if the United Nations should impose an embargo on arms to the area, Israel would always find some way of acquiring military items outside the embargo and that it was incumbent upon Egypt to endeavor to do the same. By establishing diplomatic relations with Red China, a way was open for Egypt to obtain needed equipment in these circumstances.

Regarding Egyptian policies in other Arab countries, Nasser had assured the Ambassador that Egypt had never pressed any country to procure Soviet arms and had, in fact, advised Saudi Arabia to continue to obtain its requirements from the United States. He had, moreover, advised Azzam Pasha before the latter's visit to the United States to endeavor to persuade King Saud to maintain his good relations with this country. Nasser had specifically instructed Egyptian teachers and other subjects abroad not to interfere with the internal affairs of the countries in which they resided, and was convinced that claims that Egyptian representatives were working against the United States were completely false. It was absolutely not true, the Ambassador said, that the Egyptian Government had tried to obstruct an agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia on the Dhahran Airfield or to impair Libyan-American relations. In summary, the Ambassador said that Nasser was exceedingly hurt that he had been accused of doing things which he had not done, where there was no proof to substantiate the allegations.

The Secretary said he hoped that these reports which he had mentioned to the Ambassador were not correct, and that Nasser earnestly wished to carry out policies consistent with friendly and cooperative relations with the United States. The Ambassador would realize, of course, that our Government was bound to be responsive to the American people and to the Congress. A good many things had happened to account for the feeling that had grown up which made it difficult for us to undertake with Egypt a project such as the Aswan Dam. We naturally heard many stories from various sources, some of whom are enemies of Egypt. We of course do not believe these stories unless we have independent proof.

The Ambassador said that the primary Egyptian needs were to build an adequate armed force for defense and to develop the Egyptian economy. In both of these, Egypt needed help. Egypt would have been happy to obtain arms from the United States, and would be most thankful for assistance in the economic field.

The Secretary reiterated the desire of the United States to assist Egypt but thought that for the time being the Dam project should be "put on the shelf" while we tried to develop a better atmosphere and better relations.

The Ambassador said that he wished at that point to speak entirely personally. He sincerely hated to see the Russians take advantage of the present situation. He knew they were making a "*very* generous" offer on the Dam, an offer which would be far more advantageous from the purely technical and financial points of view than that made by the World Bank and the Western Powers. He had hoped to have the matter settled before Nasser went to Moscow. Nasser had said nothing to Shepilov when the latter was in Cairo,

but in the Ambassador's judgment the risks would be very great if no deal were concluded before the Moscow visit. He had advised Nasser not to accept the Soviet offer even if the World Bank-United States-United Kingdom participation was not decided upon, but there were strong pressures which Nasser might not be able to resist.

The Secretary said he realized the implications of what the Ambassador had said, and the decision to withhold American assistance had not been taken lightly. He knew it was possible that the Russians would make an offer which might look attractive. However, we all knew that living conditions in most of Russia and the Soviet satellites were extremely bad, and that there was a tremendous demand in the USSR for an improvement. Any government which in that situation would deny its people relief from their heavy burdens in order to give aid abroad obviously would be doing so for political purposes. The United States could help others extensively without adverse effect upon its people, because of the tremendous magnitude of its national production. The Soviets may make a generous offer and Egypt might accept it, despite the risks which would be involved, although we hoped that that would not happen. He hoped the truth would be recognized that only if the Soviet Union believed it could obtain great political advantages in Egypt would it be making a generous offer, despite needs at home. He did not, however, believe that the Soviets would succeed because he felt confident that the Egyptians would be acutely aware of dangers to the independence which they have striven so hard to achieve. From the United States viewpoint, we could not undertake to try to match the Russians in any offers which might be made to Egypt or to other countries. We had to think of each proposition on its own merits, operating in ways which commend themselves to the American people.

The Secretary commented that our foreign aid program had been injured more by the proposal to assist in financing the Aswan Dam, in light of our relations with Egypt, than by anything else. He thought the first thing for us to do was to get back as quickly as possible on a basis of good relations. There need be nothing permanent about our present difficulties; it was our earnest desire to improve the situation as rapidly as possible. We did not wish to give the impression that the decision regarding the Aswan Dam was in any way unfriendly or represented a retaliation for actions of the Egyptian Government. He still saw a bright future in Egyptian-American relations. As the Ambassador knew, the present Administration had not allowed itself to be unduly pressured by any special groups in relation to its policies toward Egypt. As he had previously told the Ambassador, we regarded Egypt above all as an Arab state entitled to a position of leadership in the Arab world. We had done

nothing to impede Egyptian prestige and influence. The United States had, in fact, not joined the Baghdad Pact largely because we did not wish to assume a position in this matter which would appear to enhance the prestige of other states and leaders in the area to the detriment of Egypt and Nasser. Smiling, the Secretary commented that there was a somewhat growing feeling in some of the Arab countries that Egypt wished to dominate them, but he had no evidence that Nasser wished to rule countries other than Egypt.

The Ambassador responded that there were two points he wished to make. First, Nasser had said he had no intention of being friendly with the Soviet Union at the expense of friendship with the United States. Secondly, Egypt had no intention of dominating other Arab states; their primary objective was to get rid of colonialism and certainly Egypt did not want to impose Egyptian colonialism in lieu of others.

Upon leaving, the Ambassador inquired what he might say to the representatives of the press who were awaiting his departure. After some discussion he said that he would tell the press that he would leave to the Secretary any comment concerning the business discussed. [2]

[2] On July 21, a summary of this conversation was transmitted to Cairo. (Telegram 139; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–2156) Text of the press release was transmitted to Cairo niact and to London priority at 5:59 p.m., July 19. (Telegram 127 to Cairo and 360 to London; *ibid.*, 874.2614/7–1956)

479. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles), Washington, July 19, 1956, 5:30 p.m. [1]

The Sec. called and said he had just finished his talk with the Egyptian Amb., [2] who had handled himself surprisingly well and with dignity. The Secretary read AWD the statement and the latter thought it was a good one.

The Sec. gave a précis of what he had told Hussein.

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Asbjornson.

[2] See *supra*.

AWD said he would like some copies of the press release on the Aswan Dam as soon as he could have them so he could have it for his purposes. (cjp [3] is handling)

[3] Carolyn J. Proctor.

480. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State [1]

Ottawa, July 19, 1956—4 p.m.

31. For the Secretary. I talked at length today to Pearson on F86s, employing points contained in Deptel 24 [2] and information you communicated to me on telephone re possibility stock-pile statement within 10 days. [3] At conclusion Pearson indicated more optimism than he has yet displayed that delivery F86s might be worked out. He has asked that I furnish him memorandum recapitulating points made in talk today for his use in Cabinet next week.

Following carefully timed actions by us seem to me required to exert necessary influence on Cabinet for favorable F86 decision:

(1) Communicate to Canadians general content statement on F86 stockpile and reasonably precise indication date it would be issued. (Incidentally, Pearson said that he had not revealed to Prime Minister or Cabinet what you told him of possible F86 stock-pile since he felt you told him in extreme confidence. [4])

(2) US approval and announcement export licensing at least some helicopters, machine guns and scout cars. [5]

(3) Substantial acceptance Canadian suggestion (Embtel 22 [6]) that Canadian, UK and French Ambassadors meet with Department officials in Washington on confidentially coordinated supply actions to Israel. This would supply minor face-saver for Cabinet. Pearson, however, suggested today that he thought situation would be met for him to send high External Affairs official to Washington next week for a day or two of talks with Department. He also suggested that I might usefully accompany him, though this does not seem to

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5622/7–1956. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received at 4:41 p.m.

[2] Document 471.

[3] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[4] See Document 325.

[5] Telegram 32 from Ottawa, July 20, stressed the importance to Canadian officials of U.S. export licensing of these items. (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5622/7–2056)

[6] Document 458.

be essential. He accepted undesirability any outward appearance western bloc supply program for Israel but emphasized importance independent but confidentially concerted press announcements of any agreed US deliveries and if possible British Meteors so that Canada would not be left out alone too long.

I believe we now have makings of a successful operation. Incidentally, Winnipeg *Free Press*, which has considerable influence, came out Saturday in favor of Canadian delivery F86s to Israel.

Merchant

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481. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 20, 1956.

SUBJECT

Canadian F–86 Aircraft for Israel; "Operation Stockpile"

Discussion:

Ambassador Merchant has reported (Tab B) [2] that the points we instructed him to make to the Canadian Foreign Minister (Tab C) [3] have had considerable effect. Mr. Merchant recommends: 1) Communicate to the Canadians the general content of the statement to be made on "Operation Stockpile"; 2) Approve and announce the issuance of export licenses for at least some helicopters, machine guns, and scout cars for Israel; 3) Take some action to satisfy Canadian requirements for Western consultation on this matter—either through the Ambassadorial committee in Washington or private talks with a Canadian emissary in Washington.

We believe we should move forward with the Canadians and with the Stockpile announcement.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5622/7–2056. Top Secret. Drafted by Bergus and Burdett; initialed by Rountree for Allen.

[2] Tab B is printed *supra*.

[3] Tab C is Document 471.

Recommendations:

1. That you sign the attached telegrams to Ottawa (Tab A). [4]

2. That, subject to Canadian acceptance of our course of action, NEA be authorized to proceed with the quiet and piecemeal release to Israel of 5 helicopters, 400 machine guns, and 130 White Scout Cars (half-tracks).

3. That, provided there is nothing in Hammarskjold's report regarding his trip to the Near East which would militate against such action, we proceed with preparations to make the announcement of "Operation Stockpile" about August 1. [5]

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[4] Not attached to the source text. Presumably telegrams 33 and 34, *infra* and Document 483.

[5] A note at the bottom of the source text reads: "See Eyes Only telegram 33 to Ottawa."

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482. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada [1]

Washington, July 20, 1956—9:26 p.m.

33. Eyes only Ambassador from the Secretary. Embtel 31. [2]

1. Immediately following telegram contains text proposed US announcement re Operation Stockpile. [3] We attach utmost importance to secrecy. Announcement does not mention types of supplies and we intend take every precaution against this information becoming known even after statement issued. [4] We have not yet reached decision re time of announcement but are considering release first part August. We will wish take into account Hammarskjold report on his trip to NE. You may communicate above to Pearson for his and Prime Minister's personal and confidential information. (All matters related to Operation Stockpile should be given Top Secret handling).

2. In context of arrangement involving release by Canada of 12 F–86's, US prepared approve starting immediately export helicopters, machine guns, and scout cars. Items would not be released simultaneously. US has never publicly announced granting of arms export

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.56/7–2056. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett and Bergus and approved by Dulles.

[2] Document 480.

[3] *Infra*.

[4] The Secretary inserted the following: "even after statement issued."

licenses to any country and would not wish create precedent by public announcement these transactions. However, US would officially inform Canadian Government when licenses issued. To avoid impression concerted action we do not wish to relate two matters directly.

3. US would prefer avoid multipartite Ambassadorial consultation in Washington because of security and other problems created as well as risk of giving false impression that West coordinating massive arms program for Israel. We would welcome opportunity discuss these matters confidentially with representative External Affairs in Washington. Among aspects which could be usefully considered together would be timing, quantities, and means of using these transactions as incentives induce Israel give fullest cooperation to UN and UNTSO.

Dulles

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483. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada [1]

Washington, July 20, 1956—9:27 p.m.

34. Eyes only Ambassador from the Secretary. Text proposed announcement re Operation Stockpile mentioned preceding telegram [2] follows:

On April 9 a statement was issued by the White House regarding the serious situation in the Middle East. [3] The statement declared that the United States is determined to support and assist any nation in that area which might be subjected to aggression, and expressed confidence that other nations will act similarly in the cause of peace.

Pursuant to this statement and to enable it to act promptly and effectively thereunder, the United States Government has completed arrangements to maintain in close proximity to the Middle East area certain stockpiles of military supplies and equipment earmarked for delivery to any nation subjected to aggression arising out of the

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.56/7–2056. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Dulles.

[2] *Supra*.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 258.

Arab-Israel dispute, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Dulles

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484. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 20, 1956—4 p.m.

108. . . . initial reaction from . . . Nasser when latter heard reports decision regarding High Dam:

1. Nasser was not surprised having expected all along that United States would not follow through on offer.

2. . . . opinion it would have been better if statement had briefly announced United States Government not prepared maintain offer. Department's statement insincere in that riparian rights (Sudan) had always been understood as precondition. Furthermore, statement's reference to internal economic viability (as well as announcement's timing) might make it more difficult bargain with Soviets.

3. Timing of statement resented as obvious effort counteract Brioni and Nasser–Nehru talks.

. . . no indication as to what counter-moves GOE intended take. No papers appeared yesterday or today due holidays.

Comment: Too early predict next GOE moves. We assume they will be largely conditioned by GOE appraisal of extent to which anti-United States campaign and demonstration Egypt still has powerful friends may seem necessary to counter doubts in other Arab States and in Egypt as to wisdom GOE's present policies.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–2056. Confidential. Received at 4:57 p.m. Repeated to London.

485. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State [1]

London, July 20, 1956—6 p.m.

369. Foreign Office spokesman announced today that HMG was withdrawing its offer to assist Egypt in Aswan Dam project. Spokesman explained that main factors which led to this decision were economic ones and added "we have been in continuous consultation with the USG and the position at the moment is that we have concluded that in the present circumstances it is not feasible for us to participate in the project. The factors which have influenced the USG and ourselves are the same in this matter".

This afternoon I discussed subject with Assistant Under Secretary Ross, who expressed gratification over identity of US and UK positions. He told me that Caccia had just informed Egyptian Ambassador [2] officially of HMG's decision. Ambassador expressed to Caccia his "great disappointment" but added that he could understand why, in view of US decision, UK had likewise withdrawn its offer.

Foster

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–2056. Confidential. Received at 7:41 p.m. Repeated to Cairo.

[2] Samy Aboul-Fetouh.

486. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State [1]

Moscow, July 22, 1956—5 p.m.

181. Embtel 176. [2] While Shepilov did not make any flat statement on subject, further conversations with correspondents who heard his remarks concerning Aswan Dam were left very definitely

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–2256. Official Use Only. Received at 12:09 a.m. Repeated to London and Cairo.

[2] Telegram 176 from Moscow, July 21, reads as follows:

"Shepilov at Belgian Embassy National Day reception this evening was questioned by correspondents on Aswan Dam. He said question not 'actual' but on problem of industrialization, which most important to Egypt, Soviet Government was prepared to be of help." (*Ibid.*, 874.2614/7–2156)

with impression that Soviet Government was not at least at this time planning to undertake financing this project.

He was quite explicit, however, in his statements that industrialization was much more important to Egyptian development than Aswan Dam, and that Soviet Union was prepared to give favorable consideration to any Egyptian request for assistance in industrial development.

Bohlen

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487. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State [1]

Ottawa, July 23, 1956—6 p.m.

40. Eyes only for the Secretary. Reference Deptels 33 and 34. [2] I talked to Pearson afternoon July 23 and he is now reasonably optimistic over possibility securing Prime Minister's approval to prompt release of 12 F86s on basis of and dependent on series of US actions contemplated in Deptel 33. He wants to talk to St. Laurent within 24 hours and believes if he can convince him, there will be no difficulty with Cabinet later this week. He would thereafter hope to announce in Parliament next week immediate release 12 and tell Israel Government would consider later release additional 12. He understands and accepts that US would not publicly announce granting of arms export licenses but relies on US journalistic enterprise to discover and publish. He now agrees multipartite ambassadorial consultation would be unwise and after talking to Prime Minister, would be prepared to send expert to Washington at any time in company of Ignatieff as cover. Latter is due visit Washington shortly on NATO Wisemen operation.

For his talk with St. Laurent Pearson has asked me to provide him with top secret personal note summarizing main points. I think it important I should do so and next following telegram contains draft [3] which I will deliver pending approval of text which I hope I can have telephonically Tuesday morning. Pearson is fully cognizant

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/7–2356. Top Secret. Received at 10:02 p.m.

[2] Documents 482 and 483.

[3] *Infra.*

importance secrecy regarding Operation Stockpile though thinks it will ultimately leak, including character its contents.

Merchant

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488. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State [1]

Ottawa, July 23, 1956—7 p.m.

41. Eyes only for the Secretary. Following text proposed top secret letter to Pearson referred to in Embtel 40: [2]

"Dear Mike: With reference to our talks on July 19 and 23 concerning the furnishing of arms to Israel, I can inform you for the personal and confidential information of the Prime Minister and yourself that the US Government is planning an announcement which would refer to the April 9 White House statement re the serious situation in the Middle East [3] and go on to say that arrangements have been completed to maintain in close proximity to the Middle East area certain stockpiles of military supplies and equipment ear-marked for delivery to any nation subjected to aggression arising out of the Arab-Israeli dispute in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter. No decision has been reached re the time of issuance of such a statement but the first part of August is being considered. Hammarskjold's report on his present trip to the Middle East would be taken into account in this connection. Incidentally, Hammarskjold has been informed of the general lines of this proposal and has welcomed it.

If the Canadian Government could see its way to releasing to Israel 12 F86s, the US Government would be prepared immediately to approve the export from the US of certain quantities of helicopters, machine guns and scout cars. These items however would not be released simultaneously nor would there be public announcement of the transactions. However, the US would keep you informed as licenses were issued.

The Department would welcome the opportunity of discussing these matters confidentially in Washington with a representative of the Department of External Affairs. Among aspects which could be usefully discussed would be means of employing these transactions as incentives to induce Israeli's full cooperation with the UN and the UNTSO, as well as questions of timing.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/7–2356. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 10:17 p.m.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] See footnote 2, Document 258.

Needless to say, it is greatly hoped that in this context the Canadian Government will decide to release at least 12 of the 24 F86s sought by Israel."

Merchant

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489. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, July 23, 1956—4 p.m.

69. From conversation yesterday Embassy Counselor with senior officials Prime Minister's office and Foreign Ministry, Embassy transmits following preliminary and partial summary Hammarskjold-Ben Gurion conversations July 19–20. (While record adequate one session attended by Foreign Minister, Ben Gurion's notes his private conversations SYG called "sketchy".)

1. From trend of discussions, Israelis have concluded that decision Hammarskjold to return to area was based on concern that exercise GOI retaliation policy might evolve into large scale hostilities. GOI has discarded earlier-held theory that visit was due to some important development during SYG's Moscow talks.

2. Although Hammarskjold placed great emphasis Soviet support and cooperation his efforts, when discussions got down to specific points it was not clear as to reality this support. Israelis have concluded that Hammarskjold either exaggerating re Soviet desire peace and stability in the area or that he is not revealing his hand at this time.

3. Unlike previous visit, Hammarskjold took no initiative to discuss Banat Yaacob problem. Finally, Ben Gurion reminded him that he had promised to raise question possible solution with Russians. SYG replied that he had discussed matter with Shepilov, emphasizing need for settlement and his view that Jews had legitimate right to protest against indefinite postponement their economic development. Shepilov reportedly replied in very general terms that Jordan diversion plan was very complex problem which could not be resolved quickly.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.56/7–2356. Secret; Noform. Received at 9:41 p.m., July 24. Repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem, Amman, London, Paris, Moscow, Beirut, Damascus, and USUN.

Hammarskjold told Ben Gurion that he had discussed matter with Eric Johnston; that Johnston was a "success man" who appeared frustrated that his project had failed; and that Johnston appeared disposed to turn over entire matter to Hammarskjold. SYG said he wanted to cooperate but was not prepared to go that far. Question whether Johnston would return to area was in abeyance.

(In brief conversation with Hammarskjold at luncheon which Foreign Minister gave for him on July 20, I referred to importance of Jordan River plan to peaceful solution Arab-Israel problem and to splendid job which Johnston had done and inquired as to future developments. SYG replied "it is too soon—much too soon for Johnston", perhaps thus reflecting his disappointment with Moscow discussions this subject.)

4. Ben Gurion inquired of Hammarskjold as to whether he had asked Shepilov why Soviets had supported Arabs in deletion "mutually acceptable" provision of SC resolution.[2] SYG replied that he had and Shepilov had said that Soviet action was merely "an episode"; that it wasn't really important; and that Soviets stood by their April 17 declaration[3] on this question. (Also see Embdes 24, July 12[4]).

5. Meeting with Foreign Minister and her associates was concentrated on GAA and cease-fire. SYG reaffirmed his position that right of self-defense does not include right to retaliate; stated that he was very disturbed Israel attitude and that if hostilities grew out of retaliation world would hold Israel responsible. Myerson took strong exception, as did Ben Gurion, to this thesis, stating that Israel could not survive, in face Arab unwillingness control border, without deterrent of retaliation. When SYG protested particularly use of organized military forces for reprisals with disproportionate losses to Arabs, Myerson said alternative would be to permit individual Israel settlement to avenge itself on individual Arab village responsible for border incident. This however, would mean action aimed at civilians. Hammarskjold, to surprise of Israelis, reportedly said that he considered settlement action less evil than organized military action. Ben Gurion and Hammarskjold ended discussion with stalemate on retaliation question.

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[2] See Document 376.

[3] See Document 291.

[4] Despatch 24 from Tel Aviv, July 12, reported a conversation among William L. Hamilton and Ivan B. White of the Embassy and Gideon Rafael on July 11. Rafael had expressed his belief that Hammarskjöld was encouraged about Shepilov's attitude after a conversation between the two. Shepilov had insisted to Hammarskjöld that the Soviets still supported the idea of a mutually satisfactory settlement. Shepilov had also dismissed the June 4 Security Council resolution as an isolated incident. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.022/7–1256)

SYG raised question Israel non-compliance Israel-Egyptian GAA re restriction placed on movement, photographic work and communications of UNTSO observers in the DZ. Ben Gurion replied that Israel was within its rights and that he had been considering complete exclusion observers on grounds Egypt excluded them from area its side demarcation line. Prime Minister reportedly agreed defer decision until SYG had talked with Nasser.

6. Ben Gurion claims that he reached rapport with SYG his thesis settlement Israel-Arab problem must grow from indigenous roots and cannot be imposed from outside. SYG quoted as saying Soviets concurred that direct Israel-Arab negotiations constituted most promising approach.

Lawson

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490. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State [1]

Amman, July 23, 1956—4 p.m.

57. Hammarskjold spent two hours Amman morning July 21, [2] conferring with Foreign Minister, [3] Under Secretary Foreign Affairs [4] General Ali Abu Nuwar and Ambassador Abdul Munim Rifai. [5] Under Secretary Foreign Affairs says Hammarskjold told them he was concerned situation Jordan-Israeli border following Burns talks Ben Gurion [6] and King Hussein, [7] particularly alleged or real troop concentrations. Because UNSYG felt little progress without first hand contact he had come from Geneva at this time. Said he had informed Ben Gurion (A) Israeli retaliation Arab raids or infiltration did not constitute defense and would adversely effect Israeli position world opinion and (B) this also applied retaliatory acts Jordan which

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–2356. Confidential. Received at 3:06 p.m. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, and Paris.

[2] Hammarskjöld stopped in Amman the morning of July 21 for talks with Jordanian officials before continuing to Cairo that day.

[3] Awni Abdel Hadi.

[4] Ibrahim Hashim.

[5] Jordanian Ambassador to the United States.

[6] See Documents 417 and 418.

[7] See Document 421.

should increase efforts keep frontier quiet and refrain bellicose acts or words.

In reply HKJ told UNSYG Jordan doing utmost combat infiltration. Not only has Jordan law against infiltration but military has issued orders to shoot all infiltrators regardless direction they going. Hammarskjold assured Jordan has no aggressive intentions. On other hand country cannot allow itself be taken by surprise. Therefore, when in best estimate Jordan country is threatened HKJ considers itself free take steps necessary adequate self-defense.

Press reports UNSYG said visit continuation last trip area and he returned Amman because tense conditions Israeli border.

Hammarskjold departed for Cairo about noon July 21.

Sanger

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491. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State [1]

Tel Aviv, July 24, 1956—1 p.m.

77. Canadian Chargé [2] today showed Embassy officer cable from Ottawa, dated July 16, stating Foreign Ministry had informed US and Israeli Ambassadors that Canada did not intend make unilateral contribution of jets to Israel but would consider participation in collective effort to that end with other powers.

While I have not received from Department or AmEmbassy Ottawa word of Canadian decision not to supply jets unless similar effort made by other Western powers, it is interesting coincidence that in my July 17 conversation with Myerson (Embassy telegram 42) [3] I deliberately raised question whether jets supplied from collective pool or consortium of which US a member, and unidentified as to specific national source would meet Israel requirements. In other words, was GOI's principal interest in political identification of contributors with Israel or in obtaining jets themselves? Her answer

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5622/7–2456. Secret. Received at 12:02 p.m. Repeated to Ottawa, London, Paris, and Rome.

[2] George P. Kidd.

[3] Regarding Lawson's conversation with Myerson on July 17, see Document 470. Telegram 42 from Tel Aviv, July 15, dealt exclusively with the problem of Fedayeen penetrations into Israel. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–1555)

was declaration of desire for jets, regardless of source, to balance qualitatively arms Egypt is receiving from bloc.

Lawson

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492. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 24, 1956.

SUBJECT

Sale by Canada of F86's to Israel and Related Developments

Discussion:

Ambassador Merchant reports that the Canadian Government now appears disposed to proceed with the sale of F86's to Israel in accordance with the arrangements worked out with the Secretary before his departure. [2] He requests approval by telephone of a top secret letter which he would deliver to Pearson confirming these arrangements (Tab B). [3]

We believe it important to the position of the West in the Near East to avoid creating the impression among the Arab States of a definite switch in Western policy toward support of Israel against the Arabs. The withdrawal of the Aswan Dam offer, followed quickly by substantial arms sales on the part of Canada, the U.S. and France, together with announcement of Operation Stockpile, could convey this impression. We believe that the West cannot afford public announcement of what will appear to be a coordinated series of moves. At the same time, we do not wish to cast aside all of the work which has gone into persuading the Canadians to release F86's to Israel. Also, it is probably desirable to proceed with the announcement of Operation Stockpile, properly timed, both because of the deterrent effect which may ensue and the consider-

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[1] Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Operation Stockpile 1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett and concurred in by Murphy, MacArthur, and Elbrick. Initialed by Hoover, indicating his approval.

[2] Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower left Washington the evening of July 20 to attend the meeting of the Presidents of the American Republics at Panama City. Dulles returned to Washington on July 29.

[3] Tab B is Documents 487 and 488.

able possibility of a leak now that the project is fairly widely known.

The attached telegram (Tab A)[4] to Ottawa is intended to accomplish the above purposes and authorizes Ambassador Merchant to explain the situation to Pearson emphasizing our concern over publicity. We would also concert with the British in an effort to stop the proposed large French sales to Israel.

For security reasons we believe it advisable to explain the situation to Ambassador Merchant by telegram.

Recommendations:

1. That you telephone Ambassador Merchant stating only that a telegram is being sent immediately replying to Ottawa's telegram 40 and 41 (Tab B).

2. That you approve attached telegram to Ottawa (Tab A).

3. That we coordinate with the British in an effort to block or at least delay in NEACC the proposed large French shipments to Israel; specifically, the 40 Sherman tanks, 60 light tanks, 175–75mm guns and the unspecified number of 155mm guns.[5]

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[4] Tab A is telegram 37, *infra*.

[5] Geren reported to Burdett on the proceedings of the July 24 NEACC meeting: "At the NEACC meeting Mr. Lippincott said that we wished to consider further the strategic items. The British also took the same position. After the meeting de Laboulaye rushed around to Lippincott and Willie Morris saying 'We must know the real attitude of your governments within the next 24 hours or else my Ambassador must call for a meeting of the Ambassadorial Committee. As we all know, this would be futile.'" (Memorandum from Geren to Burdett, July 24; Department of State, Central Files, 480.008/7–2456) The minutes of the NEACC meeting are *ibid.*, G/PM/MC Files: Lot 66 D 428, NEACC Minutes M–42 to M–72.

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493. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada[1]

Washington, July 24, 1956—4:32 p.m

37. Eyes only Ambassador from Acting Secretary. Embtels 40 and 41.[2] I congratulate you on effectiveness your efforts with

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/7–2356. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Allen and Burdett, cleared with Murphy and Elbrick, and approved by Hoover.

[2] Documents 487 and 488.

Canadians. We wish take advantage favorable developments you report.

As you know, our intent is to find way Israel meet real defense needs without creating impression in Arab world that West has taken policy decision to support Israel against Arabs. Delicate situation further complicated by recent developments. Arabs may attribute withdrawal US-UK offer on Aswan Dam to Zionist pressures and we anticipate Egypt may try to encourage this erroneous belief. Undue publicity on sudden release major arms to Israel might support this thesis. Also, Operation Stockpile likely be interpreted by Arabs as designed primarily assist Israel. In addition to sale of F86s by Canada and proposed release by US of helicopters, machine guns and scout cars, France has notified NEACC of intention ship 40 Sherman tanks, 60 light tanks, 175–75mm guns, unspecified number 155-mm guns and additional items. Simultaneous public disclosure of these shipments, if made, could give cumulative impression of greater support for Israel than is in fact contemplated.

Under circumstances we believe best procedure is as follows: Announcement by Canada of intention release 12 F86 Planes as scheduled; subsequent release of announcement regarding Operation Stockpile (without indicating items involved) in August.

Believe you will wish explain situation to Pearson verbally as outlined in second paragraph this telegram, emphasizing importance of timing and avoidance publicity regarding US shipments. We think you will also wish to make following modifications in proposed top secret letter: Delete "immediately" from first sentence paragraph two; rephrase second sentence paragraph two to read "these items would not be released simultaneously and the US would make a strong effort to prevent publicity at this time". Omit last paragraph unless you regard it as essential to achieve Canadian action. If it is, omit "greatest" and "at least". Add last paragraph in following sense: "I know you also recognize the necessity of avoiding the sudden public disclosure of a series of moves involving major shipments to Israel by the Western powers. Accordingly, we think our program should be carefully spaced out with strict attention to avoiding premature public knowledge."

Because of delicate nature this matter I thought it preferable provide you our latest thinking by telegram. [3]

Hoover

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[3] In telegram 53 from Ottawa, July 25, Merchant reported he had made the changes in the letter and delivered it to Pearson. "I explained to him orally additional considerations contained Deptel 37. He understands, will discuss matter with St. Laurent today and remains optimistic of positive results." (Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/7–2556)

494. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 24, 1956—5 p.m.

124. From Hart. General Burns called on Ambassador evening July 22 on behalf Hammarskjold (who preferred avoid direct contact with Embassy view attentiveness Egyptian press) in order discuss general situation Palestine area. He could throw little light on recent talks Hammarskjold–Ben Gurion and Hammarskjold–Nasser either because Hammarskjold had not passed on to him detailed account or because he did not feel free go into details. Apparent, however, Hammarskjold had not made much headway with Ben Gurion or Nasser in "narrowing the gap" between each side regarding settlement. Full report on these conversations would be forwarded to State Department by Hammarskjold who expected draft it after arriving Geneva July 23.

Burns stated UN observer Gaza Strip functioning well but that otherwise little progress being made implementation steps taken by Hammarskjold on previous visit to reduce tension. He felt sure Israel had no intention of evacuating Al Auja and would continue take position that as long as Egypt violating article 1 of GAA by war threats and Suez blockade Israel must maintain her forward position there.

Regarding recent scare resulting from Burns talk with Ben Gurion [2] and subsequent warning Hashemite Kingdom Jordan (as reported by Amman [3]) Burns felt "exercise" had been useful as it brought Ben Gurion's belligerency into open, with result attitude shown by Ben Gurion to Hammarskjold on latest visit contrasted markedly with that former had shown Burns in meeting which had preceded scare. . . . In aggregate Burns felt Hammarskjold visits of last few months highly useful as deterrent to Israelis.

On departure Burns expressed his regret Ambassador Byroade's departure and appreciation past assistance.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–2456. Secret. Received at 7:07 a.m., July 25. Repeated to Tel Aviv, USUN, and London.

[2] See Documents 417 and 418.

[3] See Document 421.

495. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 24, 1956—7 p.m.

126. From Hart. As Department knows by now . . . Nasser reported to be contemplating termination USOM/E and may have in mind going farther and condemning United States Government influences and interests in Arab world as a whole. As reported my tel 123 [2] in short speech today he tensely promised Egyptian public to say some important things at Alexandria July 26 concerning "lying allusions" from Washington regarding Egypt's economic situation. Today government-backed daily carries articles making unprecedented attack on Point Four accusing its personnel of "spying for Pentagon", a "danger to our independence and a dagger in our backs". Fawzi had summoned me to Foreign Ministry for 7:00 p.m. July 26, one hour after Nasser scheduled begins speech but has just cancelled, promising to contact me later for another appointment.

. . . Ambassador being informed by special messenger tomorrow morning.

Byroade

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–2456. Top Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Received at 9:04 p.m.

[2] Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 874.2553/7–2456)

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496. Telegram From the Consulate General at Geneva to the Department of State [1]

Geneva, July 25, 1956—10 a.m.

60. Eyes only for the Secretary from Gowen. My telegram 53. [2] Am preparing Top Secret message for you only from Hammarskjold who saw me this morning. This will be sent within about two

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–2556. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 7:41 a.m.

[2] Gowen reported in telegram 53, July 23, that he had seen Hammarskjöld that evening upon his return from the Near East, and that Hammarskjöld had told him "he has to consider his impressions of the situation 'most carefully' and will see me again before he leaves Geneva." (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/7–2356)

hours.[3] Meantime please note Hammarskjold states that while decision rests with Secretary Dulles he feels release information in your telegram 39[4] should be withheld if there be no objection possibly for some two weeks from now and that its publication be so timed and phrased as to minimize risk of its being associated with his latest visit to Near East. He feels such association might carry implication that he had found risk of aggression so imminent as to warrant reaction. This he told me should obviously be carefully avoided in order not to give any basis for such misleading interpretation.

Gowen

[3] *Infra.*
[4] Document 456.

497. Telegram From the Consulate General at Geneva to the Department of State[1]

Geneva, July 25, 1956—noon.

61. Eyes only for the Secretary from Gowen. My telegrams 60[2] and 41.[3] Hammarskjold received me this morning and gave me following Top Secret for you only concerning certain suggestions reportedly made by Egyptian Foreign Minister (urtel 50[4]):

"After my talks in Cairo I wish very briefly to comment on those suggestions which, although significant, in my view are, perhaps, of less importance than first impressions led to believe. I went into the matter very fully with Dr. Fawzi, and as we know each other intimately, I think I have a quite clear understanding of the thinking on his side.

"I should like first of all to stress that the suggestions cannot be regarded as formal proposals, even if interpreted in a most broad sense. They appear to me as a piece of 'thinking aloud' within the framework of the efforts of the world community to find the direction in which we should move in order to reach, as quickly as possible, a settlement of the Palestine problem.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–2556. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 2:34 p.m.
[2] *Supra.*
[3] Document 468.
[4] Document 465.

"The suggestions are firm only in two respects: As an indication of the need to widen present efforts beyond the scope of the armistice agreements, and as an indication of the conviction that even solutions acceptable to leading politicians in the area may have to be proposed from outside, not with a view to enforcement but so as to enable the governments to take the unavoidable steps as concessions to such outside proposals.

"Interpreted in this way, Dr. Fawzi's suggestions are very much in line with the interpretation I gave the Egyptian policy already in April. If they bring in any new element, it is that Egypt now feels that it can go on record in relation to the Western powers with its wish to push toward a broader settlement. In doing so, Egypt is doubtlessly to some extent animated by the wish to improve its relations to the West. I guess, however, that Egypt is also influenced by the stand recently taken by Mr. Shepilov, who seems to have left no doubt about his wish to see the situation brought under control while he, on the other hand, did not in any way commit himself on questions of substance. Finally, there is in the Egyptian move an element of recognition of failure, so far, to get anywhere along the lines we discussed in Cairo in April, that is through unilateral actions. Obviously, efforts in that direction have been slowed down by complications in relation to other Arab countries and by Israel's failure, on its side, to show any cooperativeness. In terms of action Dr. Fawzi, as I understand him, envisages the next development as follows: interwoven with the continued efforts to safeguard and strengthen the cease-fire and to move towards compliance, I should try and explore such related fields as could naturally be brought up within the orbit of my exchange of views. Subjects, time and form for such explorations should be entirely determined by the circumstances, as they develop in the course of my continued contacts. 'We are not in a rush', Dr. Fawzi said in this context.

"If, as planned, I go to the Middle East in October, this would be the natural time for a stock-taking. Although we should already before that time consistently work for an appropriate widening of the field of interest.

"The October talks would provide the proper occasion for a more systematic effort to get further. The 'exploration' should even then remain informal and, as to its concrete content, played by ear. To the extent that, at this stage, the main parts of a peace settlement come up for discussion, it would be our task not only to register the stands, and the extent of the gap, but also, by appropriate suggestions, to try to narrow the gap.

"Results reached in this exploration which could be made elements of an agreement, might then be presented from the outside, and Dr. Fawzi did not feel that there was any reason now to decide how or by whom such proposals should be put forward; the group of nations he had mentioned had been indicated only by way of example. On this score he had a completely open mind and could accept anything which, in the given situation, would meet the practical purpose.

"It follows from what I have said that the suggestions from the Egyptian side do not request any hurried consideration or any quick decision. We shall have plenty of time to give them thought and to discuss them, as at all events no innovation would be considered

within the near future. I therefore feel that, for the present, I can limit myself to this account of my interpretation of the Egyptian stand, leaving the rest for a discussion on my return to New York.

"As to my own role under the Egyptian plan, there is nothing to be said against the Egyptian ideas as concerns the near future. How things should be organized later is a different problem which has to be studied in the light of such circumstances as the rather particular position I now hold in relation to both Cairo and Jerusalem; my difficulty to dispose of the time necessary, especially after October; and the doubts I feel about the wisdom of keeping the Secretary-General's office so much in the the frontline of a conflict where, sooner or later, it may be exposed beyond what may serve the long term interest of the organization. Both Cairo and Jerusalem stress their view that I must remain in the picture, but personally I sense increasingly the difficulties this particular task creates for my regular work.

"I may, perhaps, add that my personal evaluation possibility of progress in the forms suggested is not optimistic. I know only too well the present stands on both sides—I checked them again in private talks during my last visit—and the gap is very wide indeed. Even in the better atmosphere, for which we hope and work, the gap is likely to remain considerable with very inflexible views held on points not open for compromise. However, we cannot accept the existence of impossibilities, and to proceed now as suggested will at least not do any harm."

Hammarskjold asks foregoing be communicated by you to Byroade [5] whom he could not see in Cairo to avoid publicity. For same reason he did not see British Ambassador there. He states he has forwarded identical information as above to Selwyn Lloyd with copy for British Ambassador, Cairo.

Reference US military stockpiles (urtel 39 [6]), Hammarskjold gave me following separate Top Secret message for you only:

"I wish to express my appreciation of your informing me about the measure decided upon by the US Government. Short of such background information my task in relation to the Middle East problem would be seriously complicated.

"From our talk the evening we met at Ambassador Lodge's home, [7] you know that I do not believe that an outbreak of hostilities in the region, if it were to happen, is likely to take a form where the word aggression has a clear sense or where it can be in any way unambiguously determined who is to be considered aggressor. This

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[5] Howe, in a note dated July 25 attached to the source text, requested Acting Secretary Hoover's permission to communicate Hammarskjöld's message to Byroade. Hoover approved Howe's request on July 25.

[6] Document 456.

[7] According to Secretary Dulles' Appointment Book, Dulles, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, and Ambassador and Mrs. Lodge met for dinner at the Lodge's residence in New York at 8 p.m. on June 15. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) No record of this dinner conversation has been found in Department of State files.

does not reduce the potential value of the measure taken by you, but it obviously limits the extent to which the measure can usefully influence the present situation. The risk we run now is closely related to the very particular circumstances prevailing in Jordan, and especially the situation in the Jerusalem area. A further fact of importance is to be found in Israel's refusal to accept that acts of retaliation cannot be justified as self-defense, and therefore might constitute acts of aggression.

"You say in your letter [8] that you are not going to publish the measure taken until after my visit to the region. It is obviously desirable that the publication be so timed and phrased as to minimize the risk of an association with my visit. Such an association might carry the implication that I had found the risk of aggression so imminent as to warrant a reaction.

"It should obviously be carefully avoided to provide any basis for such a misleading interpretation."

Hammarskjold leaves Geneva July 26 by air for Sweden to remain there few days at his country home. He said no use giving me his country home address, which is ten hours from Stockholm but only two hours from Copenhagen. He said his best direct address after he leaves Geneva is care of United Nations information office, Copenhagen. He said secret messages for him can be sent either via American Embassy Copenhagen or through me if for any reason this might be preferable in case which is unlikely he might have to return to Geneva. Hammarskjold stated he plans to return U.S.A. either July 30 or if circumstances permit August 2. In any case he stressed he is due New York August 3. He remarked he does not necessarily now expect any sudden developments in Near East which might warrant his return there now but that in any case he is only few hours away by air from that region.

Gowen

[8] See Document 456.

498. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Egypt-Sudan Affairs (Geren) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Burdett) [1]

Washington, July 25, 1956.

SUBJECT

British Positions on French Requests for Arms to Israel

Willie Morris said that the Foreign Office has instructed the British to register no objection to the miscellaneous items included in the French request to ship arms to Israel. On what they consider the major items, the British position will be:

1. Cut the AMX tanks, of which 60 were notified, to 25 or 30 and eliminate the 40 Shermans altogether.
2. Reduce the 75mm guns, of which 175 were notified, to 25 in view of the fact 50 have been shipped in recent months (25 of them apparently without notification to NEACC).
3. Eliminate the parachutes, of which 200 were requested, since they are for paratroopers and therefore offensive.
4. Reduce the anti-tank mines, of which 100,000 were requested, to 10,000.

The British are notifying the French of these positions tomorrow. If the French could get U.S. and Italian approval to the same quantities which the British have indicated, then the French could notify Paris of a NEACC action. Such an action can theoretically be taken outside a meeting once items are on the agenda.

The French are taking the position that they must know our decision at once or must call for an Ambassadorial Committee meeting to satisfy the French Government. We will probably be able to hold off for a week or more. We should formulate our position on items, quantities, and phasing of deliveries.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/7–2556. Secret.

499. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 25, 1956.

SUBJECT

Consultations with Respect to Egyptian Situation

Discussion:

Mr. Solom gave me your message that you wished me to consider urgently whether departmental and/or interdepartmental committees should be established to follow with particular care current Egyptian developments.

As you know, the special working group . . . is still in existence. [2] On it are representatives of Defense, CIA, C, S/P and NEA. Randy Higgs, Raymond Hare, Francis Russell and representatives of IO and EUR participate as necessary and as they, themselves, may desire.

Since the current Egyptian situation inevitably involves . . . aspects of our policy, I believe departmental and interdepartmental coordination can best be effected through continuation of the arrangements which already are in effect. We are having a meeting of this group this afternoon, in order to go over the situation generally and to exchange views on what steps should be taken. [3]

Meanwhile, in light of the overnight indication that Nasser might demand the withdrawal of our Point IV Operation in Egypt, we are preparing a draft of an announcement which we might make. [4] While our action would necessarily depend in large measure upon the precise nature of Nasser's representations, if the tone of the press tickers is to be taken as any indication of what we might expect, it is likely that our announcement would have to cover all other forms of aid to Egypt, including development assistance, PL 480 sales, CARE, etc. We are already in touch with ICA on this

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[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #10. Top Secret; Omega. Initialed by Hoover, indicating his approval.

[2] Reference is to the Middle East Policy Planning Group.

[3] According to the summary minutes of this meeting of the Middle East Policy Planning Group, those in attendance approved a draft statement for possible use in case Nasser asked the United States to withdraw its aid mission. The group also agreed to recommend a delay in the delivery of U.S. and French arms to Israel and a postponement of the announcement of Operation Stockpile to avoid giving credence to the Egyptian assertion that the Aswan Dam decision demonstrated that the United States favored Israel over the Arab states. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Meetings of MEPPG (agenda, memos of conv., etc.), 4/9/56 to 6/30/56)

[4] See *infra*.

question and shall coordinate our plans and actions closely with them.

I hope that these arrangements meet with your approval. However, if you desire any special consultative group, please let me know.

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500. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

Washington, July 25, 1956.

SUBJECT

Press Release for Issuance if Nasser Terminates Point IV Program

Discussion:

Nasser has stated that he will reply decisively to the withdrawal of the Aswan Dam offer in a speech in Alexandria on July 26. It is not possible, of course, to determine what action he will take, but reports from the field indicate that he may terminate the Point IV Program.

As a contingency planning measure, we have prepared the attached press release for issuance in such an eventuality. [2] The exact wording will probably have to be changed depending upon the attitude taken by Nasser. Dr. FitzGerald in ICA has approved the release in substance for use if Nasser terminates the Program. We would plan also to issue a supplementary background statement giving additional details of the various economic aid programs.

If Nasser indicates he no longer wishes the Point IV Program, we belive we should interpret such a statement as covering all the various types of economic aid. We do not think it would be advisable just to withdraw the Point IV technicians while continuing other forms of assistance.

We have handled this matter, of course, on a most secret basis and have several times expressed to ICA the need for complete secrecy.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.5–MSP/7–2556. Secret. Drafted by Burdett.

[2] Not printed.

Recommendation:

That you approve, as a contingency planning measure, the attached press release. The final decision regarding issuance of the release would be made only after we have definitive news of the position taken by Nasser. [3]

[3] The source text contains no information to indicate whether Hoover accepted or rejected this recommendation. The source text bears the inscription in an unidentified hand, "not needed."

501. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Israel-Jordan Affairs (Bergus) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Burdett) [1]

Washington, July 25, 1956.

SUBJECT

Recent Developments on the Israel-Arab Borders

On July 24 an exchange of fire took place between Israel police on Mt. Scopus and Jordanian forces in the vicinity after Jordanian soldiers occupied a house within the Israel sector on Mt. Scopus. Two UN Observers (Canadians) arranged a cease fire and then accompanied by a Jordanian officer sought to evacuate the Jordanians from the house. As they proceeded along a track leading to the house an explosive device went off wounding all three officers. UNTSO is investigating to determine whether an old mine or an anti personnel device of another type was involved. One of the Canadian Observers had visited the same house several weeks before this incident.

Today's press tickers (we have no telegrams yet in from the field) tell of a fire fight between Israel and Jordanian forces in the Qastel area on the northern side of the Jerusalem Corridor. The Israel military spokesman has stated that Jordanians fired on Israel laborers and that Israel border guards returned the fire. The Jordan Army spokesman has said that an Israel patrol crossed into Jordan and used 3" mortar and automatic weapon fire against Jordanians,

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7-2556. Official Use Only. Drafted by Blackiston. The source text bears a notation that the memorandum was also sent to Allen and Rountree.

including civilians. Nine Jordanians are reported as wounded including a UN Observer (Swedish). Both parties have entered complaints with the MAC. Qastel is near Kiryat Anavim where, on July 23, infiltrators allegedly threw a grenade at a children's house. No casualties were suffered.

Both Israel and Egypt have counter charges arising out of an incident near Kissufim in the Gaza strip area. The Egyptians claim that the Israel patrol crossed the DL whereas the Israelis allege that the Egyptians fired at Israel patrol in Israel territory. We have no reports of casualties.

Since writing the above we have received a telegram from Jerusalem stating that two UN Observers were wounded by Jordan fire while investigating the incident near Qastel. One Jordanian colonel was also reported wounded. [2]

[2] Reference is to telegram 27 from Jerusalem, July 25, not printed. (*Ibid.*)

502. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 25, 1956—7 p.m.

133. From Byroade. Embassy officer has brought me up to date developments Cairo including anticipated nature Nasser's speech tomorrow.

My feeling is that report is probably correct and that he will terminate operations ICA. Action by Washington within last month leaves little doubt there that get tough policy already in effect. Had thought Point 4 might survive but this assessment made without knowledge Department would choose public announcement of type made on High Dam. Decision may be facilitated by fact that Egypt received no FY 1956 economic aid and in view above probably expects none in FY 1957.

If Nasser and I were both in Cairo would see him privately to caution moderation. Nasser however in Alexandria and it would be impossible for me invoke effort see him by travel from Red Sea without giving press and public impression of running after him in an effort prevent action under circumstances which give me very

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/7–2556. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:08 p.m.

small chance of succeeding. Therefore plan retain original schedule returning Cairo Sunday, unless of course Department instructs otherwise.

Embassy has instructions pick me up immediately by air in event they feel any likelihood exists of any danger life or property.

Do not feel this the case at present but strongly urge most cautious reaction and treatment any developments here as any further shock treatment can be dangerous indeed.

Byroade

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503. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 25, 1956—7 p.m.

134. If Nasser announces termination Point IV and Embassy queried by press propose reply unless otherwise instructed regretting decision terminate program which had been so successful (listing achievements) but pointing out that ICA programs and other forms US assistance operative only in countries where such cooperation welcomed in efforts achieve common goals.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.00–TA/7–2556. Secret; Niact. Received at 5:26 p.m.

504. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 25, 1956—7 p.m.

135. From Hart. Reference Embtel 119. [2] Nasser met for 2 hours with Kisselev last night. Meeting attended by 3 "Soviet officials" and Min State for Planning Boghdadi. No statement. However earlier in day Kisselev told press "I reiterate what Soviet FonMin Shepilov has already said that Soviet Govt is prepared finance High Dam scheme if Egypt requests such financing".

Byroade

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–2556. Official Use Only. Received at 7:30 p.m. Repeated to Moscow and London.

[2] The Embassy in Cairo reported in telegram 119, July 23, that Soviet Ambassador Kisselev had met with Nasser on July 22. *Al Ahram* reported that Kisselev had informed Nasser that the Soviet Union would honor its pledge to Egypt to finance the Aswan High Dam project as Shepilov had made clear in his statement. (*Ibid.*, 974.61/7–2356)

505. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 26, 1956—6 p.m.

140. From Hart. Reference Embassy telegram 135. [2] Soviet commercial attaché confirmed to British Embassy official yesterday Soviets intended finance High Dam. British Embassy official states British information although sketchy is to effect offer would involve cash loan (amount unspecified but perhaps in neighborhood 200 million pounds) repayable at 2 percent interest over 20 years period. Proceeds of loan to be available for expenditure both in rouble and non-rouble areas. This connection German Embassy has expressed to us some concern that if Soviets make available non-rouble credits

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/7–2656. Secret; Priority. Received at 2:52 p.m. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] *Supra.*

and GOE places substantial orders in West Germany effect may be to soften West German resistance to increased dealings with Soviets.

Byroade

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506. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State [1]

New York, July 26, 1956—7 p.m.

95. Re Palestine. Following letter given us today by Cordier (UN): [2]

"Pursuant to our conversation at the luncheon this noon, I am stating herewith in writing the wish of the Secretary-General to secure the assistance of the Governments of the Soviet Union, the U.S., the UK and France in connection with the present tension between Israel and Jordan.

"During the last two or three days incidents have occurred which are of a serious character. As a result, the SYG yesterday, through General Burns, made oral démarches both to Israel and Jordan on the situation stating, in substance, that the most recent incidents have elements of a clear breach of the cease-fire assurance given to the UN and representing a solemn undertaking by both governments. The incidents were also in sharp contrast to the conclusions which he felt justified from his recent talks. Under the circumstances it might be necessary to circulate without delay, a report on the developments to the members of the SC. He requested the governments to take at once the most rigorous steps to forestall any repetition of what has recently happened and to inform him of the measures taken. If the situation does not improve it might be necessary for him to call a meeting of the SC. He felt entitled to cooperation from the governments which will make such action unnecessary. He concluded by saying that in order to be able, if necessary, to bring full weight of the United Nations to bear on the situation, he planned with a change in previous schedules to return immediately to New York.

"The SYG feels that an appeal to the two governments from the four countries mentioned above may prove most effective at this

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–2656. Confidential; Priority. Received at 8:24 p.m.

[2] Wadsworth earlier in the day had informed the Department that Cordier had just received an urgent message from Hammarskjöld in Geneva requesting Cordier to ask the United States to make the strongest possible and most urgent representations to both the Israelis and the Jordanians to initiate measures to relieve current tensions. (Telegram 91 from USUN; *ibid.*)

stage. It might be put in the form of a strong request for a strict adherence to the cease-fire agreed to with the SYG in April, and to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the cease-fire is, in fact, maintained.

"On behalf of the SYG and myself I want to thank you for the prompt attention that you may give to this matter."

Wadsworth

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507. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

Washington, July 26, 1956—7:29 p.m.

71. For Ambassador. You are requested seek immediate appointment with Prime Minister and make following representations in strongest terms:

USG deeply concerned at continuing incidents along HKJ–Israel armistice line. Without sincere efforts by both parties situation can easily deteriorate further with consequences no one can foretell. USG not in position assess blame for specific incidents. This is function of MAC. We urge strongest and most complete cooperation with MAC and UNTSO in carrying out of measures aimed at reducing present tensions.

Frankness impels us communicate to Prime Minister US concern at number of reports in press and elsewhere which appear indicate preoccupation Israel Government with "right of retaliation." USG views on this well known to Israel (Deptel 37 [2]).

Especially deplorable has been wounding of several UNTSO observers while engaged in attempts pacify situation. UN personnel should be afforded maximum protection. USG urges Government Israel take all possible measures avoid further bloodshed. USG making similar representations to Jordan Government. [3]

FYI USG taking above initiative at request UNSYG who curtailing leave Sweden flying New York view present Palestine tension.

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–2656. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Bergus and Burdett; cleared by Murphy, Wilcox, and Allen; and approved by Burdett who signed for Hoover. Repeated priority to USUN, Amman, and London; pouched to Paris, Moscow, and Jerusalem.

[2] Document 461.

[3] See *infra*.

UNSYG has requested US, UK, France, USSR make strongest possible representations both sides urgently. [4] End FYI.

Hoover

[4] See *supra*.

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508. Telegram From the Department of State of the Embassy in Jordan [1]

Washington, July 26, 1956—7:31 p.m.

88. For Chargé. You are requested seek immediate audience with King and make following representations:

USG deeply concerned at continuing incidents along HKJ–Israel armistice line. Without sincere efforts by both parties situation can easily deteriorate further with consequences no one can foretell. USG not in position assess blame for specific incidents. This is function of MAC. We urge strongest cooperation with MAC and UNTSO in carrying out of measures aimed at reducing present tensions.

Frankness impels us communicate to King US concern at number of reports which appear indicate lack well-disciplined efforts to maintain order along armistice lines.

Especially deplorable has been wounding of several UNTSO observers while engaged in attempts pacify situation and prevent further bloodshed. UN observer personnel should be afforded maximum protection. USG urges HKJ take all possible measures bring present bloody cycle to immediate end. USG making similar representations to Israel Government. [2]

FYI USG taking above initiative at request UNSYG who curtailing leave Sweden flying New York view present Palestine tension. UNSYG has requested US, UK, France, USSR make strongest possible representations both sides urgently. [3] End FYI.

Hoover

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/7–2656. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Bergus and Burdett; cleared by Murphy, Wilcox, and Allen; and approved by Burdett who signed for Hoover. Repeated priority to USUN, Tel Aviv, and London; pouched to Paris, Moscow, and Jerusalem.

[2] See *supra*.

[3] See Document 506.

509. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 26, 1956—4 p.m.

143. From Hart. British Embassy has told us that in course conversation last night Fawzi told British Ambassador that he had agreed with Hammarskjold to leave timing and method of first stage up to latter. Fawzi said he hoped Hammarskjold would begin soon rather than waiting for conditions along the borders to improve. After all if first stage really got underway improvement border conditions might logically ensue.

Fawzi told Trevelyan Egyptian Govt believed progress this matter was desirable of itself; moreover progress should also help improve relations between Egypt and West. But improvement relations would be difficult unless there was at least minimum of mutual cooperation. Trevelyan interprets caveat as reference to possible implications Western withdrawal from financing High Dam.

Fawzi said Hammarskjold had agreed not to report on his discussions to UN so that if leaks should take place Egypt would be able to deny any conversations had taken place.

Fawzi told Trevelyan no progress had been made on Al Auja. Egyptians held to their demand for mutual withdrawal whereas Israelis insisted on linking their withdrawal from D/Z to Suez Canal question which in GOE view not only unrelated implementation of articles seven and eight but extraneous to GAA as whole. Fawzi noted some progress had been made on stationing of observers in Gaza area but appeared concerned over situation along Jordanian border.

Byroade

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[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–2656. Secret; Limited Distribution. Received at 8:55 p.m. Repeated to London and Tel Aviv.

510. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

Lima, July 26, 1956—6 p.m.

Dulte 4. Eyes only Acting Secretary and MacArthur. When does Secretary-General leave Near East and what is your present thinking regarding release stockpile statement?

I expect to have press conference Tuesday [2] and assume Aswan Dam will be a principal topic. On this assumption I wonder whether it would not be useful either on Monday [3] or at press conference to make stockpile statement so as to give further insight of our policies for the area and indicate that the Aswan Dam decision is not a mere isolated incident but one facet of Near East planning. [4]

Dulles

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.6/7–2656. Top Secret. Drafted by Secretary Dulles. Received at 9:03 p.m. Dulles was in Lima representing President Eisenhower at the inauguration of President Prado.

[2] July 31.

[3] July 30.

[4] Assistant Secretary Allen, in a memorandum dated July 30, recommended to Secretary Dulles that he defer making a public statement on "Stockpile", on the grounds that the Arabs in general and the Egyptians in particular would interpret such a statment as being essentially pro-Israeli and anti-Egyptian and might, in light of Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal, increase the likehood of additional Arab actions against the West. (Department of State, S/S-NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #10)

511. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State [1]

Cairo, July 26, 1956—11 p.m.

146. Nasser in two and half hour speech billed as "answer American and British conspiracies against Egypt" announced nationalization Suez Canal Company, said High Dam would be built with LE 35 million yearly net income from Canal and read details Nationalization Decree according which: all committees charge its adminis-

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/7–2656. Confidential; Niact. Received at 12:23 a.m., July 27. Repeated niact to London and Paris. Passed to the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force at 1:30 a.m., July 27.

tration abolished; share holders to be compensated today's price Paris bourse (payment to be made after government assumes control); autonomous Egyptian Government agency established in MinCom to operate Canal; all Company assets Egypt and abroad frozen; banks prohibited cash Company checks except by permission new agency; contravention decree entails imprisonment. Nasser said Egyptians already beginning assume charge and all employees ordered remain their positions.[2]

Nasser led up to nationalization announcement with long review "imperialistic efforts thwart Egyptian independence", giving exhaustive chronological accounts arms deal (including caustic description Allen's mission[3]) and High Dam negotiations. Both depicted Western attempts dominate Egypt and contrasted, in passing, "no strings United States public and private and German contributions to Israel". (Earlier in speech in vitriolic language Nasser had attacked Israel's ambition to extend from Nile to Euphrates. This would be met, however, by united Arab world from Atlantic to Persian Gulf.)

Nasser said Soviets had offered finance Dam during interval Kaissouni Washington visit and February Black talks, and Shepilov during July [*June*] visit had offered aid all projects on basis long-term loans no conditions, saying at same time he wanted Egypt have good relations with West.[4] Nasser had replied he would discuss details in course his trip Moscow.

Nasser also attacked Department's statement[5] quoting Sudan Prime Minister to prove Egypt and Sudan would reach waters settlement anyway and citing United Nations reports to reject contention Egypt's economy unsound. (He recalled Black said at his house June 20[6] that he was determined finance Dam and was sure United States and United Kingdom would go along.)

Speech on to Arabs preceded by recordings of National Anthem, liberation song and other martial music. In earlier and final sections

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[2] A translation of the Nationalization Decree was transmitted in despatch 188 from Cairo, September 5. (*Ibid.*, 974.7301/9–556) A translation of Nasser's speech was transmitted in despatch 97 from Cairo, July 31. (*Ibid.*, 774.00/7–3156) The Nationalization Decree and an extract from Nasser's speech are printed in *The Suez Canal Problem, July 26–September 22, 1956* (Department of State Publication No. 6392), pp. 25–32.

[3] See telegrams 632 and 654, vol. XIV, pp. 537 and 551.

[4] See Document 413.

[5] Reference is presumably to the Department's press release of July 19 announcing the Aswan Dam decision.

[6] See Document 406.

of speech (anti-imperialism, Egypt's strength) Nasser was clearly emotional and excited. In sections relating history negotiations he was by turns sarcastic, condescending, and occasionally facetious. Speech which heavily colloquial in tone was wildly applauded throughout.

Byroade

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